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A HISTORY OF GREECE

FROM THE TIME OF SOLON TO 403 B.C.

BY
GEORGE GROVE

EDITED AND REVISED
WITH NOTES AND APPENDICES

J. M. MITCHELL, B.A. (OXF.)
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

GEORGE GROTE, Greek historian, philosopher, educationalist, and politician, was born at Clay Hill, near Beckenham in Kent, on November 17, 1794. His grandfather, Andreas Grote, originally a merchant of Bremen, migrated to London, and was one of the founders of the banking house of Grote, Prescott and Company (January, 1766). His eldest son, George (by a second marriage), became the husband of Selina Peckwell, descended on her mother's side from the old Huguenot family of the De Blossets, who, after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, had left their home in Touraine.

George Grote the historian, the eldest son of George Grote and Selina Peckwell, inherited not only the common-sense and business capacity of the Bremen banker, but also to some extent that virile Huguenot spirit the infusion of which into British families, so often produced splendid results in all departments of intellectual and commercial activity. Selina Grote was a woman of strong character and ambition. She it was to whom Grote owed his earliest training. Before he went, in his sixth year, to Sevenoaks Grammar-school, he had learned from her not only reading and writing, but also the rudiments of Latin. At Sevenoaks he made steady progress with his work, and in his tenth year was sent to Charterhouse, where Dr. Raine was at the time headmaster. It is a curious coincidence that, among many fellow-scholars since become famous, he should there have met Connop Thirlwall, whose history of Greece his own was eventually, to some extent at least, to supersede. During the six years which he spent at Charterhouse he acquired a profound interest in Greek and Roman literature, an interest which never waned throughout his long life of varied activity. His father, sceptical of the advantages of a University career, took him from school at the age of sixteen, and put him into the bank. The mechanical routine of his daily life only confirmed him in his ardour for knowledge, and he entered upon a steady course of private reading. In order that his studies might not be confined to the literature of his own tongue, he acquired a working knowledge of German, Italian, and French. During this period he not only studied

his favourite classical authors, but also plunged into history, political science, and philosophy.

In the winter of 1814-15 he first made the acquaintance of Miss Harriet Lewin, who was afterwards to become his wife. Her father, Thomas Lewin, of Bexley in Kent, was a man of old family and independent means. Their marriage took place in 1820, and was in every respect an ideal union, strengthened by the bonds of mutual respect and intellectual sympathy.

During the three years preceding his marriage he continued his studies, and made his first attempt in the field of literary production, an essay (still existing in MS.) on Lucretius, an author for whom he had a great admiration. In 1817 he was introduced to David Ricardo, and through him to James Mill, then at work on his *Analysis of the Human Mind*. In Mill he found a teacher whose views were eminently congenial, and to this period may be traced the crystallization of his own empirical theories. This attitude towards metaphysical problems was strengthened by the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, to whom Grote owed his strong democratic principles and his intolerance of all dogmatic religion. The sequel will show how great an influence the early association with these men, afterwards known as the 'philosophic radicals', exercised upon his political career and upon his *History of Greece*.

The early years of his married life were spent in a house attached to the bank in Threadneedle Street. The death of his only child a week after its birth left Mrs. Grote dangerously ill, and it was during her slow convalescence that Grote composed his first published work, the *Essay on Parliamentary Reform*. This paper, most of which was subsequently republished in his *Essentials of Parliamentary Reform* (1831), was a powerful reply to Sir James Mackintosh, who had advocated in the *Edinburgh Review* a system of class representation. Grote's pamphlet contained a statement of a case for popular representation, frequent elections, and the use of the ballot. In 1822 he arranged for publication a manuscript of Jeremy Bentham, and gave it to the world under the title *Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness of Mankind*, by Philip Beauchamp.

The years from 1822 to 1830 were a time of quiet preparation and intercourse with congenial friends, of whom the younger Mill is perhaps the best known. A small circle of students met together regularly in Threadneedle Street for reading and conversation, mainly in metaphysics and political philosophy. In these meetings Mrs. Grote took part with the others, and sedulously qualified herself to be a worthy associate in her husband's work. In 1822 Grote began to make a

special study of Greek history. In a letter dated January 14 he says: 'I am at present engaged in the fabulous ages of Greece, which I find will be required to be illustrated by . . . a large mass of analogical matter from other early histories, in order to show the entire uncertainty and worthlessness of tales to which early associations have so long familiarized all classical minds. I am quite amazed to discover the extraordinary greediness and facility with which men assert, believe, re-assert, and are believed.' Mrs. Grote, in her biography of her husband, states that she herself in 1823 first suggested to him the idea of putting his conclusions into the form of a book; but, as is pointed out by G. Croom Robertson in his article in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, it appears certain that he was already at work in 1822. The actual writing was, most fortunately, deferred for nearly twenty years, owing to his absorption in the sphere of practical politics. His only publication at this time on Greek history was a critique on Mitford's *History of Greece* (*Westminster Review*, April, 1826).

The most important work in which Grote took part about this time was the foundation of the University of London in Gower Street (1825-27). In 1830 his father, owing to failing health, had to give up his work at the bank. Grote's new position there enabled him to pay a visit to Paris, then on the brink of revolution, a visit in the course of which he made the acquaintance of the chief Liberal politicians (see Mrs. Grote's *Life of Ary Scheffer*, 1860). In June his father died, at the age of seventy, and Grote became the owner of estates in Lincolnshire and Oxfordshire, with a capital of about £40,000. In the Reform movement of 1831 he was debarred from taking active part, owing to the work which devolved upon him as his father's executor. For this reason he refused to stand as candidate for the City, but his paper on the *Essentials of Parliamentary Reform* sufficiently indicated his views. In February, 1833, he at last took his seat as one of the members for the City of London, and his motion in favour of vote by ballot in elections was discussed two months later. The chief points of his argument are given in Alexander Bain's introduction to the *Minor Works*, 1873. The speeches are marked by accuracy of reasoning and the absence of any extraneous considerations, and are entirely worthy of the author of the *History of Greece*.

For eight years and a half, during three successive Parliaments, he continued to represent his constituency, and saw the gradual recrudescence of Conservatism which followed the Reform movement. Slowly he came to feel that the views of the 'philosophic radicals', however convincing to himself, did not represent the opinions of his party, and at the end of the Parliament of 1841 (June), he decided to

retire. He was now free to devote himself to the compilation of his works on the history and philosophy of Greece.

During 1841-42 he travelled in Italy. Returning to London, he devoted himself to the management of the bank, and to the preparation for his *History of Greece*, conscientiously re-reading the authorities and verifying his data. The two volumes which constituted the first part were preceded by an important critique¹ of Niebuhr's *Griechische Heroen-Geschichte*. The review was important not only intrinsically in relation to Niebuhr's work, but also as a 'trial trip'. In 1843 he commenced upon the actual composition of his first volume, and, in order to devote the whole of his time to the work, he retired from the management of the bank. At last, in March, 1846, the first two volumes appeared, and were received with general approbation. 'Thus I became for once', says Mrs. Grote in the biography of her husband, 'witness of a state of feeling on his part approaching to gratified self-love, which at times would pierce through that imperturbable veil of modesty habitually present with him.' The most important notices (in *The Edinburgh Review* by J. S. Mill and in *The Quarterly Review* by Dean Milman) were entirely favourable. All but the last part of the second volume contained the account of the legendary period. The second part ('Historical Greece') was only just begun.

The unqualified approbation with which the first two volumes had been received roused the author to even greater activity. The third and fourth volumes were published in 1847, the fifth and sixth in 1849. In the following year he brought out the seventh and eighth volumes, the ninth and tenth in 1852, the eleventh in 1853, the twelfth and last in 1856. Thus the publication of this great work, containing the history of Greece down to the death of Alexander the Great, was completed in ten years.

At the conclusion of his labours Grote took a holiday abroad, and then returned to take up his study of Plato. This treatise, the second of his Hellenic trilogy, appeared in 1865 under the title *Plato and the other Companions of Sokratēs*. It contains a summary of Greek philosophy from Thales to Democritus, a biography of Plato, and an analysis of all the separate dialogues, with an elaborate commentary. His next contribution was a dissertation in *The Westminster Review*, January, 1866, on J. S. Mill's *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*. In the preface (p. vii) to the third edition, Mill pays a high tribute to Grote as a philosopher in connexion with this critique.

He was now in his seventy-first year. With unabated energy he began the third part of the trilogy, his study of Aristotle. The

¹ *Westminster Review* (May, 1843, reprinted in *Minor Works*).

materials for this work he had been accumulating for upwards of fifty years, but he was not destined to complete it. All that he actually wrote was published in 1872 by Alexander Bain and G. Croom Robertson. It contains the life of Aristotle, a general discussion of his works, and a minute analysis of the logical treatises. The editors were, however, enabled to add from his MS. notes, and from what he wrote in Bain's *Manual of Mental and Moral Science*, his examination of the other works which constitute the Aristotelian Canon.

This brief sketch of Grote's life would be incomplete without a reference to his exertions on behalf of the University of London, University College, and the British Museum. On the foundation of the University of London in Gower Street he became a member of the governing council (1827-31). In 1836 this institution changed its name to 'University College', owing to the foundation (1836) of the 'University of London' at Burlington House. In 1849 he rejoined the council of University College, became treasurer in 1860, and, on the death of Lord Brougham, president in 1868. In 1862 he became vice-chancellor in the University of London. His valuable library he bequeathed to the University, and to the College a sum of £6,000 for the endowment of a Chair in Mental Philosophy. He was a trustee of the British Museum, succeeding Henry Hallam in 1859.

As an educationalist he showed the same comprehensive grasp of principles which is so marked a feature of his historical and philosophical writings. As in his *History* he realized the importance of describing the intellectual along with the social and political development of the Greek world, so in education he was a resolute opponent of the dangerous tendency towards over-specialization. While he supported the establishment of scientific degrees, he was unflinchingly opposed to the abolition of Greek in the Matriculation examination. It was his firm conviction that a perfect education could consist only of a combination of literary, philosophic, and scientific training.

He died on June 18, 1871, in his seventy-seventh year, and was buried in Westminster Abbey. He was a Fellow of the Royal Society; he received the honorary degrees of D.C.L. Oxon. and LL.D. Cantab.; he succeeded Macaulay as Foreign Member of the French Institute, and in 1869 refused Mr. Gladstone's offer of a peerage. It would be impossible to improve upon Alexander Bain's estimate of his character. 'In the depths of his character', says Bain, 'there was a fund of sympathy, generosity, and self-denial rarely equalled among men. On the exterior his courtesy, affability, and delicate consideration for the

feelings of others were indelibly impressed upon every beholder; yet this amiability of demeanour was never used to mislead, and in no case relaxed his determination for what he thought right. Punctual and exact in his engagements, he inspired a degree of confidence and respect which acted most beneficially on all the Institutions and Trusts that he took a share in administering, and his loss to them was a positive calamity.'

EDITORS' PREFACE

I

FIFTY years have now elapsed since Grote gave to the world the last volume of his great work. During these years the study of Greek history has been pursued incessantly, and works in many languages have been produced. This flood of literature has been of all kinds, ranging from comprehensive treatises on the whole subject to elaborate monographs on the minutest points. The ancient authorities have been re-edited, not only from the literary or classical point of view, but with special reference to their historical importance, and the evidence on which the historian depends has been collected under particular subject headings to facilitate comparison. Not only, therefore, is it practically safe to assert that no important literary evidence has been overlooked, but almost every passage has been analysed and re-analysed, until every possible explanation has been thoroughly reconsidered.

And, in the second place, we are now in possession of a mass of evidence which fifty years ago was lacking. This new evidence is of every kind—literary, epigraphic, numismatic, artistic. The very word 'archæology' has acquired a wholly new connotation. Half a century ago archæology was, to most people, merely the search for ancient objects of beauty, regarded as curios and collected by uncritical enthusiasts without reference to their relative age or their historical meaning. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that archæology was then merely a hobby; it is no exaggeration to say that it is now perhaps the most important part of the science of ancient history. The modern student of Greek history would do well to compare, for example, the evidence on which Thirlwall and Grote based their discussions of the problems connected with the first Delian League with that which is now accessible. Or again, let him compare an article on Troy contributed to the eighth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* with its successor in the edition of 1902. It may seem unnecessary to elaborate this point, yet it is only too easy to forget that the study of Greek history, as we now understand it, is widely different from what it was when Grote and

Thirlwall began to write. Indeed it is impossible, without a full appreciation of this point, adequately to estimate the importance of their work. If we consider for a moment what has been done in recent years in connexion with Homeric and pre-Homeric civilization, we cannot but feel surprise when we realize what a change has been wrought. The very terms 'Mycenæan', 'Minoan', 'Ægean civilization' are of recent date. When we read a report such as that by Dr. A. J. Evans in the *Times* of October 31, 1905, and compare with it a passage in Grote or Thirlwall on the same period, only then do we see how entirely the problem has changed in character, and how difficult it is, in estimating the work done by scholars of the middle nineteenth century, to realize the conditions under which they worked.

Again, when we scan the chapter headings of Grote's History, we marvel at the wide range of his work. Just as it was at last found impossible to treat Greek history in the course of a book on universal history, so at the present day no writer would think of treating such subjects as Phœnicia, Egypt, Babylon, and so on, within the limits of a Greek history on the scale which Grote attempted. In fact, so much evidence has accumulated that in all probability no Greek history covering the period from the beginning to Alexander will ever again be attempted, save in the form of superficial text-books.

✓ Finally, in this connexion it is necessary to allude to the Aristotelian *Constitution of Athens*, published in 1892. The discovery of this treatise constitutes almost a new epoch in Greek historical study. Whatever be the value attached to it, whatever its obvious defects and omissions, it has none the less solved many problems and supplied much detail hitherto lacking, as will appear in the notes and appendices to the present volume.

In view of all these points, the importance of which we cannot here consider save in the barest outline, the reader may well ask for some explanation which will justify the appearance of the present volume. ✓ What is the peculiar value of Grote's work which gives it an interest after so much time has elapsed, during which the whole subject has been reconsidered and partially reconstructed?

II

GROTE AND HIS PREDECESSORS

It was in the latter part of the eighteenth century that Greek history became a unit of study. Hitherto it had been regarded as a part of universal history, when ancient history was merely a literary pastime,

and criticism was unknown. The first author of a Greek history pure and simple was Stanyan, who published in 1739. After him, towards the end of the century, came Gast (Dublin, 1793), John Gillies, and Mitford. It is interesting, in view of what we shall have to say subsequently concerning Grote, to notice the respective attitudes of the two latter. Gillies, in his dedication to George III., sufficiently indicates his feeling with regard to the great political problems of Greek history. Deeply impressed by the events of the French Revolution, he had acquired a profound distrust of the methods of democracy. Mitford also wrote under the influence of strong Tory conviction. Both these writers made it their chief concern to contrast the peaceful permanence of the Spartan constitution with the ever-recurring *stasis* which marked the evolution and decay of the Athenian democracy. Whatever may be our opinion as to the justice of their attitude, we are bound to recognise that they first studied Greece as the birthplace of conscious political experiment, and once and for all lifted it above the level of a land of mere romance.

Further, it was to some extent due to the anti-Athenian standpoint of these works that Thirlwall and Grote undertook their tasks. Bishop Thirlwall, an accurate and accomplished scholar, and, above all, a man of absolute intellectual honesty, brought to bear upon his work a thorough knowledge not only of the ancient classical authors, but also of contemporary German scholarship. His history, though it can never, owing to its very virtues, become popular, has great merit, and is, perhaps, at the present time more highly appreciated than when it appeared. It is marked by great care in the weighing of evidence, and its conclusions are always advanced with an almost unnecessary modesty. It was this very impartiality which prevented him from taking a strong line either in praise or in blame. Although he disapproved of the categorical denunciation which Mitford meted out to Greek democracy, his habitual caution prevented him from enlarging on its merits.

Grote was a man of entirely different character. As we have seen in the biographical sketch, he was by inheritance and by the circumstances of his early life out of sympathy with the academic spirit. Trained in the atmosphere of business, deeply interested from his earliest youth in the social and political movements of the time, his interest in Greek history was that of the practical politician and man of affairs. Under the influence of the two Mills and Jeremy Bentham, he had acquired a strong antipathy to all forms of authority—social, political, and intellectual. Every problem was to him a matter for rational discussion. He viewed ancient history as one among many fields of human

development, and, sweeping from it the unreal atmosphere of abstract scholarship, subjected it to the criteria by which he judged the history of France or of England.

When he came first to consider the legendary period of Greek history in this spirit, he was astounded at the credulity, as he thought, of those who had attached any weight to its time-honoured myths. He refused to admit that any historical fact could even be deduced from them. Since his time the study of comparative mythology has demonstrated that his sweeping condemnation was unjustified. Yet his scepticism did valuable service in stimulating his successors to further research; and though his conclusions are to a great extent overthrown, this has none the less come to pass only by the more rigid application of his own method over a more extensive field of study.

It is not, however, on his examination of the legendary period that the lasting interest of Grote's work is based. We read it now mainly because it affords an important illustration of the author's habit of mind, and that of the circle in which he moved; partly also because it represents a view which is now superseded. As an authoritative exposition of the subject, it has practically ceased to be important.

In the same spirit of practical criticism, Grote proceeded to consider the part of Greek history which he distinguished as 'historical'. Though not a scholar of Thirlwall's type, he had with extraordinary perseverance read and re-read the ancient historians, and had thoroughly familiarized himself with the modern literature of the subject—English, French, and German. In addition to this, he had studied general history, mediæval and modern, and was thus enabled to illustrate his work by means of parallel examples taken from more recent events. Above all, he was, as we have seen, a practical politician, with an enthusiasm for democracy. From his schooldays till the beginning of his public career he had studied political philosophy from the theoretical standpoint, and had thoroughly absorbed the 'philosophic radicalism' of his teachers. Subsequently, during his public career he had been a steady advocate of democratic principles, and had been in the forefront of the Reform movement. Popular representation, vote by ballot, the abolition of all forms of privilege, and the spread of education—to all these he had given his support. When we further remember that during these years of active life he was continually testing and verifying the results of his study of history and political philosophy, it is not surprising that he should have become strengthened in his opposition to Mitford's view of Greek political development. It was, therefore, with the definite intention of refuting Mitford that he began his *History of Greece*.

His book is to be regarded, therefore, primarily as a deliberate

defence of Greek democracy based on the concrete facts of historical evidence, and secondarily as a study of democracy itself as it came into being, flourished, and fell in one particular instance. The great question is, 'Did Athens, and subsequently Greece as a whole, fall because or in spite of free institutions?'; in other words, 'Was Greek democracy inherently unsound?'

It is this fact which at once distinguishes Grote's history from that of Thirlwall, and gives to it a permanent interest and value which are not dependent on the minutiae of accurate scholarship or the accumulation of new evidence. One might even go so far as to say that, if subsequent research were to prove the works of Thukydides and Herodotus a tissue of the most outrageous fiction, his work would still be of great value to the student of political evolution, and a guide to the practical politician. Unlike most of the great historians, he wrote with a reasoned enthusiasm for an ideal, backed up by a thorough knowledge of the actual conditions of modern life and of the vagaries of human nature and individual idiosyncrasy.

It was no doubt due partly to this very enthusiasm that his work is so much more readable than those of most German historians (except E. Curtius, Eduard Meyer, and Adolf Holm). His expression is always clear and precise, and occasionally—as in his account of the Athenian disaster at Syracuse—rises to the most dignified grandeur. The reader is throughout impressed by a feeling of security; the argument breathes authority and sanity of judgment, and the consciousness that all obtainable evidence has been duly weighed. Nor is this feeling weakened by the fact that scholars have discovered a number of minor inaccuracies in the interpretation of quotations from the ancient authorities.

The cold impartiality of Thirlwall, as we have said, had the effect of robbing his history of what we may call its universal as opposed to its purely historical value. On the other hand, Grote's enthusiasm for democracy undoubtedly prevented him from doing full justice to much that was good in the non-democratic governments of Greece. This unfairness is exemplified most clearly in two parts of his work, namely, in his estimate of the so-called 'Tyrants' of the Greek world and in his attitude towards the Macedonian Empire.

It is necessary to examine these two points somewhat fully, in order, if possible, to justify the principle on which these parts of the *History of Greece* have been omitted in the present volume.

In the first place, all forms of absolute government were anathema to Grote. He was profoundly convinced that tyranny in itself is bad for a people collectively and individually. With the propriety of this view

we are not concerned. But he went further and practically denied that the Greek tyrants made any serious contribution to the best interests of their subjects, or had any other object than the personal gratification of greed and ambition. Even the heading of the chapter (Part II., c. ix) in which he deals specially with this question is subtly misleading. In speaking of an 'Age of the Despots', he appears to suggest that tyranny was confined to a period, and that a primitive period, of Greek development. Grote's critics, notably Dr. Mahaffy¹, have made much of this, and have pointed out with justice that absolute government was an ever-recurring phenomenon in the Greek world. This fact is, however, mentioned by Grote himself, and at the same time he quite properly distinguishes between the tyrannies of early Greece which preceded the epoch of constitutional government and those which arose at a time when the City State of the Greeks had been absorbed into an Empire, and the individual citizen had ceased to be a real political unit. The early tyrants rose by their own energies, and supported themselves by the help of a hitherto depressed element in the state. They represented a revolt against the existing power, and were, in some sense at least, a 'home-grown product'. The later tyrants were either (1) the puppets of an external power, reigning in another's interest by external support (e.g., those imposed by the Persians on the Ionian cities, 550-500 B.C.; by Antigonus Gonatas in the Peloponnesian cities); or (2) the Hellenistic monarchs, who, supposing they are properly called 'tyrants' at all, were on the same level as the Roman Emperors, and entirely different from those whom Grote discusses in this chapter. He was primarily concerned to investigate the ultimate meaning of Greek political development in relation to the history of government. He regarded it, therefore, mainly as a culture-producing mechanism, and only secondarily as a means to material prosperity. However unfair he may have been in confining himself to one epoch and disregarding the wider diffusion of Greek life which we know as Hellenism, he was therefore justified, from his point of view, in speaking of an 'Age of the Despots'. Between 508 and the Macedonian Empire there were few 'tyrannies' in the chief cities of Greece proper.

When we come, however, to consider Grote's actual account of the 'tyrants', it must be admitted that he did them less than justice. The 'tyrants', though their motives were no doubt primarily prudential rather than deliberately beneficent, undoubtedly paved the way for the 'great age' of Greece by putting an end to the struggle between the orders. The necessary condition for the permanence of a tyranny was domestic peace. Now, as the chief sufferers from the rule of the one

¹ *Prolegomena to Greek History*, ch. i.

man were the oligarchs whom he had deposed from authority, it was they from whom the tyrant had most reason to look for opposition. He was, therefore, compelled to win the assistance of the people, who were only too glad to be relieved of the selfish autocracy of their previous masters. Thus, whether the tyrant was merely an ambitious oligarch, playing for his own hand, or the champion of a merchant class whose wealth was exposed to the irresponsible depredations of the exclusive oligarchs, or the representative of an oppressed section of the people, the result was the same—a union of one powerful personality with the poorer and hitherto unrepresented classes. Not only did this union often produce order out of chaos, but it gave to the many a new feeling of confidence in themselves and a sense of responsibility. They learned their own strength, and how to put it forth.

In the second place, the tyrants were compelled in general to pay for popular support by permitting the people to pursue their private avocations without unreasonable molestation. This led to the accumulation of wealth and the extension of trade at home and abroad, and enriched the Greek mind by familiarizing it with the natural and artistic products of other lands. Thus we find evidence of commercial treaties made by Periander of Corinth (Hdt., i. 20 *et seq.*) with Thrasybulus of Miletus and Psammetichus II. of Egypt, by Kypselus with Gyges and Midas (Hdt., ii. 14). Again, in the case of Kleisthenes of Sikyon (*cf.* Hdt., vi. 127, for story of Agariste) and Peisistratus of Athens (see Appendix to C. III.), we find the cause of general peace strengthened by dynastic alliances. To this period must be ascribed the transference (due, of course, partly to the Persian conquests in Asia Minor) of commercial pre-eminence from outlying states to Corinth and Ægina, and, indeed, the birth of commerce as the predominant factor in political matters.

Finally, the tyrants were in two ways responsible for the development of Greek art and literature. In the first place, their orderly government provided for the first time the conditions which are essential to artistic and literary production. Secondly, it was their policy to foster in all possible ways everything that contributed to the magnificence of the states, and so to impress upon their subjects the advantage of monarchic over aristocratic government (Chapter III., Appendix).

In these ways the Greek tyrants not only paved the way for constitutional government by creating a national spirit in place of the perpetual strife of classes, but even anticipated many of the best results which constitutional government was to produce. But for Grote all these undoubted advantages were vitiated by the fundamental fact that the tyrant, however beneficent his rule, however popular he might be, was not a constitutional sovereign. He had no political ideal for the citizen,

save that of unquestioning submission ; he did not stimulate a political consciousness, and, in fact, did everything possible to stifle freedom of thought in the sphere of politics. An excellent example of this is to be found in the case of Peisistratus. The Solonian constitution had failed because it was too moderate ; it had despoiled the aristocrats without giving sufficient power to the democrats. Peisistratus soon found that the seeds of liberty had been sown, and that he must avoid two extremes. He must not outrage the half-conscious spirit of liberty, and yet he must not encourage it. He therefore aimed at giving the people order and prosperity and flattering their pride, so that in present prosperity they might forget the anomaly of his single predominance. So long as the farmers had no personal causes for complaint, he knew he could rely on their remaining on their farms and not making use of the Solonian reforms which he affected to maintain. Thus he governed through archons, but was careful that the office should be in the hands of his relatives. It was only when his successors became careless of their disguise that the people discovered the delusion. A silk-gloved despot is naturally a greater bar to a democratic propaganda than the most brutal usurper. Therefore Grote, regarding tyranny from the theoretical standpoint, was blind to its good points, and dismissed it as unproductive in the best sense.

We now come to the second important portion of the *History of Greece* which has been omitted from the present volume, the Age of Alexander. From Grote's first Preface we see what was his attitude towards this epoch. Speaking of the period succeeding the generation of Alexander, he says : ' The political action of Greece becomes cramped and degraded—no longer interesting to the reader, or operative on the destinies of the future world. . . . As a whole, the period between 300 B.C. and the absorption of Greece by the Romans is of no interest in itself, and is only so far of value as it helps us to understand the preceding centuries. . . . as communities, they (the Greeks) have lost their own orbit, and have become satellites of more powerful neighbours.' Whatever be the justice of these statements, it is perfectly clear that Grote himself was in no way attracted by the study of the Macedonian Empire and the diffusion of what we may perhaps, with due deference to Dr. Mahaffy, still distinguish as Hellenism. As we read the chapters dealing with the rise of the Macedonian Empire, we feel that the writer's heart was not in his work. The story lacks the fire and vitality of the preceding chapters, and is not only cold and mechanical, but also incomplete and misleading.¹ Those who would study the rise of Macedonia should

¹ This must not be taken to imply that Grote was *deliberately* misleading. His narration of detailed facts is conspicuously fair—e.g., he some-

times attacks Demosthenēs and defends Æschinēs. It is rather that his whole attitude has been shown to be incorrect.

abandon Grote in favour of more recent works, such as D. G. Hogarth's *Philip and Alexander*; Holm's *History of Greece*, ii. and iii.; Beloch's *Griechische Geschichte*, ii. and iii.

The errors which vitiate the section on the Macedonian Era cannot here be discussed. It must be sufficient to point out that the intervention of the northern monarchy must not be regarded as a gratuitous and wholly deplorable perturbation of political development in Greece, but rather as the necessary outcome of an evolution which made the Hellenic republics the inferiors of Macedon in moral energy, in military and financial power. It is an even greater mistake to look upon the outcome of the Macedonian predominance—the Hellenistic age—as a period of monotony and irremediable decay. On the contrary, it is a time of restless activity, of new ideas in almost every branch of Greek life, and represents the highest growth of Greek prestige among foreign nations. Moreover, the problems which the Hellenistic world was called upon to solve were often of a peculiarly modern character, and the record of its successes and failures cannot but be instructive to students of social and political evolution.

The years of Spartan and Theban supremacy represent in the main an epoch of stagnation, if not of retrogression, and are singularly barren in respect of new political ideas. In addition to this lack of intrinsic interest, the record has not been enriched by any new documents of first-class importance, but can safely be allowed to stand in its original form. For this period, therefore, the editors think it sufficient to refer the student to the corresponding part of Grote's own text.

III

COMPOSITION OF THE PRESENT EDITION

These reasons, added to the great difficulty of compressing so large a work into the narrow compass of one volume, have induced the editors to sacrifice the Legendary Period, the story of the Tyrants, and the Fourth Century and Macedonian Period. But in addition to these wholesale excisions, further compression has been inevitable. It may be well to go into these separate points in detail. Before doing so, it is convenient to recapitulate the chief points in the preceding pages, so that the reader may have a clear idea by force of contrast of the actual contents of the volume.

Firstly, Grote was a rationalist; therefore, and because the science of Comparative Mythology has made giant strides since Grote's work appeared, the Legendary Period has been omitted. Secondly, Grote

was an idealistic democrat, and was thus a prejudiced critic of the Tyrants; therefore the chapter on the Tyrants and those on the Macedonian Empire are omitted.

Finally, it is unquestionable that an author puts his best work into that subject in which his real interest lies. It follows that the true value of Grote's work is contained in his account of the Athenian democracy. The editors have, therefore, selected those chapters which bear most closely on this particular epoch of Greek history. But not only is this the part in which Grote was primarily interested; it is also that part which lends itself most satisfactorily to reproduction at the present day. Recent research in Greek history has only confirmed the main outline which Grote gave with so much fulness and accuracy. To reproduce to any purpose his account of the Legendary Period or of Alexander the Great would demand elaborate alteration, and even reconstruction, such as is impossible within the limits of a volume of this kind. This book, therefore, contains that portion of the *History* which is the essence of the work, and is also incomparably the most valuable in itself to the student of ancient history, even at the present day, when, as we have seen, the literature of the subject has so enormously increased.

IV

SUMMARY OF OMISSIONS

A. Part I.: The Legendary Period (see above).

B. Part II.: Chapters I.-X. These chapters contain a general description of Greece—its topography, political divisions, physical features and ethnography. The topography in general may be studied in many recent works by trained explorers to better advantage than in these chapters. Even the most superficial of readers would scarcely be interested in perusing an account of Greece which does not contain any account of recent archæological discoveries; and the briefest account of these would cover more space than the letterpress which it would purport to supplement. Moreover, the ground has been thoroughly covered by specific archæological works. Furthermore, it must be remembered that Grote had never qualified himself for this part of the work by a visit to Greece.

This disqualification appears in these chapters, and also in his accounts of military operations. The notes will to some extent show how far the more careful study of the ground has enabled us to correct the account he gave of battles and marches (see especially on Salamis, pp. 213-215). Again, the science of Greek ethnology (*e.g.*, on the sub-

ject of Pelasgi, Leleges, Dorians) is an entirely new phenomenon since Grote's time. To give any useful account of our present knowledge would involve the reconstruction of Grote's work. The same remark applies with even greater force to those passages which treat of ancient Greek religion. So little could have been retained that it has seemed best to omit the whole.

The omission of the chapters dealing with the early history of Sparta (V.-VIII.) calls for a further word of explanation. An inspection of these chapters, or of the corresponding sections of other Greek histories, will reveal the profound—we might almost say the hopeless—obscurity in which this subject is still involved. Whether we consider the institutions of Lykurgus, or the gradual rise of Sparta to its predominant position in the Peloponnese, we find that the details supplied by ancient historians are mostly worthless, and the best work of modern critics, notably that of Grote himself, has consisted in the negative process of sweeping away false inferences without supplying any systematic reconstruction. On the whole, therefore, it suffices to bear in mind that Sparta came to represent a landed gentry, living as an aristocracy of peers among a population of dependents ('Periœki') and serfs ('Helots'). Leaving to these inferior classes the pursuit of trade and agriculture, the true Spartiates concentrated themselves within their capital, and devoted themselves to the only vocation open to them—that of arms. Their success over the other Peloponnesian states merely illustrates the advantage which disciplined troops of professional warriors have always possessed over half-trained militias.

The political lessons to be learnt from these chapters are inconsiderable. Even in later historical times the influence of Sparta on Greek history is mainly a negative one, and is significant only as arresting or impeding the development of the true leaders of Greek thought and culture. Our ignorance of early Spartan history is, therefore, the less regrettable, and need not be remedied by an attempted reconstruction with such scanty material as we possess.

Chapter IX., dealing with early Corinth, Sikyon and Megara, is in the main an account of the tyrannies which flourished in those cities during the seventh and sixth centuries, and has therefore been omitted for reasons already stated.

C. Retaining Chapter XI., which treats of the Solonian legislation and the beginning of conscious political development in Athens, the editors have for the same reasons as before omitted Chapters XII., on Eubœa and the Cyclades; XIII., on the Asiatic Ionians, where again recent archæological work is of the highest importance; XIV. on the Æolic Greeks in Asia; XV., on the Asiatic Dorians.

D. Chapters XVI.–XXI. deal with the Eastern nations with which the Greeks came into contact. Of these, Chapters XVI. and XVII. contain accounts of the peoples of Asia Minor, Medes and Scythians. These subjects have been entirely revolutionized of recent years, and are now, what they scarcely yet were in Grote's time, entirely separate branches of learning. It is interesting to note that there is, for example, no reference in Grote to the important site of Pteria, now regarded by many as the ancient centre of a great Hittite monarchy. Similarly a 'Phœnician problem' has arisen, of which Grote knew nothing. Chapters XVIII. and XXI., therefore, are no longer an adequate summary of our knowledge concerning this people. Still less adequately do Chapters XIX. and XX. represent the results of recent researches in Egypt and Assyria. The bulk of this section is of value to the antiquarian only who would trace the progress of the world's enlightenment on these subjects of study. The editors have retained only a few pages of Chapter XVII., on the Lydian kings, whose history is of importance to the historian of Greece as leading up to the great Græco-Persian conflict.

E. Chapters XXII.–XXIV. and XXVII., dealing with the colonization of the West (Kyrênê, Italy, Sicily, Etruria, Gaul, Epirus, Illyria) by the Greeks, resemble the chapters on the Asiatic Greeks in consisting mainly of untrustworthy legends about the foundation of cities. Their chief use lies in the knowledge they afford about the wide area of Greek expansion; but this point is sufficiently illustrated by a perusal of the later chapters on the full historical period. Chapters XXV. and XXVI., which discuss the Northern peoples (Macedonia and Thrace, together with the Greek settlements in those districts), are omitted for similar reasons.

F. Chapters XXVIII., on the Panhellenic Festivals, and XXIX., on the Lyrical Age and the Seven Wise Men, relate more especially to the history of Greek culture, and are, therefore, out of place in a series of extracts dealing primarily with a political evolution. Moreover, so far as they bear on this question, they chiefly elucidate that Age of the Despots, on which the present volume has little to say (see above, p. xv. ff.).

Chapters XXX. and XXXI., treating of Athenian history during the latter half of the sixth century, have been retained almost in full.

G. Chapters XXXII.–XXXIV. record the rise of the Persian Empire. So far as they deal with purely national questions, they have been antiquated ever since the days of Rawlinson. Therefore, instead of reprinting the whole of this section, we would refer the student to the account in E. Meyer's *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. iii., book 1. Those

pages, however, which record the early relations of Persia with Greece have been incorporated in a composite chapter; while the end of Chapter XXXIV. and the whole of Chapter XXXV. have been welded together into a chapter whose subject is the Ionic Revolt.

From this point Grote's work has been reproduced without any substantial excisions down to the fall of the Athenian Empire in 404 B.C. (Chapters XXXVI.-LXV.). The portion which treats of the Persian Wars has frequently been amplified or corrected, in view of the new knowledge we now possess, notably in matters of topography. The story of the Athenian supremacy required very little alteration, save upon one or two questions, where fresh documentary evidence has modified the accepted conclusions; in such cases a full discussion of the problem has been reserved for an appendix.

It has already been pointed out that the period dealt with in these chapters, besides being the most significant in the whole of Greek history, was undeniably that in which Grote took especial interest. In order to do justice to the historian's highest achievement, the editors have thought it better to retain this part of the narrative almost in full, and to sacrifice the whole of the fourth-century section (see p. xix).

As regards the supplementary notes, the editors have endeavoured to give references to those sources which are most useful and most accessible to the reader. They also wish to acknowledge a more general debt of obligation to the following works: E. Meyer's *Geschichte des Altertums* (vols. iii. and iv.), and *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*; Holm's *History of Greece* (vol. ii.); Grundy's *Great Persian War*; Hill's *Sources of Greek History* (478-431); Hicks and Hill's *Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions*; and Gilbert's *Greek Constitutional Antiquities*. Finally, they have embodied a great deal of valuable and, to the best of their knowledge, unpublished material from the lecture-notes and private instruction of their former tutor, the Rev. E. M. Walker, of Queen's College, Oxford, to whom they largely owe that interest in the problems of Greek history which has led them to attempt their present task.

A short bibliography, covering the whole of Greek history down to the Roman conquest, has been appended.

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- E. CURTIUS, *History of Greece*, translated by A. W. WARD (Lond., 1868 ff.).
- V. DURUY, *History of Greece* (Eng. trans.); introd. by J. P. MAHAFFY (Lond., 1892).
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- E. ABBOTT, *Greek History* (2nd ed., Lond., 1892 ff.).
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B. SPECIAL PERIODS.

1. PRE-HISTORIC AND PROTO-HISTORIC.—Owing to the extreme rapidity with which knowledge on these periods is being accumulated, all text-books tend to pass quickly out of date. The following works may be found useful:

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 E. MEYER, *Geschichte des Altertums*, vol. ii.
 J. B. BURY, *History of Greece*, chaps. 1-3.
 G. PERROT and C. CHIZEZ, *Art in Primitive Greece* (Eng. trans. Lond., 1894).
 W. RIDGEWAY, *The Early Age of Greece* (Lond., 1901).
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Students desirous of keeping in touch with the latest results should consult the various periodicals of the archæological schools, especially the *Annual of the British School at Athens*, the *Athenische Mittheilungen*, and the *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*; also the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*.

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 FREEMAN, *History of Federal Government*, vol. i. (ed. J. B. BURY, Lond., 1893).
 A. HOLM, *History of Greece*, vol. iv.
 B.N IESE, *Gesch. der Griech. u. Makedon Staaten, 338-120 B.C.* (Gotha, 1893 ff.).

C. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY.

GILBERT, *Constitutional Antiquities* (Eng. trans., Lond., 1895).

A. H. J. GREENIDGE, *Handbook of Constitutional History* (Oxford, 1896).

A. BOEKH, *Political Economy of Athens* (Eng. trans., Lond., 1857).

J. W. HEADLAM, *Election by Lot at Athens* (Camb., 1891).

U. v. WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin, 1893).
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D. TOPOGRAPHY.

W. M. LEAKE, *Travels in the Morea* (Lond., 1830); *Travels in Northern Greece* (Lond., 1835).

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MURRAY'S *Handy Classical Maps*, ed. G. B. GRUNDY.

Also numerous articles in the journals cited under B (1)

ERRATA

Page 3, n. 1 ad fin., for 'Dipylongrābe' read 'Dipylongrāber'.

„ 7, n. 9, for Μουσείς read Μουσείον.

„ 8, n. 6, for ελοφόρας read ελοφόρας.

„ 11, line 8, for 'I. 98' read 'I. 165.'



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(The asterisk indicates the chapters to which editorial additions have been made
in the form of introductions or appendices.)

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. Footnotes which are entirely editorial are marked simply 'ED'.
Editorial additions to existing notes are printed in square brackets. Square
brackets in the text indicate important editorial modifications in the original
text.

HISTORY OF GREECE

CHAPTER I

EARLY ATTICA¹

IN spite of the prominence to which the Athenian State attained in later times, the history of early Attica is, if anything, more obscure than that of the other leading states of Greece. The two best sources of evidence for the period previous to the seventh century—(1) the records of Oriental monarchs who came into contact with the Greek world, (2) the lays of contemporary poets—fail us almost entirely in dealing with Attica, and practically we find ourselves confined to the data of subsequent tradition. Of this kind of record we have practically nothing that received literary shape before the fifth century, and much of this information is derived from writers who were removed in time from the events they described at least as far as are present-day historians from the Norman Conquest. Furthermore, even the earlier versions are largely based on pure conjecture, and, so far as they do seem to possess a substratum of fact, they often present it in a distorted and mutilated form, which argues a lack of proper understanding on the part of their authors. We hardly go too far in saying that Thukydides alone of all writers on early Attic institutions had both ready access to first-hand evidence and the ability to use it to good purpose. A survey of the existing body of tradition shows that much has to be discarded as otiose or demonstrably false, while the residue for the most part requires careful sifting, before it may safely be used constructively.

Besides the literary record, we have a certain amount of archaeological evidence, which in some cases is of a thoroughly cogent nature. But while it is reasonable to hope that this source of knowledge will continue to increase as steadily as has been the case for the last twenty years, and may even afford us data with a conclusive bearing on important questions, yet, for the present, the testimony of the monuments does not allow us to go any great length in reconstructing the history of the country.

The utmost reserve is, therefore, called for in giving any account of early Attica, and while some such exposition would seem to be required with a view to the complete understanding of later Athenian history, it should always be borne in mind that, down to the age of Solon at least, we are moving in a field of research which is still to a large extent unexplored, and perhaps will never be mapped out with an adequate supply of landmarks.

For the period preceding the 'Dorian invasion' no consistent account whatever is offered by our literary authorities. Such isolated fragments

¹ This chapter is entirely editorial; it is intended as an introduction on the history of Athens before Solon. For purposes of reference subsequent

chapters are numbered in addition with the numbers (in square brackets) which they bear in the complete edition.—Ed.

of legend as have come down to us¹ often bear the marks of baseless fabrication, and contradictions between the different versions abound. Yet there is one salient feature which runs through the great mass of Attic legends—the idea that the nation was the offspring of the Attic soil, and this same conviction was a standing article of belief among the Athenians of historic times. Thukydides² furnishes a good *a priori* reason for holding this view when he points to the barrenness of the land, which would hardly tempt a foreign invader, and the archæological evidence tends in the same direction³.

Another important fact concerning the earliest period is the wide distribution of material remains over many parts of Attica⁴. The Acropolis of Athens has, indeed, traces of a Mykenæan palace, but is, in other respects, hardly superior to many others. This accords well with the legend that Athens was not originally the sole political centre of the country, which was split up into independent communities such as are found in the early history of Laconia, and always maintained themselves in Bœotia⁵.

Concerning the very earliest period of Attic history we may, therefore, safely make two statements: (1) Attica contained an element of population of whose advent into the country no sort of trace remains; (2) the territory was originally broken up among a number of isolated villages.

Another important point is this. Although the Athenians, as we have seen, claimed to be an autochthonous people, their legends contain frequent allusions to foreign immigration. Moreover, the topographical disposition of the earliest Athenian communities presupposes some such view, for, as Thukydides tells us⁶, besides the original site on the Acropolis and its southern confines there grew up a settlement away in the south-east of the later town.

There are also general archæological considerations which render such an immigration highly probable. The primitive monuments of the country are clearly to be assigned to the 'Minoan' stage of culture, which sprang up in neolithic days within the Ægean basin⁷. The sites of a subsequent date show signs of a new type of civilization, suggesting the influx of settlers from another region. That at least one such invasion from the north took place before the beginnings of Greek history is generally admitted, and probably two successive currents may be distinguished. With the former of these we venture to connect the immigration into Attica, of

¹ For an enumeration of the chief legends, see Grote, part i., c. ii. The greater part of these stories have been preserved for us by Apollodorus, Strabo, and Harpocration, whose knowledge is mainly based on the Atticides, or special histories of Attica, which began with the work of Hellanikus (end of fifth century), and ended with the compilation of Istros (250-220 B.C.). Most of this legendary history consists of arbitrary combinations founded on a minimum of fact.

Among the earlier authorities, who were in a better position to record the popular myths, we may mention (1) Herodotus, (2) the fifth-century dramatists, (3) the fourth-century orators. All these writers, however, were led by preconceived ideas to alter the stories pretty much as they pleased; hence their unsupported statements carry little weight.

² I. 2.

³ In the beehive tomb at Acharnæ the continuous series of pottery fragments proves an unbroken

worship of the dead from neolithic times down to the full historic period (cf. Perrot et Chipiez, *Art de la Grèce Primitive*, ch. iii., § 8, pp. 414-417).

⁴ Among other sites we may mention Acharnæ, Eleusis, Thorikos, and perhaps Marathon.

⁵ There are traces of primitive fortifications in the Daphne Pass on the boundary-line between the territory of Athens and Eleusis. Tradition speaks of war between these two communities, and implies the independence of Eleusis as late as the eighth century. The Homeric Hymn to Demeter (which can hardly have been composed earlier than 750 B.C.) glorifies Eleusis without ever mentioning Athens.

⁶ II. 15.

⁷ This culture is attributed by Professor Ridgeway (in *The Early Age of Greece*) to the 'Pelasgi'. This name seems as appropriate as any other, but it is safer not to introduce specific names for peoples where no racial differentiation can as yet be proved.

which the visible proof lies in the sudden appearance of the so-called Dipylon pottery¹.

It would be rash to define exactly the nationality of these invaders, who may, indeed, have comprised different elements, and have spread their colonization over a considerable length of time. Yet we might with a fair show of reason attach to these settlers the name of 'Ionians'². Among the chief reasons for adopting this name we may mention (1) the legend of 'Ion's' coming in its various forms, and of the strife of Athênê and Póseidon Erechtheus; (2) the designation of Athenians as 'Ionians' in Homer (*Il.*, xiii. 685, 689); (3) the specifically 'Ionic' character of the deities worshipped in the south-eastern settlement of Athens (Apollo Delphinus and Poseidon Helikonius).

The later wave of invaders, generally known as the 'Dorians'³, left unmistakable marks of its progress on the general map of Greece. Yet the literary tradition unanimously declares that Attica did not receive a fresh element of population at this time, and it was the recognized belief in the historical period that the Athenians were a non-Dorian race⁴.

In Attica, therefore, we may recognize a twofold stratification of the early population (1) an autochthonous 'Attic', (2) an immigrant 'Ionic' element. We must suppose that the advent of the 'Ionians' was marked by no such cataclysms as seem to have attended the Dorian irruption, and that the amalgamation of the two elements proceeded so steadily that the feelings of racial distinction which never quite died out in the Peloponnese, and were revived by tyrants like Kleisthenês of Sikyon (who represented a racial reaction⁵), early led to a belief in national solidarity. Yet in addition to the reasons already quoted to prove the Athenians a mixed stock there are many features in the political institutions of the country which presuppose some such original division.

We have seen that there is reason to believe that Attica was originally split up into a number of independent communities. In early historic times they appear merged into a single political unit—the state of Athens; and throughout the later period there is a complete absence, within the bounds of Attica, of that local separatism which proved the bane of most of the larger Greek States.

This change was affected by a political concentration known as the *συννοικία*, in commemoration of which the Athenians of the fifth century still celebrated a feast (*τὰ συννοίκια*). There is some evidence that this process of unification was gradual, for the later existence of a religious union of four communities in the Marathon district⁶ points to a former

¹ This style of vases is discussed at length in Walters' *History of Ancient Pottery*, vol. i., pp. 177-192; Rayet et Collignon, *Histoire de la Céramique Grecque*, pp. 19-38. The assignment of the Dipylon fabrics is one of the hardest problems of prehistoric archaeology; at any rate, their abrupt appearance in the Ægean lands points to some external origin. But see Poulsen, *Dipylongræbe*.

² Professor Ridgeway (*op. cit.*) comprehends these invaders under the name 'Achæans'. But there is a difficulty in attributing, to what was in historic times so small an offshoot, such widespread upheavals as the archaeological record proves. Perhaps the safest course is to withhold a generic name for this wave of northern conquerors, and to assume that only in later days were they differentiated into distinct branches, such as the 'Achæans' of Thessaly and Peloponnese, the 'Ionians' of Attica and Asia Minor.

The latter name probably originated on the eastern side of the Ægean, and the Attic immigrants adopted it at a subsequent date in virtue of a real or supposed kinship. 'Ion' and 'Achæus' were represented as brothers in the legend.

³ The 'Dorians' are generally supposed to have introduced iron and the fibula into Greece, if not the practice of cremation. Professor Ridgeway would assign all these innovations to the Achæans. Existing evidence hardly permits of a settlement of these rival claims.

⁴ Thus Herodotus, who sharply divides the inhabitants of Greece into 'Dorians' or 'original Hellenes' and 'Pelasgi', has no hesitation in assigning the Athenians to the latter class (ii. 56; vii. 94; viii. 44).

⁵ Hdt., v. 68.

⁶ Cf. Gilbert, *Constitutional Antiquities* (Engl. transl.), p. 99, n. 1.

political federation, and the incorporation of Eleusis was probably not effected till about 700 B.C. (see p. 2, n. 5). Yet the consummation of such a change implies, as Thukydides¹ has observed, a powerful central government, and this condition of things was commonly supposed to have been realized under King Thêseus. This monarch, it should be observed, was represented as a new-comer from the 'Ionic' town of Troezen, and affiliated to the 'Ionic' gods Poseidon and Apollo Delphinus². From this we may infer that the political unification was effected by an immigrant dynasty which had gathered a large measure of power in its hands, and eclipsed the local chieftains (the *διοτρεφέες βασιλῆες* of Homer), who at this period are never mentioned as constituting a check upon the sovereign.

Of the later fortunes of this monarchy nothing certain can be said. The legends enumerate a long list of sovereigns who are in reality nothing more than names to us. We may suppose that the kingship of Athens went through the same stages of evolution as that of other Greek cities, until in the Homeric age (900-800 B.C.) it showed signs of being absorbed by the growing power of the nobility. The only event of this period to which we need ascribe any importance is the reputed colonization³ of the Cyclades, the district of Asia Minor later known as 'Ionia' by colonists mainly under Attic leadership—a movement brought about by the influx of the Dorian tribes. In view of the persistent tradition which made Athens the metropolis of all these States, and of the claim which Solon made for Athens as the 'eldermost country of Ionia', we must admit some element of truth in this legend⁴.

The disintegration of the monarchy took place in Attica, as elsewhere, by slow degrees. While refusing to bind ourselves to any of the detailed accounts in which the antiquarians set forth this change, we may follow them in distinguishing three main steps in the process; (1) the life-tenure of the sovereignty was abolished⁵; (2) the monarchy was thrown open to all the noble families; (3) the functions of the king were divided among a board of magistrates, and the term of office fixed at one year⁶. By this transformation, which was finally accomplished about the year 700⁷, Athens came under that form of government which meets us at the beginning of the historical period.

We have now reached a stage where we may argue back from the conditions presented to us in the days of Solon to the state-organization of the early Attic oligarchy, though it is still imperative to realize the rudimentary character of all the institutions of such early date, and so to avoid the anachronisms which mark the expositions of some historians, notably the theorists of the fourth century B.C.

The executive functions which the king had been compelled to share,

¹ II. 15.

² Plut., *Thesens*, chs. 6, 14, 18.

³ This event may conjecturally be placed between 1100 and 900. Hekataeus' computation in *Hdt.*, ii. 143, suggests Miletus was founded sixteen generations before his time—i.e., about 1050 B.C.

⁴ This does not compel us to take over the entire traditional account of the 'migrations.' There is much to commend the view that an 'Ionian' population already existed in Asia Minor and the islands as the result of immigration by way of Thrace and the Hellespont. The new influx from Greece proper, and especially from

Athens, may have created 'Ionia' in this sense, that it gave cohesion to the population, and led to its differentiation from 'Æolis' in the north, and 'Doris' in the south.

⁵ See Mahaffy, *Social Life in Greece*, ch. ii., pp. 37, 38, for the insecure position of Homeric monarchs whose years had brought about a decline of vigour.

⁶ A similar process of 'putting the kingship in commission' is attested for Corinth (*Diod.*, vii. 9, and Strabo, viii., p. 378).

⁷ From the year 683 there exists an uninterrupted list of names of the chief annual magistrates

first with a commander in the field, and then with a chief justice¹, are henceforth distributed as follows. (1) The *Archon Eponymus*, the youngest of the former kings' assessors, whose judicial powers raised him above the heads of his seniors to the presidency of the State, so that the administrative year came to be designated by his name. (2) The *Basileus*, who with the title of 'sovereign' only retained the old religious functions and a slender spiritual jurisdiction². (3) The *Polemarch*, who continued to be commander-in-chief. Furthermore, the chief justice was supported by a body of *Thesmothetæ*, who may be described as departmental judges³. The election of these magistrates seems to have been effected by the council of nobles⁴, who selected candidates from among the chief families, and recruited their own number from this source⁵. On such a system it is clear that power was practically confined to a close corporation of aristocrats, who not merely, like the Roman Senate, embodied among its life-members the collective political wisdom of the country, but through its nominees for office exercised a complete control over the executive. Besides its general administrative powers, the council could constitute itself, or perhaps delegate from its total numbers, a court for the hearing of important trials, and become specially identified with the judging of murder cases⁶.

The commons of this period are never mentioned as exercising any political power whatsoever. The reason for the predominant power which resided in the nobility is partly to be sought for in the accumulation of wealth in their hands⁷. But the ultimate cause, which enables us to explain a good deal that is peculiar in early Attic institutions, may be found in the religious organization which had been imposed on the country.

We have already noticed that the 'Ionian' immigrants who came to settle near Athens brought with them their own deities. This religious separation between the earlier and later strata of inhabitants in Attica has perhaps a much greater significance than has hitherto been suspected. Recent researches⁸ into the character of Greek religion have brought out very strongly the dual character that runs through the beliefs and practices of the historic period. The official 'Olympian' worship was imposed by an invading people⁹ upon a primitive cult of earth-deities, whose nature is illustrated by numerous survivals into the later epoch. The feature of

¹ Cf. *Ath. Pol.*, ch. 3, which is mostly based on a sound method of argument—inference from later survivals.

² The *rex sacrorum*, or *rex sacrificulus*, at Rome offers an exact parallel.

³ Though *Ath. Pol.* (ch. 3, § 4) makes the early *Thesmothetæ* mere clerks of the archives, Grote is no doubt right in assigning them full judicial powers. The mention of archives is clearly an anachronism (Full Text, c. x.).

⁴ It is less easy to decide whether their numbers were originally fixed at six. This provision may have been due to Solon, who is reported to have instituted the regular board of 'the nine archons' (*Ath. Pol.*, ch. 3, § 5; Apollodorus, quoted in Diog. Laert., *Solon*, 58).

⁵ The name *ἡ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλὴ* commonly given to this body may not date back beyond Solon's time. We can hardly imagine that its sittings at this date were confined to the Areopagus site.

⁶ This is as much as can safely be inferred from the somewhat confused account in *Ath. Pol.*, 3, § 6, and 8, § 2. The elections were made 'on the score of nobility and wealth'.

⁷ The account in *Ath. Pol.*, 3, § 6, attributes to

the Council (1) a general control over law and administration, (2) a power of summary jurisdiction over 'insubordinates'.

The subject of the early jurisdiction for homicide is involved in much obscurity. The 'Areopagus' was generally regarded in later times as the traditional court for murder cases, and from Plut., *Sol.*, 19, it follows that it had existed as such before Solon's time. But we cannot say for certain when this special jurisdiction fell to the Council. We also hear of nobles who sat as *ἐπῆραι* in murder cases (Poll., viii. 125, and C.I.A., i. 61), for which purpose they divided themselves into at least four courts (*Πιπταεῖον*, *Παλλάδιον*, *Δελφίνιον*, and *Φεαττῶν*), according to the specific charge. Probably the *epetai* were delegates of the Council, who may have reserved important cases for a plenary sitting. Solon seems to have regulated the sittings of the Council on the Areopagus for such trials (Pol., *ad loc.*).

⁷ *Ath. Pol.*, 2, § 2.

⁸ Miss J. E. Harrison's *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, especially c. vi.

⁹ Most probably the 'Achæans' of Professor Ridgeway and Homer.

this 'autochthonous' religion which has the most bearing on the present argument is its 'matriarchal' character. The deities are mostly female, and their affinities of kin are such as reflect the primitive organization of human races on the basis of birth by the same mother¹.

Concerning early Athens, a number of legends have been preserved which indicate the presence of a matriarchal religion, if not of a matriarchal tribe-system²; and we may with confidence assume that the autochthonous population of Attica had not freed its religious and social observances from all these primitive elements.

Among such survivals, it seems justifiable to class the organization of Attic society into Phratries. In support of this hypothesis we may urge (1) that hitherto such attempts as have been made to find even a plausible *raison d'être* for this unit on any other basis have scarcely removed more difficulties than they have created; (2) the names *φρατρίαι*, *φράτορες* are clearly akin to Latin *fratres*, and must mean 'brotherhoods', 'brothers'³. It is noticeable that the bond of brotherhood was much more important in the days anterior to patriarchal organization⁴. (3) The special duty of *φράτορες*, which survived at least as late as the fourth century⁵, was the avenging of murder within the Phratric group. Such a provision, however, only arises where no satisfaction can be obtained through patriarchal authority⁶. Moreover, the Eumenides, whose awful power as avengers of murder always impressed the Athenian mind, were deities of the primitive type⁷. (4) The inclusion of all *ὁμογάλακτες* in the *φρατρία*⁸, the former term implying a system of maternal affiliation.

Now, turning to the 'Ionian' stratum of population, we find strong evidence of its being organized on the patriarchal system. For (1) their chief gods, Apollo and Poseidon, are males of the 'Olympian' order. (2) The typical 'Ionian' festival, the Apaturia, was a gathering of *ὀπάτορες*, or *ὁμοπάτορες*⁹, of whom the élite were known as *Εὐπατρίδαι*. (3) The legend which made 'Ion' a son of 'Ἀπόλλων Πατρῶς' shows that the 'Ionian' population claimed descent from an ascertained line of male ancestors. (4) The name *γεννήται* implies the importance of paternity in the social grouping.

This patriarchal system we find imposed upon the whole burgess population in that system of *γένη* which, under the 'Ionic' nobility of Athens, became the chief unit of social organization. Membership of the *γένη* depended on descent from 'Ἀπόλλων Πατρῶς', which only the Ionian aristocrats could claim to prove, and the performance of ceremonies which

¹ Cf. McLennan, *Studies in Ancient History* (first series), chapter on 'Kinship in Ancient Greece.'

Later antiquarians were utterly unable to realize this condition of things, and their versions of the legends are often so ludicrous as to have been rejected by modern critics as utterly worthless. Yet a kernel of truth can undoubtedly be extracted from them. It is perhaps unsafe to argue from these stories to the complete retention of the 'matriarchal' system as late as the full 'Minoan' period of Ægean history; they may contain mistaken inferences from surviving religious conceptions to an early practice already obsolete.

² Cf. *Ath.*, xiii. 2, § 555; Justin, ii. 6; Plato, *Legg.*, 796 (on the primitive character of Athénè); and especially St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, 18, 9.

³ The terms *ἀδελφός*, *ἀδελφή* imply a common mother, but not necessarily the same father.

⁴ McLennan, *Studies* (first series), p. 105 ff.

⁵ C.I.A., i. 61 (Hicks and Hill, 78); Demosth. Or., 43, § 57, 58.

⁶ Cf. Grote, ch. x. (full text).

⁷ Cf. Harrison, *op. cit.*, ch. vi.

⁸ Philochorus, fr. 94: τοὺς φράτορας ἐπαναγκὴς δέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ὀργεῖνας καὶ τοὺς ὁμογάλακτας. The further remark, οὓς γεννήτας καλοῦμεν, may hold good if it merely records the conception of Philochorus' time (about 300 B.C.), but the equation *ὁμογάλακτες* = *γεννήται* seems inherently absurd, and cannot be taken to shed light on ancient family ties. The same would apply to Pollux, viii. 3, where *γεννήται* and *ὁμογάλακτες* are juxtaposed.

⁹ Meier, *De Gentilitate Attica*, p. 11. The original deity of the Apaturia was Apollo. The worship of an Athénè Phratría on this occasion is not proved for a period earlier than the fourth century, by which time the two different strata of divinities could easily be associated in a festival without any feeling of incongruity.

remained a corporate secret among these new-comers. *A fortiori*, these tests were imposed on those who would qualify for office¹, so that in effect the entire power of State came to reside with the patriarchal nobility and the population came to be sharply divided between Eupatridæ and others². The only way of entering the charmed circle lay in the admission to the religious rites of the γένη under the guise of ὀργεῶνες, coupled, no doubt, with a fictitious adoption³, and the fact that the Eupatridæ kept a rigid control over this machinery is shown by the importance accruing to the *Archon Eponymus*, who adjudicated on cases of family law. Even the old murder-jurisdiction was transferred to the control of the Eupatridæ, for the 'Areopagus' Council certainly belonged entirely to this class; and the same is stated of the ἔφεται and φυλο-βασίλεις⁴. Another division which has given rise to much perplexity, but is of less fundamental importance for the proper understanding of early Attica, is that of φυλαί, τριττύες, and ναυκραταί. The names of the four φυλαί (Γελέοντες⁵, Αἰγικορεῖς, Ἀργαδεῖς, Ὀπλητες) have given rise to a suggestion that here we have a distribution into castes. But, apart from the fact that a true caste-system can nowhere be traced in Greece, it is known that Eupatridæ were enrolled in each tribe⁶.

On the other hand, the persistent tradition that these tribes were created by 'Ion', or sons of 'Ion' bearing the above names, and their recurrence in various towns of Ionia, show that this division was not primitive, but was introduced by the 'Ionian' aristocracy.

Hence, too, the tribal system has been brought into connection with the συνοικισμός, which we have already seen to be due to an 'Ionian' monarch. It may be taken to recall a half-way stage between the original multiplicity of communities and the later concentration into a single state. The four φυλαί would then be local divisions⁷, which were retained after the complete συνοικισμός for administrative purposes. We may conjecturally place the Αἰγικορεῖς ('goatherds') on the uplands of the Μεσογεία⁸; the Ἀργαδεῖς ('tillers') in the plain north of Athens; the Ὀπλητες ('warriors') in the Tetrapolis of Marathon⁹, and the Γελέοντες in the capital.

The occurrence of tribal deities such as Ζεὺς Γελέων does not prove that the φυλαί were essentially a religious organization, for it was a common practice of Greek corporations to organize a worship of some patron deity, even where the real object of their combination was of a purely secular character⁹. Similarly, the Roman *curiae*, in spite of the prevalence of *sacra curiae*, were originally a local unit¹⁰.

The τριττύς, as the name indicates, is to be regarded as a third part of

¹ This test was preserved in the case of the archonship down to the fourth century (*Ath. Pol.*, iv. 3: ἐπερωτῶσιν, ὅταν δοκιμάζωσι, τίς σοι πατήρ . . . και τίς πατήρ πατήρ . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰσὶν αὐτῷ Ἀπόλλων Πατρώος και Ζεὺς Ἐρκειος, και πῶν ταῦτα τὰ ἱερά ἐστι).

² The names for the other elements vary (Γεωμήροι, Γεωργοί, Ἀγροῖωνται, Δημιουργοί, Ἐπιγεωμήκοι), but the contrast between Eupatrids and non-Eupatrids is always brought out clearly.

³ Cf. the process by which admission was gained into the *gentes patriciae* at Rome, who in the third and fourth centuries of the city formed a politically privileged corporation similar to that of the Eupatridæ at Athens.

⁴ Poll., viii. 111, 125.

⁵ The variants Γελέοντες and Γεδέοντες are ruled

out by the recurrence of the form Γελέοντες in inscriptions of Cyzicus (C.I.G. 3663-3665) and Teos (C.I.G. 378, 379), and of Ζεὺς Γελέων in C.I.A. iii. 2. Γελέοντες is an Ionic form from γελᾶν (Smyth, *Ionic Dialect*, § 688), and perhaps οἱ παῖδες of Hdt., v. 77.

⁶ Pollux, viii. 111.
⁷ The division into Πεδεῖς, Παράλιοι, and Διᾶκριοι, which we meet with in sixth-century history, seems an informal one.

⁸ Cf. the Τετράκωμοι of Marathon (Poll., iv. 105), and the Ἐπακρεῖς of C.I.A., ii. 570—both religious survivals.

⁹ Notable instances of these ostensibly religious organizations are the Μουσεῖς of Athens and Alexandria, and the Greek tradesmen's guilds.

¹⁰ Cf. Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*, c. i., § 4, p. 41.

the *φυλή*. Nothing is recorded of its early functions, but if we argue back from the *τριπύς*, as organized by Kleisthenēs¹, we may infer that its prototype was likewise a military unit, composing one-third of the tribal levy.

The forty-eight *ναυκαρίαι* are naturally conceived of as subdivisions of the *τριπύς*. Their military character is proved by the fact that each of these units had to supply one ship for the fleet, a number of horsemen², and presumably a quota of foot-soldiers for the army. The commanding *ναύκαροι*³, or *πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων*, are found exercising a command at the time of Kylon's conspiracy (about 630 B.C.), and no doubt served as captains of their ships.

Whatever need Attica may have had of a land-militia, there can be little doubt that in the earliest period following the Dorian invasion the fleet was often in requisition. After the breakdown of the Minoan thalassocracy the entire Ægean Sea was infested with pirates, such as the Karians and Phœnicians, whose presence Thukydides attests⁴; and Athens certainly took her part in policing the Saronic Gulf as a member of the Kalaurian League⁵; her men-of-war are frequently depicted on the Dipylon vases of the ninth and eighth centuries. In later times the need of this protecting squadron may have grown less, when the navies of Megara, Ægina, Chalkis, and Eretria effectually cleared the Ægean of foreign corsairs. We may suppose that the Naukrari of the seventh century seldom saw any active naval service.

The military functions of the Naukraries have been obscured by a fourth-century version⁶ which is followed by the later antiquarians. On the strength of some fragments of Solonian law, in which the Naukrari are represented as levying contributions and disbursing public money, they have been taken for exchequer officials. No doubt such duties fell to their lot: indeed, in pre-Solonian times taxation must chiefly have consisted of war contributions. But at this stage of Athenian development the financial duties can only have been incidental. The relation of the *ναυκαρία* to the *δῆμος* is not easy to establish. Though the latter unit was not made use of for political purposes till the end of the sixth century, there is evidence of its existence before this date⁷, and the elaborate organization and religious associations of many demes point to a high antiquity. As their number (not less than 100, perhaps much more) was far greater than that of the *ναυκαρίαι*, we may suppose that the *δῆμοι*, though constituting an important aggregate in the estimation of their inhabitants, appeared to the central government too small a unit to take into account.

If we now review the political and social organization of early Attica, we find an immigrant 'Ionian' nobility overlaid upon a nucleus of autochthonous Athenians. By their control of a government centralized to an unusual degree, and, above all, of the State religion, the former constitute an oligarchy of the most rigid type, and of popular institutions there exists as yet no trace.

¹ It seems safe to assume that if Kleisthenēs had changed the functions of the *τριπύς* he would have changed the name; to act otherwise would have been to court confusion.

² Pollux, viii. 100, assigns two horsemen to each *ναυκαρία*. A total of ninety-six horse for the whole of Attica seems much too small. Hence the reading *δύο* looks like a mistake for *δέκα*, or some such number.

³ The name is now generally interpreted as 'ship's-captains' or 'ship-furnishers' (*ναὺς κραινω*).

⁴ Thuc., i. 4-8.

⁵ Strabo, viii., p. 374.

⁶ *Ath. Pol.*, 8, § 3: *ναυκαριῶν ἀρχὴ τεταγμένη πρὸς τὰς εἰσφοράς καὶ τὰς δαπάνας*.

⁷ Cf. Hdt., i. 60, and ix. 73; ps.-Plat., *Hippiarchus*, 228 D.

Under such conditions it is inevitable that class opposition should sooner or later arise, and herein the condition of Athens differed little from that of many other Greek cities on a similar plane of evolution. The trouble was aggravated in the case of Attica by economic difficulties, which among the more progressive mercantile communities found a natural solution in colonial emigration. It is not, therefore, surprising that an ambitious noble should have taken advantage of the internal disorders of his city to try and establish himself as its despot.

Late in the sixth century¹ an aristocrat named Kylôn, who already stood in high honour as a winner at the Olympian games, and had seen his father-in-law Theagenês make a successful bid for absolute power at Megara, laid a plot to siege the Athenian Acropolis on a festival day, when the chances of a surprise were not unfavourable. In this way the citadel fell easily enough into the hands of the conspirators; but Kylôn had made the mistake of using a Megarian force to back him in his enterprise. Accordingly, instead of hailing him as a deliverer, the Athenian people promptly rallied to repel what they regarded as a foreign invasion. By maintaining a vigorous blockade, they soon reduced the garrison to sore straits. Kylôn himself escaped, but most of his party finally renounced the defence, and took sanctuary in the temple of Athênê Polias. Their treacherous slaughter by the leaders of the besieging force² brought upon the city the taint of blood-guiltiness and visitations of the plague. The pollution was removed from the community by the elaborate purification ceremonies dictated by a Cretan 'holy man' named Epimenidês; but the noble family of the Alkmæônids³, who through the archon Megaklês had taken a leading part in the act of sin, was condemned to exile, and for long after regarded as under a curse.

Another consequence of Kylôn's abortive attempt consisted in a partial concession of rights to the people on the part of the alarmed aristocracy. Towards the end of the century⁴ a junior archon named Drako was commissioned to codify and set forth in writing the body of 'ordinances' which hitherto had been kept secret by the ruling classes. This exclusive knowledge of the country's laws⁵, coupled with the religious sanction by which they could enforce their decisions, gave the Eupatridæ a mastery over the whole community which practically knew no limits. This arbitrary control over the springs of justice constituted one of the worst grievances of the early Greek commoner, for it deprived him of all security as to property and person. Though Drako's code of laws may have

¹ The date of Kylôn's victory is given by Eusebius (i. 198) as 640. His conspiracy must have fallen within one of the subsequent Olympiad years. Since Kylôn thought that his prestige as a victor would count for much, it seems preferable to make his treason follow soon upon his success at the games—i.e., in 636 or 632. Cf. J. H. Wright, *The Date of Cylon* (Boston, 1892); Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, i., p. 670, n. 10.

² The officers who actually conducted the military operations are vaguely referred to in Thuk. i., 120, as οἱ ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακὴν; Hdt., v. 71, only mentions πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράων, but the responsibility for the murder seems to have attached to the chief archon Megaklês.

³ The Alkmæonidæ, like certain other great houses at Athens, claimed descent from old Attic heroes, and were always anxious to disavow connection with the Ionian new-comers. This aversion has inspired Herodotus in certain passages (i. 143;

v. 69), which are generally assumed to reproduce their family traditions.

In spite of their proud isolation these autochthonous grandees managed to maintain themselves in the forefront of State politics (Hdt., vi. 125).

The friction between these different strata of nobility was undoubtedly one of the chief determinants of Athenian policy during the sixth and early fifth centuries, and family feeling may well have had a share in shaping Kleisthenes' constitution. Even in the days of full democracy the Alkmæonids reckoned themselves in a class apart from the Eupatridæ (Isocr., *De Big.*, § 25).

⁴ The date inferred from *Ath. Pol.*, 4, § 1, is 621. It is natural to refer Drako's laws to the period after Kylôn's conspiracy, hence that event can hardly be placed later than 624.

⁵ For the irresponsible character of the judgments delivered by the early kings and nobles, cf. Hom., *Il.* xvi. 384-388, and Hesiod, *Ἔργα*, 213-285.

seemed excessively harsh to fourth-century orators, the mere publication of such a code was an act of mercy to the oppressed classes, since at least it enabled them to ascertain the limits of their liability¹.

Drako's codification came too late to cope with the evils which the days of unwritten law had engendered. The economic position especially had become irretrievably unsound, and before long the need of a more thorough reform became evident. Under these conditions the legislator Solon swept away most of Drako's code, and left nothing standing except the venerable murder-laws². In fact, the work of Drako was obscured so effectually that later politicians could trade on the general ignorance by promulgating new 'constitutions' under Drako's name³.

APPENDIX

THE above account follows the received tradition in ascribing to Drako nothing but a codification of existing laws. This view is founded upon the explicit statement of Aristotle (*Politics*, ii. 12), who in this passage is clearly using a definite piece of knowledge to correct certain current mistakes concerning Drako.

At first sight this opinion might seem to have been refuted once for all by c. 4 of the *Ath. Pol.*, which gives a detailed exposition of a 'constitution of Drako'. But apart from the fact that the *Politics* have proved a thoroughly trustworthy treatise, whereas the *Ath. Pol.* has used good and bad sources somewhat indiscriminately, a closer inspection of the chapter shows that its statements are open to the gravest objection.

In passing from c. 3 to c. 4 of the treatise we are plunged straight out of the most primitive type of oligarchy into a highly artificial 'mixed constitution', such as could only have been evolved in days of ripe political reflection.

Among the anachronisms with which the chapter abounds we may mention (1) the *στρατηγοί* and *πρωταεῖς*; (2) the *διεγγύησις* and *εὐθύναι* of magistrates; (3) the money qualifications and financial provisos (*οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνοντες* *ἐλευθέραν*, etc.) in an age when coinage had certainly not yet crossed the Ægean, and wealth must have been expressed in terms of cattle and the like; (4) the numbers and other details of the *βουλή* (the odd voter annexed to the round 400, so as to prevent a tie on a division, implying a large experience of 'parliamentary procedure'); (5) the preferment of *εἰσαγγελλῆαι* by private citizens; (6) the plentiful use of highly technical phraseology, and the absence of those archaisms which abound in Solon's laws.

The negative evidence against c. 4. is equally strong. We may notice more particularly (1) the absence of that semi-religious organization into *γένη* which in those days was a fundamental fact in Attic politics; (2) the complete silence in which the agrarian question is passed over, though in Drako's days the problem must already have been acute.

In the face of this overwhelming array of objections, the only positive argument which might be advanced in support of the chapter is the fact that there are references to it in other parts of the treatise.

These references, however, may well have been interpolated by editors and transcribers to avoid obvious discrepancies; at all events, their evidence is clearly not in itself strong enough to outweigh the fundamental difficulties which the chapter presents.

It remains to explain from what sources this passage may have been derived.

According to one hypothesis it ultimately rests on some fragments of genuine Drakontian statutes discovered by the revising committee created after the

¹ The first written code among the Greeks, published by Zaleukus for Lokri, dates from about 660 B.C.—not very long before Drako. Many Greek cities can hardly have had any written laws until after the age of the tyrants.

In Rome the publication of the *jus civile* and *dies fasti* by the scribe Cn. Flavius in 304 confessedly dealt a severe blow to the power of the

nobles, who had hitherto contrived through their pontifices and prætors to administer the law to suit their own interests (Liv., ix. 46).

² Drako is said by some authorities to have created the Epheta (Poll., viii. 125). But it is more likely that he merely regulated their functions.

³ See below.

revolution of the Four Hundred, or the Tyranny of the Thirty. But (1) it is extremely doubtful whether any records of Drako's or Solon's constitution survived the destruction of Athens in 480-479. (2) Such a large document could hardly have remained unnoticed in the whole of the fifth century. (3) Even if the editors of these fragments were to be held responsible for the modern wording of c. 4, a genuine Drakontian fragment could not resemble the *Ath. Pol.* version even in substance.

Wilamowitz (*Arist. u. Athen.*, i. 98) would make Theraménès the author in the political crisis of autumn 404. And there is indeed a striking resemblance between some of the enactments in c. 4 and those in c. 29 embodying the ideal constitution of Theraménès—*e.g.*, the hoplite basis of citizenship, the rotation of offices among all eligible citizens. Moreover, Theraménès ostensibly tried to reinstate an 'ancestral' constitution.

But (1) it is hard to see how such a forgery could have survived the scrutiny of the *νομοθέται*, especially that of the board of 403, which was specially commissioned to sift the mass of laws ascribed to Drako and Solon (*Andok.*, *De Myst.*, §§ 81-83). (2) The return to Drako's laws was hardly contemplated by the moderate section under Theraménès, whose ideal was rather to be found in Kleisthenès (*Ath. Pol.*, c. xxviii.). The same objections apply to Theraménès' colleague Andron (father of the athidographer Androtion).

Again, the forgery might be ascribed to Nikomachus, whom Lysias (*c. Nicom.*) accuses of tampering with the old statutes, or to one of his fellow drafting-clerks. But the charges in the above-mentioned oration carry little weight, and are belied by all we know of the circumstances under which statutes were revised, such transcriptions always being carefully controlled (*Andok.*, *loc. cit.*; Reinach, *Épigraphie Grecque*, p. 306 ff.).

Though the revisions of the statute-books would pretty certainly have rendered impossible the survival of a barefaced forgery they failed to create any clear notions as to the real nature of Drako's code. It is well known that in the fourth century all sorts of institutions were ascribed to Solon. The like applies to Drako, who disputes some enactments with his more famous successor (*e.g.*, the *ῥήσος ἀρχίας*—*Plut.*, *Sol.*, 17; *Pollux*, *Onom.*, viii. 42).

These circumstances may well have led a political speculator of the fourth century to compose a 'Constitution of Drako', which by chance or intention came to be incorporated in the *Atthides*, and hence into the *Ath. Pol.* We may go further, and attribute the authorship to a writer of the Isokratean school. For (1) *Ath. Pol.* is largely based on such authorities; (2) the 'Theramenic' features of c. 4 would most naturally survive, like other parts of that statesman's programme, among this group of writers; (3) the important part assigned to the Areopagus accords well with Isokratès' favourite doctrines; (4) finance was specially attractive to some fourth-century writers like Androtion; (5) Isokratès sought his ideal in a pre-Solonian constitution (*Isokr.*, *Panath.*, § 108 ff.); (6) the whole chapter in *Ath. Pol.* resembles rather the lucubration of a professor than a document to be discussed by men of affairs.

It is noticeable that c. 4 of the *Ath. Pol.* is never quoted by other ancient authorities. Possibly it stood condemned in early times, and was passed over by the later compilers.

CHAPTER II [XI]

SOLONIAN LAWS AND CONSTITUTION

[It is important, before considering the complicated details of Solon's reforms, to point out the sources from which information is derived. In the first place, it is clear that there existed in the fifth and fourth centuries no real tradition as to the actual provisions. Had such existed there would either have been no serious difference of opinion, or else the disputants would undoubtedly have appealed to that tradition. Now, firstly, there is no such appeal, and, secondly, there are most important differences of view among fourth-century authorities—*e.g.*, concerning (1) the *Seisachtheia*, between the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* and Androtion (see below); (2) the coinage reform; (3) the respective qualifications of the second and third classes. Further, the *Ath. Pol.* endeavours to elucidate problems by inferences from Solon's poems, or by mere probability, rather than by appeal to tradition.

Another source would be the laws of Solon. In the fourth century there were undoubtedly genuine Solonian laws in existence. But the laws relating to the Seisachtheia were dead; only a few of the agrarian and constitutional laws (if any) were still in operation.

The main source is, therefore, Solon's poems, fragments of which are preserved in the *Ath. Pol.* (c. 12). In general it is important to notice that Grote's views (e.g., as to the Seisachtheia) must be reconsidered in the light of the *Ath. Pol.*, which, as will appear in the notes, differs not only from Androtion (as to the Seisachtheia), but also from nearly all previous authorities in respect of the coinage reform.—ED.]

WE now approach a new æra in Grecian history—the first known example of a genuine and disinterested constitutional reform, and the first foundation-stone of that great fabric which afterwards became the type of democracy in Greece. The archonship of the Eupatrid Solon dates in 594 B.C., thirty years after that of Drako, and about eighteen years after the conspiracy of Kylôn (assuming the latter event to be correctly placed, 612 B.C.)¹.

The lives of Solon by Plutarch and by Diogenês (especially the former) are our principal sources of information [but see above—ED.] respecting this remarkable man; and while we thank them for what they have told us, it is impossible to avoid expressing disappointment that they have not told us more. For Plutarch certainly had before him both the original poems, and the original laws, of Solon, and the few transcripts, which he gives from one or the other, form the principal charm of his biography. But such valuable materials ought to have been made available to a more instructive result than that which he has brought out. There is hardly anything more to be deplored, amidst the lost treasures of the Grecian mind, than the poems of Solon, for we see by the remaining fragments that they contained notices of the public and social phenomena before him, which he was compelled attentively to study—blended with the touching expression of his own personal feelings, in the post alike honourable and difficult, to which the confidence of his countrymen had exalted him.

Solon, son of Exekestidês, was a Eupatrid of middling fortune², but of the purest heroic blood, belonging to the family of the Kodrids and Neleids, and tracing his origin to the god Poseidon. His father is said to have diminished his substance by prodigality, which compelled Solon in his earlier years to have recourse to trade, and in this pursuit he visited many parts of Greece and Asia. He was thus enabled to enlarge the sphere of his observation, and to provide material for thought as well as for composition. His poetical talents displayed themselves at a very early age, first on light, afterwards on serious, subjects. It will be recollected that there was at that time no Greek prose-writing, and that the acquisitions as well as the effusions of an intellectual man, even in their simplest form, adjusted themselves not to the limitations of the period and the semicolon, but to those of the hexameter and pentameter. Nor in point of fact do the verses of Solon aspire to any higher effect than we are accustomed to associate with an earnest, touching, and admonitory prose composition.

¹ [The Kylonian conspiracy is generally dated 632 B.C. Kylôn, who had married the daughter of Theagenês, tyrant of Megara, attempted (probably with Megarian support) to become tyrant in Athens, but was defeated and treacherously slain with his followers. No doubt this was one of the causes of the Megarian War, which contributed to increase the economic distress in Attica by interfering with Athenian trade.

The year of Solon's archonship is probably

either 594-593 or 592-591; the former is the more likely, though it is held that his reforms probably extended over more than a year, and that he held an extraordinary office for the purpose of completing the work. Professor Case (*Class. Rev.*, October, 1888, pp. 240, 241) holds that the constitutional laws were passed about 570, but see Busolt, ii., 2d ed., p. 259.—ED.]

² Plutarch, *Solon*, i.; Diogen. Laërt. iii. 1; Aristot., *Polit.*, iv. 9, 10.

The advice and appeals which he frequently addressed to his countrymen¹ were delivered in this easy metre, doubtless far less difficult than the elaborate prose of subsequent writers or speakers, such as Thukydides, Isokratēs, or Dēmōsthenēs. His poetry and his reputation became known throughout many parts of Greece, so that he was classed along with Thālēs of Milētus, Bias of Priēnē, Pittakus of Mitylēnē, Periander of Corinth, Kleobulus of Lindus, Cheilōn of Lacedæmon—together forming the constellation afterwards renowned as the seven wise men.

The first particular event in respect to which Solon appears as an active politician is the possession of the island of Salamis, then disputed between Megara and Athens. Megara was at that time able to contest with Athens, and for some time to contest with success, the occupation of this important island. It appears that the Megarians had actually established themselves in Salamis, at the time when Solon began his political career, and that the Athenians had experienced so much loss in the struggle as to have formally prohibited any citizen from ever submitting a proposition for its reconquest. Stung with this dishonourable abnegation, Solon counterfeited a state of ecstatic excitement, rushed into the agora, and there on the stone usually occupied by the official herald, pronounced to the surrounding crowd a short elegiac poem² which he had previously composed on the subject of Salamis. Enforcing upon them the disgrace of abandoning the island, he wrought so powerfully upon their feelings, that they rescinded the prohibitory law: 'Rather (he exclaimed) would I forfeit my native city and become a citizen of Pholegandrus, than be still named an Athenian, branded with the shame of surrendered Salamis!' The Athenians again entered into the war, and conferred upon him the command of it—partly, as we are told, at the instigation of Peisistratus, though the latter must have been at this time (600-594 B.C.) a very young man, or rather a boy³.

In addition to the conquest of Salamis, Solon increased his reputation by espousing the cause of the Delphian temple against the extortionate proceedings of the inhabitants of Kirrha [for which see full text, part ii., chap. iii., p. 51]; and the favour of the oracle was probably not without its effect in procuring for him that encouraging prophecy with which his legislative career opened.

It is on the occasion of Solon's legislation that we obtain our first glimpse—unfortunately but a glimpse—of the actual state of Attica and its inhabitants.

¹ Plutarch, *Solon*, v.

² Plutarch, *Solon*, viii. It was a poem of four lines, *χαρίεργος πάνν πεποιμένον*.

Diogenēs tells us that 'Solon read the verses to the people through the medium of the herald'—a statement not less deficient in taste than in accuracy, and which spoils the whole effect of the vigorous exordium, *Αὐτὸς κήρυξ ἤλθεν ἀφ' ἱερῆς Σαλαμῖνος*, etc.

³ Plutarch, *l. c.*; Diogen. Laert. i. 47. Both Herodotus (i. 59) and some authors read by Plutarch ascribed to Peisistratus an active part in the war against the Megarians, and even the capture of Nisæa, the port of Megara. Now the first usurpation of Peisistratus was in 560 B.C., and we can hardly believe that he can have been prominent and renowned in a war no less than forty years before.

[If the recovery of Salamis be dated as above, unquestionably Peisistratus cannot have been old

enough to take any prominent part (*cf. Ath. Pol.*, c. 17). Bury (*History of Greece*, p. 191), however, assigns the capture of Salamis roughly to 560 B.C., when the power of Megara had declined, and Solon, having returned from his travels, perceived that the moment had arrived for a decisive step. This date, of course, solves the difficulty as to Peisistratus's share in the action taken. Further, the success of Solon's unconstitutional method of arousing Athenian spirit is, perhaps, less surprising at this time than had it taken place before his legislation—as Grote states. A comparison of *Ath. Pol.*, c. 17, and c. 14 seems to show that there were two wars against Megara, one (perhaps to recapture Nisæa, the port of Megara) in 570-565, in which Peisistratus gained glory, the other in 600 (?) (for the recovery of Salamis—*i.e.*, the one to which Solon's great poem necessarily belongs), in which Peisistratus cannot have taken part.—Ed.]

Violent dissensions prevailed among the inhabitants of Attica, who were separated into three factions—the Pedieis, or men of the plain, comprising Athens, Eleusis, and the neighbouring territory, among whom the greatest number of rich families were included; the mountaineers in the east and north of Attica, called Diakrii, who were on the whole the poorest party; and the Paralii in the southern portion of Attica from sea to sea, whose means and social position were intermediate between the two. Upon what particular points these intestine disputes turned we are not distinctly informed. They were not, however, peculiar to the period immediately preceding the archontate of Solon. They had prevailed before, and they reappear afterwards prior to the despotism of Peisistratus; the latter standing forward as the leader of the Diakrii, and as champion, real or pretended, of the poorer population.

✓ But in the time of Solon these intestine quarrels were aggravated by something much more difficult to deal with—a general mutiny of the poorer population against the rich, resulting from misery combined with oppression. The Thêtes, whose condition we find described in the poems of Homer and Hesiod, are now presented to us as forming the bulk of the population of Attica—the cultivating tenants, metayers, and small proprietors of the country. They are exhibited as weighed down by ✓ debts and dependence, and driven in large numbers into slavery—the ✓ whole mass of them being in debt to the rich, who were proprietors of the greater part of the soil¹.

✓ All the calamitous effects were here seen of the old harsh law of debtor and creditor—once prevalent in Greece, Italy, Asia, and a large portion of the world—combined with the recognition of slavery as a legitimate status, and of the right of one man to sell himself as well as that of another man to buy him. Every debtor unable to fulfil his contract was liable to be adjudged as the slave of his creditor, until he could find means ✓ either of paying it or working it out; and not only he himself, but his ✓ minor sons and unmarried daughters and sisters also, whom the law gave him the power of selling². The poor man thus borrowed upon the security of his body (to translate literally the Greek phrase) and upon that of the persons in his family. So severely had these oppressive contracts been enforced, that many debtors had been reduced to slavery in Attica itself, many others had been sold for exportation, and some had only hitherto preserved their own freedom by selling their children. Moreover, a great number of the smaller properties in Attica were under mortgage³, signified (according to the formality usual in the Attic law,

¹ Plutarch, *Solon*, 13. (There has been much discussion as to the Hektëmorî ('men of the sixth part'), who were certainly the distressed class in Attica. Three explanations are given: (1) labourers who received one-sixth of the produce as wages; (2) tenants who paid five-sixths as rent; (3) tenants who paid one-sixth as rent. The first two are improbable. In a country like Attica no one could have lived on so small a pittance. The last is most probable, and fits in with the statement that all the land was in the hands of a few. There seems no adequate reason to believe (e.g., with Gilbert, *Gk. Const. Antiq.*, Eng. trans., p. 117 note) that the last interpretation does not explain the misery which prevailed. The soil of Attica was not rich, and agriculture was probably very backward. One or two bad harvests would compel the Hektëmor (who probably had no reserve) to become indebted to the

capitalist, who naturally came to absorb the small holdings. The whole difficulty lay in the fact that the small tenants had no recuperative power; once in debt they were helpless—lost their land and their personal freedom. This is perhaps corroborated by the fact that at the present day the tenant-farmers of Thessaly (the most fertile land in Greece) pay only one-third as rent.—Ed.)

² So the Frisi, when unable to pay the tribute imposed by the Roman Empire, 'primo boves ipsos, mox agros, postremo corpora conjugum et liberorum, servitio tradebant' (Tacit., *Annal.*, iv. 72).

³ By almost all modern historians the word *ὑπό* is interpreted (as above) 'mortgage-pillars'. Now these undoubtedly existed in the time of Demosthenes, but none have been found earlier than 400. To suppose that Solon's reforms were so successful that no landowner was driven to mort-

and continued down throughout the historical times) by a stone pillar erected on the land, inscribed with the name of the lender and the amount of the loan. The proprietors of these mortgaged lands, in case of an unfavourable turn of events, had no other prospect except that of irremediable slavery for themselves and their families. Some had fled the country to escape legal adjudication of their persons, and earned a miserable subsistence in foreign parts by degrading occupations. [Upon several, too, this deplorable lot had fallen by unjust condemnation and corrupt judges; the conduct of the rich, in regard to money sacred and profane, in regard to matters public as well as private, being thoroughly unprincipled and rapacious.]

The manifold and long-continued suffering of the poor under this system, plunged into a state of debasement not more tolerable than that of the Gallic plebs¹—and the injustices of the rich in whom all political power was then vested—are facts well attested by the poems of Solon himself, even in the short fragments preserved to us. It appears that immediately preceding the time of his archonship, the evils had ripened to such a point—and the determination of the mass of sufferers, to extort for themselves some mode of relief, had become so pronounced—that the existing laws could no longer be enforced. [Such was the condition of things in 594 B.C., through mutiny of the depressed classes and uneasiness of the middling citizens, that the governing oligarchy were obliged to invoke the well-known wisdom and integrity of Solon. Though his vigorous protest (which doubtless rendered him acceptable to the mass of the people) against the iniquity of the existing system, had already been proclaimed in his poems—they still hoped that he would serve as an auxiliary to help them over their difficulties. They therefore chose him, nominally as archon along with Philombrotus, but with power in substance dictatorial.]

It had happened in several Grecian states, that the governing oligarchies, either by quarrels among their own members, or by the general bad condition of the people under their government, were deprived of that hold upon the public mind which was essential to their power. Sometimes (as in the case of Pittakus of Mitylênê anterior to the archonship of Solon, and often in the factions of the Italian republics in the middle ages) the collision of opposing forces had rendered society intolerable, and driven all parties to acquiesce in the choice of some reforming dictator. Usually, however, in the early Greek oligarchies, this ultimate crisis was anticipated by some ambitious individual, who availed himself of the public discontent to overthrow the oligarchy and usurp the powers of a despot. And so probably it might have happened in Athens, had not the recent failure of Kylon, with all its miserable consequences, operated as a deterring motive. It is curious to read, in the words of Solon himself,

gaged his land for nearly two centuries of internal and external strife is a large hypothesis. Again, (1) no ancient authorities describe Solon's *ôpoi* in this sense; (2) the system of mortgage belongs to a stage in economic development much in advance of the early sixth century when payment was made in kind; (3) Solon calls himself a *ôpos* in the last line of the poem. But further, if, as has been held above, the Hektêmons were not freeholders, but tenants, it follows that mortgaging was impossible. The *ôpos*, then, is a symbol not of mortgage but of ownership; the landowners had extended their private *τεμεῖνη* (estates) over the land. This process was accomplished, no doubt,

largely by the aid of the Eupatrid monopoly in the law-courts, where the old families, as at a similar period in Roman history, had great power owing to their control of religious ceremonial and their wealth. (See H. Sidgwick in *Class. Rev.*, 1894, pp. 296, 297, on the harshness of the judges.) The abolition of this religious vested interest was one of the main features of the Kleisthenean legislation. By checking this system of encroachment Solon freed the land, which had become 'enslaved', and became a 'boundary-stone' against further acquisition by the wealthy (*ορους ἀν. ἱλον πολλὰ καὶ πεπηγότας καὶ ὄρος κατέστη*).—ED.

¹ Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.*, vi. 13.

the temper in which his appointment was construed by a large portion of the community, but most especially by his own friends, bearing in mind that at this early day, so far as our knowledge goes, democratical government was a thing unknown in Greece—all Grecian governments were either oligarchical or despotic, the mass of the freemen having not yet tasted of constitutional privilege. His own friends and supporters were the first to urge him, while redressing the prevalent discontents, to multiply partisans for himself personally, and seize the supreme power. They even 'chid him as a madman for declining to haul up the net when the fish were already enmeshed'¹. The mass of the people, in despair with their lot, would gladly have seconded him in such an attempt, while many even among the oligarchy might have acquiesced in his personal government, from the mere apprehension of something worse if they resisted it. That Solon might easily have made himself despot admits of little doubt. Nothing but the combination of prudence and virtue, which marks his lofty character, restricted him within the trust specially confided to him. To the surprise of everyone—to the dissatisfaction of his own friends—under the complaints alike (as he says) of various extreme and dissident parties who required him to adopt measures fatal to the peace of society, he set himself honestly to solve the problem.

Of all grievances the most urgent was the condition of the debtors. To their relief Solon's first measure, the *Seisachtheia*², or shaking off of burthens, was directed. The relief which it afforded was complete and immediate. It cancelled at once all those contracts in which the debtor had borrowed on the security either of his person or of his land; it forbade all future loans or contracts in which the person of the debtor was pledged as security; it deprived the creditor in future of all power to imprison or enslave, or extort work from his debtor, and confined him to an effective judgment at law authorizing the seizure of the property of the latter. It liberated and restored to their full rights all debtors actually in slavery under previous legal adjudication; and it even provided the means (we do not know how) of repurchasing in foreign lands, and bringing back to a renewed life of liberty in Attica, many insolvents who had been sold for exportation³. And while Solon forbade every Athenian to pledge or sell his own person into slavery, he took a step farther in the same direction by forbidding him to pledge or sell his son, his daughter, or an unmarried sister under his tutelage—excepting only the case in which either of the latter might be detected in unchastity⁴.

By this extensive measure the poor debtors—the Thêtes, small tenants and proprietors—together with their families, were rescued from suffering and peril. But these were not the only debtors in the State; the creditors and landlords of the exonerated Thêtes were doubtless in their turn debtors to others, and were less able to discharge their obligations in consequence

¹ See Plutarch, *Solon*, 14, and, above all, the Trochaic tetrameters of Solon himself, addressed to Phôkûs, *Fr.*, 24-26, Schneidewin:

Οὐκ ἔψυ Σόλων βαθύφρων, οὐδὲ βουλῆεις ἀνὴρ,
Ἐσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ δίδοντας, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἰδέετο.
Περὶβαλὼν δ' ἄγραν, ἀγασθεὶς οὐκ ἀνέσπασεν μέγα
Δίκτυον, θυμὸν θ' ἁμαρτῇ καὶ φρενῶν ἀποσφαλεῖς.

² For the *Seisachtheia*, see appendix to this chapter.—Ed.

³ See *Ath. Pol.*, c. 12; also Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 15.—Ed.

⁴ Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 23: compare c. 13. The

statement in Sextus Empiricus (*Pyrrhon.*, *Hypot.*, iii. 24, 211) that Solon enacted a law permitting fathers to kill (φονεύειν) their children cannot be true, and must be copied from some untrustworthy authority. Compare Dionys., *Hal.*, A. R., ii. 26, where Dionysius contrasts the prodigious extent of the *patria potestas* among the early Romans, with the restrictions which all the Greek legislators alike—Solon, Pittakus, Charondas—either found or introduced: he says, however, that the Athenian father was permitted to disinherit legitimate male children, which does not seem to be correct.

of the loss inflicted upon them by the Seisachtheia. It was to assist these wealthier debtors, whose bodies were in no danger—yet without exonerating them entirely—that Solon resorted to the additional expedient of debasing the money standard¹. He lowered the standard of the drachma in a proportion something more than 25 per cent., so that 100 drachmas of the new standard contained no more silver than 73 of the old, or 100 of the old were equivalent to 138 of the new. By this change the creditors of these more substantial debtors were obliged to submit to a loss, while the debtors acquired an exemption to the extent of about 27 per cent².

Lastly, Solon decreed that all those who had been condemned by the archons to atimy (civil disfranchisement) should be restored to their full privileges of citizens—excepting, however, from this indulgence those who had been condemned by the Ephetæ, or by the Areopagus, or by the Phylo-Basileis (the four kings of the tribes), after trial in the Prytaneium, on charges either of murder or treason³. So wholesale a measure of amnesty affords strong grounds for believing that the previous judgments of the archons had been intolerably harsh; and it is to be recollected that the Drakonian ordinances were then in force.

Such were the measures of relief with which Solon met the dangerous discontent then prevalent. That the wealthy men and leaders of the people—whose insolence and iniquity he has himself severely denounced in his poems, and whose views in nominating him he had greatly disappointed⁴—should have detested propositions which robbed them without compensation of many legal rights, it is easy to imagine. But the statement of Plutarch, that the poor emancipated debtors were also dissatisfied, from having expected that Solon would not only remit their debts, but also redivide the soil of Attica, seems utterly incredible; nor is it confirmed by any passage now remaining of the Solonian poems⁵. Plutarch conceives the poor debtors as having in their minds the comparison with Lykurgus and the equality of property at Sparta, which (as I have already endeavoured to show⁶) is a fiction; and even had it been true as matter of history long past and antiquated, would not have been likely to work upon the minds of the multitude of Attica in the forcible way that the biographer supposes. The Seisachtheia must have exasperated the feelings and diminished the fortunes of many persons; but it gave to the large body of Thêtes and small proprietors all that they could possibly have hoped. We are told that after a short interval it became eminently acceptable in the general public mind, and procured for Solon a great increase of popularity—all ranks concurring in a common sacrifice of thanksgiving and harmony⁷.

In regard to the whole measure of the Seisachtheia, indeed, though the poems of Solon were open to everyone, ancient authors gave different statements both of its purport and of its extent. Most of them construed

¹ See appendix to this chapter.—Ed.

² Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 15. See the full exposition given of this debasement of the coinage in Boeckh's *Metrolgie*, c. ix., p. 115.

Boeckh thinks (c. xv., § 2) that Solon not only debased the coin, but also altered the weights and measures. I dissent from his opinion on this latter point, and have given my reasons for so doing in a review of his valuable treatise in the *Classical Museum*, No. 1. [G. F. Hill, *Num. Chron.*, 1897, pp. 284-292.—Ed.]

³ Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 19. In the general restora-

tion of exiles throughout the Greek cities, proclaimed first by order of Alexander the Great, afterwards by Polyperchon, exception is made of men exiled for sacrilege or homicide (Diodor., xvii. 109; xviii. 8-46).

⁴ Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 15. οὐδὲ μαλακῶς, οὐδ' ὑπεύκων τοῖς δυναμένοις, οὐδὲ πρὸς ἡδοὴν τῶν ἐλπομένων, ἔθετο τοὺς νόμους, etc.

⁵ Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 16.

⁶ Full text, part ii., c. vi.—Ed.

⁷ Plutarch, l. c. ἐθυσάν τε κοινῇ, Σεισάχθειαν τὴν θυσίαν δομαζόντες, etc.

it as having cancelled indiscriminately all money contracts; while Androtion and others thought that it did nothing more than lower the rate of interest and depreciate the currency to the extent of 27 per cent., leaving the letter of the contracts unchanged. How Androtion came to maintain such an opinion we cannot easily understand¹. For the fragments now remaining from Solon distinctly refute it, though, on the other hand, they do not go so far as to substantiate the full extent of the opposite view entertained by many writers—that all money contracts indiscriminately were rescinded²: against which there is also a farther reason, that if the fact had been so, Solon could have had no motive to debase the money standard. Such debasement supposes that there must have been *some* debtors at least whose contracts remained valid, and whom, nevertheless, he desired partially to assist. His poems distinctly mention three things: (1) the removal of the boundary-stones; (2) the enfranchisement of the land; (3) the protection, liberation, and restoration of the persons of endangered or enslaved debtors. All these expressions point distinctly to the Thêtes and small [tenants], whose sufferings and peril were the most urgent, and whose case required a remedy immediate as well as complete. We find that his repudiation of debts was carried far enough to exonerate them, but no farther.

It seems to have been the respect entertained for the character of Solon which partly occasioned these various misconceptions of his ordinances for the relief of debtors. Androtion in ancient, and some eminent critics in modern times are anxious to make out that he gave relief without loss or injustice to anyone. But this opinion seems inadmissible. The loss to creditors by the wholesale abrogation of numerous pre-existing contracts, and by the partial depreciation of the coin, is a fact not to be disguised. The Seisachtheia of Solon, unjust so far as it rescinded previous agreements, but highly salutary in its consequences, is to be vindicated by showing that in no other way could the bonds of government have been held together, or the misery of the multitude alleviated. We are to consider, first, the great personal cruelty of these pre-existing contracts, which condemned the body of the free debtor and his family to slavery; next, the profound detestation created by such a system in the large mass of the poor, against both the judges and the creditors by whom it had been enforced, which rendered their feelings unmanageable, so soon as they came together under the sentiment of a common danger and with the determination to ensure to each other mutual protection. Moreover, the law which vests a creditor with power over the person of his debtor, so as to convert him into a slave, is likely to give rise to a class of

¹ See appendix to this chapter.—ED.

² Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 15. The statement of Dionysius of Halic. in regard to the bearing of the Seisachtheia is in the main accurate—*χρεῶν ἀφεσιν ψηφισαμένῳ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις* (v. 65)—to the debtors who were liable on the security of their bodies and their lands, and who were chiefly poor—not to all debtors.

Herakleides Pontic. (Πολιτ., c. 1) and Dio Chrysostom (*Or.*, xxxi., p. 331) express themselves loosely.

Both Wachsmuth (*Hell.*, *Alterth.*, v. 1., p. 259) and K. F. Hermann (*Gr. Staats Alter.*, § 106) quote the Heliastic oath and its energetic protest against repudiation, as evidence of the bearing of the Solonian Seisachtheia. But that oath is referable only to a later period; it cannot be produced in proof of any matter applicable to the time of

Solon; the mere mention of the Bouté of Five Hundred in it shows that it belongs to times subsequent to the Kleisthenean revolution. Nor does the passage from Plato (*Legg.*, iii., p. 684) apply to the case.

Both Wachsmuth and Hermann appear to me to narrow too much the extent of Solon's measure in reference to the clearing of debtors. But on the other hand, they enlarge the effect of his measures in another way, without any sufficient evidence—they think that he raised the *villain tenants* into *free proprietors*. Of this I see no proof, and think it improbable. A large proportion of the small debtors whom Solon exonerated were probably free proprietors before; the existence of the *ἀγοι* or mortgage pillars upon their land proves this [but see n. 3, p. 14.—ED.].

loans which inspire nothing but abhorrence—money lent with the foreknowledge that the borrower will be unable to repay it; but also in the conviction that the value of his person as a slave will make good the loss; thus reducing him to a condition of extreme misery, for the purpose sometimes of aggrandizing, sometimes of enriching, the lender. Now the foundation on which the respect for contracts rests, under a good law of debtor and creditor, is the very reverse of this. It rests on the firm conviction that such contracts are advantageous to both parties as a class, and that to break up the confidence essential to their existence would produce extensive mischief throughout all society. The man whose reverence for the obligation of a contract is now the most profound would have entertained a very different sentiment if he had witnessed the dealings of lender and borrower at Athens under the old ante-Solonian law. The oligarchy had tried their best to enforce this law of debtor and creditor with its disastrous series of contracts; and the only reason why they consented to invoke the aid of Solon, was because they had lost the power of enforcing it any longer, in consequence of the newly-awakened courage and combination of the people. That which they could not do for themselves Solon could not have done for them, even had he been willing. Nor had he in his position the means either of exempting or compensating those creditors who, separately taken, were open to no reproach; indeed, in following his proceedings, we see plainly that he thought compensation due, not to the creditors, but to the past sufferings of the enslaved debtors, since he redeemed several of them from foreign captivity, and brought them back to their home. It is certain that no measure, simply and exclusively prospective, would have sufficed for the emergency. There was an absolute necessity for overruling all that class of pre-existing rights which had produced so violent a social fever. While, therefore, to this extent, the *Seisachtheia* cannot be acquitted of injustice, we may confidently affirm that the injustice inflicted was an indispensable price paid for the maintenance of the peace of society, and for the final abrogation of a disastrous system as regarded insolvents¹. And the feeling as well as the legislation universal in the modern European world, by interdicting beforehand all contracts for selling a man's person or that of his children into slavery, goes far to sanction practically the Solonian repudiation.

One thing is never to be forgotten in regard to this measure, combined with the concurrent amendments introduced by Solon in the law—it settled finally the question to which it referred. Never again do we hear of the law of debtor and creditor as disturbing Athenian tranquillity. The general sentiment which grew up at Athens, under the Solonian money-law and under the democratical government, was one of high respect for the sanctity of contracts. Not only was there never any demand in the Athenian democracy for new 'tables' or a depreciation of

¹ That which Solon did for the Athenian people in regard to debts, is less than what was *promised* to the Roman plebs (at the time of its secession to the Mons Sacer in 491 B.C.) by Menenius Agrippa, the envoy of the Senate, to appease them, though it does not seem to have been ever *realized* (Dionys. Halic., vi. 83). He promised an abrogation of all the debts of debtors unable to pay, without exception—if the language of Dionysius is to be trusted, which probably it cannot be.

Dr. Thirlwall justly observes respecting Solon, 'He must be considered as an arbitrator to whom all the parties interested submitted their claims, with the avowed intent that they should be decided by him, not upon the footing of legal right, but according to his own view of the public interest. It was in this light that he himself regarded his office, and he appears to have discharged it faithfully and discreetly.' (*History of Greece*, c. xi., vol. ii., p. 42.)

the money standard, but a formal abnegation of any such projects was inserted in the solemn oath taken annually by the numerous Dikasts, who formed the popular judicial body called *Hēliæa* or the *Hēliastic* jurors—the same oath which pledged them to uphold the democratical constitution, also bound them to repudiate all proposals either for an abrogation of debts or for a redivision of the lands¹. There can be little doubt that under the Solonian law, which enabled the creditor to seize the property of his debtor, but gave him no power over the person, the system of money-lending assumed a more beneficial character. The old noxious contracts, mere snares for the liberty of a poor freeman and his children, disappeared, and loans of money took their place, founded on the property and prospective earnings of the debtor, which were in the main useful to both parties, and therefore maintained their place in the moral sentiment of the public. And though Solon had found himself compelled to rescind all the mortgages on land subsisting in his time, we see money freely lent upon this same security, throughout the historical times of Athens, and the evidentiary mortgage pillars remaining ever after undisturbed².

[It is interesting to notice that, whereas in the majority of ancient communities lending money on interest was regarded as disgraceful] at Athens the more favourable point of view prevailed throughout all the historical times. The march of industry and commerce, under the mitigated law which prevailed subsequently to Solon, had been sufficient to bring it about at a very early period, and to suppress all public antipathy against lenders at interest³. We may remark, too, that this more equitable tone of opinion grew up spontaneously, without any legal restriction on the rate of interest—no such restriction having ever been imposed, and the rate being expressly declared free by a law ascribed to Solon himself⁴. The same may probably be said of the communities of Greece generally; at least, there is no information to make us suppose the contrary. But the feeling against lending money at interest remained in the bosoms of the philosophical men long after it had ceased to form a part of the practical morality of the citizens, and long after it had ceased to be justified by the appearances of the case as at first it really had been. Plato, Aristotle, Cicero⁵, and Plutarch, treat the practice as a branch of that commercial and money-getting spirit which they are anxious to discourage; and one consequence of this was, that they were less disposed to contend strenuously for the inviolability of existing money-contracts. The conservative feeling on this point was stronger among the mass than

¹ *Démôsthen., Cont. Timokrat., p. 746.* οὐδὲ τῶν χρεῶν τῶν ἰδίων ἀποκοπᾶς, οὐδὲ γῆς ἀναδασμῶν τῆς Ἀθηναίων, οὐδ' οἰκίων (ψηφισμῶς); compare Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.*, xxxi., p. 332, who also dwells upon the anxiety of various Grecian cities to fix a curse upon all propositions for χρεῶν ἀποκοπή and γῆς ἀναδασμός. What is not less remarkable is, that Dio seems not to be aware of any one well-authenticated case in Grecian history in which a redivision of lands had ever actually taken place—ὁ μὲν δ' ὅπως ἴσμεν εἰ ποτε συνέβη (l. c.).

There was one exceptional case, in which the Attic law always continued to the creditor that power over the person of the insolvent debtor which all creditors had possessed originally—it was when the creditor had lent money for the express purpose of ransoming the debtor from captivity (*Démôsthen., Cont. Nikostr., p. 1249*)—analogous to the *Actio Depensi* in the old Roman law. Any citizen who owed money to the public treasury, and whose

debt became overdue, was deprived for the time of all civil rights until he had cleared it off.

² Diodorus (i. 79) gives us an alleged law of the Egyptian king Bocchoris releasing the persons of debtors, and rendering their properties only liable, which is affirmed to have served as an example for Solon to copy. If we can trust this historian, lawgivers in other parts of Greece still retained the old severe law enslaving the debtor's person: compare a passage in Isokrates (*Orat.*, xiv., *Plataicus*, p. 305; p. 414 Bek.).

³ But see note above, p. 14.—Ed.

⁴ Boeckh (*Public Econ. of Athens*, b. i., ch. 22, p. 128) thinks differently—in my judgment, contrary to the evidence: the passages to which he refers (especially that of Theophrastus) are not sufficient to sustain his opinion, and there are other passages which go far to contradict it.

⁵ Lysias, *Cont. Theomnist. A.*, c. 5, p. 360.

⁶ Cicero, *De Officiis*, l. 42.

among the philosophers. Plato even complains of it as inconveniently preponderant¹, and as arresting the legislator in all comprehensive projects of reform. For the most part, indeed, schemes of cancelling debts and redividing lands were never thought of except by men of desperate and selfish ambition, who made them stepping-stones to despotic power. Such men were denounced alike by the practical sense of the community and by the speculative thinkers; but when we turn to the case of the Spartan king Agis III., who proposed a complete extinction of debts and an equal redivision of the landed property of the State, not with any selfish or personal views, but upon pure ideas of patriotism, well or ill understood, and for the purpose of renovating the lost ascendancy of Sparta—we find Plutarch² expressing the most unqualified admiration of this young king and his projects, and treating the opposition made to him as originating in no better feelings than meanness and cupidity. The philosophical thinkers on politics conceived (and to a great degree justly, as I shall show hereafter) that the conditions of security, in the ancient world, imposed upon the citizens generally the absolute necessity of keeping up a military spirit and willingness to brave at all times personal hardship and discomfort; so that increase of wealth, on account of the habits of self-indulgence which it commonly introduces, was regarded by them with more or less of disfavour. If in their estimation any Grecian community had become corrupt, they were willing to sanction great interference with pre-existing rights for the purpose of bringing it back nearer to their ideal standard. And the real security for the maintenance of these rights lay in the conservative feelings of the citizens generally, much more than in the opinions which superior minds imbibed from the philosophers.

Such conservative feelings were in the subsequent Athenian democracy peculiarly deep-rooted. The mass of the Athenian people identified inseparably the maintenance of property in all its various shapes with that of their laws and constitution. And it is a remarkable fact, that, though the admiration entertained at Athens for Solon was universal, the principle of his *Seisachtheia* and of his money-depreciation was not only never imitated, but found the strongest tacit reprobation; whereas at Rome, as well as in most of the kingdoms of modern Europe, we know that one debasement of the coin succeeded another. It is of some importance to take notice of this fact, when we reflect how much 'Grecian faith' has been degraded by the Roman writers into a byword for duplicity in pecuniary dealings³. The democracy of Athens (and, indeed, the cities of Greece generally, both oligarchies and democracies) stands far above the senate of Rome, and far above the modern kingdoms of France and

¹ Plato, *Legg.*, iii., p. 684; v., pp. 736, 737.

Cicero lays down very good principles about the mischief of destroying faith in contracts; but his admonitions to this effect seem to be accompanied with an impracticable condition: the lawgiver is to take care that debts shall not be contracted to an extent hurtful to the State. Compare his opinion about *feneratores*, *Offic.*, i. 42; ii. 25.

² See Plutarch's *Life of Agis*, especially c. 13, about the bonfire in which the *κλῆρα* or mortgage deeds of the creditors were all burnt, in the agora of Sparta; compare also the comparison of Agis with Gracchus, c. 2.

³ 'Græcâ fide mercari.' Polybius puts the Greeks greatly below the Romans in point of veracity and good faith (vi. 56); in another pas-

sage he speaks not quite so confidently (xviii. 17). Even the testimony of the Roman writers is sometimes given in favour of Attic good faith, not against it (Velleius Paterc., ii. 23).

The whole tone and argument of the Oration of Demosthenes against Leptinés is a remarkable proof of the respect of the Athenian Dikastery for vested interests, even under less obvious forms than that of pecuniary possession. We may add a striking passage of Demosthenés, *Cont. Timokrat.*, wherein he denounces the rescinding of past transactions (*τὰ πεπραγμένα λύσαι*), contrasted with prospective legislation) as an injustice peculiar to oligarchy, and repugnant to the feelings of a democracy (*Cont. Timokrat.*, c. 20, p. 724; c. 36, 747).

England until comparatively recent times, in respect of honest dealing with the coinage¹. Moreover, while there occurred at Rome several political changes which brought about new tables, or at least a partial depreciation of contracts, no phenomenon of the same kind ever happened at Athens, during the three centuries between Solon and the end of the free working of the democracy. Doubtless there were fraudulent debtors at Athens; while the administration of private law, though not in any way conniving at their proceedings, was far too imperfect to repress them as effectually as might have been wished. But the public sentiment on the point was just and decided. It may be asserted with confidence that a loan of money at Athens was quite as secure as it ever was at any time or place of the ancient world, in spite of the great and important superiority of Rome with respect to the accumulation of a body of authoritative legal precedent, the source of what was ultimately shaped into the Roman jurisprudence. Among the various causes of sedition or mischief in the Grecian communities² we hear little of the pressure of private debt.

By the measures of relief above described³ Solon had accomplished results surpassing his own best hopes. He had healed the prevailing discontents; and such was the confidence and gratitude which he had inspired, that he was now called upon to draw up a constitution and laws for the better working of the government in future. His constitutional changes were great and valuable: respecting his laws, what we hear is rather curious than important.

It has been already stated that, down to the time of Solon, the classification received in Attica was that of the four Ionic tribes, comprising in one scale the Phratries and Gentes, and in another scale the three Trittyes and forty-eight Naukraries; while the Eupatridæ, seemingly a few specially respected gentes, and perhaps a few distinguished families in all the gentes, had in their hands all the powers of government. Solon introduced a new principle⁴ of classification—called in Greek the timocratic principle. He

¹ A similar credit, in respect to monetary probity, may be claimed for the republic of Florence. See M. Sismondi, *Républiques Italiennes* vol. iii., ch. 18, p. 176.

² The insolvent debtor in some of the Boeotian towns was condemned to sit publicly in the agora with a basket on his head, and then disfranchised (Nikolaus Damaskenus, *Frag.*, p. 152, ed. Orelli).

According to Diodorus, the old severe law against the body of a debtor, long after it had been abrogated by Solon at Athens, still continued in other parts of Greece (i. 79).

³ Solon, *Frag.* 27, ed. Schneid.—

ἂ μὲν ἀέλπτα σὺν θεοῖσιν ἦνυσ', ἄλλα δ' οὐ μάτην ἔρπον.

⁴ According to Plutarch (*Solon*, 18-23). The *Ath. Pol.*, however (c. vii. 3), says that this division had existed before Solon's time. It is conceivable that the words in the *Ath. Pol.*, καθάπερ δὴμῳ καὶ πρότερον, are an interpolation by a redactor, who wished to make the passage square with c. iv. on Draco's alleged constitution (for which see above, Appendix to Chapter I., on Early Attica). Another suggestion (Bury, p. 183) is that the first three classes existed, but that Solon constituted a new class for those who had previously been outside the pale. The solution of this problem possesses a purely academic interest. The essential point is Solon's purpose in modifying or inventing the classification. The explanation given above, and followed by many writers (e.g., Gilbert, *Eng. trans.*, p. 130 note), is almost demonstrably unsound. The *Ath. Pol.* says nothing about taxation, and, as we

know that Peisistratus, the champion of the poorer classes, subsequently levied a uniform tax of 5 or 10 per cent., it is absurd to suppose that the highly democratic principle of a sliding-scale had been previously adopted by Solon. Peisistratus would not have dared to attempt a reaction from a sliding-scale income-tax to a sort of poll-tax. See p. 49, n. 2.

The *Ath. Pol.* (*loc. cit.*) makes it clear that what Solon did was to bring the classification, if it existed before, into organic connection with the governmental machine by basing on it a graduated system of privileges and duties. There is no doubt that the archonship was still limited to the first class, and that certain minor offices were open to the second and third classes. The essential point, however, is that the fourth class (which included such men as the fishermen of the Paralia and the artisan population of Athens) received a certain place and power in the state organism. This class was certainly ineligible for office (even in the fourth century its members could obtain office only by posing as Zeugites). According to the *Ath. Pol.* (vii. 3), Solon gave them 'a share in the ekklesia and the law-courts'; and the *Politics* (ii. 12) says that they received the right of electing the officers of State and receiving their annual accounts. If the *Ath. Pol.* (viii. 1) had been correct in its further statement about Solon—that the high offices were chosen by lot out of elected candidates—the 'share in the ekklesia' would have been valueless. The statement in the *Politics* is probably correct, and the mode of election of archons described in the *Ath. Pol.* (*loc. cit.*) must be dated after Marathon. See note, p. 314.—Ed.

distributed all the citizens of the tribes, without any reference to their gentes or phratries, into four classes, according to the amount of their property, which he caused to be assessed and entered in a public schedule. Those whose annual income was equal to 500 medimni of corn (about 700 Imperial bushels) and upwards—one medimnus being considered equivalent to one drachma in money—he placed in the highest class; those who received between 300 and 500 medimni, or drachms, formed the second class; and those between 200 and 300, the third. The fourth and most numerous class comprised all those who did not possess land yielding a produce equal to 200 medimni. The first class, called Pentakosiomedimni, were alone eligible to the archonship and to all commands: the second were called the knights or horsemen of the State, as possessing enough to enable them to keep a horse and perform military service in that capacity; the third class, called the Zeugitæ, formed the heavy-armed infantry, and were bound to serve, each with his full panoply. Each of these three classes was entered in the public schedule as possessed of a taxable capital calculated with a certain reference to his annual income, but in a proportion diminishing according to the scale of that income—and a man paid taxes to the State according to the sum for which he stood rated in the schedule; so that this direct taxation acted really like a graduated income-tax. The rateable property of the citizen belonging to the richest class (the Pentakosiomedimnus) was calculated and entered on the State-schedule at a sum of capital equal to twelve times his annual income; that of the Hippeus, horseman or knight, at a sum equal to ten times his annual income; that of the Zeugite, at a sum equal to five times his annual income. Thus, a Pentakosiomedimnus whose income was exactly 500 drachms (the minimum qualification of his class), stood rated in the schedule for a taxable property of 6,000 drachms, or one talent, being twelve times his income—if his annual income were 1,000 drachms, he would stand rated for 12,000 drachms, or two talents, being the same proportion of income to rateable capital. But when we pass to the second class, horsemen or knights, the proportion of the two is changed. The horseman possessing an income of just 300 drachms (or 300 medimni) would stand rated for 3,000 drachms, or ten times his real income, and so in the same proportion for any income above 300 and below 500. Again, in the third class, or below 300, the proportion is a second time altered—the Zeugite possessing exactly 200 drachms of income was rated upon a still lower calculation, at 1,000 drachms, or a sum equal to five times his income; and all incomes of this class (between 200 and 300 drachms) would in like manner be multiplied by five in order to obtain the amount of rateable capital. Upon these respective sums of scheduled capital, all direct taxation was levied. If the State required 1 per cent. of direct tax, the poorest Pentakosiomedimnus would pay (upon 6,000 drachms) 60 drachms; the poorest Hippeus would pay (upon 3,000 drachms) 30; the poorest Zeugite would pay (upon 1,000 drachms) 10 drachms. And thus this mode of assessment would operate like a *graduated* income-tax, looking at it in reference to the three different classes—but as an *equal* income-tax, looking at it in reference to the different individuals comprised in one and the same class¹ [but see p. 22, n. 4.—ED.].

¹ On one point I cannot concur with Boeckh (*Staatshaushaltung der Athener*, bk. iii., c. 5). He fixes the pecuniary qualification of the third class,

or Zeugites, at 150 drachms, not at 200. All the positive testimonies (as he himself allows, p. 31) agree in fixing 200, and not 150; and the inference

All persons in the state whose annual income amounted to less than 200 medimni, or drachms, were placed in the fourth class, and they must have constituted the large majority of the community. They were not liable to any direct taxation, and perhaps were not at first even entered upon the taxable schedule, more especially as we do not know that any taxes were actually levied upon this schedule during the Solonian times. It is said that they were all called Thêtes, but this appellation is not well sustained, and cannot be admitted; the fourth compartment in the descending scale was, indeed, termed the Thetic census, because it contained all the Thêtes, and because most of its members were of that humble description; but it is not conceivable that a proprietor whose land yielded to him a clear annual return of 100, 120, 140, or 180 drachms, could ever have been designated by that name¹.

Such were the divisions in the political scale established by Solon, called by Aristotle a Timocracy, in which the rights, honours, functions, and liabilities of the citizens were measured out according to the assessed property of each. The highest honours of the state—that is, the places of the nine archons annually chosen, as well as those in the senate of Areopagus, into which the past archons always entered—perhaps also the posts of Prytanes of the Naukrari—were reserved for the first class: the poor Eupatrids became ineligible, while rich men not Eupatrids were admitted. Other posts of inferior distinction were filled by the second and third classes, who were, moreover, bound to military service, the one on horseback, the other as heavy-armed soldiers on foot. Moreover, the Liturgies of the State, as they were called—unpaid functions such as the trierarchy, chorêgy, gymnasiarchy, etc., which entailed expense and trouble on the holder of them—were distributed in some way or other between the members of the three classes, though we do not know how the distribution was made in these early times. On the other hand, the members of the fourth or lowest class were disqualified from holding any individual office of dignity. They performed no liturgies, served in case of war only as light-armed or with a panoply provided by the State, and paid nothing to the direct property-tax or Eisphora. It would be incorrect to say that they paid *no* taxes, for indirect taxes, such as duties on imports, fell upon them in common with the rest; and we must recollect that these latter were, throughout a long period of Athenian history, in

drawn from the old law, quoted in Dêmôsthênês (*Cont. Makariat.*, p. 1067) is too uncertain to outweigh this concurrence of authorities.

Moreover, the whole Solonian schedule becomes clearer and more symmetrical if we adhere to the statement of 200 drachms, and not 150, as the lowest scale of Zeugite income; for the scheduled capital is then, in all the three scales, a definite and exact multiple of the income returned—in the richest class it is twelve times—in the middle class, ten times—in the poorest, five times the income. But this correspondence ceases, if we adopt the supposition of Boeckh, that the lowest Zeugite income was 150 drachms; for the sum of 1,000 drachms (at which the lowest Zeugite was rated in the schedule) is no exact multiple of 150 drachms. In order to evade this difficulty, Boeckh was compelled to have recourse to a solution both roundabout and including nice fractions: he thinks that the income of each was converted into capital by multiplying by twelve, and that in the case of the richest class, or Pentakosiomedimni, the *whole* sum so obtained was entered in the schedule—in the

case of the second class, or Hippeis, $\frac{2}{3}$ of the sum—and in the case of the third class, or Zeugites, $\frac{1}{3}$ of the sum. Now, this process seems to me rather complicated, and the employment of a fraction such as $\frac{2}{3}$ (both difficult and not much above the simple fraction of one-half) very improbable; moreover, Boeckh's own table (p. 41) gives fractional sums in the third class, when none appear in the first or second.

Such objections, of course, would not be admissible, if there were any positive evidence to prove the point. But in this case they are in harmony with all the positive evidence, and are amply sufficient (in my judgment) to countervail the presumption arising from the old law on which Boeckh relies.

¹ See Boeckh, *Staatshaushaltung der Athener*, *ut supra*. Peilux gives an Inscription describing Anthemion son of Diphilus—Ἐνταυτοῦ ἀντὶ τέλους ἰκανῶς ἀμειψάμενος. The word τέλειον does not necessarily mean *actual* payment, but 'the being included in a class with a certain aggregate of duties and liabilities'—equivalent to *censeri* (Boeckh, p. 36).

steady operation, while the direct taxes were only levied on rare occasions.

But though this fourth class, constituting the great numerical majority of the free people, were shut out from individual office, their collective importance was in another way greatly increased. They were invested with the right of choosing the annual archons, out of the class of Pentakosiomedimni; and, what was of more importance still, the archons and the magistrates generally, after their year of office, instead of being accountable to the senate of Areopagus, were made formally accountable to the public assembly sitting in judgment upon their past conduct. They might be impeached and called upon to defend themselves, punished in case of misbehaviour, and debarred from the usual honour of a seat in the senate of Areopagus.

Had the public assembly been called upon to act alone without aid or guidance, this accountability would have proved only nominal. But Solon converted it into a reality by another new institution, which will hereafter be found of great moment in the working out of the Athenian democracy. He created the pro-bouleutic or pre-considering senate¹, - *Cou* with intimate and especial reference to the public assembly—to prepare matters for its discussion, to convoke and superintend its meetings, and to ensure the execution of its decrees. The senate, as first constituted by Solon, comprised 400 members, taken in equal proportions from the four tribes—not chosen by lot (as they will be found to be in the more advanced stage of the democracy), but elected by the people, in the same way as the archons then were—persons of the fourth or poorest class of the census, though contributing to elect, not being themselves eligible.

But while Solon thus created the new pre-considering senate, identified with and subsidiary to the popular assembly, he manifested no jealousy of the pre-existing Areopagitic senate². On the contrary, he enlarged

¹ The use of the term 'senate' conveys an entirely false impression of the functions and constitution of the Solonian *Boulê*. The term 'senate' is far more suited to the ancient 'Council of the Areopagus', which was the original *Boulê* of the state, and bore a real resemblance to the Roman senate, the Spartan Gerousia, and the royal councils of the heroic ages. The Solonian *Boulê*, as in its subsequent modifications under Kleisthenês, was primarily and specifically not a deliberative assembly, but a committee whose function it was to prepare and report on business for the Ekklesiâ, a body which, for various reasons, was suited only for giving a final decision on a prepared issue. This *Boulê* must always be translated 'council', not 'senate'.

On the view taken as to the alleged Constitution of Draco (see p. 10), there is no reason to doubt the view that Solon actually invented this second council. His difficulty was that, having deprived the Areopagus of its administrative functions, he was in danger of leaving too much power in the hands of the archons, who were still Eupatrid. For the danger of leaving such an assembly as the Ekklesiâ in the hands of magistrates, we may compare the Roman comitia, with their irregular days of meeting. Possibly the *Boulê* was elected by the Naukrarîes (Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, ii. 569), as the Kleisthenean *Boulê* was by the demes (*Ath. Pol.*, 62). The *Boulê* acted, therefore, as a safeguard to the Ekklesiâ, which, by reason of the comparative infrequency of its meetings, and by its constitution, would necessarily have been the tool of the executive state officers. It is most important to remember that the *Boulê* does not

appear with any prominence between 594 and the struggle between Isagoras and Kleisthenês. It is, therefore, clear, when we further consider the political crises of the time of Damasias and the Peisistratid usurpation, that the functions of the *Boulê* cannot have been more than those of a committee of reference.—E.P.

² The *Ath. Pol.* knows practically nothing of Solon's provisions with regard to the Areopagus. The popular version (quoted by Plutarch, c. xix.)—that the Areopagus was an invention of Solon's—is disproved by his own statement of Solon's law of amnesty, which reinstated all who were then disfranchised, 'except those who had been condemned by the Areopagus on a capital charge'. Apart from other positive arguments, the analogy of all Greek states is enough to show that such a Council must have been of immemorial antiquity.

What, then, was Solon's attitude to the Areopagus? There can be little doubt that he took from it its old deliberative functions, and thus practically placed it outside the ordinary state machinery. The ekklesiâ, on its newly-broadened basis, and brought into touch with actual administration by the new *Boulê* of 400, received the power which the Areopagus had wielded. In compensation for this important deprivation, the ancient council was entrusted with the dignified position of protector of the State, while it retained its old jurisdiction in cases of homicide and offences against the law. To say that Solon 'enlarged its powers' is to overlook the fundamental importance of the new powers transferred from it to the Ekklesiâ and *Boulê* combined.—E.P.

its powers, gave to it an ample supervision over the execution of the laws generally, and imposed upon it the censorial duty of inspecting the lives and occupations of the citizens, as well as of punishing men of idle and dissolute habits. He was himself, as past archon, a member of this ancient senate, and he is said to have contemplated that by means of the two senates the state would be held fast, as it were with a double anchor, against all shocks and storms¹.

Such are the only new political institutions (apart from the laws to be noticed presently) which there are grounds for ascribing to Solon, when we take proper care to discriminate what really belongs to Solon and his age, from the Athenian constitution as afterwards remodelled. It has been a practice common with many able expositors of Grecian affairs, and followed partly even by Dr. Thirlwall², to connect the name of Solon with the whole political and judicial state of Athens as it stood between the age of Periklēs and that of Dēmōsthēnēs—the regulations of the senate of five hundred, the numerous public dikasts, or jurors, taken by lot from the people, as well as the body annually selected for law-revision, and called Nomothets, and the prosecution (called the Graphē Paranomōn) open to be instituted against the proposer of any measure illegal, unconstitutional, or dangerous. There is, indeed, some countenance for this confusion between Solonian and post-Solonian Athens, in the usage of the orators themselves. For Dēmōsthēnēs and Æschinēs employ the name of Solon in a very loose manner, and treat him as the author of institutions belonging evidently to a later age: for example, the striking and characteristic oath of the Heliastic jurors, which Dēmōsthēnēs³ ascribes to Solon, proclaims itself in many ways as belonging to the age after Kleisthenēs, especially by the mention of the Senate of five hundred and not of four hundred. Among the citizens who served as jurors, or dikasts, Solon was venerated generally as the author of the Athenian laws. An orator, therefore, might well employ his name for the purpose of emphasis, without provoking any critical inquiry whether the particular

¹ Plutarch, *Solon*, 18, 19, 23; Philochorus, *Frag.* 60, ed. Didot. Athenæus, iv., p. 168; Valer. Maxim., ii. 6.

² Meursius, *Solon*, *passim*; Sigonius, *De Re-publ. Athen.*, i., p. 39 (though in some passages he makes a marked distinction between the time before and after Kleisthenēs, p. 28.) See Wachsmuth, *Hellenische Alterthumskunde*, vol. i., § 46, 47; Tittmann, *Griechische Staatsverfassungen*, p. 146; Platner, *Der Athische Prozess*, book ii., c. 5, pp. 28-38; Dr. Thirlwall, *History of Greece*, vol. ii., ch. xi., pp. 46-57.

Niebuhr, in his brief allusions to the legislation of Solon, keeps duly in view the material difference between Athens as constituted by Solon, and Athens as it came to be after Kleisthenēs; but he presumes a closer analogy between the Roman patricians and the Athenian Eupatridæ than we are entitled to count upon.

³ Dēmōsthēnēs, *Cont. Timokrat.*, p. 746. Æschinēs ascribes this oath to ὁ νομοθέτης (*c. Ktesiphon.*, p. 389).

Dr. Thirlwall notices the oath as prescribed by Solon (*History of Greece*, vol. ii., c. xi., p. 47).

So again Dēmōsthēnēs and Æschinēs, in the orations against Leptinēs (*c. 21*, p. 486) and against Timokrat., pp. 706, 707—compare Æschin., *c. Ktesiph.*, p. 429—in commenting upon the formalities enjoined for repealing an existing law and enacting a new one, while ascribing the whole to Solon—say, among other things, that Solon directed the proposer 'to post up his project of law before

the Eponymi' (ἐκθεῖναι πρὸς τὸν τῶν Ἐπωνύμων): now the Eponymi were (the statues of) the heroes from whom the ten Kleisthenean tribes drew their names, and the law making mention of these statues, proclaims itself as of a date subsequent to Kleisthenēs. Even the law defining the treatment of the condemned murderer who returned from exile, which both Dēmōsthēnēs and Doxopater (*ap. Walz. Collect. Rhedor.*, vol. ii., p. 223) call a law of Drako, is really later than Solon, as may be seen by its mention of the ἀξων (Dēmōsth., *Cont. Aristok.*, p. 629).

Andokidēs is not less liberal in his employment of the name of Solon (see *Orat.* i. *De Mysteriis*, p. 13), where he cites as a law of Solon, an enactment which contains the mention of the tribe Æantis and the [council] of five hundred (obviously therefore subsequent to the revolution of Kleisthenēs), besides other matters which prove it to have been passed even subsequent to the oligarchical revolution of the four hundred, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war. The Prytanes, the Proedri, and the division of the year into ten portions of time, each called by the name of a *prytany*—so interwoven with all the public proceedings of Athens—do not belong to the Solonian Athens, but to Athens as it stood after the ten tribes of Kleisthenēs.

[In spite of these arguments, Greenidge (*Greek Constitutional History*, p. 154 n.) is inclined to believe that Solon did originally constitute a sworn body of dikasts.—Ed.]

institution, which he happened to be then impressing upon his audience, belonged really to Solon himself or to the subsequent periods. Many of those institutions, which Dr. Thirlwall mentions in conjunction with the name of Solon, are among the last refinements and elaborations of the democratical mind of Athens—gradually prepared, doubtless, during the interval between Kleisthenês and Periklês, but not brought into full operation until the period of the latter (460-429 B.C.). For it is hardly possible to conceive these numerous dikasteries and assemblies in regular, frequent, and long-standing operation, without an assured payment to the dikasts who composed them. Now such payment first began to be made about the time of Periklês, if not by his actual proposition¹; and Dêmôsthênês had good reason for contending that if it were suspended, the judicial as well as the administrative system of Athens would at once fall to pieces². It would be a marvel, such as nothing short of strong direct evidence would justify us in believing, that in an age when even partial democracy was yet untried, Solon should conceive the idea of such institutions; it would be a marvel still greater that the half-emancipated Thêtes and small proprietors, for whom he legislated—yet trembling under the rod of the Eupatrid archons, and utterly inexperienced in collective business—should have been found suddenly competent to fulfil these ascendent functions, such as the citizens of conquering Athens in the days of Periklês—full of the sentiment of force and actively identifying themselves with the dignity of their community—became gradually competent, and not more than competent, to exercise with effect. To suppose that Solon contemplated and provided for the periodical revision of his laws by establishing a Nomothetic jury or dikastery, such as that which we find in operation during the time of Dêmôsthênês, would be at variance (in my judgment) with any reasonable estimate either of the man or of the age. Herodotus says that Solon, having exacted from the Athenians solemn oaths that *they* would not rescind any of his laws for ten years, quitted Athens for that period, in order that he might not be compelled to rescind them himself: Plutarch informs us that he gave to his laws force for a century absolute³. Solon himself, and Drako before him, had been lawgivers evoked and empowered by the special emergency of the times: the idea of a frequent revision of laws, by a body of lot-selected dikasts, belongs to a far more advanced age, and could not well have been present to the minds of either. The wooden rollers of Solon, like the tables of the Roman decemvirs⁴, were doubtless intended as a permanent 'fons omnis publici privatique juris'.

If we examine the facts of the case, we shall see that nothing more than the bare foundation of the democracy of Athens as it stood in the time of Periklês, can reasonably be ascribed to Solon. 'I gave to the people (Solon says in one of his short remaining fragments⁵) as much strength as sufficed for their needs, without either enlarging or diminishing their dignity; for those, too, who possessed power and were noted for wealth, I took care that no unworthy treatment should be reserved. I stood with the strong shield cast over both parties, so as not to allow an unjust triumph to either.' Again, Aristotle tells us that Solon bestowed upon

¹ See Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens*, book ii., c. 15.

² Dêmôsthênês, *Cont. Timokrat.*, c. 26, p. 731: compare Aristophanês, *Ekklesiastus*, 302.

³ Herodot., i. 29; Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 25. Aulus

Gellius affirms that the Athenians swore under strong religious penalties to observe them for ever (ii. 12). [*Ath. Pol.*, c. vii., says that Solon made his laws for 100 years.—Ed.]

⁴ Livy, iii. 34.

⁵ *Ath. Pol.*, xii. 1.—Ed.

the people as much power as was indispensable, but no more¹: the power to elect their magistrates and hold them to accountability: if the people had had less than this, they could not have been expected to remain tranquil—they would have been in slavery and hostile to the constitution. Not less distinctly does Herodotus speak, when he describes the revolution subsequently operated by Kleisthenês—the latter (he tells us) found 'the Athenian people excluded from everything'². These passages seem positively to contradict the supposition, in itself sufficiently improbable, that Solon is the author of the peculiar democratical institutions of Athens, such as the constant and numerous dikasts for judicial trials and revision of laws. The genuine and forward democratical movement of Athens begins only with Kleisthenês, from the moment when that distinguished Alkmæônid, either spontaneously or from finding himself worsted in his party strife with Isagoras, purchased by large popular concessions the hearty co-operation of the multitude under very dangerous circumstances. While Solon, in his own statement as well as in that of Aristotle, gave to the people as much power as was strictly needful, but no more—Kleisthenês (to use the significant phrase of Herodotus), 'being vanquished in the party contest with his rival, *took the people into partnership*'. It was, thus, to the interests of the weaker section, in a strife of contending nobles, that the Athenian people owed their first admission to political ascendancy—in part, at least, to this cause, though the proceedings of Kleisthenês indicate a hearty and spontaneous popular sentiment. But such constitutional admission of the people would not have been so astonishingly fruitful in positive results, if the course of public events for the half-century after Kleisthenês had not been such as to stimulate most powerfully their energy, their self-reliance, their mutual sympathies, and their ambition.

But the Solonian constitution, though only the foundation, was yet the indispensable foundation, of the subsequent democracy. And if the discontents of the miserable Athenian population, instead of experiencing his disinterested and healing management, had fallen at once into the hands of selfish power-seekers like Kylon or Peisistratus³—the memorable expansion of the Athenian mind during the ensuing century would never have taken place, and the whole subsequent history of Greece would probably have taken a different course. Solon left the essential powers of the state still in the hands of the oligarchy. The party combats (to be recounted hereafter) between Peisistratus, Lykurgus and Megaklês, thirty years after his legislation, which ended in the despotism of Peisistratus, will appear to be of the same purely oligarchical character as they had been before Solon was appointed archon. But the oligarchy which he established was very different from the unmitigated oligarchy which he found, so teeming with oppression and so destitute of redress, as his own poems testify.

It was he who first gave both to the citizens of middling property and to the general mass, a *locus standi* against the Eupatrids. He enabled the people partially to protect themselves, and familiarized them with the idea of protecting themselves, by the peaceful exercise of a constitutional franchise. The new force, through which this protection was carried

¹ Aristot., *Polit.*, ii. 9, 4.

² Herodot., v. 69.

³ For a criticism of the propriety of this estimate of Peisistratus, see c. iii., appendix.—Ed.

into effect, was the public assembly called *Heliaia*¹, regularized and armed with enlarged prerogatives and farther strengthened by its indispensable ally—the pro-bouleutic or pre-considering Senate [Council]. Under the Solonian constitution, this force was merely secondary and defensive, but after the renovation of Kleisthenês it became paramount and sovereign. It branched out gradually into those numerous popular dikasteries which so powerfully modified both public and private Athenian life, drew to itself the undivided reverence and submission of the people, and by degrees rendered the single magistracies essentially subordinate functions. The popular assembly, as constituted by Solon, appearing in modified efficiency and trained to the office of reviewing and judging the general conduct of a past magistrate—forms the intermediate stage between the passive Homeric agora, and those omnipotent assemblies and dikasteries which listened to Periklês or Dêmôsthenês. Compared with these last, it has in it but a faint streak of democracy, and so it naturally appeared to Aristotle, who wrote with a practical experience of Athens in the time of the orators; but compared with the first, or with the ante-Solonian constitution of Attica, it must doubtless have appeared a concession eminently democratical. To impose upon the Eupatrid archon the necessity of being elected, or put upon his trial of after-accountability, by the *rabble* of freemen (such would be the phrase in Eupatrid society), would be a bitter humiliation to those among whom it was first introduced; for we must recollect that this was the most extensive scheme of constitutional reform yet propounded in Greece, and that despots and oligarchies shared between them at that time the whole Grecian world. As it appears that Solon, while constituting the popular assembly with its pro-bouleutic Senate [Council], had no jealousy of the Senate of Areopagus, and indeed even enlarged its powers—we may infer that his grand object was, not to weaken the oligarchy generally, but to improve the administration and to repress the misconduct and irregularities of the individual archons; and that, too, not by diminishing their powers, but by making some degree of popularity the condition both of their entry into office and of their safety or honour after it.

It is, in my judgment, a mistake to suppose that Solon transferred the judicial power of the archons to a popular dikastery. These magistrates still continued self-acting judges, deciding and condemning without appeal—not mere presidents of an assembled jury, as they afterwards came to be during the next century². For the general exercise of such

¹ Lysias, *Cont. Theomnest. A.*, c. 5, p. 357, who gives ἐν τῇ προσημίῳ ἡ ἑλιαία as a Solonian phrase; though we are led to doubt whether Solon can ever have employed it, when we find Pollux (vii. 5, 22) distinctly stating that Solon used the word *ἐπαίτια* to signify what the orators called *προσημίματα*.

The original and proper meaning of the word *ἑλιαία* is, the public assembly (see Tittmann, *Griech. Staatsverfass.*, pp. 215, 216): in subsequent times we find it signifying at Athens—(1) The aggregate of 6,000 dikasts chosen by lot annually and sworn, or the assembled people considered as exercising judicial functions; (2) each of the separate fractions into which this aggregate body was in practice subdivided for actual judicial business. *Ἑκκλησία* became the term for the public deliberative assembly properly so called, which could never be held on the same day that the dikasteries sat (Dêmôsthen., *Cont. Timokrat.*, c. 21, p. 726): every

dikastery is in fact always addressed as if it were the assembled people engaged in a specific duty.

I imagine the term *ἑλιαία* in the time of Solon to have been used in its original meaning—the public assembly, perhaps with the implication of employment in judicial proceeding. The fixed number of 6,000 does not date before the time of Kleisthenês, because it is essentially connected with the ten tribes; while the subdivision of this body of 6,000 into various bodies of jurors for different courts and purposes did not commence, probably, until after the first reforms of Kleisthenês. I shall revert to this point when I touch upon the latter and his times.

² The statement of Plutarch, that Solon gave an appeal from the decision of the archon to the judgment of the popular dikastery (Plutarch, *Solon*, 18), is distrusted by most of the expositors, though Dr. Thirlwall seems to admit it, justifying it by the analogy of the Ephetae, or judges of appeal

power they were accountable after their year of office. Such accountability was the security against abuse—a very insufficient security, yet not wholly inoperative. It will be seen, however, presently that these archons, though strong to coerce, and perhaps to oppress, small and poor men, had no means of keeping down rebellious nobles of their own rank, such as Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megaklēs, each with his armed followers. When we compare the drawn swords of these ambitious competitors, ending in the despotism of one of them, with the vehement parliamentary strife between Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs afterwards, peaceably decided by the vote of the sovereign people and never disturbing the public tranquillity, we shall see that the democracy of the ensuing century fulfilled the conditions of order, as well as of progress, better than the Solonian constitution.

To distinguish this Solonian constitution from the democracy which followed it, is essential to a due comprehension of the progress of the Greek mind, and especially of Athenian affairs. That democracy was achieved by gradual steps, which will be hereafter described. Dēmōsthenēs and Æschinēs lived under it as a system consummated and in full activity, when the stages of its previous growth were no longer matter of exact memory; and the dikasts then assembled in judgment were pleased to hear their constitution associated with the names either of Solon or of Theseus. Their inquisitive contemporary Aristotle was not thus misled; but even commonplace Athenians of the century preceding would have escaped the same delusion. For during the whole course of the democratical movement from the Persian invasion down to the Peloponnesian war, and especially during the changes proposed by Periklēs and Ephialtēs, there was always a strenuous party of resistance, who would not suffer the people to forget that they had already forsaken, and were on the point of forsaking still more, the orbit marked out by Solon. Periklēs underwent innumerable attacks both from the orators in the assembly and from the comic writers in the theatre. And among these sarcasms on the political tendencies of the day, we are probably to number the complaint, breathed by the poet Kratinus, of the desuetude into which both Solon and Drako had fallen—‘I swear’ (said he in a fragment of one of his comedies) ‘by Solon and Drako, whose wooden tablets (of laws) are now employed by people to roast their barley’¹. The laws of Solon respecting penal offences, respecting inheritance and adoption, respecting the private relations generally, etc., remained for the most part

constituted by Drako (*History of Greece*, vol. ii., ch. xi., p. 46).

[The *Ath. Pol.* (c. ix.) definitely states that Solon gave the right of appeal from the magistrates to the *Heliæa*, and seems to regard this measure as the corner-stone of his reforms (see Bury, *H. of G.*). Probably this appeal was in civil cases only, as criminal cases were still tried before the *Areopagus* and the *Ephete*. There is no doubt that the magistrates still retained considerable judicial power; it was only later that they degenerated into a court of first instance (see *Greenidge's Greek Constitutional History*, p. 154). We may add that *Lysias* (*Or. x.*, c. 16) quotes a genuine Solonian law in which the *Heliæa* is mentioned. There is therefore no doubt that the *Heliæa* were, at least in some crude form, the invention of Solon.—Ed.]

¹ Kratinus, *ap. Plutarch, Solon*, 25 :

Ἡρὸς τοῦ Σόλωνος καὶ Δράκοντος, οἷσι νῦν
φρυγούσιν ᾗδ᾽ τὰς κάρυς ταῖς κύρβεισιν.

Isokratēs praises the moderate democracy in early Athens, as compared with that under which he lived; but in the *Orat.*, vii. (*Areopagitica*), he connects the former with the names of Solon and Kleisthenēs, while in the *Orat.*, xii. (*Panathenaic*), he considers the former to have lasted from the days of Theseus to those of Solon and Peisistratus. In this latter oration he describes pretty exactly the power which the people possessed under the Solonian constitution—τῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς καταστήσαι καὶ λαβεῖν δίκην παρὰ τῶν ἐξαμαρτανόντων, which coincides with the phrase of Aristotle—τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύναι—supposing ἀρχόντων to be understood as the substantive of ἐξαμαρτανόντων.

Compare Isokratēs, *Or.*, vii., p. 143 (p. 192 Bek.), and p. 150 (202 Bek.), and *Orat.*, xii., pp. 260-264 (351-356 Bek.).

in force: his quadripartite census also continued, at least for financial purposes, until the archonship of Nausinikus in 377 B.C., so that Cicero and others might be warranted in affirming that his laws still prevailed at Athens; but his political and judicial arrangements had undergone a revolution¹ not less complete and memorable than the character and spirit of the Athenian people generally. The choice, by way of lot, of archons and other magistrates, and the distribution by lot of the general body of dikasts or jurors into pannels for judicial business, may be decidedly considered as not belonging to Solon, but adopted after the revolution of Kleisthenês; probably the choice of [councillors] by lot also. The lot was a symptom of pronounced democratical spirit, such as we must not seek in the Solonian institutions.

It is not easy to make out distinctly what was the political position of the ancient Gentes and Phratries, as Solon left them. The four tribes consisted altogether of gentes and phratries, insomuch that no one could be included in any one of the tribes who was not also a member of some gens and phratry. Now the pro-bouleutic or pre-considering [council] consisted of 400 members—100 from each of the tribes; persons not included in any gens or phratry could, therefore, have had no access to it. The conditions of eligibility were similar, according to ancient custom, for the nine archons—of course, also, for the senate of Areopagus. So that there remained only the public assembly, in which an Athenian not a member of these tribes could take part: yet he was a citizen, since he could give his vote for archons and senators, and could take part in the annual decision of their accountability, besides being entitled to claim redress for wrong from the archons in his own person—while the alien could only do so through the intervention of an avouching citizen or Prostatês. It seems, therefore, that all persons not included in the four tribes, whatever their grade of fortune might be, were on the same level in respect to political privilege as the fourth and poorest class of the Solonian census. It has already been remarked that even before the time of Solon the number of Athenians not included in the gentes or phratries was probably considerable: it tended to become greater and greater, since these bodies were close and unexpansive, while the policy of the new lawgiver tended to invite industrious settlers from other parts of Greece to Athens. Such great and increasing inequality of political privilege helps to explain the weakness of the Government in repelling the aggressions of Peisistratus, and exhibits the importance of the revolution afterwards wrought by Kleisthenês, when he abolished (for all political purposes) the four old tribes, and created ten new comprehensive tribes in place of them.

In regard to the regulations of the senate [council] and the assembly of the people, as constituted by Solon, we are altogether without information: nor is it safe to transfer to the Solonian constitution the information, comparatively ample, which we possess respecting these bodies under the later democracy.

The laws of Solon were inscribed on wooden rollers and triangular tablets, in the species of writing called Boustrophêdon (lines alternating first from left to right, and next from right to left, 'like the course of the ploughman'), and preserved first in the Acropolis, subsequently in the

¹ Cicero, *Orat. pro Sext. Roscio*, c. 25; Ælian, *V. H.*, viii. 10.

Prytaneium. On the tablets, called Kyrbeis, were chiefly commemorated the laws respecting sacred rites and sacrifices¹: on the pillars or rollers, of which there were at least sixteen, were placed the regulations respecting matters profane. So small are the fragments which have come down to us, and so much has been ascribed to Solon by the orators which belongs really to the subsequent times, that it is hardly possible to form any critical judgment respecting the legislation as a whole, or to discover by what general principles or purposes he was guided.

He left unchanged all the previous laws and practices respecting the crime of homicide, connected as they were intimately with the religious feelings of the people. The laws of Drako on this subject, therefore, remained, but on other subjects, according to Plutarch, they were altogether abrogated²: there is, however, room for supposing that the repeal cannot have been so sweeping as this biographer represents.

The Solonian laws seem to have borne more or less upon all the great departments of human interest and duty. We find regulations political and religious, public and private, civil and criminal, commercial, agricultural, sumptuary, and disciplinarian. Solon provides punishment for crimes, restricts the profession and status of the citizen, prescribes detailed rules for marriage as well as for burial, for the common use of springs and wells, and for the mutual interest of conterminous farmers in planting or hedging their properties. As far as we can judge from the imperfect manner in which his laws come before us, there does not seem to have been any attempt at a systematic order or classification. Some of them are mere general and vague directions, while others, again, run into the extreme of speciality.

By far the most important of all was the amendment of the law of debtor and creditor, which has already been adverted to, and the abolition of the power of fathers and brothers to sell their daughters and sisters into slavery. The prohibition of all contracts on the security of the body was itself sufficient to produce a vast improvement in the character and condition of the poorer population—a result which seems to have been so sensibly obtained from the legislation of Solon, that Boeckh and some other eminent authors suppose him to have abolished villenage and conferred upon the poor tenants a property in their lands, annulling the seignorial rights of the landlord. But this opinion rests upon no positive evidence, nor are we warranted in ascribing to him any stronger measure in reference to the land than the annulment of the previous mortgages³.

¹ Plutarch, *Solon*, 23-25. He particularly mentions the sixteen ἀξῶν: we learn also that the thirteenth ἀξῶν contained the eighth law (c. 19): the twenty-first law is alluded to in Harpokration, v., Ὅτι οἱ ποιητοί.

Some remnants of these wooden rollers existed in the days of Plutarch in the Athenian Prytaneium. See Harpokration and Photius, v., κύρβεις; Aristot., περὶ Πολιτικῶν, *Frag.* 35, ed. Neumann; Euphorion, *ap.* Harpokrat. Ὁ κάτωθεν νόμος. Bekker, *Anecdota*, p. 413.

What we read respecting the ἀξῶνες and the κύρβεις does not convey a clear idea of them. Besides Aristotle, both Seleukus and Didymus are named as having written commentaries expressly about them (Plutarch, *Solon*, i.; Suidas, v., Ὀργάνους; compare also Meursius, *Solon*, c. 24; *Vit. Aristotelis*, *ap.* Westermann. *Vitarum Scripti. Græc.*,

p. 404), and the collection in Stephan., *Thesaur.*, p. 1095. [Gilbert, pp. 140, 141, n.—Ed.]

² Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 27; Cyrill., *Cont. Julian.* v., p. 169, ed. Spanheim. The enumeration of the different admitted justifications for homicide, which we find in Dêmosth., *Cont. Aristokrat.*, p. 637, seems rather too copious and systematic for the age of Drako; it may have been amended by Solon, or perhaps in an age subsequent to Solon.

³ See Boeckh, *Public Economy of the Athenians*, bk. iii., § 5 (and note 3, p. 14 above). Tittmann (*Griechisch. Staatsverfass.*, p. 651) and others have supposed (from Aristot., *Polit.*, ii. 7) that Solon enacted a law to limit the quantity of land which any individual citizen might acquire. But the passage does not seem to me to bear out such an opinion. [Most writers accept.—Ed.]

The first pillar of his laws contained a regulation respecting exportable produce. He forbade the exportation of all produce of the Attic soil, except olive-oil alone. And the sanction employed to enforce observance of this law deserves notice, as an illustration of the ideas of the time—the archon was bound, on pain of forfeiting 100 drachms, to pronounce solemn curses against every offender¹. We are probably to take this prohibition in conjunction with other objects said to have been contemplated by Solon, especially the encouragement of artisans and manufacturers at Athens. Observing (we are told) that many new immigrants were just then flocking into Attica to seek an establishment, in consequence of its greater security, he was anxious to turn them rather to manufacturing industry than to the cultivation of a soil naturally poor². He forbade the granting of citizenship to any immigrants, except to such as had quitted irrevocably their former abodes, and come to Athens for the purpose of carrying on some industrious profession; and in order to prevent idleness, he directed the senate of Areopagus to keep watch over the lives of the citizens generally, and punish every one who had no course of regular labour to support him. If a father had not taught his son some art or profession, Solon relieved the son from all obligation to maintain him in his old age. And it was to encourage the multiplication of these artisans that he ensured, or sought to ensure, to the residents in Attica the exclusive right of buying and consuming all its landed produce except olive-oil, which was raised in abundance more than sufficient for their wants. It was his wish that the trade with foreigners should be carried on by exporting the produce of artisan labour instead of the produce of land³.

This commercial prohibition is founded on principles substantially similar to those which were acted upon in the early history of England, with reference both to corn and to wool, and in other European countries also. In so far as it was at all operative, it tended to lessen the total quantity of produce raised upon the soil of Attica, and thus to keep the price of it from rising—a purpose less objectionable (if we assume that the legislator is to interfere at all) than that of our late Corn Laws, which were destined to prevent the price of grain from falling. But the law of Solon must have been altogether inoperative, in reference to the great articles of human subsistence; for Attica imported, both largely and constantly, grain and salt-provisions—probably also wool and flax for the spinning and weaving of the women, and certainly timber for building. Whether the law was ever enforced with reference to figs and honey may well be doubted; at least, these productions of Attica were in after-times generally consumed and celebrated throughout Greece. Probably, also, in the time of Solon the silver-mines of Laureium had hardly begun to

¹ Plutarch, *Solon*, 24. The first law, however, is said to have related to the ensuring of a maintenance to wives and orphans (Harpokration, v., Σίρος).

By a law of Athens (which marks itself out as belonging to the century after Solon, by the fulness of its provisions and by the number of steps and official persons named in it), the rooting up of an olive-tree in Attica was forbidden, under a penalty of 200 drachms for each tree so destroyed—except for sacred purposes, or to the extent of two trees per annum for the convenience of the proprietor (Démosten., *Cont. Makariat.*, c. 16, p. 1074).

² Plutarch, *Solon*, 22.

³ Plutarch, *Solon*, 22-24. According to Herodotus, Solon had enacted that the authorities should punish every man with death who could not show a regular mode of industrious life (Herod., ii. 177; Diodor., i. 77).

So severe a punishment is not credible, nor is it likely that Solon borrowed his idea from Egypt.

According to Pollux (viii. 6) idleness was punished by atimy (civil disfranchisement) under Drako. Under Solon this punishment only took effect against the person who had been convicted of it on three successive occasions. See Meursius, *Solon*, c. 17; and the *Areopagus* of the same author, c. 8 and 9; and Taylor, *Lect. Lysiac.*, cap. 10.

be worked: these afterwards became highly productive, and furnished to Athens a commodity for foreign payments not less convenient than lucrative¹.

It is interesting to notice the anxiety, both of Solon and of Drako, to enforce among their fellow-citizens industrious and self-maintaining habits²; and we shall find the same sentiment proclaimed by Periklēs, at the time when Athenian power was at its maximum. Nor ought we to pass over this early manifestation in Attica of an opinion equitable and tolerant towards sedentary industry, which in most other parts of Greece was regarded as comparatively dishonourable. The general tone of Grecian sentiment recognised no occupations as perfectly worthy of a free citizen except arms, agriculture, and athletic and musical exercises; and the proceedings of the Spartans, who kept aloof even from agriculture and left it to their Helots, were admired, though they could not be copied, throughout most part of the Hellenic world. Even minds like Plato, Aristotle and Xenophon concurred to a considerable extent in this feeling, which they justified on the ground that the sedentary life and unceasing house-work of the artisan were inconsistent with military aptitude. The town-occupations are usually described by a word which carries with it contemptuous ideas, and though recognised as indispensable to the existence of the city, are held suitable only for an inferior and semi-privileged order of citizens. This, the received sentiment among Greeks, as well as foreigners, found a strong and growing opposition at Athens, as I have already said—corroborated also by a similar feeling at Corinth³. The trade of Corinth, as well as of Chalkis in Eubœa, was extensive, at a time when that of Athens had scarce any existence. But while the despotism of Periander can hardly have failed to operate as a discouragement to industry at Corinth, the contemporaneous legislation of Solon provided for traders and artisans a new home at Athens, giving the first encouragement to that numerous town-population both in the city and in the Peiræus, which we find actually residing there in the succeeding century. The multiplication of such town residents, both citizens and metics—i.e., resident persons, not citizens, but enjoying an assured position and civil rights—was a capital fact in the onward march of Athens, since it determined not merely the extension of her trade, but also the pre-eminence of her naval force—and thus, as a farther consequence, lent extraordinary vigour to her democratical government. It seems, moreover, to have been a departure from the primitive temper of Atticism, which tended both to cantonal residence and rural occupation. We have, therefore, the greater interest in noting the first mention of it as a consequence of the Solonian legislation.

To Solon is first owing the admission of a power of testamentary bequest at Athens, in all cases in which a man had no legitimate children. According to the pre-existing custom, we may rather assume that if a deceased person left neither children nor blood relations, his property descended (as at Rome) to his gens and phratry⁴.

¹ Xenophon, *De Vectigalibus*, iii. 2.

² Thukyd., ii. 40 (the funeral oration delivered by Periklēs)—καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τι αἰσχρὸν ἀλλ' οὐ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἰσχίον.

³ Herodot., ii. 167-177; compare Xenophon, *Economic*, iv. 3.

The unbounded derision, however, which Aristophanes heaps upon Kleôn as a tanner, and upon Hyperbolus as a lamp-maker, proves that if any

manufacturer engaged in politics, his party opponents found enough of the old sentiment remaining to turn it to good account against him.

⁴ This seems the just meaning of the words, ἐν τῷ γένει τοῦ τεθνήκτος εἶδει τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὸν οἶκον καταμένειν, for that early day (Plutarch, *Solon*, 21). (Bury (p. 186 note) thinks that Solon merely legalized an existing usage, but see Abbott, *History of Greece*, part i., p. 422.—Ed.)

It has been already mentioned that Solon forbade the sale of daughters or sisters into slavery by fathers or brothers, a prohibition which shows how much females had before been looked upon as articles of property. And it would seem that before his time the violation of a free woman must have been punished at the discretion of the magistrates, for we are told that he was the first who enacted a penalty of 100 drachms against the offender, and 20 drachms against the seducer of a free woman¹. Moreover, it is said that he forbade a bride when given in marriage to carry with her any personal ornaments and appurtenances, except to the extent of three robes and certain matters of furniture not very valuable. Solon farther imposed upon women several restraints in regard to proceeding at the obsequies of deceased relatives. He forbade profuse demonstrations of sorrow, singing of composed dirges, and costly sacrifices and contributions. He limited strictly the quantity of meat and drink admissible for the funeral banquet, and prohibited nocturnal exit, except in a car and with a light. It appears that both in Greece and Rome the feelings of duty and affection on the part of surviving relatives prompted them to ruinous expense in a funeral, as well as to unmeasured effusions both of grief and conviviality; and the general necessity experienced for legal restriction is attested by the remark of Plutarch, that similar prohibitions to those enacted by Solon were likewise in force at his native town of Chæroneia².

Other penal enactments of Solon are yet to be mentioned. He forbade absolutely evil-speaking with respect to the dead. He forbade it likewise with respect to the living, either in a temple or before judges or archons, or at any public festival, on pain of a forfeit of three drachms to the person aggrieved, and two more to the public treasury. How mild the general character of his punishments was, may be judged by this law against foul language, not less than by the law before-mentioned against rape. Both the one and the other of these offences were much more severely dealt with under the subsequent law of democratical Athens. The peremptory edict against speaking ill of a deceased person, though doubtless springing in a great degree from disinterested repugnance, is traceable also in part to that fear of the wrath of the departed which strongly possessed the early Greek mind.

It seems generally that Solon determined by law the outlay for the public sacrifices, though we do not know what were his particular directions. We are told that he reckoned a sheep and a medimnus (of wheat

¹ According to Æschinés (*Cont. Timarch.*, pp. 16-78), the punishment enacted by Solon against the *προσγυριός*, or procurer, in such cases of seduction was death.

² Plut., *Solon* 20. The Solonian restrictions on the subject of funerals were to a great degree copied in the twelve tables at Rome; see Cicero, *De Legg.*, ii. 23, 24. He esteems it a right thing to put the rich and the poor on a level in respect to funeral ceremonies. Plato follows an opposite idea, and limits the expense of funerals upon a graduated scale according to the census of the deceased (*Legg.*, xii., p. 939).

Démosthenés (*Cont. Makariat.*, p. 1071) gives what he calls the Solonian law on funerals, different from Plutarch on several points.

Ungovernable excesses of grief among the female sex are sometimes mentioned in Grecian towns. See the *μαυικόν πένθος* among the Milesian women (Polyæn., viii. 63); the Milesian

women, however, had a tinge of Karian feeling.

Compare an instructive inscription recording a law of the Greek city of Gambreion in Æolic Asia Minor, wherein the dress, the proceedings, and the time of allowed mourning, for men, women, and children who had lost their relatives, are strictly prescribed under severe penalties (Franz, *Fünf Inschriften und fünf Städte in Kleinasien*, Berlin, 1840, p. 17). Expensive ceremonies in the celebration of marriage are forbidden by some of the old Scandinavian laws (Wilda, *Das Gildenwesen im Mittelalter*, p. 18).

And we may understand the motives, whether we approve the wisdom or not, of sumptuary restrictions on these ceremonies, when we read the account given by Colonel Sleeman of the ruinous expenses incurred to this day among the Hindoos in the celebration of marriage. (*Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official*, vol. i., c. vi., p. 51-53.)

or barley ?) as equivalent, either of them, to a drachm, and that he also prescribed the prices to be paid for first-rate oxen intended for solemn occasions. But it astonishes us to see the large recompense which he awarded out of the public treasury to a victor at the Olympic or Isthmian games : to the former 500 drachms, equal to one year's income of the highest of the four classes on the census ; to the latter 100 drachms. The magnitude of these rewards strikes us the more when we compare them with the fines on rape and evil-speaking. At the same time, we must remember both that these Pan-Hellenic sacred games presented the chief visible evidence of peace and sympathy among the numerous communities of Greece, and that in the time of Solon, factitious reward was still needful to encourage them. In respect to land and agriculture Solon proclaimed a public reward of five drachms for every wolf brought in, and one drachm for every wolf's cub : the extent of wild land has at all times been considerable in Attica. He also provided rules respecting the use of wells between neighbours, and respecting the planting in continuous olive-grounds. Whether any of these regulations continued in operation during the better-known period of Athenian history cannot be safely affirmed.

In respect to theft, we find it stated that Solon repealed the punishment of death which Drako had annexed to that crime, and enacted, as a penalty, compensation to an amount double the value of the property stolen. The simplicity of this law perhaps affords ground for presuming that it really does belong to Solon. But the law which prevailed during the time of the orators respecting theft must have been introduced at some later period, since it enters into distinctions and mentions both places and forms of procedure, which we cannot reasonably refer to the forty-sixth Olympiad. The public dinners at the Prytaneum, of which the archons and a select few partook in common, were also either first established, or perhaps only more strictly regulated, by Solon. He ordered barley-cakes for their ordinary meals, and wheaten loaves for festival days, prescribing how often each person should dine at the table. The honour of dining at the table of the Prytaneum was maintained throughout as a valuable reward at the disposal of the Government.

Among the various laws of Solon there are few which have attracted more notice than that which pronounces the man, who in a sedition stood aloof and took part with neither side, to be dishonoured and disfranchised¹. Strictly speaking, this seems more in the nature of an emphatic moral denunciation, or a religious curse, than a legal sanction capable of being formally applied in an individual case and after judicial trial—though the sentence of Atimy, under the more elaborated Attic procedure, was both definite in its penal consequences and also judicially delivered. We may, however, follow the course of ideas under which Solon was induced to write this sentence on his tables, and we may trace the influence of similar ideas in later Attic institutions. It is obvious that his denunciation is confined to that special case in which a sedition has already broken out : we must suppose that Kylon has seized the Acropolis, or that Peisistratus, Megakles and Lykurgus are in arms at the head of their partisans. Assuming these leaders to be wealthy and powerful men, which would in all probability be the fact, the constituted authority—such as Solon saw

¹ Plutarch, *Solon*, 20, and *De Serâ Numinis Vindictâ*, p. 550 ; Aulus Gell., ii. 12.

before him in Attica, even after his own organic amendments—was not strong enough to maintain the peace ; it became, in fact, itself one of the contending parties. Under such given circumstances, the sooner every citizen publicly declared his adherence to some one of them, the earlier this suspension of legal authority was likely to terminate. Nothing was so mischievous as the indifference of the mass, or their disposition to let the combatants fight out the matter among themselves, and then to submit to the victor. Nothing was more likely to encourage aggression on the part of an ambitious malcontent than the conviction that if he could once overpower the small amount of physical force which surrounded the archons, and exhibit himself in armed possession of the Prytaneum or the Acropolis, he might immediately count upon passive submission on the part of all the freemen without. Under the state of feeling which Solon inculcates, the insurgent leader would have to calculate that every man who was not actively in his favour would be actively against him, and this would render his enterprise much more dangerous. Indeed, he could then never hope to succeed, except on the double supposition of extraordinary popularity in his own person, and widespread detestation of the existing government. He would thus be placed under the influence of powerful deterring motives ; so that mere ambition would be less likely to seduce him into a course which threatened nothing but ruin, unless under such encouragements from the pre-existing public opinion as to make his success a result desirable for the community. Among the small political societies of Greece—especially in the age of Solon, when the number of despots in other parts of Greece seems to have been at its maximum—every government, whatever might be its form, was sufficiently weak to make its overthrow a matter of comparative facility. Unless upon the supposition of a band of foreign mercenaries—which would render the government a system of naked force, and which the Athenian lawgiver would, of course, never contemplate—there was no other stay for it except a positive and pronounced feeling of attachment on the part of the mass of citizens. Indifference on their part would render them a prey to every daring man of wealth who chose to become a conspirator. That they should be ready to come forward, not only with voice but with arms—and that they should be known beforehand to be so—was essential to the maintenance of every good Grecian government. It was salutary, in preventing mere personal attempts at revolution, and pacific in its tendency, even where the revolution had actually broken out—because in the greater number of cases the proportion of partisans would probably be very unequal, and the inferior party would be compelled to renounce their hopes.

It will be observed that in this enactment of Solon, the existing government is ranked merely as one of the contending parties. The virtuous citizen is enjoined, not to come forward in its support, but to come forward at all events, either for it or against it. Positive and early action is all which is prescribed to him as matter of duty. In the age of Solon there was no political idea or system yet current which could be assumed as an unquestionable datum—no conspicuous standard to which the citizens could be pledged under all circumstances to attach themselves. The option lay only between a mitigated oligarchy in possession and a despot in possibility ; a contest wherein the affections of the people could

rarely be counted upon in favour of the established government. But this neutrality in respect to the constitution was at an end after the revolution of Kleisthenēs, when the idea of the sovereign people and the democratical institutions became both familiar and precious to every individual citizen. We shall hereafter find the Athenians binding themselves by the most sincere and solemn oaths to uphold their democracy against all attempts to subvert it; we shall discover in them a sentiment not less positive and uncompromising in its direction than energetic in its inspirations. But while we notice this very important change in their character, we shall at the same time perceive that the wise precautionary recommendation of Solon, to obviate sedition by an early declaration of the impartial public between two contending leaders, was not lost upon them. Such, in point of fact, was the purpose of that salutary and protective institution which is called the Ostracism. At present I merely notice its analogy with the previous Solonian law, and its tendency to accomplish the same purpose of terminating a fierce party-feud, by artificially calling in the votes of the mass of impartial citizens against one or other of the leaders—with this important difference, that while Solon assumed the hostile parties to be actually in arms, the ostracism averted that grave public calamity by applying its remedy to the premonitory symptoms [see below, c. iv., Appendix I., § 7.—ED.].

I have already considered, in a previous chapter¹, the directions given by Solon for the more orderly recital of the Homeric poems; and it is curious to contrast his reverence for the old epic with the unqualified repugnance which he manifested towards Thespis and the drama, then just nascent, and holding out little promise of its subsequent excellence. Tragedy and comedy were now beginning to be grafted on the lyric and choric song. First one actor was provided to relieve the chorus; next two actors were introduced to sustain fictitious characters and carry on a dialogue, in such manner that the songs of the chorus and the inter-location of the actors formed a continuous piece. Solon, after having heard Thespis acting (as all the early composers did, both tragic and comic) in his own comedy, asked him afterwards if he was not ashamed to pronounce such falsehoods before so large an audience. And when Thespis answered that there was no harm in saying and doing such things merely for amusement, Solon indignantly exclaimed, striking the ground with his stick, 'If once we come to praise and esteem such amusement as this, we shall quickly find the effects of it in our daily transactions.' For the authenticity of this anecdote it would be rash to vouch, but we may at least treat it as the protest of some early philosopher against the deceptions of the drama; and it is interesting as marking the incipient struggles of that literature in which Athens afterwards attained such unrivalled excellence.

It would appear that all the laws of Solon were proclaimed, inscribed, and accepted without either discussion or resistance. He is said to have described them, not as the best laws which he could himself have imagined, but as the best which he could have induced the people to accept. He gave them validity for the space of ten years, during which period² both the [Council] collectively and the archons individually swore to observe them with fidelity; under penalty, in case of non-observance, of a golden

¹ Vol. i., pp. 534 ff (ed. 1862).—ED.

² Plutarch, *Solon*, 15.

statue as large as life to be erected at Delphi. But though the acceptance of the laws was accomplished without difficulty, it was not found so easy either for the people to understand and obey, or for the framer to explain them. Every day persons came to Solon either with praise, or criticism, or suggestions of various improvements, or questions as to the construction of particular enactments; until at last he became tired of this endless process of reply and vindication, which was seldom successful either in removing obscurity or in satisfying complainants. Foreseeing that if he remained he would be compelled to make changes, he obtained leave of absence from his countrymen for ten years, trusting that before the expiration of that period they would have become accustomed to his laws. He quitted his native city, in the full certainty that his laws would remain unrepealed until his return; for (says Herodotus) 'the Athenians *could not* repeal them, since they were bound by solemn oaths to observe them for ten years. The unqualified manner in which the historian here speaks of an oath, as if it created a sort of physical necessity and shut out all possibility of a contrary result, deserves notice as illustrating Grecian sentiment¹.

On departing from Athens, Solon first visited Egypt, where he communicated largely with Psenôphis of Heliopolis and Sonchis of Saïs, Egyptian priests who had much to tell respecting their ancient history, and from whom he learnt matters real or pretended, far transcending in alleged antiquity the oldest Grecian genealogies—especially the history of the vast submerged island of Atlantis, and the war which the ancestors of the Athenians had successfully carried on against it 9,000 years before. Solon is said to have commenced an epic poem upon this subject, but he did not live to finish it, and nothing of it now remains. From Egypt he went to Cyprus, where he visited the small town of Æpeia, said to have been founded originally by Demophôn, son of Theseus, and ruled at this period by the prince Philokyprus—each town in Cyprus having its own petty prince. It was situated near the river Klarius in a position precipitous and secure, but inconvenient and ill-supplied. Solon persuaded Philokyprus to quit the old site and establish a new town down in the fertile plain beneath. He himself staid and became Oekist of the new establishment, making all the regulations requisite for its safe and prosperous march, which was indeed so decisively manifested, that many new settlers flocked into the new plantation, called by Philokyprus *Soli*, in honour of Solon. To our deep regret, we are not permitted to know what these regulations were; but the general fact is attested by the poems of Solon himself, and the lines, in which he bade farewell to Philokyprus on quitting the island, are yet before us. On the dispositions of this prince his poem bestowed unqualified commendation².

Besides his visit to Egypt and Cyprus, a story was also current of his having conversed with the Lydian king Cræsus at Sardis. The communication said to have taken place between them has been woven by Herodotus into a sort of moral tale, which forms one of the most beautiful episodes in his whole history. Though this tale has been told and retold as if it were genuine history, yet as it now stands, it is irreconcilable with

¹ Herodot., i. 29. One hundred years is the term stated by Plutarch (*Sol.* 25). [*A. P.* vii. says 100.]

² Plutarch, *Solon*, 26; Herodot., v. 113. The statements of Diogenes that Solon founded *Soli*

in Kilikia, and that he died in Cyprus, are not worthy of credit (*Diog. Laërt.*, i. 51-62). [Even the visit to Philokyprus is regarded by many—*e.g.*, Bury, p. 163—as based on no real evidence.—*Ed.*]

chronology, although very possibly Solon may at some time or other have visited Sardis, and seen Cræsus as hereditary prince¹.

But even if no chronological objections existed, the moral purpose of the tale is so prominent, and pervades it so systematically from beginning to end, that these internal grounds are of themselves sufficiently strong to impeach its credibility as a matter of fact, unless such doubts happen to be outweighed—which in this case they are not—by good contemporary testimony. The narrative of Solon and Cræsus can be taken for nothing else but an illustrative fiction, borrowed by Herodotus from some philosopher, and clothed in his own peculiar beauty of expression, which on this occasion is more decidedly poetical than is habitual with him. I cannot transcribe, and I hardly dare to abridge it. The vain-glorious Cræsus, at the summit of his conquests and his riches, endeavours to win from his visitor Solon an opinion that he is the happiest of mankind. The latter, after having twice preferred to him modest and meritorious Grecian citizens, at length reminds him that his vast wealth and power are of a tenure too precarious to serve as an evidence of happiness—that the gods are jealous and meddlesome, and often make the show of happiness a mere prelude to extreme disaster—and that no man's life can be called happy until the whole of it has been played out, so that it may be seen to be out of the reach of reverses. Cræsus treats this opinion as absurd, but 'a great judgment from God fell upon him, after Solon was departed—probably (observes Herodotus) because he fancied himself the happiest of all men'. First he lost his favourite son Atys, a brave and intelligent youth (his only other son being dumb). For the Mysians of Olympus, being ruined by a destructive and formidable wild boar which they were unable to subdue, applied for aid to Cræsus, who sent to the spot a chosen hunting force, and permitted—though with great reluctance, in consequence of an alarming dream—that his favourite son should accompany them. The young prince was unintentionally slain by the Phrygian exile Adrastus, whom Cræsus had sheltered and protected². Hardly had the latter recovered from the anguish of this misfortune, when the rapid growth of Cyrus and the Persian power induced him to go to war with them, against the advice of his wisest counsellors. After a struggle of about three years he was completely defeated, his capital, Sardis, taken by storm, and himself made prisoner. Cyrus ordered a large pile to be prepared, and placed upon it Cræsus in fetters, together with fourteen young Lydians, in the intention of burning them alive, either as a religious offering, or in fulfilment of a vow, 'or perhaps (says Herodotus) to see whether some of the gods would not interfere to rescue a man so pre-eminently pious as the king of Lydia'. In this sad extremity Cræsus bethought him of the warning which he had before despised, and thrice pronounced, with a deep groan, the name of Solon. Cyrus desired the interpreters to inquire whom he was invoking, and learnt in reply the anecdote of the Athenian lawgiver, together with the

¹ Plutarch tells us that several authors rejected the reality of this interview as being chronologically impossible.

In my judgment, this is an illustrative tale, in which certain real characters—Cræsus and Solon—and certain real facts—the great power and succeeding ruin of the former by the victorious arm of Cyrus—together with certain facts probably altogether fictitious, such as the two sons of

Cræsus, the Phrygian Adrastus and his history, the hunting of the mischievous wild boar on Mount Olympus, the ultimate preservation of Cræsus, etc., are put together so as to convey an impressive moral lesson. The whole adventure of Adrastus and the son of Cræsus is depicted in language eminently beautiful and poetical.

² Herod., i. 32, 34, 44, 45.

solemn memento which he had offered to Cræsus during more prosperous days, attesting the frail tenure of all human greatness. The remark sunk deep into the Persian monarch, as a token of what might happen to himself: he repented of his purpose, and directed that the pile, which had already been kindled, should be immediately extinguished. But the orders came too late. In spite of the most zealous efforts of the bystanders, the flame was found unquenchable, and Cræsus would still have been burnt, had he not implored with prayers and tears the succour of Apollo, to whose Delphian and Theban temples he had given such munificent presents. His prayers were heard; the fair sky was immediately overcast, and a profuse rain descended, sufficient to extinguish the flames. The life of Cræsus was thus saved, and he became afterwards the confidential friend and adviser of his conqueror.

Such is the brief outline of a narrative which Herodotus has given with full development and with impressive effect. It would have served as a show-lecture to the youth of Athens not less admirably than the well-known fable of the Choice of Hēraklēs, which the philosopher Prodikus¹, a junior contemporary of Herodotus, delivered with so much popularity. It illustrates forcibly the religious and ethical ideas of antiquity; the deep sense of the jealousy of the gods, who would not endure pride in anyone except themselves²; the impossibility for any man of realizing to himself more than a very moderate share of happiness; the danger from reactionary Nemesis, if at any time he had overpassed such limit; and the necessity of calculations taking in the whole of life, as a basis for rational comparison of different individuals. And it embodies, as a practical consequence from these feelings, the often-repeated protest of moralists against vehement impulses and unrestrained aspirations. The more valuable this narrative appears, in its illustrative character, the less can we presume to treat it as a history.

It is much to be regretted that we have no information respecting events in Attica immediately after the Solonian laws and constitution, which were promulgated in 594 B.C., so as to understand better the practical effect of these changes³. What we next hear respecting Solon in Attica refers to a period immediately preceding the first usurpation of Peisistratus in 560 B.C., and after the return of Solon from his long absence. We are here again introduced to the same oligarchical dissensions as are reported to have prevailed before the Solonian legislation: the Pedieis, or opulent proprietors of the plain round Athens, under Lykurgus, the

¹ Xenoph., *Memorab.*, ii. 1, 21.

² Herodot., vii. 10.

³ From the *Ath. Pol.* (c. xiii.) we are able to supplement the above account, though the new information is both partial and beset with difficulties. We learn (1) that, in the fifth year (590-589) after Solon's archonship, internal strife (*στάσις*) became so serious that no archon was elected (this incidentally shows that office was still elective); (2) that four years later (586-585) there was *anarchia*; and (3) that in 582-580 the archon Damasias (illegally) remained in office for two years and two months, after which he was forcibly expelled from office, and ten archons were elected—five Eupatrid, three Agroeci, and two Demiurgi. This account leads up to Peisistratus by the simple statement that the city continued to suffer from perpetual strife between the various factions.

It is noticeable that the *στάσις* recurs every fourth year, and that each of the three cases would

be officially described as *anarchy*—i.e., either there was no archon, or, as in (3), an illegal archon. Probably the whole story may be reduced to the single fact of Damasias's archonship. It has been argued that the solution described in (3) represents a compromise which was to supersede Solon's constitution. It is more probable, however, that the archonship (*ὁ ἀρχων*) was put into commission of ten to avoid the domination of a single archon like Damasias. The other eight archons on this hypothesis still existed.

It is important to notice the essential fact that immediately after Solon's departure there was strife between the Eupatrids and the agriculturalists, which almost certainly proves that Solon's removal of the *ἄποι* (boundary-stones) had largely failed in its object. It follows that the healthy economic condition of Athens in the fifth century was due mainly to Peisistratus and Kleisthenēs.—E.

Parali of the south of Attica, under Megaklēs, and the Diakrii or mountaineers of the eastern cantons, the poorest of the three classes, under Peisistratus, are in a state of violent intestine dispute. The account of Plutarch represents Solon as returning to Athens during the height of this sedition. He was treated with respect by all parties, but his recommendations were no longer obeyed, and he was disqualified by age from acting with effect in public. He employed his best efforts to mitigate party animosities, and applied himself particularly to restrain the ambition of Peisistratus, whose ulterior projects he quickly detected.

The future greatness of Peisistratus is said to have been first portended by a miracle which happened, even before his birth, to his father Hippokratēs at the Olympic games. It was realized, partly by his bravery and conduct, which had been displayed in the capture of Nisæa from the Megarians¹, partly by his popularity of speech and manners, his championship of the poor², and his ostentatious disavowal of all selfish pretensions—partly by an artful mixture of stratagem and force. Solon, after having addressed fruitless remonstrances to Peisistratus himself, publicly denounced his designs in verses addressed to the people. The deception whereby Peisistratus finally accomplished his design, is memorable in Grecian tradition³. He appeared one day in the agora of Athens in his chariot with a pair of mules; he had intentionally wounded both his person and the mules, and in this condition he threw himself upon the compassion and defence of the people, pretending that his political enemies had violently attacked him. He implored the people to grant him a guard, and at the moment when their sympathies were freshly aroused both in his favour and against his supposed assassins, Aristo proposed formally to the Ekklesiā (the pro-bouleutic Senate [Council], being composed of friends of Peisistratus, had previously authorized the proposition⁴) that a company of fifty club-men should be assigned as a permanent bodyguard for the defence of Peisistratus. To this motion Solon opposed a strenuous resistance⁵, but found himself overborne, and even treated as if he had lost his senses. The poor were earnest in favour of it, while the rich were afraid to express their dissent; and he could only comfort himself after the fatal vote had been passed, by exclaiming that he was wiser than the former and more determined than the latter. Such was one of the first known instances in which this memorable stratagem was played off against the liberty of a Grecian community⁶.

The unbounded popular favour which had procured the passing of this grant was still farther manifested by the absence of all precautions to prevent the limits of the grant from being exceeded. The number of the bodyguard was not long confined to fifty, and probably their clubs were soon exchanged for sharper weapons. Peisistratus thus found himself strong enough to throw off the mask and seize the Acropolis. His leading opponents, Megaklēs and the Alkmæonids, immediately fled the city, and it was left to the venerable age and undaunted patriotism of Solon to stand forward almost alone in a vain attempt to resist the usurpation. He publicly presented himself in the market-place, employing encourage-

¹ See note above, p. 13, n. 3.—Ed.

² Aristot., *Politic.*, v. 4, 5; Plutarch, *Solon*, 29.

³ Plato, *Republic*, viii., p. 565; [*Ath. Pol.*, c. xiv.].

⁴ Diog. Laërt., i. 49. [The name should be Ariston according to *Ath. Pol.*, c. xiv.—Ed.]

⁵ Plutarch, *Solon*, 29, 30; Diog. Laërt., i. 50, 51; *Ath. Pol.*, c. xiv.

⁶ This story is said to be commemorated in the 'Stèle of Ariston,' a monument discovered at Brauron, which represents a figure holding a long club standing by the side of a tomb.—Ed.

ment, remonstrance and reproach, in order to rouse the spirit of the people. To prevent this despotism from coming (he told them) would have been easy; to shake it off now was more difficult, yet at the same time more glorious¹. But he spoke in vain, for all who were not actually favourable to Peisistratus listened only to their fears, and remained passive; nor did anyone join Solon, when, as a last appeal, he put on his armour and planted himself in military posture before the door of his house. 'I have done my duty (he exclaimed at length); I have sustained to the best of my power my country and the laws'; and he then renounced all farther hope of opposition, though resisting the instances of his friends that he should flee, and returning for answer, when they asked him on what he relied for protection, 'On my old age.' Nor did he even think it necessary to repress the inspirations of his Muse. Some verses yet remain, composed seemingly at a moment when the strong hand of the new despot had begun to make itself sorely felt, in which he tells his countrymen—'If ye have endured sorrow from your own baseness of soul, impute not the fault of this to the gods. Ye have yourselves put force and dominion into the hands of these men, and have thus drawn upon yourselves wretched slavery.'

It is gratifying to learn that Peisistratus, whose conduct throughout his despotism was comparatively mild, left Solon untouched. How long this distinguished man survived the practical subversion of his own constitution we cannot certainly determine; but according to the most probable statement he died during the very next year, at the advanced age of eighty.

We have only to regret that we are deprived of the means of following more in detail his noble and exemplary character. He represents the best tendencies of his age, combined with much that is personally excellent; the improved ethical sensibility; the thirst for enlarged knowledge and observation, not less potent in old age than in youth; the conception of regularized popular institutions, departing sensibly from the type and spirit of the governments around him, and calculated to found a new character in the Athenian people; a genuine and reflecting sympathy with the mass of the poor, anxious not merely to rescue them from the oppressions of the rich, but also to create in them habits of self-relying industry; lastly, during his temporary possession of a power altogether arbitrary, not merely an absence of all selfish ambition, but a rare discretion in seizing the mean between conflicting exigencies. In reading his poems we must always recollect that what now appears commonplace was once new, so that to his comparatively unlettered age the social pictures which he draws were still fresh, and his exhortations calculated to live in the memory. The poems composed on moral subjects generally inculcate a spirit of gentleness towards others and moderation in personal objects. They represent the gods as irresistible, retributive, favouring the good and punishing the bad, though sometimes very tardily. But his compositions on special and present occasions are usually conceived in a more vigorous spirit; denouncing the oppressions of the rich at one time, and the timid submission to Peisistratus at another—and expressing in emphatic language his own proud consciousness of having stood forward as champion of the mass of the people. Of his early poems

¹ Plutarch, *Solon*, 30; Diogen. Laërt., i. 49; Diodor., *Excerpta*, lib. vii.-x.

hardly anything is preserved. The few lines remaining seem to manifest a jovial temperament which we may well conceive to have been overlaid by such political difficulties as he had to encounter—difficulties arising successively out of the Megarian war, the Kylonian sacrilege, the public despondency healed by Epimenidēs, and the task of arbiter between a rapacious oligarchy and a suffering people. In one of his elegies addressed to Mimnermus, he marked out the sixtieth year as the longest desirable period of life, in preference to the eightieth year, which that poet had expressed a wish to attain¹. But his own life, as far as we can judge, seems to have reached the longer of the two periods; and not the least honourable part of it (the resistance to Peisistratus) occurs immediately before his death.

There prevailed a story that his ashes were collected and scattered around the island of Salamis, which Plutarch treats as absurd — though he tells us at the same time that it was believed both by Aristotle and by many other considerable men. It is at least as ancient as the poet Kratinus, who alluded to it in one of his comedies, and I do not feel inclined to reject it². The inscription on the statue of Solon at Athens described him as a Salaminian: he had been the great means of acquiring the island for his country, and it seems highly probable that among the new Athenian citizens who went to settle there he may have received a lot of land and become enrolled among the Salaminian demots. The dispersion of his ashes connecting him with the island as its Oekist may be construed, if not as the expression of a public vote, at least as a piece of affectionate vanity on the part of his surviving friends.

We have now reached the period of the usurpation of Peisistratus (560 B.C.), whose dynasty governed Athens (with two temporary interruptions during the life of Peisistratus himself) for fifty years. The history of this despotism, milder than Grecian despotism generally, and productive of important consequences to Athens, will be reserved for a succeeding chapter.

APPENDIX

SOLON'S ECONOMIC REFORMS

[THE view taken above as to the details of the measure known as the *Seisachtheia* ('shaking off of burdens') is not in accordance with those of present-day scholars. The *Ath. Pol.* (cc. x. and xii.) has supplied new evidence, and other considerations tend to modify Grote's explanation.

There is no doubt that one provision was that which forbade all loans on the security of the person (*κωλύσας δανείζειν ἐπὶ σώμασι*). This was presumably retrospective, otherwise the 'freeing of the land' from the wealthy holders would have been so far meaningless. It is also clear that Solon restored to the Hektemors the land which had been absorbed into the large private *τεμένη*. So much is clear from the poems as quoted in the *Ath. Pol.* Further, we learn from the poems that Solon had to deal with a cry for *γῆς ἀνάδασμος*, and that he refused to grant *ισομοιρίαν*.

But the poems do not in any way confirm the view (given in *Ath. Pol.*) that Solon cancelled all debts. It is fairly clear that this idea was merely a mistaken inference from the fact that the slaves were re-enfranchised.

¹ Solon, *Fragment 22*, ed. Bergk. Isokratēs affirms that Solon was the first person to whom the appellation Sophist (in later times carrying with it so much obloquy) was applied

(Isokratēs, Or. xv., *De Permutatione*, p. 344; p. 496 Bek.).

² Plutarch, *Solon*, 32; Kratinus *ap.* Diogen. Laërt., i. 62.

The questions of the *δποι* (explained by Grote as mortgage-pillars) and the Hektemors having been dealt with already in the footnotes, it remains to discuss Grote's theory as to the relation between the above economic reforms and the reform of the coinage. Grote's criticism of Androton's somewhat puerile theory is valuable, but it does not go far enough. The fact is that up to the discovery of the *Ath. Pol.* all historians were under a complete misconception as to Solon's coinage reform. From the *Ath. Pol.* (c. x. 1) we learn that this was entirely distinct from the Seisachtheia, and directed solely to the expansion of Athenian foreign trade by bringing it into a more intimate connexion with the best markets—*i.e.*, Solon replaced the Æginetan scale of weights and measures by the Eubœic (approximately), and perhaps made a similar change in the coinage. By this change Athens was enabled to leave the hostile and limited markets of Ægina and Megara, and seek new trade with Chalkis and Corinth, both in Eubœa, among all the Greek cities of the Ægean Sea, and also in Italy. Not only did Athens thus enter upon a new and productive commercial career, but she also began to come more and more into contact with the wider Greek world as a whole, and thus to prepare for her imperial destiny in the fifth century. There is no reason to doubt that Solon's early travels had shown him the immense fields of activity which awaited Athens in the Ægean as soon as she should have freed herself from a scale of coinage, etc., which bound her to the Saronic Gulf.—ED.]

CHAPTER III [XXX]

GRECIAN AFFAIRS DURING THE GOVERNMENT OF PEISISTRATUS AND HIS SONS AT ATHENS

WE now arrive at what may be called the second period of Grecian history, beginning with the rule of Peisistratus at Athens and of Crœsus in Lydia.

(It has been already stated that Peisistratus made himself despot of Athens in 560 B.C. He died in 527 B.C., and was succeeded by his son Hippias, who was deposed and expelled in 510 B.C., thus making an entire space of fifty years between the first exaltation of the father and the final expulsion of the son.) These chronological points are settled on good evidence. But the thirty-three years covered by (the reign of Peisistratus are interrupted by two periods of exile) one of them lasting not less than ten years, the other five years; and the exact place of the years of exile, being nowhere laid down upon authority, has been differently determined by the conjectures of chronologers¹. Partly from this half-known chronology, partly from a very scanty collection of facts, the history of the half-century now before us can only be given very imperfectly. Nor can we wonder at our ignorance, when we find that even among the Athenians themselves, only a century afterwards, statements the most incorrect and contradictory respecting the Peisistratids were in circulation, as Thukydides distinctly, and somewhat reproachfully, acquaints us.

More than thirty years had now elapsed since the promulgation of the Solonian Constitution, whereby the annual Senate [Council] of Four Hundred had been created, and the public assembly (preceded in its

¹ The *Ath. Pol.* has a fairly elaborate account of the period contained in this chapter, and, among other details, gives the lengths of Peisistratus' three periods of rule and his two exiles. The dates given are, however, like many others in the treatise, self-contradictory. As no certain solution has been offered by the critics, and as the discussion has been purely academic interest, it is unnecessary here to discuss the matter (see J. E. Sandys on *Ath. Pol.*,

c. xiv., note; Bury, *Class. Rev.*, February, 1895, and Busolt, ii., 2, p. 258). It may be mentioned, however, that some authorities (*e.g.*, Beloch in *Rhein. Mus.*, xlv., 1890, pp. 465 *et seq.*; Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* ii., pp. 772, 773) are inclined to hold that the whole story of alternate rule and exile is open to serious doubt, and that Peisistratus may perhaps not have experienced so many vicissitudes.—ED.

action as well as aided and regulated by this Senate [Council]) invested with a power of exacting responsibility from the magistrates after their year of office. The seeds of the subsequent democracy had thus been sown, and no doubt the administration of the archons had been practically softened by it. Yet nothing in the nature of a democratical sentiment had yet been created. A hundred years hence we shall find that sentiment unanimous and potent among the enterprising masses of Athens and Peiræus, and shall be called upon to listen to loud complaints of the difficulty of dealing with 'that angry, waspish, intractable little old man, Dêmus of Pnyx'—so Aristophanês¹ calls the Athenian people to their faces, with a freedom which shows that he at least counted on their good temper. (But between 560-510 B.C. the people are as passive in respect to political rights and securities as the most strenuous enemy of democracy could desire, and the government is transferred from hand to hand by bargains and cross-changes between two or three powerful men², at the head of partisans who echo their voices, espouse their personal quarrels, and draw the sword at their command.) It was this ancient constitution—Athens as it stood before the Athenian democracy—which the Macedonian Antipater professed to restore in 322 B.C., when he caused the majority of the poorer citizens to be excluded altogether from the political franchise³.

By the stratagem recounted in a former chapter, Peisistratus had obtained from the public assembly a guard which he had employed to acquire forcible possession of the Acropolis. He thus became master of the administration; but he employed his power honourably and well, not disturbing the existing forms farther than was necessary to ensure to himself full mastery. Nevertheless we may see by the verses of Solon⁴ (the only contemporary evidence which we possess), that (the prevalent sentiment was by no means favourable to his recent proceeding, and that there was in many minds a strong feeling both of terror and aversion, which presently manifested itself in the armed coalition of his two rivals—Megaklês at the head of the Parali or inhabitants of the sea-board, and Lykurgus at the head of those in the neighbouring plain.) As the conjunction of the two formed a force too powerful for Peisistratus to withstand, he was driven into exile, after no long possession of his despotism. But the time came (how soon we cannot tell⁵) when the two rivals who had expelled him quarrelled. (Megaklês made propositions to Peisistratus, inviting him to resume the sovereignty, promising his own aid, and stipulating that Peisistratus should marry his daughter.) The conditions being accepted, a plan was laid between the two new allies for carrying them into effect, by a novel stratagem—since the simulated wounds and pretence of personal danger were not likely to be played off a second time with success. The two conspirators clothed a stately woman, six feet high, named Phyê, in the panoply and costume of Athênê, surrounded her with the proceSSIONAL accompaniments belonging to the goddess, and placed her in a chariot with Peisistratus by her side. In this guise the

¹ Ἀγροίκος ὄργην, κυματοῖνξ, ἀκράχολος
Δῆμος Πνυκίτης, δύσκολον γεροντίον.
Aristoph., *Equit.*, 41.

I need hardly mention that the Pnyx was the place in which the Athenian public assemblies were held.

² Plutarch (*De Herodot. Malign.*, c. 15, p. 858) is angry with Herodotus for imparting so petty and personal a character to the dissensions between

the Alkmaeonids and Peisistratus. His severe remarks in that treatise, however, tend almost always to strengthen rather than to weaken the credibility of the historian.

³ Plutarch, *Phokion*, c. 27.

⁴ Solon, *Frag.*, 10, ed. Bergk. :

Εἰ δὲ πεπόνθατε λυγρὰ δὲ ὑμετέρην κακότητα,
Μῆτε θεοῖς τούτων μοῖραν ἐπαμφέρετε, etc.

⁵ *Ath. Pol.* says eleven years.—Ed.

exiled despot and his adherents approached the city and drove up to the Acropolis, preceded by heralds, who cried aloud to the people—'Athenians, receive ye cordially Peisistratus, whom Athênê has honoured above all other men, and is now bringing back into her own Acropolis.' The people in the city received the reputed goddess with implicit belief and demonstrations of worship, while among the country cantons the report quickly spread that Athênê had appeared in person to restore Peisistratus, who thus found himself, without even a show of resistance, in possession of the Acropolis and of the government. His own party, united with that of Megaklês, were powerful enough to maintain him, when he had once acquired possession. And probably all, except the leaders, sincerely believed in the epiphany of the goddess, which came to be divulged as having been a deception, only after Peisistratus and Megaklês had quarrelled¹.

The daughter of Megaklês, according to agreement, quickly became the wife of Peisistratus, but she bore him no children. It became known that her husband, having already adult sons by a former marriage, and considering that the Kylonian curse rested upon all the Alkmæonid family, did not intend that she should become a mother. (Megaklês) was so incensed at this behaviour, that he not only renounced his alliance with Peisistratus, but even made his peace with the third party, the adherents of Lykurgus, and assumed so menacing an attitude, that the despot was obliged to evacuate Attica. (He retired to Eretria² in Eubœa,

¹ Herodot., i. 60; [*Ath. Pol.*, c. xiv. *ad fin.*] A statement (Athenæus, xiii., p. 609) represents Phyê to have become afterwards the wife of Hipparchus.

Of this remarkable story, not the least remarkable part is the criticism with which Herodotus himself accompanies it. He treats it as a proceeding infinitely silly; he cannot conceive how Greeks, so much superior to barbarians—and even Athenians, the cleverest of all the Greeks—could have fallen into such a trap. To him the story was told as a deception from the beginning, and he did not perhaps take pains to put himself into the state of feeling of those original spectators who saw the chariot approach without any warning or preconceived suspicion. But even allowing for this, his criticism brings to our view the alteration and enlargement which had taken place in the Greek mind during the century between Peisistratus and Periklês. Doubtless neither the latter nor any of his contemporaries could have succeeded in a similar trick.

The fact, and the criticism upon it, now before us, are illustrated by an analogous case recounted in a previous chapter [Full Text, vol. ii., c. viii.]. Nearly at the same period as this stratagem of Peisistratus, the Lacedæmonians and the Argæians agreed to decide, by a combat of three hundred select champions, the dispute between them as to the territory of Kynuria. The combat actually took place, and the heroism of Othryades, sole Spartan survivor, has been already recounted. In the eleventh year of the Peloponnesian war (shortly after or near upon the period when we may conceive the history of Herodotus to have been finished) the Argæians, concluding a treaty with Lacedæmon, introduced as a clause into it the liberty of reviving their pretensions to Kynuria, and of again deciding the dispute by a combat of select champions. To the Lacedæmonians of that time this appeared extreme folly—the very proceeding which had been actually resorted to a century before. Here is another case, in which the change in the point of view, and the increased positive tendencies in the Greek mind, are brought to our notice not less forcibly than by the criticism of Herodotus upon Phyê-Athênê.

Istrus (one of the Attido-graphers of the third century B.C.) and Antiklês published books respecting the personal manifestations or epiphanies of the gods—*Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπιφανείαι*: see Istrus, *Fragment.*, 33-37 ed. Didot. If Peisistratus and Megaklês had never quarrelled their joint stratagem might have continued to pass for a genuine epiphany, and might have been included as such in the work of Istrus. I will add, that the real presence of the gods, at the festivals celebrated in their honour, was an idea continually brought before the minds of the Greeks.

The Athenians fully believed the epiphany of the god Pan to Pheidippidês the courier on his march to Sparta a little before the battle of Marathon (Herodot., vi. 105), and even Herodotus himself does not controvert it, though he relaxes the positive character of history so far as to add—'as Pheidippidês himself said and recounted publicly to the Athenians'. His informants in this case were doubtless sincere believers, whereas, in the case of Phyê, the story was told to him at first as a fabrication.

At Gela in Sicily, seemingly not long before this restoration of Peisistratus, Têlinês (ancestor of the despot Gelon) had brought back some exiles to Gela, 'without any armed force, but merely through the sacred ceremonies and appurtenances of the subterranean goddesses' (Herodot., vii. 153). Herodotus does not tell us the details which he had heard of the manner in which this restoration at Gela was brought about; but his general language intimates that they were remarkable details, and they might have illustrated the story of Phyê-Athênê.

[It has been suggested with some plausibility that the whole Phyê episode was a later invention which originated in a plastic representation of the return of Peisistratus, in which the goddess Athênê, as it were officially, accompanied Peisistratus into the city (see Stein, *Herodotus*, i. 60).—Ed.]

² According to the *Ath. Pol.* (c. xv.) Peisistratus settled first on the Thermaic Gulf at a place called Rhakêlus, subsequently crossed the isthmus to the district round Pangæum, and thence to Eretria, where he arrived in the eleventh year after his expulsion.—Ed.

where he remained no less than ten years, employed in making preparations for a forcible return, and exercising, even while in exile, a degree of influence much exceeding that of a private man. He not only lent valuable aid to Lygdamis of Naxos¹ in constituting himself despot of that island, but possessed, we know not how, the means of rendering important service to different cities, Thebes in particular. They repaid him by large contributions of money to aid in his re-establishment: mercenaries were hired from Argos, and the Naxian Lygdamis came himself both with money and with troops. Thus equipped and aided, Peisistratus landed at Marathon in Attica. How the Athenian government had been conducted during his ten years' absence, we do not know; but the leaders of it permitted him to remain undisturbed at Marathon, and to assemble his partisans both from the city and from the country. It was not until he broke up from Marathon and had reached Pallênê on his way to Athens, that they took the field against him. Moreover, their conduct, even when the two armies were near together, must have been either extremely negligent or corrupt; for Peisistratus found means to attack them unprepared, routing their forces almost without resistance. In fact, the proceedings have altogether the air of a concerted betrayal. For the defeated troops, though unpursued, are said to have dispersed and returned to their homes forthwith, in obedience to the proclamation of Peisistratus, who marched on to Athens, and found himself a third time ruler².

(On this third successful entry he took vigorous precautions for rendering his seat permanent.) The Alkmæônidæ and their immediate partisans retired into exile: but he seized the children of those who remained and whose sentiments he suspected, as hostages for the behaviour of their parents, and placed them in Naxos under the care of Lygdamis. Moreover, he provided himself with a powerful body of Thracian mercenaries, paid by taxes levied upon the people³: and he was careful to conciliate the favour of the gods by a purification of the sacred island of Delos. All the dead bodies which had been buried within sight of the temple of Apollo, were exhumed and reinterred farther off. At this time the Delian festival—attended by the Asiatic Ionians and the islanders, and with which Athens was of course peculiarly connected—must have been beginning to decline from its pristine magnificence; for the subjugation of the continental Ionic cities by Cyrus had been already achieved, and the power of Samos, though increased under the despot Polykratês, seems to have increased at the expense and to the ruin of the smaller Ionic islands. Partly from the same feelings which led to the purification of Delos, partly as an act of party revenge, Peisistratus caused the houses of the Alkmæônids to be levelled with the ground, and the bodies of the deceased members of that family to be disinterred and cast out of the country⁴.

(This third and last period of the rule of Peisistratus lasted several years,

¹ About Lygdamis, see *Ath. Pol.*, c. 15.—ED.

² Herodot., i. 63. The *Ath. Pol.* (*loc. cit.*) says that on his second return Peisistratus, presumably finding that his popularity was uncertain, arranged a review of the armed citizens in the Theseum, and addressed them intentionally in a voice which they could not all hear. On their protesting, he bade them move to the gate of the Acropolis, and while he further addressed them his agents secured their arms, which they had left in the Theseum. Peisistratus then told them of his stratagem, and bade

them go home and leave him to manage their affairs. If the story is true, and if Peisistratus had good reason for the step he took, it is almost incredible that the Athenians should have again permitted themselves to be so easily duped. In spite of Grote's skilful argument (above, p. 47, note), the three stories of Peisistratus's *coups d'état* bear all the signs of that romantic fiction which even at a later date collects round the names of famous men.—ED.

³ Herodot., i. 64.

⁴ Isokratês, *Or.*, xvi., *De Bigis*, c. 351.

until his death in 527 B.C.) It is said to have been so mild in its character, that he once even suffered himself to be cited for trial before the Senate of Areopagus¹; yet, as we know that he had to maintain a large body of Thracian mercenaries out of the funds of the people, we shall be inclined to construe this eulogium comparatively rather than positively. Thukydides affirms that both he and his sons governed in a wise and virtuous spirit, levying from the people only an income-tax of 5 per cent.² This is high praise coming from such an authority, though it seems that we ought to make some allowance for the circumstance of Thukydides being connected by descent with the Peisistratid family³. The judgment of Herodotus is also very favourable respecting Peisistratus; that of Aristotle favourable, yet qualified, since he includes these despots among the list of those who undertook public and sacred works with the deliberate view of impoverishing as well as of occupying their subjects. This supposition is countenanced by the prodigious scale upon which the temple of Zeus Olympius at Athens was begun by Peisistratus—a scale much exceeding either the Parthenôn or the temple of Athênê Polias; both of which, nevertheless, were erected in later times, when the means of Athens were decidedly larger⁴ and her disposition to demonstrative piety certainly no way diminished. It was left by him unfinished, nor was it ever completed until the Roman emperor Hadrian undertook the task. Moreover, Peisistratus introduced the greater Panathenaic festival, solemnized every four years, in the third Olympic year: the annual Panathenaic festival, henceforward called the Lesser, was still continued⁵.

I have already noticed, at considerable length, the care which he bestowed in procuring full and correct copies of the Homeric poems, as well as in improving the recitation of them at the Panathenaic festival—a proceeding for which we owe him much gratitude, but which has been shown to be erroneously interpreted by various critics. He probably also collected the works of other poets—called by Aulus Gellius⁶, in language not well

¹ *Ath. Pol.* (c. xv., 8) says the charge was one of murder, and that the accuser was so terrified that he did not proceed with the case. Surely it is at least as logical to infer from this that Peisistratus had some suspicion that the issue would be thus favourable to him. If we credit him with the diplomatic genius which the common accounts presume, it is surely ungenerous to accuse him in this case of a disinterested anxiety to let the law take its course.—Ed.

² For the statement of Boeckh, Dr. Arnold, and Dr. Thirlwall, that Peisistratus had levied a tithe or tax of 10 per cent., and that his sons reduced it to the half, I find no sufficient warrant: certainly the spurious letter of Peisistratus to Solon in Diogenes Laërtius (i. 53) ought not to be considered as proving anything.

[The *Ath. Pol.* (c. xvi., 4) definitely states that Peisistratus imposed a tax of 10 per cent., which he was able to collect owing to the prosperity and contentment which followed his administration (so Zenob., 4, 76, speaks of a tithe on farmers). It is suggested by Bury (p. 195) that this tax was an old impost continued by Peisistratus, and that either he or his sons reduced it to 5 per cent. (this would soften the contradiction between Thuk., vi. 54, and *Ath. Pol.*). The real interest of this tax is that it proves conclusively that Solon could not have introduced a sliding-scale income-tax. Peisistratus, whose whole aim was to conciliate his friends, the poorer classes, would have been the last to revert from a democratic system to one under which all citizens paid at an equal rate (see above, p. 22, note).]

Here in the complete edition follows a note in which Grote seeks to refute Thirlwall's theory, based on Herod., i. 64, that Peisistratus possessed estates in the Strymon. The statement of the *Ath. Pol.* (p. 47, note) that Peisistratus spent part of his exile accumulating resources of men and money in 'the places about Pangæum' at least proves that the author of the *Ath. Pol.* saw no reason to discredit the statement of Herodotus. The eager haste with which after the Persian War the Athenians directed their energies to driving the Persian governor from Eion and the Strymon valley seems to suggest that they were endeavouring to recover a possession of proved value (Thuk., i. 98).—Ed.]

³ Hermippus (*ap. Marcellin. Vit. Thukyd.*, p. ix.), and the Scholiast on Thukyd., i. 20, affirm that Thukydides was connected by relationship with the Peisistratidæ. His manner of speaking of them certainly lends countenance to the assertion; not merely as he twice notices their history, once briefly (i. 20) and again at considerable length (vi. 54-59), though it does not lie within the direct compass of his period—but also as he so emphatically announces his own personal knowledge of their family relations (vi. 55).

⁴ Aristot., *Politic.*, v. 9, 4; Dikæarchus, *Vita Græciæ*, pp. 140-166, ed. Fuhr; Pausan., i. 18, 8.

⁵ For a further estimate of Peisistratus's services to religion and art, and of his rule in general, see Appendix to this chapter.—Ed.

⁶ Aul. Gell., *N. A.*, vi. 17.

suit to the sixth century B.C., a library thrown open to the public. The service which he thus rendered must have been highly valuable at a time when writing and reading were not widely extended. His son Hipparchus followed up the same taste, taking pleasure in the society of the most eminent poets of the day¹—Simonidēs, Anakreon, and Lasus; not to mention the Athenian mystic Onomakritus, who though not pretending to the gift of prophecy himself, passed for the proprietor and editor of the various prophecies ascribed to the ancient name of Musæus. The Peisistratids, well versed in these prophecies, set great value upon them, and guarded their integrity so carefully, that Onomakritus, being detected on one occasion in the act of interpolating them, was banished by Hipparchus in consequence². The statues of Hermēs, erected by this prince or by his personal friends in various parts of Attica³, and inscribed with short moral sentences, are extolled by the author of the Platonic dialogue called *Hipparchus*, with an exaggeration which approaches to irony. It is certain, however, that both the sons of Peisistratus, as well as himself, were exact in fulfilling the religious obligations of the State, and ornamented the city in several ways, especially the public fountain Kallirrhœ. They are said to have maintained the pre-existing forms of law and justice, merely taking care always to keep themselves and their adherents in the effective offices of state, and in the full reality of power. They were, moreover, modest and popular in their personal demeanour, and charitable to the poor; yet one striking example occurs of unscrupulous enmity, in their murder of Kimôn by night through the agency of hired assassins⁴. There is good reason, however, for believing that the government both of Peisistratus and of his sons was in practice generally mild until after the death of Hipparchus by the hands of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn, after which event the surviving Hippias became alarmed, cruel, and oppressive during his last four years. Hence the harshness of this concluding period left upon the Athenian mind⁵ that profound and imperishable hatred against the dynasty generally, which Thukydidēs reluctantly admits, labouring to show that it was not deserved by Peisistratus, nor at first by Hippias.

Peisistratus left three legitimate sons—Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus⁶. The general belief at Athens among the contemporaries of Thukydidēs was, that Hipparchus was the eldest of the three, and had succeeded him. Yet the historian emphatically pronounces this to be a mistake, and certifies upon his own responsibility that Hippias was both

¹ Herodot., vii. 6; Pseudo-Plato, *Hipparchus*, p. 220.

² Herodot., v. 93; vii. 6. Ὀνομακρίτων, χρησιμολόγων καὶ διαβήτην τῶν χρησίων τῶν Μουσίων. See Pausan., i. 22, 7. Compare, about the literary tendencies of the Peisistratids, Nitzsch, *De Historiâ Homeris*, ch. 30, p. 168.

³ Philochor., *Frag.*, 69, ed. Didot; Plato, *Hipparchus*, p. 230.

⁴ Herodot., vi. 38-103; Theopomp., *ap. Athenæ.*, xii., p. 533.

⁵ Thukyd., vi. 53; Pseudo-Plato, *Hipparchus*, p. 230; Pausan., i. 23, 1.

⁶ *Ath. Pol.* (c. xvii. 3) states that Hippias and Hipparchus were the sons of Peisistratus's early marriage, prior to his tyranny, while Iophon and Hegesistratus were the sons of an Argive woman, Timonassa, whom he married either in his first exile or 'when he was in power'. The fact that the first two were already growing up at the time

may perhaps partly account for his apparently un diplomatic conduct towards the daughter of Megaklēs. By Timonassa, whose former husband was Archinus of the house of Kypselus, Peisistratus became connected not only with Argos, but also with the old tyrant family of Corinth. The *Ath. Pol.* adds that Hegesistratus was known also as Thessalus, but Thukydidēs calls Thessalus legitimate, while Herodotus says that Hegesistratus was a bastard; and, again, that he was in command at Sigeum, while Thukydidēs says that Thessalus remained at Athens. The point is as difficult as it is unimportant; what is valuable is that the *Ath. Pol.* definitely states (c. xviii.) that Hippias was both older than Hipparchus and steadier and more capable politically, and that he, therefore, ruled the city. Hipparchus is described as having the 'artistic' temperament, frivolous, and pleasure-loving, while Thessalus—greatly his junior—is an uncouth and insolent fellow.—Ed.

eldest son and successor. Such an assurance from him, fortified by certain reasons in themselves not very conclusive, is sufficient ground for our belief—the more so as Herodotus countenances the same version; but we are surprised at such a degree of historical carelessness in the Athenian public, and seemingly even in Plato¹, about a matter both interesting and comparatively recent. In order to abate this surprise, and to explain how the name of Hipparchus came to supplant that of Hippias in the popular talk, Thukydidēs recounts the memorable story of Harmodius and Aristogeitōn.

Of these two Athenian citizens², both belonging to the ancient gens called Gephyraî, the former was a beautiful youth, attached to the latter by a mutual friendship and devoted intimacy which Grecian manners did not condemn. Hipparchus made repeated propositions to Harmodius, which were repelled, but which, on becoming known to Aristogeitōn, excited both his jealousy and his fears lest the disappointed suitor should employ force—fears justified by the proceedings not unusual with Grecian despots, and by the absence of all legal protection against outrage from such a quarter. Under these feelings, he began to look about, in the best way that he could, for some means of putting down the despotism. Meanwhile Hipparchus, though not entertaining any designs of violence, was so incensed at the refusal of Harmodius, that he could not be satisfied without doing something to insult or humiliate him. In order to conceal the motive from which the insult really proceeded, he offered it, not directly to Harmodius, but to his sister. He caused this young maiden to be one day summoned to take her station in a religious procession as one of the Kanêphoræ or basket-carriers, according to the practice usual at Athens. But when she arrived at the place where her fellow-maidens were assembled, she was dismissed with scorn as unworthy of so respectable a function, and the summons addressed to her was disavowed.

An insult thus publicly offered filled Harmodius with indignation, and still farther exasperated the feelings of Aristogeitōn. Both of them resolving at all hazards to put an end to the despotism, concerted means for aggression with a few select associates. They awaited the festival of the Great Panathenæa, wherein the body of the citizens were accustomed to march up in armed procession, with spear and shield, to the Acropolis, this being the only day on which an armed body could come together without suspicion. The conspirators appeared armed like the rest of the citizens, but carrying concealed daggers besides. Harmodius and Aristogeitōn undertook with their own hands to kill the two Peisistratids, while the rest promised to stand forward immediately for their protection against the foreign mercenaries; and though the whole number of persons engaged was small, they counted upon the spontaneous sympathies of the armed bystanders in an effort to regain their liberties, so soon as the blow should once be struck. The day of the festival having arrived, Hippias, with his foreign bodyguard around him, was marshalling the armed citizens for procession, in the Kerameikus without the gates, when

¹ Thukyd., i. 20, about the general belief of the Athenian public in his time—'Ἀθηναίων γοῦν τὸ πλῆθος οἰοῦνται ὑπὸ Ἄρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος Ἱππάρχον τύραννον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν, καὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν ὅτι Ἱππίας πρεσβύτερος ὢν ἤρχε τῶν Πεισιστράτων παιδῶν, etc. [But see p. 50, n. 6.—Ed.]

The Pseudo-Plato in the dialogue called *Hipparchus* adopts this belief, and the real Plato in

his *Symposion* (c. 9, p. 182) seems to countenance it.

² Herodot., v. 55-58. Harmodius is affirmed by Plutarch to have been of the deme Aphidnæ (Plutarch, *Symposiacen*, i. 10, p. 628).

It is to be recollected that he died before the introduction of the Ten Tribes, and before the recognition of the demes as political elements in the commonwealth.

Harmodius and Aristogeitôn approached with concealed daggers to execute their purpose. On coming near, they were thunderstruck to behold one of their own fellow-conspirators talking familiarly with Hippias, who was of easy access to every man. They immediately concluded that the plot was betrayed. Expecting to be seized, and wrought up to a state of desperation, they resolved at least not to die without having revenged themselves on Hipparchus, whom they found within the city gates near the chapel called the Leôkorion, and immediately slew him. His attendant guards killed Harmodius on the spot, while Aristogeitôn, rescued for the moment by the surrounding crowd, was afterwards taken, and perished in the tortures applied to make him disclose his accomplices.

The news flew quickly to Hippias in the Kerameikus, who heard it earlier than the armed citizens near him awaiting his order for the commencement of the procession. With extraordinary self-command, he took advantage of this precious instant of foreknowledge, and advanced towards them, directing them to drop their arms for a short time, and assemble on an adjoining ground. They unsuspectingly obeyed; upon which he ordered his guards to take possession of the vacant arms. Being now undisputed master, he seized the persons of all those citizens whom he mistrusted—especially all those who had daggers about them, which it was not the practice to carry in the Panathenaic procession.

Such is the memorable narrative of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn, peculiarly valuable inasmuch as it all comes from Thukydidês¹. (To possess great power—to be above legal restraint—to inspire extraordinary fear—is a privilege so much coveted by the giants among mankind, that we may well take notice of those cases in which it brings misfortune even upon themselves.) The fear inspired by Hipparchus—of designs which he did not really entertain, but was likely to entertain, and competent to execute without hindrance—was here the grand cause of his destruction.

The conspiracy here detailed happened in 514 B.C., during the thirteenth year of the reign of Hippias, which lasted four years longer, until 510 B.C. These last four years, in the belief of the Athenian public, counted for his whole reign; nay, many persons made the still greater historical mistake of eliding these last four years altogether, and of supposing that the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn had deposed the Peisistratid government and liberated Athens. Both poets and philosophers shared this faith, which is distinctly put forth in the beautiful and popular Skolion or song on the subject: the two friends are there celebrated as the authors of liberty at Athens—‘they slew the despot and gave to Athens equal laws’². So inestimable a present was alone

¹ Thukyd., i. 20; vi. 54-59; Herodot., v. 55, 56; vi. 123; Aristot., *Polit.*, v. 8, 9.

[This story is confirmed in its general outlines by the *Ath. Pol.*, though Thessalus, not Hipparchus, is the disappointed lover and the cause of the tumult, and certain other details are different. The interest of this incident, which was doubtless told in many forms, is that while the earlier years of the Peisistratids had been marked by mild administration, the subsequent severity of Hippias was apparently so appalling that the fertile imagination of the Athenians subsequently magnified this very commonplace personal quarrel into a crisis of first-rate national importance. Romance apart, Harmodius and Aristogeitôn are sorry national heroes; but it must be remembered that the actual expulsion of Hippias could not

honestly be attributed to any Athenian. In the same way the heroes of the Greek revolution received an honour which they could hardly claim; Mavrocordatos, indeed, was merely incompetent, but Kolokotronis and Odysseus were frankly blackguards. For the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeitôn, see E. Gardner, *Handbook of Greek Sculpture*, pp. 181-187.—ED.

² See the words of the song:

Ὅτι τὸν τύραννον κρᾶνεν
Ἰσονόμους τ’ Ἀθῆνας ἐποίησάν—

(*ap. Athenæus*, xv., p. 691).

The epigram of the Keian Simonidês (*Fragm.*, 132, ed. Bergk; *ap. Hephæstion*, c. 14, p. 26, ed. Gaisf.) implies a similar belief; also the passages in Plato, *Symposium*, p. 182; in Aristot., *Polit.*, v. 8, 21; and Arrian, *Exped. Alex.*, iv. 10, 3.

sufficient to enshrine in the minds of the subsequent democracy those who had sold their lives to purchase it. Moreover, we must recollect that the intimate connection between the two, though repugnant to the modern reader, was regarded at Athens with sympathy, so that the story took hold of the Athenian mind by the vein of romance conjointly with that of patriotism. Harmodius and Aristogeitôn were afterwards commemorated both as the winners and as the protomartyrs of Athenian liberty. (Statues were erected in their honour shortly after the final expulsion of the Peisistratids; immunity from taxes and public burdens was granted to the descendants of their families; and the speaker who proposed the abolition of such immunities, at a time when the number had been abusively multiplied, made his only special exception in favour of this respected lineage¹.) And since the name of Hipparchus was universally notorious as the person slain, we discover how it was that he came to be considered by an uncritical public as the predominant member of the Peisistratid family—the eldest son and successor of Peisistratus, the reigning despot—to the comparative neglect of Hippias.

Whatever may have been the previous moderation of Hippias, indignation at the death of his brother, and fear for his own safety², now induced him to drop it altogether. It is attested both by Thukydidês and Herodotus, and admits of no doubt, that his power was now employed harshly and cruelly—that he put to death a considerable number of citizens. We find also a statement no way improbable in itself and affirmed both in Pausanias and in Plutarch—inferior authorities, yet still in this case sufficiently credible—that he caused Leæna, the mistress of Aristogeitôn, to be tortured to death, in order to extort from her a knowledge of the secrets and accomplices of the latter³. But as he could not but be sensible that this system of terrorism was full of peril to himself, so he looked out for shelter and support in case of being expelled from Athens. With this view he sought to connect himself with Darius, king of Persia, a connection full of consequences to be hereafter developed. Æantidês, son of Hippoklus, the despot of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, stood high at this time in the favour of the Persian monarch, which induced Hippias to give him his daughter Archedikê in marriage, no small honour to the Lampsakene, in the estimation of Thukydidês⁴. To explain how Hippias came to fix upon this town, however, it is necessary to say a few words on the foreign policy of the Peisistratids.

It has already been mentioned that the Athenians, even so far back as the days of the poet Alkæus, had occupied Sigeium in the Troad, and had there carried on war with the Mityleneans; so that their acquisitions in these regions date much before the time of Peisistratus. Owing probably to this circumstance, an application was made to them in the early part of his reign from the Dolonkian Thracians, inhabitants of the Chersonese on the opposite side of the Hellespont, for aid against their powerful neighbours the Absinthian tribe of Thracians. Opportunity was thus

¹ Herodot., vi. 109; Demosthen., *Adv. Leptin.*, c. 27, p. 495; *Cont. Meidiam*, c. 47, p. 569; and the oath prescribed in the Psephism of Demophantus—Andokidês, *De Mysterioris*, p. 13; Pliny, *H. N.*, xxxiv. 4-8; Pausan., i. 8, 5; Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, xxv.

The statues were carried away from Athens by Xerxês, and restored to the Athenians by Alexander after his conquest of Persia

(Arrian, *Ex. Al.*, iii. 16, 14; Pliny, *H. N.*, xxxiv. 4-8).

² *Ἡ γὰρ δειλία φοιικώτατον ἐστὶν ἐν ταῖς τυραννίσιν*, observes Plutarch (*Arlaxerxês*, c. 25).

³ Pausan., i. 23, 2; Plutarch, *De Garrulitate*, p. 897; Polyæn., viii. 45; Athenæus, xiii., p. 596.

⁴ We can hardly be mistaken in putting this interpretation on the words of Thukydidês—*Ἀθηναῖος ὧν, Λαμψακηνὴν ἔδωκε* (vi. 59).

offered for sending out a colony to acquire this valuable peninsula for Athens. Peisistratus willingly entered into the scheme, while Miltiadês, son of Kypselus, a noble Athenian living impatiently under his despotism, was no less pleased to take the lead in executing it : his departure and that of other malcontents as founders of a colony suited the purpose of all parties. According to the narrative of Herodotus — alike pious and picturesque, and doubtless circulating as authentic at the annual games which the Chersonesites, even in his time, celebrated to the honour of their œkist—it is the Delphian god who directs the scheme and singles out the individual. The chiefs of the distressed Dolonkians going to Delphi to crave assistance towards procuring Grecian colonists, were directed to choose for their œkist the individual who should first show them hospitality on their quitting the temple. They departed and marched all along what was called the Sacred Road, through Phokis and Bœotia to Athens, without receiving a single hospitable invitation. At length they entered Athens, and passed by the house of Miltiadês while he himself was sitting in front of it. Seeing men whose costume and arms marked them out as strangers, he invited them into his house and treated them kindly : upon which they apprised him that he was the man fixed upon by the oracle, and adjured him not to refuse his concurrence. After asking for himself personally the opinion of the oracle, and receiving an affirmative answer, he consented, sailing as œkist at the head of a body of Athenian emigrants to the Chersonese¹.

Having reached this peninsula, and having been constituted despot of the mixed Thracian and Athenian population, he lost no time in fortifying the narrow isthmus by a wall reaching all across from Kardia to Paktya, a distance of about four miles and a half ; so that the Absinthian invaders were for the time effectually shut out², though the protection was not permanently kept up. He also entered into a war with Lampsakus on the Asiatic side of the strait, but was unfortunate enough to fall into an ambushade and become a prisoner. Nothing preserved his life except the immediate interference of Crœsus, King of Lydia, coupled with strenuous menaces addressed to the Lampsakenes, who found themselves compelled to release their prisoner. Miltiadês had acquired much favour with Crœsus, in what manner we are not told. He died childless some time afterwards, while his nephew Stesagoras, who succeeded him, perished by assassination some time subsequent to the death of Peisistratus at Athens³.

The expedition of Miltiadês to the Chersonese must have occurred early after the first usurpation of Peisistratus, since even his imprisonment by the Lampsakenes happened before the ruin of Crœsus (546 B.C.). But it was not till much later—probably during the third and most powerful period of Peisistratus—that the latter undertook his expedition against Sigeium in the Troad. This place appears to have fallen into the hands

¹ Herodot., vi. 36, 37.

² Thus the Scythians broke into the Chersonese even during the government of Miltiadês, son of Kimôn, nephew of Miltiadês the œkist, about forty years after the wall had been erected (Herodot., vi. 40). Again, Periklês re-established the cross-wall, on sending to the Chersonese a fresh band of 1,000 Athenian settlers (Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 19) : lastly, Derkyllidas the Lacedæmonian built it anew, in consequence of loud complaints raised by the inhabitants of their defenceless condition—

about 397 B.C. (Xenophon, *Hellen.*, iii. 2, 8-10). So imperfect, however, did the protection prove, that about half a century afterwards, during the first years of the conquests of Philip of Macedon, an idea was entertained of digging through the isthmus, and converting the peninsula into an island (Demosthenês, *Philippic* ii. 6, p. 92, and *De Halonneso*, c. 10, p. 86) ; an idea, however, never carried into effect.

³ Herodot., vi. 38, 39.

of the Mityleneans: Peisistratus retook it¹, and placed there his illegitimate son Hegesistratus as despot. The Mityleneans may have been enfeebled at this time (somewhere between 537-527 B.C.) not only by the strides of Persian conquest on the mainland, but also by the ruinous defeat which they suffered from Polykratès and the Samians². Hegesistratus maintained the place against various hostile attempts, throughout all the reign of Hippias, so that the Athenian possessions in those regions comprehended at this period both the Chersonese and Sigeium³. To the former of the two Hippias sent out Miltiadès, nephew of the first ækist, as governor after the death of his brother Stesagoras. The new governor found much discontent in the peninsula, but succeeded in subduing it by entrapping and imprisoning the principal men in each town. He farther took into his pay a regiment of five hundred mercenaries and married Hegesipylê, daughter of the Thracian king Olorus⁴. It must have been about 518 B.C. that this second Miltiadès went out to the Chersonese⁵. He seems to have been obliged to quit it for a time, after the Scythian expedition of Darius, in consequence of having incurred the hostility of the Persians; but he was there from the beginning of the Ionic revolt until about 493 B.C., or two or three years before the battle of Marathon, on which occasion we shall find him acting commander of the Athenian army.

Both the Chersonese and Sigeium, however, though Athenian possessions, were now tributary and dependent on Persia. It was to Persia that Hippias, during his last years of alarm, looked for support in the event of being expelled from Athens: he calculated upon Sigeium as a shelter, and upon Æantidès as well as Darius as an ally. Neither the one nor the other failed him.

The same circumstances which alarmed Hippias and rendered his dominion in Attica at once more oppressive and more odious, tended, of course, to raise the hopes of his enemies, the Athenian exiles, with the powerful Alkmæonids at their head. Believing the favourable moment to be come, they even ventured upon an invasion of Attica, and occupied a post called Leipsydriou in the mountain range of Parnès, which separates Attica from Bœotia⁶. But their schemes altogether failed: Hippias defeated and drove them out of the country. His dominion now seemed confirmed, for the Lacedæmonians were on terms of intimate friendship with him; and Amyntas, King of Macedon, as well as the Thessalians, were his allies. Yet the exiles whom he had beaten in the open field succeeded in an unexpected manœuvre, which, favoured by circumstances, proved his ruin.

By an accident which had occurred in the year 548 B.C.⁷, the Delphian

¹ Herodot., v. 94. Grote's view that there were two expeditions against Sigeium is generally adopted (but see Beloch in *Rhein. Mus.*, xlv., pp. 465-473). The first war, as attested by the mention of Alkæus and Periander, may be dated roughly 600 to 590, its object being to injure Megarian trade. The 'Sigeium bilingual' (Hicks and Hill, 8), indicating Athenian influence in that district, probably belongs to about 600. The second war must certainly be attributed to a late date in Peisistratus's reign, especially if Hegesistratus was really appointed governor (see note, p. 50). Perhaps the final security of the Athenian settlement at Sigeium may be attributed to weakness on the part of Lesbos, due to the attacks of

Polykratès. For a brief account of the bilingual, see Bury, p. 864.—Ed.

² Herodot., iii. 39.

³ *Ibid.*, vi. 104, 139, 140.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vi. 39-103.

⁵ There is nothing that I know to mark the date except that it was earlier than the death of Hipparchus in 514 B.C., and also earlier than the expedition of Darius against the Scythians, about 516 B.C., in which expedition Miltiadès was engaged: see Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, and J. M. Schultz, *Beitrag zu genaueren Zeitbestimmungen der Hellen. Geschichte von der 63sten bis zur 72sten Olympiade*, p. 165, in the *Kieler Philologische Studien*, 1841.

⁶ Herodot., v. 62.

⁷ Pausan., x. 5, 5.

temple was set on fire and burnt. To repair this grave loss was an object of solicitude to all Greece; but the outlay required was exceedingly heavy, and it appears to have been long before the money could be collected. The Amphiktyons decreed that one-fourth of the cost should be borne by the Delphians themselves, who found themselves so heavily taxed by such assessment, that they sent envoys throughout all Greece to collect subscriptions in aid, and received, among other donations, from the Greek settlers in Egypt twenty minæ, besides a large present of alum from the Egyptian king Amasis: their munificent benefactor Cræsus fell a victim to the Persians in 546 B.C., so that his treasure was no longer open to them. The total sum required was three hundred talents (equal probably to about 115,000*l.* sterling¹)—a prodigious amount to be collected from the dispersed Grecian cities, who acknowledged no common sovereign authority, and among whom the proportion reasonable to ask from each was difficult to determine with satisfaction to all parties. At length, however, the money was collected, and the Amphiktyons were in a situation to make a contract for the building of the temple. The Alkmæonids, who had been in exile ever since the third and final acquisition of power by Peisistratus, took the contract. In executing it, they not only performed the work in the best manner, but even went much beyond the terms stipulated, employing Parian marble for the frontage where the material prescribed to them was coarse stone². As was before remarked in the case of Peisistratus when he was in banishment, we are surprised to find exiles (whose property had been confiscated) so amply furnished with money, unless we are to suppose that Kleisthenês the Alkmæonid, grandson of the Sikyonian Kleisthenês, inherited through his mother wealth independent of Attica, and deposited it in the temple of the Samian Hêrê. But the fact is unquestionable, and they gained signal reputation throughout the Hellenic world for their liberal performance of so important an enterprise. That the erection took considerable time, we cannot doubt. It seems to have been finished, as far as we can conjecture, about a year or two after the death of Hipparchus—512 B.C.—more than thirty years after the conflagration.

To the Delphians, especially, the rebuilding of their temple on so superior a scale was the most essential of all services, and their gratitude towards the Alkmæonids was proportionally great. Partly through such a feeling, partly through pecuniary presents, Kleisthenês was thus enabled to work the oracle for political purposes, and to call forth the powerful arm of Sparta against Hippias. Whenever any Spartan presented himself to consult the oracle, either on private or public business, the answer of the priestess was always in one strain—‘Athens must be liberated’. The constant repetition of that mandate at length extorted from the piety of the Lacedæmonians a reluctant compliance. Reverence for the god overcame their strong feeling of friendship towards the Peisistratids, and Anchimolius, son of Aster, was despatched by sea to Athens at the head

¹ Herodot., i. 50, ii. 180. I have taken the 300 talents of Herodotus as being Æginetan talents, which are to Attic talents in the ratio of 5:3. The Inscriptions prove that the accounts of the temple were kept by the Amphiktyons on the Æginetan scale of money: see *Corpus Inscript.* Boeckh, No. 1688, and Boeckh, *Metrologie*, vii. 4. [Others—e.g., Bury—give ‘over £70,000’.—Ed.]

² Herodot., v. 62. The words of the historian

would seem to imply that they only began to think of this scheme of building the temple after the defeat of Leipsydrius, and a year or two before the expulsion of Hippias; a supposition quite inadmissible, since the temple must have taken some years in building.

[It is interesting to notice that recent excavation confirms the statement of Herodotus, that the Delphian temple had one marble façade (*Bull. de Corresp. Hell.*, 1896, p. 650 *et seq.*).—Ed.]

of a Spartan force to expel them. On landing at Phalêrum, however, he found them already forewarned and prepared, as well as farther strengthened by one thousand horse specially demanded from their allies in Thessaly. Upon the plain of Phalêrum this latter force was found peculiarly effective, so that the division of Anchimolius were driven back to their ships with great loss, and he himself slain¹. The defeated armament had probably been small, and its repulse only provoked the Lacedæmonians to send a larger, under the command of their king Kleomenês in person, who on this occasion marched into Attica by land. On reaching the plain of Athens, he was assailed by the Thessalian horse, but repelled them in so gallant a style, that they at once rode off and returned to their native country, abandoning their allies with a faithlessness not unfrequent in the Thessalian character. Kleomenês marched on without farther resistance to Athens, where he found himself, together with the Alkmæonids and the malcontent Athenians generally, in possession of the town. At that time there was no fortification except round the Acropolis, into which Hippias retired, with his mercenaries and the citizens most faithful to him, having taken care to provision it well beforehand, so that it was not less secure against famine than against assault. He might have defied the besieging force, which was no way prepared for a long blockade. Yet, not altogether confiding in his position, he tried to send his children by stealth out of the country; in which proceeding the children were taken prisoners. To procure their restoration, Hippias consented to all that was demanded of him, and withdrew from Attica to Sigeium in the Troad within the space of five days.

Thus fell the Peisistratid dynasty in 510 B.C., fifty years after the first usurpation of its founder². It was put down through the aid of foreigners³, and those foreigners, too, wishing well to it in their hearts, though hostile from a mistaken feeling of divine injunction. Yet both the circumstances of its fall, and the course of events which followed, conspire to show that it possessed few attached friends in the country, and that the expulsion of Hippias was welcomed unanimously by the vast majority of Athenians. His family and chief partisans would accompany him into exile—probably as a matter of course, without requiring any formal sentence of condemnation. An altar was erected in the Acropolis, with a column hard by, commemorating both the past iniquity of the dethroned dynasty, and the names of all its members.

APPENDIX

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[THE above chapter, as has been indicated in the Preface, gives a very inadequate idea of the services of Peisistratus to the Athenian state both in its internal and in its external relations. This is due partly no doubt to the author's underlying distrust of autocracy, however moderate, and also to insufficient knowledge. Subsequent discoveries, archæological and other, together with an impartial consideration of the evidence, enable us to arrive at a more just appreciation of a most important epoch in the development of the Athenian state.

1. *Internal Affairs*.—We have already seen that, for many reasons, the

¹ Herodot., v. 62, 63. [*Ath. Pol.* (xix. 4) gives Anchimolius.—ED.]

² Herodot., v. 64, 65.

³ Thukyd., vi. 56, 57.

legislation of Solon was a failure. The recurrent civil strife culminating for the moment in the archonship of Damasias, followed by some twenty years of perpetual civil disturbance between the rich and poor, town and country, landlord and tenant, show conclusively that the net result of the Solonian reforms was meagre. Yet we learn that the general peace and prosperity in the third period of Peisistratus's rule was such that a uniform tax of 10 per cent. was successfully levied (see above, p. 49 note), and that, as the author of the *Ath. Pol.* states, the period was as 'the age of Kronos'. This fact alone is enough to show that some fundamental change had come over the country.

The *Ath. Pol.* (c. xvi.) entirely corroborates the general view indicated in the above chapter that Peisistratus was a moderate ruler. 'He governed more as a constitutional monarch than as a tyrant, and was kindly, considerate, and inclined to mercy.' He maintained the form of government by archons, though in some way he brought it about that his relatives and friends were always in office—not, as is often held, by influencing the verdict of the lot; for until after Marathon the archons were elected (see note, p. 314). His main object, as the *Ath. Pol.* (*loc. cit.*) specifically states, was to make the people imagine that the established forms were safe in his hands. To accomplish this it was essential that they should be induced to remain peacefully on their farms¹, and in their consequent prosperity lose sight of the fact that his position was unconstitutional. He therefore encouraged agriculture by granting freeholds to the farmers, no doubt partly from the lands acquired from his former rivals who had fled the country, and by actually advancing money. In this way he healed the strife which, even after Solon's legislation, had been prevalent between landlord and tenant, and relieved himself of the peril of an idle, discontented mob in Athens itself. With the same object of decentralizing the population he established local courts of justice throughout Attica, and himself frequently went on circuit. On one of these journeys he met on Hymettus an old farmer who sturdily declaimed against the hardships of his lot, ascribing them to the 10 per cent. tax. According to the story, Peisistratus at once remitted the tax in his case. This personal supervision exercised by Peisistratus, coupled with the obvious wisdom of his policy, stamps him as a man of real political genius.

The same statesmanlike prudence enabled him to realize the importance of weakening the local religious domination of the landowners by creating a new popular and national religion—a policy which Kleisthenés subsequently followed to its logical conclusions. It was he who organized the great city Dionysia, games to Dionysus, in honour of whom he built at the foot of the Acropolis a temple, the ruins of which are still in part visible. Since Dionysus was the god of the rustics, it is clear that in exalting his festival to the dignity of a national celebration he was strengthening his hold on the people on whose support his position depended. In the same spirit he encouraged the celebration of the Panathenaic games, and added to the old limestone temple of Athena on the Acropolis a Doric colonnade (Dörpfeld, *Athenische Mitteilungen*, 1886, pp. 337-351; Schrader, *ib.*, 1904; Gardner, *Ancient Athens*); he planned, though he never finished, a great temple to Olympian Zeus in the site where more than six hundred years later Hadrian completed the famous temple, some pillars of which may still be seen. To him has been ascribed the original Parthenon which preceded that of Periklēs, and it is said that he gave encouragement to Thespis of Ikaria, who, by his character-impersonation, became the precursor of the subsequent Attic drama. His alleged services to Homeric scholarship are separately considered below.

Nor, in the midst of these comprehensive activities, did he omit to care for useful public works. Recent excavation has brought to light in the valley between the Areopagus and the Pnyx the waterworks which he built to receive water brought by an aqueduct from the Kephissus². We hear also that he constructed roads and other public works.

2. *External Policy.*—We have already seen that Peisistratus had a very distinct foreign policy. If the stories of his exiles are true, this attitude was indeed thrust upon him by circumstances. There are signs, however, which prove that he thoroughly realized (as was the case with other of the Greek tyrants) the value of external alliances. The catholicity of his extra-Athenian friendships

¹ Cf. Periander of Corinth (Diog. Laërt., i. 98); the Sikyonian tyrants (Poll., vii. 68).

² Dörpfeld in *Ath. Mitt.*, 1894, pp. 143-151; 1895, pp. 161 *et seq.*; 1896, p. 265 *et seq.*

is remarkable. By his marriage with Timonassa he was connected with Argos ; in Lygdamis, whom he installed at Naxos, he had a trusted friend ; during his second exile he had formed connexions in Thessaly, on the Strymon, and in Eretria. He was also on good terms with Sparta and Thebes. Of far more vital importance to the peculiar destiny of Athens was his policy of expansion in the Hellespont. In the first place he recaptured the fortress of Sigeium at the mouth of the strait (this was no doubt a second war, not the one in which Alkæus cast away his shield, see p. 55 n.), and it was under his auspices, no doubt, that the Philaid Miltiadês went out as the official founder of an Athenian settlement on the Thracian Chersonese. By these two enterprises, following on the humiliation of Megara nearer home, Peisistratus unquestionably laid the foundation of the Athenian Empire, and paved the way for the glories of the fifth century. Hitherto a colonial policy had been peculiar among Greeks to those of the eastern Ægean, who, especially the Milesians, had extended Greek commerce to the distant shores of the Euxine. By the settlements of Sigeium and the Thracian Chersonese, Athens became mistress of the narrow strait, by the possession of which she was to control the enormous Pontic grain-trade.

3. The question of how far, if at all, Peisistratus influenced the text of Homer is one to which, in view of the slenderness of the evidence, no answer can here be attempted. Similarly we cannot properly go further than express an opinion that the Panathenaic regulation is a fact, and that the authorship may be attributed to either Solon, Peisistratus, or Hipparchus. From this assumption the smallest legitimate inference would be that there already existed some recognized order ; how else could they have known in what order the *rhapsodiæ* should be sung ? The most recent view taken by Mr. T. W. Allen (to whom the editors are indebted for the above opinion) is that the historical Homer of 900, or thereabouts, left the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* much as we now have them (see *Class. Rev.*, June, 1906).—Ed.]

CHAPTER IV [XXXI]

GRECIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE PEISISTRATIDS—REVOLUTION OF KLEISTHENÊS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS

WITH Hippias disappeared the mercenary Thracian garrison, upon which he and his father before him had leaned for defence as well as for enforcement of authority. Kleomenês with his Lacedæmonian forces retired also, after staying only long enough to establish a personal friendship, productive subsequently of important consequences, between the Spartan king and the Athenian Isagoras. The Athenians were thus left to themselves, without any foreign interference to constrain them in their political arrangements.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter that the Peisistratids had for the most part respected the forms of the Solonian Constitution. The nine archons, and the pro-bouleutic or pre-considering [Council] of Four Hundred (both annually changed), still continued to subsist, together with occasional meetings of the people—or rather of such portion of the people as was comprised in the gentes, phratries, and four Ionic tribes. The timocratic classification of Solon (or quadruple scale of income and admeasurement of political franchises according to it) also continued to subsist—but all within the tether and subservient to the purposes of the ruling family, who always kept one of their number as real master, among the chief administrators, and always retained possession of the acropolis as well as of the mercenary force.

(That overawing pressure being now removed by the expulsion of Hippias, the enslaved forms became at once endued with freedom and reality.) There appeared again, what Attica had not known for thirty years, declared political parties, and pronounced opposition between two men as leaders—on one side, Isagoras son of Tisander, a person of illustrious descent—on the other, Kleisthenēs the Alkmæonid, not less illustrious, and possessing at this moment a claim on the gratitude of his countrymen as the most persevering as well as the most effective foe of the dethroned despots.) In what manner such opposition was carried on we are not told. It would seem to have been not altogether pacific; but at any rate, Kleisthenēs had the worst of it, and in consequence of this defeat (says the historian), 'he took into partnership the people, who had been before excluded from everything'¹. His partnership with the people gave birth to the Athenian democracy: it was a real and important revolution².

The political franchise, or the character of an Athenian citizen, both before and since Solon, had been confined to the primitive four Ionic tribes, each of which was an aggregate of so many close corporations or quasi-families—the gentes and the phratries. None of the residents in Attica, therefore, except those included in some gens or phratry, had any part in the political franchise. Such non-privileged residents were probably at all times numerous, and became more and more so by means of fresh settlers. Moreover, they tended most to multiply in Athens and Peiræus, where immigrants would commonly establish themselves. Kleisthenēs, breaking down the existing wall of privilege, imparted the political franchise to the excluded mass. But this could not be done by enrolling them in new gentes or phratries, created in addition to the old. For the gentile tie was founded upon old faith and feeling which in the existing state of the Greek mind could not be suddenly conjured up as a bond of union for comparative strangers. It could only be done by disconnecting the franchise altogether from the Ionic tribes as well as from the gentes which constituted them, and by redistributing the population into new tribes with a character and purpose exclusively political. Accordingly, Kleisthenēs abolished the four Ionic tribes, and created in their place ten new tribes founded upon a different principle, independent of the gentes and phratries. Each of his new tribes comprised a certain number of demes or cantons, with the enrolled proprietors and residents in each of them. The demes taken altogether included the entire surface of Attica, so that the Kleisthenean constitution admitted to the political franchise all the free native Athenians; and not merely these, but also many metics, and even some of the superior order of slaves³. Putting out of sight the general body of slaves, and regarding only the free inhabitants, it was in point of fact a scheme approaching to universal suffrage, both political and judicial.

The slight and cursory manner in which Herodotus announces this

¹ Herodot., v. 66-69.

² The *Ath. Pol.* (cc. xix., xx.) gives practically the same account of the expulsion of the Peisistratids. It states, however (c. xxi.), that, though Kleisthenēs obtained the support of the people at once, it was only in the fourth year afterwards on the final expulsion of Isagoras that he began to frame his constitution. It is most important to realize that Isagoras was actually elected archon in this year (508-507), which shows that the struggle

was protracted, and that Kleisthenēs had by no means the unanimous support of the people till this year. Note also that it is in the course of this struggle that the *Boulê*—i.e., the Solonian 400, not the Kleisthenean—first appears as a dominating factor in politics.—Ed.

³ Aristot., *Polit.*, iii. 1, 10; vi. 2, 11. Κλεισθένης — πολλοὺς ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. [See Appendix to the chapter.—Ed.]

memorable revolution tends to make us overlook its real importance. He dwells chiefly on the alteration in the number and names of the tribes: Kleisthenês, he says, despised the Ionians so much, that he would not tolerate the continuance in Attica of the four tribes which prevailed in the Ionic cities, deriving their names from the four sons of Ion—just as his grandfather the Sikyonian Kleisthenês, hating the Dorians, had degraded and nicknamed the three Dorian tribes at Sikyôn. Such is the representation of Herodotus, who seems himself to have entertained some contempt for the Ionians, and therefore to have suspected a similar feeling where it had no real existence¹.

But the scope of Kleisthenês was something far more extensive. He abolished the four ancient tribes, not because they were Ionic, but because they had become incommensurate with the existing condition of the Attic people, and because such abolition procured both for himself and for his political scheme new as well as hearty allies. And, indeed, if we study the circumstances of the case, we shall see very obvious reasons to suggest the proceeding. For more than thirty years—an entire generation—the old constitution had been a mere empty formality, working only in subservience to the reigning dynasty, and stripped of all real controlling power. We may be very sure, therefore, that both the [Council] of Four Hundred and the popular assembly, divested of that free speech which imparted to them not only all their value but all their charm, had come to be of little public estimation, and were probably attended only by a few partisans. Under such circumstances, the difference between qualified citizens and men not so qualified—between members of the four old tribes and men not members—became during this period practically effaced. This, in fact, was the only species of good which a Grecian despotism² ever seems to have done. It confounded the privileged and the non-privileged under one coercive authority common to both, so that the distinction between the two was not easy to revive when the despotism passed away. As soon as Hippias was expelled, the [Council] and the public assembly regained their efficiency; but had they been continued on the old footing, including none but members of the four tribes, these tribes would have been re-invested with a privilege which in reality they had so long lost, that its revival would have seemed an odious novelty, and the remaining population would probably not have submitted to it. If in addition we consider the political excitement of the moment—the restoration of one body of men from exile, and the departure of another body into exile—the outpouring of long-suppressed hatred, partly against these very forms by the corruption of which the despot had reigned—we shall see that prudence as well as patriotism dictated the adoption of an enlarged scheme of government. Kleisthenês had learnt some wisdom during his long exile; and as he probably continued for some time after the introduction of his new constitution, to be the chief adviser of his countrymen, we may consider their extraordinary success as a testimony to his prudence and skill not less than to their courage and unanimity.

¹ Herod., v. 69. This comparison of the Athenian Kleisthenês, whose tribal organization was specifically intended to raise the status of the people generally, with Kleisthenês of Sikyôn, whose aim was to exalt the Ionians at the expense of the Dorians, is a striking example of historical ineptitude. It is difficult to see how Herodotus

could have conceived that Kleisthenês intended to slight the Ionians. For the antipathy of the Alkmæonids towards Ionians, see chap. i., p. 9, n. 3.—Ed.

² For a criticism of Grote's attitude to the Greek tyrants, see Preface, p. xv foll., and Appendix to the previous chapter.—Ed.

Nor does it seem unreasonable to give him credit for a more generous forward movement than what is implied in the literal account of Herodotus. Instead of being forced against his will to purchase popular support by proposing this new constitution, Kleisthenēs may have proposed it before, during the discussions which immediately followed the retirement of Hippias; so that the rejection of it formed the ground of quarrel (and no other ground is mentioned) between him and Isagoras¹. The latter doubtless found sufficient support, in the existing [Council] and public assembly, to prevent it from being carried without an actual appeal to the people. His opposition to it, moreover, is not difficult to understand; for necessary as the change had become, it was not the less a shock to ancient Attic ideas. It radically altered the very idea of a tribe, which now became an aggregation of demes, not of gentes—of fellow-demots, not of fellow-gentiles. It thus broke up those associations, religious, social, and political, between the whole and the parts of the old system, which operated powerfully on the mind of every old-fashioned Athenian. The patricians at Rome who composed the gentes and curiæ—and the plebs, who had no part in these corporations—formed for a long time two separate and opposing factions in the same city, each with its own separate organization. Only by slow degrees did the plebs gain ground, while the political value of the patrician gens was long maintained alongside of and apart from the plebeian tribe. So too, in the Italian and German cities of the Middle Ages, the patrician families refused to part with their own separate political identity when the guilds grew up by the side of them; even though forced to renounce a portion of their power, they continued to be a separate fraternity, and would not submit to be regimented anew, under an altered category and denomination, along with the traders who had grown into wealth and importance². But the reform of Kleisthenēs effected this change all at once, both as to the name and as to the reality. In some cases, indeed, that which had been the name of a gens was retained as the name of a deme, but even then the old gentiles were ranked indiscriminately among the remaining demots. The Athenian people, politically considered, thus became one homogeneous whole, distributed for convenience into parts, numerical, local, and politically equal. It is, however, to be remembered, that while the four Ionic tribes were abolished, the gentes and phratries which composed them were left untouched, continuing to subsist as family and religious associations, though carrying with them no political privilege.

The ten newly-created tribes, arranged in an established order of precedence, were called—Erechthëis, Ægëis, Pandiönis, Leontis, Akamantis, Genëis, Kekröpis, Hippothoöntis, Æantis, Antiochis; names borrowed chiefly from the respected heroes of Attic legend. This number remained unaltered until the year 305 B.C., when it was increased to twelve by the addition of two new tribes, Antigonias and Demetrias, afterwards designated anew by the names of Ptolemas and Attalis: the mere names of these last two, borrowed from living kings, and not from legendary

¹ It is conceivable that Kleisthenēs made some previous attempt at a constitutional reform, but the *Att. Pol.* merely states that there was *στάσις* (as during the period after Solon), and thus lends no colour to the theory that Kleisthenēs had any idea of a reform in 511-510. The quarrel was probably merely a struggle for supremacy between

two party leaders, as in the period preceding the rule of Peisistratus.—Ed.

² In illustration of what is here stated, see the account of the modifications of the Constitution of Zurich, in Bluntschli, *Staats und Rechts Geschichte der Stadt Zurich*, book iii., ch. 2, p. 322; also, Kortüm, *Entstehungs Geschichte der Freistädteischen Bünde im Mittelalter*, ch. 5, pp. 74, 75.

heroes, betray the change from freedom to subservience at Athens. Each tribe comprised a certain number of demes—cantons, parishes, or townships—in Attica. But the total number of these demes is not distinctly ascertained; for though we know that in the time of Polemô (the third century B.C.) it was one hundred and seventy-four, we cannot be sure that it had always remained the same; and several critics construe the words of Herodotus to imply that Kleisthenês at first recognised exactly one hundred demes, distributed in equal proportion among his ten tribes¹. Such construction of the words, however, is more than doubtful, while the fact itself is improbable; partly because if the change of number had been so considerable as the difference between one hundred and one hundred and seventy-four, some positive evidence of it would probably be found—partly because Kleisthenês would indeed have a motive to render the amount of citizen population nearly equal, but no motive to render the number of demes equal, in each of the ten tribes. It is well known how great is the force of local habits, and how unalterable are parochial or cantonal boundaries. In the absence of proof to the contrary, therefore, we may reasonably suppose the number and circumscription of the demes, as found or modified by Kleisthenês, to have subsisted afterwards with little alteration, at least until the increase in the number of the tribes.

There is another point, however, which is at once more certain, and more important to notice. (The demes which Kleisthenês assigned to each tribe were in no case all adjacent to each other: and therefore the tribe, as a whole, did not correspond with any continuous portion of the territory, nor could it have any peculiar local interest, separate from the entire community.) (Such systematic avoidance of the factions arising out of neighbourhood will appear to have been more especially necessary, when we recollect that the quarrels of the Parali, the Diakrii, the Pediaki, during the preceding century, had all been generated from local feud, though doubtless artfully fomented by individual ambition.) (Moreover, it was only by this same precaution that the local predominance of the city, and the formation of a city-interest distinct from that of the country, was obviated; which could hardly have failed to arise had the city by itself constituted either one deme or one tribe.) Kleisthenês distributed the city (or found it already distributed) into several demes, and those demes among several tribes, while Peiræus and Phalêrum, each constituting a separate deme, were also assigned to different tribes; so that there were no local advantages either to bestow predominance, or to create a struggle for predominance, of one tribe over the rest². Each deme had its own local interests to watch over; but the tribe was a mere aggregate

¹ Herodot., v. 69. [See Appendix to this chapter, § iv.—Ed.]

² The deme *Melité* belonged to the tribe *Kekropis*; *Kollytus*, to the tribe *Ægæis*; *Kydatheonon*, to the tribe *Pandionis*; *Kerameis*, or *Kerameikus*, to the *Akamantis*; *Skambônida*, to the *Leontis*.

All these five were demes within the city of Athens, and all belonged to different tribes.

Peiræus belonged to the *Hippothontis*; *Phalêrum*, to the *Æantis*; *Xypetê*, to the *Kekropis*; *Thymatada*, to the *Hippothontis*. These four demes, adjoining to each other, formed a sort of quadruple local union, for festivals and other purposes, among themselves; though three of them belonged to different tribes.

See the list of the Attic demes, with a careful statement of their localities in so far as ascertained,

in Professor Ross, *Die Deme von Attika*, Halle, 1846. The distribution of the city-demes, and of *Peiræus* and *Phalêrum*, among different tribes, appears to me a clear proof of the intention of the original distributors. It shows that they wished from the beginning to make the demes constituting each tribe discontinuous, and that they desired to prevent both the growth of separate tribe-interests and ascendancy of one tribe over the rest: it contradicts the belief of those who suppose that the tribe was at first composed of continuous demes, and that the breach of continuity arose from subsequent changes.

Of course, there were many cases in which adjoining demes belonged to the same tribe; but not one of the ten tribes was made up altogether of adjoining demes.

of demes for political, military, and religious purposes, with no separate hopes or fears apart from the whole State. Each tribe had a chapel, sacred rites and festivals, and a common fund for such meetings, in honour of its eponymous hero, administered by members of its own choice: and the statues of all the ten eponymous heroes, fraternal patrons of the democracy, were planted in the most conspicuous part of the agora of Athens. In the future working of the Athenian Government, we shall trace no symptom of disquieting local factions.

(The deme now became the primitive constituent element of the commonwealth, both as to persons and as to property.) It had its own demarch, its register of enrolled citizens, its collective property, its public meetings and religious ceremonies, its taxes levied and administered by itself. The register of qualified citizens¹ was kept by the demarch, and the inscription of new citizens took place at the assembly of the demots, whose legitimate sons were enrolled on attaining the age of eighteen, and their adopted sons at any time when presented and sworn to by the adopting citizen. The citizenship could only be granted by a public vote of the people, but wealthy non-freemen were enabled sometimes to evade this law and purchase admission upon the register of some poor deme, probably by means of a fictitious adoption. At the meetings of the demots, the register was called over, and it sometimes happened that some names were expunged, in which case the party thus disfranchised had an appeal to the popular judicature. So great was the local administrative power, however, of these demes, that they are described as the substitute, under the Kleisthenean system, for the Naukraries under the Solonian and ante-Solonian. The Trittyes and Naukraries², though nominally preserved, and the latter augmented in number from forty-eight to fifty, appear henceforward as of little public importance.

Kleisthenês preserved, but at the same time modified and expanded, all the main features of Solon's political constitution; the public assembly or Ekklesiâ—the pre-considering [Council] composed of members from all the tribes—and the habit of annual election, as well as annual responsibility of magistrates, by and to the Ekklesiâ. The full value must now have been felt of possessing such pre-existing institutions to build upon, at a moment of perplexity and dissension. But the Kleisthenean Ekklesiâ acquired new strength, and almost a new character, from the great increase of the number of citizens qualified to attend it; while the annually-changed [Council], instead of being composed of four hundred members taken in equal proportion from each of the old four tribes, was enlarged to five hundred, taken equally from each of the new ten tribes. It now comes before us, under the name of [Council] of Five Hundred, as an active and indispensable body throughout the whole Athenian democracy: moreover, the practice now seems to have begun (though the period of commencement cannot be decisively proved) of determining the names

¹ We may remark that this register was called by a special name, the Lexiarchic register; while the primitive register of phrators and gentiles always retained, even in the time of the orators, its original name of the *common register*.

² If the Naukraries still supplied as in older times one ship and two mounted soldiers each, it would seem that less than twenty years before Marathon Athens had only 50 ships and 100 horse. E. Meyer points out that Kleidêmus alone

(*Frag.*, 8) speaks of the Kleisthenean Naukraries and suggests that they were abolished in 483, when the fleet was increased. Certainly we do not hear anything of them afterwards. It is suggested that in Poll., 8, 108, we should read 'ten' for 'two', and thus obtain a cavalry force 480 strong. But see Boeckh (*Political Economy of the Athenians*, ii., § 21), who makes out a good case for believing that the cavalry amounted to only 96 under the system of 48 Naukraries.—Ed.

of the [councillors] by lot¹. Both the [Council] thus constituted, and the public assembly, were far more popular and vigorous than they had been under the original arrangement of Solon.

The new constitution of the tribes, as it led to a change in the annual [Council], so it transformed no less directly the military arrangements of the state, both as to soldiers and as to officers. The citizens called upon to serve in arms were now marshalled according to tribes—each tribe having its own taxiarchs as officers for the hoplites, and its own phylarch at the head of the horsemen. Moreover, there were now created, for the first time, ten stratēgi² or generals, one from each tribe; and two hipparchs, for the supreme command of the horsemen. Under the prior Athenian constitution it appears that the command of the military force had been vested in the third archon or polemarch, no stratēgi then existing. Even after the stratēgi had been created, under the Kleisthenean constitution, the polemarch still retained a joint right of command along with them—as we are told at the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus the polemarch not only enjoyed an equal vote in the council of war along with the ten stratēgi, but even occupied the post of honour on the right wing³. The ten generals, annually changed, are thus (like the ten tribes) a fruit of the Kleisthenean constitution, which was at the same time powerfully strengthened and protected by this remodelling of the military force. The functions of the generals became more extensive as the democracy advanced, so that they seem to have acquired gradually not merely the direction of military and naval affairs, but also that of the foreign relations of the city generally—while the nine archons, including the polemarch, were by degrees lowered down from that full executive and judicial competence which they had once enjoyed, to the simple ministry of police and preparatory justice. Encroached upon by the stratēgi on one side, they were also restricted in efficiency, on the other side, by the rise of the popular dikasteries or numerous jury-courts. We may be sure that these popular dikasteries had not been permitted to meet or to act under the despotism of the Peisistratids, and that the judicial business of the city must then have been conducted partly by the Senate of Areopagus, partly by the archons; perhaps with a nominal responsibility of the latter, at the end of their year of office, to an acquiescent Ekklesia. And if we even assume it to be true, as some writers contend, that the habit of direct popular judicature (over and above this annual trial of responsibility) had been partially introduced by Solon, it must have been discontinued during the long coercion exercised by the supervening dynasty. But the out-

¹ The method of appointment of the Councillors (by the demes *Ath. Pol.*, c. 62) in the time of Kleisthenes can only be inferred from third-century inscriptions, according to which they were appointed in numbers proportionate to the population of the deme, and by lot. We need hardly doubt that this method was adopted by Kleisthenes. If so, it is only in the broadest sense that we can describe the Kleisthenean Boulē as a representative assembly (Bury, p. 215). The elected stratēgi were far more representative in character. As to the method of election, it should be added that in the analogous constitution imposed (? 450) on Erythræ (*C. I. A.*, i. 9; Hicks and Hill, 32), the Council is appointed by lot. For a list of Councillors of the third-century type, see *C. I. A.*, ii. 868; Acharnæ has 22.—Ed.

² From the *Ath. Pol.* (c. 22) we learn that the institution of the stratēgi—(1) must have been

at least as late as 504 B.C., and (2) was, in fact, in the twelfth year before Marathon—i.e., in 501 B.C. Further, the polemarch is described as still in supreme command of the whole army. In a subsequent note (p. 314) we shall see that the introduction of sortition in the election of the archons coincides with the diminishing importance of the office—e.g., ten years after Marathon the polemarch has vanished—and the parallel increase in the power of the stratēgi. The stratēgi were elected (not chosen by lot) originally by and out of their respective tribes; in the fourth century out of the whole body of citizens (*Ath. Pol.*, c. 41). The first known case of two generals who were of the same tribe is that of Periklēs and Diotimus in 440. Therefore, the change probably took place about the middle of the fifth century.—Ed.

³ Herodot., vi. 109-III.

burst of popular spirit, which lent force to Kleisthenês, doubtless carried the people into direct action as jurors in the aggregate *Heliaea*, not less than as voters in the *Ekklesia*—and the change was thus begun which contributed to degrade the archons from their primitive character as judges, into the lower function of preliminary examiners and presidents of a jury. Such convocation of numerous juries, beginning first with the aggregate body of sworn citizens above thirty years of age, and subsequently dividing them into separate bodies or pannels for trying particular causes, became gradually more frequent and more systematized; until at length, in the time of Periklês, it was made to carry a small pay, and stood out as one of the most prominent features of Athenian life. We cannot particularize the different steps whereby such final development was attained, and whereby the judicial competence of the archon was cut down to the mere power of inflicting a small fine. But the first steps of it are found in the revolution of Kleisthenês, and it seems to have been consummated after the battle of Plataea. Of the function exercised by the nine archons, as well as by many other magistrates and official persons at Athens, in convoking a *dikastery* or jury-court, bringing on causes for trial, and presiding over the trial—a function constituting one of the marks of superior magistracy, and called the Hegemony or presidency of a *dikastery*—I shall speak more at length hereafter. At present I wish merely to bring to view the increased and increasing sphere of action on which the people entered at the memorable turn of affairs now before us.

The financial affairs of the city underwent at this epoch as complete a change as the military. The appointment of magistrates and officers by tens, one from each tribe, seems to have become the ordinary practice. A board of ten, called *Apodektæ*¹, were invested with the supreme management of the exchequer, dealing with the contractors as to those portions of the revenue which were farmed, receiving all the taxes from the collectors, and disbursing them under competent authority. Of this board the first nomination is expressly ascribed to Kleisthenês, as a substitute for certain persons called *Kôlakretæ*, who had performed the same function before, and who were now retained only for subordinate services in *Prytaneum*. The duties of the *Apodektæ* were afterwards limited to receiving the public income, and paying it over to the ten treasurers of the goddess *Athêrê*, by whom it was kept in the inner chamber of the Parthenon, and disbursed as needed; but this more complicated arrangement cannot be referred to Kleisthenês. From this time forward, too, the [Council] of Five Hundred steps far beyond its original duty of preparing matters for the discussion of the *Ekklesia*. It embraces, besides, a large circle of administrative and general superintendence, which hardly admits of any definition. Its sittings become constant, with the exception of special holidays. The year is distributed into ten portions called *Prytanies*—the fifty senators of each tribe taking by turns the duty of constant attendance during one *prytany*, and receiving during that time the title of *The Prytanês*: the order of precedence among the tribes in these duties was annually determined by lot. In the ordinary Attic year of twelve lunar months, or 354 days, six of the *prytanes* contained thirty-five days,

¹ See further *Ath. Pol.*, ch. xlviii. This is the only board of ten which can be attributed to Kleisthenês himself.—ED.

four of them contained thirty-six : in the intercalated years of thirteen months, the number of days was thirty-eight and thirty-nine respectively. Moreover, a farther subdivision of the prytany into five periods of seven days each, and of the fifty tribe-councillors into five bodies of ten each, was recognised. Each body of ten presided in the [Council] for one period of seven days, drawing lots every day among their number for a new chairman called Epistatês, to whom during his day of office were confided the keys of the acropolis and the treasury, together with the city seal. The remaining councillors, not belonging to the prytanizing tribe, might of course attend if they chose. But the attendance of nine among them, one from each of the remaining nine tribes, was imperatively necessary to constitute a valid meeting, and to ensure a constant representation of the collective people¹.

During those later times known to us through the great orators, the Ekklesia, or formal assembly of the citizens, was convoked four times regularly during each prytany, or oftener if necessity required—usually by the [Council], though the stratêgi had also the power of convoking it by their own authority. It was presided over by the prytanes, and questions were put to the vote by their Epistatês or chairman. But the nine representatives of the non-prytanizing tribes were always present as a matter of course, and seem, indeed, in the days of the orators to have acquired to themselves the direction of it, together with the right of putting questions for the vote²—setting aside wholly or partially the fifty prytanes. When we carry our attention back, however, to the state of the Ekklesia, as first organized by Kleisthenês (I have already remarked that expositors of the Athenian constitution are too apt to neglect the distinction of times, and to suppose that what was the practice between 400-330 B.C. had been always the practice), it will appear probable that he provided one regular meeting in each prytany, and no more ; giving to the [Council] and the stratêgi power of convening special meetings if needful, but establishing one Ekklesia during each prytany, or ten in the year, as a regular necessity of state. How often the ancient Ekklesia had been convoked during the interval between Solon and Peisistratus we cannot exactly say—probably but seldom during the year. Under the Peisistratids, its convocation had dwindled down into an inoperative formality. Hence the re-establishment of it by Kleisthenês, not merely with plenary determining powers, but also under full notice and preparation of matters beforehand, together with the best securities for orderly procedure, was in itself a revolution impressive to the mind of every Athenian citizen. To render the Ekklesia efficient, it was indispensable that its meetings should be both frequent and free. Men were thus trained to the duty both of speakers and hearers, and each man, while he felt that he exercised his share of influence on the decision, identified his own safety and happiness with the vote of the majority, and became familiarized with the notion of a sovereign authority which he neither could nor ought to resist. This was an idea new to the Athenian bosom. With it came the feelings sanctifying free speech and equal law—words which no Athenian citizen ever afterwards heard unmoved : together with that sentiment of the entire commonwealth as one and indivisible,

¹ See Appendix to this chapter.—ED.

² See the valuable treatise of Schömann, *De Comitiis*, *passim* ; also his *Antiq. Jur. Publ. Gr.*,

c. xxxi. ; Harpokration, v., *Κυρία Ἐκκλησία* ; Pollux, viii. 95.

which always overruled, though it did not supplant, the local and cantonal specialities. It is not too much to say that these patriotic and ennobling impulses were a new product in the Athenian mind, to which nothing analogous occurs even in the time of Solon. They were kindled in part doubtless by the strong reaction against the Peisistratids, but still more by the fact that the opposing leader, Kleisthenês, turned that transitory feeling to the best possible account, and gave to it a vigorous perpetuity, as well as a well-defined positive object, by the popular elements conspicuous in his constitution. His name makes less figure in history than we should expect, because he passed for the mere renovator of Solon's scheme of government after it had been overthrown by Peisistratus. Probably he himself professed this object, since it would facilitate the success of his propositions; and if we confine ourselves to the letter of the case, the fact is in a great measure true, since the annual [Council] and the Ekklesia are both Solonian—but both of them under his reform were clothed in totally new circumstances, and swelled into gigantic proportions.

But it was not only the people formally installed in their Ekklesia who received from Kleisthenês the real attributes of sovereignty—it was by him also that the people were first called into direct action as dikasts or jurors. I have already remarked that this custom may be said, in a certain limited sense, to have begun in the time of Solon, since that law-giver invested the popular assembly with the power of pronouncing the judgment of accountability upon the archons after their year of office. Here again the building, afterwards so spacious and stately, was erected on a Solonian foundation, though it was not itself Solonian. That the popular dikasteries, in the elaborate form in which they existed from Periklês downward, were introduced all at once by Kleisthenês, it is impossible to believe. Yet the steps by which they were gradually wrought out are not distinctly discoverable. It would rather seem, that at first only the aggregate body of citizens above thirty years of age exercised judicial functions, being specially convoked and sworn to try persons accused of public crimes, and when so employed bearing the name of the *Heliæa*, or *Heliasts*; private offences and disputes between man and man being still determined by individual magistrates in the city, and a considerable judicial power still residing in the senate of Areopagus. There is reason to believe that this was the state of things established by Kleisthenês, which afterwards came to be altered by the greater extent of judicial duty gradually accruing to the *Heliasts*, so that it was necessary to subdivide the collective *Heliæa*.

According to the subdivision, as practised in the times best known, 6,000 citizens above thirty years of age were annually selected by lot out of the whole number, 600 from each of the ten tribes; 5,000 of these citizens were arranged in ten pannels or decuries of 500 each, the remaining 1,000 being reserved to fill up vacancies in case of death or absence among the former. The whole 6,000 took a prescribed oath, couched in very striking words; after which every man received a ticket inscribed with his own name as well as with a letter designating his decury. When there were causes or crimes ripe for trial, the *Thesmothets*, or six inferior archons, determined by lot, first, which decuries should sit, according to the number wanted; next, in which court, or under the presidency of what magistrates the decury B or E should sit, so that it could not be known beforehand

in what cause each would be judge. In the number of persons who actually attended and sat, however, there seems to have been much variety, and sometimes two decuries sat together¹. The arrangement here described, we must recollect, is given to us as belonging to those times when the dikasts received a regular pay, after every day's sitting; and it can hardly have long continued without that condition, which was not realized before the time of Periklês. Each of these decuries sitting in judicature was called *the Heliæa*—a name which belongs properly to the collective assembly of the people, this collective assembly having been itself the original judicature. I conceive that the practice of distributing this collective assembly or *Heliæa* into sections of jurors for judicial duty may have begun under one form or another soon after the reform of Kleisthenês, since the direct interference of the people in public affairs tended more and more to increase. But it could only have been matured by degrees into that constant and systematic service which the pay of Periklês called forth at last in completeness. Under the last-mentioned system the judicial competence of the archons was annulled, and the third archon or polemarch withdrawn from all military functions. But this had not been yet done at the time of the battle of Marathon, where Kallimachus the polemarch not only commanded along with the stratêgi, but enjoyed a sort of pre-eminence over them: nor had it been done during the year after the battle of Marathon, in which Aristeidês was archon—for the magisterial decisions of Aristeidês formed one of the principal foundations of his honourable surname, the Just².

With this question as to the comparative extent of judicial power vested by Kleisthenês in the popular dikastery and the archons, are in reality connected two others in Athenian constitutional law, relating, first, to the admissibility of all citizens for the post of archon, next, to the choosing of archons by lot. It is well known that in the time of Periklês, the archons, and various other individual functionaries, had come to be chosen by lot³—moreover, all citizens⁴ were legally admissible, and might give in their names to be drawn for by lot, subject to what was called the *Dokimasy* or legal examination into their status of citizen and into various moral and religious qualifications, before they took office; while at the same time the function of the archon had become nothing higher than preliminary examination of parties and witnesses for the dikastery, and presidency over it when afterwards assembled, together with the power of imposing by authority a fine of small amount upon inferior offenders. Now all these three political arrangements hang essentially together. The great value of the lot, according to Grecian democratical ideas, was that it equalized the chance of office between rich and poor; but so long as the poor citizens were legally inadmissible, choice by lot could have no recommendation either to the rich or to the poor. In fact, it would be less democratical than election by the general mass of citizens, because the poor citizen would under the latter system enjoy an important right of interference by means of his suffrage, though he could not be elected himself. Again, choice by lot could never under any circumstances be applied to those posts where special competence, and a certain measure

¹ For the whole question of the *Heliæa*, see Gilbert, *Constitutional Antiquities* (Eng. trans.), pp. 391 ff.—Ed.

² Plutarch, *Arist.*, 7; Herodot., vi. 109-111.

³ For the introduction of the lot, see note, p. 314.—Ed.

⁴ The *Thêtes* were not legally eligible even in the fourth century; see note, p. 22.—Ed.

of attributes possessed only by a few, were indispensable—nor was it ever applied throughout the whole history of democratical Athens, to the *stratēgi* or generals, who were always elected by show of hands of the assembled citizens. Accordingly, we may regard it as certain, that at the time when the archons first came to be chosen by lot, the superior and responsible duties once attached to that office had been, or were in course of being, detached from it, and transferred either to the popular *dikasts* or to the ten elected *stratēgi*; so that there remained to these archons only a routine of police and administration, important, indeed, to the State, yet such as could be executed by any citizen of average probity, diligence, and capacity—at least there was no obvious absurdity in thinking so; while the *Dokimasy* excluded from the office men of notoriously discreditable life, even after they might have drawn the successful lot. *Periklēs*¹, though chosen *stratēgus* year after year successively, was never archon; and it may be doubted whether men of first-rate talents and ambition often gave in their names for the office. To those of smaller aspirations² it was doubtless a source of importance, but it imposed troublesome labour, gave no pay, and entailed a certain degree of peril upon any archon who might have given offence to powerful men, when he came to pass through the trial of accountability which followed immediately upon his year of office. There was little to make the office acceptable, either to very poor men, or to very rich and ambitious men; and between the middling persons who gave in their names, anyone might be taken without great practical mischief, always assuming the two guarantees of the *Dokimasy* before, and accountability after office. This was the conclusion—in my opinion a mistaken conclusion, and such as would find no favour at present—to which the democrats of Athens were conducted by their strenuous desire to equalize the chances of office for rich and poor. But their sentiment seems to have been satisfied by a partial enforcement of the lot to the choice of some offices—especially the archons, as the primitive chief magistrates of the State—without applying it to all or to the most responsible and difficult. Hardly would they have applied it to the archons, if it had been indispensably necessary that these magistrates should retain their original very serious duty of judging disputes and condemning offenders.

I think therefore that these three points—(1) The opening of the post of archon to all citizens indiscriminately; (2) the choice of archons by lot; (3) the diminished range of the archon's duties and responsibilities, through the extension of those belonging to the popular courts of justice on the one hand and to the *stratēgi* on the other—are all connected together, and must have been simultaneous, or nearly simultaneous, in the time of introduction: the enactment of universal admissibility to office certainly not coming after the other two, and probably coming a little before them³.

Now in regard to the eligibility of all Athenians indiscriminately to the office of archon, we find a clear and positive testimony as to the time when it was first introduced. Plutarch tells us⁴ that the oligarchical⁵, but high-principled, *Aristeidēs* was himself the proposer of this constitutional

¹ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 9-16.

² See a passage about such characters in Plato, *Republic*, v., p. 473 B.

³ For the whole of this question, see pp. 314, 280, and notes.—Ed.

⁴ So at least the supporters of the constitution of Kleisthenēs were called by the contemporaries of *Periklēs*.

change, shortly after the battle of Plataæ, with the consequent expulsion of the Persians from Greece, and the return of the refugee Athenians to their ruined city. Seldom has it happened in the history of mankind that rich and poor have been so completely equalized as among the population of Athens in that memorable expatriation and heroic struggle; nor are we at all surprised to hear that the mass of the citizens, coming back with freshly-kindled patriotism as well as with the consciousness that their country had only been recovered by the equal efforts of all, would no longer submit to be legally disqualified from any office of State. It was on this occasion that the constitution was first made really 'common' to all, and that the archons, stratêgi, and all functionaries, first began to be chosen from all Athenians without any difference of legal eligibility¹. No mention is made of the lot, in this important statement of Plutarch, which appears to me every way worthy of credit, and which teaches us, that down to the invasion of Xerxês, not only had the exclusive principle of the Solonian law of qualification continued in force (whereby the first three classes on the census were alone admitted to all individual offices, and the fourth or Thêtic class excluded), but also the archons had hitherto been elected by the citizens—not taken by lot. Now for financial purposes, the quadruple census of Solon was retained long after this period, even beyond the Peloponnesian war and the oligarchy of Thirty; but we thus learn that Kleisthenês in his constitution retained it for political purposes also, in part at least. He recognised the exclusion of the great mass of the citizens from all individual offices—such as the archon, the stratêgus, etc. In his time, probably, no complaints were raised on the subject. For his constitution gave to the collective bodies—[Council], Ekklesia, and Heliæa or Dikastery—a degree of power and importance such as they had never before known or imagined. And we may well suppose that the Athenian people of that day had no objection even to the proclaimed system and theory of being exclusively governed by men of wealth and station as individual magistrates—especially since many of the newly-enfranchised citizens had been before metics and slaves. Indeed, it is to be added, that even under the full democracy of later Athens, though the people had then become passionately attached to the theory of equal admissibility of all citizens to office, yet in practice poor men seldom obtained offices which were elected by the general vote, as will appear more fully in the course of this history².

The choice of the stratêgi remained ever afterwards upon the footing on which Aristeidês thus placed it; but the lot for the choice of archon must have been introduced shortly after his proposition of universal eligibility, and in consequence too of the same tide of democratical feeling—introduced as a farther corrective, because the poor citizen, though he had become eligible, was, nevertheless, not elected. And at the same time, I imagine, that elaborate distribution of the Heliæa, of aggregate body of dikasts or jurors, into separate pannels or dikasteries

¹ Plutarch, *Arist.*, c. 22: γράφει ψήφισμα, κοινὴν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν, καὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων πάντων αἰρεῖσθαι.

² [See notes referred to above.—ED.] So in the Italian republics of the twelfth and thirteenth century the nobles long continued to possess the exclusive right of being elected to the consulate and the great offices of state, even after those offices had come to be elected by the people. The

habitual misrule and oppression of the nobles gradually put an end to this right, and even created in many towns a resolution positively to exclude them. At Milan, towards the end of the twelfth century, the twelve consuls with the Podesta possessed all the powers of government. These consuls were nominated by one hundred electors chosen by and among the people. (Sismondi, *Histoire des Républiques Italiennes*, ch. xii., vol. ii., p. 240).

for the decision of judicial matters, was first regularized. It was this change that stole away from the archons so important a part of their previous jurisdiction: it was this change that Periklēs more fully consummated by ensuring pay to the dikasts.

But the present is not the time to enter into the modifications which Athens underwent during the generation after the battle of Plataea. They have been here briefly noticed for the purpose of reasoning back, in the absence of direct evidence, to Athens as it stood in the generation before that memorable battle, after the reform of Kleisthenēs. His reform, though highly democratical, stopped short of the mature democracy which prevailed from Periklēs to Demosthenēs, in three ways especially, among various others; and it is therefore sometimes considered by the later writers as an aristocratical constitution¹: (1) It still recognised the archons as judges to a considerable extent, and the third archon or polemarch as joint military commander along with the stratēgi; (2) it retained them as elected annually by the body of citizens, not as chosen by lot; (3) it still excluded the fourth class of the Solonian census from all individual office, the archonship among the rest. The Solonian law of exclusion, however, though retained in principle, was mitigated in practice thus far—that whereas Solon had rendered none but members of the highest class on the census (the Pentakosiomedimni) eligible to the archonship, Kleisthenēs opened that dignity to all the first three classes, shutting out only the fourth². That he did this may be inferred from the fact that Aristeidēs, assuredly not a rich man, became archon. I am also inclined to believe that the [Council] of Five Hundred as constituted by Kleisthenēs was taken, not by election, but by lot, from the ten tribes, and that every citizen became eligible to it. Election for this purpose—that is, the privilege of annually electing a batch of fifty [councillors] at once by each tribe—would probably be thought more troublesome than valuable; nor do we hear of separate meetings of each tribe for purposes of election. Moreover, the office of [councillor] was a collective, not an individual office; the shock therefore to the feelings of semi-democratised Athens, from the unpleasant idea of a poor man sitting among the fifty prytanes, would be less than if they conceived him as polemarch at the head of the right wing of the army, or as an archon administering justice.

A farther difference between the constitution of Solon and that of Kleisthenēs is to be found in the position of the Senate of Areopagus. Under the former, that Senate had been the principal body in the State, and Solon had even enlarged its powers; under the latter, it must have been treated at first as an enemy and kept down. For as it was composed only of all the past archons, and as during the preceding thirty years every archon had been a creature of the Peisistratids, the Areopagites collectively must have been both hostile and odious to Kleisthenēs and his partisans—perhaps a fraction of its members might even retire into exile with Hippias. Its influence must have been sensibly lessened by the change of party, until it came to be gradually filled by fresh archons springing from the bosom of the Kleisthenean constitution. Now during this important interval the new-modelled [Council] of Five Hundred and the popular assembly stepped into that ascendancy which they never

¹ Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 15; compare Plutarch, *Aristeidēs*, c. 2, and Isokratēs, *Areopagiticus*, Or. vii., p. 143, 192 (ed. Bek.).

² But see p. 314 note.—ED.

afterwards lost. From the time of Kleisthenês forward, the Areopagites cease to be the chief and prominent power in the State. Yet they are still considerable; and when the second fill of the democratical tide took place, after the battle of Plataea, they became the focus of that which was then considered as the party of oligarchical resistance. I have already remarked that the archons during the intermediate time (about 509-477 B.C.) were all elected by the Ekklesia, not chosen by lot¹, and that the fourth or poorest and most numerous class on the census were by law then ineligible; while election at Athens, even when every citizen without exception was an elector and eligible, had a natural tendency to fall upon men of wealth and station. We thus see how it happened that the past archons, when united in the Senate of Areopagus, infused into that body the sympathies, prejudices, and interests, of the richer classes. It was this which brought them into conflict with the more democratical party headed by Periklês and Ephialtês, in times when portions of the Kleisthenean constitution had come to be discredited as too much imbued with oligarchy.

One other remarkable institution, distinctly ascribed to Kleisthenês, yet remains to be noticed—the ostracism; upon which I have already made some remarks² in touching upon the memorable Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition. It is hardly too much to say, that without this protective process none of the other institutions would have reached maturity.

By the ostracism a citizen was banished without special accusation, trial, or defence, for a term of ten years—subsequently diminished to five. His property was not taken away, nor his reputation tainted; so that the penalty consisted solely in the banishment from his native city to some other Greek city. As to reputation, the ostracism was a compliment rather than otherwise³; and so it was vividly felt to be, when, about ninety years after Kleisthenês, the conspiracy between Nikias and Alkibiadês fixed it upon Hyperbolus: the two former had both recommended the taking of an ostracising vote, each hoping to cause the banishment of the other; but before the day arrived, they accommodated their own quarrel. To fire off the safety-gun of the republic against a person so little dangerous as Hyperbolus, was denounced as the prostitution of a great political ceremony: 'it was not against such men as he (said the comic writer Plato) that the shell was intended to be used'. The process of ostracism was carried into effect by writing upon a shell or potsherd the name of the person whom a citizen thought it prudent for a time to banish, which shell, when deposited in the proper vessel, counted for a vote towards the sentence.

I have already observed that all the governments of the Grecian cities, when we compare them with that idea which a modern reader is apt to conceive of the measure of force belonging to a government, were essentially weak—the good as well as the bad—the democratical, the oligarchical, and the despotic. The force in the hands of any government, to cope with conspirators or mutineers, was extremely small, with the single exception of a despot surrounded by his mercenary troop. Accordingly, no tolerably sustained conspiracy or usurper could be put down

¹ See p. 314, and note—Ed.

² See above, chap. ii., p. 38, and Appendix to this chapter.—Ed.

³ Aristeidês Rhetor, *Orat.*, xli., vol. ii., p. 317 (ed. Dindorf).

except by direct aid of the people in support of the Government, which amounted to a dissolution, for the time, of constitutional authority, and was pregnant with reactionary consequences such as no man could foresee. To prevent powerful men from attempting usurpation was therefore of the greatest possible moment. Now a despot or an oligarchy might exercise at pleasure preventive means¹, much sharper than the ostracism, such as the assassination of Kimon, mentioned in the last chapter as directed by the Peisistratids. At the very least, they might send away anyone, from whom they apprehended attack or danger, without incurring even so much as the imputation of severity. But in a democracy, where arbitrary action of the magistrate was the thing of all others most dreaded, and where fixed laws, with trial and defence as preliminaries to punishment, were conceived by the ordinary citizen as the guarantees of his personal security and as the pride of his social condition—the creation of such an exceptional power presented serious difficulty. If we transport ourselves to the times of Kleisthenês, immediately after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, when the working of the democratical machinery was as yet untried, we shall find this difficulty at its maximum. But we shall also find the necessity of vesting such a power somewhere absolutely imperative. For the great Athenian nobles had yet to learn the lesson of respect for any constitution. Their past history had exhibited continual struggles between the armed factions of Megaklês, Lykurgus, and Peisistratus, put down after a time by the superior force and alliances of the latter; and though Kleisthenês, the son of Megaklês, might be firmly disposed to renounce the example of his father, and to act as the faithful citizen of a fixed constitution, he would know but too well that the sons of his father's companions and rivals would follow out ambitious purposes without any regard to the limits imposed by law, if ever they acquired sufficient partisans to present a fair prospect of success. Moreover, when any two candidates for power, with such reckless dispositions, came into a bitter personal rivalry, the motives to each of them, arising as well out of fear as out of ambition, to put down his opponent at any cost to the constitution might well become irresistible, unless some impartial and discerning interference could arrest the strife in time. 'If the Athenians were wise (Aristeidês is reported to have said², in the height and peril of his parliamentary struggle with Themistoklês), they would cast both Themistoklês and me into the barathrum³.' And whoever reads the sad narrative of the Korkyræan sedition, in the third book of Thukydîdês, together with the reflections of the historian upon it⁴, will trace the gradual exasperation of these party feuds, beginning even under democratical forms, until at length they break down the barriers of public as well as of private morality.

Against this chance of internal assailants Kleisthenês had to protect the democratical constitution—first, by throwing impediments in their way and rendering it difficult for them to procure the requisite support ;

¹ See the discussion of the ostracism in Aristot., *Politic.*, iii. 8, where he recognises the problem as one common to all governments.

² Plutarch, *Aristeid.*, c. 3.

³ The barathrum was a deep pit, said to have had iron spikes at the bottom, into which criminals condemned to death were sometimes cast. Though probably an ancient Athenian punishment, it seems to have become at the very least extremely rare, if

not entirely disused, during the times of Athens historically known to us, but the phrase continued in speech after the practice had become obsolete. The iron spikes depend on the evidence of the Schol. Aristophan., *Plutus*, 431—a very doubtful authority, when we read the legend which he blends with his statement.

⁴ Thukyd., iii., 70, 81, 82.

(next, by eliminating them before any violent projects were ripe for execution.) To do either the one or the other, it was necessary to provide such a constitution as would not only conciliate the good-will, but kindle the passionate attachment, of the mass of citizens, insomuch that not even any considerable minority should be deliberately inclined to alter it by force. It was necessary to create in the multitude, and through them to force upon the leading ambitious men, that rare and difficult sentiment which we may term a constitutional morality—a paramount reverence for the forms of the constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities acting under and within those forms, yet combined with the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts—combined, too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the forms of the constitution will be not less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own. This co-existence of freedom and self-imposed restraint, of obedience to authority with unmeasured censure of the persons exercising it, may be found in the aristocracy of England (since about 1688) as well as in the democracy of the American United States : and because we are familiar with it, we are apt to suppose it a natural sentiment ; though there seem to be few sentiments more difficult to establish and diffuse among a community, judging by the experience of history. We may see how imperfectly it exists at this day in the Swiss Cantons ; while the many violences of the first French revolution illustrate, among various other lessons, the fatal effects arising from its absence, even among a people high in the scale of intelligence. Yet the diffusion of such constitutional morality, not merely among the majority of any community, but throughout the whole, is the indispensable condition of a government at once free and peaceable ; since even any powerful and obstinate minority may render the working of free institutions impracticable, without being strong enough to conquer ascendancy for themselves. Nothing less than unanimity, or so overwhelming a majority as to be tantamount to unanimity, on the cardinal point of respecting constitutional forms, even by those who do not wholly approve of them, can render the excitement of political passion bloodless, and yet expose all the authorities in the State to the full licence of pacific criticism.

At the epoch of Kleisthenês, which by a remarkable coincidence is the same as that of the refuge at Rome, such constitutional morality, if it existed anywhere else, had certainly no place at Athens ; and the first creation of it in any particular society must be esteemed an interesting historical fact. By the spirit of his reforms—equal, popular, and comprehensive, far beyond the previous experience of Athenians—he secured the hearty attachment of the body of citizens. But from the first generation of leading men, under the nascent democracy, and with such precedents as they had to look back upon, no self-imposed limits to ambition could be expected. Accordingly, Kleisthenês had to find the means of eliminating beforehand any one about to transgress these limits, so as to escape the necessity of putting him down afterwards, with all that bloodshed and reaction, in the midst of which the free working of the constitution would be suspended at least, if not irrevocably extinguished. To acquire such influence as would render him dangerous under demo-

cratical forms, a man must stand in evidence before the public, so as to afford some reasonable means of judging of his character and purposes. Now the security which Kleisthenês provided, was, to call in the positive judgment of the citizens respecting his future promise purely and simply, so that they might not remain too long neutral between two formidable political rivals—pursuant in a certain way to the Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition, as I have already remarked in a former chapter. He incorporated in the constitution itself the principle of *privilegium* (to employ the Roman phrase, which signifies, not a peculiar favour granted to anyone, but a peculiar inconvenience imposed), yet only under circumstances solemn and well-defined, with full notice and discussion beforehand, and by the positive secret vote of a large proportion of the citizens. 'No law shall be made against any single citizen, without the same being made against *all* Athenian citizens; unless it shall so seem good to 6,000 citizens voting secretly¹.' Such was that general principle of the Constitution, under which the ostracism was a particular case. Before the vote of ostracism could be taken, a case was to be made out in the Senate and the public assembly to justify it. In the sixth prytany of the year, these two bodies debated and determined whether the state of the Republic was menacing enough to call for such an exceptional measure². If they decided in the affirmative, a day was named, the agora was railed round, with ten entrances left for the citizens of each tribe, and ten separate casks or vessels for depositing the suffrages, which consisted of a shell or a potsherd with the name of the person written on it whom each citizen designed to banish. At the end of the day the number of votes were summed up, and if 6,000 votes were found to have been given against any one person, that person was ostracized; if not, the ceremony ended in nothing³. Ten days were allowed to him for settling his affairs, after which he was required to depart from Attica for ten years, but retained his property, and suffered no other penalty.

It was not the maxim at Athens to escape the errors of the people, by calling in the different errors, and the sinister interest besides, of an extra popular or privileged few. Nor was any third course open, since the principles of representative government were not understood, nor, indeed, conveniently applicable to very small communities. Beyond the judgement of the people (so the Athenians felt), there was no appeal. Their grand study was to surround the delivery of that judgement with the best securities for rectitude, and the best preservatives against haste, passion, or private corruption. Whatever measure of good government could not be obtained in that way, could not, in their opinion, be obtained at all. I shall illustrate the Athenian proceedings on this head more

¹ Andokidês, *De Mysteriis*, p. 12, c. 13. According to the usual looseness in dealing with the name of Solon, this has been called a law of Solon (see Petit., *Leg. Att.*, p. 188), though it certainly cannot be older than Kleisthenês.

² *Privilegia ne irroganto* said the law of the Twelve Tables at Rome (Cicero, *Legg.*, iii. 4-19).

³ Aristotle and Philochorus, *ap. Photium, App.*, p. 672 and 675, ed. Porson.

It would rather appear by that passage that the ostracism was never formally abrogated; and that even in the later times, to which the description of Aristotle refers, the form was still preserved of

putting the question whether the public safety called for an ostracizing vote, long after it had passed both out of use and out of mind.

⁴ Philochorus, *ut supra*; Plutarch, *Aristeid.*, c. 7; Schol. *ad* Aristophan., *Equit.*, 851; Pollux, viii. 19.

There is a difference of opinion among the authorities, as well as among the expositors, whether the minimum of 6,000 applies to the votes given in all, or to the votes given against any one name. I embrace the latter opinion, which is supported by Philochorus, Pollux, and the Schol. on Aristophanês, though Plutarch countenances the former. [See Appendix to this chapter, § 7.—ED.]

fully when I come to speak of the working of their mature democracy. Meanwhile in respect to this grand protection of the nascent democracy—the vote of ostracism—it will be found that the securities devised by Kleisthenês, for making the sentence effectual against the really dangerous man and against no one else, display not less foresight than patriotism. The main object was, to render the voting an expression of deliberate public feeling, as distinguished from mere factious antipathy. Now the large minimum of votes required (one-fourth of the entire citizen population) went far to ensure this effect—the more so, since each vote, taken as it was in a secret manner, counted unequivocally for the expression of a genuine and independent sentiment, and could neither be coerced nor bought. Then, again, Kleisthenês did not permit the process of ostracizing to be opened against any one citizen exclusively. If opened at all, everyone without exception was exposed to the sentence; so that the friends of Themistoklês could not invoke it against Aristeidês, nor those of the latter against the former, without exposing their own leader to the same chance of exile. It was not likely to be invoked at all, therefore, until exasperation had proceeded so far as to render both parties insensible to this chance—the precise index of that growing internecine hostility, which the ostracism prevented from coming to a head. Nor could it even then be ratified unless a case was shown to convince the more neutral portion of the [Council] and the Ekklesia: moreover, after all, the Ekklesia did not itself ostracize, but a future day was named, and the whole body of the citizens were solemnly invited to vote. It was in this way that security was taken not only for making the ostracism effectual in protecting the constitution, but to hinder it from being employed for any other purpose. We must recollect that it exercised its tutelary influence not merely on those occasions when it was actually employed, but by the mere knowledge that it might be employed, and by the restraining effect which that knowledge produced on the conduct of the great men. Again, the ostracism, though essentially of an exceptional nature, was yet an exception sanctified and limited by the constitution itself; so that the citizen, in giving his ostracizing vote, did not in any way depart from the constitution or lose his reverence for it. The issue placed before him—‘Is there any man whom you think vitally dangerous to the State? If so, whom?’—though vague, was yet raised directly and legally. Had there been no ostracism, it might probably have been raised both indirectly and illegally, on the occasion of some special imputed crime of a suspected political leader, when accused before a court of justice—a perversion, involving all the mischief of the ostracism, without its protective benefits.

Care was taken to divest the ostracism of all painful consequence except what was inseparable from exile. This is not one of the least proofs of the wisdom with which it was devised. Most certainly it never deprived the public of candidates for political influence: and when we consider the small amount of individual evil which it inflicted—evil, too, diminished, in the cases of Kimon and Aristeidês, by a reactionary sentiment which augmented their subsequent popularity after return—two remarks will be quite sufficient to offer in the way of justification. First, it completely produced its intended effect; for the democracy grew up from infancy to manhood without a single attempt to overthrow it by

force¹—a result, upon which no reflecting contemporary of Kleisthenês could have ventured to calculate. Next, through such tranquil working of the democratical forms, a constitutional morality quite sufficiently complete was produced among the leading Athenians, to enable the people after a certain time to dispense with that exceptional security which the ostracism offered². To the nascent democracy, it was absolutely indispensable; to the growing, yet militant, democracy, it was salutary; but the full-grown democracy both could and did stand without it. The ostracism passed upon Hyperbolus, about ninety years after Kleisthenês, was the last occasion of its employment. And even this can hardly be considered as a serious instance: it was a trick concerted between two distinguished Athenians (Nikias and Alkibiadês) to turn, to their own political account a process already coming to be antiquated. Nor would such a manœuvre have been possible, if the contemporary Athenian citizens had been penetrated with the same serious feeling of the value of ostracism as a safeguard of democracy, as had been once entertained by their fathers and grandfathers. Between Kleisthenês and Hyperbolus, we hear of about ten different persons as having been banished by ostracism: first of all, Hipparchus of the deme Cholargus, the son of Charmus, a relative of the recently-expelled Peisistratid despots³; then Aristeidês, Themistoklês, Kimon, and Thukydidês, son of Melêsias, all of them renowned political leaders: also Alkibiadês and Megaklês (the paternal and maternal grandfathers of the distinguished Alkibiadês), and Kallias, belonging to another eminent family at Athens; lastly, Damôn, the preceptor of Periklês in poetry and music, and eminent for his acquisitions in philosophy⁴. In this last case comes out the vulgar side of humanity, aristocratical as well as democratical; for with both, the process of philosophy and the persons of philosophers are wont to be alike unpopular. Even Kleisthenês himself is said to have been ostracized under his own law, and Xanthippos; but both upon authority too weak to trust⁵. Miltiadês was not ostracized at all, but tried and punished for misconduct in his command.

Plutarch has affirmed that the ostracism arose from the envy and jealousy inherent in a democracy⁶, and not from justifiable fears—an observation often repeated, yet not the less demonstrably untrue. Not merely because ostracism so worked as often to increase the influence of that political leader whose rival it removed—but still more, because, if the fact had been as Plutarch says, this institution would have continued as long as the democracy; whereas it finished with the banishment of

¹ It is not necessary in this remark to take notice, either of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, or of that of Thirty, called the Thirty Tyrants, established during the closing years of the Peloponnesian war, and after the ostracism had been discontinued. Neither of these changes was brought about by the excessive ascendancy of any one or few men; both of them grew out of the embarrassments and dangers of Athens in the latter period of her great foreign war.

² Aristotle (*Polit.*, iii. 8, 6) seems to recognise the political necessity of the ostracism, as applied even to obvious superiority of wealth, connection, etc. (which he distinguishes pointedly from superiority of merit and character), and upon principles of symmetry only, even apart from dangerous designs on the part of the superior mind. No painter (he observes) will permit a foot, in his picture of a man, to be of disproportionate size with the entire

body, though separately taken it may be finely painted; nor will the chorus-master allow any one voice, however beautiful, to predominate beyond a certain proportion over the rest.

His final conclusion is, however, that the legislator ought, if possible, so to construct his constitution as to have no need of such exceptional remedy; but if this cannot be done then the second-best step is to apply the ostracism. Compare also v. 2, 5.

The last century of the free Athenian democracy realized the first of these alternatives.

³ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 11; [*Ath. Pol.*, xxii. 4.—Ed.]

⁴ Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 4; Plutarch, *Aristeid.*, c. 1.

⁵ *Ælian*, V. H., xiii. 24; Herakleidês, *περί Πολιτειῶν*, c. 1, ed. Köhler.

⁶ Plutarch, *Themistoklês*, 22; Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, 7.

Hyperbolus, at a period when the government was more decisively democratical than it had been in the time of Kleisthenēs. It was, in truth, a product altogether of fear and insecurity¹, on the part both of the democracy and its best friends—fear perfectly well grounded, and only appearing needless because the precautions taken prevented attack. So soon as the diffusion of a constitutional morality had placed the mass of the citizens above all serious fear of an aggressive usurper, the ostracism was discontinued. And doubtless the feeling, that it might safely be dispensed with, must have been strengthened by the long ascendancy of Periklēs—by the spectacle of the greatest statesman whom Athens ever produced, acting steadily within the limits of the constitution; and by the ill-success of his two opponents, Kimon and Thukydidēs—aided by numerous partisans and by the great comic writers, at a period when comedy was a power in the State such as it has never been before or since—in their attempts to get him ostracized. They succeeded in fanning up the ordinary antipathy of the citizens towards philosophers so far as to procure the ostracism of his friend and teacher Damon; but Periklēs himself (to repeat the complaint of his bitter enemy the comic poet Kratinus²) ‘holds his head as high as if he carried the Odeion upon it, now that the shell has gone by’—*i.e.*, now that he has escaped the ostracism. If Periklēs was not conceived to be dangerous to the constitution, none of his successors were at all likely to be so regarded. Damon and Hyperbolus were the two last persons ostracized. Both of them were cases, and the only cases, of an unequivocal abuse of the institution, because, whatever the grounds of displeasure against them may have been, it is impossible to conceive either of them as menacing to the State—whereas all the other known sufferers were men of such position and power that the 6,000 citizens who inscribed each name on the shell, or at least a large proportion of them, may well have done so under the most conscientious belief that they were guarding the constitution against real danger. Such a change in the character of the persons ostracized plainly evinces that the ostracism had become dissevered from that genuine patriotic prudence which originally rendered it both legitimate and popular. It had served for two generations an inestimable tutelary purpose—it lived to be twice dishonoured—and then passed, by universal acquiescence, into matter of history.

A process analogous to the ostracism subsisted at Argos³, at Syracuse, and in some other Grecian democracies. Aristotle states that it was abused for factious purposes: and at Syracuse, where it was introduced after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty, Diodorus affirms that it was so unjustly and profusely applied, as to deter persons of wealth and station from taking any part in public affairs; for which reason it was speedily discontinued. We have no particulars to enable us to appreciate this general statement. But we cannot safely infer that because the ostracism worked on the whole well at Athens, it must necessarily have worked well in other States—the more so as we do not know whether it was surrounded with the same precautionary formalities, nor whether it even required the same large minimum of votes to make it effective. This

¹ Thukyd., viii. 73.

² Kratinus *ap.* Plutarch., *Periklēs*, c. 13.

³ Ὁ σχινοκέφαλος Ζεὺς ὁδὶ προσέρχεται
Περικλέης, τῷδεῖον ἐπὶ τοῦ κρανίου

⁴ Ἐχων, ἐπειδὴ τοῦστρακον παροίχεται.

For the attacks of the comic writers upon Damon, see Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 4.

⁵ Aristot., *Polit.*, iii. 8, 4; v. 2, 5.

latter guarantee, so valuable in regard to an institution essentially easy to abuse, is not noticed by Diodorus in his brief account of the Petalism—so the process was denominated at Syracuse¹.

Such was the first Athenian democracy, engendered as well by the reaction against Hippias and his dynasty, as by the memorable partnership, whether spontaneous or compulsory, between Kleisthènes and the unfranchised multitude. It is to be distinguished both from the mitigated oligarchy established by Solon before, and from the full-grown and symmetrical democracy which prevailed afterwards from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, towards the close of the career of Periklês.) It was, indeed, a striking revolution, impressed upon the citizen not less by the sentiments to which it appealed than by the visible change which it made in political and social life. He saw himself marshalled in the ranks of hoplites alongside of new companions in arms—he was enrolled in a new register, and his property in a new schedule, in his deme and by his demarch, an officer before unknown—he found the year distributed afresh, for all legal purposes, into ten parts bearing the name of prytanes, each marked by a solemn and free-spoken Ekklesia at which he had a right to be present, his Ekklesia was convoked and presided over by [councillors] called prytanes, members of a [Council] novel both as to number and distribution, his political duties were now performed as member of a tribe, designated by a name not before pronounced in common Attic life, connected with one of ten heroes whose statues he now for the first time saw in the agora, and associating him with fellow-tribesmen from all parts of Attica. All these and many others were sensible novelties felt in the daily proceedings of the citizen. But the great novelty of all was, the authentic recognition of the ten new tribes as a sovereign Dêmos or people, apart from all specialities of phratric or gentile origin, with free speech and equal law; retaining no distinction except the four classes of the Solonian property-schedule with their gradations of eligibility. To a considerable proportion of citizens this great novelty was still farther endeared by the fact that it had raised them out of the degraded position of metics and slaves; while to the large majority of all the citizens, it furnished a splendid political idea, profoundly impressive to the Greek mind—capable of calling forth the most ardent attachment as well as the most devoted sense of active obligation and obedience. We have now to see how their newly-created patriotism manifested itself.

Kleisthenês and his new constitution carried with them so completely the popular favour, that Isagoras had no other way of opposing it except by calling in the interference of Kleomênes and the Lacedæmonians². Kleomenês listened the more readily to this call, as he was reported to have been on an intimate footing with the wife of Isagoras. He prepared to come to Athens; but his first aim was to deprive the democracy of its great leader Kleisthenês, who, as belonging to the Alkmæônid family, was supposed to be tainted with the inherited sin of his great-grandfather Megaklês, the destroyer of the usurper Kylôn. Kleomenês sent a herald to Athens, demanding the expulsion 'of the accursed'—so this family were called by their enemies, and so they continued to be called eighty

¹ Diodor., xl. 55-57. This author describes very imperfectly the Athenian ostracism, transferring to it apparently the circumstances of the Syracusan Petalism.

² For the order of these events, see note, p. 60 above.—ED.

years afterwards, when the same manœuvre was practised by the Lacedæmonians of that day against Periklês. This requisition, recommended by Isagoras, was so well timed, that Kleisthenês, not venturing to disobey it, retired voluntarily; so that Kleomenês, though arriving at Athens only with a small force, found himself master of the city. At the instigation of Isagoras, he sent into exile seven hundred families, selected from the chief partisans of Kleisthenês. His next attempt was to dissolve the new [Council] of Five Hundred¹, and to place the whole government in the hands of three hundred adherents of the chief whose cause he espoused. But now was seen the spirit infused into the people by their new constitution. At the time of the first usurpation of Peisistratus, the [Council] of that day had not only not resisted, but even lent themselves to the scheme. Now, the new [Council] of Kleisthenês resolutely refused to submit to dissolution, while the citizens generally, even after the banishment of the chief Kleisthenean partisans, manifested their feelings in a way at once so hostile and so determined, that Kleomenês and Isagoras were altogether baffled. They were compelled to retire into the acropolis and stand upon the defensive. This symptom of weakness was the signal for a general rising of the Athenians, who besieged the Spartan king on the holy rock. He had evidently come without any expectation of finding, or any means of overpowering, resistance; for at the end of two days his provisions were exhausted, and he was forced to capitulate. He and his Lacedæmonians, as well as Isagoras, were allowed to retire to Sparta; but the Athenians of the party captured along with him were imprisoned, condemned², and executed by the people.

Kleisthenês, with the seven hundred exiled families, was immediately recalled, and his new constitution materially strengthened by this first success. Yet the prospect of renewed Spartan attack was sufficiently serious to induce him to send envoys to Artaphernês, the Persian Satrap at Sardis, soliciting the admission of Athens into the Persian alliance. He probably feared the intrigues of the expelled Hippias in the same quarter. Artaphernês, having first informed himself who the Athenians were, and where they dwelt, replied that if they chose to send earth and water to the king of Persia, they might be received as allies, but upon no other condition. Such were the feelings of alarm under which the envoys had quitted Athens, that they went the length of promising this unqualified token of submission. But their countrymen on their return disavowed them with scorn and indignation³.

It was at this time that the first connection began between Athens and the little Boeotian town of Plataea, situated on the northern slope of the range of Kithæron, between that mountain and the river Asôpus—on the road from Athens to Thebes; and it is upon this occasion that we first become acquainted with the Boeotians and their politics. The

¹ The Council here referred to is the Solonian, not the Kleisthenean. See p. 60 note.—Ed.

² Herodot., v. 70-72. [*Ath. Pol.*, c. xx.—Ed.]

³ Herodot. v. 73. [The importance of this incident is overlooked by many authors. The statement that the ambassadors of their own accord gave the symbols of submission is quite incredible. Kleisthenês was supreme at the time, must have given the ambassadors their instructions, and must have known that any help from Persia meant submission. The probability is that, being hard pressed by the forces of Sparta, Eubœa, and Boeotia (Herod., v. 73 *ff.*), he sought

aid from Persia, hoping to disguise from the Ekklesiâ the nature of the agreement. The fact that the Ekklesiâ saw through the plan lends probability, if not to Ælian's story that Kleisthenês himself was ostracized, at least to the hypothesis that he fell into disgrace soon after his legislation. His total disappearance (which is in no way explained) is one of the strange facts in Greek history. At all events, it is clear that the alleged mediocrism of the Alkmaonids at Marathon was not without precedent in Athens, whose Pan-hellenic patriotism was a growth of later date.—Ed.]

Bœotian federation¹ was composed of some twelve or thirteen autonomous towns under the headship of Thebes, which was, or professed to have been, their mother-city. Plataea had been (so the Thebans affirmed) their latest foundation²; it was ill-used by them, and discontented with the alliance. Accordingly, as Kleomenês was on his way back from Athens, the Plataeans took the opportunity of addressing themselves to him, craving the protection of Sparta against Thebes, and surrendering their town and territory without reserve. The Spartan king, having no motive to undertake a trust which promised nothing but trouble, advised them to solicit the protection of Athens, as nearer and more accessible for them in case of need. He foresaw that this would embroil the Athenians with Bœotia, and such anticipation was, in fact, his chief motive for giving the advice, which the Plataeans followed. Selecting an occasion of public sacrifice at Athens, they despatched thither envoys, who sat down as suppliants at the altar, surrendered their town to Athens, and implored protection against Thebes. Such an appeal was not to be resisted, and protection was promised. It was soon needed, for the Thebans invaded the Platæan territory, and an Athenian force marched to defend it. Battle was about to be joined, when the Corinthians interposed with their mediation, which was accepted by both parties. They decided altogether in favour of Plataea, pronouncing that the Thebans had no right to employ force against any seceding member of the Bœotian federation³. The Thebans, finding the decision against them, refused to abide by it, and attacked the Athenians on their return, but sustained a complete defeat: a breach of faith which the Athenians avenged by joining to Plataea the portion of Theban territory south of the Asôpus, and making that river the limit between the two. By such success, however, the Athenians gained nothing except the enmity of Bœotia—as Kleomenês had foreseen. Their alliance with Plataea, long-continued and presenting in the course of this history several incidents touching to our sympathies, will be found, if we except one splendid occasion⁴, productive only of burden to the one party, yet insufficient as a protection to the other.

¹ See part ii., c. iii. of full edition.

² Thukyd., iii. 61.

³ Herodot., vi. 108. This is an important circumstance, in regard to Grecian political feeling; I shall advert to it hereafter.

⁴ Herodot., vi. 108. Thukydides (iii. 58), when recounting the capture of Plataea by the Lacedæmonians in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, states that the alliance between Plataea and Athens was then in its ninety-third year of date; according to which reckoning it would begin in the year 519 B.C.

I venture to think that the immediate circumstances, as recounted in the text from Herodotus (whether Thukydides conceived them in the same way, cannot be determined), which brought about the junction of Plataea with Athens, cannot have taken place in 519 B.C., but must have happened after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens in 510 B.C.—for the following reasons:

1. No mention is made of Hippias, who yet, if the event had happened in 519 B.C., must have been the person to determine whether the Athenians should assist Plataea or not.

[But Thukydides naturally would not mention Hippias; he was no doubt reflecting the view taken in his day, which would naturally ascribe so romantic a friendship as that of Athens and Plataea, not to Hippias, but to the democracy. —Ed.]

2. We know no cause which should have brought Kleomenês with a Lacedæmonian force near to Plataea in the year 519 B.C.; we know from the statement of Herodotus (v. 76) that no Lacedæmonian expedition against Attica took place at that time. But in the year to which I have referred the event, Kleomenês is on his march near the spot upon a known and assignable object.

[Kleomenês may well have been occupied in securing Megara for the Peloponnesian League. —Ed.]

3. Again, Kleomenês, in advising the Plataeans to solicit Athens, does not give the advice through good will towards them, but through a desire to harass and perplex the Athenians, by entangling them in a quarrel with the Bœotians. At the point of time to which I have referred the incident, this was a very natural desire; he was angry, and perhaps alarmed, at the recent events which had brought about his expulsion from Athens. But what was there to make him conceive such a feeling against Athens during the reign of Hippias? That despot was on terms of the closest intimacy with Sparta: the Peisistratids were (*ἑταῖροις*—*ἑταῖροις ταμιχίοις*—Herod., v. 63, 90, 91) 'the particular guests' of the Spartans, who were only induced to take part against Hippias from a reluctant obedience to the oracles procured one after another by Kleisthenês. The motive, therefore, assigned by Herodotus, for the advice given

Meanwhile Kleomenês had returned to Sparta full of resentment against the Athenians, and resolved on punishing them as well as on establishing his friend Isagoras as despot over them. Having been taught, however, by humiliating experience, that this was no easy achievement, he would not make the attempt, without having assembled a considerable force. He summoned allies from all the various States of Peloponnesus, yet without venturing to inform them what he was about to undertake. He at the same time concerted measures with the Bœotians, and with the Chalkidians of Eubœa, for a simultaneous invasion of Attica on all sides. It appears that he had greater confidence in their hostile dispositions towards Athens than in those of the Peloponnesians, for he was not afraid to acquaint them with his design—and probably the Bœotians were incensed with the recent interference of Athens in the affair of Plataea. As soon as these preparations were completed, the two kings of Sparta, Kleomenês and Demaratus, put themselves at the head of the united Peloponnesian force, marched into Attica, and advanced as far as Eleusis on the way to Athens. But when the allies came to know the purpose for which they were to be employed, a spirit of dissatisfaction manifested itself among them. They had no unfriendly sentiment towards Athens; and the Corinthians especially, favourably disposed rather than otherwise towards that city, resolved to proceed no farther. At the same time, king Demaratus, either sharing in the general dissatisfaction or moved by some grudge against his colleague which had not before manifested itself, renounced the undertaking also. Two such examples, operating upon the pre-existing sentiment of the allies generally, caused the whole camp to break up and return home without striking a blow¹.

We may here remark that this is the first instance known in which Sparta appears in act as recognised head of an obligatory Peloponnesian alliance, summoning contingents from the cities to be placed under the command of her king. Her headship, previously recognised in theory, passes now into act, but in an unsatisfactory manner, so as to prove the necessity of precaution and concert beforehand—which will be found not long wanting.

Pursuant to the scheme concerted, the Bœotians and Chalkidians attacked Attica at the same time that Kleomenês entered it. The former seized Cœnoë and Hysiaë, the frontier demes of Attica on the side towards

by Kleomenês to the Plataeans, can have no application to the time when Hippias was still despot.

4. That Herodotus did not conceive the victory gained by the Athenians over Thebes as having taken place *before* the expulsion of Hippias, is evident from his emphatic contrast between their warlike spirit and success when liberated from the despots, and their timidity or backwardness while under Hippias (v. 78). The man who wrote thus cannot have believed that in the year 519 B.C., while Hippias was in full sway, the Athenians gained an important victory over the Thebans, cut off a considerable portion of the Theban territory for the purpose of joining it to that of the Plataeans, and showed from that time forward their constant superiority over Thebes by protecting her inferior neighbour against her.

[Against this we know that the birth of Athenian enterprise was not posterior to the Peisistratids (cf. the expeditions to Sigeium, the Thracian Chersonese, etc.).

For this problem, see J. Wells in *Journ. of Hell. Stud.* (1905, pp. 193 *et seq.*); he argues for 519 B.C., but accepts the object of Kleomenês as Herodotus gives it. From this we should be compelled to assume that Sparta had for many years been acting a treacherous rôle towards Athens under the guise of friendship to the Peisistratids. Against this, however, it must be pointed out that, in point of fact, the alliance of Plataea was really valuable to Athens, which thus acquired a useful base against Bœotia, and command of the most important line of retreat for a defeated Bœotian army. Moreover, (1) the alteration of ninety-three years to eighty-three is not technically plausible, and (2) we may well conceive that Kleomenês, on the ground of the friendship with Hippias, to which Herodotus bears witness, actually did intend to benefit Athens by his decision with regard to Plataea.—Ed.]

¹ Herodot., v. 75.

Plataea; while the latter assailed the north-eastern frontier which faces Eubœa. Invaded on three sides, the Athenians were in serious danger, and were compelled to concentrate all their forces at Eleusis against Kleomenès, leaving the Bœotians and Chalkidians unopposed. But the unexpected breaking-up of the invading army from Peloponnesus proved their rescue, and enabled them to turn the whole of their attention to the other frontier. They marched into Bœotia to the strait called Euripus, which separates it from Eubœa, intending to prevent the junction of the Bœotians and Chalkidians, and to attack the latter first apart. But the arrival of the Bœotians caused an alteration in their scheme; they attacked the Bœotians first, and gained a victory of the most complete character—killing a large number, and capturing 700 prisoners. On the very same day they crossed over to Eubœa, attacked the Chalkidians, and gained another victory so decisive that it at once terminated the war. Many Chalkidians were taken, as well as Bœotians, and conveyed in chains to Athens, where after a certain detention they were at last ransomed for two minæ per man. Of the sum thus raised, a tenth was employed in the fabrication of a chariot and four horses in bronze, which was placed in the Acropolis to commemorate the victory. Herodotus saw this trophy when he was at Athens. He saw, too, what was a still more speaking trophy, the actual chains in which the prisoners had been fettered, exhibiting in their appearance the damage undergone when the Acropolis was burnt by Xerxès: an inscription of four lines described the offerings and recorded the victory out of which they had sprung¹.

Another consequence of some moment arose out of this victory. The Athenians planted a body of 4,000 of their citizens as Klêruchs (lot-holders) or settlers upon the lands of the wealthy Chalkidian oligarchy called the Hippobotæ—proprietors probably in the fertile plain of Lëlantum between Chalkis and Eretria. This is a system which we shall find hereafter extensively followed out by the Athenians in the days of their power; partly with the view of providing for their poorer citizens—partly to serve as garrison among a population either hostile or of doubtful fidelity. These Klêruchs did not lose their birthright as Athenian citizens. They were not colonists in the Grecian sense, and they are known by a totally different name—but they corresponded very nearly to the colonies formerly planted out on the conquered lands by Rome. The increase of the poorer population was always more or less painfully felt in every Grecian city; for though the aggregate population never seems to have increased very fast, yet the multiplication of children in poor families caused the subdivision of the smaller lots of land, until at last they became insufficient for a maintenance; and the persons thus impoverished found it difficult to obtain subsistence in other ways, more especially as the labour for the richer classes was so much performed by imported slaves. Doubtless some families possessed of landed property became extinct. Yet this did not at all benefit the smaller and poorer proprietors, for the lands rendered vacant passed, not to them, but by inheritance or bequest or intermarriage to other proprietors for the most part in easy circum-

¹ Herodot., v. 77; Ælian, V. H., vi. 1; Pausan., i. 28, 2. [The Athenians further erected a portico at Delphi. There has recently been found the dedicatory inscription (Hicks and Hill, 11) which runs, 'The Athenians dedicated the portico

with the arms and figure-heads which they took from their enemies.' Wilamowitz-Moellendorf shows that this refers to a sea-fight in 506 (Arist. und Ath., ii. 287).—Ed.]

stances, since one opulent family usually intermarried with another. The numerous Klêruchies sent out by Athens, of which this to Eubœa was the first, arose in a great measure out of the multiplication of the poorer population, which her extended power was employed in providing for. Her subsequent proceedings with a view to the same object will not be always found so justifiable as this now before us, which grew naturally, according to the ideas of the time, out of her success against the Chalkidians.

The war between Athens, however, and Thebes with her Bœotian allies still continued, to the great and repeated disadvantage of the latter, until at length the Thebans in despair sent to ask advice of the Delphian oracle, and were directed to 'solicit aid from those nearest to them'¹. 'How (they replied) are we to obey? Our nearest neighbours, of Tanagra, Korôneia, and Thespiæ, are now, and have been from the beginning, lending us all the aid in their power.' An ingenious Theban, however, coming to the relief of his perplexed fellow-citizens, dived into the depths of legend and brought up a happy meaning. 'Those nearest to us (he said) are the inhabitants of Ægina: for Thêbê (the eponym of Thebes) and Ægina (the eponym of that island) were both sisters, daughters of Asôpus. Let us send to crave assistance from the Æginetans.' If his subtle interpretation (founded upon their descent from the same legendary progenitors) did not at once convince all who heard it, at least no one had any better to suggest. Envoys were at once sent to the Æginetans, who, in reply to a petition founded on legendary claims, sent to the help of the Thebans a reinforcement of legendary, but venerated, auxiliaries—the Æakid heroes. We are left to suppose that their effigies are here meant. It was in vain, however, that the glory and the supposed presence of the Æakids Telamôn and Pêleus were introduced into the Theban camp. Victory still continued on the side of Athens; so that the discouraged Thebans again sent to Ægina, restoring the heroes², and praying for aid of a character more human and positive. Their request was granted, and the Æginetans commenced war against Athens, without even the decent preliminary of a herald and declaration³.

This remarkable embassy first brings us into acquaintance with the Dorians of Ægina—oligarchical, wealthy, commercial, and powerful at sea, even in the earliest days; more analogous to Corinth than to any of the other cities called Dorian. The hostility which they now began without provocation against Athens—repressed by Sparta at the critical moment of the battle of Marathon, then again breaking out—and hushed for a while by the common dangers of the Persian invasion under Xerxês, was appeased only with the conquest of the island about twenty years after that event, and with the expulsion and destruction of its inhabitants. There had been, indeed, according to Herodotus⁴, a feud of great antiquity between Athens and Ægina, of which he gives the account in a singular

¹ Herodot., v. 80.

² In the expression of Herodotus, the Æakid heroes are *really* sent from Ægina, and *really* sent back by the Thebans (v. 80, 81). Compare again v. 75; viii. 64; and Polyb., vii. 9, 2: *θεῶν τῶν σὺνταρτυμένων*.

Justin gives a narrative of an analogous application from the Epizephyrian Lokrians to Sparta (xx. 3): 'Territi Locrenses ad Spartanos decurrunt: auxilium supplices deprecantur: illi longinquâ

militiâ gravati, auxilium a Castore et Polluce petere eos jubent. Neque legati responsum sociæ urbis spreverunt; profectique in proximum templum, facto sacrificio, auxilium deorum implorant. Litatis hostiis, obtemloque, ut rebantur, quod petebant—haud secus latî quam si deos ipsos secum aucturi essent—pulvinaria iis in navi componunt, faustisque profecti omnibus, solatia suis pro auxiliis deportant.'

³ Herodot., v. 81, 82.

⁴ *Ibid.* v. 83-88.

narrative, blending together religion, politics, exposition of ancient customs, etc. But at the time when the Thebans solicited aid from Ægina, the latter was at peace with Athens. The Æginetans employed their fleet, powerful for that day, in ravaging Phalærum and the maritime demes of Attica; nor had the Athenians as yet any fleet to resist them¹. It is probable that the desired effect was produced, of diverting a portion of the Athenian force from the war against Bœotia, and thus partially relieving Thebes; but the war of Athens against both of them continued for a considerable time, though we have no information respecting its details.

Meanwhile the attention of Athens was called off from these combined enemies by a more menacing cloud which threatened to burst upon her from the side of Sparta. Kleomenēs and his countrymen, full of resentment at the late inglorious desertion of Eleusis, were yet more incensed by the discovery, which appears to have been then recently made, that the injunctions of the Delphian priestess for the expulsion of Hippias from Athens had been fraudulently procured². Moreover, Kleomenēs, when shut up in the Acropolis of Athens with Isagoras, had found there various prophecies previously treasured up by the Peisistratids, many of which foreshadowed events highly disastrous to Sparta. And while the recent brilliant manifestations of courage and repeated victories, on the part of Athens, seemed to indicate that such prophecies might perhaps be realized, Sparta had to reproach herself, that, from the foolish and mischievous conduct of Kleomenēs, she had undone the effect of her previous aid against the Peisistratids, and thus lost that return of gratitude which the Athenians would otherwise have testified. Under such impressions, the Spartan authorities took the remarkable step of sending for Hippias from his residence at Sigeium to Peloponnesus and of summoning deputies from all their allies to meet him at Sparta.

The convocation thus summoned deserves notice as the commencement of a new æra in Grecian politics. The previous expedition of Kleomenēs against Attica presents to us the first known example of Spartan headship passing from theory into act: that expedition miscarried because the allies, though willing to follow, would not follow blindly, nor be made the instruments of executing purposes repugnant to their feelings. Sparta had now learnt the necessity, in order to ensure their hearty concurrence, of letting them know what she contemplated, so as to ascertain at least that she had no decided opposition to apprehend. Here, then, is the third stage in the spontaneous movement of Greece towards a systematic conjunction, however imperfect, of its many autonomous units: first we have Spartan headship suggested in theory, from a concourse of circumstances which attract to her the admiration of all Greece—power, unrivalled training, undisturbed antiquity, etc.; next, the theory passes into act, yet rude and shapeless; lastly, the act becomes clothed with formalities, and preceded by discussion and determination. The first convocation of the allies at Sparta, for the purpose of having a common object submitted to their consideration, may well be regarded as an important event in Grecian political history; the proceedings at the convocation are no less important, as an indication of the way in which the Greeks of that day felt and acted, and must be borne in mind as a contrast with times hereafter to be described.

¹ Herodot., v. 81-89. [See Appendix II. to this chapter.—Ed.]

² Herodot., v. 90.

Hippias having been presented to the assembled allies, the Spartans expressed their sorrow for having dethroned him—their resentment and alarm at the new-born insolence of Athens¹, already tasted by her immediate neighbours, and menacing to every State represented in the convocation—and their anxiety to restore Hippias, not less as a reparation of past wrong, than as a means, through his rule, of keeping Athens low and dependent. But the proposition, though emanating from Sparta, was listened to by the allies with one common sentiment of repugnance. They had no sympathy for Hippias—no dislike, still less any fear, of Athens—and a profound detestation of the character of a despot. The spirit which had animated the armed contingents at Eleusis now reappeared among the deputies at Sparta, and the Corinthians again took the initiative. Their deputy Sosiklēs protested against the project in the fiercest and most indignant strain. No language can be stronger than that of the long harangue which Herodotus puts into his mouth, wherein the bitter recollections prevalent at Corinth respecting Kypselus and Periander are poured forth. ‘Surely heaven and earth are about to change places—the fish are coming to dwell on dry land, and mankind going to inhabit the sea—when you, Spartans, propose to subvert the popular governments, and to set up in the cities that wicked and bloody thing called a Despot². First try what it is, for yourselves at Sparta, and then force it upon others if you can: you have not tasted its calamities as we have, and you take very good care to keep it away from yourselves. We adjure you by the common gods of Hellas, plant not despots in her cities: if you persist in a scheme so wicked, know that the Corinthians will not second you.’

This animated appeal was received with a shout of approbation and sympathy on the part of the allies. All with one accord united with Sosiklēs in adjuring the Lacedæmonians³ ‘not to revolutionize any Hellenic city’. No one listened to Hippias when he replied, and warned the Corinthians that the time would come, when they, more than anyone else, would dread and abhor the Athenian democracy, and wish the Peisistratidæ back again. He knew well (says Herodotus) that this would be, for he was better acquainted with the prophecies than any man; but no one then believed him, and he was forced to take his departure back to Sigeium; the Spartans not venturing to espouse his cause against the determined sentiment of the allies⁴.

That determined sentiment deserves notice, because it marks the present period of the Hellenic mind: fifty years later it will be found materially altered. Aversion to single-headed rule, and bitter recollection of men like Kypselus and Periander, are now the chords which thrill in an assembly of Grecian deputies. The idea of a revolution (implying thereby an organic and comprehensive change of which the party using the word disapproves) consists in substituting a permanent One in place of those periodical magistrates and assemblies which were the common attribute of oligarchy and democracy; the antithesis between these last two is as yet in the background, and there prevails neither fear of Athens nor hatred of the Athenian democracy. But when we turn to the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war, we find the order of prece-

¹ Herodot., v. 90, 91.

² *Ibid.*, v. 92.

³ *Ibid.*, v. 93.

⁴ *Ibid.*, v. 93, 94.

dence between these two sentiments reversed. The antimonarchical feeling has not perished, but has been overlaid by other and more recent political antipathies—the antithesis between democracy and oligarchy having become, not indeed the only sentiment, but the uppermost sentiment, in the minds of Grecian politicians generally, and the soul of active party movement. Moreover, a hatred of the most deadly character has grown up against Athens and her democracy, especially in the grandsons of those very Corinthians who now stand forward as her sympathizing friends. The remarkable change of feeling here mentioned is nowhere so strikingly exhibited as when we contrast the address of the Corinthian Sosiklēs just narrated, with the speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta immediately antecedent to the Peloponnesian war, as given to us in Thukydides¹. It will hereafter be fully explained by the intermediate events, by the growth of Athenian power, and by the still more miraculous development of Athenian energy.

Such development, the fruit of the fresh-planted democracy as well as the seed for its sustentation and aggrandizement, continued progressive during the whole period just adverted to; but the first unexpected burst of it, under the Kleisthenean constitution and after the expulsion of Hippias, is described by Herodotus in terms too emphatic to be omitted. After narrating the successive victories of the Athenians over both Bœotians and Chalkidians, that historian proceeds—‘Thus did the Athenians grow in strength. And we may find proof not merely in this instance but everywhere else, how valuable a thing freedom is: since even the Athenians, while under a despot, were not superior in war to any of their surrounding neighbours, but so soon as they got rid of their despots, became by far the first of all. These things show that while kept down by one man, they were slack and timid, like men working for a master; but when they were liberated, every single man became eager in exertions for his own benefit.’ The same comparison reappears a short time afterwards, where he tells us that ‘the Athenians, when free, felt themselves a match for Sparta; but while kept down by any man under a despotism, were feeble and apt for submission.’²

Stronger expressions cannot be found to depict the rapid improvement wrought in the Athenian people by their new democracy. Of course this did not arise merely from suspension of previous cruelties, or from better laws, or better administration. These, indeed, were essential conditions, but the active transforming cause here was, the principle and system of which such amendments formed the detail: the grand and new idea of the sovereign People, composed of free and equal citizens—or liberty and equality, to use words which so profoundly moved the French nation half a century ago³. It was this comprehensive political idea which acted with electric effect upon the Athenians, creating within them a host of sentiments, motives, sympathies, and capacities, to which they had before been strangers. Democracy in Grecian antiquity possessed the privilege, not only of kindling an earnest and unanimous attachment to the Constitution in the bosoms of the citizens, but also of creating an energy of public and private action, such as could never be obtained under an oligarchy, where the utmost that could be hoped for was a passive acquiescence and obedience. Burke has remarked that

¹ Thukydid., i. 68-71, 120-124.

² Herodot., v. 78-91.

³ *I.e.*, in the French Revolution.—Ed.

the mass of the people are generally very indifferent about theories of government; but such indifference (although improvements in the practical working of all Governments tend to foster it) is hardly to be expected among any people who exhibit decided mental activity and spirit on other matters; and the reverse was unquestionably true, in the year 500 B.C., among the communities of ancient Greece. Theories of government were there anything but a dead letter: they were connected with emotions of the strongest as well as of the most opposite character. The theory of a permanent ruling One, for example, was universally odious: that of a ruling Few, though acquiesced in, was never positively attractive, unless either where it was associated with the maintenance of peculiar education and habits, as at Sparta, or where it presented itself as the only antithesis to democracy, the latter having by peculiar circumstances become an object of terror. But the theory of democracy was pre-eminently seductive, creating in the mass of the citizens an intense positive attachment and disposing them to voluntary action and suffering on its behalf, such as no coercion on the part of other Governments could extort. Herodotus¹, in his comparison of the three sorts of government, puts in the front rank of the advantages of democracy 'its most splendid name and promise'—its powers of enlisting the hearts of the citizens in support of their constitution, and of providing for all a common bond of union and fraternity. This is what even democracy did not always do: but it was what no other government in Greece *could* do: a reason alone sufficient to stamp it as the best Government, and presenting the greatest chance of beneficent results, for a Grecian community. Among the Athenian citizens, certainly, it produced a strength and unanimity of positive political sentiment, such as has rarely been seen in the history of mankind, which excites our surprise and admiration the more when we compare it with the apathy which had preceded, and which is even implied as the natural state of the public mind in Solon's famous proclamation against neutrality in a sedition². Because democracy happens to be unpalatable to most modern readers, they have been accustomed to look upon the sentiment here described only in its least honourable manifestations—in the caricatures of Aristophanès, or in the empty commonplaces of rhetorical declaimers. But it is not in this way that the force, the earnestness, or the binding value, of democratical sentiment at Athens is to be measured. We must listen to it as it comes from the lips of Periklès³, while he is strenuously enforcing upon the people those active duties for which it both implanted the stimulus and supplied the courage; or from the oligarchical Nikias in the harbour of Syracuse, when he is endeavouring to revive the courage of his despairing troops for one last death-struggle, and when he appeals to their democratical patriotism as to the only flame yet alive and burning even in that moment of agony⁴. From the time of Kleisthenès downward, the creation of this new mighty impulse makes an entire revolution in the Athenian character; and if the change still stood out in so prominent a manner before the eyes of Herodotus, much more must it have been felt by the contemporaries among whom it occurred.

¹ Herodot., iii, 80. The democratical speaker at Syracuse, Athenagoras, also puts this name and promise in the first rank of advantages (Thukyd., vi. 39).

² See chapter ii. above.

³ See the two speeches of Periklès in Thukyd., ii. 35-46, and ii. 60-64. Compare the reflections of Thukydides upon the two democracies of Athens and Syracuse—vi. 69 and vii. 21-55.

⁴ Thukyd., vii. 69.

The attachment of an Athenian citizen to his democratical constitution comprised two distinct veins of sentiment: first, his rights, protection and advantages derived from it—next, his obligations of exertion and sacrifice towards it and with reference to it. Neither of these two veins of sentiment was ever wholly absent; but according as the one or the other was present at different times in varying proportions, the patriotism of the citizen was a very different feeling. That which Herodotus remarks is the extraordinary efforts of heart and hand which the Athenians suddenly displayed—the efficacy of the active sentiment throughout the bulk of the citizens. We shall observe even more memorable evidences of the same phænomenon in tracing down the history from Kleisthenês to the end of the Peloponnesian war: we shall trace a series of events and motives eminently calculated to stimulate that self-imposed labour and discipline which the early democracy had first called forth. But when we advance farther down, from the restoration of the democracy after the Thirty Tyrants, to the time of Demosthenês—(I venture upon this brief anticipation, in the conviction that one period of Grecian history can only be thoroughly understood by contrasting it with another)—we shall find a sensible change in Athenian patriotism. The active sentiment of obligation is comparatively inoperative—the citizen, it is true, has a keen sense of the value of the democracy, as protecting him and ensuring to him valuable rights, and he is, moreover, willing to perform his ordinary sphere of legal duties towards it; but he looks upon it as a thing established, and capable of maintaining itself in a due measure of foreign ascendancy, without any such personal efforts as those which his forefathers cheerfully imposed upon themselves. The orations of Demosthenês contain melancholy proofs of such altered tone of patriotism—of that languor, paralysis, and waiting for others to act, which preceded the catastrophe of Chæroneia, notwithstanding an unabated attachment to the democracy as a source of protection and good government¹. That same preternatural activity which the allies of Sparta, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, both denounced and admired in the Athenians, is noted by the orator as now belonging to their enemy Philip. Such variations in the scale of national energy pervade history, modern as well as ancient, but in regard to Grecian history, especially, they can never be overlooked. For a certain measure, not only of positive political attachment, but also of active self-devotion, military readiness, and personal effort, was the indispensable condition of maintaining Hellenic autonomy, either in Athens or elsewhere, and became so more than ever, when the Macedonians were once organized under an enterprising and semi-hellenized prince. The democracy was the first creative cause of that astonishing personal and many-sided energy which marked the Athenian character, for a century downward from Kleisthenês; that the same ultra-Hellenic activity did not longer continue, is referable to other causes which will be hereafter in part explained. No system of government, even supposing it to be very much better and more faultless than the Athenian democracy, can ever pretend to accomplish its legitimate end apart from the personal character of the people, or to supersede the necessity of individual virtue and vigour. During the half-century imme-

¹ Compare the remarkable speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta (Thukyd., i. 68-71) with the *φιλοπραγμωσύνη* which Demosthenês so

emphatically notices in Philip (*Olynthiac.*, i. 6, p. 13); also *Philippic.*, i. 2, and the *Philippics* and *Olynthiacs* generally.

diately preceding the battle of Chæroneia, the Athenians had lost that remarkable energy which distinguished them during the first century of their democracy, and had fallen much more nearly to a level with the other Greeks, in common with whom they were obliged to yield to the pressure of a foreign enemy. I here briefly notice their last period of languor, in contrast with the first burst of democratical fervour under Kleisthenês now opening—a feeling, which will be found, as we proceed, to continue for a longer period than could have been reasonably anticipated, but which was too high-strung to become a perpetual and inherent attribute of any community.

APPENDIX I

THE KLEISTHENEAN REFORMS *read*

[The *Ath. Pol.* (c. xxi. ff.) does not greatly advance our knowledge of the details of the Kleisthenean reforms. The general description there given tallies in all essentials with the authorities quoted by Grote. Certain points deserve special attention.

According to the *Ath. Pol.*, (1) Kleisthenês divided the people into ten tribes, in order that more might share the privileges of citizenship (so Grote), and that the tribal organization might be entirely dissociated from the clans and phratries; in other words, that the old local religious unit might have no connection with politics. The anti-local character of the tribes is further emphasized by the fact that they were called after ten Attic¹ heroes selected by the Pythia out of 100 suggested names. (2) The country was divided into thirty sections in three groups—the City, the Shore (*Paralia*), and the Inland (*Mesogaea*), each of which had ten 'trittyes'. Each of the ten tribes received by lot three trittyes. (This division further marks the anti-local nature of the Kleisthenean system.) (3) The residents in each deme constituted a political unit—i.e., were regarded as 'fellow-demesmen'. (4) The forty-eight naukraries were superseded (politically) by the demes.

The main difficulties of the divisions are as follows:

1. We must conclude that the territory of each tribe fell into three blocks, each of which might consist of one deme or several. It would be expected that the demes of each tribe would fall into three groups, but, in fact, this is not the case. Thus, Æantis consists of Phalêrum and eleven demes in the north in the Marathon district—i.e., of two groups. Other tribes are in five or six groups².

2. It is impossible to determine precisely the geographical extent of the divisions 'City', 'Shore', and 'Inland'. The City is practically identical with the old *Pedion*, but the Kleisthenean 'Shore' is more extensive than the old *Paralia*, which was properly the southern coast only.

3. The *Ath. Pol.* seems to suggest that the demes were the creation of Kleisthenês, but there is clear evidence that they were primitive divisions. Thus Herodotus (ix. 73), speaking of Decelea, says 'the Dioscuri set up the demes', and (i. 62) speaks of hostility between 'the City and the Demes'. We may fairly conclude that the country demes were not created but merely given political existence by Kleisthenês, while the demes of Athens were created by him.

4. Herodotus says that Kleisthenês divided the demes δέκα εἰς τὰς φυλάς—i.e., ten to each tribe³. The *Ath. Pol.* says nothing of this, and it is clear that in such a symmetrical arrangement the division into thirty trittyes would be out of place. Further, as Grote says, there is no reason to suppose there

¹ Even Ajax, eponym of Æantis, though not Attic, might well be regarded as such.

² On the division into tribes and trittyes, Milchhöfer (*Über die Demeordnung des Kleisth.*, in Appendix to *Abhandlung. d. Berl. Akad.*, 1892) has a detailed account which in the main bears out the *Ath. Pol.* He mentions, among other things, that the demes apportioned to each trittys

were mostly contiguous, and that two trittyes of one tribe are sometimes (e.g., in Ægæis and Pandionis) contiguous. R. Loepfer in *Ath. Mitt.*, 1892, pp. 319-433.

³ Willamowitz-Moellendorf (*Arist. und Athen.*, pp. 149, 150) suggests δέκα for δέκα—i.e., he parcelled out the demes to the tribes in ten batches.

were originally exactly 100 demes. (Strabo gives 174 (p. 396); from *Inscr.* about 170 names have been recovered.) It has been held that the number was originally 100, but was subsequently increased to prevent an inequality due to increased population in certain districts. But (a) from the first there must have been difference in size among the demes—e.g., between the hill-demes of the north and Phalérum, the port of Athens; (b) no equality was subsequently maintained, for in the two succeeding centuries there were demes containing from 100 to 200 people, while Acharnæ was μέγα μέρος τῆς πόλεως, and perhaps could muster 3,000 hoplites; (c) the whole argument is based on a misconception as to the nature of the demes. In fact, the membership was hereditary, and a man retained his deme-connexion even though for business or other reasons he might reside in another deme—a privilege for which he paid a tax (such a man was called an ἐγκεκτημένος).

5. The next difficulty is as to those whom Kleisthenês admitted to citizenship (p. 60 above). From the *Politics* it is clear that he did admit aliens who were resident in Attica, presumably merchants whose admission strengthened not only his own party but also the State as a whole, and certain slaves (perhaps freedmen who had acquired some social status). Obviously, however, he must have done more than this; it would not have gratified his party that he should grant privileges to aliens and slaves. From *Ath. Pol.* (xiii. 5) we gather that from the time of Solon there was a class of people who were outside the citizen body, being of impure descent (τῷ γένει μὴ καθαροί); these people, for obvious reasons, strongly supported the Peisistratids, after whose expulsion they were definitely stigmatized as without the pale by a special vote (διαψηφισμός).

The authorship of this decree is not stated. The natural supposition is that it was part of the programme of Isagoras, but he, according to the *Ath. Pol.*, was 'the friend of the tyrants'¹, and would not commit the folly of passing a decree against a body of men who had held the same political views². It would seem, indeed, that Kleisthenês, as the enemy of the Peisistratids, must have carried the decree in the first moments of his triumphant return, and that later, being worsted by Isagoras (who was elected archon in 508), he made a *volte face*, and proposed the admission probably in large numbers of the class in question as a political device.

Whether this inference is correct or not, it is certain that Grote was right in his contention that Kleisthenês broadened the basis of citizenship apart from his admission of aliens and slaves. Herodotus and the *Ath. Pol.* are equally emphatic in regarding citizenship as the bait by which he won the support of the popular party.

6. Recent criticism only confirms Grote's view that the Council (*Boulê*) of Five Hundred was the corner-stone of the Kleisthenean structure. Though we cannot agree with those who maintain that no *Boulê* had existed before Kleisthenês³, it is perfectly clear from the absence of any recorded action by such a Council between Solon and 510 that from this time it acquired a new importance, and that it came to be looked upon as the real executive power, whereas the *Ekklesiâ* met rarely (four times a month), and was in any case too large for real discussion. The Council was a compact body in continuous session, and, though (*Ath. Pol.*, c. 62) a councillor could not serve more than twice, we may fairly assume that there was some approach to continuity of policy. Moreover, the fact that the councillors were held responsible for the discharge of their duties at the end of their year of office and for the preliminary examination of their successors (*δοκιμασία*) must have contributed to give to their deliberations a sobriety which did not necessarily characterize the proceedings of the *Ekklesiâ*. It is important in this connexion to notice that on at least two occasions of the utmost importance the Council was given full powers, (1) to send ambassadors to Philip (Demosthenês, *Fals. Leg.*, p. 389), and (2) to inquire into the affair of the mutilation of the Hermæ on the night preceding the sailing of the Sicilian expedition. The importance which the Athenians attached to this body in the

¹ Note, however, that Busolt (ii.², p. 401) and Meyer (ii., p. 798) regard this as a false inference; and, indeed, later Alkmaeonid traditions would be glad to emphasize such a point.

² Quite possibly 'those of impure descent' may have included Peisistratidean mercenaries; in a similar case the mercenaries of Gêlo and Hierô

refused to surrender the franchise.

³ The argument is based largely on the existence of an inscription relating to Salamis (Hicks and Hill, 4), in which, instead of the formula usual in later times—'it seemed good to the *Boulê* and the people' (*Ekklesiâ*)—we read 'it seemed good to the people'.

middle fifth century is shown by (among other instances) the inscription relating to the constitution imposed on Erythræ (about 450 B.C.), which included a body of presumably similar functions. In a word, the proper working of a Greek democracy inevitably postulated a Council of this sort.

7. Finally, it is necessary to say something of the device of ostracism, which Grote treated favourably at considerable length in the chapter above. The *Ath. Pol.* (c. xxii.) definitely states that Kleisthenēs invented the system with a view to getting rid of the tyrants, and yet Hipparchus, its first Peisistratid victim, was not expelled till 488. To this problem no answer has been given. Again, if this was the original object it could have had no object at all after Marathon, which finally extinguished any hopes which the ex-tyrants may have cherished. To justify it as being better than the existing *συνδρις* is clearly beside the point.

At the best we can but regard ostracism as a *pis aller*; at the worst, *i.e.*, as a purely political device, it was unjust to the victim, and harmful to the State both intrinsically and as the ruin of the party system. In practice it demanded a very high level of self-control on the part of the people, a sobriety of judgment which is not happily illustrated by the story of the man who voted against Aristeidēs because he was always called 'The Just.' It might well be argued that a system which deprived Athens of the assistance of Xanthippus and Aristeidēs during the invasion of Xerxēs, and of Kimōn at the time of Tanagra, stands self-condemned. The defence that it stimulated a national consciousness again recalls the Aristeidēs story, and leads us to consider whether the Athenian was not at least sufficiently stimulated in this respect by the meetings of the Ekklēsia, and by his service as a dikast. The real significance of the system is that it definitely transferred from the Areopagus to the Ekklēsia the ultimate protection of the Constitution¹.—ED.]

APPENDIX II

ATHENS AND ÆGINA

[THE history of the relations between Ægina and Athens (which constitutes almost the whole history of the island) is very difficult to recover from Herodotus. Their strife is traced back to a curious feud about the images of the deities Damia and Auxesia, which the Æginetans had carried off from Epidaurus. The Epidaurians had sent annual offerings to Athens in recognition of the fact that the images were made of Attic olive wood. This act of courtesy the Æginetans withheld, but when the Athenians endeavoured to carry off the deities the images fell on their knees, the Æginetans attacked their enemies, and only one Athenian survived, to be murdered on his return by Athenian matrons. For this episode Herodotus gives no date; R. W. Macan and J. B. Bury suggest c. 570. But the whole story suggests an ætiological myth to account for the kneeling posture of the statues and certain ancient customs in the two cities.

The story of the fifth-century war presents problems of a different character. According to Herodotus, the sole authority, when (shortly after 507) Ægina definitely joined the Thebans the Athenians prepared to strike hard without delay, in spite of an oracle which bade them dedicate a precinct to Æakus, and expect victory only after the lapse of thirty years; they were interrupted by Sparta's movements on behalf of Hippias. Subsequently (it is necessary to anticipate events) Ægina medized in 491; Athens persuaded Sparta to punish this treachery, and Kleomenēs, after one failure, succeeded, with his new colleague Leotychidēs, in exacting hostages, whom he deposited in Athens (according to Herodotus, 491-490). On his death the Athenians refused to give up these hostages, and war ensued, in which the Athenians, in spite of the help of the traitor Nikodromus, unquestionably had the worst.

¹ The fact that Hipparchus was the first to be ostracized in 488 gave rise to the suggestion (Lugebil, *Das Wesen d. Ostrak.*) that the device was not invented till about 496, and was, therefore, not part of the Kleisthenæan reform. But it is quite likely that *Ath. Pol.* (xxii. 4)—which would seem to corroborate this view—is arguing from a list of those who were returning early in 480—*i.e.*, of those exiled after Marathon. We

need not doubt the unanimous testimony of our authorities.

Grote's view that ostracism did not take place unless 6,000 votes were cast against one man is open to the serious objection that it is highly improbable that a sufficient number of citizens were even present at an Ekklēsia to give so large a vote on one side. Probably 6,000 votes had to be given in all, as for other *privilegia* in Attic law.

The problems of this account are :

1. Herodotus clearly implies that the war lasted from 507-481 (*i.e.*, the Congress at the Isthmus), and though at that time, as he says, it was the most important war in Greece, he gives no account except of the years 491-490.

2. If the war was at its height (see p. 126 note) in 498, how could the Athenians have dared to send twenty ships (out of so small a fleet) to assist the Ionians at Ladé?

Rev. E. M. Walker suggests the following solution. The only certain date is 458, that of the final victory of Athens; the oracle speaks of thirty years from the dedication to Æakus to that victory. This gives us 488. When we consider further (1) that it was in 483-482 that Themistoklēs persuaded Athens to raise a fleet of 200, and (2) that it is precisely to the period 490-480 that later historians (Eusebius, *Chron. Can.*) assign the greatness of the Æginetan power, we may well conclude that, although Ægina may have sympathized with Thebes after 507, she declined to render active assistance, and that the war actually broke out in 488 when Athens declined to surrender the hostages.—ED.]

CHAPTER V [XVII, XXXII-XXXIV]

IONIAN GREEKS—RISE OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE

IN the preceding chapter I have followed the history of Central Greece very nearly down to the point at which the history of the Asiatic Greeks becomes blended with it, and after which the two streams begin to flow to a great degree in the same channel. I now turn to the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks, and of the Asiatic kings as connected with them.

With Gygēs, the Mermnad King, commences the series of aggressions from Sardis upon the Asiatic Greeks, which ultimately ended in their subjection. Gygēs invaded the territories of Milētus and Smyrna, and even took the city (probably not the citadel) of Kolophôn. Though he thus, however, made war upon the Asiatic Greeks, he was munificent in his donations to the Grecian god of Delphi. His numerous as well as costly offerings were seen in the temple by Herodotus. Elegiac compositions of the poet Mimnermus celebrated the valour of the Smyrnæans in their battle with Gygēs¹. Gygēs also attacked the territory of Magnēsia (probably Magnēsia on Sipylus) and after a considerable struggle took the city².

How far the Lydian kingdom of Sardis extended during the reign of Gygēs we have no means of ascertaining. Strabo alleges that the whole Troad³ belonged to him, and that the Greek settlement of Abydos on the Hellespont was established by the Milesians only under his auspices. On what authority this statement is made we are not told, and it appears doubtful, especially as so many legendary anecdotes are connected with the name of Gygēs. This prince reigned (according to Herodotus) thirty-eight years, and was succeeded by his son Ardys, who reigned forty-nine years (about 678-629 B.C.)⁴. We learn that he attacked the Milesians,

¹ Herod., i. 14; Pausan., ix. 29, 2.

² Nikolaus Damasc., p. 52, ed. Orelli.

³ Strabo, xiii., p. 509.

⁴ The early history of Lydia, as told by Grote, is little more than a record of successive dynasties whose actual achievements remain utterly unknown to us. Though this account, based wholly on Herodotus and other Greek writers whose knowledge of the subject was more mythological than historical, can now be supplemented to a certain extent by the results of recent archaeological research, our total sum of information is still exceedingly scanty. Until Lydia, like the neighbouring kingdoms of the Phrygians and Hittites,

becomes more accessible to explorers, it must remain an unprofitable task to chronicle its early history. The connexion between Lydia and Greece during these days remains a matter of profound obscurity, and for the student of Greek history the early record of the Asiatic kingdom, such as it is, has very little value.

With the accession of the so-called Mermnad dynasty (late in the eighth century) the history of Lydia acquires greater interest, and can be treated somewhat more fully. At this point the present volume begins to reproduce Grote's original text.—ED.

and took the Ionic city of Priênê. Yet this possession cannot have been maintained, for the city appears afterwards as autonomous¹. His long reign, however, was signalized by two events, both of considerable moment to the Asiatic Greeks—the invasion of the Cimmerians, and the first approach to collision (at least the first of which we have any historical knowledge) between the inhabitants of Lydia and those of Upper Asia under the Median kings².

As the dominion of the Scythians in Upper Asia lasted twenty-eight years before they were expelled by Kyaxarês, so also the inroads of the Cimmerians through Asia Minor, which had begun during the reign of the Lydian king Ardys, continued through the twelve years of the reign of his son Sadyattês (629-617 B.C.), and were finally terminated by Alyattês, son of the latter³. Notwithstanding the Cimmerians, however, Sadyattês was in a condition to prosecute a war against the Grecian city of Milêtus, which continued during the last seven years of his reign, and which he bequeathed to his son and successor. Alyattês continued the war for five years longer. So feeble was the sentiment of union among the various Grecian towns on the Asiatic coast, that none of them would lend any aid to Milêtus except the Chians, who were under special obligations to Milêtus for previous aid in a contest against Erythræ. The Milesians unassisted were no match for a Lydian army in the field, though their great naval strength placed them out of all danger of a blockade; and we must presume that the erection of those mounds of earth against the walls, whereby the Persian Harpagus vanquished the Ionian cities half a century afterwards, was then unknown to the Lydians. For twelve successive years the Milesian territory was annually overrun and ravaged, previous to the gathering in of the crops. The inhabitants, after having been defeated in two ruinous battles, gave up all hope of resisting the devastation; so that the task of the invaders became easy, and the Lydian army pursued their destructive march to the sound of flutes and harps. While ruining the crops and the fruit-trees, Alyattês would not allow the farm-buildings or country-houses to be burnt, in order that the means of production might still be preserved, to be again destroyed during the following season. By such unremitting devastation the Milesians were reduced to distress and famine, in spite of their command of the sea. The fate which afterwards overtook them during the reign of Crœsus, of becoming tributary subjects to the throne of Sardis, would have begun half a century earlier, had not Alyattês unintentionally committed a profanation against the goddess Athênê. Though no one took notice of this incident at the time, yet Alyattês on his return to Sardis was smitten with prolonged sickness. Unable to obtain relief, he despatched envoys to seek humble advice from the god at Delphi. But the Pythian

¹ Herodot., i. 15.

² The invasion of the Cimmerians has a certain amount of interest, owing to the effect it produced upon the Greek settlers in Asia Minor. Putting together the few useful items of information in Herodotus (i. 15, 16; iv. 11, 12), and some isolated notices in other writers, we may infer—(1) that they were a nomadic people, who had formerly lived in and around the Crimea; (2) that they made a sudden raid (perhaps by sea) into Asia Minor; (3) that they established themselves on the north coast, and from there overran Phrygia and Lydia; (4) that they diverted the attention of the Lydian kings for a while from the Greek

cities of Asia Minor, but themselves endangered and even captured some of these; (5) that they made little permanent impression on the distribution of power in Asia Minor, save that they destroyed the Phrygian kingdom, and so opened a way for the later Lydian kings into farther Asia Minor.

The earliest relations of Lydia with the powers of further Asia (Assyria and Media) are of little or no importance for Greek history.—ED.

³ From whom Polyænus borrowed his statement, that Alyattês employed wild effect savage dogs against the Cimmerians, we do not know (Polyæn., vii. 2, 1).

priestess refused to furnish any healing suggestions until he should have rebuilt the burnt temple of Athênê, and Periander, at that time despot of Corinth, having learnt the tenor of this reply, transmitted private information of it to Thrasybulus, despot of Milêtus, with whom he was intimately allied. Presently there arrived at Milêtus a herald on the part of Alyattês, proposing a truce for the special purpose of enabling him to rebuild the destroyed temple, who on his arrival found abundance of corn heaped up in the agora, and the citizens engaged in feasting and enjoyment; for Thrasybulus had caused all the provision in the town both public and private to be brought out in order that the herald might see the Milesians in a condition of apparent plenty, and carry the news of it to his master. The stratagem succeeded. Alyattês, under the persuasion that his repeated devastation inflicted upon the Milesians no sensible deprivations, abandoned his hostile designs, and concluded with them a treaty of amity and alliance. It was his first proceeding to build two temples to Athênê, in place of the one which had been destroyed, and he then forthwith recovered from his protracted malady. His gratitude for the cure was testified by the transmission of a large silver bowl, with an iron footstand welded together by the Chian artist Glaukus—the inventor of the art of thus joining together pieces of iron¹.

Alyattês is said to have carried on other operations against some of the Ionic Greeks: he took Smyrna², but was defeated in an inroad on the territory of Klazomenæ. But on the whole his long reign of fifty-seven years was one of tranquillity to the Grecian cities on the coast, though we hear of an expedition which he undertook against Karia³. He is reported to have been during youth of overweening insolence, but to have acquired afterwards a just and improved character. By an Ionian wife he became father of Crœsus, whom even during his lifetime he appointed satrap of the town of Adramyttium and the neighbouring plain of Thêbê. How far his dominion in the interior of Asia Minor extended we do not know, but very probably his long and comparatively inactive reign may have favoured the accumulation of those treasures which afterwards rendered the wealth of Crœsus so proverbial. His monument, an enormous pyramidal mound upon a stone base, erected near Sardis by the joint efforts of the whole Sardian population, was the most memorable curiosity in Lydia during the time of Herodotus. It was inferior only to the gigantic edifices of Egypt and Babylon⁴.

Crœsus obtained the throne, at the death of his father, by appointment from the latter. The aggressive reign of Crœsus, lasting fourteen years (559-545 B.C.), formed a marked contrast to the long quiescence of his father during a reign of fifty-seven years.

Pretences being easily found for war against the Asiatic Greeks, Crœsus attacked them one after the other. Unfortunately, we know neither the particulars of these successive aggressions, nor the previous history

¹ Herodot., i. 20-23.

² The operations of the Lydian kings seem to have been mainly directed against those Greek ports which stood at the extremity of the great trade-routes descending from the heart of Asia Minor to the Ægean sea. Thus, Smyrna and Phœkæa, situated near the mouth of the Hermus, and Kolophon and Ephesus, commanding the lower Kayster valley, were of great importance to a monarch whose capital (Sardis) stood at the meeting-point of the Hermus and Kayster roads.

When once they had acquired these terminal ports, the Lydian kings controlled the whole of the great North Road through Asia Minor up to the river Halys. Similarly, the acquisition of Milêtus gave them complete dominion over the Mæander valley and the Southern Road as far as Kilikia.—Ed.

³ Nikolaus Damasken., p. 54, ed. Orelli; Xanthi Fragment.

⁴ Herodot., i. 92, 93. [For a description of Alyattês' tomb, see Stein, *Herodotus*, i. 93.—Ed.]

of the Ionic cities, so as to be able to explain how it was that the fifth of the Mermnad kings of Sardis met with such unqualified success, in an enterprise which his predecessors had attempted in vain. Milētus alone, with the aid of Chios, had resisted Alyattēs and Sadyattēs for eleven years—and Cræsus possessed no naval force, any more than his father and grandfather. But on this occasion, not one of the towns can have displayed the like individual energy. In regard to the Milesians, we may perhaps suspect that the period now under consideration was comprised in that long duration of intestine conflict which Herodotus represents (though without defining exactly when) to have crippled the forces of the city for two generations, and which was at length appeased by a memorable decision of some arbitrators invited from Paros. These latter, called in by mutual consent of the exhausted antagonist parties at Milētus, found both the city and her territory in a state of general neglect and ruin. But on surveying the lands, they discovered some which still appeared to be tilled with undiminished diligence and skill: to the proprietors of these lands they consigned the government of the town, in the belief that they would manage the public affairs with as much success as their own¹. Such a state of intestine weakness would partly explain the easy subjugation of the Milesians by Cræsus, while there was little in the habits of the Ionic cities to present the chance of united efforts against a common enemy. These cities, far from keeping up any effective political confederation, were in a state of habitual jealousy of each other, and not unfrequently in actual war². The common religious festivals—the Deliac festival as well as the Pan-Ionia, and afterwards the Ephesia in place of the Delia—seem to have been regularly frequented by all the cities throughout the worst of times. But these assemblies had no direct political function, nor were they permitted to control that sentiment of separate city-autonomy which was paramount in the Greek mind—though their influence was extremely precious in calling forth social sympathies. Apart from the periodical festival, meetings for special emergencies were held at the Pan-Ionic temple; but from such meetings any city, not directly implicated, kept aloof³. As in this case, so in others not less critical throughout the historical period—the incapacity of large political combination was the source of constant danger, and ultimately proved the cause of ruin, to the independence of all the Grecian states. Herodotus warmly commends the advice given by Thalēs to his Ionic countrymen—and given (to use his remarkable expression) ‘before the ruin of Ionia’⁴—that a common Senate, invested with authority over all the twelve cities, should be formed within the walls of Teōs, as the most central in position; and that all the other cities should account themselves mere demes of this aggregate commonwealth or Polis. And we cannot doubt that such was the unavailing aspiration of many a patriot of Milētus or Ephesus, even before the final operations of Cræsus were opened against them.

¹ Herodot., v. 28.

Alyattēs reigned fifty-seven years, and the vigorous resistance which the Milesians offered to him took place in the first six years of his reign. The ‘two generations of intestine dissension’ may well have succeeded after the reign of Thrasybulus. This, indeed, is a mere conjecture, yet it may be observed that Herodotus, speaking of the time of the Ionic revolt (500 B.C.), and intimating that Milētus, though then peaceable, had been for

two generations at an early period torn by intestine dissension, could hardly have meant these ‘two generations’ to apply to a time earlier than 617 B.C.

² Herodot., i. 17; vi. 99; Athenæ., vi., p. 267.

³ See the remarkable case of Milētus sending no deputies to a Pan-Ionic meeting, being safe herself from danger (Herodot., i. 141).

⁴ Herodot., i. 141-170. About the Pan-Ionia and the Ephesia, see Thukyd., iii. 104; Dionys. Halik., iv. 25; Herodot., i. 143-148.

That prince attacked the Greek cities successively, finding or making different pretences for hostility against each. He began with Ephesus, which is said to have been then governed by a despot of harsh and oppressive character, named Pindarus, whose father had married a daughter of Alyattès, and who was therefore himself nephew of Crœsus. The latter, having in vain invited Pindarus to surrender the town, brought up his forces and attacked the walls. One of the towers being overthrown, the Ephesians abandoned all hope of defending their town, and sought safety by placing it under the guardianship of Artemis, to whose temple they carried a rope from the walls—a distance little less than seven furlongs. They at the same time sent a message of supplication to Crœsus, who is said to have granted them the preservation of their liberties, out of reverence to the protection of Artemis, exacting at the same time that Pindarus should quit the place. Such is the tale of which we find a confused mention in Ælian and Polyænus. But Herodotus, while he notices the fact of the long rope whereby the Ephesians sought to place themselves in contact with their divine protectress, does not indicate that Crœsus was induced to treat them more favourably. Ephesus, like all the other Grecian towns on the coast, was brought under subjection and tribute to him¹. How he dealt with them, and what degree of coercive precaution he employed either to ensure subjection or collect tribute, the brevity of the historian does not acquaint us. But they were required, partially at least, if not entirely, to raze their fortifications; for on occasion of the danger which supervened a few years afterwards from Cyrus, they are found practically unfortified².

Thus completely successful in his aggressions on the continental Asiatic Greeks, Crœsus conceived the idea of assembling a fleet, for the purpose of attacking the islanders of Chios and Samos; but became convinced (as some said, by the sarcastic remark of one of the seven Greek sages, Bias or Pittakus) of the impracticability of the project. He carried his arms, however, with full success, over other parts of the continent of Asia Minor, until he had subdued the whole territory within the river Halys, excepting only the Kilikians and the Lykians. The Lydian empire thus reached the maximum of its power, and the treasures amassed by Crœsus at Sardis, derived partly from this great number of tributaries, partly from mines in various places as well as auriferous sands of the Paktôlus, exceeded anything which the Greeks had ever before known.

We learn, from the brief but valuable observations of Herodotus, to appreciate the great importance of these conquests of Crœsus, with reference not merely to the Grecian cities actually subjected, but also indirectly to the whole Grecian world.

'Before the reign of Crœsus (observes the historian) all the Greeks were free: it was by him first that Greeks were subdued into tribute'³. And he treats this event as the initial phenomenon of the series, out of which grew the hostile relations between the Greeks on one side, and Asia

¹ Herodot., i. 26; Ælian, V. H., iii. 26; Polyæn., vi. 50. The story contained in Ælian and Polyænus seems to come from Batôn of Sinopé.

In reference to the rope reaching from the city to the Artemision, we may quote an analogous case of the Kylonian suppliants at Athens, who sought to maintain their contact with the altar by means

of a continuous cord—unfortunately the cord broke (Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 12).

² Herodot., i. 141. Compare also the statement respecting Phôkæa, c. 168.

³ This remark, of course, is not quite accurate. Some cities—e.g., Kolophon—had been subdued more than a century before.—ED.

as represented by the Persians on the other, which were uppermost in the minds of himself and his contemporaries.

It was in the case of Cræsus that the Greeks were first called upon to deal with a tolerably large barbaric aggregate under a warlike and enterprising prince, and the result was such as to manifest the inherent weakness of their political system, from its incapacity of large combination. The separated autonomous cities could only maintain their independence either through similar disunion on the part of barbaric adversaries, or by superiority, on their own side, of military organization as well as of geographical position. The situation of Greece proper and of the islands was favourable to the maintenance of such a system: not so the shores of Asia with a wide interior country behind. The Ionic Greeks were at this time different from what they became during the ensuing century. Little inferior in energy to Athens or to the general body of European Greeks, they could doubtless have maintained their independence, had they cordially combined. But it will be seen hereafter that the Greek colonies—planted as isolated settlements, and indisposed to political union, even when neighbours—all of them fell into dependence so soon as attack from the interior came to be powerfully organized; especially if that organization was conducted by leaders partially improved through contact with the Greeks themselves. Small autonomous cities maintain themselves so long as they have only enemies of the like strength to deal with: but to resist larger aggregates requires such a concurrence of favourable circumstances as can hardly remain long without interruption. And the ultimate subjection of entire Greece, under the kings of Macedon, was only an exemplification on the widest scale of this same principle.

The Lydian monarchy under Cræsus, the largest with which the Greeks had come into contact down to that moment, was very soon absorbed into a still larger—the Persian—of which the Ionic Greeks, after unavailing resistance, became the subjects. The partial sympathy and aid which they obtained from the independent or European Greeks, their western neighbours, followed by the fruitless attempt on the part of the Persian king to add these latter to his empire, gave an entirely new turn to Grecian history and proceedings. First, it necessitated a degree of central action against the Persians which was foreign to Greek political instinct; next, it opened to the noblest and most enterprising section of the Hellenic name—the Athenians—an opportunity of placing themselves at the head of this centralizing tendency; while a concurrence of circumstances, foreign and domestic, imparted to them at the same time that extraordinary and many-sided impulse, combining action with organization, which gave such brilliancy to the period of Herodotus and Thukydides. It is thus that most of the splendid phenomena of Grecian history grew, directly or indirectly, out of the reluctant dependence in which the Asiatic Greeks were held by the inland barbaric powers, beginning with Cræsus.

These few observations will suffice to intimate that a new phase of Grecian history is now on the point of opening. Down to the time of Cræsus, almost everything which is done or suffered by the Grecian cities bears only upon one or other of them separately: the instinct of the Greeks repudiates even the modified forms of political centralization, and there are no circumstances in operation to force it upon them. Rela-

tion of power and subjection exists between a strong and a weak State, but no tendency to standing political co-ordination. From this time forward, we shall see partial causes at work, tending in this direction, and not without considerable influence; though always at war with the indestructible instinct of the nation, and frequently counteracted by selfishness and misconduct on the part of the leading cities¹.

The Ionic and Æolic Greeks on the Asiatic coast had been conquered and made tributary by the Lydian king Crœsus: 'down to that time (says Herodotus) all Greeks had been free.' Their conqueror Crœsus, who ascended the throne in 560 B.C., appeared to be at the summit of human prosperity and power in his unassailable capital, and with his countless treasures at Sardis. His dominions comprised nearly the whole of Asia Minor, as far as the river Halys to the east; on the other side of that river began the Median monarchy under his brother-in-law Astyagês, extending eastward to some boundary which we cannot define, but comprising in a south-eastern direction Persis proper or Farsistan, and separated from the Kissians and Assyrians on the east by the line of Mount Zagros (the present boundary-line between Persia and Turkey). Babylonia, with its wondrous city, between the Euphrates and the Tigris, was occupied by the Chaldæans, under their king Labynêtus: a territory populous and fertile, partly by nature, partly by prodigies of labour, to a degree which makes us mistrust even an honest eye-witness who describes it afterwards in its decline—but which was then in its most flourishing condition. The Chaldæan dominion under Labynêtus reached to the borders of Egypt, including as dependent territories both Judæa and Phenicia. In Egypt reigned the native king Amasis, powerful and affluent, sustained in his throne by a large body of Grecian mercenaries, and himself favourably disposed to Grecian commerce and settlement. Both with Labynêtus and with Amasis, Crœsus was on terms of alliance; and as Astyagês was his brother-in-law, the four kings might well be deemed out of the reach of calamity. Yet within the space of thirty years or a little more, the whole of their territories had become embodied in one vast empire, under the son of an adventurer as yet not known even by name.

The rise and fall of Oriental dynasties has been in all times distinguished by the same general features. A brave and adventurous prince, at the head of a population at once poor, warlike, and greedy, acquires dominion; while his successors, abandoning themselves to sensuality and sloth, probably also to oppressive and irascible dispositions, become in process of time victims to those same qualities in a stranger which had enabled their own father to seize the throne. Cyrus, the great founder of the Persian empire, first the subject and afterwards the dethroner of the Median Astyagês, corresponds to this general description, as far at least

¹ The effect of the Lydian overlordship on the Greek towns of Asia Minor was certainly not a very unfavourable one. (1) Though compelled to demolish their walls, the cities do not seem to have lost all their control over foreign affairs, but in the later wars of Crœsus appear rather as allies than as subjects. (2) Their obligation to pay tribute was more than compensated by their admission into one of the greatest trading states of the time. The trade and wealth of the Ionian cities suffered no loss from the conquest; in some cases—e.g., that of Phœkai—it benefited considerably. In this connexion we may also men-

tion the invention of coinage by the Lydians, which the Asiatic Greeks were not slow to adopt for their own use (cf. P. Gardner, *Types of Greek Coins*, pp. 1-6; Head, *Coinage of Lydia and Persia*, Introduction; Holm, *Greek History*, Engl. transl., pp. 214, 215). (3) The racial and religious differences between conquerors and conquered were not very deep, and do not appear to have been sharply felt on either side.

The subsequent dominion of the Persians, though by no means oppressive, must have appeared harsh enough to the Greeks by contrast with the Lydian suzerainty.—Ed.

as we can pretend to know his history. For in truth, even the conquests of Cyrus, after he became ruler of Media, are very imperfectly known, whilst the facts which preceded his rise up to that sovereignty cannot be said to be known at all: we have to choose between different accounts at variance with each other, and of which the most complete and detailed is stamped with all the character of romance. The *Cyropædia* of Xenophon is memorable and interesting, considered with reference to the Greek mind, and as a philosophical novel¹. That it should have been quoted so largely as authority on matters of history is only one proof among many how easily authors have been satisfied as to the essentials of historical evidence. The narrative given by Herodotus of the relations between Cyrus and Astyagês, agreeing with Xenophon in little more than the fact that it makes Cyrus son of Kambysês and Mandanê and grandson of Astyagês, goes even beyond the story of Romulus and Remus in respect to tragical incident and contrast.

To the historian of Halikarnassus we have to oppose the physician of the neighbouring town Knidus—Ktêsias, who contradicted Herodotus, not without strong terms of censure, on many points, and especially upon that which is the very foundation of the early narrative respecting Cyrus; for he affirmed that Cyrus was noway related to Astyagês². However indignant we may be with Ktêsias for the disparaging epithets which he presumed to apply to an historian, whose work is to us inestimable, we must, nevertheless, admit that as surgeon in actual attendance on King Artaxerxês Mnêmon, and healer of the wound inflicted on that prince at Kunaxa by his brother Cyrus the younger, he had better opportunities even than Herodotus of conversing with sober-minded Persians; and that the discrepancies between the two statements are to be taken as a proof of the prevalence of discordant, yet equally accredited, stories.

That Cyrus was the first Persian conqueror, and that the space which he overran covered no less than fifty degrees of longitude, from the coast of Asia Minor to the Oxus and the Indus, are facts quite indisputable; but of the steps by which this was achieved, we know very little. The native Persians, whom he conducted to an empire so immense, were an aggregate of seven agricultural, and four nomadic tribes—all of them rude, hardy, and brave—dwelling in a mountainous region, clothed in skins, ignorant of wine, or fruit, or any of the commonest luxuries of life, and despising the very idea of purchase or sale. Their tribes were very unequal in point of dignity, probably also in respect to numbers and powers, among one another. First in estimation among them stood the Pasargadæ; and the first phratry or clan among the Pasargadæ was the Achæmenidæ, to whom Cyrus himself belonged. Whether his relationship to the Median king whom he dethroned was a matter of fact, or a politic fiction, we cannot well determine. But Xenophon, in noticing the spacious deserted cities, Larissa and Mespila, which he saw in his march with the Ten Thousand Greeks on the eastern side of the Tigris, gives us to understand that the conquest of Media by the Persians was reported to him as having been an obstinate and protracted struggle. However this may be, the preponderance of the Persians was at last complete: though the Medes always continued to be the second nation in the

¹ Among the lost productions of Antisthenês, the contemporary of Xenophon and Plato, and emanating like them from the tuition of Sokratês, was one,

Κύρος, ἡ περὶ Βασιλείας (Diogenes Laërt., vi. 15).

² See the extracts from the lost *Persian History* of Ktêsias, in Photius Cod., lxxii.

empire, after the Persians, properly so called ; and by early Greek writers the great enemy in the East is often called ' the Mede ' as well as ' the Persian '. The Median Ekbatana, too, remained as one of the capital cities, and the usual summer residence, of the kings of Persia ; Susa on the Choaspês, on the Kissian plain farther southward, and east of the Tigris, being their winter abode.

The general analogy among the population of Iran probably enabled the Persian conqueror with comparative ease to extend his empire to the east, after the conquest of Ekbatana, and to become the full heir of the Median kings. If we may believe Ktésias, even the distant province of Baktria had been before subject to those kings. At first it resisted Cyrus, but finding that he had become son-in-law of Astyagês as well as master of his person, it speedily acknowledged his authority¹.

According to the representation of Herodotus, the war between Cyrus and Crœsus of Lydia began shortly after the capture of Astyagês, and before the conquest of Baktria. Crœsus was the assailant, wishing to avenge his brother-in-law, to arrest the growth of the Persian conqueror, and to increase his own dominions. His more prudent councillors in vain represented to him that he had little to gain, and much to lose, by war with a nation alike hardy and poor. He is represented as just at that time recovering from the affliction arising out of the death of his son.

To ask advice of the oracle, before he took any final decision, was a step which no pious king would omit. But in the present perilous question Crœsus did more. Before he would send to ask advice respecting the project itself, he resolved to test the credit of some of the chief surrounding oracles—Delphi, Dôdôna, Branchidæ near Milêtus, Amphiaras at Thebes, Trophônus at Lebadeia, and Ammôn in Libya. Amphiaras maintained his credit undiminished, while Apollo at Delphi, more omniscient than Apollo at Branchidæ, solved the question with such unerring precision as to afford a strong additional argument against persons who might be disposed to scoff at divination. Crœsus accounted the Delphian oracle and that of Amphiaras the only trustworthy oracles on earth—following up these feelings with a holocaust of the most munificent character, in order to win the favour of the Delphian god. Three thousand cattle were offered up, and upon a vast sacrificial pile were placed the most splendid purple robes and tunics, together with couches and censers of gold and silver ; besides which he sent to Delphi itself the richest presents in gold and silver—ingots, statues, bowls, jugs, etc., the size and weight of which we read with astonishment ; the more so as Herodotus himself saw them a century afterwards at Delphi. Nor was Crœsus altogether unmindful of Amphiaras. He sent to him a spear and shield of pure gold, which were afterwards seen at Thebes by Herodotus : this large donative may help the reader to conceive the immensity of those which he sent to Delphi.

The envoys who conveyed these gifts were instructed to ask at the same time, whether Crœsus should undertake an expedition against the Persians—and if so, whether he should solicit any allies to assist him. In regard to the second question, the answer both of Apollo and of Amphiaras was decisive, recommending him to invite the alliance of the most powerful Greeks. In regard to the first and most momentous question

¹ Ktésias, *Persica*, c. 2.

their answer was as remarkable for circumspection as it had been before for detective sagacity : they told Cræsus, that if he invaded the Persians, he would subvert a mighty monarchy. The blindness of Cræsus interpreted this declaration into an unqualified promise of success : he sent farther presents to the oracle, and again inquired whether his kingdom would be durable. 'When a mule shall become King of the Medes (replied the priestess), then must thou run away—be not ashamed'¹.

More assured than ever by such an answer, Cræsus sent to Sparta, under the kings Anaxandridēs and Aristo, to tender presents and solicit their alliance. His propositions were favourably entertained—the more so, as he had before gratuitously furnished some gold to the Lacedæmonians, for a statue to Apollo. The alliance now formed was altogether general—no express effort being as yet demanded from them, though it soon came to be. But the incident is to be noted, as marking the first plunge of the leading Grecian state into Asiatic politics. At this time Cræsus was the master and tribute-exactor of the Asiatic Greeks, whose contingents seem to have formed part of his army for the expedition now contemplated ; an army consisting principally, not of native Lydians, but of foreigners.

The river Halys formed the boundary at this time between the Median and Lydian empires : and Cræsus, marching across that river into Kappadokia, took the city of Pteria, with many of its surrounding dependencies. Cyrus lost no time in bringing an army to their defence considerably larger than that of Cræsus ; trying at the same time, though unsuccessfully, to prevail on the Ionians to revolt from him. A bloody battle took place between the two armies, but with indecisive result : after which Cræsus, seeing that he could not hope to accomplish more with his forces as they stood, thought it wise to return to his capital, and collect a larger army for the next campaign. Immediately on reaching Sardis he despatched envoys to Labynētus, king of Babylon ; to Amasis, king of Egypt ; to the Lacedæmonians, and to other allies ; calling upon all of them to send auxiliaries to Sardis during the course of the fifth month. In the meantime, he dismissed all the foreign troops who had followed him into Kappadokia.

Had these allies appeared, the war might perhaps have been prosecuted with success. And on the part of the Lacedæmonians, at least, there was no tardiness ; for their ships were ready and their troops almost on board, when the unexpected news reached them that Cræsus was already ruined. Cyrus had foreseen and forestalled the defensive plan of his enemy. Pushing on with his army to Sardis without delay, he obliged the Lydian prince to give battle with his own unassisted subjects. The open and spacious plain before that town was highly favourable to the Lydian cavalry, which at that time (Herodotus tells us) was superior to the Persian. But Cyrus, employing a stratagem whereby this cavalry was rendered unavailable, placed in front of his line the baggage camels, which the Lydian horses could not endure either to smell or to behold. The horsemen of Cræsus were thus obliged to dismount ; nevertheless, they fought bravely on foot, and were not driven into the town till after a sanguinary combat.

Though confined within the walls of his capital, Cræsus had still good reason for hoping to hold out until the arrival of his allies, to whom he

¹ The Delphians subsequently explained this oracle in the sense that Cyrus, being born of

parents of unequal station, was a 'mule' (Herodot., i. 91).—Ed.

sent pressing envoys of acceleration. For Sardis was considered impregnable—one assault had already been repulsed, and the Persians would have been reduced to the slow process of blockade. But on the fourteenth day of the siege, accident did for the besiegers that which they could not have accomplished either by skill or force. Sardis was situated on an outlying peak of the northern side of Tmôlus; it was well fortified everywhere except towards the mountain; and on that side the rock was so precipitous and inaccessible, that fortifications were thought necessary, nor did the inhabitants believe assault to be possible in that quarter. But a Persian soldier having accidentally seen one of the garrison descending this precipitous rock to pick up his helmet which had rolled down, watched his opportunity, tried to climb up, and found it not impracticable; others followed his example, the stronghold was thus seized first, and the whole city speedily taken by storm.

Cyrus had given especial orders to spare the life of Crœsus, who was accordingly made prisoner. But preparations were made for a solemn and terrible spectacle; the captive king was destined to be burnt in chains, together with fourteen Lydian youths, on a vast pile of wood. We are even told that the pile was already kindled and the victim beyond the reach of human aid, when Apollo sent a miraculous rain to preserve him. As to the general fact of supernatural interposition, in one way or another, Herodotus and Ktésias both agree, though they describe differently the particular miracles wrought¹. It appears that Crœsus, after some time, was released and well treated by his conqueror, and lived to become the confidential adviser of the latter as well as of his son Kambysés. Ktésias also acquaints us that a considerable town and territory near Ekbatana, called Barêné, was assigned to him, according to a practice which we shall find not unfrequent with the Persian kings.

The destruction of the Lydian monarchy, and the establishment of the Persians at Sardis—an event pregnant with consequences to Hellas generally—took place in 546 B.C.². Surely did the Ionic Greeks now

¹ Compare Herodot., i. 84-87, and Ktésias, *Persica*, c. 4; which latter seems to have been copied by Polyænus, vii. 6, 10.

It is remarkable that among the miracles enumerated by Ktésias, no mention is made of fire or of the pile of wood kindled: we have the chains of Crœsus miraculously struck off, in the midst of thunder and lightning, but no fire mentioned. This is deserving of notice, as illustrating the fact that Ktésias derived his information from *Persian* narrators, who would not be likely to impute to Cyrus the use of fire for such a purpose. The Persians worshipped fire as a god, and considered it impious to burn a dead body (Herodot., iii. 16). Now Herodotus seems to have heard the story about the burning from Lydian informants (λέγεται ὑπὸ Λυδῶν, Herodot., i. 87). Whether the Lydians regarded fire in the same point of view as the Persians, we do not know; but even if they did, they would not be indisposed to impute to Cyrus an act of gross impiety, just as the Egyptians imputed another act equally gross to Kambysés, which Herodotus himself treats as a falsehood (iii. 16).

The long narrative given by Nikolaus Damas-kénus of the treatment of Crœsus by Cyrus, has been supposed by some to have been borrowed from the Lydian historian Xanthus, elder contemporary of Herodotus. But it seems to me a mere compilation, not well put together, from Xenophon's *Cyropædia* and from the narrative of Herodotus, perhaps including some particular in-

cidents out of Xanthus (see Nikol. Damas., *Fragm.*, ed. Orell., pp. 57-70, and the Fragments of Xanthus in Didot's *Historic. Græcor. Fragm.*, p. 40).

[Another version, which ascribes the building of the pyre to Crœsus' own will, is preserved (1) in a representation on an Attic vase of about 500 B.C. (cf. *Journ. of Hell. Stud.*, 1898, p. 268); (2) in Bacchylidés, iii. 23-62. A similar act of self-immolation is recorded of Asshur-edilani, the last king of Nineveh, and of the Carthaginian general Hamilcar (Herodot., vii. 167), and is well in keeping with the temperament of Semitic princes.

Bacchylidés agrees with Ktésias in saving Crœsus by the intervention of Apollo, who is made to transplant him to the 'Hyperboreans'. This last point suggests a doubt whether the Greeks of the fifth century had any definite knowledge of Crœsus' fate. It has been suggested that Crœsus actually perished on his own pyre (Grundy, *Great Persian War*, p. 28); but against this must be set the explicit statement of Ktésias quoted in the text.—ED.]

² This important date depends upon the evidence of Solinus (*Polyhistor*, i. 112) and Sosikratés (ap. Diog. Laërt., i. 95): see Clinton's *Fasts Hellen.*, ad ann. 546, and his Appendix, c. 17, upon the Lydian kings.

[The chronology of Xanthus, who assigns a reign of five generations (167 years) to the last Lydian dynasty, and places their accession in Ol. 18 (708-705), brings the capture of Sardis down to 541-537 (cf. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ii², p. 460)—ED.]

repent that they had rejected the propositions made to them by Cyrus for revolting from Crœsus—though at the time when these propositions were made, it would have been highly imprudent to listen to them, since the Lydian power might reasonably be looked upon as the stronger. As soon as Sardis had fallen, they sent envoys to the conqueror entreating that they might be enrolled as his tributaries, on the footing which they had occupied under Crœsus. The reply was a stern and angry refusal, with the exception of the Milesians, to whom the terms which they asked were granted¹.

The other continental Ionians and Æolians began to put themselves in a condition of defence. It seems that the Lydian king had caused their fortifications to be wholly or partially dismantled, for we are told that they now began to erect walls; and the Phôkæans especially devoted to that purpose a present which they had received from the Iberian Arganthônus, king of Tartêssus. Besides thus strengthening their own cities, they thought it advisable to send a joint embassy entreating aid from Sparta. They doubtless were not unapprised that the Spartans had actually equipped an army for the support of Crœsus. Their deputies went to Sparta, where the Phôkæan Pythermus, appointed by the rest to be spokesman, clothing himself in a purple robe² in order to attract the largest audience possible, set forth their pressing need of succour against the impending danger. The Lacedæmonians refused the prayer; nevertheless, they despatched to Phôkæa some commissioners to investigate the state of affairs—who, perhaps persuaded by the Phôkæans, sent one of their number to the conqueror at Sardis, to warn him that he should not lay hands on any city of Hellas, for the Lacedæmonians would not permit it. 'Who are these Lacedæmonians? (inquired Cyrus from some Greeks who stood near him)—how many are there of them, that they venture to send me such a notice?' Having received the answer, wherein it was stated that the Lacedæmonians had a city and a regular market at Sparta, he exclaimed—'I have never yet been afraid of men like these, who have a set place in the middle of their city, where they meet to cheat one another and forswear themselves. If I live they shall have troubles of their own to talk about, apart from the Ionians.' To buy or sell appeared to the Persians a contemptible practice: for they carried out consistently one step farther, the principle upon which even many able Greeks condemned the lending of money on interest; and the speech of Cyrus was intended as a covert reproach of Grecian habits generally.

The Ionic Greeks were left to defend themselves as best they could against the conqueror; who presently, however, quitted Sardis to prosecute in person his conquests in the East, leaving the Persian Tabalus with a garrison in the citadel, but consigning the large treasure captured, with authority over the Lydian population, to the Lydian Paktyas. As he carried away Crœsus along with him, he probably considered himself sure of the fidelity of those Lydians whom the deposed monarch recommended. But he had not yet arrived at his own capital, when he received

¹ This preferential treatment may have been due to commercial reasons. The Persians had special motives for suppressing the trade of the two other great markets at the end of the Asiatic trade-routes—Phôkæa and Sardis. For this object they would have had to transfer traffic to the

route of the Maeander Valley, and to attach firmly to themselves its terminal port of Miletus.—Ed.

² Herodot., i. 152. The purple garment, so attractive a spectacle amid the plain clothing universal at Sparta, marks the contrast between Asiatic and European Greece.

the intelligence that Paktyas had revolted, arming the Lydian population, and employing the treasure in his charge to hire fresh troops.

Paktyas had come down to the sea-coast, and employed the treasures of Sardis in levying a Grecian mercenary force, with which he invested the place and blocked up the governor Tabatus. But he manifested no courage worthy of so dangerous an enterprise; for no sooner had he heard that the Median general Mazarês was approaching at the head of an army despatched by Cyrus against him, than he disbanded his force and fled to Kymê for protection as a suppliant. Presently arrived a menacing summons from Mazarês, demanding that he should be given up forthwith.

Not choosing to surrender Paktyas, nor daring to protect him against a besieging army, they sent him away to Mitylênê, whither the envoys of Mazarês followed and demanded him, offering a reward so considerable, that the Kymæans became fearful of trusting them, and again conveyed away the suppliant to Chios. But here again the pursuers followed. The Chians were persuaded to drag him from the temple and surrender him, on consideration of receiving the territory of Atarneus (a district on the continent over against the island of Lesbos) as purchase-money. Paktyas was thus seized and sent prisoner to Cyrus, who had given the most express orders for this capture: hence the unusual intensity of the pursuit¹.

Mazarês next proceeded to the attack and conquest of the Greeks on the coast; an enterprise which, since he soon died of illness, was completed by his successor Harpagus. The towns assailed successively made a gallant but ineffectual resistance. The Persian general by his numbers drove the defenders within their walls, against which he piled up mounds of earth, so as either to carry the place by storm or to compel surrender. All of them were reduced one after the other. With all, the terms of subjection were doubtless harder than those which had been imposed upon them by Croesus, because Cyrus had already refused to grant these terms to them, with the single exception of Milêtus, and because they had since given additional offence by aiding the revolt of Paktyas². The inhabitants of Priênê were sold into slavery: they were the first assailed by Mazarês, and had perhaps been especially forward in the attack made by Paktyas on Sardis.

Among these unfortunate towns thus changing their master and passing into a harsher subjection, two deserve especial notice—Teôs and Phôkæa. The citizens of the former, so soon as the mound around their walls had rendered farther resistance impossible, embarked and emigrated, some to Thrace, where they founded Abdêra—others to the Cimmerian Bosphorus, where they planted Phanagoria: a portion of them, however, must have

¹ Herodot., i. 160. The short fragment from Charôn of Lampsakus, which Plutarch (*De Malig-nitat. Herod.*, p. 859) cites here, in support of one among his many unjust censures on Herodotus, is noway inconsistent with the statement of the latter, but rather tends to confirm it.

In writing this treatise on the alleged ill-temper of Herodotus, we see that Plutarch had before him the history of Charôn of Lampsakus, more ancient by one generation than the historian whom he was assailing, and also belonging to Asiatic Greece. Of course, it suited the purpose of his work to produce all the contradictions to Herodotus which he could find in Charôn: the fact that he has produced none

of any moment, tends to strengthen our faith in the historian of Halikarnassus, and to show that in the main his narrative was in accordance with that of Charôn.

² The chief disadvantages of the Persian rule, as compared with the Lydian, were—(1) the system of control by means of local tyrants; (2) the obligation to military service; (3) the withdrawal of encouragement to Greek trade. The prosperity of Ionia depended largely on free intercourse with the hinterland; the loss of these facilities, apart from all political disasters, would have sufficed to ruin this coast district of Asia Minor.—ED.

remained to take the chances of subjection, since the town appears in after-times still peopled and still Hellenic¹.

The fate of Phôkæa, similar in the main, is given to us with more striking circumstances of detail, and becomes the more interesting, since the enterprising mariners who inhabited it had been the torch-bearers of Grecian geographical discovery in the West. Arganthônios, King of Tartessus (near Cadiz), invited them to immigrate in a body to his kingdom, offering them the choice of any site which they might desire. His invitation was declined, though probably the Phôkæans may have subsequently regretted the refusal; he also manifested his goodwill towards them by a large present with which they defrayed the expense of constructing fortifications round their town². The walls were both extensive and well-built. Yet they could not hinder Harpagus from raising his mounds of earth up against them, while he was politic enough at the same time to tempt them with offers of a moderate capitulation; requiring only that they should breach their walls in one place by pulling down one of the towers, and consecrate one building in the interior of the town as a token of subjection. To accept these terms was to submit themselves to the discretion of the besieger, for there could be no security that they would be observed. The Phôkæans, while they asked for one day to deliberate upon their reply, entreated that during that day Harpagus should withdraw his troops altogether from the walls. With this demand the latter complied, intimating at the same time that he saw clearly through the meaning of it. The Phôkæans, having determined that the inevitable servitude impending over their town should not be shared by its inhabitants, employed their day of grace in preparation for collective exile, putting on shipboard their wives and children as well as their furniture and the moveable decorations of their temples. They then set sail for Chios, leaving to the conqueror a deserted town for the occupation of a Persian garrison.

It appears that the fugitives were not very kindly received at Chios. At least when they made a proposition for purchasing from the Chians the neighbouring islands of Cénussæ as a permanent abode, the latter were induced to refuse by apprehensions of commercial rivalry. It was necessary to look farther for a settlement; while Arganthônios, their protector, being now dead, Tartessus was no longer inviting. Twenty years before, however, the colony of Alalia in the island of Corsica had been founded from Phôkæa by the direction of the oracle, and thither the general body of Phôkæans now resolved to repair. Having prepared their ships for this distant voyage, they first sailed back to Phôkæa, surprised the Persian garrison whom Harpagus had left in the town, and slew them. They then sunk in the harbour a great lump of iron, binding themselves by a solemn and unanimous oath never again to see Phôkæa until that iron should come up to the surface. Nevertheless, in spite of

¹ Herodot., i. 168; Skymnus Chius, *Fragm.*, v. 153; Dionys., *Perieg.*, v. 553.

² As to the fortifications (which Phôkæa and the other Ionic cities are reported to have erected after the conquest of Sardis by the Persians), the case may stand thus. While these cities were all independent, before they were first conquered by Croesus, they must undoubtedly have had fortifications. When Croesus conquered them, he directed the demolition of the fortifications; but demolition does not necessarily mean pulling down the entire walls: when one or a few breaches are

made, the city is laid open, and the purpose of Croesus would thus be answered. Such may well have been the state of the Ionian cities at the time when they first thought it necessary to provide defences against the Persians at Sardis; they repaired and perfected the breached fortifications.

[If the stone foundations of these city walls were preserved, as is most likely, it would be possible to build up the remaining courses of sundried brick at short notice, as the Athenians did in 479.—ED.]

the oath, the voyage of exile had been scarcely begun when more than half of them repented of having so bound themselves, and became homesick. They broke their vow and returned to Phôkæa. Harpagus must have been induced to pardon the previous slaughter of his Persian garrison, or at least to believe that it had been done by those Phôkæans who still persisted in exile. He wanted tribute-paying subjects, not an empty military post, and the repentant home-seekers were allowed to number themselves among the slaves of the Great King.

Meanwhile the smaller but more resolute half of the Phôkæans executed their voyage to Alalia in Corsica, with their wives and children, in sixty pentekontêrs or armed ships, and established themselves along with the previous settlers. They remained there for five years, during which time their indiscriminate piracies had become so intolerable (even down to this time, piracy committed against a foreign vessel seems to have been practised frequently and without much disrepute), that both the Tyrrhenian sea-ports along the Mediterranean coast of Italy, and the Carthaginians, united to put them down. There subsisted particular treaties between these two, for the regulation of the commercial intercourse between Africa and Italy, of which the ancient treaty preserved by Polybius between Rome and Carthage (made in 509 B.C.) may be considered as a specimen¹. Sixty Carthaginian and as many Tuscan ships, attacking the sixty Phôkæan ships near Alalia, destroyed forty of them, yet not without such severe loss to themselves that the victory was said to be on the side of the latter; who, however, were compelled to carry back their remaining twenty vessels to Alalia, and to retire with their wives and families, in so far as room could be found for them, to Rhegium. At last these unhappy exiles found a permanent home by establishing the new settlement of Elea or Velia in the Gulf of Policastro, on the Italian coast, southward from Poseidônia or Pæstum. The Phôkæan captives, taken prisoners in the naval combat by Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, were stoned to death. But a divine judgment overtook the Tyrrhenian town of Agylla in consequence of this cruelty; and even in the time of Herodotus, a century afterwards, the Agyllæans were still expiating the sin by a periodical solemnity and agon, pursuant to the penalty which the Delphian oracle had imposed upon them.

Such was the fate of the Phôkæan exiles, while their brethren at home remained as subjects of Harpagus, in common with all the other Ionic and Æolic Greeks, except Samos and Milêtus. For even the insular inhabitants of Lesbos and Chios, though not assailable by sea, since the Persians had no fleet, thought it better to renounce their independence and enrol themselves as Persian subjects—both of them possessing strips of the mainland which they were unable to protect otherwise. Samos, on the other hand, maintained its independence, and even reached, shortly after this period, under the despotism of Polykratês, a higher degree of power than ever: perhaps the humiliation of the other maritime Greeks around may have rather favoured the ambition of this unscrupulous prince, to whom I shall revert presently. But we may readily conceive that the public solemnities in which the Ionic Greeks intermingled, in place of those gay and richly-decked crowds which the Homeric hymn

¹ Aristot., *Polit.*, iii. 5, 11; Polyb., iii. 22. [On the date see Mommsen, *Rom. Hist.*, ii., appendix (1894).—Ed.]

describes in the preceding century as assembled at Delos, presented scenes of marked despondency. One of their wisest men, indeed, Bias of Priênê, went so far as to propose, at the Pan-Ionic festival, a collective emigration of the entire population of the Ionic towns to the island of Sardinia. Nothing like freedom (he urged) was now open to them in Asia; but in Sardinia, one great Pan-Ionic city might be formed, which would not only be free herself, but mistress of her neighbours. The proposition found no favour, the reason of which is sufficiently evident from the narrative just given respecting the unconquerable local attachment on the part of the Phôkæan majority'. But Herodotus bestows upon it the most unqualified commendation, and regrets that it was not acted upon. Had such been the case, the subsequent history of Carthage, Sicily, and even Rome, might have been sensibly altered.

Thus subdued by Harpagus, the Ionic and Æolic Greeks were employed as auxiliaries to him in the conquest of the south-western inhabitants of Asia Minor—Karians, Kaunians, Lykians, and Doric Greeks of Knidus and Halikarnassus. Of the fate of the latter town, Herodotus tells us nothing, though it was his native place. The inhabitants of Knidus, a place situated on a long outlying tongue of land, at first tried to cut through the narrow isthmus which joined them to the continent, but abandoned the attempt with a facility which Herodotus explains by referring it to a prohibition of the oracle. Neither Karians nor Kaunians offered any serious resistance. The Lykians only, in their chief town Xanthus, made a desperate defence. Having in vain tried to repel the assailants in the open field, and finding themselves blocked up in their city, they set fire to it with their own hands, consuming in the flames their women, children and servants, while the armed citizens marched out and perished to a man in combat with the enemy¹. Such an act of brave and even ferocious despair is not in the Grecian character. In recounting, however, the languid defence and easy submission of the Greeks of Knidus, it may surprise us to call to mind that they were Dorians and colonists from Sparta. The want of stedfast courage, often imputed to Ionic Greeks as compared to Dorian, ought properly to be charged on Asiatic Greeks as compared with European; or, rather, upon that mixture of indigenous with Hellenic population, which all the Asiatic colonies, in common with most of the other colonies, presented, and which in Halikarnassus was particularly remarkable; for it seems to have been half Karian, half Dorian, and was even governed by a line of Karian despots.

Harpagus and the Persians thus mastered, without any considerable resistance, the western and southern portions of Asia Minor; probably, also, though we have no direct account of it, the entire territory within the Halys which had before been ruled by Croesus. The tributes of the conquered Greeks were transmitted to Ekbatana instead of to Sardis. While Harpagus was thus employed, Cyrus himself had been making still more extensive conquests in Upper Asia and Assyria.

It was not till thirty years later that King Darius completed the conquest of the Ionic Greeks by the acquisition of Samos. That island had maintained its independence, at the time when the Persian general Har-

¹ Herodot., i. 176. The whole population of Xanthus perished, except eighty families accidentally absent: the subsequent occupants of the town were recruited from strangers. Nearly five

centuries afterwards, their descendants in the same city slew themselves in the like desperate manner, to avoid surrendering to the Roman army under Marcus Brutus (Plutarch, *Brutus*, c. 31).

pagus effected the conquest of Ionia, and even when Chios and Lesbos submitted. The Persians had no fleet to attack it ; nor had the Phenicians yet been taught to round the Triopian cape. Indeed, the depression which overtook the other cities of Ionia tended rather to the aggrandizement of Samos, under the energetic and unscrupulous despotism of Polykratês. That ambitious Samian, about ten years after the conquest of Sardis by Cyrus (seemingly between 536-532 B.C.), contrived to seize by force or fraud the government of his native island, with the aid of his brothers Pantagnôtus and Sylosôn, and a small band of conspirators. At first the three brothers shared the supreme power ; but presently Polykratês put to death Pantagnôtus, banished Sylosôn, and made himself despot alone. In this station his ambition, his perfidy, and his good fortune were alike remarkable. He conquered several of the neighbouring islands, and even some towns on the mainland : he carried on successful war against Milêtus, and signally defeated the Lesbian ships which came to assist Milêtus : he got together a force of one hundred armed ships called pente-konters, and one thousand mercenary bowmen—aspiring to nothing less than the dominion of Ionia, with the islands in the Ægean. Alike terrible to friend and foe by his indiscriminate spirit of aggression, he acquired a naval power which seems at that time to have been the greatest in the Grecian world. He had been in intimate alliance with Amasis, King of Egypt¹, who, however, ultimately broke with him. Considering his behaviour towards allies, this rupture is not at all surprising ; but Herodotus ascribes it to the alarm which Amasis conceived at the uninterrupted and superhuman good fortune of Polykratês—a degree of good fortune sure to draw down ultimately corresponding intensity of suffering from the hands of envious gods.

The facts mentioned by Herodotus rather lead us to believe that it was Polykratês, who, with characteristic faithlessness, broke off his friendship with Amasis ; finding it suitable to his policy to cultivate the alliance of Kambysês, when that prince was preparing for his invasion of Egypt. In that invasion the Ionic subjects of Persia were called upon to serve, and Polykratês deeming it a good opportunity to rid himself of some Samian malcontents, sent to the Persian king to tender auxiliaries from himself. Kambysês eagerly caught at the prospect of aid from the first naval potentate in the Ægean ; upon which forty Samian triremes were sent to the Nile, having on board the suspected persons, as well as conveying a secret request to the Persian king that they might never be suffered to return. Either they never went to Egypt, however, or they found means to escape. But they certainly returned to Samos, attacked Polykratês at home, and were driven off by his superior force without making any impression. Whereupon they repaired to Sparta to entreat assistance.

We may here notice the gradually-increasing tendency in the Grecian world to recognise Sparta as something like a head, protector, or referee, in cases either of foreign danger or internal dispute. The earliest authentic instance known to us, of application to Sparta in this character, is that of Crœsus against Cyrus ; next, that of the Ionic Greeks against the latter : the instance of the Samians now before us, is the third. The important

¹ The value which kings of Egypt could derive from an alliance with the predominant naval power of the Ægean is illustrated by the care with

which the early Ptolemies courted Rhodes in order to safeguard themselves and retain their hold on Cyprus against the rulers of Syria.—Ed.

events connected with, and consequent upon, the expulsion of the Peisistratidæ from Athens, manifesting yet more formally the headship of Sparta, occur fifteen years after the present event; they have been already recounted in a previous chapter, and serve as a farther proof of progress in the same direction. To watch the growth of these new political habits is essential to a right understanding of Grecian history.

We are told that both the Lacedæmonians and the Corinthians—who joined them in the expedition now contemplated—had separate grounds of quarrel with the Samians, which operated as a more powerful motive than the simple desire to aid the suffering exiles. But it rather seems that the subsequent Greeks generally construed the Lacedæmonian interference against Polykratês as an example of standing Spartan hatred against despots. Indeed, the only facts which we know to sustain this anti-despotic sentiment for which the Lacedæmonians had credit, are, their proceedings against Polykratês and Hippias: there may have been other cases, but we cannot specify them with certainty. However this may be, a joint Lacedæmonian and Corinthian force accompanied the exiles back to Samos, and assailed Polykratês in the city: they did their best to capture it, for forty days, and were at one time on the point of succeeding, but were finally obliged to retire without any success.

On the retirement of the Lacedæmonian force, the Samian exiles were left destitute; and looking out for some community to plunder, weak as well as rich, they pitched upon the island of Siphnos. The Siphnians of that day were the wealthiest islanders in the Ægean, from the productiveness of their gold and silver mines—the produce of which was annually distributed among the citizens, reserving a tithe for the Delphian temple. Their treasure-chamber was among the most richly-furnished of which that holy place could boast, and they themselves probably, in these times of early prosperity, were numbered among the most brilliant of the Ionic visitors at the Delian festival¹. The Samians, landing at Siphnos, demanded a contribution, under the name of a loan, of ten talents. Upon refusal, they proceeded to ravage the island, inflicting upon the inhabitants a severe defeat, and ultimately extorting from them 100 talents. They next purchased from the inhabitants of Hermionê, in the Argolic peninsula, the neighbouring island of Hydra, famous in modern Greek warfare. Yet it appears that their plans must have been subsequently changed, for instead of occupying it, they placed it under the care of the Trœzenians, and repaired themselves to Krete, for the purpose of expelling the Zakynthian settlers at Kydônia. In this they succeeded, and were induced to establish themselves in that place; but after they had remained there five years, the Kretans obtained naval aid from Ægina, whereby the place was recovered, and the Samian intruders finally sold into slavery².

Such was the melancholy end of the enemies of Polykratês. Meanwhile that despot himself was more powerful and prosperous than ever. Samos under him was 'the first of all cities, Hellenic or barbaric'. The great works admired by Herodotus in the island—an aqueduct for the city, tunnelled through a mountain for the length of seven furlongs—a mole

¹ The contribution which Siphnos made to the chest of the Delian League was unusually high for a small island: in 450 it amounted to three talents (*C. I. A.*, i. 230).—Ed.

² The connexion between Krete and Ægina was proverbial (*cf.* Stein, *Herodot.*, iii. 59). The former island may have served the Æginetans as a station on their trade-route to Naukratis in Egypt.—Ed.

to protect the harbour, two furlongs long and twenty fathoms deep¹—and the vast temple of Hêrê—may probably have been enlarged and completed, if not begun, by him. Aristotle quotes the public works of Polykratês as instances of the profound policy of despots, to occupy as well as to impoverish their subjects². The earliest of all Grecian thalassokrats, or sea-kings—master of the greatest naval force in the Ægean, as well as of many among its islands—he displayed his love of letters by friendship to Anakreon, and his piety by consecrating to the Delian Apollo³ the neighbouring island of Rhêneia. But while thus outshining all his contemporaries, victorious over Sparta and Corinth, and projecting farther aggrandizement, he was precipitated on a sudden into the abyss of ruin; and that, too, as if to demonstrate unequivocally the agency of the envious gods, not from the revenge of any of his numerous victims, but from the gratuitous malice of a stranger whom he had never wronged and never even seen. The Persian satrap Oroëtês, on the neighbouring mainland, conceived an implacable hatred against him. Availing himself of the notorious ambition and cupidity of Polykratês, he sent to Samos a messenger, pretending that his life was menaced by Kambysês, and that he was anxious to make his escape with his abundant treasures. He proposed to Polykratês a share in this treasure, sufficient to make him master of all Greece, as far as that object could be achieved by money, provided the Samian prince would come over to convey him away. Mæandrius, secretary of Polykratês, was sent over to Magnêsia on the Mæander to make inquiries. He there saw the satrap with eight large coffers full of gold—or, rather, apparently so, being in reality full of stones, with a layer of gold at the top⁴—tied up ready for departure. The cupidity of Polykratês was not proof against so rich a bait. He crossed over to Magnêsia with a considerable suite, and thus came into the power of Oroëtês. The satrap slew him and crucified his body; releasing all the Samians who accompanied him, with an intimation that they ought to thank him for procuring them a free government—but retaining both the foreigners and the slaves as prisoners.

At the departure of the latter from Samos, in anticipation of a speedy return, Mæandrius had been left as his lieutenant at Samos; and the unexpected catastrophe of Polykratês filled him with consternation. Though possessed of the fortresses, the soldiers, and the treasures, which had constituted the machinery of his powerful master, he knew the risk of trying to employ them on his own account. Partly from this apprehension, partly from the genuine political morality which prevailed with more or less force in every Grecian bosom, he resolved to lay down his authority and enfranchise the island. 'He wished (says the historian in a remarkable phrase⁵) to act like the justest of men; but he was not allowed to do so.' His first proceeding was to erect in the suburbs an altar, in honour of Zeus Eleutherius, and to enclose a piece of ground as precinct, which still existed in the time of Herodotus; he next convened an assembly of the Samians. 'You know (said he) that the whole power

¹ The aqueduct is still to be seen in a remarkable state of preservation. Cf. Fabricius, *Athenische Mittheilungen*, ix., p. 163 ff.—Ed.

² Aristotle, *Polit.*, v. 9, 4: τῶν περὶ Σάμον ἔργα Πολυκράτειά· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα δύναται ταῦτον, ἀσχολιῖαν καὶ πέναν τῶν ἀρχομένων.

³ Thukyd., i. 14; iii. 104.

⁴ Compare the trick of Hannibal at Gortyn in Krete—Cornelius Nepos (*Hannibal*, c. 9).

⁵ Herodot., iii. 142: τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ ἀνδρῶν βουλευμένῳ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐξεγένετο. Compare his remark on Kadmus, who voluntarily resigned the despotism at Kôs (vii. 164).

of Polykratês is now in my hands, and that there is nothing to hinder me from continuing to rule over you. Nevertheless, what I condemn in another I will not do myself, and I have always disapproved of Polykratês, and others like him, for seeking to rule over men as good as themselves. Now that Polykratês has come to the end of his destiny, I at once lay down the command, and proclaim among you equal law ; reserving to myself as privileges, first, six talents out of the treasures of Polykratês—next, the hereditary priesthood of Zeus Eleutherius for myself and my descendants for ever. To him I have just set apart a sacred precinct, as the God of that freedom which I now hand over to you¹.

This reasonable and generous proposition fully justifies the epithet of Herodotus. But very differently was it received by the Samian hearers. One of the chief men among them exclaimed with the applause of the rest, ' *You rule us, low-born and scoundrel as you are ! you are not worthy to rule : don't think of that, but give us some account of the money which you have been handling* '.

Such an unexpected reply caused a total revolution in the mind of Mæandrius. It left him no choice but to maintain dominion at all hazards, which he resolved to do. Retiring into the acropolis under pretence of preparing his money accounts for examination, he sent for Tlesarchus and his chief political enemies, one by one—intimating that the accounts were open to inspection. As fast as they arrived they were put in chains, while Mæandrius remained in the acropolis, with his soldiers and his treasures, as the avowed successor of Polykratês.

We cannot but contrast their conduct on this occasion with that of the Athenians about twelve years afterwards, on the expulsion of Hippias, which has been recounted in a previous chapter. The position of the Samians was far the more favourable of the two, for the quiet and successful working of a free government, since they had the advantage of a voluntary as well as a sincere resignation from the actual despot. Yet the thirst for reactionary investigation prevented them even from taking a reasonable estimate of their own power of enforcing it. They passed at once from extreme subjection to overbearing and ruinous rashness. Whereas the Athenians, under circumstances far less promising, avoided the fatal mistake of sacrificing the prospects of the future to recollections of the past ; showed themselves both anxious to acquire the rights, and willing to perform the obligations, of a free community ; listened to wise counsels, maintained unanimous action, and overcame by heroic efforts forces very greatly superior. If we compare the reflections of Herodotus on the one case and on the other², we shall be struck with the difference which those reflections imply between the Athenians and the Samians—a difference traceable in a great degree to the preliminary lessons of the Solonian constitution, overlaid, but not extinguished, during the despotism of the Peisistratids which followed.

The events which succeeded in Samos are little better than a series of crimes and calamities. The prisoners, whom Mæandrius had detained in the acropolis, were slain during his dangerous illness, by his brother Lykarêtus, under the idea that this would enable him more easily to seize the sceptre. But Mæandrius recovered, and must have continued as

¹ For the reservation of a sacerdotal prerogative to retired monarchs, cf. Battus III. of Kyrênê

(Herodot., iv. 161) and the βασιλεύς of republican Athens.—Ed. ² Herodot., v. 78, and iii. 142, 143.

despot for a year or two. It was, however, a weak despotism, contested more or less in the island, and very different from the iron hand of Polykratês. In this untoward condition the Samians were surprised by the arrival of a new claimant for their sceptre and acropolis—and what was much more formidable, a Persian army to back him.

Sylosôn, the brother of Polykratês, having taken part originally in his brother's conspiracy and usurpation, had been at first allowed to share the fruits of it, but quickly found himself banished. In this exile he remained during the whole life of Polykratês, and until the accession of Darius to the Persian throne, which followed about a year after the death of Polykratês. He happened to be at Memphis in Egypt during the time when Kambysês was there with his conquering army¹, and when Darius, then a Persian of little note, was serving among his guards. Sylosôn was walking in the agora of Memphis, wearing a scarlet cloak, to which Darius took a great fancy, and proposed to buy it. A divine inspiration prompted Sylosôn to reply, 'I cannot for any price sell it; but I give it you for nothing, if it must be yours'. Sylosôn at length heard with surprise that the unknown Persian, whom he had presented with the cloak at Memphis, was installed as king in the palace at Susa. He went thither, proclaimed himself as the benefactor of the new king, and was admitted to the regal presence. Darius remembered the adventure of the cloak, when it was brought to his mind—and showed himself forward to requite, on the scale becoming the Great King, former favours rendered to the simple soldier at Memphis. Gold and silver were tendered to Sylosôn in profusion, but he rejected them—requesting that the island of Samos might be conquered and handed over to him, without slaughter or enslavement of inhabitants. His request was complied with. Otanês was sent down to the coast of Ionia with an army, carried Sylosôn over to Samos, and landed him unexpectedly on the island.

Mæandrius was in no condition to resist the invasion, nor were the Samians generally disposed to sustain him. He accordingly concluded a convention with Otanês, whereby he agreed to make way for Sylosôn, to evacuate the island, and to admit the Persians at once into the city; retaining possession, however, for such time as might be necessary to embark his property and treasures, of the acropolis, which had a separate landing-place, and even a subterranean passage and secret portal for embarkation—probably one of the precautionary provisions of Polykratês. Otanês willingly granted these conditions, and himself with his principal officers entered the town, the army being quartered around; while Sylosôn seemed on the point of ascending the seat of his deceased brother without violence or bloodshed. But the Samians were destined to a fate more calamitous. Mæandrius had a brother named Charilaus, violent in his temper and half a madman, whom he was obliged to keep in confinement. This man, looking out of his chamber-window, saw the Persian officers seated peaceably throughout the town and even under the gates of the acropolis, unguarded, and relying upon the convention. He clamoured for liberty and admission to his brother, whom he reviled as a coward no less than a tyrant. 'Here are you, worthless man, keeping me, your own brother, in a dungeon, though I have done no wrong worthy of

¹ Sylosôn, like many other Greeks, had gone to 'see the country' (Herodot., iii. 139) out of pure curiosity.—Ed.

bonds ; while you do not dare to take your revenge on the Persians, who are casting you out as a houseless exile, and whom it would be so easy to put down. If you are afraid of them, give me your guards ; I will make the Persians repent of their coming here, and I will send you safely out of the island forthwith.'

Mæandrius, on the point of quitting Samos for ever, had little personal motive to care what became of the population. He had probably never forgiven them for disappointing his honourable intentions after the death of Polykratês, nor was he displeased to hand over to Sylosôn an odious and blood-stained sceptre, which he foresaw would be the only consequence of his brother's mad project. He therefore sailed away with his treasures, leaving the acropolis to his brother Charilaus ; who immediately armed the guards, sallied forth from his fortress, and attacked the unsuspecting Persians. Many of the great officers were slain without resistance before the army could be got together ; but at length Otanês collected his troops and drove the assailants back into the acropolis. While he immediately began the siege of that fortress, he also resolved, as Mæandrius had foreseen, to take a signal revenge for the treacherous slaughter of so many of his friends and companions. His army, no less incensed than himself, were directed to fall upon the Samian people and massacre them without discrimination—man and boy, on ground sacred as well as profane. The bloody order was too faithfully executed, and Samos was handed over to Sylosôn, stripped of its male inhabitants.

Sylosôn was thus finally installed as despot of an island peopled chiefly, if not wholly, with women and children : we may, however, presume that the deed of blood has been described by the historian as more sweeping than it really was. It seems, nevertheless, to have set heavily on the conscience of Otanês, who was induced some time afterwards to take measures for repopling the island. From whence the new population came we are not told ; but wholesale translations of inhabitants from one place to another were familiar to the mind of a Persian king or satrap.

Mæandrius, following the example of the previous Samian exiles under Polykratês, went to Sparta and sought aid for the purpose of re-establishing himself at Samos. But the Lacedæmonians had no disposition to repeat an attempt which had before turned out so unsuccessfully, nor could he seduce King Kleomenês by the display of his treasures and finely-wrought gold plate. The king, however, not without fear that such seductions might win over some of the Spartan leading men, prevailed with the ephôrs to send Mæandrius away¹.

Sylosôn seems to have remained undisturbed at Samos, as a tributary of Persia, like the Ionic cities on the continent : some years afterwards we find his son Æakês reigning in the island.

Darius had now acquired full authority throughout the Persian empire, having put down the refractory satrap Oretês, as well as the revolted Medes and Babylonians. He had, moreover, completed the conquest of Ionia, by the important addition of Samos ; and his dominion thus comprised all Asia Minor with its neighbouring islands. But this was not sufficient for the ambition of a Persian king, next but one in succession to the great Cyrus. The conquering impulse was yet unabated among the Persians, who thought it incumbent upon their king, and whose

¹ The date of this event may be placed about 515 B.C.—*i.e.*, soon after Kleomenês' accession.—Ed.

king thought it incumbent upon himself, to extend the limits of the empire. Though not of the lineage of Cyrus, Darius had taken pains to connect himself with it by marriage: he had married Atossa and Artystonê, daughters of Cyrus—and Parmys, daughter of Smerdis the younger son of Cyrus. Atossa had been first the wife of her brother Kambysês; next, of the Magian Smerdis his successor; and thirdly of Darius, to whom she bore four children. Of those children the eldest was Xerxês, respecting whom more will be said hereafter.

Had her influence prevailed, the first conquering appetites of Darius would have been directed not against the steppes of Scythia, but against Attica and Peloponnesus; at least so Herodotus assures us.

Atossa took an early opportunity of reminding Darius that the Persians expected from him some positive addition to the power and splendour of the empire; and when Darius, in answer, acquainted her that he contemplated a speedy expedition against the Scythians, she entreated him to postpone it and to turn his forces first against Greece—‘I have heard (she said) about the maidens of Sparta, Athens, Argos and Corinth, and I want to have some of them as slaves to serve me—you have near you the best person possible to give information about Greece—that Greek who cured your foot.’ Darius was induced by this request to send some confidential Persians into Greece to procure information, along with his surgeon, Dêmokêdês. Selecting fifteen of them, he ordered them to survey the coasts and cities of Greece, under guidance of Dêmokêdês, but with peremptory orders upon no account to let him escape or to return without him.

They visited and examined all the principal places in Greece—probably beginning with the Asiatic and insular Greeks, crossing to Eubœa, circumnavigating Attica and Peloponnesus, then passing to Korkyra and Italy. They surveyed the coasts and cities, taking memoranda of everything worthy of note which they saw. Such a *Periplûs*, if it had been preserved, would have been inestimable, as an account of the actual state of the Grecian world about 515 B.C. As soon as they arrived at Tarentum, Dêmokêdês found an opportunity of executing what he had meditated from the beginning. At his request, Aristophilidês the king of Tarentum, seized the fifteen Persians and detained them as spies, while Dêmokêdês himself made his escape to Krotôn.

Like the Milesian Histiaëus (of whom I shall speak hereafter), he cared not what amount of risk he brought upon his country in order to procure his own escape from a splendid detention at Susa. Now the influence which he originated was on the point of precipitating upon Greece the whole force of the Persian empire, at a time when Greece was in no condition to resist it. Had the first aggressive expedition of Darius, with his own personal command and fresh appetite for conquest, been directed against Greece instead of against Scythia, Grecian independence would have perished almost infallibly. For Athens was then still governed by the Peisistratids. What she was under them, we have had occasion to notice in a former chapter. She had then no courage for energetic self-defence, and probably Hippias himself, far from offering resistance, would have found it advantageous to accept Persian dominion as a means of strengthening his own rule, like the Ionian despots. Moreover, Grecian habit of co-operation was then only just commencing. But fortunately the Persian invader did not touch the shore of Greece until more than

twenty years afterwards, in 490 B.C., and during that precious interval, the Athenian character had undergone the memorable revolution which has been before described. Their energy and their organization had been alike improved, and their force of resistance had become decupled; besides which, their conduct had so provoked the Persian that resistance was then a matter of necessity with them, and submission on tolerable terms an impossibility. When we come to the grand Persian invasion of Greece, we shall see that Athens was the life and soul of all the opposition offered. We shall see, farther, that with all the efforts of Athens, the success of the defence was more than once doubtful, and would have been converted into a very different result, if Xerxês had listened to the best of his own counsellors. But had Darius—at the head of the very same force which he conducted into Scythia, or even an inferior force—landed at Marathon in 514 B.C., instead of sending Datis in 490 B.C., he would have found no men like the victors of Marathon to meet him. As far as we can appreciate the probabilities, he would have met with little resistance except from the Spartans singly, who would have maintained their own very defensible territory against all his efforts, like the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor, or like the Mainots of Laconia in later days; but Hellas generally would have become a Persian satrapy. So incalculably great has been the influence of Grecian development, during the two centuries between 500-300 B.C., on the destinies of mankind, that we cannot pass without notice a contingency which threatened to arrest that development in the bud. Indeed, it may be remarked that the history of any nation, considered as a sequence of causes and effects affording applicable knowledge, requires us to study not merely real events, but also imminent contingencies—events which were on the point of occurring, but yet did not occur.

APPENDIX

[THE account of the Scythian expedition of Darius has been omitted in the present text because it has but little bearing on the history of Greece. Moreover the version of our chief ancient authority on this episode (Herodotus) is so manifestly worthless that our positive knowledge about it is inconsiderable, and to discuss the conjectures of modern commentators would hardly fall within the scope of this work. For detailed treatises on the subject reference may be made to Macan, *Herodotus*, vol. ii., app. iii.; Grundy, *Great Persian War*, pp. 48-64; Bury, *Classical Review*, July, 1897, pp. 277-282.]

The chief points concerning the expedition may be summarized as follows:

1. *Its Date.*—The termini are 514 B.C. and 511 B.C. The balance of evidence inclines to 512.

2. *Its Object.*—This seems to have been subsidiary to another enterprise, which, though hardly mentioned by Herodotus, was calculated greatly to strengthen the military position of the Persian empire—the conquest of Thrace. The advance into Scythia may then be conceived of as a demonstration of strength against tribes which might have been inclined to violate the new frontier (*cf.* Macan, *op. cit.*, p. 49). In later times a similar offensive movement was found necessary by Alexander the Great and by Trajan.

3. *The Route Pursued.*—The bridging of the Bosphorus rests on good evidence, and a similar operation on the Danube cannot reasonably be called into doubt. Darius' subsequent advance would seem to have been confined to the plains of Wallachia.

4. *Its Result.*—This must have been more or less disastrous, otherwise Byzantium and the Propontis towns would hardly have dared to revolt (see pp. 118-120).—ED.]

CHAPTER VI [XXXIV *cont.*, XXXV]

IONIC REVOLT

THERE can be no doubt that during Darius' absence across the Danube the Ionians lost an opportunity eminently favourable, such as never again returned, for emancipating themselves from the Persian dominion. Their despots, especially the Milesian Histiaëus, were not induced to preserve the bridge across that river committed to their care by any honourable reluctance to betray the trust reposed in them, but simply by selfish regard to the maintenance of their own unpopular dominion¹. And we may remark that the real character of this impelling motive, as well as the deliberation accompanying it, may be assumed as resting upon very good evidence, since we are now arrived within the personal knowledge of the Milesian historian Hekataëus, who took an active part in the Ionic revolt a few years afterwards, and who may perhaps have been personally engaged in this expedition.

Extricated from the perils of Scythian warfare, Darius marched southward from the Danube through Thrace to the Hellespont, where he crossed from Sestus into Asia. He left, however, a considerable army in Europe, under the command of Megabazus, to accomplish the conquest of Thrace. Perinthus on the Propontis made a brave resistance, but was at length subdued; after which all the Thracian tribes, and all the Grecian colonies between the Hellespont and the Strymon, were forced to submit, giving earth and water, and becoming subject to tribute. Near the lower Strymon was the Edonian town of Myrkinus, which Darius ordered to be made over to Histiaëus of Milêtus; for both this Milesian, and Kôês of Mitylênê, had been desired by the Persian king to name their own reward for their fidelity to him on the passage over the Danube. Kôês requested that he might be constituted despot of Mitylênê, which was accomplished by Persian authority; but Histiaëus solicited that the territory near Myrkinus might be given to him for the foundation of a colony. As soon as the Persian conquests extended thus far, the site in question was presented to Histiaëus, who entered actively upon his new scheme. We shall find the territory near Myrkinus eminent hereafter as the site of Amphipolis; it offered great temptation to settlers, as fertile, well-wooded, convenient for maritime commerce, and near to auriferous and argenti-ferous mountains.

It seems, however, that the Persian dominion in Thrace was disturbed by an invasion of the Scythians, who, in revenge for the aggression of Darius, overran the country as far as the Thracian Chersonese, and are even said to have sent envoys to Sparta, proposing a simultaneous invasion of Persia, from different sides, by Spartans and Scythians. The Athenian Miltiadês, who was despot or governor of the Chersonese, was forced to quit it for some time, and Herodotus ascribes his retirement to the incursion of these nomads. But we may be permitted to suspect that the historian has misconceived the real cause of such retirement. Miltiadês could not remain in the Chersonese after he had incurred the

¹ Histiaëus had pointed out that the annihilation of Darius' army in Scythia would lead to

popular risings against the Greek tyrants who had accompanied the expedition.—Ep.

enmity of Darius by exhorting the Ionians to destroy the bridge over the Danube¹.

The conquests of Megabazus did not stop at the western bank of the Strymon. He carried his arms across that river, conquering the Pæonians, and reducing the Macedonians under Amyntas to tribute. A considerable number of the Pæonians were transported across into Asia, by express order of Darius. Such violent transportations of inhabitants were in the genius of the Persian Government².

From the Pæonian lake Prasias, seven eminent Persians were sent as envoys into Macedonia, to whom Amyntas readily gave the required token of submission, inviting them to a splendid banquet. When exhilarated with wine, they demanded to see the women of the regal family, who, being accordingly introduced, were rudely dealt with by the strangers: at length the son of Amyntas, Alexander, resented the insult, and exacted for it a signal vengeance. When Bubarès, another eminent Persian, was sent into Macedonia to institute researches, Alexander contrived to hush up the proceeding by large bribes, and by giving him his sister Gygæa in marriage³.

Meanwhile Megabazus crossed over into Asia, carrying with him the Pæonians from the river Strymon. Having become alarmed at the progress of Histæus with his new city of Myrkinus, he communicated his

¹ Herodot., vi. 40-84. That Miltiades could have remained in the Chersonese undisturbed, during the interval between the Scythian expedition of Darius and the Ionic revolt (when the Persians were complete masters of those regions, and when Otanès was punishing other towns in the neighbourhood for evasion of service under Darius), after he had declared so pointedly against the Persians on a matter of life and death to the king and army—appears to me, as it does to Dr. Thirlwall (*History of Greece*, vol. ii., app. ii., p. 486, ch. xiv., pp. 226-249), eminently improbable. So forcibly does Dr. Thirlwall feel the difficulty, that he suspects the reported conduct and exhortations of Miltiades at the bridge over the Danube to have been a falsehood, fabricated by Miltiades himself twenty years afterwards, for the purpose of acquiring popularity at Athens during the time immediately preceding the battle of Marathon.

I cannot think this hypothesis admissible. It directly contradicts Herodotus on a matter of fact very conspicuous, and upon which good means of information seem to have been within his reach. I have already observed that the historian Hekateus must have possessed personal knowledge of all the relations between the Ionians and Darius, and that he very probably may have been even present at the bridge: all the information given by Hekateus upon these points would be open to the inquiries of Herodotus.

There are means of escaping from the difficulty of the case, I think, without contradicting Herodotus on any matter of fact important and conspicuous, or indeed on any matter of fact whatever. We see by vi. 40 that Miltiades *did quit the Chersonese* between the close of the Scythian expedition of Darius and the Ionic revolt; Herodotus indeed tells us that he quitted it in consequence of an incursion of the Scythians. Now, without denying the fact of such an incursion, we may well suppose the historian to have been mistaken in assigning it as the cause of the flight of Miltiades. The latter was prevented from living in the Chersonese continuously, during the interval between the Persian invasion of Scythia and the Ionic revolt, by fear of Persian enmity. It is not necessary for us to believe that he was never there

at all, but his residence there must have been interrupted and insecure.

The statement of Cornelius Nepos, that he quitted it immediately after the return from Scythia, from fear of the Persians, may be substantially true.

[There is no need to assume that Miltiades was the sole author of the resolution about breaking the bridge: the idea may have been rife among the Greek squadron generally. It is probable enough that Miltiades and his friends exaggerated the part he played, perhaps on the occasion of one of his trials at Athens, and that Herodotus was influenced to some extent by the Philaid traditions.]

But considering that the Propontis cities on this occasion grew disaffected against Darius, and that Miltiades took good care to escape from the Persians during the Ionic revolt, we may well suppose that his conduct had been treasonable. Miltiades' alleged flight from the Scythians, which comes somewhat awkwardly into Herodotus' text, may have been a distortion on the part of his enemies—e.g., the Alkmaeonids, whose traditions Herodotus almost certainly used. If the Scythians ever did reach the Chersonese, Miltiades would have shown a very poor spirit in thus fleeing, instead of standing behind his fortifications, which the nomad raiders could hardly have forced.—Ed.]

² The motive for this transportation which Herodotus supplies is purely fanciful. The real reason lay, no doubt, in the need of placing under full Persian control the important coast-road to Macedonia, which could easily have been blocked by the natives between the sea on the one hand, Lake Prasias and Mount Pangæus on the other (*cf.* Grundy, *Great Persian War*, p. 67). The measure may first have been suggested by Megabazus, whose strategic sense also warned him against leaving Myrkinus in the hands of Histæus.—Ed.]

³ The murder of the envoys has been regarded with a good show of reason as a fiction which Alexander subsequently circulated among the Greeks to lend colour to his claim of Phil-Hellenism (*cf.* Macan, *Herodotus*, i., p. 162). Herodotus seems to reproduce the traditions of his house in several passages (vii. 173, viii. 136-140, ix. 44). If the tale is true, we must suppose that Darius overlooked the insult because he wished to make an example of insubordinate officials.—Ed.]

apprehensions to Darius, who was prevailed upon to send for Histæus, retaining him about his person, and carrying him to Susa as counsellor and friend, with every mark of honour, but with the secret intention of never letting him revisit Asia Minor. The fears of the Persian general were probably not unreasonable; but this detention of Histæus at Susa became in the sequel an important event.

On departing for his capital, Darius nominated his brother Artaphernês satrap of Sardis, and Otanês general of the forces on the coast in place of Megabazus. The new general dealt very severely with various towns near the Propontis, on the ground that they had evaded their duty in the late Scythian expedition, and had even harassed the army of Darius in its retreat. He took Byzantium and Chalkêdon, as well as Antandrus in the Troad, and Lampônium. With the aid of a fleet from Lesbos, he achieved a new conquest—the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, at that time occupied by a Pelasgic population, seemingly without any Greek inhabitants at all¹.

At the time when Darius quitted Sardis on his return to Susa, carrying with him the Milesian Histæus, he left Artaphernês his brother as satrap of Sardis, invested with the supreme command of Western Asia Minor. The Grecian cities on the coast, comprehended under his satrapy, appear to have been chiefly governed by native despots in each; and Milêtus especially, in the absence of Histæus, was ruled by his son-in-law Aristagoras. That city was now in the height of power and prosperity—in every respect the leading city of Ionia. The return of Darius to Susa may be placed seemingly between 512 and 510 B.C., from which time forward the state of things above described continued, without disturbance, for about ten years—‘a respite from suffering’, to use the significant phrase of the historian.

It was about the year 506 B.C. that the exiled Athenian despot Hippias, after having been repelled from Sparta by the unanimous refusal of the Lacedæmonian allies to take part in his cause, presented himself from Sigeium as a petitioner to Artaphernês at Sardis. He now doubtless found the benefit of the alliance which he had formed for his daughter with the despot Æantidês of Lampsakus, whose favour with Darius would stand him in good stead. He made pressing representations to the satrap, with a view of procuring restoration to Athens, on condition of holding it under Persian dominion; and Artaphernês was prepared, if an opportunity offered to aid him in this design. So thoroughly had he resolved on espousing actively the cause of Hippias, that when the Athenians despatched envoys to Sardis, to set forth the case of the city against its exiled pretender, he returned to them an answer not merely of denial, but of menace—bidding them receive Hippias back again, if they looked for safety. Such a reply was equivalent to a declaration of war, and so it was construed at Athens. It leads us to infer that the satrap was even then revolving in his mind an expedition against Attica, in conjunction with Hippias; but fortunately for the Athenians, other projects and necessities intervened to postpone for several years the execution of the scheme.

¹ The annexation of Lemnos and Imbros ought perhaps to be dated back to the time of the Peisistratids. If the natives were not expelled till 502, we might expect to hear of Darius reinstating

them in 494 (*cf.* Meyer, *Forschungen*, i., pp. 13-15). It is easy to conceive how the Athenian democracy transferred the credit for that conquest from the tyrants to the popular hero Miltiades.—ED.

Of these new projects, the first was that of conquering the island of Naxos. Here, too, as in the case of Hippias, the instigation arose from Naxian exiles—a rich oligarchy which had been expelled by a rising of the people. This island, like all the rest of the Cyclades, was as yet independent of the Persians¹. It was wealthy, prosperous, possessing a large population both of freemen and slaves, and defended as well by armed ships as by a force of 8,000 heavy-armed infantry. The exiles applied for aid to Aristagoras, who saw that he could turn them into instruments of his own policy, provided he could induce Artaphernês to embark in the project along with him—his own force not being adequate by itself. Accordingly he went to Sardis, and laid his project before the satrap, intimating that as soon as the exiles should land with a powerful support, Naxos would be reduced with little trouble: that the neighbouring islands of Paros, Andros, Tênos, and the other Cyclades, could not long hold out after the conquest of Naxos, nor even the large and valuable island of Eubœa. He himself engaged, if a fleet of 100 ships were granted to him, to accomplish all these conquests for the Great King, and to bear the expenses of the armament besides. Artaphernês entertained the proposition with eagerness, and promised him in the ensuing spring 200 ships instead of 100. Messengers despatched to Susa having brought back the ready consent of Darius, a large armament was forthwith equipped under the command of the Persian Megabatês, to be placed at the disposal of Aristagoras—composed both of Persians and of all the tributaries near the coast.

With this force Aristagoras and the Naxian exiles set sail from Milêtus, giving out that they were going to the Hellespont: on reaching Chios, they waited in its western harbour of Kaukasa for a fair wind to carry them straight across to Naxos. But a warning, opportunely transmitted, was turned by the Naxians to the best account. They carried in their property, laid up stores, and made every preparation for a siege, so that when the fleet arrived, it was met by a stout resistance, remained on the island for four months in prosecution of an unavailing siege, and was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything beyond the erection of a fort, as lodgment for the Naxian exiles.

Aristagoras now put into effect the scheme of revolting from Persia, and it so happened that there arrived nearly at the same moment a messenger from his father-in-law Histiaëus, who was detained at the court of Susa, secretly instigating him to this very resolution. Not knowing whom to trust with this dangerous message, Histiaëus had caused the head of a faithful slave to be shaved—branded upon it the words necessary—and then despatched him, so soon as his hair had grown, to Milêtus, with a verbal intimation to Aristagoras that his head was to be again shaved and examined. Histiaëus sought to provoke this perilous rising, simply as a means of procuring his own release from Susa, and in the calculation that Darius would send him down to the coast to re-establish order. Aristagoras convened his principal partisans at Milêtus, and laid before them the formidable project of revolt. All of them approved it, with one remarkable exception—the historian Hekataëus of Milêtus, who opposed

¹ Herodot., v. 31. Plutarch says that Lygdamis, established as despot at Naxos by Peisistratus (Herodot., i. 64), was expelled from this post by the Lacedæmonians (*De Herodot. Malignitat.*, c. 21, p. 859). I confess that I do not place much

confidence in the statements of that treatise as to the many despots expelled by Sparta; we neither know the source from whence Plutarch borrowed them, nor any of the circumstances connected with them.

it as altogether ruinous, and contended that the power of Darius was too vast to leave them any prospect of success. When he found direct opposition fruitless, he next insisted upon the necessity of at once seizing the large treasures in the neighbouring temple of Apollo at Branchidæ for the purpose of carrying on the revolt. By this means alone (he said) could the Milesians, too feeble to carry on the contest with their own force alone, hope to become masters at sea—while, if *they* did not take these treasures, the victorious enemy assuredly would. Neither of these recommendations, both of them indicating sagacity and foresight in the proposer, was listened to. Probably the seizure of the treasures—though highly useful for the impending struggle, and though in the end they fell into the hands of the enemy, as Hekataëus anticipated—would have been insupportable to the pious feelings of the people, and would thus have proved more injurious than beneficial.

Aristagoras and his friends resolved forthwith to revolt. Their first step was to conciliate popular favour throughout Asiatic Greece by putting down the despots in all the various cities—the instruments not less than the supports of Persian ascendancy, as Histiaëus had well argued at the bridge of the Danube. The opportunity was favourable for striking this blow at once on a considerable scale. For the fleet, recently employed at Naxos, had not yet dispersed, but was still assembled at Myus, with many of the despots present at the head of their ships. Accordingly Iatragoras was despatched from Milêtus, at once to seize as many of them as he could, and to stir up the soldiers to revolt. This decisive proceeding was the first manifesto against Darius. Iatragoras was successful: the fleet went along with him, and many of the despots fell into his hands—among them Histiaëus (a second person so named) of Termera, Oliatus of Mylasa (both Karians), Kôês of Mitylênê, and Aristagoras (also a second person so named) of Kymê. At the same time the Milesian Aristagoras himself, while he formally proclaimed revolt against Darius, and invited the Milesians to follow him, laid down his own authority, and affected to place the government in the hands of the people. Throughout most of the towns of Asiatic Greece, insular and continental, a similar revolution was brought about; the despots were expelled, and the feelings of the citizens were thus warmly interested in the revolt. Such of these despots as fell into the hands of Aristagoras were surrendered into the hands of their former subjects, by whom they were for the most part quietly dismissed, and we shall find them hereafter active auxiliaries to the Persians. To this treatment the only exception mentioned is Kôês, who was stoned to death by the Mitylenæans¹.

¹ The story of the siege of Naxos and the causes of the revolt given by Herodotus is open to several objections.

1. The prospect of Aristagoras aggrandizing his own power by the conquest of Naxos was too slight to be worth calculating upon. The experience of Histiaëus' dispossession at Myrkinus ought to have dispelled any illusions which Aristagoras cherished on this point.

2. The conduct of Megabâtês in warning the Naxians, and thus wrecking the expedition out of pure ill-will against Aristagoras, is not even plausible. Megabâtês would have courted disgrace by such an action.

3. If the Naxians had received no warning until the expedition was under way they could hardly have fortified and provisioned their town for a

four months' siege. Their resistance in 490 against an armament probably not much greater collapsed entirely.

4. Histiaëus could not reasonably expect to stir up a revolt by a single message of a summary character.

5. The success of Aristagoras in spreading revolt throughout the west of Asia Minor cannot be explained on the supposition that he was pursuing a purely selfish policy.

The general course of Herodotus' narrative rather points to some such development, as follows:

1. The rising had been concerted long beforehand. For (a) it is known that a general desire for revolt had been in existence so far back as 512 (Herodot., iv. 137). (b) The occupation of Myrkinus by Histiaëus points to some scheme of

By these first successful steps the Ionic revolt was made to assume an extensive and formidable character, much more so, probably, than the prudent Hekataëus had anticipated as practicable. The naval force of the Persians in the Ægean was at once taken away from them, and passed to their opponents, who were thus completely masters of the sea, and would, in fact, have remained so, if a second naval force had not been brought up against them from Phenicia—a proceeding never before resorted to, and perhaps at that time not looked for.

Having exhorted all the revolted towns to name their generals and to put themselves in a state of defence, Aristagoras crossed the Ægean to obtain assistance from Sparta, then under the government of King Kleomenês, to whom he addressed himself, 'holding in his hand a brazen tablet, wherein was engraved the circuit of the entire earth, with the whole sea and all the rivers'. Probably this was the first map or plan which had ever been seen at Sparta, and so profound was the impression which it made, that it was remembered there even in the time of Herodotus¹. Having emphatically entreated the Spartans to step forth in aid of their Ionic brethren, now engaged in a desperate struggle for freedom, he proceeded to describe the wealth and abundance (gold, silver, brass, vestments, cattle and slaves), together with the ineffective weapons and warfare, of the Asiatics. Such enemies as the latter (he said) could be at once put down, and their wealth appropriated, by military training such as that of the Spartans—whose long spear, brazen helmet and breast-plate, and ample shield, enabled them to despise the bow, the short javelin, the light wicker target, the turban and trowsers, of a Persian. He concluded by magnifying especially the vast treasures at Susa—'Instead of fighting your neighbours (he concluded), Argeians, Arcadians, and Messenians, from whom you get hard blows and small reward, why do you not make yourselves rulers of all Asia, a prize not less easy than lucrative?' Kleomenês replied to these seductive instigations by desiring him to come for an answer on the third day. When that day arrived, he put to him the simple question, how far it was from Susa to the sea? To which Aristagoras answered with more frankness than dexterity, that

creating a bulwark for the Greeks against the Persian advance. (c) The message of Histiaüs can hardly have been anything but a final signal for the execution of a pre-arranged plan. (d) The ease with which the anti-tyrannical revolutions were effected shows that the train had been laid in most of the Greek cities.

2. The Naxian expedition provided the chief of the conspiracy with a large Ionian armament (the Persian contingent being an unsolicited and no doubt unwelcome reinforcement). A long delay before Naxos gave Aristagoras time to prepare his armament for the moment of striking—'bellum habere quam gerere malebat'. It is very tempting to conjecture that warning was sent to Naxos, not by Megabates, but by Aristagoras, or at least that Aristagoras used Megabates for his tool, and that the word was given some time beforehand.

3. The underlying motive for the revolt must have been generally prevalent. The mere desire for independence may count for much, and the westward advance of Darius, with the menace of the Ægean Sea being turned into a Persian lake, may have alarmed those cities whose trade intercourse with Greece proper and the West was considerable. But the prompt deposition of the tyrants in all the cities indicates that the Ionians,

who, no doubt, now felt themselves prepared to imitate Athens, and take the government into their own hands, keenly resented the Persian system of ruling by means of local despots. It is noticeable that Darius subsequently did not reinstate the tyrants (*cf.* Grundy, *Great Persian War*, pp. 79-91).

The Ionian revolt thus appears as a patriotic and well-conceived movement. If Herodotus represents it for the most part (though not consistently) in an odious light, this may be due to the sources he used. Among these may be enumerated (1) Hekataëus, who thought the rising was doomed from the first, and was constantly overruled in the councils of war; (2) a Samian tradition, which would naturally seek to condone the sorry behaviour of its countrymen by representing the whole revolt as a sorry business, and would in no case speak well of its rival Milêtus; (3) the opinion of Periklês' circle at Athens, which had little sympathy with the Ionians, and found it expedient to depreciate the military capacity of the subject dependencies in the fifth century.—*Ed.*

¹ The earliest map of which mention is made was prepared by Anaximander in Ionia, apparently not long before this period: see Strabo, i., p. 7; Agathemerus, i., c. 1; Diogen. Laërt., ii. 1.

it was a three months' journey; and he was proceeding to enlarge upon the facilities of the road when Kleomenēs interrupted him—'Quit Sparta before sunset, Milesian stranger: you are no friend to the Lacedæmonians, if you want to carry them a three months' journey from the sea'. In spite of this peremptory mandate, Aristagoras tried a last resource. Taking in his hand the bough of supplication, he again went to the house of Kleomenēs, who was sitting with his daughter Gorgō, a girl of eight years old. He requested Kleomenēs to send away the child, but this was refused, and he was desired to proceed; upon which he began to offer to the Spartan king a bribe for compliance, bidding continually higher and higher from ten talents up to fifty. At length the little girl suddenly exclaimed, 'Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if you do not at once go away'. The exclamation so struck Kleomenēs, that he broke up the interview, and Aristagoras forthwith quitted Sparta¹.

Doubtless Herodotus heard the account of this interview from Lacedæmonian informants. Yet we may be permitted to doubt whether any such suggestions were really made, or any such hopes held out, as those which he places in the mouth of Aristagoras—suggestions and hopes which might well be conceived in 450-440 B.C., after a generation of victories over the Persians, but which have no pertinence in the year 499 B.C. Down even to the battle of Marathon, the name of the Medes was a terror to the Greeks, and the Athenians are highly and justly extolled as the first who dared to look them in the face. Aristagoras may very probably have represented that the Spartans were more than a match for Persians in the field; but even thus much would have been considered, in 502 B.C., rather as the sanguine hope of a petitioner than as the estimate of a sober looker-on.

The Milesian chief had made application to Sparta, as the presiding power of Hellas—a character which we thus find more and more recognised and passing into the habitual feeling of the Greeks. Fifty years previously to this, the Spartans had been flattered by the circumstance that Cræsus singled them out from all other Greeks to invite as allies: now, they accepted such priority as a matter of course.

Rejected at Sparta, Aristagoras proceeded to Athens, now decidedly the second power in Greece. Here he found an easier task, not only as it was the metropolis (or mother-city) of Asiatic Ionia, but also as it had already incurred the pronounced hostility of the Persian satrap, and might look to be attacked as soon as the project came to suit his convenience, under the instigation of Hippias: whereas the Spartans had not only no kindred with Ionia, beyond that of common Hellenism, but were in no hostile relations with Persia, and would have been provoking a new enemy by meddling in the Asiatic war. The promises and representations of Aristagoras were accordingly received with great favour by the Athenians, who, over and above the claims of sympathy, had a powerful interest in sustaining the Ionic revolt as an indirect protection to themselves—and to whom the abstraction of the Ionic fleet from the Persians afforded a conspicuous and important relief. The Athenians at once

¹ We may remark, both in this instance and throughout all the life and time of Kleomenēs, that the Spartan king has the active management and direction of foreign affairs—subject, however,

to trial and punishment by the ephors in case of misbehaviour (Herodot., vi. 82). We shall hereafter find the ephors gradually taking into their own hands, more and more, the actual management.

resolved to send a fleet of twenty ships, under Melanthius, as an aid to the revolted Ionians—ships which are designated by Herodotus, 'the beginning of the mischiefs between Greeks and barbarians'—as the ships in which Paris crossed the Ægean had before been called in the *Iliad* of Homer. Herodotus farther remarks that it seems easier to deceive many men together than one—since Aristagoras, after having failed with Kleomenēs, thus imposed upon the 30,000 citizens of Athens. But on this remark two comments suggest themselves. First, the circumstances of Athens and Sparta were not the same in regard to the Ionic quarrel—an observation which Herodotus himself had made a little while before: the Athenians had a material interest in the quarrel, political as well as sympathetic, while the Spartans had none. Secondly, the ultimate result of their interference, as it stood in the time of Herodotus, though purchased by severe intermediate hardship, was one eminently gainful and glorifying, not less to Athens than to Greece.

When Aristagoras returned, he seems to have found the Persians engaged in the siege of Milētus. The twenty Athenian ships soon crossed the Ægean, and found there five Eretrian ships which had also come to the succour of the Ionians, the Eretrians generously taking this opportunity to repay assistance formerly rendered to them by the Milesians in their ancient war with Chalkis. On the arrival of these allies, Aristagoras organized an expedition from Ephesus up to Sardis, under the command of his brother Charopinus. The ships were left at Korëssus, a mountain and seaport five miles from Ephesus, while the troops marched up under Ephesian guides, first along the river Kayster, next across the mountain range of Tmôlus to Sardis. Artaphernês had not troops enough to do more than hold the strong citadel, so that the assailants possessed themselves of the town without opposition. But he immediately recalled his force near Milētus¹, and summoned Persians and Lydians from all the neighbouring districts, thus becoming more than a match for Charopinus, who found himself, moreover, obliged to evacuate Sardis owing to an accidental conflagration. Most of the houses in that city were built in great part with reeds or straw, and all of them had thatched roofs. Hence it happened that a spark touching one of them set the whole city in flame. Obligated to abandon their dwellings by this accident, the population of the town congregated in the market-place—and as reinforcements were hourly crowding in, the position of the Ionians and Athenians became precarious. They evacuated the town, took up a position on Mount Tmôlus, and when night came, made the best of their way to the sea-coast. The troops of Artaphernês pursued, overtook them near Ephesus, and defeated them. Eualkidēs, the Eretrian general, perished in the action, together with a considerable number of troops. After this unsuccessful commencement, the Athenians betook themselves to their vessels and sailed home, in spite of pressing instances on the part of Aristagoras to induce them to stay. They took no farther part in the struggle²; a retirement at once so sudden and so complete, that they must probably have experienced some glaring desertion on the part of

¹ Charôn of Lampsakus, and Lysaniās in his history of Eretria, seem to have mentioned this first siege of Milētus, and the fact of its being raised in consequence of the expedition to Sardis: see Plutarch, *De Herodot. Malignit.*, p. 86r, though the citation is given there con-

fusedly, so that we cannot make much out of it.

² Herodot., v. 102, 103. It is a curious fact that Charôn of Lampsakus made no mention of this defeat of the united Athenian and Ionian force: see Plutarch, *De Herodot. Malignit.*, *ut sup.*

their Asiatic allies, similar to that which brought so much danger upon the Spartan general Derkyllidas, in 396 B.C.¹

The burning of a place so important as Sardis, however, including the temples of the local goddess Kybêbê, which perished with the remaining buildings, produced a powerful effect on both sides—encouraging the revolters, as well as incensing the Persians. Aristagoras despatched ships along the coast, northward as far as Byzantium, and southward as far as Cyprus. The Greek cities near the Hellespont and the Propontis were induced, either by force or by inclination, to take part with him: the Karians embraced his cause warmly; even the Kaunians, who had not declared themselves before, joined him as soon as they heard of the capture of Sardis; while the Greeks in Cyprus, with the single exception of the town of Amathûs, at once renounced the authority of Darius, and prepared for a strenuous contest². Ōnesilus of Salamis, the most considerable city in the island, finding the population willing, but his brother, the despot Gorgus, reluctant, shut the latter out of the gates, took the command of the united forces of Salamis and the other revolting cities, and laid siege to Amathûs. These towns of Cyprus were then, and seem always afterwards to have continued, under the government of despots; who, however, unlike the despots in Ionia generally, took part along with their subjects in the revolt against Persia³.

The rebellion had now assumed a character so serious, that the Persians were compelled to put forth their strongest efforts to subdue it. From the number of different nations comprised in their empire, they were enabled to make use of the antipathies of one against the other, and the old adverse feeling of Phenicians against Greeks was now found extremely serviceable. The Phenician fleet was employed to transport into Cyprus the Persian general Artybius with a Kilikian and Egyptian army; while the force under Artaphernês at Sardis was so strengthened as to enable him to act at once against all the coast of Asia Minor, from the Propontis to the Triopian promontory. On the other side, the common danger had for the moment brought the Ionians into a state of union foreign to their usual habit; so that we hear now, for the first and the last time, of a tolerably efficient Pan-Ionic authority.

Apprised of the coming of Artybius with the Phenician fleet, Onesilus and his Cyprian supporters solicited the aid of the Ionic fleet, which arrived shortly after the disembarkation of the Persian force in the island. Onesilus offered to the Ionians their choice, whether they would fight the Phenicians at sea or the Persians on land. Their natural determination was in favour of the sea-fight, and they engaged with a degree of

¹ Further motives for the retirement of Athens from the conflict have been suggested.

1. The war against Ægina, which (according to Herodotus) was at its height in 491, may have reached an acute stage in 498. The absence of an Athenian squadron in Ionia gave the Æginetans an opportunity for an attack in force (but see ch. iv., app. ii.).

2. The medizing party at Athens may have gained the upper hand after the retreat from Sardis. This faction had gained a temporary ascendancy in 507, and again in 496 carried the election of Hipparchus (presumably a kinsman of the tyrant) to the archonship (Dion. Hal., *Antiq. Rom.*, vi. 1). It is likely enough that the government was in its hands from 498 till 493, when the fall of Milêtus and the imminence of an invasion brought the

patriotic party once more into power (see note on p. 133).—Ed.

² This revolt may be brought into connection with a victory of the Ionian over the Phenician fleet off the Pamphylian coast (mentioned in Plutarch, *De Herod. Malign.*, ch. xxiv.). Such a battle would explain the inactivity of the Phenician ships till 497 (Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 99 *et seq.*).—Ed.

³ Herodot., v. 103, 104, 108. Compare the proceedings in Cyprus against Artaxerxês Mnêmon, under the energetic Evagoras of Salamis (Diodor., xiv. 98; xv. 2), about 386 B.C.; most of the petty princes of the island became for the time his subjects, but in 351 B.C. there were nine of them independent (Diodor., xvi. 42), and seemingly quite as many at the time when Alexander besieged Tyre (Arrian, ii. 20, 8).

courage and unanimity which procured for them a brilliant victory ; the Samians being especially distinguished. But the combat on land, carried on at the same time, took a different turn.

The personal bravery of the Cypriots was rendered useless by treachery in their own ranks. Stêsênor, despot of Kurium, deserted in the midst of the battle, and even the scythed chariots of Salamis followed his example ; while the brave Onesilus, thus weakened, perished in the total rout of his army. No farther hopes now remaining for the revolters, the victorious Ionian fleet returned home. Salamis relapsed under the sway of its former despot Gorgus, while the remaining cities in Cyprus were successively besieged and taken ; not without a resolute defence, however, since Soli alone held out five months.

Meanwhile the principal force of Darius having been assembled at Sardis, Daurisês, Hymeas, and other generals who had married daughters of the Great King, distributed their efforts against different parts of the western coast. Daurisês attacked the towns near the Hellespont—Abydus, Perkôtê, Lampsakus, and Pæsus—which made little resistance. He was then ordered southward into Karia, while Hymeas, who with another division had taken Kios on the Propontis, marched down to the Hellespont and completed the conquest of the Troad as well as of the Æolic Greeks in the region of Ida. Artaphernês and Otanês attacked the Ionic and Æolic towns on the coast—the former taking Klazomenâ, the latter Kymê.

There remained Karia, which, with Milêtus in its neighbourhood, offered a determined resistance to Daurisês. Forewarned of his approach, the Karians assembled at a spot called the White Pillars, near the confluence of the rivers Mæander and Marsyas. Victory, after a sharp contest, declared in favour of Daurisês, chiefly in consequence of his superior numbers. Two thousand Persians, and not less than ten thousand Karians, are said to have perished in the battle. The Karian fugitives, re-united after the fight in the grove of Zeus Stratius near Labranda, were deliberating whether they should now submit to the Persians or emigrate for ever, when the appearance of a Milesian reinforcement restored their courage. A second battle was fought, and a second time they were defeated, the loss on this occasion falling chiefly on the Milesians. The victorious Persians now proceeded to assault the Karian cities, but Herakleidês of Mylasa laid an ambuscade for them with so much skill and good fortune, that their army was nearly destroyed, and Daurisês with other Persian generals perished. This successful effort, following upon two severe defeats, does honour to the constancy of the Karians, upon whom Greek proverbs generally fasten a mean reputation. It saved for the time the Karian towns, which the Persians did not succeed in reducing until after the capture of Milêtus.

On land, the revolters were thus everywhere worsted, though at sea the Ionians still remained masters. But the unwarlike Aristagoras began to despair of success. Assembling his chief advisers, he represented to them the unpromising state of affairs, and the necessity of securing some place of refuge, in case they were expelled from Milêtus. He then put the question to them, whether the island of Sardinia, or Myrkinus in Thrace near the Strymon (which Histiaëus had begun some time before to fortify), appeared to them best adapted to the purpose. Among the persons

consulted was Hekataeus the historian, who approved neither the one nor the other scheme, but suggested the erection of a fortified post in the neighbouring island of Leros, a Milesian colony, wherein a temporary retirement might be sought, should it prove impossible to hold Milêtus, but which permitted an easy return to that city, so soon as opportunity offered¹. Emigration to Myrkinus, as proposed by Aristagoras, presented no hope of refuge at all; since the Persians, if they regained their authority in Asia Minor, would not fail again to extend it to the Strymon². Nevertheless, the consultation ended by adopting this scheme, since probably no Ionians could endure the immeasurable distance of Sardinia as a new home. Aristagoras set sail for Myrkinus, taking with him all who chose to bear him company. But he perished not long after landing, together with nearly all his company, in the siege of a neighbouring Thracian town. Though making profession to lay down his supreme authority at the commencement of the revolt, he had still contrived to retain it in great measure; and on departing for Myrkinus, he devolved it on Pythagoras, a citizen in high esteem. It appears, however, that the Milesians paid little obedience to his successor, and made their government from this period popular in reality as well as in profession.

Not long after his departure, another despot—Histiaeus of Milêtus, his father-in-law and jointly with him the fomentor of the revolt—presented himself at the gates of Milêtus for admission. The outbreak of the revolt had enabled him, as he had calculated, to procure leave of departure from Darius. That prince had been thrown into violent indignation by the attack and burning of Sardis, and by the general revolt of Ionia, headed by the Milesian Aristagoras, but carried into effect by the active co-operation of the Athenians. 'The Athenians (exclaimed Darius)—who are *they*?' On receiving the answer, he asked for his bow, placed an arrow on the string, and shot as high as he could towards the heavens, saying—'Grant me, Zeus, to revenge myself on the Athenians'. He at the same time desired an attendant to remind him thrice every day at dinner—'Master, remember the Athenians': for as to the Ionians, he felt assured that their hour of retribution would come speedily and easily enough³.

At first Darius had been inclined to ascribe the movement in Ionia to the secret instigation of Histiaeus. But the latter found means to satisfy him, and even to make out that no such mischief would have occurred, if he (Histiaeus) had been at Milêtus instead of being detained at Susa. By such assurances he obtained his liberty, and went down to Sardis, promising to return as soon as he should have accomplished them. But on reaching Sardis he found the satrap Artaphernês better informed than the Great King at Susa. Accordingly Histiaeus took to flight, went

¹ Herodotus has perhaps mistaken the occasion on which Hekataeus gave this advice. In 496 such a proposal would have been a ridiculous half-measure. If the contest really was hopeless, emigration to Myrkinus, or elsewhere away from Asia, could alone have safeguarded the Ionians; if there remained any prospect of holding the sea and of recovering the mainland, the evacuation of Milêtus would have been a gratuitous sacrifice. Hekataeus' advice would suit much better some crisis of party quarrel within the walls of Milêtus (cf. Macan, *Herodotus*, i., p. 267).—Ed.

² The territory of Myrkinus, commanding the

only passage across the Strymon, might have been held with a small force almost indefinitely. The idea of Histiaeus and Aristagoras may have been from the very first to find a barrier against Persia's westward advance.—Ed.

³ Herodot., v. 105: 'Ὁ Ζεῦ, ἐκγενοῦμαι μοι Ἀθηναίους ῥιπαῖαι. Compare the Thracian practice of communicating with the gods by shooting arrows high up into the air (Herodot., iv. 94). [Herodotus here seems to be using an Attic version, composed, perhaps, after the battle of Marathon, 'ad majorem Atheniensium gloriam'.—Ed.]

down to the coast, and from thence passed over to Chios. Here he found himself seized on the opposite count as the confidant of Darius and the enemy of Ionia. He was released, however, on proclaiming himself not merely a fugitive escaping from Persian custody, but also as the prime author of the Ionic revolt: and he farther added that Darius had contemplated the translation of the Ionian population to Phenicia, as well as that of the Phenician population to Ionia—to prevent which translation he (Histiaëus) had instigated the revolt. This allegation, though nothing better than a pure fabrication, obtained for him the goodwill of the Chians, who carried him back to Milêtus: but before he departed, he despatched to Sardis some letters, addressed to distinguished Persians, framed as if he were already in established intrigue with them for revolting against Darius, and intended to invite them to actual revolt. His messenger betrayed him, and carried his letters straight to Artaphernês. The satrap desired that these letters might be delivered to the persons to whom they were addressed, but that the answers sent to Histiaëus might be handed to himself. Such was the tenor of the answers, that Artaphernês was induced to seize and put to death several of the Persians around him: but Histiaëus was disappointed in his purpose of bringing about a revolt in the place.

On arriving at Milêtus, Histiaëus found Aristagoras no longer present, and the citizens altogether adverse to the return of their old despot: nevertheless, he tried to force his way by night into the town, but was repulsed and even wounded in the thigh. He returned to Chios, but the Chians refused him the aid of any of their ships: he next passed to Lesbos, from the inhabitants of which island he obtained eight triremes, and employed them to occupy Byzantium¹.

A vast Persian force, both military and naval, was gradually concentrating itself near Milêtus, against which city Artaphernês had determined to direct his principal efforts. Not only the whole army of Asia Minor, but also the Kilikian and Egyptian troops fresh from the conquest of Cyprus, and even the conquered Cypriots themselves, were brought up as reinforcements; while the entire Phenician fleet, no less than 600 ships strong, co-operated on the coast. To meet such a land-force in the field was far beyond the strength of the Ionians, and the joint Pan-Ionic Council resolved that the Milesians should be left to defend their own fortifications, while the entire force of the confederate cities should be mustered on board the ships. At sea they had as yet no reason to despair, having been victorious over the Phenicians near Cyprus, and having sustained no defeat. The combined Ionic fleet, including the Æolic Lesbians, amounting in all to the number of 353 ships, was accordingly mustered at Ladê—then a little island near Milêtus, but now joined on to the coast, by the gradual accumulation of land in the bay at the mouth of the Mæander. Eighty Milesian ships formed the right wing, one hundred Chian ships the centre, and sixty Samian ships the left wing, while the space between the Milesians and the Chians was occupied by twelve ships from Priênê, three from Myus, and seventeen from Teôs

¹ The story of Histiaëus' piracies deserves no credit. If he had molested Ionian commerce the confederates would certainly have sent a squadron to stop the nuisance. The fact that he was left undisturbed for more than a year proves that he

was keeping his trust. His commission was more probably to keep the Bosphorus route open for the passage of supply-ships, and to ensure the fidelity of Byzantium (*cf.* Grundy, *op cit.*, p. 121 *et seq.*)—*ED.*

—the space between the Chians and Samians was filled by eight ships from Erythræ, three from Phôkæa, and seventy from Lesbos.

The total armament thus made up was hardly inferior in number to that which, fifteen years afterwards, gained the battle of Salamis against a far larger Persian fleet than the present. Moreover, the courage of the Ionians, on ship-board, was equal to that of their contemporaries on the other side of the Ægean; while in respect of disagreement among the allies, we shall hereafter find the circumstances preceding the battle of Salamis still more menacing than those before the coming battle of Ladê. The chances of success, therefore, were at least equal between the two, and, indeed, the anticipations of the Persians and Phenicians on the present occasion were full of doubt, so that they thought it necessary to set on foot express means for disuniting the Ionians—it was fortunate for the Greeks that Xerxês at Salamis could not be made to conceive the prudence of aiming at the same object. There were now in the Persian camp all those various despots whom Aristagoras, at the beginning of the revolt, had driven out of their respective cities. At the instigation of Artaphernês, each of these men despatched secret communications to their citizens in the allied fleet, endeavouring to detach them severally from the general body, by promises of gentle treatment in the event of compliance, and by threats of extreme infliction from the Persians if they persisted in armed efforts. Though these communications were sent to each without the knowledge of the rest, yet the answer from all was one unanimous negative. The confederates at Ladê seemed more one, in heart and spirit, than the Athenians, Spartans and Corinthians will hereafter prove to be at Salamis.

But there was one grand difference which turned the scale—the superior energy and ability of the Athenian leaders at Salamis, coupled with the fact that they *were* Athenians—that is, in command of the largest and most important contingent throughout the fleet.

At Ladê, unfortunately, this was quite otherwise. Each separate contingent had its own commander, but we hear of no joint commander at all. Nor were the chiefs who came from the larger cities—Milesian, Chian, Samian, or Lesbian—men like Themistoklês, competent and willing to stand forward as self-created leaders, and to usurp for the moment, with the general consent and for the general benefit, a privilege not intended for them. The only man of sufficient energy and forwardness to do this was the Phôkæan Dionysius—unfortunately the captain of the smallest contingent of the fleet, and therefore enjoying the least respect. For Phôkæa, once the daring explorer of the western waters, had so dwindled down since the Persian conquest of Ionia, that she could now furnish no more than three ships.

The same impatience of steady toil and discipline, which the Ionians displayed to their own ruin before the battle of Ladê, will be found to characterize them fifty years afterwards as allies of Athens, as I shall have occasion to show when I come to describe the Athenian empire¹.

From the day on which the Ionians discarded Dionysius, their camp

¹ While the lack of union among the Ionians is clearly proved by their behaviour at Ladê, and suggests that they committed a great mistake in refusing to undergo the discipline of Dionysius, the story which Herodotus relates about their laziness and love of ease is hardly credible. The entire past history of Ionia and the achievements

of the fleet during the present revolt (Herodot., v. 121) prove that they were skilful and active sailors. The pungency of Herodotus' satire on Ionian effeminacy goes far to belie his own statement, and suggests that he was here drawing from prejudiced sources (see note on p. 122).—ED.

became a scene of disunion and mistrust. Some of them grew so reckless and unmanageable, that the better portion despaired of maintaining any orderly battle; and the Samians in particular now repented that they had declined the secret offers made to them by their expelled despot—Æakēs, son of Sylosōn. They sent privately to renew the negotiation, received a fresh promise of the same indulgence, and agreed to desert when the occasion arrived. On the day of battle, when the two fleets were on the point of coming to action, the sixty Samian ships all sailed off, except eleven, whose captains disdained such treachery. Other Ionians followed their example; yet amidst the reciprocal crimination which Herodotus had heard, he finds it difficult to determine who was most to blame, though he names the Lesbians as among the earliest deserters. The hundred ships from Chios, constituting the centre of the fleet—each ship carrying forty chosen soldiers fully armed—formed a brilliant exception to the rest. They fought with the greatest fidelity and resolution, inflicting upon the enemy, and themselves sustaining, heavy loss. Dionysius the Phōkæan also behaved in a manner worthy of his previous language, and captured with his three ships the like number of Phenicians. But such examples of bravery did not compensate the treachery or cowardice of the rest. The defeat of the Ionians at Ladê was complete as well as irrecoverable. To the faithful Chians, the loss was terrible both in the battle and after it; for though some of their vessels escaped from the defeat safely to Chios, others were so damaged as to be obliged to run ashore close at hand on the promontory of Mykalê, where the crews quitted them, with the intention of marching northward through the Ephesian territory to the continent opposite their own island. We hear with astonishment, that at that critical moment, the Ephesian women were engaged in solemnizing the Thesmophoria—a festival celebrated at night, in the open air, in some uninhabited portion of the territory, and without the presence of any male person. As the Chian fugitives entered the Ephesian territory by night, their coming being neither known nor anticipated—it was believed that they were thieves or pirates coming to seize the women, and under this error they were attacked by the Ephesians and slain. It would seem from this incident that the Ephesians had taken no part in the Ionic revolt, nor are they mentioned amidst the various contingents; nor is anything said either of Kolophôn, or Lebedus, or Eræ.

The Phōkæan Dionysius, perceiving that the defeat of Ladê was the ruin of the Ionic cause, and that his native city was again doomed to Persian subjection, did not think it prudent even to return home. Immediately after the battle he set sail, not for Phōkæa, but for the Phenician coast, at this moment stripped of its protecting cruisers. He seized several Phenician merchantmen, out of which considerable profit was obtained: then setting sail for Sicily, he undertook the occupation of a privateer against the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians, abstaining from injury towards Greeks. Such an employment seems then to have been considered perfectly admissible. A considerable body of Samians also migrated to Sicily, indignant at the treachery of their admirals in the battle, and yet more indignant at the approaching restoration of their despot Æakēs.

The victory of Ladê enabled the Persians to attack Milêtus by sea as well as by land; they prosecuted the siege with the utmost vigour, by undermining the walls, and by various engines of attack. Their re-

sources in this respect seem to have been enlarged since the days of Harpagus. In no long time the city was taken by storm, and miserable was the fate reserved to it. The adult male population was chiefly slain; while such of them as were preserved, together with the women and children, were sent in a body to Susa to await the orders of Darius, who assigned to them a residence at Ampê, not far from the mouth of the Tigris. The temple at Branchidæ was burnt and pillaged, as Hekataeus had predicted at the beginning of the revolt. The large treasures therein contained must have gone far to defray the costs of the Persian army. The Milesian territory is said to have been altogether denuded of its former inhabitants—the Persians retaining for themselves the city with the plain adjoining to it, and making over the mountainous portions to the Karians of Pedasa. Some few of the Milesians found a place among the Samian emigrants to Sicily. It is certain, however, that new Grecian inhabitants must have been subsequently admitted into Milêtus; for it appears ever afterwards as a Grecian town, though with diminished power and importance.

The capture of Milêtus, in the sixth year from the commencement of the revolt¹, carried with it the rapid submission of the neighbouring towns in Karia²; and during the next summer—the Phœnician fleet having wintered at Milêtus—the Persian forces by sea and land reconquered all the Asiatic Greeks, insular as well as continental. Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos—the towns in the Chersonese—Selymbria and Perinthus in Thrace—Prokonnêsus and Artake in the Propontis—all these towns were taken or sacked by the Persian and Phœnician fleet. The inhabitants of Byzantium and Chalkêdôn fled for the most part, without even awaiting its arrival, to Mesembria; while the Athenian Miltiadês only escaped Persian captivity by a rapid flight from his abode in the Chersonese to Athens. His pursuers were, indeed, so close upon him, that one of his ships, with his son Metiochus on board, fell into their hands. As Miltiadês had been strenuous in urging the destruction of the bridge over the Danube, on the occasion of the Scythian expedition, the Phœnicians were particularly anxious to get possession of his person, as the most acceptable of all Greek prisoners to the Persian king, who, however, when Metiochus the son of Miltiadês was brought to Susa, not only did him no harm, but treated him with great kindness, and gave him a Persian wife with a comfortable maintenance.

Far otherwise did the Persian generals deal with the reconquered cities on and near the coast. The threats which had been held out before the battle of Ladê were realized to the full. The most beautiful Greek youths and virgins were picked out, to be distributed among the Persian grandees as eunuchs or inmates of the harems. The cities, with their edifices, sacred as well as profane, were made a prey to the flames; and in the case of the islands, Herodotus even tells us that a line of Persians was formed from shore to shore, which swept each territory from north to south, and drove the inhabitants out of it. That much of this hard

¹ Herodot., vi. 18. This is almost the only distinct chronological statement which we find in Herodotus respecting the Ionic revolt. [For detailed expositions of chronology, see Macan, *op. cit.*, p. v; Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-144. The revolt as a whole is now placed by most authorities between 499 and 494.—Ed.]

² The entire disappearance of Karia from Herodotus' narrative after the campaign of Pedasa suggests that it had already been reduced (*cf.* Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 135). This would also explain how Artaphernês came to have such a large army at his disposal.—Ed.

treatment is well founded, there can be no doubt. But it must be exaggerated as to extent of depopulation and destruction, for these islands and cities appear ever afterwards as occupied by a Grecian population, and even as in a tolerable, though reduced, condition. Samos was made an exception to the rest, and completely spared by the Persians, as a reward to its captains for setting the example of desertion at the battle of Ladê; while Æakês, the despot of that island, was reinstated in his Government.

Amidst the sufferings endured by so many innocent persons, of every age and of both sexes, the fate of Histiaëus excites but little sympathy. He was at Byzantium when he learnt the surrender of Milêtus; he then thought it expedient to sail with his Lesbian vessels for Chios, where admittance was refused to him. But the Chians, weakened as they had been by the late battle, were in little condition to resist, so that he defeated their troops and despoiled the island. During the present break-up of the Asiatic Greeks, there were doubtless many who (like the Phôkæan Dionysius) did not choose to return home to an enslaved city, yet had no fixed plan for a new abode. Of these exiles, a considerable number put themselves under the temporary command of Histiaëus, and accompanied him to Thasos¹. While besieging that town, he learnt the news that the Phenician fleet had quitted Milêtus to attack the remaining Ionic towns. He therefore left his designs on Thasos unfinished, in order to go and defend Lesbos. But in this latter island the dearth of provisions was such, that he was forced to cross over to the continent to reap the standing corn, around Atarneus and in the fertile plain of Mysia near the river Kaïkus. Here he fell in with a considerable Persian force under Harpagus—was beaten, compelled to flee, and taken prisoner. On his being carried to Sardis, Artaphernês the satrap caused him to be at once crucified: partly no doubt from genuine hatred, but partly also under the persuasion that if he were sent up as a prisoner to Susa, he might again become dangerous, since Darius would even now spare his life, under an indelible sentiment of gratitude for the maintenance of the bridge over the Danube. The head of Histiaëus was embalmed and sent up to Susa, where Darius caused it to be honourably buried, condemning this precipitate execution of a man who had once been his preserver.

We need not wonder that the capture of Milêtus excited the strongest feeling, of mixed sympathy and consternation, among the Athenians. In the succeeding year (so at least we are led to think, though the date cannot be positively determined) it was selected as the subject of a tragedy—*The Capture of Milêtus*—by the dramatic poet Phrynichus; which, when performed, so painfully wrung the feelings of the Athenian audience that they burst into tears in the theatre, and the poet was condemned to pay a fine of one thousand drachmæ, as 'having recalled to them their own misfortunes'². The piece was forbidden to be afterwards acted, and has not come down to us.

¹ The attack upon Thasos looks like a preliminary operation to the conquest of Myrkinus (Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 139).—Ed.

² The impeachment of Phrynichus seems to represent a desperate attempt on the part of the medizing party at Athens to hush up the sensational news from Ionia which threatened to cause a revulsion of feeling in favour of the patriots (see note 1 on p. 126, and *cf.* the effect of the capture of Olynthus in 348 B.C.). The year 493 marks the return of Miltiadês to Athens, and the

election of Themistoklês to the archonship. Perhaps the latter was Phrynichus' chorêgus, and induced him to write a patriotic play (Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alterthums*, iii., p. 312); in 476 he paid the costs for the production of the *Phanissæ*, in which the same poet glorified the battle of Salamis (Plutarch, *Themistoklês*, ii., § 6). In spite of Phrynichus' condemnation, the war-party acquired and retained control till after the battle of Marathon.—Ed.

CHAPTER VII [XXXVI]

FROM IONIC REVOLT TO BATTLE OF MARATHON

IN the preceding chapter I indicated the point of confluence between the European and Asiatic streams of Grecian history—the commencement of a decided Persian intention to conquer Attica. From this time forward, therefore, the affairs of Greece and Persia come to be in direct relation one with the other, and capable of being embodied, much more than before, into one continuous narrative.

The reconquest of Ionia being thoroughly completed, Artaphernès proceeded to organize the future government of it, with a degree of prudence and forethought not often visible in Persian proceedings. Convoking deputies from all the different cities, he compelled them to enter into a permanent convention for the amicable settlement of disputes, so as to prevent all employment of force by any one against the others. Moreover, he caused the territory of each city to be measured by parasangs (each parasang was equal to thirty stadia, or about three miles and a half), and arranged the assessments of tribute according to this measurement, without any material departure, however, from the sums which had been paid before the revolt. Unfortunately, Herodotus is unusually brief in his allusion to this proceeding, which it would have been highly interesting to be able to comprehend perfectly. We may, however, assume it as certain, that both the population and the territory of many among the Ionic cities, if not of all, were materially altered in consequence of the preceding revolt, and still more in consequence of the cruelties with which the suppression of the revolt had been accompanied. In regard to Milêtus, Herodotus tells us that the Persians retained for themselves the city with its circumjacent plain, but gave the mountain portion of the Milesian territory to the Karians of Pêdasa. Such a proceeding would naturally call for fresh measurement and assessment of tribute; and there may have been similar transfers of land elsewhere. I have already observed that the statements which we find in Herodotus, of utter depopulation and destruction falling upon the cities, cannot be credited in their full extent; for these cities are all peopled, and all Hellenic, afterwards. New inhabitants would probably be admitted in many of them, to supply the loss sustained; and such infusion of fresh blood would strengthen the necessity for the organization introduced by Artaphernès, in order to determine clearly the obligations due from the cities both to the Persian Government and towards each other. Herodotus considers that the arrangement was extremely beneficial to the Ionians, and so it must unquestionably have been. He farther adds that the tribute then fixed remained unaltered until his own day—a statement requiring some comment, which I reserve until the time arrives for describing the condition of the Asiatic Greeks after the repulse of Xerxès from Greece Proper.

Meanwhile the intentions of Darius for the conquest of Greece were now effectively manifested. Mardonius, invested with the supreme command, and at the head of a large force, was sent down in the ensuing spring for the purpose. Having reached Kilikia in the course of the march, he

himself got on ship-board and went by sea to Ionia, while his army marched across Asia Minor to the Hellespont. His proceeding in Ionia surprises us, and seems to have appeared surprising as well to Herodotus himself as to his readers. Mardonius deposed the despots throughout the various Greek cities, leaving the people of each to govern themselves, subject to Persian dominion and tribute. This was a complete reversal of the former policy of Persia, and must be ascribed to a new conviction, doubtless wise and well founded, which had recently grown up among the Persian leaders, that on the whole their unpopularity was aggravated more than their strength was increased, by employing these despots as instruments. The phenomena of the late Ionic revolt were well calculated to teach such a lesson; but we shall not often find the Persians profiting by experience, throughout the course of this history.

Mardonius did not remain long in Ionia, but passed on with his fleet to the Hellespont, where the land-force had already arrived. He transported it across into Europe, and began his march through Thrace; all of which had already been reduced by Megabazus, and does not seem to have participated in the Ionic revolt. The island of Thasus surrendered to the fleet without resistance, and the land-force was conveyed across the Strymon to the Greek city of Akanthus, on the western coast of the Strymonic Gulf. From hence Mardonius marched into Macedonia, and subdued a considerable portion of its inhabitants—perhaps some of those not comprised in the dominion of Amyntas, since that prince had before submitted to Megabazus. Meanwhile he sent his fleet to double the promontory of Mount Athos, and to join the land-force again at the Gulf of Therma, with a view of conquering as much of Greece as he could, and even of prosecuting the march as far as Athens and Eretria; so that the expedition afterwards accomplished by Xerxes would have been tried at least by Mardonius, twelve or thirteen years earlier, had not a terrible storm completely disabled the fleet. The sea near Athos was then, and is now, full of peril to navigators. One of the hurricanes so frequent in its neighbourhood overtook the Persian fleet, destroyed three hundred ships, and drowned or cast ashore not less than twenty thousand men. Of those who reached the shore, many died of cold, or were devoured by the wild beasts on that inhospitable tongue of land. This disaster checked altogether the farther progress of Mardonius, who also sustained considerable loss with his land-army, and was himself wounded, in a night attack made upon him by the tribe of Thracians called Brygi. Though strong enough to repel and avenge this attack, and to subdue the Brygi, he was yet in no condition to advance farther. Both the land-force and the fleet were conveyed back to the Hellespont, and from thence across to Asia.

The ill-success of Mardonius seems to have inspired the Thasians, so recently subdued, with the idea of revolting. At least their conduct provoked the suspicion of Darius; for they made active preparations for defence, both by building war-ships, and by strengthening their fortifications. The Thasians were at this time in great opulence, chiefly from gold and silver mines, both in their island and in their mainland territory opposite. The mines at Skaptê Hylê in Thrace yielded to them an annual income of eighty talents; their total surplus revenue—after defraying all the expenses of government so that the inhabitants were entirely untaxed—was two hundred talents (£46,000, if Attic

talents ; more, if either Euboic or Æginæan). With such large means, they were enabled soon to make preparations which excited notice among their neighbours ; many of whom were doubtless jealous of their prosperity, and perhaps inclined to dispute with them possession of the profitable mines of Skaptê Hylê. As in other cases, so in this : the jealousies among subject neighbours often procured revelations to the superior power. The proceedings of the Thasians were made known, and they were forced to raze their fortifications as well as to surrender all their ships to the Persians at Abdêra¹.

Darius was only the more eagerly bent on his project of conquering Greece. Hippias was at his side to keep alive his wrath against the Athenians. Orders were despatched to the maritime cities of his empire to equip both ships of war and horse-transports for a renewed attempt. His intentions were probably known in Greece itself by this time, from the recent march of his army to Macedonia. Nevertheless, he now thought it advisable to send heralds round to most of the Grecian cities, in order to require from each the formal token of submission—earth and water ; and thus to ascertain what extent of resistance his projected expedition was likely to experience. The answers received were to a high degree favourable. Many of the continental Greeks sent their submission, as well as all those islanders to whom application was made. Among the former we are probably to reckon the Thebans and Thessalians, though Herodotus does not particularize them. Among the latter Naxos, Eubœa, and some of the smaller islands, are not included ; but Ægina, at that time the first maritime power of Greece, is expressly included.

Nothing marks so clearly the imminent peril in which the liberties of Greece were now placed, and the terror inspired by the Persians after their reconquest of Ionia, as this abasement on the part of the Æginetans, whose commerce with the Asiatic islands and continent doubtless impressed them strongly with the melancholy consequences of unsuccessful resistance to the Great King. But on the present occasion their conduct was dictated as much by antipathy to Athens as by fear, so that Greece was thus threatened with the intrusion of the Persian arm as ally and arbiter in her internal contests—a contingency which, if it had occurred now in the dispute between Ægina and Athens, would have led to the certain enslavement of Greece, though when it did occur nearly a century afterwards, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war and in consequence of the prolonged struggle between Lacedæmon and Athens, Greece had become strong enough in her own force to endure it without the loss of substantial independence.

Though a period apparently not less than fourteen years (from about 506-492 B.C.) had elapsed from the beginning of the war with Ægina, the state of hostility still continued ; and we may readily conceive that Hippias, the great instigator of Persian attack upon Greece, would not fail to enforce upon all the enemies of Athens the prudence of seconding, or at least of not opposing, the efforts of the Persian to reinstate him in that city. It was partly under this feeling, combined with genuine alarm, that both Thebes and Ægina manifested submissive dispositions towards the heralds of Darius.

¹ Herodot., vi. 46-48. See a similar case of disclosure arising from jealousy between Tenedos and Lesbos (Thukyd., iii. 2).

Among these heralds, some had gone both to Athens and to Sparta, for the same purpose of demanding earth and water¹.

About this period we see the bonds drawn closer between Athens and Sparta². The Athenians, for the first time, prefer a complaint at Sparta against the Æginetans for having given earth and water to Darius—accusing them of having done this with views of enmity to Athens, and in order to invade Attica conjointly with the Persian. This they represented 'as treason to Hellas', calling upon Sparta, as head of Greece, to interfere. In consequence of their appeal, Kleomenês, King of Sparta, went over to Ægina, to take measures against the authors of the late proceeding, 'for the general benefit of Hellas'.

The proceeding now before us is of very great importance in the progress of Grecian history. It is the first direct and positive historical manifestation of Hellas as an aggregate body, with Sparta as its chief, and obligations of a certain sort on the part of its members, the neglect or violation of which constitutes a species of treason. I have already pointed out several earlier incidents, showing how the Greek political mind, beginning from entire severance of states, became gradually prepared for this idea of a permanent league with mutual obligations and power of enforcement vested in a permanent chief—an idea never fully carried into practice, but now distinctly manifest and partially operative. First, the great acquired power and territory of Sparta, her military training, her undisturbed political traditions, create an unconscious deference towards her such as was not felt towards any other State. Next, she is seen (in the proceedings against Athens after the expulsion of Hippias) as summoning and conducting to war a cluster of self-obliged Peloponnesian allies, with certain formalities which give to the alliance an imposing permanence and solemnity. Thirdly, her position becomes recognised as first power or president of Greece, both by foreigners who invite alliance (Croesus) or by Greeks who seek help, such as the Platæans against Thebes or the Ionians against Persia. But Sparta has not been hitherto found willing to take on herself the performance of this duty of Protector general. She refused the Ionians and the Samian Mæandrius, as well as the Platæans, in spite of their entreaties founded on common Hellenic lineage: the expedition which she undertook against Polykratês of Samos was founded upon private motives for displeasure, even in the estimation of the Lacedæmonians themselves: moreover, even if all these requests had been granted, she might have seemed to be rather obeying a generous sympathy than performing a duty incumbent upon her as superior. But in the case now before us, of Athens against Ægina, the latter consideration stands distinctly prominent. Athens is not a member of the cluster of Spartan allies, nor does she claim the compassion of Sparta, as defenceless against an overpowering Grecian neighbour. She complains of a Pan-Hellenic obligation as having been contravened by the Æginetans to her detriment and danger, and calls upon Sparta to enforce upon the delinquents respect to these obligations. For the first

¹ The outrages which Herodotus alleges to have been committed against these envoys at Sparta and Athens are perhaps to be regarded as a fiction of the later fifth century, when the Persians were held in contempt by the Greeks. Moreover, the visit of a Persian envoy at Athens in 491 accords ill with the version that Darius had declared 'war to the knife' upon them during the Ionian

revolt, and had launched the expedition of 492 specially against them (*cf.* Macan, *Herodotus*, ii., pp. 98-101).—Ed.

² This friendship may have dated from the patriotic reaction at Athens in 493 (see note to p. 133), and have ripened into a defensive alliance.—Ed.

time in Grecian history such a call is made; for the first time in Grecian history, it is effectively answered. We may well doubt whether it would have been thus answered—considering the tardy, unimpressible, and home-keeping character of the Spartans, with their general insensibility to distant dangers—if the adventure of the Persian herald had not occurred to gall their pride beyond endurance—to drive them into unpardonable hostility with the Great King—and to cast them into the same boat with Athens for keeping off an enemy who threatened the common liberties of Hellas.

From this time, then, we may consider that there exists a recognised political union of Greece against the Persian—or at least something as near to a political union as Grecian temper will permit—with Sparta as its head for the present. To such a pre-eminence of Sparta, Grecian history had been gradually tending. But the final event which placed it beyond dispute, and which humbled for the time her ancient and only rival—Argos—is now to be noticed.

It was about three or four years before the arrival of these Persian heralds in Greece, and nearly at the time when Milētus was besieged by the Persian generals, that a war broke out between Sparta and Argos¹—on what grounds Herodotus does not inform us. Kleomenēs, encouraged by a promise of the oracle that he should take Argos, led the Lacedæmonian troops to the banks of the Erasinus, the border river of the Argeian territory. But the sacrifices, without which no river could be crossed, were so unfavourable, that he altered his course, extorted some vessels from Ægina and Sikyon, and carried his troops by sea to Nauplia, the seaport belonging to Argos, and to the territory of Tiryns. The Argeians having marched their forces down to resist him, the two armies joined battle at Sêpeia near Tiryns. Kleomenēs, by a piece of simplicity on the part of his enemies which we find it difficult to credit in Herodotus, was enabled to attack them unprepared, and obtained a decisive victory. For the Argeians (the historian states) were so afraid of being over-reached by stratagem, in the post which their army occupied over against the enemy,

¹ That which marks the siege of Milētus, and the defeat of the Argeians by Kleomenēs, as contemporaneous, or nearly so, is—the common oracular dictum delivered in reference to both: in the same prophecy of the Pythia, one half alludes to the sufferings of Milētus, the other half to those of Argos (Herodot., vi. 19-77).

I consider this evidence of date to be better than the statement of Pausanias. That author places the enterprise against Argos immediately (*αὐτίκα*—Paus., iii. 4, 1) after the accession of Kleomenēs, who, as he was king when Mæandrius came from Samos (Herodot., iii. 148), must have come to the throne not later than 518 or 517 B.C. This would be thirty-seven years prior to 480 B.C., a date much too early for the war between Kleomenēs and the Argeians, as we may see by Herodotus (vii. 149).

[An early date for this campaign has lately been advocated by Mr. J. Wells (*Journ. Hell. Stud.*, 1905, pt. ii., pp. 193-197). The chief arguments advanced are (1) the statement of Pausanias; (2) the presence of 1,000 Argive volunteers in the wars of Ægina and Athens about 487 B.C.; (3) the expansion of Sparta beyond the Peloponnese, 519-509 B.C., which could hardly have occurred until Argos had been crippled; (4) the suspicious character of the Telesilla story, which suggests that the oracle on which it was based was a later fabrication.

Against this we may urge: (1) Pausanias' version clearly rests on a prejudiced account which seeks to emphasize the folly of preferring Kleomenēs as king to Doriæus. By placing his Argive campaign and its atrocities 'immediately after his accession', Spartan tradition threw the disastrous effect of this preference into stronger light. Hence the chronology may have been adapted to give point to a local Spartan version. (2) The Argives may have been attracted by the prospect of high pay, as when they aided Athens during the Peloponnesian war. (3) Sparta's policy shows many signs of hesitation between 519 and 495. The surrender of Plataea to Athens in 519 (see note on p. 82), the lukewarm prosecution of the campaign against Athens in 507, and the desertion of the Boeotian allies, the rejection of the proposals of Mæandrius and Aristagoras (515 and 499), almost require an impending 'Argive peril' to account for them. (4) An oracle so obscure as to require a fiction to explain it is for that very reason unlikely to be a later forgery. Moreover, the fact that the oracle gave a *wrong* forecast (a hard-won Argive victory) seems decisive in favour of its genuineness. Again, it is unlikely that the oracle was delivered 530-520; about this period Milētus stood on specially good terms with Persia, and to forecast its destruction would have constituted a gratuitous act of prophecy.—Ed.]

that they listened for the commands proclaimed aloud by the Lacedæmonian herald, and performed with their own army the same order which they thus heard given. This came to the knowledge of Kleomenês, who communicated private notice to his soldiers, that when the herald proclaimed orders to go to dinner, they should not obey, but immediately stand to their arms. We are to presume that the Argeian camp was sufficiently near to that of the Lacedæmonians to enable them to hear the voice of the herald—yet not within sight, from the nature of the ground. Accordingly, so soon as the Argeians heard the herald in the enemy's camp proclaim the word to go to dinner, they went to dinner themselves. In this disorderly condition they were attacked and overthrown by the Spartans. Many of them perished in the field, while the fugitives took refuge in a thick grove consecrated to their eponymous hero Argus. Kleomenês, having enclosed them therein, yet thinking it safer to employ deceit rather than force, ascertained from deserters the names of the chief Argeians thus shut up, and then invited them out successively by means of a herald—pretending that he had received their ransom, and that they were released. As fast as each man came out, he was put to death; the fate of these unhappy sufferers being concealed from their comrades within the grove by the thickness of the foliage, until someone climbing to the top of a tree detected and proclaimed the destruction going on—after about fifty of the victims had perished. Unable to entice any more of the Argeians from their consecrated refuge, which they still vainly hoped would protect them, Kleomenês set fire to the grove and burnt it to the ground. The persons within it appear to have been destroyed either by fire or by sword. Not less than six thousand citizens, the flower and strength of Argos, perished in this disastrous battle and retreat. So completely was the city prostrated, that Kleomenês might easily have taken it, had he chosen to march thither forthwith and attack it with vigour. If we are to believe later historians whom Pausanias, Polyænus, and Plutarch have copied, he did march thither and attack it, but was repulsed by the valour of the Argeian women, who, in the dearth of warriors occasioned by the recent defeat, took arms along with the slaves, headed by the poetess Telesilla, and gallantly defended the walls¹. This is probably a myth, generated by a desire to embody in detail the dictum of the oracle a little before, about 'the female conquering the male'². We are compelled by the distinct statement of Herodotus to affirm that Kleomenês never did attack it. Immediately after the burning of the sacred grove of Argos, he dismissed the bulk of his army to Sparta, retaining only one thousand choice troops with whom he marched up to the Hêræum, or great temple of Hêrê, between Argos and Mykênæ, to offer sacrifice. The priest in attendance forbade him to enter, saying that no stranger was allowed to offer sacrifice in the temple. But Kleomenês had once already forced his way into the sanctuary of Athênê on the Athenian Acropolis, in spite of the priestess and her interdict—and he now acted still more brutally towards the Argeian priest, for he directed his helots to drag him from the altar and scourge

¹ Pausan., ii. 20, 7; Polyæn., viii. 33; Plutarch, *De Virtut. Mulier.*, p. 245; Suidas, v. Τηλεσίλλα.

² Herodot., vi. 77:

Ἄλλ' ὅταν ἡ θηλεία τὸν ἀρσένει νικήσασα
Ἐξέλῃσιν, καὶ κύδος ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἄρῃται, etc.

If this prophecy can be said to have any distinct meaning, it probably refers to Hêrê, as protectress of Argos, repulsing the Spartans.

him. Having offered sacrifice, Kleomenēs returned with his remaining force to Sparta.

But the army whom he had sent home returned with a full persuasion that Argos might easily have been taken—that the king alone was to blame for having missed the opportunity. As soon as he himself returned, his enemies (perhaps his colleague Demaratus) brought him to trial before the ephors on a charge of having been bribed, against which he defended himself as follows. He had invaded the hostile territory on the faith of an assurance from the oracle that he should take Argos; but so soon as he had burnt down the sacred grove of the hero Argus (without knowing to whom it belonged), he became at once sensible that this was all that the god meant by *taking Argos*, and therefore that the divine promise had been fully realized. Accordingly, he did not think himself at liberty to commence any fresh attack, until he had ascertained whether the gods would approve it and would grant him success. It was with this view that he sacrificed in the Hēræum. There, though his sacrifice was favourable, he observed that the flame kindled on the altar flashed back from the bosom of the statue of Hērê, and not from her head. If the flame had flashed from her head, he would have known at once that the gods intended him to take the city by storm; but the flash from her bosom plainly indicated that the topmost success was out of his reach, and that he had already reaped all the glories which they intended for him. We may see that Herodotus, though he refrains from criticizing this story, suspects it to be a fabrication. Not so the Spartan ephors. To them it appeared not less true as a story than triumphant as a defence, ensuring to Kleomenēs an honourable acquittal¹.

Though this Spartan king lost the opportunity of taking Argos, his victories already gained had inflicted upon her a blow such as she did not recover for a generation, putting her for a time out of all condition to dispute the primacy of Greece with Lacedæmon. Both in legend and in earliest history, Argos stands forth as the first power in Greece, with legendary claims to headship, and decidedly above Lacedæmon, who gradually usurps from her, first the reality of superior power, next the recognition of pre-eminence—and is now, at the period which we have reached, taking upon herself both the rights and the duties of a presiding State over a body of allies who are bound both to her and to each other. Her title to this honour however, was never admitted at Argos, and it is very probable that the war just described grew in some way or other out of the increasing presidential power which circumstances were tending to throw into her hands. Now the complete temporary prostration of Argos was one essential condition to the quiet acquisition of this power by Sparta. Occurring as it did two or three years before the above-recounted adventure of the heralds, it removed the only rival at that time both willing and able to compete with Sparta—a rival who might well have prevented any effective union under another chief, though she could no longer have secured any Pan-Hellenic ascendancy for herself—a rival

¹ The real motive of Kleomenēs in retreating after his victory should rather be sought in the standing policy of Sparta with regard to Argos. In spite of constant enmities Sparta seems always to have treated her 'elder sister' with marked forbearance, and to have desired nothing more than to render her unable to do active damage.

This attitude manifests itself time after time during the Peloponnesian war (between 420 and 415). It is rare to find one Hellenic city compassing the complete ruin of another, and Kleomenēs, by sacking Argos, would have shocked Greek sentiment, and won the applause of none but a few extremists in his country.—Ed.

who would have seconded Ægina in her submission to the Persians, and would thus have lamed incurably the defensive force of Greece. The ships which Kleomenēs had obtained from the Æginetans as well as from the Sikyonians, against their own will, for landing his troops at Nauplia, brought upon both these cities the enmity of Argos, which the Sikyonians compromised by paying a sum of money, while the Æginetans refused to do so. The circumstances of the Kleomenic war had thus the effect not only of enfeebling Argos, but of alienating her from her natural allies and supporters, and clearing the ground for undisputed Spartan primacy.

Returning now to the complaint preferred by Athens to the Spartans against the traitorous submission of Ægina to Darius, we find that King Kleomenēs passed immediately over to that island for the purpose of inquiry and punishment. He was proceeding to seize and carry away as prisoners several of the leading Æginetans, when some among them opposed to him a menacing resistance, telling him that he came without any regular warrant from Sparta and under the influence of Athenian bribes—that in order to carry authority, both the Spartan kings ought to come together. It was not of their own accord that the Æginetans ventured to adopt so dangerous a course. Demaratus, the colleague of Kleomenēs in the junior or Prokleid line of kings, had suggested to them the step and promised to carry them through it safely. Dissension between the two co-ordinate kings was no new phenomenon at Sparta. But in the case of Demaratus and Kleomenēs, it had broken out some years previously on the occasion of the march against Attica. Hence Demaratus, hating his colleague more than ever, entered into the present intrigue with the Æginetans with the deliberate purpose of frustrating his intervention. He succeeded, so that Kleomenēs was compelled to return to Sparta, not without unequivocal menace against Krius and the other Æginetans who had repelled him, and not without a thorough determination to depose Demaratus.

It appears that suspicions had always attached to the legitimacy of Demaratus's birth. His reputed father, Aristo, having had no offspring by two successive wives, at last became enamoured of the wife of his friend Agētus—a woman of surpassing beauty—and entrapped him into an agreement, whereby each solemnly bound himself to surrender anything 'belonging to him which the other might ask for. That which Agētus asked from Aristo was at once given. In return, the latter demanded to have the wife of Agētus; nevertheless, the oath was peremptory, and he was forced to comply. The birth of Demaratus took place so soon after this change of husbands, that when it was first made known to Aristo, as he sat upon a bench along with the ephors, he counted on his fingers the number of months since his marriage, and exclaimed with an oath—'The child cannot be mine.' He soon, however, retracted his opinion, and acknowledged the child, who grew up without any question being publicly raised as to his birth, and succeeded his father on the throne. But the original words of Aristo had never been forgotten, and private suspicions were still cherished that Demaratus was really the son of his mother's first husband.

Of these suspicions Kleomenēs now resolved to avail himself, exciting Leotychidēs, the next heir in the Prokleid line of kings, to impugn

publicly the legitimacy of Demaratus—engaging to second him with all his influence as next in order for the crown—and exacting in return a promise that he would support the intervention against Ægina. Leotychidēs was animated not merely by ambition, but also by private enmity against Demaratus, who had disappointed him of his intended bride. He warmly entered into the scheme, arraigned Demaratus as no true Herakleid, and produced evidence to prove the original doubts expressed by Aristo. A serious dispute was thus raised at Sparta, wherein Kleomenēs, espousing the pretensions of Leotychidēs, recommended that the question as to the legitimacy of Demaratus should be decided by reference to the Delphian oracle. Through the influence of a powerful native of Delphi, he procured for the Pythian priestess an answer pronouncing that Demaratus was not the son of Aristo. Leotychidēs thus became king of the Prokleid line, while Demaratus descended into a private station, and was elected at the ensuing solemnity of the Gymnopædia to an official function. The new king, unable to repress a burst of triumphant spite, sent an attendant to ask him in the public theatre, how he felt as an officer after having once been a king. Demaratus retired home from the theatre, and at once quitted Sparta for Elis, under pretence of going to consult the Delphian oracle.

Demaratus was well known to be a high-spirited and ambitious man—noted, among other things, as the only Lacedæmonian king down to the time of Herodotus who had ever gained a chariot victory at Olympia. Hence Kleomenēs and Leotychidēs became alarmed at the mischief which he might do them in exile. By the law of Sparta, no Herakleid was allowed to establish his residence out of the country, on pain of death¹. Accordingly they sent in pursuit of him, and seized him in the island of Zakynthus. But the Zakynthians would not consent to surrender him, so that he passed unobstructed into Asia, where he presented himself to Darius, and was received with abundant favours and presents.

Meanwhile Kleomenēs, having obtained a consentient colleague in Leotychidēs, went with him over to Ægina, eager to revenge himself for the affront which had been put upon him. To the requisition and presence of the two kings jointly, the Æginetans did not dare to oppose any resistance. Kleomenēs made choice of ten citizens eminent for wealth, station, and influence. Conveying them away to Athens, he deposited them as hostages in the hands of the Athenians.

It was in this state that the affairs of Athens and of Greece generally were found by the Persian armament which landed at Marathon, the progress of which we are now about to follow. And the events just recounted were of material importance, considered in their indirect bearing upon the success of that armament. Sparta had now, on the invitation of Athens, assumed to herself for the first time a formal Pan-Hellenic primacy, her ancient rival Argos being too much broken to contest it—her two kings, at this juncture unanimous, employ their presiding interference in coercing Ægina, and placing Æginetan hostages in the hands of Athens. The Æginetans would not have been unwilling to purchase victory over a neighbour and rival at the cost of submission to Persia, and it was the Spartan interference only which restrained them from

¹ Plutarch, *Agis*, c. 11: κατὰ δὲ τινα νόμον παλαίων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ τὸν Ἡρακλείδην ἐκ γυναικὸς

ἀλλοδαπῆς τεκνούσθαι, τὸν δ' ἀπελθόντα τῆς Σπάρτης ἐπὶ μετακίσμῳ πρὸς ἑτέρου ἀποθνήσκειν κελεύει.

assailing Athens conjointly with the Persian invaders ; thus leaving the hands of the Athenians free, and their courage undiminished, for the coming trial.

Meanwhile a Persian force, brought together in consequence of the preparation made during the last two years in every part of the empire, had assembled in the Aleïan plain of Kilikia near the sea. A fleet of six hundred armed triremes, together with many transports both for men and horses, was brought hither for their embarkation : the troops were put on board and sailed along the coast to Samos in Ionia. The Ionic and Æolic Greeks constituted an important part of this armament, while the Athenian exile Hippias was on board as guide and auxiliary in the attack of Attica. The generals were Datis, a Median—and Artaphernês, son of the satrap of Sardis so named, and nephew of Darius. We may remark that Datis is the first person of Median lineage who is mentioned as appointed to high command after the accession of Darius, which had been preceded and marked by an outbreak of national hostility between the Medes and Persians¹. Their instructions were, generally, to reduce to subjection and tribute all such Greeks as had not already given earth and water. But Darius directed them most particularly to conquer Eretria and Athens, and to bring the inhabitants as slaves into his presence.

The recent terrific storm near Mount Athos deterred the Persians from following the example of Mardonius, and taking their course by the Hellespont and Thrace. It was resolved to strike straight across the Ægean (the mode of attack which intelligent Greeks like Themistoklês most feared, even after the repulse of Xerxês) from Samos to Eubœa, attacking the intermediate islands in the way. Among those islands was Naxos, which ten years before had stood a long siege, and repelled the Persian Megabatês with the Milesian Aristagoras. It was one of the main objects of Datis to efface this stain on the Persian arms and to take a signal revenge on the Naxians. Crossing from Samos to Naxos, he landed his army on the island, which he found an easier prize than he had expected. The terrified citizens, abandoning their town, fled with their families to the highest summits of their mountains ; while the Persians, seizing as slaves a few who had been dilatory in flight, burnt the undefended town with its edifices sacred and profane².

From Naxos Datis despatched his fleet round the other Cyclades islands, requiring from each, hostages for fidelity and a contingent to increase his army. With the sacred island of Delos, however, he dealt tenderly and respectfully. The Delians had fled before his approach to Tênos, but Datis sent a herald to invite them back again, promised to preserve their persons and property inviolate, and proclaimed that he had received express orders from the Great King to reverence the island in which Apollo and Artemis were born. His acts corresponded with this language ; for the fleet was not allowed to touch the island, and he himself, landing with only a few attendants, offered a magnificent sacrifice at the altar. As a large portion of his armament consisted of Ionic Greeks, such pronounced respect to the island of Delos may probably be ascribed to the

¹ Rawlinson, *Herodotus*, app. bk. iii., essay ii., proves that the revolt at the outset of Darius' reign was inspired by religious and not by national feeling. —ED.

² The historians of Naxos affirmed that Datis

had been repulsed from the island. We find this statement in Plutarch, *De Malign. Herodot.*, c. 36, p. 869, among his violent and unfounded contradictions of Herodotus.

desire of satisfying their religious feelings; for in their days of early freedom, this island had been the scene of their solemn periodical festivals, as I have already more than once remarked.

Pursuing his course without resistance along the islands, and demanding reinforcements as well as hostages from each, Datis at length touched the southernmost portion of Eubœa—the town of Karystus and its territory. The Karystians at first refused either to give hostages or to furnish reinforcements against their friends and neighbours. But they were speedily compelled to submission by the aggressive devastation of the invaders.

The destination of the armament was no secret to the inhabitants of Eretria, among whom consternation, aggravated by intestine differences, was the reigning sentiment. They made application to Athens for aid, which was readily afforded to them by means of those four thousand kleruchs or out-citizens whom the Athenians had planted sixteen years before in the neighbouring territory of Chalkis. Notwithstanding such reinforcement, however, many of them despaired of defending the city, and thought only of seeking shelter on the unassailable summits of the island, as the more numerous and powerful Naxians had already done before them; while another party, treacherously seeking their own profit out of the public calamity, lay in wait for an opportunity of betraying the city to the Persians. Though a public resolution was taken to defend the city, yet so manifest was the absence of that stoutness of heart which could alone avail to save it, that a leading Eretrian named Æschinês was not ashamed to forewarn the four thousand Athenian allies of the coming treason, and urge them to save themselves before it was too late. They followed his advice and passed over to Attica by way of Orôpus; while the Persians disembarked their troops, and even their horses, in expectation that the Eretrians would come out and fight. As the Eretrians did not come out, they proceeded to lay siege to the city, and for some days met with a brave resistance, so that the loss on both sides was considerable. At length two of the leading citizens betrayed Eretria to the besiegers; its temples were burnt, and its inhabitants dragged into slavery. It is impossible to credit the exaggerated statement of Plato, which is applied by him to the Persians at Eretria as it had been before applied by Herodotus to the Persians at Chios and Samos—that they swept the territory clean of inhabitants by joining hands and forming a line across its whole breadth¹. That a large proportion of the inhabitants were carried away as prisoners, there can be no doubt. But the traitors who betrayed the town were spared and rewarded by the Persians², and we see plainly that either some of the inhabitants must have been left, or new settlers introduced, when we find the Eretrians reckoned ten years afterwards among the opponents of Xerxês.

After halting a few days at Eretria, and depositing in the neighbouring

¹ Plato, *Legg.*, iii., p. 698, and *Menexen.*, c. 10, p. 240; Diogen. Laërt., iii., 33; Herodot., vi. 31: compare Strabo, x., p. 446, who ascribes to Herodotus the statement of Plato about the *συνήνευσις* of Eretria. Plato says nothing about the betrayal of the city.

It is to be remarked, that in the passage of the treatise *De Legibus*, Plato mentions this story (about the Persians having swept the territory of Eretria clean of its inhabitants) with some doubt as to its truth, and as if it were a rumour inten-

tionally circulated by Datis with a view to frighten the Athenians. But in the *Menexenus* the story is given as if it were an authentic historical fact.

² Plutarch, *De Garrulitate*, c. 15, p. 510. The descendants of Gongylus the Eretrian, who passed over to the Persians on this occasion, are found nearly a century afterwards in possession of a town and district in Mysia, which the Persian king had bestowed upon their ancestor. Herodotus does not mention Gongylus (*Xenoph.*, *Hellen.*, iii. 1, 6).

islet of Ægilia the prisoners recently captured, Datis re-embarked his army to cross over to Attica, and landed in the memorable bay of Marathon on the eastern coast—the spot indicated by the despot Hippias, who now landed along with the Persians, twenty years after his expulsion from the government. Forty-seven years had elapsed since he had made as a young man this same passage, from Eretria to Marathon, in conjunction with his father Peisistratus, on the occasion of the second restoration of the latter. On that previous occasion, the force accompanying the father had been immeasurably inferior to that which now seconded the son. Yet it had been found amply sufficient to carry him in triumph to Athens, with feeble opposition from citizens alike irresolute and disunited. And the march of Hippias from Marathon to Athens would now have been equally easy, as it was doubtless conceived to be by himself, both in his waking hopes and in the dream which Herodotus mentions—had not the Athenians whom he found been men radically different from those whom he had left.

To that great renewal of the Athenian character, under the democratical institutions which had subsisted since the dispossession of Hippias, I have already pointed attention in a former chapter. The modifications introduced by Kleisthenês in the Constitution had now existed about eighteen years, without any attempt to overthrow them by violence. Individual citizens doubtless remained partisans in secret, and perhaps correspondents, of Hippias. But the mass of citizens, in every scale of life, could look upon his return with nothing but aversion. With what degree of newly-acquired energy the democratical Athenians could act in defence of their country and institutions, has already been related in a former chapter. But unfortunately we possess few particulars of Athenian history, during the decade preceding 490 B.C., nor can we follow in detail the working of the Government. The new form, however, which Athenian politics had assumed becomes partially manifest when we observe the three leaders who stand prominent at this important epoch—Miltiadês, Themistoklês, and Aristeidês.

The first of the three had returned to Athens three or four years before the approach of Datis, after his absence in the Chersonesus of Thrace, whither he had been originally sent by Hippias about the year 517-516 B.C., to inherit the property as well as the supremacy of his uncle, the ækist Miltiadês. As despot of the Chersonese, and as one of the subjects of Persia, he had been among the Ionians who accompanied Darius to the Danube in his Scythian expedition. He had been the author of that memorable recommendation which Histiaëus and the other despots did not think it their interest to follow—of destroying the bridge and leaving the Persian king to perish. Subsequently he had been unable to remain permanently in the Chersonese, for reasons which have before been noticed; but he seems to have occupied it during the period of the Ionic revolt. What part he took in that revolt we do not know. On arriving at Athens, after his escape from the Phœnician fleet, he was brought to trial before the judicial popular assembly for alleged misgovernment in the Chersonese, or for what Herodotus calls 'his despotism' there exercised. Probably the Athenian citizens settled in that peninsula may have had good reason to complain of him—the more so as he had carried out with him the maxims of government prevalent at

Athens under the Peisistratids, and had in his pay a body of Thracian mercenaries¹. However, the people at Athens honourably acquitted him, and he was one of the ten annually elected generals of the Republic, during the year of this Persian expedition.

The character of Miltiadēs is one of great bravery and decision. Yet he does not peculiarly belong to the democracy of Kleisthenēs, like his younger contemporaries Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs. The two latter are specimens of a class of men new at Athens since the expulsion of Hippias, and contrasting forcibly with Peisistratus, Lykurgus, and Megaklēs, the political leaders of the preceding generation. Themistoklēs and, in a less degree, Aristeidēs, different as they were in disposition, agree in being politicians of the democratical stamp, exercising ascendancy by and through the people—devoting their time to the discharge of public duties, and to the frequent discussions in the political and judicial meetings of the people—manifesting those combined powers of action, comprehension, and persuasive speech, which gradually accustomed the citizens to look to them as advisers as well as leaders—but always subject to criticism and accusation from unfriendly rivals, and exercising such rivalry towards each other with an asperity constantly increasing.

Neither Themistoklēs nor Aristeidēs could boast a lineage of gods and heroes, like the Æakid Miltiadēs. Both were of middling station and circumstances. Aristeidēs, son of Lysimachus, was on both sides of pure Athenian blood; but the wife of Neoklēs, father of Themistoklēs, was a foreign woman of Thrace or of Karia: and such an alliance is the less surprising, since Themistoklēs must have been born during the dynasty of the Peisistratids, when the status of an Athenian citizen had not yet acquired its political value. There was a marked contrast between these two eminent men—those points which stood most conspicuous in the one being comparatively deficient in the other. In the description of Themistoklēs, which we have the advantage of finding briefly sketched by Thukydides, the circumstance most emphatically brought out is, his immense force of spontaneous invention and apprehension, without any previous aid either from teaching or gradual practice. The might of unassisted nature² was never so strikingly exhibited as in him. He conceived the complications of a present embarrassment, and divined the chances of a mysterious future, with equal sagacity and equal quickness. The right expedient seemed to flash upon his mind extempore, even in the most perplexing contingencies, without the least necessity for premeditation. He was not less distinguished for daring and resource in action: when engaged on any joint affairs, his superior competence marked him out as the leader for others to follow, and no business, however foreign to his experience, ever took him by surprise, or came wholly amiss to him. Such is the remarkable picture which Thukydides draws of a countryman whose death nearly coincided in time with his own birth. The untutored readiness and universality of Themistoklēs probably formed in his mind a contrast to the more elaborate discipline, and careful preliminary study, with which the statesmen of his own day—

¹ The charge of 'tyrannical government' is unlikely, for the bitterest enemies of Miltiadēs—the Alkmaonidae—were almost certainly partisans of the ex-tyrant Hippias. No satisfactory reason can be supplied for a capital impeachment of Miltiadēs at this date. It is tempting to conjecture

that an attempt was made to disqualify Miltiadēs for the generalship by an Apodokimasia (if such a process existed early in the fifth century), and that this endeavour was magnified into a judicial trial through confusion with the impeachment after Marathon.—Ed.

² Thukyd., i. 138.

and Periklēs especially, the greatest of them—approached the consideration and discussion of public affairs. Themistoklēs had received no teaching from philosophers, sophists and rhetors, who were the instructors of well-born youth in the days of Thukydidēs, and whom Aristophanēs, the contemporary of the latter, so unmercifully derides—treating such instruction as worse than nothing, and extolling, in comparison with it, the unlettered courage, with mere gymnastic accomplishments, of the victors at Marathon. There is no evidence in the mind of Thukydidēs of any such undue contempt towards his own age. The same terms of contrast are tacitly present to his mind, but he seems to treat the great capacity of Themistoklēs as the more a matter of wonder, since it sprang up without that preliminary cultivation which had gone to the making of Periklēs.

The general character given by Plutarch¹, though many of his anecdotes are both trifling and apocryphal, is quite consistent with the brief sketch just cited from Thukydidēs. Themistoklēs had an unbounded passion—not merely for glory, insomuch that the laurels of Miltiadēs acquired at Marathon deprived him of rest—but also for display of every kind. He was eager to vie with men richer than himself in showy exhibition—one great source, though not the only source, of popularity at Athens—nor was he at all scrupulous in procuring the means of doing so. Besides being assiduous in attendance at the Ekklesia and the Dikastery, he knew most of the citizens by name, and was always ready with advice to them in their private affairs. Moreover, he possessed all the tactics of an expert party-man in conciliating political friends and in defeating political enemies. And though he was in the early part of his life sincerely bent upon the upholding and aggrandizement of his country, and was on some most critical occasions of unspeakable value to it, yet on the whole his morality was as reckless as his intelligence was eminent. He will be found grossly corrupt in the exercise of power, and employing tortuous means, sometimes, indeed, for ends in themselves honourable and patriotic, but sometimes also merely for enriching himself. He ended a glorious life by years of deep disgrace, with the forfeiture of all Hellenic esteem and brotherhood—a rich man, an exile, a traitor, and a pensioner of the Great King, pledged to undo his own previous work of liberation accomplished at the victory of Salamis.

Of Aristeidēs we possess, unfortunately, no description from the hand of Thukydidēs. Yet his character is so simple and consistent, that we may safely accept the brief but unqualified encomium of Herodotus and Plato, expanded as it is in the biography of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos², however little the details of the latter can be trusted. Aristeidēs was inferior to Themistoklēs in resource, quickness, flexibility, and power of coping with difficulties; but incomparably superior to him, as well as to other rivals and contemporaries, in integrity public as well as private; inaccessible to pecuniary temptations as well as to other seductive influences, and deserving as well as enjoying the highest measure of personal confidence. He is described as the peculiar friend of Kleisthenēs, the first founder of the democracy³—as pursuing a straight and single-handed

¹ Plutarch, *Themistoklēs*, c. 3, 4, 5; Cornelius Nepos, *Themist.*, c. 1.

² Herodot., viii. 79; Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 172: ἀριστον ἀνδρα ἐν Ἀθῆναις καὶ δικαιοτάτον.

³ Plutarch, *Aristeidēs*, c. 1-4; *Themistoklēs*, c. 3; *An Seni sit gerenda respublica*, c. 12, p. 790; *Præcepta Reip. Gerend.*, c. ii., p. 805.

course in political life, with no solicitude for party-ties¹, and with little care either to conciliate friends or to offend enemies—as unflinching in the exposure of corrupt practices, by whomsoever committed or upheld—as earning for himself the lofty surname of ‘the Just,’ not less by his judicial decisions in the capacity of archon, than by his equity in private arbitrations and even his candour in political dispute—and as manifesting, throughout a long public life full of tempting opportunities, an uprightness without flaw and beyond all suspicion, recognised equally by his bitter contemporary the poet Timokreon² and by the allies of Athens upon whom he first assessed the tribute. Few of the leading men in any part of Greece were without some taint on their reputation, deserved or undeserved, in regard to pecuniary probity. But whoever became notoriously recognised as possessing this vital quality, acquired by means of it a firmer hold on the public esteem than even eminent talents could confer. Thukydides ranks conspicuous probity among the first of the many ascendent qualities possessed by Periklēs; while Nikias, equal to him in this respect, though immeasurably inferior in every other, owed to it a still larger proportion of that exaggerated confidence which the Athenian people continued so long to repose in him. The abilities of Aristeidēs—though apparently adequate to every occasion on which he was engaged, and only inferior when we compare him with so remarkable a man as Themistoklēs—were put in the shade by this incorruptible probity, which procured for him, however, along with the general esteem, no inconsiderable amount of private enmity from jobbers whom he exposed, and even some jealousy from persons who heard it proclaimed with offensive ostentation. We are told that a rustic and unlettered citizen gave his ostracizing vote and expressed his dislike against Aristeidēs³, on the simple ground that he was tired of hearing him always called ‘the Just’. Neither indiscreet friends nor artful enemies, however, could rob him of the lasting esteem of his countrymen, which he enjoyed, though with intervals of their displeasure, to the end of his life. He was ostracized during a part of the period between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, at a time when the rivalry between him and Themistoklēs was so violent that both could not remain at Athens without peril; but the dangers of Athens during the invasion of Xerxēs brought him back before the ten years of exile were expired. His fortune, originally very moderate, was still farther diminished during the course of his life, so that he died very poor, and the State was obliged to lend aid to his children.

Such were the characters of Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs, the two earliest leaders thrown up by the Athenian democracy. Half a century before, Themistoklēs would have been an active partisan in the faction of the Parali or the Pedieis, while Aristeidēs would probably have remained an unnoticed citizen. At the present period of Athenian history,

¹ The entire abstention of Aristeidēs from party politics is not beyond dispute. He is generally found sharing the good and evil fortunes of the Alkmaonidae. In 489, when he became archon, in 479 and subsequent years, when he was prominent in the public service, the Alkmaonid party were enjoying political ascendancy, and their chief representative, Xanthippos is often found acting in union with Aristeidēs. The latter’s ostracism in 483 likewise follows close upon that of the Alkmaonid leaders (see note to p. 179).

The title of ‘Just’ may have been originally

conferred on Aristeidēs in consequence of his assessment of the Delian Confederates in 478 (Meyer, *Gesch. d. Altertums*, iii., p. 492). This title has led later writers, from the fourth century onwards, to idealize Aristeidēs’ character, and has served as a peg on which to hang innumerable anecdotes. Our real knowledge of Aristeidēs is almost entirely confined to the scanty notices about him in Herodotus.—Ed.

² Timokreon *ap.* Plutarch, *Themistoklēs*, c. 21.

³ Plutarch, *Aristeidēs*, c. 7.

the characters of soldier, magistrate, and orator, were intimately blended together in a citizen who stood forward for eminence, though they tended more and more to divide themselves during the ensuing century and a half. Aristeidēs and Miltiadēs were both elected among the ten generals, each for his respective tribe, in the year of the expedition of Datis across the Ægean, and probably even after that expedition was known to be on its voyage. Moreover, we are led to suspect from a passage in Plutarch, that Themistoklēs also was general of his tribe on the same occasion¹, though this is doubtful; but it is certain that he fought at Marathon. The ten generals had jointly the command of the army, each of them taking his turn to exercise it for a day. In addition to the ten, the third archon or polemarch was considered as eleventh in the military council. The polemarch of this year was Kallimachus of Aphidnæ.

Such were the chiefs of the military force, and to a great degree the administrators of foreign affairs, at the time when the four thousand Athenian kleruchs or settlers planted in Eubœa—escaping from Eretria, now invested by the Persians—brought word to their countrymen at home that the fall of that city was impending. It was obvious that the Persian host would proceed from Eretria forthwith against Athens. A few days afterwards Hippias disembarked them at Marathon.

Of the feeling which now prevailed at Athens we have no details. Opinions were not unanimous as to the proper steps to be taken, nor were suspicions of treason wanting. Pheidippidēs² the courier was sent to Sparta immediately to solicit assistance; and such was his prodigious activity, that he performed this journey of 150 miles, on foot, in forty-eight hours³. Revealing to the ephors that Eretria was already enslaved, he entreated their assistance to avert the same fate from Athens, the most ancient city in Greece. The Spartan authorities readily promised their aid, but unfortunately it was now the ninth day of the moon. Ancient law or custom forbade them to march, in this month at least, during the last quarter before the full moon; but after the full, they engaged to march without delay. Five days' delay at this critical moment might prove the utter ruin of the endangered city; yet the reason assigned seems to have been no pretence on the part of the Spartans. It was mere blind tenacity of ancient habit, which we shall find to abate, though never to disappear, as we advance in their history⁴.

In this respect the answer brought by Pheidippidēs was mischievous, as it tended to increase that uncertainty and indecision which already prevailed among the ten generals, as to the proper steps for meeting the invaders. Partly, perhaps, in reliance on this expected Spartan help, five out of the ten generals were decidedly averse to an immediate engagement with the Persians, while Miltiadēs with the remaining force strenuously urged that not a moment should be lost in bringing the enemy to action, without leaving time to the timid and the treacherous to establish correspondence with Hippias and to take some active step for paralyzing all united action on the part of the citizens. This most momentous debate, upon which the fate of Athens hung, is represented

¹ Plutarch, *Aristeidēs*, c. 5.

² The name is now usually read 'Philippidēs'.
—Ed.

³ Mr. Kinneir remarks that the Persian Cassids, or foot-messengers, will travel for several days

successively at the rate of sixty or seventy miles a day (*Geographical Memoir of Persia*, p. 44).

⁴ We may suspect that Sparta during this crisis missed the firm hand of Kleomenēs, who probably was in exile at the time (see p. 176).—Ed.

by Herodotus to have occurred at Marathon, after the army had marched out and taken post there within sight of the Persians; while Cornelius Nepos describes it as having been raised before the army quitted the city—upon the question whether it was prudent to meet the enemy at all in the field, or to confine the defence to the city and the sacred rock. Inaccurate as this latter author generally is, his statement seems more probable here than that of Herodotus. For the ten generals would scarcely march out of Athens to Marathon without having previously resolved to fight: moreover, the question between fighting in the field or resisting behind the walls, which had already been raised at Eretria, seems the natural point on which the five mistrustful generals would take their stand¹.

However this may be, the equal division of opinion among the ten generals, whether manifested at Marathon or at Athens, is certain. Miltiadês had to await the casting-vote of the polemarch Kallimachus. To him he represented emphatically the danger of delay, with the chance of some traitorous intrigue occurring to excite disunion and aggravate the alarms of the citizens. Nothing could prevent such treason from breaking out, with all its terrific consequences of enslavement to the Persians and to Hippias, except a bold, decisive, and immediate attack—the success of which he (Miltiadês) was prepared to guarantee. Fortunately for Athens, the polemarch embraced the opinion of Miltiadês; while the seditious movements which were preparing did not show themselves until after the battle had been gained. Aristeidês and Themistoklês are both recorded to have seconded Miltiadês warmly in this proposal, while all the other generals agreed in surrendering to Miltiadês their days of command, so as to make him as much as they could the sole leader of the army². It is said that the latter awaited the day of his own regular turn before he fought the battle. Yet considering the eagerness which he displayed to bring on an immediate and decisive action, we cannot suppose that he would have admitted any serious postponement upon such a punctilio³.

While the army were mustered on the ground sacred to Hêraklês near Marathon, with the Persians and their fleet occupying the plain and shore beneath, and in preparation for immediate action—they were joined by the whole force of the little town of Plataea, consisting of about 1,000 hoplites, who had marched directly from their own city to the spot, along the southern range of Kithærôn, and passing through Dekeleia. Their coming on this important occasion seems to have been a spontaneous effort of gratitude, which ought not to be the less commended because their

¹ The general question of marching out or standing at bay behind the walls was no doubt settled in Athens; but the method and moment of attack can only have been decided on the field (*cf.* Macan, *op. cit.*, ii., pp. 208, 209).—Ed.

² Herodotus' account betrays some confusion as to the relations between Kallimachus and Miltiadês. The former is represented as presiding over the debate, but the conduct of operations during the battle seems entirely in the hands of Miltiadês. Moreover, the historian clearly conceives the functions of the polemarchus and the stratêgi to have been the same as in his own day, when the former magistrate had lost all importance, and was selected by the indiscriminate verdict of the lot, and all the real power was vested in the generals.

But it is now certain that no change was made in the position of the higher magistrates before 487 (*Ath. Pol.*, c. 22); hence we may safely conclude that Kallimachus was the commander-in-chief, and Miltiadês his subordinate. If Herodotus has unduly exalted Miltiadês' official standing, and later historians have recognised him as generalissimo to the complete exclusion of Kallimachus, their mistake was most probably due to the later tradition of the Athenian people, which rightly made Miltiadês the hero of the campaign. But it was by his advice, and not by his word of command, that Miltiadês brought the battle to a successful issue (*cf.* Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-178).—Ed.

³ For the real explanation of this delay, see note on p. 155.—Ed.

interests were really wrapped up in those of Athens—since if the latter had been conquered, nothing could have saved Plataea from being subdued by the Thebans. Yet many a Grecian town would have disregarded both generous impulse and rational calculation, in the fear of provoking a new and terrific enemy. If we summon up to our imaginations all the circumstances of the case—which it requires some effort to do, because our authorities come from the subsequent generations, after Greece had ceased to fear the Persians—we shall be sensible that this volunteer march of the whole Plataean force to Marathon is one of the most affecting incidents of all Grecian history. Upon Athens generally it produced an indelible impression, commemorated ever afterwards in the public prayers of the Athenian herald¹, and repaid by a grant to the Plataeans of the full civil rights (seemingly without the political rights) of Athenian citizens.

Of the two opposing armies at Marathon, we are told that the Athenians were 10,000 hoplites, either including, or besides, the 1,000 who came from Plataea². This statement is no way improbable, though it does not come from Herodotus, who is our only really valuable authority on the case, and who mentions no numerical total. Indeed, the number named may seem smaller than we should have expected, considering that no less than 4,000 kleruchs or out-settled citizens had just come over from Euboea. A sufficient force of citizens must of course have been left behind to defend the city. The numbers of the Persians we cannot be said to know at all, nor is there anything certain except that they were greatly superior to the Greeks. We hear from Herodotus that their armament originally consisted of six hundred ships of war, but we are not told how many separate transports there were; moreover, reinforcements had been procured as they came across the Ægean from the islands successively conquered³. There were a certain proportion of cavalry, and some transports expressly prepared for the conveyance of horses. Moreover, Herodotus tells us that Hippias selected the plain of Marathon for a landing-place, because it was the most convenient spot in Attica for cavalry movements—though it is singular, that in the battle the cavalry are not mentioned⁴.

¹ Thukyd., iii. 55.

² Justin states 10,000 Athenians, besides 1,000 Plataeans. Cornelius Nepos, Pausanias and Plutarch give 10,000 as the sum total of both. Justin, ii. 9; Corn. Nep., *Miltiad.*, c. 4; Pausan., iv. 25, 5; x. 20, 2; compare also Suidas, v., *Ivniat*.

³ Justin (ii. 9) says that the total of the Persian army was 600,000, and that 200,000 perished. Plato (*Menexen.*, p. 240) and (Lysias) (*Orat. Funer.*, c. 7) speak of the Persian total as 500,000 men. Valerius Maximus (v. 3), Pausanias (iv. 25), and Plutarch (*Parallel. Græc.*, ad init.), give 300,000 men. Cornelius Nepos (*Miltiad.*, c. 5) gives the more moderate total of 170,000 men.

The silence of Herodotus (whom we shall find hereafter very circumstantial as to the numbers of the army under Xerxes) seems to show that he had no information which he could trust. His account of the battle of Marathon presents him in honourable contrast with the loose and boastful assertors who followed him. For though he does not tell us much, and falls lamentably short of what we should like to know, yet all that he does say is reasonable and probable as to the proceedings of both armies; and the little which he states becomes more trustworthy on that very account—because it is so little—showing that he keeps strictly within his authorities.

There is nothing in the account of Herodotus to make us believe that he had ever visited the ground of Marathon.

The strength of the Persian army is not altogether beyond computation. (1) Allowing for 100 soldiers on each Persian man-of-war (it is extremely unlikely that the troops were carried on special transports), we obtain a total of 60,000. But the number 600, which is also assigned to the Persian fleets of 512 (Herodot., iv. 87) and 494 B.C. (Herodot., vi. 9), and reappears in simple multiples or aliquot parts in Xerxes' campaign and on later occasions, is clearly a conventional total, and may not have been attained on this occasion (Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, iii., p. 325; Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 49 note). (2) The Persian loss of 5,400 probably represents one-third or one-fourth of the numbers engaged, for it is clear that their casualties, especially in the centre, were proportionately high. If we suppose about one-half of the army was not present at the battle (see note on p. 155), this leaves us a total of 40,000 or 50,000 men.—Ed.

⁴ The statement that the plain of Marathon was suitable for cavalry action has lately been challenged. It is asserted that the ground was too highly cultivated and intersected with too many trenches (Stein, *Herodotus*, vi. 102, 2 note; T. M. Hughes in *Class. Rev.*, March, 1901, pp. 131-136).

It is difficult to say whether these obstacles would have baffled the fine light cavalry of the Persians. Perhaps the horses were merely landed for rest and pasture after the long sea-voyage. On the absence of the cavalry from the battle, see note on p. 155.—Ed.

Marathon, situated near to a bay on the eastern coast of Attica, and in a direction E.N.E. from Athens, is divided by the high ridge of Mount Pentelikus from the city, with which it communicated by two roads, one to the north, another to the south of that mountain. Of these two roads, the northern, at once the shortest and the most difficult, is twenty-two miles in length: the southern—longer, but more easy, and the only one practicable for chariots—is twenty-six miles in length, or about six and a half hours of computed march. It passed between Mounts Pentelikus and Hymettus, through the ancient demes of Gargëttus and Pallênê, and was the road by which Peisistratus and Hippias, when they landed at Marathon forty-seven years before, had marched to Athens. The bay of Marathon, sheltered by a projecting cape from the northward, affords both deep water and a shore convenient for landing; while its plain extends in a perfect level along this fine bay, and is in length about six miles, in breadth never less than about one mile and a half. Two marshes bound the extremities of the plain: the southern is not very large, and is almost dry at the conclusion of the great heats; but the northern, which generally covers considerably more than a square mile, offers several parts which are at all seasons impassable. Both, however, leave a broad, firm, sandy beach between them and the sea. The uninterrupted flatness of the plain is hardly relieved by a single tree; and an amphitheatre of rocky hills and rugged mountains separates it from the rest of Attica, over the lower ridges of which some steep and difficult paths communicate with the districts of the interior¹.

The position occupied by Miltiadês before the battle, identified as it was to all subsequent Athenians by the sacred grove of Hêraklês near Marathon, was probably on some portion of the high ground above this plain. The Persians occupied a position on the plain; their fleet was ranged along the beach, and Hippias himself marshalled them for the battle. The native Persians and Sakæ, the best troops in the whole army, were placed in the centre, which they considered as the post of honour, and which was occupied by the Persian king himself, when present at a battle. The right wing was so regarded by the Greeks, and the polemarch Kallimachus had the command of it. The hoplites were arranged in the order of their respective tribes from right to left, and at the extreme left stood the Plateans. It was necessary for Miltiadês to present a front equal or nearly equal to that of the more numerous Persian host, in order to guard himself from being taken in flank. With this view he drew up the central tribes, including the Leontis and Antiochis, in shallow files and occupying a large breadth of ground; while each of the wings was in stronger and deeper order, so as to make his attack efficient on both sides. His whole army consisted of hoplites, with some slaves as unarmed or light-armed attendants, but without either bowmen or cavalry.

At length the sacrifices in the Greek camp were favourable for battle. Miltiadês, who had everything to gain by coming immediately to close quarters, ordered his army to advance at a running step over the interval of one mile which separated the two armies². It doubtless operated

¹ On the topography of Marathon, which has been more closely investigated since Grote wrote, see especially Grundy, *Great Persian War*, pp. 163-165, and the map of Attica by Curtius, Kaupert, and Milchhöfer (Berlin, 1903).—Ed.

² Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay seem disposed

to reduce the run to a quick march, partly on the ground that the troops must have been disordered and out of breath by running a mile. The probability is, that they really were so, and that such was the great reason of the defeat of the centre. It required some steadiness of discipline

beneficially in rendering the Persian archers comparatively innocuous, but we may reasonably suppose that it also disordered the Athenian ranks, and that when they reached the Persian front, they were both out of breath and unsteady in that line of presented spears and shields which constituted their force. On the two wings, where the files were deep, such disorder produced no mischievous effect: the Persians, after a certain resistance, were overborne and driven back. But in the centre, where the files were shallow, and where, moreover, the native Persians and other choice troops of the army were posted, the breathless and disordered Athenian hoplites found themselves in far greater difficulties. The tribes Leontis and Antiochis, with Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs among them, were actually defeated, broken, driven back, and pursued by the Persians and Sakæ. Miltiadēs seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a check when he found himself compelled to diminish so materially the depth of his centre. For his wings, having routed the enemies opposed to them, were stayed from pursuit until the centre was extricated, and the Persians and Sakæ put to flight along with the rest. The pursuit then became general, and the Persians were chased to their ships ranged in line along the shore. Some of them became involved in the impassable marsh and there perished¹. The Athenians tried to set the ships on fire, but the defence here was both vigorous and successful—several of the forward warriors of Athens were slain, and only seven ships out of the numerous fleet destroyed. This part of the battle terminated to the advantage of the Persians. They repulsed the Athenians from the seashore, so as to secure a safe re-embarkation, leaving few or no prisoners, but a rich spoil of tents and equipments which had been disembarked and could not be carried away.

Herodotus estimates the number of those who fell on the Persian side in this memorable action at 6,400 men. The number of Athenian dead is accurately known, since all were collected for the last solemn obsequies—they were 192. How many were wounded we do not hear. The brave Kallimachus the polemarch, and Stesilaus, one of the ten generals, were among the slain, together with Kynegirus son of Euphorion, who, in laying hold on the poop-staff of one of the vessels, had his hand cut off by an axe, and died of the wound. He was brother of the poet Æschylus, himself present at the fight. The statement of the Persian loss as given by Herodotus appears moderate and reasonable², but he does not specify any distinguished individuals as having fallen.

But the Persians, though thus defeated and compelled to abandon the position of Marathon, were not yet disposed to relinquish altogether their chances against Attica. Their fleet was observed to take the direction of

to prevent the step of hoplites, when charging, from becoming accelerated into a run. See the narrative of the battle of Kunaxa in Xenoph., *Anab.*, i. 8, 18; Diodor., xiv. 23; compare Polyæn., ii. 2, 3. The passage of Diodorus here referred to contrasts the advantages with the disadvantages of the running charge.

[Most modern critics are inclined to reserve the actual run for the last two hundred yards or so, when the Athenians were within range of the Persian archers, and were unprotected on the flanks. Even a Greek hoplite trained in the *ὀπλιτῶν δρόμος* (in which the shield must have been a specially severe hindrance), would obviously exhaust his strength in a set run of one mile.

Delbrück (*Gesch. der Kriegskunst*, vol. i., book i., 5) observes that Cæsar's soldiers at Pharsalus took rest in the middle of a charge over 600 to 700 feet of ground.—ED.]

¹ Pausan., i. 32, 6.

² For the exaggerated stories of the numbers of Persians slain, see Xenophon, *Anab.*, iii. 2, 12; Plutarch, *De Malign. Herodot.*, c. 26, p. 862; Justin, ii. 9; and Suidas, v. Περσικά.

In the account of Ktésias, Datis was represented as having been killed in the battle, and it was further said that the Athenians refused to give up his body for interment; which was one of the grounds whereupon Xerxes afterwards invaded Greece. See Ktésias, *Persica*, c. 18-21.

Cape Sunium—a portion being sent to take up the Eretrian prisoners and the stores which had been left in the island of Ægilia. At the same time a shield, discernible from its polished surface afar off, was seen held aloft upon some high point of Attica—perhaps on the summit of Mount Pentelikus, as Colonel Leake supposes with much plausibility. The Athenians doubtless saw it as well as the Persians; and Miltiadês did not fail to put the right interpretation upon it, taken in conjunction with the course of the departing fleet. The shield was a signal put up by partisans in the country, to invite the Persians round to Athens by sea, while the Marathonian army was absent. Miltiadês saw through the plot, and lost not a moment in returning to Athens. On the very day of the battle, the Athenian army marched back with the utmost speed from the precinct of Hêraklês at Marathon to the precinct of the same god at Kynosarges close to Athens, which they reached before the arrival of the Persian fleet. Datis soon came off the port of Phalêrum; but the partisans of Hippias had been so dismayed by the rapid return of the Marathonian army, that he did not find those aids and facilities which he had anticipated for a fresh disembarkation in the immediate neighbourhood of Athens. Though too late, however, it seems that he was not much too late. The Marathonian army had only just completed their forced return-march. A little less quickness on the part of Miltiadês in deciphering the treasonable signal, and giving the instant order of march—a little less energy on the part of the Athenian citizens in superadding a fatiguing march to a no less fatiguing combat—and the Persians with the partisans of Hippias might have been found in possession of Athens. As the facts turned out, Datis, finding at Phalêrum no friendly movement to encourage him, but, on the contrary, the unexpected presence of the soldiers who had already vanquished him at Marathon—made no attempt again to disembark in Attica, but sailed away, after a short delay, to the Cyclades.

Thus was Athens rescued, for this time at least, from a danger not less terrible than imminent. Nothing could have rescued her except that decisive and instantaneous attack which Miltiadês so emphatically urged. Imperfect as the account is which Herodotus gives of this most interesting crisis, we see plainly that the partisans of Hippias had actually organized a conspiracy, and that it only failed by coming a little too late. The bright shield uplifted on Mount Pentelikus, apprising the Persians that matters were prepared for them at Athens, was intended to have come to their view before any action had taken place at Marathon, and while the Athenian army were yet detained there; so that Datis might have sent a portion of his fleet round to Phalêrum, retaining the rest for combat with the enemy before him. If it had once become known to the Marathonian army that a Persian detachment had landed at Phalêrum—where there was a good plain for cavalry to act in, prior to the building of the Phalêric wall, as had been seen in the defeat of the Spartan Anchimolius by the Thessalian cavalry, in 510 B.C. — that it had been joined by timid or treacherous Athenians, and had perhaps even got possession of the city—their minds would have been so distracted by the double danger, and by fears for their absent wives and children, that they would have been disqualified for any unanimous execution of military orders¹. Generals as well as soldiers

¹ Grote's acute conjecture that the shield was hoisted as a signal to Datis to send part of his

fleet round to Phalêrum has provided the key by which the most successful modern critics have

would have become incurably divided in opinion—perhaps even mistrustful of each other. The citizen-soldier of Greece generally, and especially of Athens, possessed in a high degree both personal bravery and attachment to order and discipline. But his bravery was not of that equal, imperturbable, uninquiring character, which belonged to the battalions of Wellington or Napoleon. It was fitful, exalted or depressed by casual occurrences, and often more sensitive to dangers absent and unseen, than to enemies immediately in his front. Hence the advantage, so unspeakable in the case before us, and so well appreciated by Miltiadês, of having one undivided Athenian army—with one hostile army, and only one, to meet in the field. When we come to the battle of Salamis, ten years later, it will be seen that the Greeks of that day enjoyed the same advantage. But the wisest advisers of Xerxês impressed upon him the prudence of dividing his large force, and of sending detachments to assail separate Greek States—which would infallibly produce the effect of breaking up the combined Grecian host, and leaving no central or co-operating force for the defence of Greece generally. If time had been allowed for the Persian movement on Athens before the battle of Marathon had been fought, the triumph of the Athenians might well have been exchanged for a calamitous servitude. To Miltiadês belongs the credit of having comprehended the emergency from the beginning, and overruled the irresolution of his colleagues by his own single-hearted energy.

I have already observed that the phase of Grecian history best known to us, and amidst which the great authors from whom we draw our information lived, was one of contempt for the Persians in the field. It requires some effort of imagination to call back previous feelings after the circumstances have been altogether reversed. Perhaps even Æschylus the poet, at the time when he composed his tragedy of the *Persæ* to celebrate the disgraceful flight of the invader Xerxês, may have forgotten the emotions with which he and his brother Kyngeirus must have marched out from Athens fifteen years before, on the eve of the battle of Marathon. Again, therefore, the fact must be brought to view, that down to the time

explained the course of operations. In accordance with recent views, we may reconstruct the campaign as follows :

1. Datis landed at Marathon, not so much because of his horses, as for the purpose of luring the Athenian army as far as possible from the capital.

2. After providing a sufficient force to occupy and detain the Athenian levy posted on the spurs of Pentelikus, Datis held a detachment of his fleet in readiness to sail to Phalerum and strike a blow with the help of the medizing party in Athens. The whole of the cavalry accompanied this latter army, perhaps for use against the Spartan force on the contingency of its appearing off Athens.

The plan of surprising Athens by such a sudden swoop may have been suggested by Hippias, in whose interests it was to gain a bloodless victory.

3. So long as the whole Persian force remained at Marathon the Athenians made no move; without the help of the Spartan contingent they were manifestly too weak to assume the offensive (*cf.* note on p. 150).

4. When the Persian striking force was embarked, either anticipating the shield-signal (as Herodotus' version would lead us to suppose), or directly after its appearance, the Athenian army seized its chance of dealing with the enemy in detail, and promptly attacked the retreating force.

The Athenians may have realized that the critical moment had come in different ways : (a) by actually observing the departure of half the fleet, or the preparations to that effect; (b) by guessing the meaning of the shield-signal; (c) by information from the Ionians in Datis' fleet, who are said to have sent a signal to Miltiadês to the effect that 'the horse were gone' (Suidas, s. v., *ἵππων ἴμμεϊς*; Macan, *op. cit.*, ii., p. 231).

The chief advantages of this theory are that it explains—(1) the early reluctance of both sides to take the offensive; (2) the vital importance of the shield-signal; (3) the absence of the Persian cavalry from the battle; and (4) the comparative ease with which the Athenians won the day. If all our ancient authorities pass over in silence the division of Datis' force, it should be remembered that Athenian patriots would be likely to suppress everything that minimized the victory, and that the traitors would have no motive for explaining the true history of the shield episode.

This account follows in the main the reconstructions of the campaign made by Munro (*Journ. Hell. Stud.*, 1899, pp. 186-197) and Grundy (*Great Persian War*, ch. 4). These treatises, together with the critical analysis of the ancient authorities in Macan (*Herodotus*, ii., app. x.), are almost indispensable as a supplement to Grote's account.—Ed.

when Datis landed in the bay of Marathon, the tide of Persian success had rarely been interrupted, and that especially during the ten years immediately preceding, the stern extinction of the Ionic revolt had aggravated to the highest pitch the alarm of the Greeks: To this must be added the successes of Datis himself, and the calamities of Eretria, coming with all the freshness of novelty as an apparent sentence of death to Athens. The extreme effort of courage required in the Athenians to encounter such invaders, is attested by the division of opinion among the ten generals. Putting all the circumstances together, it is without a parallel in Grecian history. It surpasses even the combat of Thermopylæ, as will appear when I come to describe that memorable event. The combat of Marathon was by no means a very decisive defeat, but it was a defeat—the first notable one which the Persians had ever received from Greeks in the field. If the battle of Salamis, ten years afterwards, could be treated by Themistoklēs as a hair-breadth escape for Greece, much more is this true of the battle of Marathon, which first afforded reasonable proof, even to discerning and resolute Greeks, that the Persians might be effectually repelled, and the independence of European Greece maintained against them—a conviction of incalculable value in reference to the formidable trials destined to follow.

Upon the Athenians themselves, 'the first to face in the field successfully the terrific look of a Persian army', the effect of the victory was yet more stirring and profound¹. It supplied them with resolution for the far greater actual sacrifices which they cheerfully underwent ten years afterwards, at the invasion of Xerxēs, without faltering in their Pan-Hellenic fidelity. It strengthened them at home by swelling the tide of common sentiment and patriotic fraternity in the bosom of every individual citizen. It was the exploit of Athenians alone, but of all Athenians without dissent or exception—the boast of orators, repeated until it almost degenerated into commonplace, though the people seem never to have become weary of allusions to their single-handed victory over a host of forty-six nations². It had been purchased without a drop of intestine bloodshed—for even the unknown traitors who raised the signal shield on Mount Pentelikus, took care not to betray themselves by want of apparent sympathy with the triumph. Lastly, it was the final guarantee of their democracy, barring all chance of restoration of Hippias for the future³.

Who it was that raised the treacherous signal shield, to attract the Persians to Athens, was never ascertained. Very probably, in the full exultation of success, no investigation was made. Of course, however, the public belief would not be satisfied without singling out some persons as the authors of such a treason. The information received by Herodotus

¹ Pausanias, i. 14, 4; Thukyd., i. 73: φαμέν γὰρ Μαραθῶνι τε μόνοι προκινδυνεύσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ, etc.

Herodot., vi. 112: πρῶτοι τε ἀνέσχοιντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὀρέοντες, καὶ ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τίως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι καὶ τὸ οὐνομα τὸ Μῆδων φόβος ἀκούσαι.

It is not unworthy of remark, that the memorable oath in the oration of Demosthenēs, *De Coronā*, wherein he adjures the warriors of Marathon, copies the phrase of Thukydides:—οὐ μὰ τοῖς ἐν Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας τῶν προγόνων, etc. (Demosthen., *De Coronā*, c. 60).

(This stock phrase does some injustice to the

Ionians, who fought bravely enough against Cyrus and Darius. It is only strictly true if by 'Hellenes' the European Greeks alone are signified.—Ed.)

² So the computation stands in the language of Athenian orators (Herodot., ix. 27). It would be unfair to examine it critically.

³ According to Cicero (*Epist. ad Attic.*, ix. 10) and Justin (ii. 9), Hippias was killed at Marathon. Suidas (v. Ἰππίας) says that he died afterwards at Lemnos. Neither of these statements seems probable. Hippias would hardly go to Lemnos, which was an Athenian possession; and had he been slain in the battle, Herodotus would have been likely to mention it.

(probably about 450-440 B.C., forty or fifty years after the Marathonian victory) ascribed the deed to the Alkmæonids. He does not notice any other reported authors, though he rejects the allegation against the Alkmæonids upon very sufficient grounds. They were a race religiously tainted, ever since the Kylonian sacrilege, and were therefore convenient persons to brand with the odium of an anonymous crime; while party feud, if it did not originally invent, would at least be active in spreading and certifying such rumours. At the time when Herodotus knew Athens, the political enmity between Periklēs, son of Xanthippus, and Kimon, son of Miltiadēs, was at its height. Periklēs belonged by his mother's side to the Alkmæonid race, and we know that such lineage was made subservient to political manœuvres against him by his enemies¹. Moreover, the enmity between Kimon and Periklēs had been inherited by both from their fathers; for we shall find Xanthippus, not long after the battle of Marathon, the prominent accuser of Miltiadēs. Though Xanthippus was not an Alkmæonid, his marriage with Agaristē connected himself indirectly, and his son Periklēs directly, with that race. And we may trace in this standing political feud a probable origin for the false reports as to the treason of the Alkmæonids².

When the Athenian army made its sudden return-march from Marathon to Athens, Aristeidēs with his tribe was left to guard the field and the spoil; but the speedy retirement of Datis from Attica left the Athenians at full liberty to revisit the scene, and discharge the last duties to the dead. A tumulus was erected on the field (such distinction was never conferred by Athens except in this case only) to the one hundred and ninety-two Athenian citizens who had been slain. Their names were inscribed on ten pillars erected at the spot, one for each tribe: there was also a second tumulus for the slain Plataeans, a third for the slaves, and a separate funeral monument to Miltiadēs himself. Six hundred years after the battle, Pausanias saw the tumulus, and could still read on the pillars the names of the immortalized warriors³. Even now a conspicuous tumulus exists about half a mile from the seashore, which Colonel Leake believes to be the same⁴. The inhabitants of the deme of Marathon worshipped these slain warriors as heroes, along with their own eponymus, and with Hēraklēs.

So splendid a victory had not been achieved, in the belief of the Athenians, without marked supernatural aid. The god Pan had met the courier Pheidippidēs on his hasty route from Athens to Sparta, and had told him that he was much hurt that the Athenians had as yet neglected to worship him; in spite of which neglect, however, he promised them effective aid at Marathon. The promise of Pan having been faithfully executed, the Athenians repaid it by a temple with annual worship and

¹ Thukyd., i. 126.

² Although Herodotus endeavours to represent the Alkmæonidae as an eminently patriotic and tyrant-hating clan, he himself admits elsewhere that—(1) their earlier representatives (especially Megaklēs) were on good terms with several autocrats; (2) Kleisthenēs in 507 counselled submission to Persia (see note on p. 81, c. iv.); (3) in 489 they were prominent in impeaching Miltiadēs. It is also significant that Pindar in his ode on the Alkmæonid Megaklēs, written to celebrate a victory in autumn 490 (*Pyth.*, vii.), makes no mention of Marathon, which is quite contrary to his

habit of alluding to great contemporaneous events (*cf.* Macan, *op. cit.*, ii., p. 176).

For the policies of Athenian parties with regard to the Persian wars, see note 1 on p. 126.—ED.

³ Pausan., i. 32, 3. Compare the elegy of Kritias *ap.* Athenæ., i., p. 28.

⁴ The tumulus now existing is about thirty feet high, and two hundred yards in circumference. (Leake, *On the Deme of Attica*; *Transactions of Royal Soc. of Literat.*, ii., p. 171).

[The correctness of this identification has been upheld against recent criticisms by T. M. Hughes in the *Class. Rev.*, March, 1901, p. 131 *ff.*—ED.]

sacrifice. Moreover, the hero Theseus was seen strenuously assisting in the battle; while an unknown warrior, in rustic garb and armed only with a ploughshare, dealt destruction among the Persian ranks: after the battle he could not be found, and the Athenians, on asking at Delphi who he was, were directed to worship the hero Echetus¹. Even in the time of Pausanias, this memorable battle-field was heard to resound every night with the noise of combatants and the snorting of horses. Amidst the ornaments with which Athens was decorated during the free working of her democracy, the glories of Marathon of course occupied a conspicuous place. The battle was painted on one of the compartments of the portico called Pœkilê, wherein, amidst several figures of gods and heroes—Athênê, Héraklê, Theseus, Echetus, and the local patron Marathon—were seen honoured and prominent the polemarch Kallimachus and the general Miltiadês, while the Platæans were distinguished by their Bœotian leather casques². The sixth of the month Boëdromion, the anniversary of the battle, was commemorated by an annual ceremony even down to the time of Plutarch³.

Two thousand Spartans started from their city immediately after the full moon, and reached the frontier of Attica on the third day of their march—a surprising effort when we consider that the total distance from Sparta to Athens was about one hundred and fifty miles. They did not arrive, however, until the battle had been fought and the Persians departed. Curiosity led them to the field of Marathon to behold the dead bodies of the Persians, after which they returned home, bestowing well-merited praise on the victors.

Datis and Artaphernês returned across the Ægean with their Eretrian prisoners to Asia. On reaching Asia, the Persian generals conducted their prisoners up to the court of Susa and into the presence of Darius. They were planted at a spot called Arderikka, in the Kissian territory, one of the resting-places on the road from Sardis to Susa, and about twenty-six miles distant from the latter place. Herodotus seems himself to have seen their descendants there on his journey between the two capitals, and to have had the satisfaction of talking to them in Greek—which we may easily conceive to have made some impression upon him, at a spot distant by nearly three months' journey from the coast of Ionia.

Happy would it have been for Miltiadês if he had shared the honourable death of the polemarch Kallimachus—'animam exhalasset opimam'—in seeking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The short sequel of his history will be found in melancholy contrast with the Marathonian heroism.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds. He now proposed to his countrymen to incur the cost of equipping an armament of

¹ Plutarch, *Theseus*, c. 24; Pausan., i. 32, 4.

² Pausan., i. 15, 4; Dêmôsthen., *Cont. Neer*, c. 25.

[In this connection should also be mentioned the Treasury of the Athenians at Delphi, dedicated out of the spoils at Marathon (see Paus., x. 11, 5); Homolle, *Fouilles de Delphes*; Hicks and Hill, *Historical Inscriptions*, n. 13]. For a full description of the painting in the Pœkilê portico, see Harrison and Verrall, *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, pp. 133-137.]

³ Herodot., vi. 120; Plutarch, *Cumill*, c. 19;

De Malignit. Herodoti, c. 26, p. 862; and *De Glorîi Atheniensium*, c. 7.

Boëdromion was the third month of the Attic year, which year began shortly after the summer solstice.

[Bœckh, *Mondeyklen der Hellenen*, § 15, p. 64 *et seq.*, makes the sixth of Boëdromion merely the memorial day, and not the anniversary of the battle (*cf.* our official 'King's birthday'). Though contested by Grote, this theory has been generally adopted by modern critics, as it obviates many difficulties incident on correlating the Athenian and Spartan calendars for the year.—ED.]

seventy ships with an adequate armed force, and to place it altogether at his discretion, giving them no intimation whither he intended to go, but merely assuring them that if they would follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant, and thus enrich them¹. Such a promise from the lips of the recent victor of Marathon was sufficient. The armament was granted, no man except Miltiadēs knowing what was its destination. He sailed to the island of Paros², laid siege to the town, and sent in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one hundred talents, on pain of entire destruction. In vain did Miltiadēs prosecute hostilities against them for the space of twenty-six days: he ravaged the island, but his attacks made no impression upon the town. Beginning to despair of success in his military operations, he entered into some negotiation (such at least was the tale of the Parians themselves) with a Parian woman named Timō, priestess or attendant in the temple of Dēmêtēr near the town-gates. This woman, promising to reveal to him a secret which would place Paros in his power, induced him to visit by night a temple to which no male person was admissible. Having leaped the exterior fence, he approached the sanctuary; but on coming near, he was seized with a panic terror and ran away, almost out of his senses. On leaping the same fence to get back, he strained or bruised his thigh badly, and became utterly disabled. In this melancholy state he was placed on ship-board, the siege being raised, and the whole armament returning to Athens³.

Xanthippus, father of the great Periklēs, thereupon impeached Miltiadēs as having been guilty of deceiving the people, and as having deserved the penalty of death⁴. The accused himself, disabled by his injured thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable to stand or to say a word in his own defence. He lay on his couch before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best case they could in his behalf. Defence, it appears, there was none; all they could do was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable exploit of Marathon, coming in addition to his previous conquest of Lemnos. The assembled dikasts or jurors showed their sense of such powerful appeals by rejecting the proposition of his accuser to condemn him to death; but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents 'for his iniquity'. Cornelius Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the expenses incurred by the State in fitting out the armament.

In those penal cases at Athens, where the punishment was not fixed

¹ This may be an allusion to Thasos; perhaps it was merely a pretence (*cf.* Macan, *Herodotus*, ii., p. 254). Secrecy was no doubt essential to the success of Miltiadēs' enterprise. The difficulty of concealing plans under a democratic rule frequently hampered Athenian generals.—Ed.

² Cornelius Nepos (*Miltiadēs*, ch. vii.), whose account is probably based on Ephorus, and embodies better traditions than the mixture of Parian and Alkmæonid sources on which Herodotus appears to be based, says that Miltiadēs had a general commission to punish medizing islanders, and regained control over most of the Ægean. Though this account is rather in the vein of the later fifth century, when Athens presided over the Delian League, it helps us to recover the true object of Miltiadēs' expedition—the formation of an outer circle of defence which would at least delay any future Persian armada.

Whether he reduced other islands or not, it may be presumed that Naxos was still unsubdued by Persia; the acquisition of the neighbouring and next greatest island of Paros would then have provided the Athenians with an excellent nucleus for an advanced line of resistance among the Cyclades.

The date of this expedition is variously given as 490 or 489.—Ed.

³ Ephorus (*Fragm. Hist. Gr.*, n. 107) attributes Miltiadēs' injuries to the weapons of the besieged, and ignores the Parian version preserved by Herodotus. But, like the latter, he fails to supply a natural motive for the raising of the siege.—Ed.

⁴ The version of Ephorus and Cornelius Nepos (*loc. cit.*) represents the charge as one of 'treason': Miltiadēs had allowed the siege of Paros to end in a fiasco in consideration of a bribe.—Ed.

beforehand by the terms of the law, if the person accused was found guilty, it was customary to submit to the jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to amount of punishment: first, the accuser named the penalty which he thought suitable; next, the accused person was called upon to name an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were constrained to take their choice between these two—no third gradation of penalty being admissible for consideration. Of course, under such circumstances, it was the interest of the accused party to name, even in his own case, some real and serious penalty—something which the jurors might be likely to deem not wholly inadequate to his crime just proved; for if he proposed some penalty only trifling, he drove them to prefer the heavier sentence recommended by his opponent¹. Accordingly, in the case of Miltiadês, his friends, desirous of inducing the jurors to refuse their assent to the punishment of death, proposed a fine of fifty talents as the self-assessed penalty of the defendant; and perhaps they may have stated, as an argument in the case, that such a sum would suffice to defray the costs of the expedition. The fine was imposed, but Miltiadês did not live to pay it: his injured limb mortified, and he died, leaving the fine to be paid by his son Kimon.

According to Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he was put in prison, after having been fined, and there died². But Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment, nor does the fact appear to me probable: he would hardly have omitted to notice it, had it come to his knowledge. Immediate imprisonment of a person fined by the dikastery, until his fine was paid, was not the natural and ordinary course of Athenian procedure, though there were particular cases in which such aggravation was added. Usually a certain time was allowed for payment³, before absolute execution was resorted to, though the person under sentence became disfranchised and excluded from all political rights, from the very instant of his condemnation as a public debtor, until the fine was paid. Now in the instance of Miltiadês, the lamentable condition of his wounded thigh rendered escape impossible—so that there would be no special motive for departing from the usual practice, and imprisoning him forthwith: moreover, if he was not imprisoned forthwith, he would not be imprisoned at all, since he cannot have lived many days after his trial. All accounts concur in stating that he died of the mortal bodily hurt which already disabled him even at the moment of his trial, and that his son Kimon paid the fifty talents after his death. If he could pay them, probably his father could have paid them also. This is an additional reason for believing that there was no imprisonment—for nothing but non-payment could have sent him to prison.

Thus closed the life of the conqueror of Marathon. The last act of it produces an impression so mournful, that readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding someone to blame for it: we must

¹ It is not certain whether such a form of legal procedure existed in Miltiadês' time. The charge may have been preferred to begin with in the form of an *εἰσαγγελία* in the Ekklesia, and the death-sentence modified by an amendment (*cf.* Macan, *op. cit.*, ii., p. 257; Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, iii., 339).—E.D.

² Cornelius Nepos, *Miltiadês*, c. 7; and *Kimon*, c. 1; Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 4; Diodorus, *Fragment*, lib. x. All these authors probably drew from the same original fountain; perhaps Ephorus; but we have no means of determining. Respecting the

alleged imprisonment of Kimon, however, they must have copied from different authorities, for their statements are all different.

³ See Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens*, b. iii. ch. xiii., p. 390, Engl. transl. (vol. i., p. 420 Germ.) Meier and Schömann, *Altisch. Prossess*, p. 744. Dr. Thirlwall takes a different view of this point, with which I cannot concur (*Hist. Gr.*, vol. iii., app. ii., p. 488); though his general remarks on the trial of Miltiadês are just and appropriate (ch. xiv., p. 273).

except Herodotus, our original authority, who recounts the transaction without dropping a hint of blame against anyone. To speak ill of the people, as Machiavel has long ago observed, is a strain in which everyone at all times, even under a democratical government, indulges with impunity and without provoking any opponent to reply. In this instance, the hard fate of Miltiadês has been imputed to the vices of the Athenians and their democracy—it has been cited in proof, partly of their fickleness, partly of their ingratitude. But however much blame may serve to lighten the mental sadness arising from a series of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to those facts a reasonable criticism.

What is called the fickleness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of Miltiadês, unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath. The question to be determined is, whether there be sufficient ground for such a change; and in the case of Miltiadês, that question must be answered in the affirmative¹.

The charge of ingratitude against the Athenian popular juries really amounts to this—that in trying a person accused of present crime or fault, they were apt to confine themselves too strictly and exclusively to the particular matter of charge, either forgetting, or making too little account of, past services which he might have rendered. Whoever imagines that such was the habit of Athenian dikasts, must have studied the orators to very little purpose. Their real defect was the very opposite: they were too much disposed to wander from the special issue before them, and to be affected by appeals to previous services and conduct². That which an accused person at Athens usually strives to produce is an impression in the minds of the dikasts favourable to his general character and behaviour; of course he meets the particular allegation of his accuser as well as he can, but he never fails also to remind them emphatically how well he has performed his general duties of a citizen—how many times he has served in military expeditions—how many trierarchies and liturgies he has performed, and performed with splendid efficiency. In fact, the claim of an accused person to acquittal is made to rest too much on his prior services, and too little upon innocence or justifying matter as to the particular indictment. It is what we should naturally expect from a body of private, non-professional citizens assembled for the occasion—and belongs more or less to the system of jury-trial everywhere; but it

¹ If the more plausible account of Nepos be adhered to, it will be seen that Miltiadês, though perhaps deserving of a money fine, had certainly done nothing worthy of death, the only reasonable charge against him being his failure to take Paros. The fact that the death-penalty was demanded is a proof of the bitter rancour with which his enemies persecuted him. Though it is difficult to say whether the people in this case are absolutely free from blame or not, there is no doubt that Miltiadês' political rivals showed a most vindictive spirit in preferring their accusation.

Chief among the accusers were the Alkmaeonidæ. It has already been observed how their un-patriotic policy in previous years was thwarted by Miltiadês (see note on p. 126). The failure of the Parian expedition provided them with an opportunity for taking revenge on their adversary, and re-establishing for a while their own ascendancy.

The Alkmaeonid version has very probably been

reproduced by Herodotus, who clearly did not consult the traditions of the Philaid house for this last episode, though he apparently drew upon them for Miltiadês' earlier career.—ED.

² Machiavel, in the twenty-ninth chapter of his *Discorsi sopra T. Livio*, examines the question: 'Which of the two is more open to the charge of being ungrateful—a popular government or a king?' He thinks that the latter is more open to it. Compare ch. 59 of the same work, where he again supports a similar opinion.

M. Sismondi also observes, in speaking of the long attachment of the city of Pisa to the cause of the Emperors and to the Ghibelin party: 'Pise montra dans plus d'une occasion, par sa constance à supporter la cause des empereurs au milieu des revers, combien la reconnaissance lie un peuple libre d'une manière plus puissante et plus durable qu'elle ne sauroit lier le peuple gouverné par un seul homme' (*Histoire des Republ. Italiennes*, ch. xiii., tom. ii., p. 302).

is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

I have already remarked that the fickleness, which has been so largely imputed to the Athenian democracy in their dealings with him, is nothing more than a reasonable change of opinion on plausible grounds: nor can it be said that fickleness was in any case an attribute of the Athenian democracy. It is a well-known fact, that feelings, or opinions, or modes of judging, which have once obtained footing among a large number of people, are more lasting and unchangeable than those which belong only to one or a few; insomuch that the judgments and actions of the many admit of being more clearly understood as to the past, and more certainly predicted as to the future. If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude, it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue fickleness. There will occur nothing in the course of this history to prove that the Athenian people changed their opinions, on insufficient grounds, more frequently than an irresponsible one or few would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian democracy which imparted to it an appearance of greater fickleness, without the reality:—first, that the manifestations and changes of opinion were all open, undisguised, and noisy: the people gave utterance to their present impression, whatever it was, with perfect frankness; if their opinions were really changed, they had no shame or scruple in avowing it: secondly—and this is a point of capital importance in the working of democracy generally—the *present* impression, whatever it might be, was not merely undisguised in its manifestations, but also had a tendency to be exaggerated in its intensity. This arose from their habit of treating public affairs in multitudinous assemblages, the well-known effect of which is to inflame sentiment in every man's bosom by mere contact with a sympathizing circle of neighbours. Whatever the sentiment might be, fear, ambition, cupidity, wrath, compassion, piety, patriotic devotion, etc.¹, and whether well-founded or ill-founded—it was constantly influenced more or less by such intensifying cause. This is a defect which, of course, belongs in a certain degree to all exercise of power by numerous bodies, even though they be representative bodies—especially when the character of the people, instead of being comparatively sedate and slow to move, like the English, is quick, impressible, and fiery, like Greeks or Italians; but it operated far more powerfully on the self-acting Dêmos assembled in the Pnyx. It was, in fact, the constitutional malady of the democracy, of which the people were themselves perfectly sensible—as I shall show hereafter from the securities which they tried to provide against it—but which no securities could ever wholly eradicate. Frequency of public assemblies, far from aggravating the evil, had a tendency to lighten it. The people thus became accustomed to hear and

¹ This is the general truth, which ancient authors often state, both partially, and in exaggerated terms as to degree. 'Hæc est natura multitudinis (says Livy); aut humiliter servit aut superbe dominatur.' Again, Tacitus—'Nihil in vulgo modicum; terrere, ni paveant; ubi pertinuerint, impune contemni' (*Annal.*, i. 29). Herodotus, iii. 81: ὡς ἐπεὶ δὲ (ὁ δῆμος) ἐμπροσθέν τὰ πρῆγματα ἀνεν τοῦ, χειμάρρην ποταμῶ ἐκείνου.

It is remarkable that Aristotle, in his *Politica*, takes little or no notice of this attribute belonging to every numerous assembly. He seems rather to reason as if the aggregate intelligence of the

multitude was represented by the sum total of each man's separate intelligence in all the individuals composing it (*Polit.*, iii. 6, 4; 10, 12), just as the property of the multitude, taken collectively, would be greater than that of the few rich. He takes no notice of the difference between a number of individuals judging jointly and judging separately. I do not indeed observe that such omission leads him into any positive mistake, but it occurs in some cases calculated to surprise us, and where the difference here adverted to is important to notice (see *Politica*, iii. 10, 5, 6).

balance many different views as a preliminary to ultimate judgment ; they contracted personal interest and esteem for a numerous class of dissident speakers ; and they even acquired a certain practical consciousness of their own liability to error. Moreover, the diffusion of habits of public speaking, by means of the sophists and the rhetors, whom it has been so much the custom to disparage, tended in the same direction—to break the unity of sentiment among the listening crowd, to multiply separate judgments, and to neutralize the contagion of mere sympathizing impulse. These were important deductions, still farther assisted by the superior taste and intelligence of the Athenian people : but still the inherent malady remained—excessive and misleading intensity of present sentiment. It was this which gave such inestimable value to the ascendancy of Periklês, as depicted by Thukydîdês : his hold on the people was so firm, that he could always speak with effect against excess of the reigning tone of feeling. ‘When Periklês (says the historian) saw the people in a state of unseasonable and insolent confidence, he spoke so as to cow them into alarm ; when again they were in groundless terror, he combated it, and brought them back to confidence¹.’ We shall find Dêmôsthênês, with far inferior ascendancy, employed in the same honourable task. The Athenian people often stood in need of such correction, but unfortunately did not always find statesmen, at once friendly and commanding, to administer it.

CHAPTER VIII [XXXVIII]

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE MARCH OF XERXÊS AGAINST GREECE

I HAVE recounted, in a preceding chapter, the Athenian victory at Marathon, the repulse of the Persian general Datis, and the return of his armament across the Ægean to the Asiatic coast. Far from satiating his revenge upon Athens, the Persian monarch was compelled to listen to the tale of an ignominious defeat. His wrath against the Athenians rose to a higher pitch than ever, and he commenced vigorous preparations for a renewed attack upon them as well as upon Greece generally. Resolved upon assembling the entire force of his empire, he directed the various satraps and sub-governors throughout all Asia to provide troops, horses, and ships both of war and burthen. For no less than three years the empire was agitated by this immense levy, which Darius determined to conduct in person against Greece. Nor was his determination abated by a revolt of the Egyptians, which broke out about the time when his preparations were completed. He was on the point of undertaking simultaneously the two enterprises—the conquest of Greece and the reconquest of Egypt—when he was surprised by death, after a reign of thirty-six years. As a precaution previous to this intended march, he had nominated as successor Xerxês, his son by Atossa ; for the ascendancy of that queen ensured to Xerxês the preference over his elder brother Artabazanes, son of Darius by a former wife, and born before the latter became king. The choice of the reigning monarch passed unquestioned, and Xerxês succeeded without

¹ Thukyd., ii. 65.

opposition. It deserves to be remarked, that though we meet with several acts of cruelty and atrocity perpetrated in the Persian regal family, there is nothing like that systematic fratricide which has been considered necessary to guarantee succession in Turkey and other Oriental empires.

The intense wrath against Athens, which had become the predominant sentiment in the mind of Darius, was yet unappeased at the time of his death, and it was fortunate for the Athenians that his crown now passed to a prince less obstinately hostile as well as in every respect inferior. Xerxēs, personally the handsomest and most stately man amid the immense crowd which he led against Greece, was in character timid and faint-hearted, over and above those defects of vanity, childish self-conceit, and blindness of appreciation, which he shared more or less with the later Persian kings. Yet we shall see that even under his conduct, the invasion of Greece was very near proving successful: and it might well have succeeded altogether, had he been either endued with the courageous temperament, or inflamed with the fierce animosity, of his father.

On succeeding to the throne, Xerxēs found the forces of the empire in active preparation, pursuant to the orders of Darius; except Egypt, which was in a state of revolt. His first necessity was to reconquer this country, a purpose for which the great military power now in readiness was found amply sufficient. Egypt was subdued and reduced to a state of much harder dependence than before: we may presume that not only the tribute was increased, but also the numbers of the Persian occupying force, maintained by contributions levied on the natives. Achæmenes, brother of Xerxēs, was installed there as satrap.

But Xerxēs was not at first equally willing to prosecute the schemes of his deceased father against Greece. At least such is the statement of Herodotus, who represents Mardonius as the grand instigator of the invasion, partly through thirst for warlike enterprise, partly from a desire to obtain the intended conquest as a satrapy for himself. There were not wanting Grecian counsellors to enforce his recommendation both by the promise of help and by the colour of religion. The great family of the Aleuadæ, belonging to Larissa and perhaps to other towns in Thessaly, were so eager in the cause, that their principal members came to Susa to offer an easy occupation of that frontier territory of Hellas; while the exiled Peisistratids from Athens still persevered in striving to procure their own restoration at the tail of a Persian army. Indeed, it was not difficult to show, according to the feelings then prevalent, that a new king of Persia was in honour obliged to enlarge the boundaries of the empire¹. The conquering impulse springing from the first founder was as yet unexhausted; the insults offered by the Athenians remained still unavenged.

On the occasion of this invasion, now announced and about to take place, we must notice especially the historical manner and conception of our capital informant—Herodotus. The invasion of Greece by Xerxēs, and the final repulse of his forces, constitute the entire theme of his three last books, and the principal object of his whole history, towards which the previous matter is intended to conduct. Amidst those prior circumstances, there are doubtless many which have a substantive importance and interest of their own, recounted at so much length that they appear

¹ Æschylus, *Pers.*, 761.

coördinate and principal, so that the thread of the history is for a time put out of sight. Yet we shall find, if we bring together the larger divisions of his history, omitting the occasional prolixities of detail, that such thread is never lost in the historian's own mind: it may be traced by an attentive reader, from his preface and the statement immediately following it—of Cræsus as the first barbaric conqueror of the Ionian Greeks—down to the full expansion of his theme, 'Græcia Barbariæ lento collisa duello', in the expedition of Xerxês. That expedition, as forming the consummation of his historical scheme, is not only related more copiously and continuously than any events preceding it, but is also ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poetical accompaniment, so that the seventh book of Herodotus reminds us in many points of the second book of the *Iliad*. The dream sent by the Gods to frighten Xerxês, when about to recede from his project—as well as the ample catalogue of nations and eminent individuals embodied in the Persian host—have both of them marked parallels in the *Iliad*: and Herodotus seems to delight in representing to himself the enterprise against Greece as an antithesis to that of the Atreidæ against Troy¹. The religious idea, so often presented elsewhere in Herodotus—that the Godhead was jealous and hostile to excessive good fortune or immoderate desires in man—is worked into his history of Xerxês as the ever-present moral and as the main cause of its disgraceful termination². For we shall discover as we proceed, that the historian, with that honourable frankness which Plutarch calls his 'malignity', neither ascribes to his countrymen credit greater than they deserve for personal valour, nor seeks to veil the many chances of defeat which their mismanagement laid open³.

Xerxês is described as having originally been averse to the enterprise, and only stimulated thereto by the persuasions of Mardonius. This was probably the genuine Persian belief, for the blame of so great a disaster would naturally be transferred from the monarch to some evil counsellor. Against the rashness of this general—the evil genius of Xerxês—we find opposed the prudence and long experience of Artabanus, brother of the deceased Darius, and therefore uncle to the monarch. The age and relationship of this Persian Nestor emboldened him to undertake the dangerous task of questioning the determination which Xerxês, though professing to invite the opinions of others, had proclaimed as already settled in his own mind. The speech which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Artabanus is that of a thoughtful and religious Greek.

Herodotus represents the great expedition of Xerxês to have originated partly in the rashness of Mardonius, who reaps his bitter reward on the field of battle at Platæa—but still more in the influence of 'mischievous Oneiros', who is sent by the gods (as in the second book of the *Iliad*) to

¹ The same comparison of the Persian struggle with the Trojan war is perhaps found in the pediment sculptures of the temple which the Æginetans dedicated after the contest of 480 (but see Furtwängler, *Ægina*, 1906).—E.D.

² For a fuller discussion of Herodotus' ethics, see E. Meyer, *Forschungen*, vol. ii., pp. 252-268.—E.D.

³ While Plutarch (if indeed the treatise *De Herodoti Malignitate* be the work of Plutarch) treats Herodotus as uncandid, malicious, corrupt, the calumniator of great men and glorious deeds—Dionysius of Halikarnassus on the contrary, with more reason, treats him as a pattern of excellent

dispositions in an historian, contrasting him in this respect with Thukydides, to whom he imputes an unfriendly spirit in criticising Athens, arising from his long banishment: 'Ἡ μὲν Ἡροδότου διάθεσις ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπικrής, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς συννηρόμενη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς συναλγοῦσα· ἡ δὲ Θουκυδίδου διάθεσις ἀνθεκαστός τις καὶ πικρά, καὶ τῇ πατρίδι τῆς φυγῆς μνησικακοῦσα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀμαρτήματα ἐπεξερχεται καὶ μάλα ἀκριβῶς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ νόον κεχωρηκότων καθάπαξ οὐ μὲνεται ἢ ὥσπερ ἡρακλασμένος (Dionys. Hal., *Ad Cr. Pompeium de Præcip. Historicis*, p. 112, ed. Rhys Roberts)—E.D.]

put a cheat upon Xerxês, and even to overrule by terror both his scruples and those of Artabanus. The gods having determined (as in the instances of Astyagês, Polykratês, and others) that the Persian empire shall undergo signal humiliation and repulse at the hands of the Greeks, constrain the Persian monarch into a ruinous enterprise against his own better judgment. Such religious imagination is not to be regarded as peculiar to Herodotus, but as common to him with his contemporaries generally, Greeks as well as Persians, though peculiarly stimulated among the Greeks by the abundance of their epic or quasi-historical poetry. The story of Xerxês' dream has its rise (as Herodotus tells us¹) in Persian fancy, and is in some sort a consolation for the national vanity; but it is turned and coloured by the Grecian historian, who mentions also a third dream, which appears to Xerxês after his resolution to march was finally taken, and which the mistake of the Magian interpreters falsely construed² into an encouragement, though it really threatened ruin. How much this religious conception of the sequence of events belongs to the age, appears by the fact that it not only appears in Pindar and the Attic tragedians generally, but pervades especially the *Persæ* of Æschylus, exhibited seven years after the battle of Salamis—in which we find the premonitory dreams as well as the jealous enmity of the gods towards vast power and overweening aspirations in man³; though without any of that inclination, which Herodotus seems to have derived from Persian informants, to exculpate Xerxês by representing him as disposed himself to sober counsels, but driven in a contrary direction by the irresistible fiat of the gods.

While we take due notice of those religious conceptions with which both the poet and the historian surround this vast conflict of Greeks and barbarians, we need look no farther than ambition and revenge for the real motives of the invasion. Considering that it had been a proclaimed project in the mind of Darius for three years previous to his death, there was no probability that his son and successor would gratuitously renounce it. Shortly after the reconquest of Egypt, Xerxês began to make his preparations, the magnitude of which attested the strength of his resolve as well as the extent of his designs. The satraps and subordinate officers, throughout the whole range of his empire, received orders to furnish the amplest quota of troops and munitions of war—horse and foot, ships of war, horse-transport, provisions, or supplies of various kinds, according to the circumstances of the territory; while rewards were held out to those who should execute the orders most efficiently. For four entire years these preparations were carried on, and we are told that similar preparations had been going forward during the three years preceding the death of Darius.

The Persian empire was at this moment more extensive than ever it will appear at any subsequent period; for it comprised maritime Thrace and Macedonia as far as the borders of Thessaly, and nearly all the islands

¹ Herodot., vii. 12: Καὶ δὴ κού ἐν τῇ νυκτὶ εἶδε ὄψιν τοιούτην, ὡς λέγεται ὑπὸ Περσίων.

Respecting the influence of dreams in determining the enterprises of the early Turkish sultans, see Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, book ii., vol. i., p. 49.

² Compare the dream of Darius Codomannus. Plutarch, *Alexander*, c. 18.

[A similar conception appears on a Greek vase of the fourth or third century from Canusium (Gerhard, *Antike Denkmäler*, pl. 103), in which the

Persian king is represented as seated in council, with a winged Ἀπατή (Deceit) hovering over him.—Ed.]

³ Æschylus, *Pers.* 96, 104, 181, 220, 368, 745, 825; compare Sophocles, *Ajax*, 129, 744, 775, and the end of the *Edipus Tyrannus*; Euripides, *Hecub.*, 58; Pindar, *Olymp.*, viii. 86; *Isthm.*, vi. 39; Pausanias, ii. 33, 3. Compare the sense of the word *δεισιδαιμον* in Xenophon, *Agessilus*, c. 11, § 8: 'the man who in the midst of success fears the envious gods'.

of the Ægean north of Crete and east of Eubœa—including even the Cyclades. There existed Persian forts and garrisons at Doriskus, Eion, and other places on the coast of Thrace, while Abdëra with the other Grecian settlements on that coast were numbered among the tributaries of Susa¹. It is necessary to bear in mind these boundaries of the empire at the time when Xerxēs mounted the throne, as compared with its reduced limits at the later time of the Peloponnesian war—partly that we may understand the apparent chances of success to his expedition, as they presented themselves both to the Persians and to the *medizing* Greeks—partly that we may appreciate the after-circumstances connected with the formation of the Athenian maritime empire.

In the autumn of the year 481 B.C. the vast army thus raised by Xerxēs arrived, from all quarters of the empire, at or near to Sardis, a large portion of it having been directed to assemble at Kritala in Kappadokia, on the eastern side of the Halys, where it was joined by Xerxēs himself on the road from Susa. From thence he crossed the Halys, and marched through Phrygia and Lydia, until he reached Sardis, where winter-quarters were prepared for him. But this land force, vast as it was, was not all that the empire had been required to furnish. Xerxēs had determined to attack Greece, not by traversing the Ægean, as Datis had passed to Eretria, and Marathon, but by a land force and fleet at once—the former crossing the Hellespont, and marching through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, while the latter was intended to accompany and coöperate. A fleet of ships of war, besides numerous vessels of service and burthen, had been assembled on the Hellespont and on the coasts of Thrace and Ionia; moreover, Xerxēs, with a degree of forethought much exceeding that of his father Darius in the Scythian expedition, had directed the formation of large magazines of provisions at suitable maritime stations along the line of march, from the Hellespont to the Strymonic Gulf. During the four years of military preparation there had been time to bring together great quantities of flour and other essential articles from Asia and Egypt.

If the whole contemporary world were overawed by the vast assemblage of men and muniments of war, which Xerxēs thus brought together, so much transcending all past, we might even say all subsequent, experience—they were no less astounded by two enterprises which entered into his scheme—the bridging of the Hellespont, and the cutting of a ship-canal through the isthmus of Mount Athos. For the first of the two there had indeed been a precedent, since Darius about thirty-five years before had caused a bridge to be thrown over the Thracian Bosphorus, and crossed it in his march to Scythia. Yet this bridge of Darius, though constructed by the Ionians and by a Samian Greek, having had reference only to distant regions, seems to have been little known or little thought of among the Greeks generally, as we may infer from the fact that the poet Æschylus² speaks as if he had never heard of it; while the bridge of Xerxēs was ever remembered both by Persians and by Greeks as a most imposing display of Asiatic omnipotence. The bridge of boats—or rather the two separate bridges not far removed from each other—which Xerxēs caused to be thrown across the Hellespont, stretched from the neighbourhood of

¹ Herodot., vii. 106, 108; also vii. 59, and Xenophon, *Memorab.*, iii. 5, 11. Compare Æschylus, *Pers.* 871-896.

² Æschylus, *Pers.*, 731, 754, 873.

Abydos on the Asiatic side to the coast between Sestos and Madytus on the European, where the strait is about an English mile in breadth. The execution of the work was at first entrusted, not to Greeks, but to Phenicians and Egyptians, who had received orders long beforehand to prepare cables of extraordinary strength and size expressly for the purpose; the material used by the Phenicians was flax, that employed by the Egyptians was the fibre of the papyrus. Already had the work been completed and announced to Xerxês as available for transit, when a storm arose, so violent as altogether to ruin it. The wrath of the monarch, when apprised of this catastrophe, burst all bounds. It was directed partly against the chief engineers, whose heads he caused to be struck off¹, but partly also against the Hellespont itself. He commanded that the strait should be scourged with 300 lashes, and that a set of fetters should be let down into it as a farther punishment².

It has been common, however, to set aside in this case not merely the words, but even the main incident of punishment inflicted on the Hellespont³, as a mere Greek fable rather than a real fact; the extreme childishness and absurdity of the proceeding giving to it the air of an enemy's calumny. But this reason will not appear sufficient, if we transport ourselves back to the time and to the party concerned. To transfer to inanimate objects the sensitive as well as the willing and designing attributes of human beings is among the early and widespread instincts of mankind, and one of the primitive forms of religion⁴. By the old procedure, never formally abolished, though gradually disused, at Athens—an inanimate object which had caused the death of a man was solemnly tried and cast out of the border. And the Arcadian youths, when they returned hungry from an unsuccessful day's hunting, scourged and pricked the god Pan or his statue by way of revenge. Much more may we suppose a young Persian monarch, corrupted by universal subservience around him, to be capable of thus venting an insane wrath⁵. To offer sacrifice to rivers, and to testify in this manner gratitude for service rendered by rivers, was a familiar rite in the ancient religion. While the grounds for distrusting the narrative are thus materially weakened, the positive evidence will be found very forcible. The expedition of Xerxês took place when Herodotus was about four years old, so that he afterwards enjoyed ample opportunity of conversing with persons who had witnessed and taken part in it: and the whole of his narrative shows that he availed himself largely of such access to information. Besides, the building of the bridge across the Hellespont, and all the incidents connected with it, were acts necessarily known to many witnesses, and therefore the more easily verified.

New engineers—perhaps Greek along with, or in place of, Phenicians and Egyptians—were immediately directed to recommence the work which Herodotus now describes in detail. To form the two bridges, two

¹ Plutarch (*De Tranquillitate Animi*, p. 470) speaks of them as having had their noses and ears cut off.

² Herodot., vii. 34, 35.

The assertion—that no one was in the habit of sacrificing to the Hellespont—appears strange, when we look to the subsequent conduct of Xerxês himself (vii. 53); compare vii. 113, and vi. 76.

³ See Stanley and Blomfield on *Æschyl.*, *Pers.*,

731, and K. O. Müller, *Kleine Schriften*, vol. ii., p. 59.

⁴ Cf. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. ii. (on Animism).—E.D.

⁵ On the other hand, it should be observed that the worship of the Iranian nations was remarkably free from animistic and anthropomorphic ideas, and that Xerxês' father at any rate was a strenuous upholder of pure Zoroastrianism. Cf. Rawlinson, *Herodotus*, app. to bk. iii., essay 2.—E.D.

lines of ships—triremes and pentekonteres blended together—were moored across the strait breastwise, with their heads towards the Euxine and their sterns towards the Ægean, the stream flowing always rapidly from the former towards the latter¹. They were moored by anchors head and stern, and by very long cables. The number of ships placed to carry the bridge nearest to the Euxine was three hundred and sixty, the number in the other three hundred and fourteen. Over each of the two lines of ships, across from shore to shore, were stretched six vast cables, which discharged the double function of holding the ships together, and of supporting the bridge-way to be laid upon them. They were tightened by means of capstans on each shore; in three different places along the line a gap was left between the ships for the purpose of enabling small trading vessels without masts, in voyage to or from the Euxine, to pass and repass beneath the cables.

Over the cables were laid planks of wood, sawn to the appropriate width, secured above by a second line of cables stretched across to keep them in their places. Lastly, upon this foundation the causeway itself was formed out of earth and wood, with a palisade on each side high enough to prevent the cattle which passed over from seeing the water.

The other great work which Xerxes caused to be performed, for facilitating his march, was the cutting through of the isthmus which connects the stormy promontory of Mount Athos with the mainland². That isthmus near the point where it joins the mainland was about twelve stadia (not quite so many furlongs) across, from the Strymonic to the Toronaic Gulf; and the canal dug by order of Xerxes was broad and deep enough for two triremes to sail abreast. In this work, too, as well as in the bridge across the Hellespont, the Phenicians were found the ablest and most efficient among all the subjects of the Persian monarch; but the other tributaries, especially the Greeks from the neighbouring town of Akanthus, and indeed the entire maritime forces of the empire³, were brought together to assist. The headquarters of the fleet were first at Kymê and Phokæa, next at Elæus in the southern extremity of the Thracian Chersonese, from which point it could protect and second at once the two enterprises going forward at the Hellespont and at Mount Athos.

Herodotus remarks that Xerxes must have performed this laborious

¹ Grote, who rightly interpreted several doubtful points in Herodotus' description as against previous critics, has himself given a slightly erroneous description, mainly owing to his misconception of the coast-line near Sestos, and the consequent direction of the current. He would place both the bridges in a direct line with the channel.

But (1) the ἀκτὴ πρᾶξεία of Herodotus (vii. 34) is a headland on which a landing could not easily be effected, hence the European ends of the two bridges must have been a good way apart on either side of this promontory. If both bridges started from Abydos the natural course for the lower bridge would be straight across the channel, for the upper one to slant away up-stream. This agrees well with Herodotus' statement that the upper bridge contained more vessels (and so presumably was longer) than the lower one.

(2) Owing to the bend of the channel off Sestos, the current does not run parallel to the shore, but crosses over more or less in a line from Sestos to Abydos. Unless the boats' noses in the upper bridge had been turned straight up the current,

the strain on one set of anchor-sheets would have been excessive, and by their tendency to swing round the ships would have provided an insecure foundation for the upper works. If, then, the vessels in this bridge were anchored in a line with the current, they stood slantwise across the channel. This interpretation is as consistent as any with the somewhat loosely-worded account of Herodotus (vii. 36): τοῦ μὲν Πόντου ἐπικαρσίας τοῦ δὲ Ἑλληνιστοῦ κατὰ ῥόον.

Herodotus gives the distance from Abydos to the opposite shore as seven stades (at the present time it is more than 5,000 feet). The number of boats in either bridge imply a somewhat greater length, and the upper one probably exceeded a mile in length.

Cf. Stein, *Herodotus*, ad loc., and Grundy, *Great Persian War*, pp. 215, 216.—Ed.

² For a specimen of the destructive storms near the promontory of Athos, see Ephorus, *Fragment*, 121, ed. Didot; Diodor., xiii. 41.

³ Herodot., vii. 22, 23, 116; Diodor., xi. 2.

work from motives of mere ostentation : ' for it would have cost no trouble at all ' (he observes¹) to drag all the ships in the fleet across the isthmus ; so that the canal was nowise needed. So familiar a process was it, in the mind of a Greek of the fifth century B.C., to transport ships by mechanical force across an isthmus, a special groove or slip being seemingly prepared for them : such was the case at the Diolkus across the isthmus of Corinth. It is also to be noted, that the men who excavated the canal at Mount Athos worked under the lash ; and these, be it borne in mind, were not bought slaves, but freemen, except in so far as they were tributaries of the Persian monarch ; perhaps the father of Herodotus, a native of Halkarnassus and a subject of the brave Queen Artemisia, may have been among them. We shall find other examples as we proceed, of this indiscriminate use of the whip, and full conviction of its indispensable necessity, on the part of the Persians²—even to drive the troops of their subject-contingents on to the charge in battle. To employ the scourge in this way towards freemen, and especially towards freemen engaged in military service, was altogether repugnant both to Hellenic practice and to Hellenic feeling. The Asiatic and insular Greeks were relieved from it, as from various other hardships, when they passed out of Persian dominion to become, first allies, afterwards subjects, of Athens : and we shall be called upon hereafter to take note of this fact when we appreciate the complaints preferred against the hegemony of Athens.

At the same time that the subject-contingents of Xerxês excavated this canal, which was fortified against the sea at its two extremities by compact earthen walls or embankments, they also threw bridges of boats over the river Strymon. These two works, together with the renovated double bridge across the Hellespont, were both announced to Xerxês as completed and ready for passage, on his arrival at Sardis at the beginning of winter 481-480 B.C. Whether the whole of his vast army arrived at Sardis at the same time as himself, and wintered there, may reasonably be doubted ; but the whole was united at Sardis and ready to march against Greece, at the beginning of spring 480 B.C.

While wintering at Sardis, the Persian monarch despatched heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Sparta and Athens, to demand the received tokens of submission, earth and water. The news of his prodigious

¹ Herodot., vii. 24.

As this ship-canal across the isthmus of Athos has been treated often as a fable both by ancients (Juvenal, *Sat.*, x.) and by moderns (Cousinéry, *Voyage en Macédoine*), I transcribe the observations of Colonel Leake. That excellent observer points out evident traces of its past existence ; but in my judgment, even if no such traces now remained, the testimony of Herodotus and Thukydides (iv. 109) would alone be sufficient to prove that it *had* existed really. The observations of Colonel Leake illustrate at the same time the motives in which the canal originated. ' The canal (he says) seems to have been not more than sixty feet wide. As history does not mention that it was ever kept in repair after the time of Xerxes, the waters from the heights around have naturally filled it in part with soil in the course of ages. It might, however, without much labour, be renewed, and there can be no doubt that it would be useful to the navigation of the *Ægean*, for such is the fear entertained by the Greek boatmen of the strength and uncertain direction of the currents around Mount Athos, and of the gales and high seas to which the vicinity of the mountain is subject during half the year, and

which are rendered more formidable by the deficiency of harbours in the Gulf of Orfaná, that I could not, as long as I was on the peninsula, and though offering a high price, prevail upon any boat to carry me from the eastern side of the peninsula to the western. Xerxês, therefore, was perfectly justified in cutting this canal, as well from the security which it afforded to his fleet, as from the facility of the work and the advantages of the ground, which seems made expressly to tempt such an undertaking. The experience of the losses which the former expedition under Mardonius had suffered suggested the idea. The circumnavigation of the capes Ampelus and Canastræum was much less dangerous, as the gulfs afford some good harbours, and it was the object of Xerxês to collect forces from the Greek cities in those gulfs as he passed ' (Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii., ch. 24, p. 145).

² Herodot., vii. 22 ; compare vii. 103, and Xenophon, *Anabasis*, iii. 4-25.

The essential necessity, and plentiful use, of the whip, towards subject-tributaries, as conceived by the ancient Persians, finds its parallel in the modern Turks.

armament was well calculated to spread terror even among the most resolute of them. And he at the same time sent orders to the maritime cities in Thrace and Macedonia to prepare 'dinner' for himself and his vast suite as he passed on his march, which was commenced at the first beginning of spring.

From Sardis the host of Xerxès directed its march to Abydos, first across Mysia and the river Kaïkus—then through Atarneus, Karinë, and the plain of Thêbê. They passed Adramyttium and Antandrus, and crossed the range of Ida, which was on their right hand¹, not without some loss from stormy weather and thunder. From hence they reached Ilium and the river Skamander, the stream of which was drunk up, or probably in part trampled and rendered undrinkable, by the vast host of men and animals. Xerxès ascended the holy hill of Ilium—reviewed the Pergamus where Priam was said to have lived and reigned—sacrificed 1,000 oxen to the patron goddess Athênê—and caused the Magian priests to make libations in honour of the heroes who had fallen on that venerated spot. He even condescended to inquire into the local details, abundantly supplied to visitors by the inhabitants of Ilium, of that great real or mythical war to which Grecian chronologers had hardly yet learned to assign a precise date. Another day's march between Rhœteium, Ophryneium and Dardanus on the left-hand, and the Teukrians of Gergis on the right-hand, brought him to Abydos, where his two newly-constructed bridges over the Hellespont awaited him.

On this transit from Asia into Europe Herodotus dwells with peculiar emphasis. He surrounds it with much dramatic circumstance, not only mentioning the marble throne erected for Xerxès on a hill near Abydos, from whence he surveyed both his masses of land-force covering the shore and his ships sailing and racing in the strait (a race in which the Phœnicians of Sidon surpassed the Greeks and all the other contingents)—but also superadding to this real fact a dialogue with Artabanus, intended to set forth the internal mind of Xerxès.

At the first moment of sunrise, so sacred in the mind of Orientals², the passage was ordered to begin. The bridges were perfumed with frankincense and strewed with myrtle boughs, while Xerxès himself made libations into the sea with a golden censer, and offered up prayers to Helios, that he might effect without hindrance his design of conquering Europe even to its farthest extremity. Along with his libation he cast into the Hellespont the censer itself, with a golden bowl and a Persian scimitar. Of the two bridges, that nearest to the Euxine was devoted to the military force—the other to the attendants, the baggage, and the beasts of burthen. The 10,000 Persians, called Immortals, all wearing garlands on their heads, were the first to pass over. Xerxès himself, with the remaining army, followed next: the monarch having reached the European shore, saw his troops crossing the bridges after him 'under the lash'. But in spite of the use of this sharp stimulus to accelerate progress, so vast were the numbers of his host, that they occupied no less than seven days and seven nights, without a moment of intermission, in the business of crossing over.

¹ Herodotus says 'on the *left* hand' (vii. 42, § 2). On the source of this curious error, see Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 217.—Ed.

² Tacitus, *Histor.*, iii. 24: 'Undique clamor, et orientem solem, ita in Syriâ mos est, consalutavêre'

—in his striking description of the night battle near Cremona between the Roman troops of Vitellius and Vespasian, and the rise of the sun while the combat was yet unfinished: compare also Quintus Curtius, iii. 3, 8. [*Cf.* also Hdt., iii. 84.—Ed.]

Having thus cleared the strait, Xerxēs directed his march along the Thracian Chersonese, to the isthmus whereby it is joined with Thrace, between the town of Kardia on his left-hand and the tomb of Hellē on his right—the eponymous heroine of the strait. After passing this isthmus, he turned westward along the coast of the Gulf of Melas and the Ægean Sea. Having passed by the Æolic city of Ænus he reached the sea-coast and plain called Doriskus covering the rich delta near the mouth of the Hebrus. A fort had been built there and garrisoned by Darius.

Having been here joined by his fleet, which had doubled¹ the southernmost promontory of the Thracian Chersonese, he thought the situation convenient for a general review and enumeration both of his land and his naval force.

Never probably in the history of mankind has there been brought together a body of men from regions so remote and so widely diverse, for one purpose and under one command, as those which were now assembled in Thrace near the mouth of the Hebrus. About the numerical total we cannot pretend to form any definite idea; about the variety of contingents there is no room for doubt². The eight nations who furnished the fleet were—Phenicians (300 ships of war), Egyptians (200), Cypriots (150), Kilikians (100), Pamphylians (30), Lykians (50), Karians (70), Ionic Greeks (100), Doric Greeks (30), Æolic Greeks (60), Hellespontic Greeks (100), Greeks from the islands in the Ægean (17): in all 1,207 triremes or ships of war with three banks of oars. The descriptions of costumes and arms which we find in Herodotus are curious and varied. But it is important to mention that no nation except the Lydians, Pamphylians, Cypriots, and Karians (partially also the Egyptian marines on ship-board) bore arms analogous to those of the Greeks (*i.e.* arms fit for steady conflict and sustained charge—for hand combat in line as well as for defence of the person—but inconveniently heavy either in pursuit or in flight). The other nations were armed with missile weapons—light shields of wicker or leather, or no shields at all—turbans or leather caps instead of helmets—swords and scythes. They were not properly equipped either for fighting in regular order or for resisting the line of spears and shields which the Grecian hoplites brought to bear upon them. Their persons, too, were much less protected against wounds than those of the latter.

It was at Doriskus that the fighting-men of the entire land-army were first numbered; for Herodotus expressly informs us that the various contingents had never been numbered separately, and avows his own ignorance of the amount of each. The means employed for numeration were remarkable. Ten thousand men were counted³, and packed together as closely as possible: a line was drawn, and a wall of enclosure built, around the space which they had occupied, into which all the army was directed to enter successively, so that the aggregate number of divisions,

¹ Herodot., vii. 58, 59; Pliny, *H. N.*, iv. 11. See some valuable remarks on the topography of Doriskus and the neighbourhood of the town still called Enos, in Grisebach, *Reise durch Rumelien und nach Brussa*, ch. vi., vol. i., p. 157-159 (Göttingen, 1841). He shows reason for believing that the indentation of the coast, marked on the map as the Gulf of Ænos, did not exist in ancient times, any more than it exists now.

² Herodotus (vii. 61-96) enumerates forty-six

nations. This total he may have derived from a Persian 'army-list' (*cf.* Munro in *Journ. Hell. Stud.*, 1902), obtained perhaps from Artabazus (*cf.* Stein on Hdt., viii. 126), or from the *Ἱστορίαι* of Hekataeus, or by combining these two data.—Ed.

³ The army which Darius had conducted against Scythia is said to have been counted by divisions of 10,000 each, but the process is not described in detail (Herodot., iv. 87).

comprising 10,000 each, was thus ascertained. One hundred and seventy of these divisions were affirmed by the informants of Herodotus to have been thus numbered, constituting a total of 1,700,000 foot, besides 80,000 horse, many war-chariots from Libya and camels from Arabia, with a presumed total of 20,000 additional men¹. Such was the vast land-force of the Persian monarch: his naval equipments were of corresponding magnitude, comprising not only the 1,207 triremes or war-ships of three banks of oars, but also 3,000 smaller vessels of war and transports. The crew of each trireme comprised 200 rowers², and 30 fighting-men, Persians or Sakæ; that of each of the accompanying vessels included 80 men, according to an average which Herodotus supposes not far from the truth. If we sum up these items, the total numbers brought by Xerxes from Asia to the plain and to the coast of Doriskus would reach the astounding figure of 2,317,000 men. Nor is this all. In the farther march from Doriskus to Thermopylæ, Xerxes pressed into his service men and ships from all the people whose territory he traversed; deriving from hence a reinforcement of 120 triremes with aggregate crews of 24,000 men, and of 300,000 new land troops, so that the aggregate of his force when he appeared at Thermopylæ was 2,640,000 men. To this we are to add, according to the conjecture of Herodotus, a number not at all inferior, as attendants, slaves, sutlers, crews of the provision-craft and ships of burthen, etc., so that the male persons accompanying the Persian king when he reached his first point of Grecian resistance amounted to 5,283,220! So stands the prodigious estimate of this army, the whole strength of the eastern world, in clear and express figures of Herodotus, who himself evidently supposes the number to have been even greater; for he conceives the number of 'camp-followers' as not only equal to, but considerably larger than, that of fighting-men.

To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible. As to the number of triremes, his statement seems beneath the truth, as we may judge from the contemporary authority of Æschylus, who in the 'Persæ' gives the exact number of 1,207 Persian ships as having fought at Salamis³. But the aggregate of 3,000 smaller ships, and still more that of 1,700,000 infantry, are far less trustworthy. There would be little or no motive for the enumerators to be exact, and every motive for them to exaggerate—an immense nominal total would be no less pleasing to the army than to the monarch himself—so that the military total of land-force and ships' crews, which Herodotus gives as 2,641,000 on the arrival at Thermopylæ, may be dismissed as unwarranted and incredible. And the computation whereby he determines the amount of non-military persons present, as equal or more than equal to the military, is founded upon suppositions no way admissible. For though in a Grecian well-appointed army it was customary to reckon one light-armed soldier or attendant for every hoplite, no such estimate can be applied to the Persian host. An Asiatic soldier will at this day make his campaign

¹ Herodot., vii. 60, 87, 184. This same rude mode of enumeration was employed by Darius Codomannus a century and a half afterwards, before he marched his army to the field of Issus (Quintus Curtius, iii. 2, 3).

² This reckoning is perhaps not applicable to the early fifth century. Meyer (*Gesch. d. Alterthums*, iii., p. 359) assigns only 150 men to the warship of this period.—Ed.

³ Even if Æschylus was an eye-witness at Salamis, or even a participant in the battle, he cannot well have ascertained the total of the Persian fleet from some such official source as Herodotus used. Hence it is less likely that Herodotus underrated the Persian aggregate, than that Æschylus overestimated their number at Salamis by omitting to deduct previous casualties from the original official total (see note on p. 209).—Ed.

upon scanty fare, and under privations which would be intolerable to an European¹. But it would be rash to pretend to guess at any positive number in the entire absence of ascertained data. When we learn from Thukydides that he found it impossible to find out the exact numbers of the small armies of Greeks who fought at Mantinea², we shall not be ashamed to avow our inability to count the Asiatic multitudes at Doriskus.

Ktesias gives the total of the host at 800,000 men, and 1,000 triremes, independent of the war-chariots: if he counts the crews of the triremes apart from the 800,000 men (as seems probable), the total will then be considerably above a million. Ælian assigns an aggregate of 700,000 men: Diodorus³ appears to follow partly Herodotus, partly other authorities. None of these witnesses enables us to correct Herodotus, in a case where we are obliged to disbelieve him⁴.

After the numeration had taken place, Xerxes embarked on board a Sidonian trireme and sailed along the prows of his immense fleet, moored in line about 400 feet from the shore, and every vessel completely manned for action. Such a spectacle was well calculated to rouse emotions of arrogant confidence. It was in this spirit that he sent forthwith for Demaratus the exiled King of Sparta, who was among his auxiliaries—to ask whether resistance on the part of the Greeks, to such a force, was even conceivable. The conversation between them, dramatically given by Herodotus, is one of the most impressive manifestations of sentiment

¹ See on this point Volney, *Travels in Egypt and Syria*, ch. xxiv., vol. ii., pp. 70, 71; ch. xxxii., p. 367; and ch. xxxix., p. 435 (Engl. transl.).

Kinneir, *Geographical Memoir of the Persian Empire*, pp. 22, 23. Bernier, who followed the march of Aurungzebe from Delhi, in 1655, says that some estimated the number of persons in the camp at 300,000, others at different totals, but that no one knew, nor had they ever been counted. He says, 'You are no doubt at a loss to conceive how so vast a number both of men and animals can be maintained in the field. The best solution of the difficulty will be found in the temperance and simple diet of the Indians' (Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, translated by Brock, vol. ii., App., p. 118).

So also Petit de la Croix says, about the enormous host of Genghis-Khan, 'Les hommes sont si sobres, qu'ils s'accroissent de toutes sortes d'alimens.'

That author seems to estimate the largest army of Genghis at 700,000 men (*Histoire de Genghis*, liv. ii., ch. vi., p. 193).

² Thukyd., v. 68.

The Duke of Ragusa (in his *Voyage en Hongrie, Turquie, etc.*), after mentioning the prodigiously exaggerated statements current about the numbers slain in the suppressed insurrection of the Janissaries at Constantinople in 1826, observes, 'On a dit et répété, que leur nombre s'étoit élevé à huit ou dix mille, et cette opinion s'est accréditée (it was really about 500). Mais les Orientaux en général, et les Turcs en particulier, n'ont aucune idée des nombres: ils les emploient sans exactitude, et ils sont par caractère portés à l'exagération. D'un autre côté, le gouvernement a dû favoriser cette opinion populaire, pour frapper l'imagination et inspirer une plus grande terreur' (vol. ii., p. 37).

[The Greeks, as is well known, began to lose their distinct conception of number at totals exceeding 10,000.—Ed.]

³ Ktesias, *Persica*, c. 22, 28 Ælian, *V. H.*, xii. 3; Diodorus, xi. 2-11.

The Samian poet Choerilus, a few years younger than Herodotus, and contemporary with Thukydides, composed an epic poem on the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. Two or three short fragments of it are all that is preserved. He enumerated all the separate nations who furnished contingents to Xerxes, and we find not only the Sakæ, but also the Solymi (apparently the Jews, and so construed by Josephus) among them. See *Fragments*, iii. and iv., in Næke's edition of Choerilus, pp. 121-134.

⁴ The chief criterion for determining the numbers of Xerxes' force is supplied by Herodotus (viii. 126), who relates that Artabazus escorted the King on his retreat to Asia as far as Macedonia. From this it would appear that Xerxes left behind him in Greece almost all the troops which he had brought over, and the same inference may be drawn from Æschylus' description of the retreat (*Persæ*, 482 *et seq.*). In this case, the total Persian force on land never much exceeded that which Mardonius retained in 479 (Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ii. 3, p. 671; Munro in *Journ. Hell. Stud.*, 1902, p. 295).

If the numbers of Mardonius as given in Herodotus (viii. 113) be accepted—300,000—the total Persian land-force can hardly have exceeded half a million (Gründy, *Great Persian War*, p. 211, inclines to a slightly higher total).

On the other hand, it is probable enough that even Mardonius' total is exaggerated (see note on p. 229). Delbrück (*Perser- und Burgunderkriege*, p. 164) would reduce Xerxes' force to 50,000 combatants, Meyer (*Gesch. des Alt.*, iii., p. 375) to 100,000. Munro (*loc. cit.*) suggests that each of the thirty generals mentioned in Herodot., *vil. 61 et seq.*, nominally commanded 10,000 men. Unless a considerable part of the official force were left behind, which is unlikely, though Munro makes this suggestion (*loc. cit.*, p. 298), Xerxes' land army might be estimated as nearly 300,000 men. The total number engaged on the fleet probably did not exceed 200,000 (see note on p. 173).—Ed.

in the Greek language¹. Demaratus assures him that the Spartans most certainly, and the Dorians of Peloponnesus probably, will resist him to the death, be the difference of numbers what it may.

After the completion of the review, Xerxês with the army pursued his march westward, in three divisions and along three different lines of road, through the territories of seven distinct tribes of Thracians, interspersed with Grecian maritime colonies². The cost incurred by the city of Thasus, on account of their possessions of the mainland, for the entertainment of his host, was no less than 400 talents³ (= 92,800*l.*).

Through the territory of the Edonian Thracians and the Pierians, between Pangæus and the sea, Xerxês and his army reached the river Strymon at the important station called Ennea Hodoi or Nine-Roads, afterwards memorable by the foundation of Amphipolis. Bridges had been already thrown over the river, to which the Magian priests rendered solemn honours by sacrificing white horses and throwing them into the stream. From the Strymon he marched forward along the Strymonic Gulf, passing through the territory of the Bisaltæ near the Greek colonies of Argilus and Stageirus, until he came to the Greek town of Akanthus hard by the isthmus of Athos which had been recently cut through.

All the Greek cities which Xerxês had passed by obeyed his orders with sufficient readiness, and probably few doubted the ultimate success of so prodigious an armament. At Akanthus he separated himself from his fleet, which was directed to sail through the canal of Athos, to double the two south-western capes of the Chalkidic peninsula, to enter the Thermaic Gulf, and to await his arrival at Therma. The fleet in its course gathered additional troops from the Greek towns in the two peninsulas of Sithonia and Pallênê. Near Therma (Saloniki), in the interior of the Gulf and eastward of the mouth of the Axius, the fleet awaited the arrival of Xerxês by land from Akanthus. He seems to have had a difficult march, and with some columns to have taken a route considerably inland, through Pæonia and Krestônia—a wild, woody, and untrodden country, where his baggage-camels were set upon by lions, and where there were also wild bulls of prodigious size and fierceness. At length he rejoined his fleet at Therma, and stretched his army throughout Mygdonia, the ancient Pieria, and Bottiæis, as far as the mouth of the Haliakmôn.

Xerxês had now arrived within sight of Mount Olympus, the northern boundary of what was properly called Hellas, after a march through

¹ When Herodotus specifies his informants (it is much to be regretted that he does not specify them often) they seem to be frequently Greeks, such as Dikæus the Athenian exile, Thersander of Orchomenus in Boetia, Archias of Sparta, etc. (iii. 55; viii. 65; ix. 16). He mentions the Spartan king Demaratus often, and usually under circumstances both of dignity and dramatic interest. It is highly probable that he may have conversed with that prince himself, or with his descendants who remained settled for a long time in Teuthrania, near the Æolic coast of Asia Minor (Xenoph., *Hellenica*, iii. 1, 6), and he may thus have heard of representations offered by the exiled Spartan king to Xerxês.

It is not improbable that the skeleton of the conversation between Xerxês and Demaratus was a reality, heard by Herodotus from Demaratus himself or from his sons; for the extreme speciality with which the Lacedæmonian exile confines his

praise to the Spartans and Dorians, not including the other Greeks, hardly represents the feeling of Herodotus himself.

The minuteness of the narrative which Herodotus gives respecting the deposition and family circumstances of Demaratus (vi. 63 *et seq.*), and his view of the death of Kleomenês as an atonement to that prince for injury done may seem derived from family information (vi. 84).

² Grundy (*op. cit.*, p. 220 *et seq.*) shows that none but the coast-road along Thrace is practicable, and that the columns which struck inland merely took up stations to protect the flank of the army against the raids of mountaineers.—ED.

³ This sum of 400 talents was equivalent to the entire annual tribute charged in the Persian king's rent-roll, upon the satrapy comprising the western and southern coast of Asia Minor, wherein were included all the Ionic and Æolic Greeks, besides Lykians, Pamphylians, etc. (Herodot., iii. 90).

nothing but subject territory, with magazines laid up beforehand for the subsistence of his army—with additional contingents levied in his course—and probably with Thracian volunteers joining him in the hopes of plunder. The road along which he had marched was still shown with solemn reverence by the Thracians, and protected both from intruders and from tillage, even in the days of Herodotus. The Macedonian princes, the last of his western tributaries, in whose territory he now found himself—together with the Thessalian Aleuadae—undertook to conduct him farther. Nor did the task as yet appear difficult: what steps the Greeks were taking to oppose him shall be related in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER IX [XXXIX]

PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE TIME OF THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ

OUR information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathon is very scanty.

Kleomenês and Leotychidês, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder or Eurystheneid, the latter to the younger or the Prokleid race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Prokleid king Demaratus: and Kleomenês had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His manœuvre being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against his country¹. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not last long. His habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a Helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished. So shocking a death was certain to receive a religious interpretation: yet which, among the misdeeds of his life, had drawn down upon him the divine wrath, was a point difficult to determine. But what surprises us most is to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divine agency, recognised on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause: Kleomenês had gone mad (they affirmed) through habits of intoxication, learnt from some Scythian envoys who had come to Sparta².

¹ A nucleus for an Arcadian League existed in the common religious cult of Zeus Lykæus, in connexion with which a federal coinage was issued at this period (Head, *Historia Numorum*, p. 372).—Ed.

² The bitter hostility of Spartan tradition against Kleomenês, which has plainly infected the accounts of Herodotus (especially v. 42; vi. 75) and Pausanias (iii., ch. 4), is no doubt due to his having partly reasserted the ancient royal prerogatives against the encroachments of the board of ephors. The latter magistrates would seem to have acquired virtual control of the Government during the sixth century, but during Kleomenês' reign they retire into the background. The expulsion of the king may be ascribed to their efforts, and

it may be suspected that Herodotus' account of Kleomenês' death covers a piece of foul play on the part of the ephors. The latter certainly stood to gain much by his death, for henceforward their supremacy remained unchallenged for two and a half centuries.

The calumnies levelled against Kleomenês should not blind us to the fact that by the statesmanlike policy of his early days he largely helped to consolidate the Peloponnesian League, and that by his vigorous measures in dealing with Ægina and Argos he disabled betimes two powers which might have seriously hindered the strategy of the patriots in the Persian wars of 490 and 480 respectively.—Ed.

The death of Kleomenês, and the discredit thrown on his character, emboldened the Æginetans to prefer a complaint at Sparta respecting their ten hostages, whom Kleomenês and Leotychidês had taken away from the island, a little before the invasion of Attica by the Persians under Datis, and deposited at Athens as guarantee to the Athenians against aggression from Ægina at that critical moment. Leotychidês was the surviving auxiliary of Kleomenês in the requisition of these hostages, and against him the Æginetans complained. Though the proceeding was one unquestionably beneficial to the general cause of Greece, yet such was the actual displeasure of the Lacedæmonians against the deceased king and his acts, that the survivor Leotychidês was brought to a public trial, and condemned to be delivered up as prisoner in atonement to the Æginetans. The latter were about to carry away their prisoner, when a dignified Spartan named Theasidês, pointed out to them the danger which they were incurring by such an indignity against the regal person. The Spartans (he observed) had passed sentence under feelings of temporary wrath, which would probably be exchanged for sympathy if they saw the sentence executed.

Accordingly the Æginetans contented themselves with stipulating that Leotychidês should accompany them to Athens and redemand their hostages detained there. The Athenians refused to give up the hostages, in spite of the emphatic terms in which the Spartan king set forth the sacred obligation of restoring a deposit. They justified the refusal in part by saying that the deposit had been lodged by the two kings jointly, and could not be surrendered to one of them alone. But they probably recollected that the hostages were placed with them less as a deposit than as a security against Æginetan hostility—which security they were not disposed to forego.

Leotychidês having been obliged to retire without success, the Æginetans resolved to adopt measures of retaliation for themselves. They waited for the period of a solemn festival celebrated every fifth year at Sunium; on which occasion a ship, peculiarly equipped and carrying some of the leading Athenians as Theôrs or sacred envoys, sailed thither from Athens. This ship they found means to capture, and carried all on board prisoners to Ægina. Whether an exchange took place, or whether the prisoners and hostages on both sides were put to death, we do not know. But the consequence of their proceeding was an active and decided war between Athens and Ægina¹, beginning seemingly about 488 or 487 B.C., and lasting until 481 B.C., the year preceding the invasion of Xerxês².

An Æginetan citizen named Nikodromus took advantage of this war to further a plot against the government of the island. Having been before banished, he now organized a revolt of the people against the ruling

¹ Herodot., vi. 87, 88.

Instead of ἡ γὰρ δὴ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις πεντήρης ἐν Σουνίῳ (vi. 87), I follow the reading proposed by Schömann and sanctioned by Boeckh—*πεντηρηίς*. See Boeckh, *Urkunden über das Ätische Seewesen*, chap. vii., pp. 75, 76.

² The date 488-487 can be deduced with a fair measure of certainty from an oracle quoted by Herodotus in vi. 89, which promised the Athenians the definite subjugation of Ægina after thirty years' fighting. Though the occasion on which the oracle was delivered is not known—perhaps it immediately preceded or even followed upon the actual capture of Ægina—it is safe to infer

that a great conflict began thirty years before the final triumph of Ægina, which came to pass in 458-457 (cf. Macan, *Herodotus*, iii., app., viii.).

It may be convenient to recapitulate the probable chronology of the Æginetan wars at this point (but see chap. iv., app. ii.):

1. *Temp.* Peisistratus, the first outbreak.
2. 506 B.C., alliance of Ægina and Thebes.
3. 498 B.C., Ægina opens war upon Athens.
4. 491 B.C., a truce is imposed by Kleomenês.
5. 488 B.C., the war is renewed.
6. 481 B.C., Ægina and Athens are reconciled.
7. 459-457 B.C., the final conflict; Ægina becomes tributary to Athens.—Ed.

oligarchy, concerting with the Athenians a simultaneous invasion in support of his plan. Accordingly on the appointed day he rose with his partisans in arms and took possession of the Old Town—a strong post which had been superseded in course of time by the more modern city on the sea-shore, less protected though more convenient¹. But no Athenians appeared, and without them he was unable to maintain his footing. He was obliged to make his escape from the island, after witnessing the complete defeat of his partisans, a large body of whom, seven hundred in number, fell into the hands of the government, and were led out for execution.

The Athenians who were to have assisted Nikodromus arrived at Ægina one day too late². Their proceedings had been delayed by the necessity of borrowing twenty triremes from the Corinthians, in addition to fifty of their own³: with these seventy sail they defeated the Æginetans, who met them with a fleet of equal number—and then landed on the island. The Æginetans solicited aid from Argos, but that city was either too much displeased with them, or too much exhausted by the defeat sustained from the Spartan Kleomenês, to grant it. Nevertheless, one thousand Argeian volunteers came to their assistance, and a vigorous war was carried on, with varying success, against the Athenian armament.

At sea the Athenians sustained a defeat, being attacked at a moment when their fleet was in disorder, so that they lost four ships with their crews: on land they were more successful, and few of the Argeian volunteers survived to return home. At length the invaders were obliged to leave the island without any decisive result, and the war seems to have been prosecuted by frequent descents and privateering on both sides—in which Nikodromus and the Æginetan exiles, planted by Athens on the coast of Attica near Sunium, took an active part⁴; the advantage on the whole being on the side of Athens.

The general course of this war, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerted with Nikodromus in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency towards maritime activity, which coincided so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history, as well as a new career for themselves.

Miltiadês, the victor of Marathon, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristeidês and Themistoklês became the chief men at Athens, and the former was chosen archon during the succeeding year. The rivalry between the two chiefs became so

¹ See Thukyd., i. 8.

² The real reason for the failure of the Athenians to assist Nikodromus may have been a naval defeat which Herodotus omits to mention.

The oracle referred to in v. 89 *οὐδὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πολλὰ πείσονται* during the war. If this is an allusion to unsuccessful battles, it should be observed that only two such reverses are actually recorded between 488 and 458 (Herodotus, vi. 93; Thuk., i. 105). Cf. Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, ii², p. 648.—Ed.

³ Herodotus (vi. 89) says the ships were sold at a nominal price of five drachmæ apiece. It is not unlikely that he has made a mistake about the occasion of this transaction. Soon after Marathon we find the Athenians equipping a fleet of seventy sail against Paros. This implies that they had

already acquired the twenty Corinthian ships in addition to their standing home-levy of fifty. The deal must then have taken place in 498 or soon after (cf. Macan, *op. cit.*, p. 116).

The friendliness which Corinth habitually displayed towards Athens about this time (cf. ch. 31, pp. 142, 144) was no doubt mainly inspired by her commercial rivalry with Ægina. After the Persian wars, when Athens had become her most formidable competitor, Corinth made common cause with the Æginetans.—Ed.

⁴ How much damage was done by such a privateering war, between countries so near as Ægina and Attica, may be seen by the more detailed description of a later war of the same kind in 388 B.C. (Xenophon, *Hellenic.*, v. 1).

bitter and menacing, that even Aristeidès himself is reported to have said, 'If the Athenians were wise they would cast both of us into the barathrum'. Under such circumstances it is not too much to say that the peace of the country was preserved mainly by the institution called Ostracism. After three or four years of continued political rivalry, the two chiefs appealed to a vote of ostracism, and Aristeidès was banished.

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was the important change of policy above alluded to—the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power—the development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities this change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistoklès². On that account, if for no other reason, Aristeidès would probably be found opposed to it: but it was, moreover, a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life, and narrow range of active duty and experience—which Aristeidès seems to have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas, and the quickness of his intelligence. The land-service was a type of steadiness and inflexible ranks, the sea-service that of mutability and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers³: though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian seaman. His training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete⁴, than that of the Athenian hoplite or horseman: a training beginning with Themistoklès, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian war.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistoklès displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time, for which Thukydides gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristeidès, though the honester politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with Ægina, a maritime power equal, or more than equal, and within sight of the

¹ The course of party politics at Athens after 490 has become better known since the discovery of the *Ath. Pol.*

An important event ascribed to the year 487-486 is the change in the method of appointing the archons. Instead of being elected, they were henceforth drawn by lot, perhaps from a preliminary list of 500 pentakosiomedimni appointed probably by tribal election (*Ath. Pol.*, c. 22). The result of this measure was to transfer the real power in the administration from the archons to the elective board of strategi. By the time of the great Persian invasion the former set of magistrates had passed into obscurity. The change may have been due to Aristeidès (*cf. Plut., Arist.*, 22).

The ostracism of Aristeidès in 483-482 was preceded by that of the Alkmaeonid leaders Megaklès and Xanthippos (485-484), who were probably in league with Aristeidès against Themistoklès (*cf. note on p. 148*). *Cf. Ath. Pol.*, c. 22; Hicks and Hill, *Historical Inscriptions*, No. 14.

Plutarch (*Themist.*, c. 4) records on the strength of Stesimbrotus, biographer of Themistoklès in the late fifth century, that Themistoklès had to overcome the resistance of Miltiadès in propounding

his naval programme. But (1) Miltiadès seems rather to have advocated an expansive policy for Athens, and to have understood the value of naval power; (2) he had died before Themistoklès seriously brought forward his proposals. It is possible that Stesimbrotus made Miltiadès the hero of Marathon on an *ἀνὴρ Μαραθωνομάχης*, such as Aristophanes liked to portray—i.e., a sturdy conservative, with a deep-rooted dislike for the ναυτικός ὄχλος and all its works.—Edo.

² Plutarch, *Themist.*, c. 19.

³ Plato, *Legg.*, iv., pp. 705, 706. Plutarch, *Themistoklès*, c. 19. Isokrates, *Panathenaic.*, c. 43.

Plutarch, *Philopæmen*, c. 14: Πλὴν Ἐταπεινῶνδαν μὲν ἐνίοι λέγουσιν ὀκνοῦντα γεῦσαι τῶν κατὰ θάλασσαν ὠφελειῶν τοὺς πολίτας, ὅπως αὐτῷ μὴ λάθωσιν ἀντὶ μονίμων ὀπλιτῶν, κατὰ Πλάτωνα, πάντας γεγόμενοι καὶ διαφθαρέντες, ἀπρακτοὶ ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας καὶ τῶν ἡσίων ἀπελθεῖν ἐκουσίως: compare vii., p. 301.

⁴ See the remarkable passage in Xenophon (*Memorab.*, iii. 5, 19), attesting that the Hoplites and the Hippeis, the persons first in rank in the city, were also the most disobedient on military service.

Athenian harbour—but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression as well as increased thirst for revenge; and Themistoklēs knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis to Marathon¹, against which the best defence would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet. Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistoklēs, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against Persia. Not only were two hundred new ships to be built, and citizens trained as seamen—but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistoklēs was archon², of forming and fortifying a new harbour for Athens at Peiræus, instead of the ancient open bay of Phalærum³. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Peiræus with its three separate natural ports⁴, admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say, with Herodotus, that the Æginetan 'war was the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power'⁵. The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxēs turned upon this new movement in the organization of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years, between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged, was, in truth, the result of accident. First the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxēs at his first accession towards Hellenic matters—postponed until 480 B.C., an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B.C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls—the great engine of her subsequent salvation.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built—a considerable amount of public money—was also by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium⁶ in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the State. They were situated in the southern portion of the territory, not very far from the promontory of

¹ Thukyd., i. 93.

² Ibid.

³ Themistoklēs' archonship is placed by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (*Antiq. Rom.*, vi. 34) in 493-492. The *Ath. Pol.*, following a different scheme of chronology, which postdates the chief events in Themistoklēs' life by ten years, seems to imply the year 483-482, thus connecting the fortification of the Peiræus with the great ship-building programme (*cf.* Munro, in *Class. Rev.*, October, 1892, pp. 333, 334).

In favour of the former date it may be urged: (1) The 'Themistoklēs' of Dionysius can hardly be any but the famous statesman of that name; (2) the chances of the lot falling on Themistoklēs for the archonship in 483-482 were very minute (Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, ii., p. 643, second edition);

(3) the archonship had lost its administrative importance in 483; (4) the *Ath. Pol.* chronology is certainly wrong in the other dates which it gives for Themistoklēs.

Probably the fortification of Peiræus was simply a measure of precaution devised against the Æginetans, who had surprised and raided the open roadstead of Phalærum not long before 493 (Herodot., v. 81), and might be expected to renew the attack any moment.—Ed.

⁴ On these three harbours, see E. Gardner, *Ancient Athens*, pp. 562, 563.—Ed.

⁵ Herodot., vii. 144: ὁβτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστάς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους.

⁶ Æschylus, *Persæ*, 235.

Sunium. It was the practice of the Athenian Government either to sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to individuals or companies, on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at the time when Themistoklès made his proposition to enlarge the naval force, a great sum arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens—ten drachms to each man¹. This great amount in hand must probably have been the produce of the purchase-money or fines received from recent sales, since the small annual reserved rent can hardly have been accumulated during many successive years. New and enlarged enterprises in mines must be supposed to have been recently begun by individuals under contract with the Government: otherwise there could hardly have been at the moment so overflowing an exchequer, or adequate means for the special distribution contemplated. Themistoklès availed himself of this precious opportunity—set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina, and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia—and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy². One cannot doubt that there must have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution; insomuch that the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain, deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Immense indeed was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens, but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxès came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for the equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece Proper; especially the vast labour bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian or Akanthian citizen who visited the festival games in Peloponnesus. The formal announcements of Xerxès all designated Athens as the special object

¹ Cf. the yearly distribution of the revenue from the gold-mines on Siphnos (Herodot., iii. 57).—Ed.

² All the information—unfortunately it is very scanty—which we possess respecting the ancient mines of Laurium, is brought together in the valuable Dissertation of Boeckh, translated and appended to the English translation of his *Public Economy of Athens*. He discusses the fact stated in this chapter of Herodotus, in sect. 8 of that Dissertation: but there are many of his remarks in which I cannot concur.

After multiplying ten drachmæ by the assumed number of 20,000 Athenian citizens, making a sum total distributed of 33½ talents, he goes on—'That the distribution was made annually might have been presumed from the principles of the Athenian administration. We are not, therefore, to suppose that the savings of several years are meant, nor merely a surplus; but that all the public money arising from the mines, as it was not required for any other object, was divided among the members of the community' (p. 632).

We are hardly authorized to conclude from the passage of Herodotus that *all* the sum received from the mines was about to be distributed. The treasury was very rich, and a distribution was

about to be made; but it does not follow that nothing was to be left in the treasury after the distribution. Accordingly, all calculations of the total produce of the mines, based upon this passage of Herodotus, are uncertain.

I imagine that the sum of 33 talents, or 50 talents, necessary for the distribution, formed part of a larger sum lying in the treasury, arising from the mines. Themistoklès persuaded the people to employ the *whole* sum in shipbuilding, which, of course, implied that the distribution was to be renounced.

[The *Ath. Pol.* (c. 22) states that a sum of 100 talents was expended in order to build 100 ships. This number represents, no doubt, the sum available in 484 or 483 (when Themistoklès brought forward his measure), and the ships actually completed by 480. These newly-built vessels, when added to the existing fleet of about 70, would very nearly give the total which is ascribed to the Athenian naval contingent in 480.

This version does not necessarily conflict with Herodotus' statement that 200 ships were to be built. This sum rather represents the ideal total, which had not been attained by the time the war against Persia was resumed.—Ed.]

of his wrath and vengeance. Other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape without mischief, so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous dispositions to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxēs from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle; while both at the same time joined to convene a Pan-Hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organizing resistance against the expected invader.

I have in the preceding chapters pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Pan-Hellenic character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Peloponnesian states who constitute the immediate allies of Sparta; it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation: moreover, it seeks to combine every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it—even the Kretans, Korkyraëans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states do not actually come—but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come. The dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are entreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose—the defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything which has gone before—enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage—and thus introducing increased habits of coöperation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandizement among the leaders. The congress at the Isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralizing tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not be found realized.

Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of *medizing* (i.e., embracing the cause of the Persians), which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius. But her present conduct afforded no countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defence, and willingly consented to accommodate her difference with Athens. In this work of reconciling feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistoklēs took a prominent part, as well as Cheileos of

Tegea in Arcadia¹. The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit coöperation from such cities as were yet either equivocal or indifferent, especially Argos, Korkyra, and the Cretan and Sicilian Greeks, and at the same time to despatch spies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been detected, and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxês, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple, when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristonikê, when she at once exclaimed—'Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body, feet, and hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only *your* city, but other cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods—which are now sweating and trembling with fear and fore-shadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow.'

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not carry it back to Athens. In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here as elsewhere the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time. Upon which the priestess replied—'Athênê with all her prayers and all her sagacity cannot propitiate Olympian Zeus. But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant. When everything else in the land of Kekrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athênê that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent, but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest.'²

¹ Plutarch, *Themistokl.*, c. 10. About Cheileos, Herodot., ix. 9.

² Τείχος Τριτογενὲς ἔξλιγον διδοὶ εὐρύσσεια Ζεὺς
Μοῦνον ἀπόρθητον τελέθειν, τὸ σὲ τέκνα τ' ὀνήσει.
.....

Ἡ θεὴ Σαλαμίς, ἀπολεῖς δὲ σὺ τέκνα γυναικῶν,
etc. (Herodot., vii. 141).

[It may be doubted whether the two oracles delivered to the Athenians followed one another so closely as Herodotus represents.

In the former prophecy it was evidently the intention of the Delphians to terrify the Athenians out of Greece. They believed, no doubt, that Athens was really the special goal of Xerxês, and that the removal of the *corpus delicti* might prove the salvation of Greece as a whole. In accordance

with this view, they also advised Argos, Crete, and perhaps other States to remain passive.

The second oracle is clearly a message to the Athenians to take to their ships, but not necessarily for purposes of emigration. It has been conjectured that this change of attitude was brought about by the Spartans, who could not afford to lose the Athenian fleet, and therefore induced the Delphians to hint that the Athenians should prepare their fleet for battle (Grundy, *Great Persian War*, pp. 233-238). Timon the Delphian no doubt first communicated this changed attitude to Athens.

The last two lines of the second oracle are almost certainly *ex post facto*. Hence the story that Themistoklês reassured his countrymen on the strength of them falls to the ground. But Themistoklês no doubt helped to persuade them to put their trust in the fleet.—ED.]

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first. It left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark and unintelligible. When read to the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by 'the wooden wall'? Some supposed that the Acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out; but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on ship-board, deprecated all idea of a naval battle, and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica for ever.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers: nay, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real saviour of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired, by most of the Grecian states—he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologizes for it as something wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence. Not only did the Athenians dare to stay and fight against immense odds: they threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed, as will appear farther in the sequel.

But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the Isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognise some one commanding city. With regard to the land-force, no one dreamt of contesting the pre-eminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started that Athens should command at sea and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honour of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force at this moment of peril would be compromised. To appreciate this abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable we must recollect that the love of pre-eminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic character; a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honour and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.

During the winter preceding the march of Xerxès from Sardis, the congress at the Isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action. Among the cities north of Attica and Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Bœotia, or were at least lukewarm in the cause of

independence : so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Plataeans fifty-three years afterwards) was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader.

Even in the interior of Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, setting forth the common danger and soliciting coöperation. The result is certain, that no coöperation was obtained—the Argeians did nothing throughout the struggle ; but as to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the Delphian oracle—exactng only as conditions that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should equally divide the honours of headship with Argos. To the proposed truce there would probably have been no objection, nor was there any as to the principle of dividing the headship. But the Spartans added that they had two kings, while the Argeians had only one ; and inasmuch as neither of the two Spartan kings could be deprived of his vote, the Argeian king could only be admitted to a third vote conjointly with them. This proposition appeared to the Argeians (who considered that even the undivided headship was no more than their ancient right) as nothing better than insolent encroachment, and incensed them so much that they desired the envoys to quit their territory before sunset, preferring even a tributary existence under Persia to a formal degradation as compared with Sparta¹.

Such was the story told by the Argeians themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks, or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was, that the Argeians had a secret understanding with Xerxês. It was even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection and of vengeance to themselves against Sparta after their defeat by Kleomenês. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they *medized*, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards². It is certain that in act the Argeians were neutral, and one of their reasons for neutrality was that they did not choose to join any Pan-Hellenic levy except in the capacity of chiefs. But probably the more powerful reason

¹ Herodot., vii. 147-150.

² The opinion of Herodotus is delivered in a remarkable way, without mentioning the name of the Argeians, and with evident reluctance. After enumerating all the Grecian contingents assembled for the defence of the Isthmus, and the different inhabitants of Peloponnesus, ethnically classified, he proceeds to say : Τούτων ὦν τῶν ἐπὶ ἑθνῶν αἱ λοιπαὶ πόλεις, παρὲς τῶν κατέλεξα, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου ἐκατέατο· εἰ δὲ ἐλευθέρως ἐξεστὶ εἰπεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατῆμενοι ἐμῇ διζῶν (viii. 73). This assertion includes the Argeians without naming them.

When he speaks respecting the Argeians by name, he is by no means so free and categorical : compare vii. 152 ; he will give no opinion of his own, differing from the allegation of the Argeians themselves ; he mentions other stories, incompatible with that allegation, but without guaranteeing their accuracy ; he delivers a general admonition that those who think they have great reason to complain of the conduct of others would

generally find, on an impartial scrutiny, that others have as much reason to complain of them.—'And thus the conduct of Argos has not been so much worse than that of others'—οὕτω δὲ οὐκ Ἀργείοισι αἰσχίστα πεποιήται.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when the history of Herodotus was probably composed, the Argeians were in a peculiarly favourable position. They took part neither with Athens nor Lacedæmon, each of whom was afraid of offending them. An historian who openly countenanced a grave charge of treason against them in the memorable foregone combat against Xerxês, was thus likely to incur odium from both parties in Greece.

The comments of Plutarch on Herodotus in respect to this matter are of little value (*De Herodoti Malignis*, c. 28, p. 863), and are indeed unfair, since he represents the Argeian version of the facts as being universally believed (ἀπαντες ἰσάσων), which it evidently was not.

was that they shared the impression, then so widely diffused throughout Greece, as to the irresistible force of the approaching host, and chose to hold themselves prepared for the event. They kept up secret negotiations even with Persian agents, yet not compromising themselves while matters were still pending. Nor is it improbable, in their vexation against Sparta, that they would have been better pleased if the Persians had succeeded—all which may reasonably be termed *medizing*.

The absence of Hellenic fidelity in Argos was borne out by the parallel examples of Crete and Korkyra, to which places envoys from the Isthmus proceeded at the same time. The Cretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle; the Korkyræans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Korkyra; but they took care not to sail round Cape Malea, or to reach the scene of action. Their fleet remained on the southern or western coast of Peloponnesus, under pretence of being weather-bound, until the decisive result of the battle of Salamis was known. Their impression was that the Persian monarch would be victorious, in which case they would have made a merit of not having arrived in time; but they were also prepared with the plausible excuse of detention from foul winds, when the result turned out otherwise, and when they were reproached by the Greeks for their absence. Such duplicity is not very astonishing, when we recollect that it was the habitual policy of Korkyra to isolate herself from Hellenic confederacies¹.

The envoys who visited Korkyra proceeded onward on their mission to Gelon the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, I shall speak more fully in a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now that he rendered no aid against Xerxês. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations; for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians².

The endeavours of the deputies of Greeks at the Isthmus had thus produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Korkyræans. It was about the time when Xerxês was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B.C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadæ were among the companions of Xerxês, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every

¹ Thukyd., i. 32-37. It is singular that the Corinthian envoys in Thukydides do not make any allusion to the duplicity of the Korkyræans in regard to the Persian invasion, in the strong invective which they deliver against Korkyra before the Athenian assembly (Thukyd., i. 37-42).

[This *argumentum ex silentio* is so powerful that we are led to think that the Korkyræans really had a good excuse for their late arrival. The battle of Salamis took place about the time of the 'change

of the monsoon', and the north-eastern gales which are frequent about this period may have rendered it impossible for the fleet to double Cape Malea in time.

Herodotus' version has perhaps been influenced by Athenian sentiment soon after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, when the lukewarmness of Korkyra on behalf of her new protector doubtless gave rise to a feeling of irritation, and produced rumours about 'Korkyraean perfidiousness'.—Ed.]

² Herodot., vii. 158-167; Diodor., xi. 22.

promise of ready submission from their countrymen—yet it seems that these promises were in reality unwarranted. The Aleuadæ were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Peisistratidæ; while most of the Thessalians were disposed to resist Xerxês—for which purpose they now sent envoys to the Isthmus, intimating the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly, a body of 10,000 Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistoklès, were despatched by sea to Alus in Achæa Phthiôtis, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achæa and Thessaly. Being joined by the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempê, through which the river Peneius makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempê formed then, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from Lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly. The lofty mountain precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road: it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host¹. But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could not hold—first, because the powerful fleet of Xerxês would be able to land troops in their rear; secondly, because there were two other entrances possible in summer, from Upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain passes over the range of Olympus, entrances which traversed the country of the Perrhæbians and came into Thessaly near Gonnus, about the spot where the defile of Tempê begins to narrow. It was, in fact, by this second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempê, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made. On the present occasion, the Grecian commanders were quite ignorant of the existence of any other entrance into Thessaly, besides Tempê, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend for a time both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. But they remained only a few days at Tempê, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the Isthmus of Corinth—about the time when Xerxês was crossing the Hellespont.

This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of Mount Kithæron and of the Megarid territory without defence, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states, north of that boundary, to make their submission to Xerxês, which some of them had

¹ The expedition to Tempê can hardly have been seriously meant by the Spartan authorities. The danger of the Persian fleet disembarking troops on the Magnesian coast or at Pagasæ made this advanced line untenable in the long run. The march was no doubt undertaken simply as a manifesto of goodwill on behalf of the Thessalian peoples; but this effect was completely spoiled by the hasty retreat, which can only be looked upon in the light of a grave mistake.

On this showing it hardly matters whether the allies were or were not aware at first that the pass of Tempê could be turned by land, or felt much discomfited at the discovery. We need certainly not follow Herodotus in bringing Alexander I. of Macedon on to the scene. With regard to this monarch, the historian generally seems to use sources of a character far from impartial.

For the topography of Tempê, cf. Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 231.—ED.

already begun to do before¹. When Xerxês in the course of his march reached the Thermaic Gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name—the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænians, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Lokrians, Dorians, Malians, Phthiôtid Achæans, and Bœotians. Among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Plataea. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxês, under the stimulus of the Aleuadae, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempê and the arrival of Xerxês at Therma, no new plan of defence was yet thoroughly organized; for it was not until that arrival became known at the Isthmus that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.

CHAPTER X [XL]

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM

It was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign punishment, to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception was to be made in favour of those states which had been driven to yield by irresistible necessity. Such a vow seemed at that moment little likely to be executed. It was the manifestation of a determined feeling binding together the states which took the pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping together doubtful allies. The pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of Tempê—leaving out, indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians, Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Phthiôtid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænians, Malians, etc., who would all have been included if the latter line had been adhered to, but comprising the largest range consistent with safety. The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not to be found at Tempê; the mainland was here separated from the island of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half in its smallest breadth, between Mount Knêmis and Cape Kênæum. On the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa Phthiôtis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium, a name derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous feature, belonging to

¹ Diodor., xi. 3: ἐν παρουσίᾳ τῆς ἐν τοῖς Τέμπεσι φυλακῆς, etc.

the town of Histiaea. It was arranged that the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to coöperate with the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space¹ was supposed favourable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as their ships were both fewer in number, and heavier in sailing than those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa to the north and west from the mainland, and which between Chalkis and Bœotia becomes not too wide for a bridge. The occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.

Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what was then called the Maliac Gulf, into which the river Spercheius poured itself, near the town of Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of the Spercheius was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians, bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiôtis: the southernmost Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places considerable, in others very narrow—enclosed between Mount Oeta and the sea. From Trachis the range of Oeta stretched eastward, bordering close on the southern shore of the Maliac Gulf: between the two lay the memorable pass of Thermopylæ. On the road from Trachis to Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter, was placed the town of Anthêla, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

Immediately near to Anthêla, the northern slope of the mighty and prolonged ridge of Oeta approached so close to the gulf, or at least to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow entrance formed the western gate of Thermopylæ. At some little distance, three miles to the eastward, the same close conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated—thus forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first town of the Lokrians, called Alpêni. The space between these two gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt and sulphureous: The Phokians, some time before, had designedly endeavoured so to conduct the water as to render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a wall across it, in order to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to extend their conquests southward and eastward.

Such was the general scene—two narrow openings with an intermediate section of enlarged road and hot springs between them—which passed in ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates; or sometimes, more briefly, Pylæ—The Gates. At a point also near Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles outside or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent mountains were lower, and presented less difficulty of transit, while at Thermopylæ

¹ Herodot., viii. 15-60. Compare Isokratês, *Panegyric*, Or. iv., p. 59.

I shall have occasion presently to remark the

revolution which took place in Athenian feeling on this point between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

itself, the overhanging projection of Mount Oeta was steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessaly into Lokris and the territories south-east of Oeta, only through the straight gate, save and except an unfrequented as well as circuitous mountain path which will be presently noticed. The wall originally built across the pass by the Phokians was now half-ruined by age and neglect; but the Greeks easily re-established it, determining to await in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of Tempê, the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea-line appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking nor for sailing; but there were points at which boats could land, so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet at Artemisium, while Alpêni was immediately in their rear to supply provisions¹.

Though a general resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus, to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been taken seemingly not long after the retreat from Tempê, their troops and their fleet did not actually occupy these positions until Xerxês was known to have reached the Thermaic Gulf. Both were then put in motion; the land-force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval force under the Spartan commander Eurybiadês, apparently about the [middle of August²]. Leonidas was the younger brother, the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king Kleomenês, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother of the same family—Dorieus, older than Leonidas—had perished, even before the death of Kleomenês, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant a colony in Sicily; and room had been thus made for the unexpected succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of 300 Spartans—all being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons to supply their places³. Along with them were 500 hoplites from Tegea, 500 from Mantinea, 120 from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 1,000 from the rest of Arcadia, 400 from Corinth, 200 from Phlius, and 80 from Mykenæ. There were also doubtless Helots and other light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans⁴. In their march through Bœotia they were joined by 700 hoplites of Thespiæ, hearty in the cause, and by 400 Thebans of more equivocal fidelity under Leontiadês. It appears, indeed, that the leading men of Thebes, at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly *medized*, or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist in the defence of Thermopylæ, was doubtful whether they would not refuse

¹ For a detailed description of the pass and the surrounding country, see Grundy, *Great Persian War*, pp. 277-291.—Ed.

² Upon the chronology of Thermopylæ, cf. A. Mommsen, *Ueber die Zeit der Olympien*, p. 63; Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.*, ii², p. 674. Grote was inclined to place this advance about the middle of June.—Ed.

³ In selecting men for a dangerous service, the Spartans took by preference those who already had families: if such a man was slain, he left behind him a son to discharge his duties to the State, and to maintain the continuity of the family sacred rites, the extinction of which was considered as a great misfortune. In our ideas, the life of the father of a family in mature age would be considered as of more value, and his

death a greater loss, than that of a younger and unmarried man.

⁴ It is extremely unlikely that many Helots marched out: they would have been more of a hindrance than a help in the narrow pass of Thermopylæ. It is more reasonable to suppose that some Perieki were included in the expedition. For a similar failure on Herodotus' part to mention the Perieki, see ix. 85. If we add a force of about 1,000 Perieki to the total of 3,100 Peloponnesians enumerated by Herodotus, we obtain the 4,000 mentioned in the epigram of Herodot. vii. 228 (cf. Stein, *ad loc.*).—Ed.

Diodorus, xi. 4, speaks of 1,000 'Lacedæmonians' (cf. Isokr., *Paneg.*, § 90 (χιλίους αὐτῶν ἐπιλέξαντες) Ktésias, *Pers.*, 25.]

compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real inclinations, and furnished a contingent of 400 men¹, chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed, the Theban people, and the Bœotians generally, with the exception of Thespiæ and Plataea, seem to have had little sentiment on either side, and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylæ, whence he sent envoys to invite the junction of the Phokians and the Lokrians of Opus. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water to Xerxēs, of which they are said to have repented: the step was taken probably only from fear, which at this particular moment prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately victorious²: while the Phokians, if originally disposed to *medize*, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their bitter enemies the Thessalians were active in the cause of Xerxēs and influential in guiding his movements³. The Greek envoys added strength to their summons by all the encouragements in their power. 'The troops now at Thermopylæ (they said) were a mere advanced body, preceding the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already on guard. Moreover, there was no cause for fear, since the invader was after all not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in pre-eminent condition⁴.' Whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian Lokrians, and 1,000 Phokians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ⁵.

The question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced guard. The answer is to be found in another attribute of the Greek character—it was the time of celebrating both the Olympic festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian States⁶.

¹ Herodot., vii. 205; Thukyd., iii. 62; Diodor., xi. 4; Plutarch, *Aristeidēs*, c. 18.

The passage of Thukydides is very important here, as confirming to a great degree the statement of Herodotus, and enabling us to appreciate the criticisms of Plutarch, on this particular point very plausible (*De Herodoti Malign.*, pp. 865, 866).

The statement of Diodorus—*ἑπταίων ἀπὸ τῆς ἑρπας μέγιστος ὡς στρατοῦ*—is illustrated by a proceeding of the Korkyraean government (Thukyd. iii. 75) when they enlisted their enemies in order to send them away: also that of the Italian Cumæ (Dionys. Hal., vii. 5).

² Diodor., xi. 4.

³ Herodot., viii. 30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vii. 203.

⁵ The Lokrian contingent is not mentioned again by Herodotus, and seems to have taken no part in the main combat at Thermopylæ. Munro (*Journ. Hell. Stud.*, p. 313) suggests that it was detailed to hold the strong position of Herakleia. This fortress, a little to the west of Thermopylæ, completely commands the road up the Asôpus gorge into Doris and the Kephissus valley (*cf. Grundy, op. cit.*, pp. 261-264). In spite of the difficulties of this route, it would almost certainly have been used by the Persians to turn the position of Thermopylæ, had it been open at the time—a Persian column subsequently used it in marching to Phokis (Herodot., viii. 31)—hence it is reasonable to suppose that it was held. If

Hydarnēs began his march by way of the Asôpus gorge (see p. 105), the Lokrians must have surrendered after a few days' resistance, in which case it is likely enough that the tale of their inglorious behaviour was hushed up.—*Ed.*

⁶ Herodot., vii. 206. It was only the Dorian States (Lacedæmon, Argos, Sikyon, etc.) which were under obligations of abstinence from aggressive military operations during the month of the Karneian festival: other States (even in Peloponnesus), Elis, Mantinea, etc., and, of course, Athens, were not under similar restraint (Thukyd., v. 54, 75).

I do not here mean to assert that these two festivals (the Karneia and the Olympia) took place so exactly at the same time, that persons could not attend both. It would seem that the Karneia came earlier of the two. But the Grecian festivals depended on the lunar months, and varied more or less in reference to the solar year. The Karneia were annual; the Olympia quadrennial.

[Modern critics are more or less agreed that the celebration of the festivals was merely adduced as a pretext. The real reason for the half-hearted measures adopted by Sparta has been variously interpreted. The disaffection of Argos may have required a Spartan force to remain in the Peloponnese (*cf. Herodot.*, ix. 12), and the allies may have been preoccupied with the harvest (*cf. Thuk.*, iii. 15). Possibly the occupation of Thermopylæ

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for the first time that there was also a mountain path starting from the neighbourhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asôpus, and the hill called Anopæa, then crossing the crest of Oeta and descending in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of Alpêni. This path was revealed to him by its first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phokis, after the Phokians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore not unknown to the Phokians : it conducted from Trachis into their country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would occupy and defend it. But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence, for the mountain path as well as for the defile, as that which had induced their former army to abandon Tempê. The Peloponnesian troops, anxious only for their own separate line of defence at the Isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat thither forthwith. Leonidas thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate reinforcements. So painfully were the consequences now felt, of having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals in Peloponnesus.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers at Artemisium on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan Eurybiadês. It was composed as follows :—100 Athenian triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Plataea, in spite of their total want of practice on ship-board, 40 Corinthian, 20 Megarian, 20 Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis and lent to them by Athens, 18 Æginetan, 12 Sikyonian, 10 Lacedæmonian, 8 Epidaurian, 7 Eretrian, 5 Troezenian, 2 from Styria in Eubœa, and 2 from the island of Keos. There were thus in all 271 triremes ; together with 9 pentekonteres, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of Opus. Themistoklês was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and Adeimantus of the Corinthian ; of other officers we hear nothing. Three cruising vessels were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from Therma.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest. Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes, who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire fleet sought safety in flight, but were run down and captured.

Xerxês had halted on the Thermaic Gulf for several days, employing a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods, and clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from Upper Macedonia into Perrhæbia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as prefer-

was meant to be merely temporary, to give the fleet a chance of striking a decisive blow in the selected position of Artemisium. But the despatch of a messenger to solicit reinforcements shows that Leonidas, at any rate, intended to make a serious stand at Thermopylæ. Hence it

would appear that originally the Spartan Government meant to adopt an energetic policy, but afterwards wavered in its resolve or found its hands forced by the other Peloponnesian States, who certainly were addicted to a short-sighted policy of defence at the Isthmus.—ED.]

able to the defile of Tempé¹. Not intending to march through the latter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake. His march from Therma through Macedonia, Perrhæbia, Thessaly, and Achæa Phthiôtis, into the territory of the Malians and the neighbourhood of Thermopylæ, occupied eleven or twelve days²: the people through whose towns he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host was still farther swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander. He respected and protected the sacred places, an incident which shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Milêtus, etc., was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious feeling. Along the shore of the Malian Gulf he at length came into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylæ, where he encamped, seemingly awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine his farther movements in advance, now that the enemy were immediately in his front.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylæ. After having ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned (which captured the three Grecian guardships) that the channel between Skiathos and the mainland was safe, the Persian admiral Megabates sailed with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna³, his station in the Thermaic Gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his land-march, and reached in one long day's sail the eastern coast of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable; but south of the town called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach where the fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called the Sêpias Aktê. The first line of ships were moored to the land, but the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane—a wind called by the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large number, unable

¹ The pass over which Xerxês passed was that by Petra, Pythium, and Oloosson—'saltum ad Petram', 'Perrhæbiæ saltum' (Livy, xiv. 21; xlv. 27). Petra was near the point where the road passed from Pieria or Lower Macedonia into Upper Macedonia (see Livy, xxxix. 26).

Compare respecting this pass, and the general features of the neighbouring country, Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii., ch. xviii., pp. 337-343; and ch. xxx., p. 430; also Boué, *La Turquie en Europe*, vol. i., pp. 198-202.

The Thracian king Sitalkês, like Xerxês on this occasion, was obliged to cause the forests to be cut, to make a road for his army, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war (Thukyd., ii. 98).

² The Persian fleet did not leave Therma until eleven days after Xerxês and his land-force (Herodot., vii. 183): it arrived in one day on the Sêpias Aktê or south-eastern coast of Magnesia (*ibid.*), was then assailed and distressed for three days by

the hurricane (vii. 191), and proceeded immediately afterwards to Aphetæ (vii. 193). When it arrived at the latter places, Xerxês himself had been three days in the Malian territory (vii. 196).

[It has been observed that Herodotus' diaries of the Persian army and fleet do not agree as to the time that elapsed since the advance from Therma until the end of the double battle at Thermopylæ and Artemisium; for the fleet he counts eighteen, for the army twenty days. Modern critics usually make the arrival of the army at Trachis and the fleet at the Sêpias coast fall on the same day, and either shorten Xerxês' alleged stay at Trachis from four days to two, or lengthen the duration of the naval operations. Cf. Bury, in the *Annual of the British School at Athens*, vol. ii., 1895-96, p. 83 *at seq.*; Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 320, 342, 343, where a detailed reconstruction is attempted.—Ed.]

³ Diodor., xi. 12.

to take such a precaution, were carried before the wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanæa, and other points of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports and provision craft, were destroyed : and the loss of life as well as of property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without defence, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers. At length on the fourth day calm weather returned, when all those ships which were in condition to proceed put to sea and sailed along the land, round the southern promontory of Magnesia to Aphetæ at the entrance of the Gulf of Pagasæ.

Meanwhile Xerxês, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered four days to pass without making any attack. A probable reason may be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been utterly destroyed by the storm : but Herodotus assigns a different cause. Xerxês could not believe (according to him) that the Greeks at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention to resist.

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe that we are reading historical reality. The whole proceedings of Xerxês, and the immensity of host which he summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance ; and though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the position which they then occupied—an entrance little wider than a single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it.

The Medes, whom Xerxês first ordered to the attack, animated as well by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon, manifested great personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were of little avail : a close combat hand to hand was indispensable, and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well as armour. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and spreading shields, steady ranks, and practised fighting of the defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favour, maintained long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves, and little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was as constantly renewed, for two successive days : the Greek troops were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since the space was so narrow that few could contend at once ; and even the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day, were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the rest. Xerxês surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne expressly provided for him : ‘ thrice (says the historian, with Homeric vivacity) did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army.’

At the end of two days’ fighting no impression had been made. The pass appeared impracticable, and the defence not less triumphant than

courageous—when a Malian named Ephialtēs revealed to Xerxēs the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer of the fatal secret¹. There were, however, other Greeks who were also affirmed to have earned the favour of Xerxēs by the same valuable information ; and very probably there may have been more than one informant—indeed, the Thessalians, at that time his guides, can hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought of, however, that no one in the Persian army knew it to be already occupied by the Phokians. At nightfall Hydarnēs with a detachment of Persians proceeded along the gorge of the river Asōpus, ascended the path of Anopæa, through the woody region between the mountains occupied by the Oetæans and those possessed by the Trachinians, and found himself at daybreak near the summit, within sight of the Phokian guard of 1,000 men². In the stillness of daybreak, the noise of his army trampling through the wood aroused the defenders ; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnēs in alarm asked his guides whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the Phokians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain. Anxious only for their own safety, they became unmindful of the inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, they might have planted such a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less impregnable than the pass beneath.

Hydarnēs, not troubling himself to pursue the Phokians, followed the descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending, and arrived in the rear of Thermopylæ not long after midday. But before he had yet completed his descent, the fatal truth had already been made known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closing in upon him behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp, had both come in with the news. There was ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable, and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of prudent officers, under the circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea of retreat was intolerable. His own personal honour, together with that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself, forbade him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or die in the post assigned to him, whatever might be the superiority of number on the part of the enemy : moreover, we are told that the Delphian oracle had declared that

¹ Ktésias states that it was two powerful men of Trachis, Kalliadēs and Timaphernēs, who disclosed to Xerxēs the mountain-path (*Persica*, c. 24).

² The position of the Phokians was perhaps not on Mount Kallidromus, but nearer the Asōpus gorge, enabling them to guard the road into their own country by way of Doris as well. For (1) this part is thickly covered with oaks (whereas Kallidromus has firs) ; (2) the Phokians would probably have

refused to run the risk of being cut off on Kallidromus from their natural line of retreat westward.

In this passage, as elsewhere, Herodotus (viii. 30 ; ix. 17) tries to represent the equivocal conduct of the Phokians during the war in as favourable a light as possible ; but there can be little doubt that they were no more unselfish than the other peoples of Northern and Central Greece (*cf.* Munro, *loc. cit.*, pp. 314, 315. For a description of the Anopæa Pass, *cf.* Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-303).—ED.

either Sparta itself, or a king of Sparta, must fall victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece especially, always burst upon the general who failed; while his voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to this act of generous self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment: but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire¹. None of the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Thespian and the Theban. The former, under their general Demophilus, volunteered to share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint which arises from the necessity of acting up to a pre-established fame and superiority. But retreat with them presented no prospect better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in exile and misery, since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by the invaders²; while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind them the Isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent, we are much perplexed; for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves prisoners to Xerxēs as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the Thespians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having stayed along with the Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the Thebans³. All things considered, it seems probable that the Thebans remained, but remained by

¹ Herodot., vii. 220.

Compare a similar act of honourable self-devotion, under less conspicuous circumstances, of the Lacedæmonian commander Anaxibius, when surprised by the Athenians under Iphikrātēs in the territory of Abydos (Xenophon, *Hellenic.*, iv. 8, 38). He and twelve Lacedæmonian harmosts all refused to think of safety by flight. He said to his men, when resistance was hopeless, "Ἄνδρες, ἐμοὶ μὲν καλὸν ἐνθάδε ἀποθανεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὶν ἐνμυθεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, σπεύδετε εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν."

[In the Persian war alone we have two instances of Spartan commanders retreating without dishonour (Eurybiadēs, Pausanias). As for the oracle, this was no doubt made up *ex post facto* in order to raise the hopes of the Spartans. In the same way the rest of the story of Leonidas' heroism as recounted in Herodotus was almost certainly an 'official' account, which at once raised the reputation of the Spartans for valour, and diverted attention from the previous shortcomings in their policy with regard to Thermopylæ. This version would also find support among the other Peloponnesians, whose retreat from the field of battle was thus invested with a good excuse.

As to the real motive which induced Leonidas and the Bœotians to stay, it has been suggested that he hoped to detain Hydarnēs or even trap him between two forces by sending the Peloponnesian allies up the eastern end of the Anopæa pass or a little beyond Alpeῖni. Bury (*op. cit.*) makes up the total of 4,000 slain at Thermopylæ (Herodot., viii. 25) by attributing heavy losses to the Peloponnesians on this special service. But in this case it is extremely unlikely that all records relating to

such a brave resistance against Hydarnēs should have perished.

It is more likely that Leonidas hoped to hold the pass long enough for the fleet to strike a decisive blow, after which event the evacuation of Thermopylæ would at any rate have had a less serious moral effect (Munro, *loc. cit.*, pp. 315-319).—Ed.]

² The subsequent distress of the surviving Thespians is painfully illustrated by the fact, that in the battle of Plataea in the following year, they had no heavy armour (Herodot., ix. 30). After the final repulse of Xerxēs, they were forced to recruit their city by the admission of new citizens (Herodot., viii. 75).

³ Herodot., vii. 222. How could these Thebans serve as hostages? Against what evil were they intended to guard Leonidas, or what advantages could they confer upon him? Unwilling comrades on such an occasion would be noway desirable. Plutarch (*De Herodot. Malign.*, p. 865) severely criticizes this statement of Herodotus, and on very plausible grounds; among the many unjust criticisms in his treatise, this is one of the few exceptions.

Compare Diodorus, xi. 9; and Pausan., x. 20, 1.

Of course the Thebans, taking part as they afterwards did heartily with Xerxēs, would have an interest in representing that their contingent had done as little as possible against him, and may have circulated the story that Leonidas detained them as hostages. The politics of Thebes *before* the battle of Thermopylæ were essentially double-faced and equivocal, not daring to take any open part against the Greeks before the arrival of Xerxēs.

their own offer—being citizens of the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to retire with the Peloponnesians, than to remain, suspected as they were of *medism*. But when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians, they endeavoured to save their lives by taking credit for *medism*, and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylæ consisted of the 300 Spartans, with a certain number of dependents attending them, together with 700 Thespians and apparently 400 Thebans. By previous concert with the guide Ephialtēs, Xerxēs delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops under Hydarnēs might soon be expected in the rear. On this last day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the defensive, but advanced into the wider space outside of the pass, becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the Greeks as in the neighbouring sea and morass, and even trodden down by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were repulsed by the Greeks for several times, with the loss of many of their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxēs. Fatigued, exhausted, diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons, the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief, into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat altogether on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnēs, which had now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded, overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man, not losing courage even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades — 300 Spartans and 700 Thespians. Herodotus had asked and learnt the name of every individual among this memorable three hundred. And even six hundred years afterwards, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on a column at Sparta¹.

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band we turn with repugnance to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thespians, exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached the enemy with outstretched hands and entreated quarter. They now loudly pro-

¹ Herodot., vii. 224. Pausanias, iii. 14, 1. Annual festivals, with a panegyric oration and gymnastic matches, were still celebrated even in his time in honour of Leonidas, jointly with the

regent Pausanias, whose subsequent treason tarnished his laurels acquired at Plataea. It is remarkable that the two kings should have been made partners in the same public honours.

claimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great King, and had come to Thermopylæ against their own consent; all which was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians, the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace, however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy slaves—an indignity to which their commander Leontiadês was compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even of doubt: Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a Bœotian author¹, who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiadês, was commander of the Thebans at Thermopylæ². Without calling in question the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in Greece after the repulse of Xerxês.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the close of the action, is said to have vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross. But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind. He was farther impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly invincible. He now learnt to be anxious respecting the farther resistance which remained behind. 'Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned out true: now tell me how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?' 'O king (replied Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is great; in Sparta alone there are 8,000 adult warriors, all equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians, though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers.' 'Tell me (rejoined Xerxês), what will be the least difficult way of conquering such men?' Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of his fleet to occupy the island of Kythêra, and from thence to make war on the southern coast of Lakonia, which would distract the attention of Sparta, and prevent her from coöperating in any combined scheme of defence against his land-force. Unless this were done, the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet witnessed.

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achæmenes, the brother of Xerxês, interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action. The fleet, after the damage sustained by the recent storm, would bear no farther diminution of number: and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on land as well as on sea, in one undivided and coöperating mass³.

¹ Herodot., vii. 233; Plutarch, *Herodot. Malign.*, p. 867. The Bœotian history of Aristophanês, cited by the latter, professed to be founded in part upon memorials arranged according to the sequence of magistrates and generals—ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ἀρχόντας ἀπομνημονίων ἱστορήσε.

² The name Leontiadês is significant. Another Leontiadês, possibly a grandson, led the attack against Plataeân 431 (Thuk., ii. 2), and so no doubt

rendered his name odious in Athens about the time when Herodotus wrote bk. vii. The elder Leontiadês and his soldiers were no doubt included in the same campaign of calumny (see Stein, *Herodotus*, ad. loc.).—E.p.

³ This story, whether authentic or not (Herodotus may have heard it from Demaratus' descendants in Teuthrania, cf. Xen., *Anab.*, vii. 8, 17) is of importance in that it gives us a clue as to the

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium¹.

It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general plan of defence, that the Eubœan strait should be defended against the Persian fleet; and the Greeks could not expect any more favourable position to fight in.

The Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape, detached 200 ships to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south, in the rear of the Greeks; postponing their own attack in front until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the manœuvre was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter—Skyllias of Skione².

The Greeks resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of 200 ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistoklès, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Aphetæ³. Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phenicians and others in the Persian fleet handled and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained⁴. Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries. To both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with their sterns in the interior, and presenting

real numbers of the Persian fleet. The statement of Achemènes that the Persians after their losses at Artemisium, etc., could no longer afford to detach a squadron from their main armament shows that their total numbers at the battle of Salamis cannot have amounted to such a vast total as Herodotus and Æschylus suppose.—Ed.

¹ Herodotus records that the Greeks before the battle of Artemisium were twice seized with a panic. (1) On hearing of the capture of their three scouts (see p. 192) they retired to Chalkis, and remained there during the three days' storm, but after hearing of the Persian losses off the Sepian coast, returned to their former position (viii. 182, 189, 192). (2) Upon discovering that the Persian fleet was still in fighting trim, they proposed to run away once more, but Themistoklès was bribed by the Eubœans, and in turn bribed Eurybiadès and Adeimantus to remain at Artemisium. (3) After the third day's hard fighting they again proposed to retire, when word came about the loss of Thermopylæ, and a retreat was made in good earnest.

The absurdity of these stories does not need further demonstration. As for the real events that underlie Herodotus' distorted record, the first 'flight' may have been a retreat to leeward of Eubœa for the purpose of sheltering from the storm (Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 324). On the other hand, the Greek fleet may have been secure enough in the adjacent harbour of Histiaæ. In any case one or all of the tales may have found their origin in the detachment of the Athenian squadron of fifty-three ships to guard the defiles of Chalkis against the circumventing squadron of the Persians

(see note on p. 200). Perhaps the 'flights' at Artemisium are a replica of those at Salamis (*cf.* Bury, *loc. cit.*, p. 38 *et seq.*).—Ed.

² There are some indications that these ships were despatched on the evening of the fleet's arrival at the Sepian coast. The chief advantage of this hypothesis is that it enables us to dispense with the second violent storm following close upon the first in a manner unusual to a Greek summer; the same gale which wrecked the main armada on the Sepian strand caught the detached squadron off Eubœa. (See Bury, *loc. cit.*; Munro, *loc. cit.*, pp. 307-309.) In this case we may suppose that the total Persian casualties by storm, not those of the main squadron alone, amounted to 400 vessels.—Ed.

³ Diodorus, xi. 12.

⁴ It may be conjectured that this attack was not merely in the nature of an experiment. It must have been evident all along to the more clear-sighted commanders, such as Themistoklès, that if the Greeks were to risk a decisive engagement at all they must do so by sea. Artemisium was a favourable position for such a combat (Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 334), and the proportionate strength of the fleet as compared with the army at Thermopylæ leads us to suppose that they were concentrating their efforts on the sea rather than on the land. Hence their attack at Artemisium was probably meant to bring on a general engagement, ending in the complete disablement of the Persian fleet. But the Greeks did not fight under the same spur of necessity as at Salamis, and therefore made but little impression on their enemies.—Ed.

their prows in front, at all points of the circumference¹. In this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them: but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them. Such unexpected forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who, however, rallied and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks. But the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station; the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to Artemisium.

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties, and did much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the middle of summer—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece—the most violent wind, rain, and thunder prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from the former storm at Sêpias Aktê, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril; the more so when they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island (called the Hollows of Eubœa) were driven upon the rocks and wrecked². The news of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings, the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight³.

The Persian admirals about noon on the ensuing day sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half-moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action, the ships running foul of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of valour among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though

¹ Compare the description in Thukyd., ii. 84, of the naval battle between the Athenian fleet under Phormio and the Lacedæmonian fleet, where the ships of the latter are marshalled in this same array.

² Grundy (*op. cit.*, p. 335) suggests that the Hollows were the bays at the south end of the western coast of Eubœa.—E.D.

³ This engagement is supposed by Bury and Munro (*loc. cit.*) to have taken place near the Hollows, where the fifty-three Athenian guard-

ships, issuing out from Chalkis, might have caught the remnant of the Persian squadron that was wrecked off the Eubœan coast. In favour of this view we may adduce a statement in Isokr., *Paneg.*, § 90, that the Athenians defeated τὰς πρόπλους—i.e., the circumventing squadron. But Grundy (*op. cit.*, p. 334) shows that the Kilikian squadron could have been isolated and crushed near Artemisium quite in the manner which Herodotus describes.—E.D.

the Greeks being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments—still they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total: and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one half of their number out of condition to renew it. The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

On the same evening the Greeks received news which rendered retreat absolutely necessary. The Athenian Abrônynchus, stationed with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxês was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait, the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistoklês, conducting the latter, staid long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe, on some neighbouring stones, invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxês; whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against their fathers, but to desert, if possible—or at least, to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistoklês hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus to diminish their efficiency. With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed by a citizen of Histiaæa to the Persians at Aphetæ, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiaæa and the neighbouring territory; from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxês, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxês is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except 1,000, whose bodies were left out—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylæ, 4,000 in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. According to the statement of Herodotus, 20,000 men were slain on the side of the Persians—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that they were little defensive armour, and that they were three days fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same historian as 4,000: if this be correct, it must include a considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites present on the last day except the 300 Spartans, the 700 Thespians, and the 400 Thebans¹. Some hoplites were of course slain in the first two days' battles, though apparently not many. The number who originally came to the defence of the pass seems to have been about 7,000, but the epigram composed shortly afterwards and inscribed on the spot by order of the Amphiktyonic

¹ It is incredible that 3,000 Helots should have been present at Thermopylæ (see note on p. 190). The simplest explanation is that Herodotus has confused the '4,000' of the epigram (vii. 228),

who are described as having merely fought at Thermopylæ, with the roll of the dead. The actual loss in the pass probably did not exceed 2,000.—ED.

assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast that 4,000 warriors 'from Peloponnesus had here fought with 300 myriads or 3,000,000 of enemies'. Respecting this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the statement of 4,000 warriors from Peloponnesus must indicate all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of merit fully equal; especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline. While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive, destined for the Spartan dead separately, 'Stranger, tell the Lacedæmonians that we lie here, in obedience to their orders'. On the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honour of Leonidas, decorated apparently with an epigram by the poet Simonidēs. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the glories of Thermopylæ, besides several epigrams, one of which was consecrated to the prophet Megistias, 'who, though well aware of the fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs'.

CHAPTER XI [XLI]

BATTLE OF SALAMIS—RETREAT OF XERXÊS

THE sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant. It was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion; the season of the festival-games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken. Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least preparations—and what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxês at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Platæa, now joined him. Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader Attaginus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns¹, as

¹ Plutarch, *De Herodot. Malignit.*, p. 864; Herodot., viii. 34.

well to protect them from plunder as to ensure their fidelity. The Thespians, on the other hand, abandoned their city and fled into Peloponnesus; while the Plataeans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium, were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city and removing their families. It was not only the land-force of Xerxês which had been thus strengthened. His fleet also had received some accessions from Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades—so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sêpias and the fights at Artemisium were, at least in part, repaired, while the fleet remained still superior in number to that of the Greeks.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxês time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him: a reproach true almost to the letter¹. It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to protect Attica². To defend the Isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them. Thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Kleombrotus, king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of 10,000 each) working and bringing materials night and day. As a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position: they considered it as their last chance, abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxês, while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus arose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ: no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting that there would be a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready to sustain Leonidas, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property. But they saw with dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence. The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbour of Trœzen, there to await such reinforcements as could be got together: but the Athenians

¹ Thukyd., i. 69.

² To attempt the defence of the comparatively weak frontiers of Bœotia or Attica in the face of Xerxês' victorious army would have been such a rash proceeding that it is doubtful whether even the Athenians entertained this idea in 480. This

policy was more in the spirit of the following year's campaign, and may have been transferred by later Attic tradition into the story of the year 480 as well (*cf.* Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, iii. 384). Perhaps the evacuation was begun before the harvest (*cf.* Herodot., viii. 142, and Munro, *op. cit.*, p. 320).—Ed.

entreated Eurybiadès to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiadès was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trœzen came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.

Meanwhile Themistoklès and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalêrum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion, and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Orôpus, within the narrow space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxès actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner¹. The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying out the helpless exiles; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens)²—but in part also to Ægina: there were, however, many who could not or would not go farther than Salamis. Themistoklès impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the Acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athênê Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was placed once in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched. The sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the Acropolis, and it behoved the citizens to follow the example, confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution.

Some few individuals, too poor to hope for maintenance, or too old to care for life, elsewhere—confiding, moreover, in their own interpretation of the wooden wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable—shut themselves up in the Acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with

¹ Herodot., viii. 41; Plutarch, *Themistoklès*, c. x.

In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded the liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave their country and seek refuge in Salamis three several times. These incidents are sketched in a manner alike interesting and instructive by Dr. Waddington, in his visit to Greece (London, 1825), *Letters*, vi., vii., x. He states, p. 92: 'Three times have the Athenians emigrated in a body, and sought refuge from the sable among the houseless rocks of Salamis. Upon these occasions, I am assured that many have dwelt in caverns, and many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountain side by their own feeble hands. Many have perished too from exposure to an intemperate climate; many from diseases con-

tracted through the loathsomeness of their habitations; many from hunger and misery. On the retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their country. But to what a country did they return? To a land of desolation and famine; and, in fact, on the first reoccupation of Athens, after the departure of Omer Brionî, several persons are known to have subsisted for some time on grass, till a supply of corn reached the Piræus from Syra and Hydra.'

[In 1688, also, in the war between the Turks and Venetians, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to Salamis, Ægina, and Corinth (cf. Finlay, *History of Greece*, ed. 1877, v., p. 188).—ED.]

² The Athenians derived their hero Theseus from this town (cf. chapter on Early Attica, p. 4).—ED.

wooden doors and palisades¹. When we read how great were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war², we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxès.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy: arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended; Themistoklès proposed to the people a decree and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover, he not only included, but even specially designated among them, his own great opponent Aristeidès, now in the third year of ostracism³. Xanthippus the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiadès, were partners in the same emigration. The latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the State, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the Acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on ship-board, instead of on horseback⁴. It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles but still more for the equipment of the fleet; yet there were no funds in the public treasury. But the Senate of Areopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others, and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms for every soldier serving⁵.

By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Attica—those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis—the rest to some place of refuge—together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country, that the host of Xerxès, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners. Moreover, the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium

¹ Herodotus' account of the Acropolis garrison raises several difficulties. (1) The 'poor men' would have consulted their own interests better by embarking on the fleet, and sharing the grant made by the Areopagus (see above). (2) Men of small means could not have provisioned the citadel against a siege. (3) The slaughter of a few fanatics by the Persian storming-party would not have thrown the Greeks at Salamis into a panic (c. viii., 56). This panic may not be historical, but it probably rests on some real feeling of depression, and suggests that the fleet received some serious bad news.

It has been suggested that a genuine garrison was left on the citadel, and that its defence was considered a vital matter by the Athenians (Bury in *Class. Rev.*, December, 1896, pp. 414-418). They may well have anticipated Xerxès' intention of destroying their sanctuaries, and have been anxious to protect them against harm. It is significant that the treasurer of Athena's temple remained to safeguard the objects of value (Herodot., viii. 751).

The falsification of the account in Herodotus was no doubt dictated by Athenian pride, which could not allow that a regular garrison had failed to hold so strong a position for any length of time.—E.D.

² Thukyd., ii. 16, 17.

³ This event fell within the official year 481-480 (*Ath. Pol.*, c. 22), and must therefore have occurred before the end of June.—E.D.

⁴ Plutarch, *Themistoklès*, c. 10, 11; and *Kimon*, c. 5.

⁵ It is probable that the Areopagus did not merely deal out money during the crisis of 480, but provisionally took over the whole administration. It is clear that the ordinary democratic machinery must have been thrown completely out of gear through the evacuation of Athens, and the orderliness with which the retreat was executed suggests the supervision of some such 'Committee of Public Safety'. The high repute in which the Areopagus stood for many years subsequently (*Arist., Polit.*, v. 3, 5) points to some particular display of patriotism.

The later Athenian democracy would naturally suppress this episode in its own interests; but the fourth-century historians revived the tradition. From the fact that these latter could discover no decree investing the Areopagus with special powers (*cf. Ath. Pol.*, c. 23), it seems certain that the action of this body was, strictly speaking, a usurpation, although justified by its results.—E.D.

partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of 366 ships—a force far greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than 200 were Athenian, twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambrakia and as many from Eretria, five from Trœzen, three from Hermionê, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis—all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games. The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force (353 ships) collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Ladê, fifteen years earlier, during the Æonic revolt. We may doubt, however, whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of 300 sail, in addition to ten primer and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus¹.

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxês and his host overran the deserted country, his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalêrum with the coast adjoining. His land-force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thesalians, two or three days after the battle of Thermopylæ; and he was assumed by some Arcadians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. 'What prize does the victor receive?' he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was nothing more than a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæchmês, son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus, is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders—'Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honour!' Whether this be a remark really delivered or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a charac-

¹ Æschylus, *Persæ*, 347; Herodot., viii. 48; vi. 9; Pausanias, i. 14, 4. The total which Herodotus announces is 378; but the items which he gives amount, when summed up, only to 366.

Ktésias represents that the numbers of the Persian war-ships at Salamis were above 1,000, those of the Greeks 700 (*Persica*, c. 26).

[If Æschylus' estimate be chosen as substantially correct, the total supplied by Herodotus requires to be reduced by sixty or seventy. This can scarcely be achieved except by taking a lower figure for the Athenian contingent, which perhaps only reached Ktésias' sum of 110 (*cf.* Meyer, *Gesch. d. Ath.*, iii., p. 387). After the severe handling of the Athenian fleet at Artemisium (Herodot., viii. 18), where the original total may not have exceeded 127 (taking the special force of 53 ships as detached from the original aggregate, and

not as a *later* reinforcement), the force at Salamis can scarcely have grown to 180 or 200. That the Athenians were certainly disposed in later times to exaggerate their quota is proved by the statement of the Athenian envoy to Sparta in 431, about the time that Herodotus wrote, and of Isokrates in 380 (Thuk., i. 74: ναὺς παρσχομένη ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγη ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν; Isokr., *Paneg.*, 107: ἡ πόλις πλείους συνεβάλετο τρήρεις ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ ναυμαχοῦσάντες.

Unless Herodotus' sum of 366 is a mere blunder in arithmetic the extra twelve may be counted as part of the Æginetan reserve squadron (*cf.* Herodot., viii. 46, 1, where Stein inserts δώδεκα); their total contingent must have exceeded forty, if they contributed the second largest fleet, as Paus., ii. 29, 5, says.—E.D.]

teristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phokians disposed to refuse submission; and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favourable terms. The former conducted Xerxês through the little territory of Doris, which *medized* and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the Kephissus, among the towns of the Phokians. All of them were found deserted, the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the widespreading summit of Parnassus called Tithorea, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phokian towns, the most considerable of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders. Even Abæ, with its temple and oracle of Apollo, was no better treated than the rest: all the sacred treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxês detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Plataea; both of them had been deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the Acropolis at Athens.

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi. Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Crœsus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus and for their families by transport across the Gulf into Æolia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain: but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schistê up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athênê Pronæa—on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard—two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athênê. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled, pursued not only by the Delphians, but also (as they themselves affirmed) by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. Herodotus himself, when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athênê the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians¹.

¹ Herodot., viii. 38, 39; Diodor., xi. 14; Pausan., x. 8, 4.

Compare the account given in Pausanias (x. 23) of the subsequent repulse of Brennus and the Gauls

from Delphi: in his account, the repulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of Herodotus; there is a larger force of human combatants in defence of the temple, though greatly

Four months had elapsed, since the departure from Asia, when Xerxès reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain—and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the Acropolis ventured to defy him; nor could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender. The Athenian Acropolis—a craggy rock rising more or less abruptly about 400 feet, with a flat summit of about 1,000 feet long from east to west, by 500 feet broad from north to south—had no practicable access except on the western side¹: moreover, in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obligated to take the place by force, the Persian army were posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the north-west, called Areopagus: from whence they bombarded (if we may venture upon the expression) with hot missiles the wood-work before the gates; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time the Great King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified²: moreover, the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party were enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole Acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames. The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxès by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.

assisted by divine intervention: there is also loss on both sides. A similar descent of crags from the summit is mentioned.

Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near the spot, which have rolled down from the top, and which remind the traveller of these passages.

The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxès upon the Delphian temple, seems not easy to reconcile with the words of Marodonius, Herodot., ix. 42; still less can it be reconciled with the statement of Plutarch (*Numa*, c. 9), who says that the Delphian temple was burnt by the Medes.

[The Persian force that marched to Delphi was probably not despatched by Xerxès to plunder the

temple: the oracle had *medised* far too boldly to deserve such treatment at his hands. It has been suggested that this detachment was sent to *protect* the temple, but that this motive was not understood by the guerillas on Parnassus (Munro, *op. cit.*, pp. 319, 320); or it may have consisted of marauding troops that had got out of hand. From a later notice in Herodotus (viii. 134) it would also appear that the damage done at Abæ was not so severe as his informants (no doubt Phokians) tried to make out.—E.D.]

¹ On the natural features of the Acropolis, see E. Gardner, *Ancient Athens*.—E.D.

² On the chapel of Aglaurus, see Gardner, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-50.—E.D.

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxēs immediately despatched to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting seemingly the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus. On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the Acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground. They discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel of Erechtheus, the especial gift of the goddess Athênê, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long: at least the piety of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent, as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dikæus (an Athenian companion of the Peisistratids) in the Thriasian plain. It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxēs himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so: but he construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis.

About the time of the capture of the Acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the bay of Phalêrum, reinforced by ships from Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sêpias Aktê, an estimate certainly not admissible¹.

Soon after their arrival Xerxēs himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favour of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxēs himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity—Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus in Karia, into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis—predicting that if the land-force were moved forward to attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own homes, and that thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island—and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well as for the

¹ Herodotus seems to tell the truth unconsciously about the numbers of the Persian fleet when he represents it through Achaemenes' mouth as not very much larger than that of the Greeks (*cf.* Herodot., vii. 236; note on p. 198). After de-

ducting from the original total of 1,207 the losses hitherto sustained (hardly less than 400), we obtain a total not exceeding 800. The accessions from Karystus, etc., must have been quite insignificant.—ED.

subject contingents of Xerxês generally. That Queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question ; and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested. But I find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia, an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just, though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote¹, and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterwards. But Xerxês resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon. Orders were accordingly issued for the fleet to attack the next day, and for the land-force to move forward towards Peloponnesus.

Whilst, on the shore of Phalêrum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation—great indeed was the contrast presented by the neighbouring Greek armament at Salamis, among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxês being already in Attica, Eurybiadês convoked the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the Isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore and the men would join in the land service—while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be enclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape. The majority came to a formal vote for removing to the Isthmus ; but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs—the Corinthians in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favourable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet ; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their own homes—while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body ; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, etc., each fearing that the Persian fleet

¹ The picture drawn in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon represents the subjects of Persia as spiritless and untrained to war (ἀνάλκιδες καὶ ἀσύντακτοι),

and even designedly kept so, forming a contrast to the native Persians (Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* viii. 1, 45).

might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiadês to keep them together. Hence the order for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence: and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistoklês, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

Themistoklês, however, prevailed upon Eurybiadês to convene a fresh synod. Eurybiadês then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistoklês began the debate. He vehemently enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the Isthmus—as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina; contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it took place at the Isthmus; whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs; who were even exasperated at being again summoned, to reopen a debate already concluded—and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. The Corinthian Adeimantus sharply denounced the presumption of Themistoklês, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent—Athens being in the power of the enemy. Nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiadês had no right to count the vote of Themistoklês until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half the Greek fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians. Themistoklês thereupon reminded them that while he had around him 200 well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere a new city and territory. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiadês, and addressing him personally, he said—‘If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well; but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin. For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs, then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying.’

Eurybiadês had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistoklês. But this last downright menace clenched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not, however, put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution, and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or

unwilling. The succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes of Salamis—Telamon and Ajax : they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistoklēs, and were further strengthened by the advices from the Isthmus. The messengers from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were *they* not there also, to join hands and to help in the defence—even if worsted at sea—at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy ? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiadēs : at length the common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked. Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed, the Peloponnesian chiefs clamouring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were equally urgent in favour of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistoklēs that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiadēs ; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent—when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnus his slave—seemingly an Asiatic Greek who understood Persian—was instructed to acquaint them privately in the name of Themistoklēs, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity (it was added) was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without delay, first to enclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.

Such was the important communication despatched by Themistoklēs across the narrow strait (only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part) which divides Salamis from the neighbouring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem : had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honour from it in the eyes of the Greeks as a stratagem, Themistoklēs lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days¹, as a capital service rendered to the

¹ Thukyd., i. 137. It is curious to contrast this with Æschylus, *Persæ*, 351 *et seq.* See also Herodot., viii. 109, 110.

Persian monarch. It is not improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message¹.

Xerxēs entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides, to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape². The station of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica—its headquarters were in the bay of Phalærum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbours, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus—and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalærum; while the Greek fleet was in the harbour of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing Mount Ægæleos in Attica. A portion of the Persian fleet³, sailing from Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbour of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis; while another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the south-eastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttaleia near to that corner. These measures were all taken to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbour⁴.

¹ In the text given above the narrative of Herodotus has been reproduced for the most part, with the exception of some incidents which are pretty generally discredited by modern critics. It should, however, be observed that (1) the necessity of deciding the campaign by sea and not by land must have become even more plain to the Greeks than at Artemisium; (2) that the position at Salamis, which nullified the superior numbers of the Persian fleet, and gave the Greeks the advantage of 'inner lines', was as good as that of Artemisium, and can hardly have failed to impress the Greek admirals; (3) that *three* councils of war are unlikely to have occurred.

On the whole, it may be concluded that at least one such council took place, and that some admirals, anxious, no doubt, to reinforce the army at the Isthmus, offered a good deal of opposition to Themistoklēs' proposals. But Herodotus' version probably exaggerates the length and intensity of these debates.

The tale of Sikinnus, which has the support of Æschylus, is credible enough; but unless the quarrels of the admirals were really so bad as Herodotus makes them, the message may well have been sent with the approval of Eurybiadēs.—ED.

² Æschylus, *Persæ*, 370.

³ Diodorus (xi. 17) states that the Egyptian squadron in the fleet of Xerxēs was detached to block up the outlet between Salamis and the Megarid—that is, to sail round the south-western corner of the island to the north-western strait, where the north-western corner of the island is separated by a narrow strait from Megara, near the spot where the fort of Budorum was afterwards situated, during the Peloponnesian war.

[This statement is supported by Plutarch (*Themistoklēs*, c. 12), who says that the circumventing squadron was 200 strong. This number represents the strength of the Egyptian fleet, according to Herodotus (vii. 89).

This move clearly reproduces the Persian tactics pursued at Artemisium. It is quite possible that their commanders had great hopes of this manoeuvre, which, if successful, might have caused the annihilation of the Greek fleet. It was this pros-

pect, perhaps, even more than the message of Themistoklēs, which induced Xerxēs to select a battle-ground which in many respects handicapped his armament.

The Greeks must have been as well aware of the peril of being taken in the rear as they were at Artemisium, and it is probable that they took the same steps to guard against it (see note on p. 219). In this way they reaped the full advantage of moving on 'inner lines', and had the chance of beating the Persian force in detail.—ED.]

⁴ Herodotus (viii. 70, 76) states that the Persian fleet made two movements: (1) *In the evening* they wheeled to the right, so as to close the strait between the Attic coast and Salamis; (2) *at midnight* they placed one wing *πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα* and 'occupied the whole channel up to Munychia'.

This latter move has been taken by Grote to mean that the ships ranged themselves again line abreast along the Attic shore further westwards, in which formation they advanced next morning against the Greek fleet arrayed in similar formation right along Salamis.

But Herodotus' account is clearly wrong. Among the chief objections to it we may urge: (1) that it cannot be made to square in several features with that of Æschylus (*Persæ*, l. 355 *et seq.*), whose first-hand evidence on the tactics of the battle must receive unqualified preference over that of Herodotus; (2) the second wheeling movement would have placed the Persian advanced guard entirely at the mercy of the Greeks, had they detected it betimes, and it is hard to see how they could have failed to detect it; (3) by leaving their position across the straits the Persians threw away all the benefit they could draw from having blocked the straits, occupied Psyttaleia, and despatched a squadron round to the west of Salamis.

The simplest solution is to suppose that movement (1) was made *in the middle of the night*, and that the Persian fleet still stood athwart the channel when the battle opened in the line of Peiræus and Psyttaleia. The Greeks next morning sailed out from Salamis and took position across the straits between Salamis town and the promontory of Ægæleos.

Meanwhile that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistoklēs had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. Accordingly the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning—when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn. Aristeidēs arrived at Salamis from Ægina¹. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel in coming from Ægina had only eluded under favour of night. So obstinate, indeed, was some of the admirals' incredulity that they would not accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristeidēs: nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.

Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxēs had erected for himself a lofty seat or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of Mount Ægaleos—near the Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea²—from whence he could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was persuaded that they had not done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valour: moreover, his royal scribes stood ready by his side to record the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet, which was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left, were placed the Phenicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians, opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians.

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack, with the usual pæan or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians³. Indeed, the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight. The Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate—and even backed water for a space⁴. The Athenian

As for the second movement in Herodotus, the meaning of it is quite obscure. The historian was almost certainly misled by the oracle quoted in viii. 77, and thus applied to Salamis a formation which was more probably intended to apply to Artemisium (*cf.* Munro, *loc. cit.*, p. 306, n. 21). He may also have been anticipating a movement made by the Persians *during the battle*—the rapid forward movement of their right wing along the Attic coast.

For a detailed discussion, see Goodwin, *Journal of the Archaeological Institute of America*, 1882-1883, pp. 234-262, and especially Grundy, *Great Persian War*, pp. 369-373, 382-387.—Ed.

¹ It has been pointed out above (*cf.* note 3 to p. 205) that Aristeidēs had been recalled early in the year. As he was in command of the Athenian infantry on Psytaleia (p. 216), it is most probable that he had been elected Strategus for 480-479, and was admitted as such to the naval council.

His journey to Ægina may have been made either to supervise the transportation of the Athenian non-combatants, or to fetch the Æakidæ (*cf.* Bury in *Class. Rev.*, December, 1896, p. 417, 418). In this latter case the ship bearing these images must have returned to Salamis by midnight (about the time that the circumventing squadron

of the Persians was passing between Salamis and Ægina), though the fleet as a whole only learnt the news of their arrival just before the battle (Herodot., viii. 83; R. M. Burrows in *Class. Rev.*, June, 1897, pp. 258, 259).—Ed.

² Æschylus, *Pers.*, 473; Herodot., viii. 90. The throne with silver feet, upon which Xerxēs had sat, was long preserved in the Acropolis of Athens, having been left at his retreat. Harpokration, Ἀργυρόπους θρόνος.

³ The war-shout described by Æschylus (*Pers.*, 396-415), a warrior actually engaged, shows us the difference between a naval combat of that day and the improved tactics of the Athenians fifty years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Phormion especially enjoins on his men the necessity of silence (Thukyd., ii. 89).

⁴ It is not unlikely that this move was intentional, and contributed largely to the victory of the Greeks. The Persian fleet, in order to attack their enemy, had (1) to wheel to the left with their pivot near Psytaleia, so as to come into line with the Greek fleet, (2) to diminish their front as they advanced into the neck of the channel. This double operation required an exact timing of its various moments, otherwise the Persian line was sure to become crowded in some parts and leave

captains Ameinias and Lykomêdês (the former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to attack. Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phœnician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general.

Herodotus, with his usual candour, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom (apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge) were lukewarm, and some even averse—the subjects of Xerxês conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phœnicians, Cyprians, Kilikians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on ship-board, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behaviour. Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage—but, first, to the narrow space, which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks: thirdly, to the fact that when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion and caused them to run foul of each other. Those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear advance: the oar-blades were broken by collision—the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalêrum¹: Demokritus, the Naxian captain, was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral Ariabignês, brother of Xerxês, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate was very great, the more so as few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand.

It appears that the Phœnician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxês, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors.

gaps at others. If the right wing was then lured by the Greek left into a too rapid advance, their centre and left, being crowded near Psyttaleia, must have fallen behind considerably, and the whole Persian line been broken in two. This version would explain—(1) the success of the Æginetans (in the centre of the Greek line) taking the Persian right wing in the rear; (2) the cry of treason raised by the Phœnicians (right wing)

against the Ionians (left wing). Cf. Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 394, 397, 398.

It is worth observing that the fairway in the line of the Greek position, which is now about one mile, was probably still narrower in antiquity. The sea in this strait would seem to have risen about 6 feet above its ancient level (cf. Negrin in *Athenische Mittheilungen*, 1904, p. 355 ff.).—Ed.

¹ Simonides, *Epigr.*, 138, Bergk.

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable. She then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch Ameinias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma she preserved herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she charged the trireme of the Karian prince Damasithymus of Kalyndus, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit. But knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy's ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognised the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him, 'Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy's ship?' Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, 'My men have become women; my women, men'. Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships, among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story¹.

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred, independent of those which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia. As soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeidés carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops, in great proportion the native Persian guards².

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves—immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies—made ready for a second engagement. But they were re-

¹ Herodot., viii. 87, 88, 93. The story here given by Herodotus respecting the stratagem whereby Artemisia escaped, seems sufficiently probable, and he may have heard it from fellow-citizens of his own who were aboard her vessel. Though Plutarch accuses him of extravagant disposition to compliment this queen, it is evident that he does not himself like the story, nor consider it to be complimentary; for he himself insinuates a doubt, 'I do not know whether she ran down the Kalyndian ship intentionally, or came accidentally into collision with it'. Since the shock was so destructive that the Kalyndian ship was completely run down and sunk, so that every man of her crew perished, we may be pretty sure that it was intentional; and the historian merely sug-

gests a possible hypothesis to palliate an act of great treachery. Though the story of the sinking of the Kalyndian ship has the air of truth, however, we cannot say the same about the observation of Xerxes, and the notice which he is reported to have taken of the act: all this reads like nothing but romance.

We have to regret (as Plutarch observes, *De Malign. Herodot.*, p. 873) that Herodotus tells us so much less about others than about Artemisia; but he doubtless heard more about her than about the rest, and perhaps his own relatives may have been among her contingent.

² Herodot., viii. 95; Plutarch, *Aristid.*, c. 9; *Æschyl.*, *Pers.*, 454-470; Diodor., xi. 19.

lieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity¹ of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and distrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations—Phenicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphylians, Ionic Greeks, etc., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service except fear; while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it². Xerxès, though at first breathing revenge³, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalêrum in the night—not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board. They were directed to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head. It was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do—and to advise the return of Xerxès himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly he began to re-assure his master by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phenicians, Egyptians, etc., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's revenge upon Hellas—that Xerxès might now very well retire with the bulk of his army, if he were disposed, and that he (Mardonius) would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of 300,000 chosen troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity, and safety for his person.

The Greeks at Salamis learnt with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalêrum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistoklès and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxès—had they not been

¹ The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were materially aided by the personal timidity of Xerxès, and of Darius Codomannus at Issus and Arbela (Arrian, ii. xi. 6; iii. i4. 3).

² Apart from Xerxès' sentiments, there was the hard fact that the Persians, having once lost the command of the sea, could no longer depend on receiving the supplies necessary for their whole armada. Hence only such a land army could remain in Greece as could subsist on the country. Xerxès and his full force would henceforth have found Greece as untenable as the English in the Peninsular war found Spain when they advanced too far from their base of supplies on the seaboard.—Ed.

³ If the tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled *Phanissæ*, had been preserved, we should have known more about the position and behaviour of the Phenician contingent in this invasion. It was represented at Athens only three years after the battle of Salamis, in 476 B.C., with Themistoklès as choregus, four years earlier than the *Persæ* of Æschylus, which was affirmed by Glaucus to have been (*παρὰ τὸν ἥσαν*) altered from it. The Chorus in the *Phanissæ* consisted of Phenician women, possibly the widows of those Phenicians whom Xerxès had caused to be beheaded after the battle (Herodot., viii. 90, as Dr. Blomfield supposes, *Præf. ad Æsch., Pers.*, p. ix), or only of Phenicians absent on the expedition.

restrained by the caution of Eurybiadēs and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece¹.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cycladēs, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persians. While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians, Themistoklēs sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Karystus, Paros, and other places he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals, but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence the fleet was brought back to Salamis².

Xerxēs remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained all the Persians, Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents, making in all, according to Herodotus, 300,000 men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as 60,000 out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxēs himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to winter in Thessaly, and to postpone farther military operations until the ensuing spring.³

Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxēs marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat a plentiful stock of stories were circulated⁴—inconsistent with each other, fanciful, and even incredible. Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal, delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow. After forty-five days' march from Attica, Xerxēs at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him. But the short-lived bridge had already been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on ship-board across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort

¹ It is very improbable that such a proposal as is here attributed to Themistoklēs was ever made in 480. It is much more likely that even this leader from the first adopted the more cautious policy attributed to him in Herodot., viii. 109. The plan of attacking the Hellespont was impracticable so long as the Greeks required to concentrate their efforts on the Persian land-force, and so could not keep their fleet at full strength in distant waters. The capture of one or two posts on the Hellespont could not have cut off Xerxēs' retreat, so that a raid into these quarters would have been quite futile.—Ed.

² Herodot., viii. 112; Plutarch, *Themistoklēs*, c. 21, who cites a few bitter lines from the contemporary poet Timokreon.

³ This statement is of importance as proving that Xerxēs took no large portion of his army back to Asia (see note on p. 174).—Ed.

⁴ The account given by Æschylus of this retiring march appears to me exaggerated, and in several points incredible (*Persæ*, 482-513). That they suffered greatly during the march from want of provisions, is doubtless true, and that many of them died of hunger. But we must consider in deduction: (1) That this march took place in the months of October and November, therefore not

very long after the harvest; (2) that Mardonius maintained a large army in Thessaly all the winter, and brought them out in fighting condition in the spring; (3) that Artabazus also with another large division was in military operation in Thrace all the winter, after having escorted Xerxēs into safety.

When we consider these facts, it will seem that the statements of Æschylus even as to the sufferings by famine, must be taken with great allowance. But his statement about the passage of the Strymon appears to me incredible.

That a large river such as the Strymon near its mouth (180 yards broad, and in latitude about N. 40° 50'), at a period which could not have been later than the beginning of November, should have been frozen over in one night so hardly and firmly as to admit of a portion of the army marching over it at daybreak, before the sun became warm, is a statement which surely requires a more responsible witness than Æschylus to avouch it.

During the advancing march of Xerxēs, a bridge of boats had been thrown over the Strymon: nor can any reason be given why that bridge should not still have been subsisting. Artabazus must have recrossed it after he had accompanied the monarch to the Hellespont.

and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdëra still showed the gilt scimitar and tiara, which Xerxês had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction.

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed. At the division of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phœnician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athênê at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the Isthmus of Corinth. Farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honour was awarded to the Athenians; the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenes and Ameinias, being ranked first among the individual combatants¹. Respecting the behaviour of Adeimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavourable picture, representing them to have fled at the commencement and to have been only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining the victory. Yet in this case it seems that not only the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece, contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that at the time when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristæus, son of Adeimantus, was among the most efficient enemies of the former².

Besides the first and second prizes of valour, the chiefs at the Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidon: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man

¹ Herodot., viii. 93-122; Diodor., xi. 27.

² Herodot., viii. 94; Thukyd., i. 42, 103: τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος from Corinth towards Athens. About Aristæus, Thukyd., ii. 67.

Plutarch (*De Herodot. Malignit.*, p. 870) employs many angry words in retuting this Athenian scandal, which the historian himself does not uphold as truth. Dio Chrysostom (*Or.*, xxxvii., p. 456) is not satisfied with rejecting this tale of the Athenians, but goes the length of affirming that the Corinthians carried off the palm of bravery, and were the cause of the victory. The epigrams of Simonides, which he cites, prove nothing of the kind (p. 459).

[The fact that Corinthian epitaphs have been found in the cemetery of old Salamis, in a position of honour, tends to confirm Plutarch's and Dio's

theory that the Corinthians distinguished themselves at Salamis (Hicks and Hill, *Historical Inscriptions*, n. 18).

The tale of Adeimantus' 'flight westward' may have arisen from the fact that he was detailed (like the Athenian special squadron at Artemisium) to hold in check the Egyptian circumventing squadron; his 'return to the fighting line' may signify that the enemy failed to break through the Corinthian line at the western straits, and finally retired, thus leaving Adeimantus free to rejoin the main squadron (Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 405).

With these operations we should perhaps connect the 'building of the mole', which Ktésias (*Persica*, c. 26) and Strabo (ix., p. 395) place before the battle (*cf.* Munro, *loc. cit.*, p. 332).—ED.]

had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistoklēs had a large majority of votes for the second¹. The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistoklēs was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps through that very disappointment, in general renown. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honours such as were never paid, before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurybiadēs as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistoklēs as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity, together with a chariot, the finest which the city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the 300 select youths called Hippeis, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honour to the frontiers of Tegea. Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immoveable Spartans, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistoklēs should be offended by being deprived of the general prize: and they are even said to have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was displaced from his place of general, to which Xanthippus was nominated². Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of them confirmed by Herodotus. The fact that Xanthippus became general of the fleet during the ensuing year is in the regular course of Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of Themistoklēs.

CHAPTER XII [XLII]

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALÆ—FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS

THOUGH the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kymē and Samos. Early in the spring they were reassembled—to the number of 400 sail, but without the Phœnicians—at the naval station of Samos, intending, however, only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of 110 ships, under the Spartan king Leotychidēs, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian

¹ Herodot., viii. 123; Plutarch (*Themist.*, c. 17: compare *De Herodot. Malign.*, p. 871) states that each individual chief gave his second vote to Themistoklēs. The more we test Herodotus by comparison with others, the more we shall find him free from the exaggerating spirit.

² Diodor., xi. 27: compare Herodot., viii. 125, and Thukyd., i. 74.

[Diodorus' statement that Themistoklēs was deposed for bribery seems to contain a kernel of truth. From the very bitter invective quoted by

Plutarch from Timokreon (see note 2 on p. 218) it may be inferred that Themistoklēs had rendered himself unpopular with the maritime Greeks because of his (no doubt selfish and unscrupulous) extortions of money. It seems certain that Themistoklēs was never again placed in command over the fleet, and as Aristeidēs was the natural leader of the land army, Themistoklēs, whether re-elected or not, took no further part of importance in the war.—Ed.]

fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychildēs to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the eastern waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Hēraklēs¹: not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared, fifty-two years afterwards, to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxēs had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander, King of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadæ, and the Boeotian leaders, still remained in hearty co-operation with Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phokians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks north-west of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, as well as the neighbouring towns in the long tongue of Pallênê, declared themselves independent: and the neighbouring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxēs to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks under Kritobulus of Torônê. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa, the defence of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in Pallênê. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the Skiônæan auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallênæan peninsula to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius in Thessaly.

Mardonius, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Boeotia and Phokis. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent. But neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public². It appears, however, that at this period, when Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus³. The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens—

¹ Herodot., viii. 131, 132: compare Thukyd., iii. 29-32.

Herodotus says that the Chian envoys had great difficulty in inducing Leotychildēs to proceed even as far as Delos.

² Herodot., viii. 134, 135; Pausanias, ix. 24, 3.

³ Herodot., viii. 141.

Such oracles must have been generated by the hopes of the *medizing* party in Greece at this particular moment; there is no other point of time to which they could be at all adapted—no other, in which expulsion of all the Dorians from Pelopon-

Alexander, King of Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers—to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King—and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians re-established wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxēs from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have gone far to detach them from the cause of Hellas: and even at the present moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would ensure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing a winning game: while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover, the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer, together with the seed of the past autumn¹. The prudential view of the case being thus favourable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succour during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: 'Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours: we too know *that*, as well as thou: but we nevertheless love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxēs: we will encounter him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burnt. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us even in the spirit of goodwill, into unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands.'

To the Spartans the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor, protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and

ness, by united Persians and Athenians, could be even dreamt of. The Lacedæmonians are indeed said here 'to call to mind the prophecies'—as if these latter were old, and not now produced for the first time. But we must recollect that a fabricator of prophecies, such as Onomakritus, would in all probability at once circulate them as old; that is, as forming part of some old collection like that of Bakis or Musæus. And Herodotus doubtless himself believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give credit to the Lacedæmonians for the same knowledge, and suppose them to be alarmed

by 'calling these prophecies to mind'.

¹ Herodot., viii. 142: Πιερευμένοις μέντοι ὑμῖν συναχθόμεθα (say the Spartan envoys to the Athenians), καὶ ὅτι καρπὸν ἐστερήθητε διῶν ἤδη, καὶ ὅτι οἰκοφθόρησθε χρόνον ἤδη πολλόν. Seeing that this is spoken before the invasion of Mardonius, the loss of *two crops* must include the seed of the preceding autumn: and the advice of Themistoklēs to his countrymen—καὶ τις οἰκίην τε ἀναπλάσασθαι, καὶ σπόρον ἀνακῆς ἐχέτω (viii. 109)—must have been found impracticable in most cases to carry into effect.

liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxēs. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprised that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to assist in the defence of Attica¹. The Spartan envoys, promising fulfilment of this request, and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants and the frequent theme of applause by their orators. But the same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside of their own isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing and on which they had relied for protection against the land-force of Xerxēs, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was, however, still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept the terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defence and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Bœotia and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius. Indeed, king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died². Besides these two reasons—indifference and unfavourable omens—which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object (says the historian)³ to fulfil 'the exigencies of the god'.

Meanwhile Mardonius, informed of the unfavourable reception which his proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia, the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavoured to dissuade him from farther military operations against the united force of his enemies

¹ Herodot. viii. 143, 144; Plutarch, *Aristeides*, c. 10. According to Plutarch, it was Aristeides who proposed and prepared the reply to be delivered. But here as elsewhere, the loose, exaggerating style of Plutarch contrasts unfavourably with the simplicity and directness of Herodotus.

² This eclipse took place on October 2.—Ed. The death of two Spartan kings in rapid suc-

cession (Leonidas and Kleombrotus) may have been one reason why Spartan policy at this crisis proved so irresolute.

³ Herodot. ix. 7. Nearly a century after this, we are told that it was always the practice for the Amyklæan hoplites to go home for the celebration of the Hyakinthia, on whatever expedition they might happen to be employed (Xenoph., *Hellen.*, iv. 5, 11).

—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice. About ten months' after the retreat of Xerxēs, he entered the country without resistance, and again established the Persian headquarters in Athens (May or June, 479 B.C.).

Before he arrived the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Bœotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis. The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them. But it was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Plataea two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon. He thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychidēs, a Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian Council at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal, not less resolute than what had been returned to Alexander of Macedon, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception to this unanimity, venturing to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychidēs. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to death; while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor; unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings¹.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their stedfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with Megara and Plataea, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica, not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy. The Spartan ephors postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten

¹ Herodot., ix. 5. I dare not reject this story about Lykidas (see Lykurgus, *Cont. Leokrat.*, c. 30, p. 222), though other authors recount the same incident as having happened to a person named Kyrtilus, during the preceding year, when the Athenians quitted Athens: see Demosthen., *De Coronâ*, p. 296, c. 59; and Cicero, *De Officiis*, iii. 11. That two such acts were perpetrated by the Athenians is noway probable: and if we are to choose between the two, the story of Herodotus is far the more probable.

Isokratēs (Or. iv., *Panegyric.*, s. 184, c. 42) states that the Athenians condemned many persons to death for *medism* (in allusion, doubtless, to Themistoklēs as one), but he adds: 'Even now they imprecate curses on any citizen who enters into amicable negotiation with the Persians'—ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἐστὶ καὶ νῦν ἀρὰς ποιοῦνται, εἴτε ἐπικυρκεῖσθαι Πέρσας τῶν πολιτῶν. This must have been an ancient custom, continued after it had ceased to be pertinent or appropriate.

successive days, while in the meantime they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the Isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer, had not a Tegean named Chileos, whom they much esteemed and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea.

The strong opinion of this respected Tegean proved to the ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies, and brought to their attention that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; so that they despatched forthwith in the night 5,000 Spartan citizens to the Isthmus—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification—the ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory¹. Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise—the ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter, who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to 5,000 being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all: 5,000 Lacedæmonian Perioeci, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was thus collected under the Spartan Pausanias².

¹ Probably the Helots must have followed; one hardly sees how so great a number could have been all suddenly collected, and marched off in one night, no preparations having been made beforehand.

² Besides the secrecy and rapidity with which the Spartan army was concentrated, it is worth noting the route it took to the Isthmus. Instead of using the more direct ways through Argos or Eastern Arcadia, it marched through up the Eurotas valley to Orestheium (not far from the later site of Megalopolis). These two facts taken together show that the Spartans at this time had not full control over Central Peloponnese. Herodotus himself (ix. 12) plainly hints that the Argives would have interposed their forces had they not been anticipated; while on the central route the city of Mantinea served as a centre of disaffection (*cf.* ix. 77). Sparta therefore had not merely to overcome the apathy of Corinth and

other Peloponnesian states, but the more active hostility of her closer neighbours.

This difficulty is in itself a sufficient explanation for Sparta's seemingly faithless policy in the spring of 479. It may well be believed that the promise they gave to the Athenians in the winter to invade Boeotia was meant in earnest. It would, in fact, be surprising if Spartan troops had not possessed enough morale to face Mardonius, or had not felt eager to emulate the achievements of Athens at Marathon. So far as blame for the delay in taking the offensive can be apportioned at all, it should rather fall upon the minor Peloponnesian states than upon Sparta. Herodotus has no doubt been misled by the cry of 'Spartan perfidy' which was in the air at Athens about the time he wrote (*cf.* *Ar., Ach.*, 307, *Lys.*, 629; *Eurip., Androm.*, 445).

As an example of military efficiency this feat of sudden mobilization is perhaps unsurpassed in Greek history.—Ed.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders. If they ever made such a promise, the suddenness of the march, as well as the greatness of the force, prevented them from fulfilling it, and may perhaps have been so intended by the ephors, under the apprehension that resistance might possibly be offered by the Argeians. At any rate, the latter were forced to content themselves with apprising Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry on the war in Bœotia, a country in every way more favourable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or around Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxēs during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of 1,000 Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara, he withdrew all his army into Bœotia, not taking either the straight road to Plataea through Eleuthera, or to Thebes through Phylê, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the north-easterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asôpus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself, after a route longer but easier, in Bœotia on the plain of the Asôpus; along which river he next day marched westward to Skôlus, a town in the territory of Thebes, near to that of Plataea¹. He then took up a position not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asôpus: his left wing over against Erythræ, his centre over against Hysia, and his right in the territory of Plataea: and he employed his army in constructing forthwith a fortified camp of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favourable for cavalry, with a camp more or less defensible—the fortified city of Thebes in his rear—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success²: even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries.

If many of the chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his overwhelming march of the preceding year was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardonius, and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack, but jealous of his superior. Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the

¹ For the topography of the passes between Attica and Bœotia, see Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 446-448. For the site of Skôlus, see note to p. 449.—ED.

² Herodot., ix. 16, 40, 45, 67; Plutarch, *Ariseidês*, c. 18.

Phokians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of 1,000 hoplites had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phokians even remained behind in the neighbourhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians.

Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tegea, 1,500; from Corinth, 5,000, besides a small body of 300 from the Corinthian colony of Potidæa; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 600; from Sikyon, 3,000; from Epidaurus, 800; from Trœzen, 1,000; from Lepreon, 200; from Mykênæ and Tiryns, 400; from Phlius, 1,000; from Hermione, 300; from Eretria and Styra, 600; from Chalkis, 400; from Ambrakia, 500; from Leukas and Anaktorium, 800; from Palê in Kephallenia, 200; from Ægina, 500. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up 3,000 Megarian hoplites; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of 8,000 Athenian hoplites, and 600 Platæan, under Aristeidês, who passed over from Salamis¹. The total force of hoplites or heavy-armed troops was thus 38,700 men. There were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen—but if we add those who are called light-armed or unarmed generally, some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armour—the grand total was not less than 110,000 men. Of these light-armed or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance on the 5,000 Spartan citizens, and 34,500 in attendance on the other hoplites; together with 1,800 Thespians who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks².

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Platæa, which took place some little time afterwards. But it seemed that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came

¹ Compare this list of Herodotus with the enumeration which Pausanias read inscribed on the statue of Zeus, erected at Olympia by the Greeks who took part in the battle of Platæa (Pausan., v. 23, 1).

Pausanias found inscribed nearly all the names here indicated by Herodotus, except the Palês of Kephallenia; and he found in addition the Eleians, Keans, Kythnians, Tenians, Naxians, and Mèlians. The five last names are islanders in the Ægean; their contingents sent to Platæa must at all events have been very small, and it is surprising to hear that they sent any—especially when we recollect that there was a Greek fleet at this moment on service, to which it would be natural that they should join themselves in preference to land-service.

[These islanders may have been included, as they were on the common thanks-offering at Delphi, as having in a general way 'helped to destroy the barbarian' (Thuk., i. 32). But it is clear that Pausanias did not copy the Olympian list on the spot, but wrote it down from memory. Since he forgets to mention several cities that stand

on the lists of Herodotus and of the Delphian dedication (the Thespians, Eretrians, Leukadians), it is conceivable that he substituted states which he knew to have been contained in other catalogues.

The bronze column of three intertwined serpents, which was put up at Delphi (ix. 81), and transferred by Constantine to his new capital, is still visible there. Its votive inscription contains thirty-one names, including the islanders and the Eleians (whom Pausanias also mentions), but not the Mantineans (*cf.* Hicks and Hill, *Historical Inscriptions*, No. 19).—ED.

² These figures may be taken as giving pretty exactly the Greek total. Beloch (*Die Bevölkerung der griech-römischen Welt*) considers many of the figures too high, because the armies equipped by many of the Greek States in the Peloponnesian war were often much smaller. But it is likely enough that many cities, especially in the Peloponnese, were more thickly populated in 480 than in 430. In some cases, such as that of Corinth and Megara, it is practically certain that such a decline in population took place.—ED.

for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis. At Eleusis as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asôpus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground¹. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach; but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows². So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially 300 chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general Masistius—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armour—and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass, to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other.

So much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiaë, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Plateæan territory along the Asôpus and on its right bank, with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia, and their left wing near to the chapel of the Plateæan hero

¹ On the site of Erythræ, and the first position of the two armies, see Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 458-460.—Ed.

² About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see Herodot., i. 136; Xenophon, *Anab.*, iii. 4. 17.

Androkratēs¹. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them—and the Athenians on the left wing².

Mardonius, apprised of this change of position, marched his army also a little further to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asôpus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the centre; and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at 50,000: nor can we place any confidence in the total of 300,000 which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less³.

There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment, though fortunately repressed⁴ by Aristeidês, with a hand at once gentle and decisive.

The annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant. Their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asôpus, prevented the Greeks from using the river for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position near the Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover, the Theban leader Timêgenidas, remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful. A train of 500 beasts of burden with supplies was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp; so that it became unsafe for any further convoys to approach the Greeks. Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timêgenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed this manœuvre; which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his

¹ On the topography of Hysia, Gargaphia, and the Herôium of Androkratês, see Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 464-468. The same author (pp. 470, 471) suggests that Herodotus is mistaken in bringing the Greek force right up to the Asôpus (ix. 30); it was perhaps screened by the low ridge that runs alongside that river to the east of the Plataea-Thebes road.—Ed.

² The story about the quarrel of the Athenians and the Tegeans about the honour of fighting on the left wing (Herodot., ix. 26-29) is refuted by

W. J. Woodhouse, *Journ. of Hell. Stud.*, 1898, pp. 41, 42.—Ed.

³ The total attributed to Mardonius' force—350,000—is distinctly too large, for (1) the country could not have afforded the necessary supplies for so great an army; (2) it is very unlikely that only 40,000 men out of 300,000 should have escaped after the battle of Plataea. Perhaps 150,000 would be a more suitable figure.—Ed.

⁴ Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 13.

impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith. In vain did Artabazus endeavour to dissuade him from the step, taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them. He recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned, so as to allow time for distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognised superiority of the Persian arms.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise; but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander, king of Macedon; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeidês and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name and proclaiming his sympathy for the Grecian cause, he apprised them that Mardonius, though eager for battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favourable sacrifices, but was nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning¹.

The Persian cavalry's rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks more than ever. The latter (as has been before stated) had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asôpus, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place, and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable—while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithæron to join them².

In this dilemma Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent. After an anxious debate, the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry, and to occupy the ground called the Island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Plataea, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant. This island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two

¹ Alexander also stated that supplies were running low, so that the Persians must either make a successful attack or retreat (Herodot., ix. 45).—Ed.

² Herodotus (ix. 46, 47), after the episode of Alexander, recounts a story that the Spartans, afraid to meet the native Persians when Mardonius should attack, begged to change places with the Athenians, but upon the enemy detecting the move and making a similar change in his line, returned to their original position.

This account cannot be accepted as it stands. But the truth which underlies it is of an important character. After advancing to their second

position the Greeks secretly endeavoured to extend their line to the left, with a view to crossing the Asôpus, and taking the Persians in the flank (cf. Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 473). Their plan was no doubt to wheel right round with the original left wing for their pivot, so that in the new position the Spartans would have been on the left wing, and the Athenians on the right, this being the manœuvre which was misinterpreted by Herodotus, misled by Attic tradition (cf. Woodhouse, *loc. cit.*, pp. 44-48). It is clear that the Persians detected this move, and prepared to baffle it by a similar change in their position; hence the Greek plan, perhaps, was never put into execution.—Ed.

branches of the river Oeroë¹; both of these flow from Kithæron, and after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run in a north-westerly direction towards one of the recesses of the Gulf of Corinth—quite distinct from the Asôpus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa. When encamped in this so-called Island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asôpus. It was farther resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the Island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march was to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy's cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack. But his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering; insomuch that the centre of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, etc., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when the hour arrived for retiring to the Island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the Island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Platæa, and took up a position in front of the Heræum or temple of Hêrê², where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (*i.e.*, between the course of the Asôpus and that of the Oeroë), there was a range of low hills. The Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side. Pausanias, apprised that the divisions of the centre had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the Island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honour of a Spartan: nevertheless, most of the taxiarchs or leaders of companies obeyed without murmuring, but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana³, obstinately refused. Not having

¹ On the position of the island, see Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 480-487.—Ed.

² This temple stood some distance outside the town to the north, towards the apex of the triangular plateau of which Platæa in 480 occupied the southern base (see the *American Journal of Archaeology*, 1891, pp. 390-405).—Ed.

³ There is on this point a difference between Thukydides and Herodotus: the former affirms that there never was any Spartan lochus so called (Thukyd., i. 21).

We have no means of reconciling the difference, nor can we be certain that Thukydides is right in his negative comprehending all past time—ὅς οὐδ' ἐγένετο πώποτε.

been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring 'that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner'. Pausanias, with the second in command, Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance. But they could by no means induce him to retreat: nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy¹.

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions. The Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus, which was prolonged until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat—calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground which divided him from the Island, he commanded a halt, either to await Amompharetus if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him: overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloeis and the temple of Eleusinian Dēmêtêr². The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march towards the Island.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had, moreover, been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians, on the contrary, marching without halt, and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. Mardonius immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asôpus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell, without any thought of order of preparations for overcoming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush forward³: but the Thebans and the other Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius appear to have maintained somewhat better order.

¹ With regard to the Greek retreat, it may be doubted whether the centre was prompted by motives of cowardice to retire too far; they might easily have lost their way in the hilly country at night-time.

As to the Spartan line of march, it was probably intended to take them at first away to the right, in order to set free the Dryoskephalæ pass (Grundy, pp. 490-492).

Herodotus' account of Amompharetus' stubbornness may have been a regimental tradition supplied to him by his informant Archias of Pitane (iii. 55). It is suggested that he was really left in an ad-

vanced position in order to mask the somewhat dangerous movement of the Spartans, and prevent the Persian cavalry pouncing upon them before they had reached the high ground close to Klitharon (Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-54).—Ed.

² On the topography, see Grundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 494-498.—Ed.

³ Herodot., ix. 59.

Herodotus dwells especially on the reckless and disorderly manner in which the Persians advanced: Plutarch, on the contrary, says of Mardonius—*ἔχων συντεταγμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐπέφεροτο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις*, etc. (Plutarch, *Aristeid.*, c. 17).

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighbourhood of the Demetrium or temple of Eleusinian Dēmêtēr, where he had halted to take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprise the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. The Athenians were prompt in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Thebian allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him. Accordingly the Lacedæmonians and Tegeates had to encounter the Persians single-handed without any assistance from the other Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha (or long wicker shields), forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows¹: their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battle-sacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavourable, so that he did not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks, among them the brave Kallikratēs, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with his compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heræum of the Platæans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Hērê to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favourable²: but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying, anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge. Nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge and having no defensive armour, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks³. They threw themselves upon the Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them: many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with

¹ About the Persian bow, see Xenoph., *Anab.*, iii., 4, 17.

² For incidents illustrating the hardships which a Grecian army endured from its reluctance to move without favourable sacrifices, see Xenophon, *Anabasis*, vi. 4, 10-25; *Hellenic*, iii., 2, 17.

[Pausanias' delay in announcing favourable omens has been interpreted as due to military genius rather than to superstition. By holding in his troops for a while he allowed for the Persian attack to become more ragged than ever, and so enabled his men to join the conflict on more than equal terms. Thus the defeat which the Spartan corps seemed bound to incur, when it was caught in the plain by the Persian cavalry, was turned into a decisive victory (1) by the excessive eagerness of the Persian pursuers to come to close quarters; (2) by the inspiration of Pausanias, which contrived that the effects of this too great hurry should assert themselves to the full (Grundy, *op. cit.*, p. 501).—Ed.]

³ Herodot., ix. 62, 63. His words about the courage of the Persians are remarkable: *λήματα μὲν νῦν καὶ ῥώμη οὐκ ἔσσαντες ἦσαν οἱ Πέρσαι*,

ἀνοπλοὶ δὲ εἶντες, καὶ πρὸς ἀνεπιστήμονες ἦσαν, καὶ οὐκ ὁμοίῳ τοῖσι ἐναντιοῖσι σφίην . . . πλείστον γὰρ σφεας δηλέετο ἢ εὐστῆς ἐρμῆος εὐστα ὄπλον, πρὸς γὰρ ὁπλίτας εἶντες γυμνῆτες ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῖντο. Compare the striking conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot., vii. 104).

The description given by Herodotus of the gallant rush made by these badly-armed Persians, upon the presented line of spears in the Lacedæmonian ranks, may be compared with Livy (xxxii. 17), a description of the Romans attacking the Macedonian phalanx—and with the battle of Sempach (June, 1386), in which 1,400 half-armed Swiss overcame a large body of fully-armed Austrians, with an impenetrable front of projecting spears; which for some time they were unable to break in upon, until at length one of their warriors, Arnold von Winkelried, grasped an armful of spears, and precipitated himself upon them, making a way for his countrymen over his dead body. See Vogelin, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, ch. vi., p. 240, or indeed any history of Switzerland, for a description of this memorable incident.

the short spear and the dagger¹. Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his bodyguard distinguished themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Acimnēstus; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp, constructed by Mardonius behind the Asôpus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Bœotians, especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of 300 of their best troops. The Theban cavalry, however, still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety—a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp. With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other *medizing* Greeks rendered any real service. Instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that in point of fact the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were, the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and the Bœotians on the right; the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A body of 40,000 men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprised that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marshalled his division and led them out towards the scene of action, though despairing of success and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be proved false. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat—that he took no pains to ensure the concerted action of his whole army. Accordingly before Artabazus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat; not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phokis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.

¹ For the arms of the Persians, see Herodot., vii. 61.

Herodotus states in another place that the Persian troops adopted the Egyptian breastplates (*θυσπικας*): probably this may have been after the battle of Platæa. Even at this battle, the Persian

leaders on horseback had strong defensive armour, as we may see by the case of Masistius above narrated: by the time of the battle of Kunaxa, the habit had become more widely diffused (Xenoph., *Anab.*, i. 8, 6), for the cavalry at least.

As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians, were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian army had gone during the night to the town of Platæa instead of to the Island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle was that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honour, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order, the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills, and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asôpodôrus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously, and drove them back, to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of 600 men. But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the general defeat.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterwards exhibited in their temple of Athênê Alea — while his silver-footed throne and scimitar¹ were preserved in the Acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus, there survived only 3,000 men out of the 300,000 which had composed the army of Mardonius—save and except the 40,000 men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat².

Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports, without any pretence of computation: about the Grecian loss his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herein, however, is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry, nor is the number of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified: while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than 1,360 Greeks were slain in the action, appears probable: all doubtless hoplites—for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed

¹ Herodot., ix. 70; Demosthenês, *Cont. Timokrat.*, p. 741, c. 33. Pausanias (i. 27, 2) doubts whether this was really the scimitar of Mardonius, contending that the Lacedæmonians would never have permitted the Athenians to take it.

² Herodot., ix. 70: compare Æschyl., *Pers.*, 805-824. The latter singles out 'the Dorian spear' as the great weapon of destruction to the

Persians at Platea—very justly. Dr. Blomfield is surprised at this compliment; but it is to be recollected that all the earlier part of the tragedy had been employed in setting forth the glory of Athens at Salamis, and he might well afford to give the Peloponnesians the credit which they deserved at Platea. Pindar distributes the honour between Sparta and Athens in like manner (*Pyth.*, i. 76).

are we told that they took any active part in the battle. Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery, while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other *medizing* Grecian States was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia. The interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast. Artabazus subsequently rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians and the Phliasiens each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate tomb in commemoration. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial-places: one for the so-called Eirenes, among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Amompharetus, the refractory captain—a second for the other Spartans—and a third for the Helots¹. Besides these sepulchral monuments erected in the neighbourhood of Plataea by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honour, with the connivance and aid of the Plataeans². The body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas³.

¹ Herodot., ix. 84. Herodotus, indeed, assigns this second burial-place only to the other *Spartans*, apart from the Select. He takes no notice of the Lacedæmonians not Spartans, either in the battle or in reference to burial, though he had informed us that 5,000 of them were included in the army.

(Herodotus' division into Eirenes (or youths, like the Attic Ephēbi), Spartiates, and Helots seems unsatisfactory, for (1) Amompharetus could hardly be a young man of about twenty; (2) the Laconian Perieki are quite left out of account. A more likely distribution would be (a) Spartiates, including the Eirenes, (b) Perieki, (c) Helots (cf. Stein, *Herodotus*, ad loc.)—Ed.]

² Herodot., ix. 85.

[It is difficult to believe that the Æginetans sustained absolutely no loss, though no doubt their dead nowhere fell thick and fast, and therefore could not be gathered into a common national tomb. Under these circumstances we may suppose that the memorial was not erected in order to deceive, but in accordance with an ordinary Greek custom of erecting cenotaphs when the remains of the fallen could not be recovered.—Ed.]

³ Herodot., ix. 78, 79. This suggestion, so

abhorrent to Grecian feeling, is put by the historian into the mouth of the Æginetan Lampôn. In my preceding note I have alluded to another statement made by Herodotus, not very creditable to the Æginetans; there is, moreover, a third (ix. 80), in which he represents them as having cheated the Helots in their purchases of the booty. We may presume him to have heard all these anecdotes at Plataea: at the time when he probably visited that place, not long before the Peloponnesian war, the inhabitants were united in the most intimate manner with Athens, and doubtless sympathized in the hatred of the Athenians against Ægina. It does not from hence follow that the stories are all untrue. I disbelieve the advice said to have been given by Lampôn to crucify the body of Mardonius.

[The story in ix. 80 is full of absurdities, and the remark, 'And that's the way the Æginetans first came by their great riches', reveals its true character as a malicious witticism, which, no doubt, had its origin among the trade rivals of Ægina.

It is worth remembering that at the time when Herodotus wrote his later books (early in the Peloponnesian war) public opinion at Athens was vehemently hostile to Ægina.—Ed.]

On the morrow the body was stolen away and buried; by whom was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artayntês, the son of Mardonius. The funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of Pausanias¹.

The spoil was rich and multifarious—gold and silver in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, etc., even the magnificent tent of Xerxês, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included. By order of the general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general—the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers². Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Platæan inhabitants afterwards discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Platæa were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians and Tegeans. The Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognised, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece³. It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantinea, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithæron, first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius—the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the *medizing* leaders should be delivered up, especially Timêgenidas and Attaginus. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory, giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the chiefs at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremp-

¹ Herodot., ix. 84; Pausanias, ix. 2, 2.

² Diodorus (xi. 33) states this proportional distribution. Herodotus only says: *ἐλαβον ἕκαστοι τῶν ἀξίωι ἦσαν* (ix. 81).

³ Plutarch animadverts severely (*De Malign. Herodot.*, p. 873; compare *Plut., Aristid.*, c. 19) upon Herodotus, because he states that none of the Greeks had any share in the battle of Platæa except the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians: the pseudo-Lysias repeats the same statement (*Oratio Funer.*, c. 9). If this were the fact (Plutarch asks) how comes it that the inscriptions and poems of the [time recognise the exploit as performed by the whole Grecian army, Corinthians and others included? But these inscriptions do not really contradict what is affirmed by Herodotus. The actual battle was fought only by a part of the collective Grecian army; but this happened

in a great measure by accident; the rest were little more than a mile off, and until within a few hours had been occupying part of the same continuous line of position; moreover, if the battle had lasted a little longer, they would have come up in time to render actual help. They would naturally be considered, therefore, as entitled to partake in the glory of the entire result.

When, however, in after-times a stranger visited Platæa, and saw Lacedæmonian, Tegean, and Athenian tombs, but no Corinthian nor Æginetan, etc., he would naturally inquire how it happened that none of these latter had fallen in the battle, and would then be informed that they were not really present at it. Hence the motive for these cities to erect empty sepulchral monuments on the spot, as Herodotus informs us that they afterwards did or caused to be done by individual Plateans.

torily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attaginus, who found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous¹, that they were nowise implicated in the *medism* of their father. Timêgenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal—indeed, the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation. It is remarkable that Pausanias himself only a few years afterwards, when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money². In this hope, indeed, he found himself deceived, as Timêgenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is not the less to be noted as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognised untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valour at the battle of Platæa may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize—that Aristeidês appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Platæans, to which proposition both Aristeidês and Pausanias acceded³. But it seems that the general opinion recognised the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general.

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch that the Platæans received by general vote the prize of valour, it is certain that they were largely honoured and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The marketplace and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Platæan territory, who had been invoked

¹ See, a little above in this chapter, the treatment of the wife and children of the Athenian senator Lykidas (Herodot., ix. 5). Compare also Herodot., iii. 116; ix. 120.

² Thukyd., i. 131: καὶ πιστεύων χρημασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν. Compare Thukyd., viii. 45, where he states that the trierarchs and generals of the Lacedæmonian and allied fleet (all except Hermokratês of Syracuse) received bribes from

Tissaphernes to betray the interests both of their seamen and of their country: also c. 49 of the same book about the Lacedæmonian general Astyocheus. The bribes received by the Spartan kings Leoty-chidês and Pleistoanax are recorded (Herodot. vi. 72; Thukyd., ii. 21).

³ Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 20; *De Herodot. Malign.*, p. 873.

in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of the ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied¹. The Plataeans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honourable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome temple of Athênê—the symbol probably of renewed connection with Athens. They undertook to render religious honours every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece². In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias and the whole body of allies bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platæa, and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Platæa, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent. An aggregate force of 10,000 hoplites, 1,000 cavalry, and 100 triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified. Moreover, the town of Platæa was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble³.

This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristeidês, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might re-assemble, or be reinforced. Indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykâlê had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable⁴; nor did anyone then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern half of Greece was still *medizing*, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxês might probably keep up his ascendancy in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeidês and the Athenians had the strongest interest in pro-

¹ Thukyd., ii. 71, 72. So the Roman Emperor Vitellius, on visiting the field of Bedriacum, where his troops had recently been victorious, 'instaurabat sacrum Diis loci' (Tacitus, *Histor.*, ii. 70).

² Thukyd., ii. 71; Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 19-21; Strabo, ix., p. 412; Pausanias, ix. 2, 4.

The Eleutheria were celebrated on the fourth of the Attic month Boëdromion, which was the day on which the battle itself was fought; while the annual decoration of the tombs, and ceremonies in honour of the deceased, took place on the sixteenth of the Attic month Mœmaktérion.

³ Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 21. [Plutarch's state-

ments about the resolutions passed after the battle of Platæa must be regarded with a good deal of suspicion. The technical language which he uses (*ἐγγραφέν Ἀριστείδους ψήφισμα*, etc.) is clearly inappropriate to the occasion. If the proposal to establish a 'Hellenic federal corps' was made at all, it is probable that it was put forward informally and carried by acclamation, without having any binding force (cf. Holm, *Greek History*, Engl. transl., p. 76, n. 10); it is certain that no further mention of it occurs in our historical record.—Ed.]

⁴ Thukyd., i. 90.

viding a line of defence which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus, and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their Isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage for this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedæmonians to Plataea, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment; though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Plataea, projected by Aristeidês, from taking effect¹.

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army conquered at Plataea, the naval armament under Leotychidês and Xanthippus was engaged in operations hardly less important at Mykalê on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet (which numbered 110 triremes), having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any offensive operations against the Persians at Samos, for the rescue of Ionia—although Ionian envoys, especially from Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychidês that their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomêstor, whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet should appear off the island. Leotychidês' reluctance gradually gave way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. Engagements were ultimately exchanged, and while the other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet.

When they reached the Heræum near Kalami in Samos², and had prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they discovered that the enemy's fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the neighbouring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so disheartened with the defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again at sea. We do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phœnician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykalê near Miletus³. Here they were under the protection of a land-force of 60,000 men, under the command of Tigranês—the main reliance of Xerxês for the defence of Ionia. The

¹ It is to this general and solemn meeting, held at Plataea after the victory, that we might probably refer another vow noticed by the historians and orators of the subsequent century, if that vow were not of suspicious authenticity. The Greeks, while promising faithful attachment, and continued peaceful dealing among themselves, and engaging at the same time to amerce in a tithe of their property all who had *medized*—are said to have vowed that they would not repair or rebuild the temples which the Persian invader had burnt; but would leave them in their half-ruined condition as a monument of his sacrilege. Some of the injured temples near Athens were seen in their half-burnt state even by the traveller Pausanias (x. 35, 2), in his time. Periklês subsequently tried to convoke a Pan-Hellenic assembly at Athens, for the purpose of deliberating what should be done with these temples (Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 17). Yet Theopompus pronounced this alleged oath to be a fabrication, though both the orator Lykurgus and Diodorus profess to report it verbatim. We may safely assert that the oath, as they give it, is not

genuine; but perhaps the vow of tithing those who had voluntarily joined Xerxês, which Herodotus refers to an earlier period, when success was doubtful, may now have been renewed in the moment of victory: see Diodor., ix. 29; Lykurgus, *Cont. Leokrat.*, c. 19, p. 193; Polybius, ix. 33; Isokratês, *Or.*, iv.; *Panegy.*, c. 41, p. 74; Theopompus, *Fragm.*, 167, ed. Didot; Suidas, v., *Δεκατέσιον*, Cicero, *De Republica*, iii. 9, and the beginning of the chapter last but one preceding this History.

² Herodot., ix. 96.

It is by no means certain that the Heræum here indicated is the celebrated temple which stood near the city of Samos (iii. 80): the words of Herodotus rather seem to indicate that another temple of Hêrê, in some other part of the island, is intended.

³ The eastern promontory (Cape Poseidon) of Samos was separated only by seven stadia from Mykalê (Strabo, xiv., p. 637), near to the place where Glaukê was situated (Thukyd., viii. 79)—modern observers make the distance rather more than a mile (Poppo, *Prolegg. ad Thucyd.*, vol. ii., p. 465).

ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting, by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleet and again offer battle at Mykalê. On reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and sea-force before them. But since much of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leotychidês was, to copy the previous manœuvre of Themistoklês, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Eubœa. Sailing along close to the coast, he addressed, through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt, calculating, even if they did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops, and marshalled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land, while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifestation, and suspecting, either from his manœuvre, or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mykalê—with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Bœotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent brethren that they disembarked, and were made ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day—the fourth of the month Boedromion (about September), 479 B.C. By a remarkable coincidence, the victory of Platœa in Bœotia had been gained by Pausanias that very morning. At the moment when the Greeks were advancing to the charge, a divine Phê mê or message flew into the camp. Whilst a herald's staff was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the Ægean—the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their countrymen in Bœotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the account given by Herodotus, and doubtless universally accepted in his time, when the combatants of Mykalê were alive to tell their own story. Diodorus and other later writers¹, who wrote when the impressions

¹ Diodor., xi. 35; Polyæn., i. 33. Justin (ii. 14) is astonished in relating 'tantam famæ velocitatem'.

[There is no evidence to contradict Herodotus' statement that the battles were fought on the same day. But on general grounds such a corre-

spondence does not seem very probable, and the probability of the story is diminished by the fact that a similar coincidence is recorded between the day of Himera and Salamis (Herodot., vii. 166) or Thermopylæ (Diod., xi. 24).

It is obvious that the decisive battle of the

of the time had vanished, and when divine interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the whole proceeding as if it were a report designedly circulated by the generals, for the purpose of encouraging their army.

The Lacedæmonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and ravine, while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians and Trœzenians, and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Plataea, employed their *gerrha*, or wicker bucklers planted by spikes in the ground, as a breast-work, from behind which they discharged their arrows; and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this defence from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it and driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against the ardour of their pursuers, who forced their way into it almost along with the defenders. Even when this last rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpractised in line and drill, and acting only in small knots, with disadvantages of armour such as had been felt severely at Plataea, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedæmonians with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack, that the defence was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat. First, the disarmed Samians—next, other Ionians and Æolians—lastly, the Milesians who had been posted to guard the passes in the rear—not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack. The Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykalê, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force, Tigranês and Mardontês, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian admirals, Artayntês and Ithamitrês, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the assailants, and were burnt. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless. Among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians, with their commander Perilaus. The honours of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians, the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished for individual feats of arms.

The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykalê, was withdrawn from the coast forthwith to Sardis under the command of Artayntês. Xerxês had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast; so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

Plataean campaign cannot have been fought out and reported across the Ægean before the conflict at Mykalê began. Possibly the report they heard

related to one of the earlier incidents of the operations in Boeotia, such as the death of Masistius (*cf. Grundy, op. cit.*, pp. 526, 527).—ED.]

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet, having full confidence in their power of defending the islands, willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Strattis and Theomêstor were expelled from Chios and Samos. But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not be upheld against the great inland power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless, not enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxês, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the *medizing* Greeks from their sea-port towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan dignity of Athens¹. The Lacedæmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honourable grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dispossession eminently difficult to execute²—yet at the same time to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the Ionians, and to throw upon Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendancy and separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing first, the confederacy of Delos—next, Athenian maritime empire.

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge. For so imperfect was their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm and in passable condition in September, 479 B.C., though it had been broken and useless at the time when Xerxês crossed the strait in his retreat, ten months before (about November, 480 B.C.). Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychidês and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith, but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiadês down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part of that time tributary to Persia. From the flight of the second Miltiadês to the expulsion of Xerxês from Greece (493-480 B.C.), a period during which the Persian monarch was irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, no Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykalê were now naturally eager both to re-establish the ascendancy of Athens, and to regain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese. Probably many of the leading men, especially Kimon, son of Miltiadês, had extensive possessions there to

¹ Herodot., ix. 106; Diodor., xi. 37. The latter represents the Ionians and Æolians as having actually consented to remove into European Greece, and indeed the Athenians themselves as having at first consented to it, though the latter afterwards repented and opposed the scheme.

² Such wholesale transportations of population from one continent to another have always been more or less in the habits of Oriental despots, the

Persians in ancient times and the Turks in more modern times: to a conjunction of free states like the Greeks they must have been impracticable.

See Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, vol. I., book vi., p. 251, for the forced migrations of people from Asia into Europe directed by the Turkish Sultan Bayezid (A.D. 1390-1400).

recover, as Alkibiadês had in after days, with private forts of his own. To this motive for attacking the Chersonese may be added another—the importance of its corn-produce, as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Ægina¹. Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the coöperation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus, the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the centre in which all the neighbouring Persian garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, had got together under Oeobazus and Artayktês².

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of provisions or means of making a long defence. But of all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were the inhabitants of Elæus—the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the sea-shore, was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elæus, but also for the neighbouring Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched with ample votive offerings and probably deposits for security. The story ran that when Xerxês was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktês, greedy of all this wealth, had stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. He was not content without still farther outraging Grecian sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines. Such proceedings were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison, which, nevertheless, still held out, by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well nigh exhausted. It was with difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktês and Oeobazus were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Oeobazus found his way into Thrace, where, however, he was taken captive by the Absinthian natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleistôrus: Artayktês fled northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and made prisoner near Ægospotami, after a strenuous resistance. He was brought with his son

¹ Herodot., vii. 147; Schol. ad. Aristophan., *Equites*, 262.

In illustration of the value set by Athens upon the command of the Hellespont, see Demosthenês, *De Fals. Legat.*, c. 59.

² Herodot., ix. 114, 115. Σηστὸν—φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ παντὸς Ἑλλησπόντου—Thukyd., viii. 62: compare Xenophon, *Hellenic.*, ii. 1, 25.

in chains to Sestus, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of 100 talents as compensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a farther sum of 200 talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian commander Xanthippus, and the citizens of Elæus, disdained everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktês after having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxean bridge had been fixed. There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian : it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.

After the capture of Sestus the Athenian fleets returned home with their plunder, towards the commencement of winter, not omitting to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxean bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the Acropolis of Athens.

CHAPTER XIII [XLIII]

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND

[Or the early history of Sicily very little has come down to us beyond a bare record of colonizations, whose chief value lies in the list which it supplies of the cities that sent out settlers. The traditional dates of the various foundations are generally admitted to be untrustworthy.

The genuine history of Sicily can only be said to begin with some scattered notices concerning events of the sixth century, and this is the point at which the present chapter takes up the narrative.

For further details about the early period the reader is referred to Grote, *H. of G.* (full text), c. 22 ; Freeman, *History of Sicily*, vols. I. and II. ; Holm, *Geschichte Siziliens*, vol. I., pp. 1-170 ; G. F. Hill, *Coins of Ancient Sicily*.—Ed.]

THOUGH Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B.C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, had been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens named Phalaris, a despot energetic, warlike and cruel. An exile from Astypalæa near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum, he contrived to make himself despot seemingly about the year 570 B.C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmæônids rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to assemble therein a considerable number of men, whom he armed, and availed himself of the opportunity of a festival of Dêmêtêr to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over the petty Sikan communities in the neighbourhood : but exaction and cruelties towards his own subjects are noticed as his most prominent characteristic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishable memory. This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to contain one or more victims enclosed within it, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated : the cries of these suffering prisoners passed for the roarings of

the animal. The artist was named Perillus, and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it by order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris maintained himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which period, a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his life¹. Whether Telemachus, became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterwards, we shall find his descendant Thêro established in that position.

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that the Syracusans reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (in the south-east of the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory². With the exception of this accidental circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time rather before 500 B.C., just when the war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenès.

The first forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks, as among the cities of Greece Proper in the early historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical. We do not know under what particular modifications they were kept up, but probably all more or less resembled that of Syracuse, where the Gamori (or wealthy proprietors descended from the original colonizing chiefs), possessing large landed properties tilled by a numerous Sikel serf population called Kyllirii, formed the qualified citizens—out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates and generals were chosen; while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, comprised, first, the small proprietary cultivators who maintained themselves, by manual labour and without slaves, from their own lands or gardens—next, the artisans and tradesmen. In the course of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen into poverty, and would find themselves more nearly on a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted into the privileged body. Here were ample materials for discontent. Ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body, put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the oligarchy, and made themselves despots, democracy being at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece. The general fact of this change, preceded by occasional violent dissensions among the privileged class themselves³, is all that we are permitted to know, without those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied in every separate city. Towards or near the year 500 B.C., we find Anaxilaus despot at Rhegium, Skythês at Zanklê, Terillus at Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, and Panætius at Leontini⁴. It was about

¹ Everything which has ever been said about Phalaris is noticed and discussed in the learned and acute Dissertation of Bentley on the *Letters of Phalaris*: compare also Seyffert, *Ahragas und sein Gebiet*, p. 57-61, who, however, treats the pretended letters of Phalaris with more consideration than the readers of Dr. Bentley will generally be disposed to sanction.

The story of the brazen bull of Phalaris seems to rest on sufficient evidence; it is expressly mentioned by Pindar, and the bull itself, after having been carried away to Carthage when the Carthaginians took Agrigentum, was restored to the Agri-

gentines by Scipio when he took Carthage.

[For the temples of Agrigentum, see R. Koldewey and O. Puchstein, *Die griech. Tempel in Unteritalien und Sicilien* (Berlin 1899).—Ed.]

² Thukyd., vi. 5; Schol. ad Pindar., *Olymp.*, v. 19.

³ At Gela, Herodot., vii. 153; at Syracuse, Aristot., *Polit.*, v. 3, 1.

⁴ Aristot., *Polit.*, v. 8, 4; v. 10, 4. Καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥστερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχεδὸν αἱ πλείους τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν Λεοντοῖσις εἰς τὴν Πανατίου τυραννίδα, καὶ ἐν Ῥέλα εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου, καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὡσαύτως.

the year 509 B.C. that the Spartan prince Dorieus conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx and Egesta, near the north-western corner of the island, in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitants and founding a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining, and who had already aided in driving Dorieus from a previous establishment at Kinyps in Libya—now lent such vigorous assistance to the Egestæan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions. Such of them as escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, which bore from henceforward the name of Herakleia¹—a colony and dependency of the neighbouring town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, and established himself as despot; until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular mutiny².

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phœnicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian æra, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe—and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egestæans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made some conquests of the neighbouring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse³.

Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander, despot of Gela, began to raise his city to ascendancy over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes⁴, did not preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven years: but it enabled his brother and successor Hippokratēs to extend his dominion over nearly half of the island. In that mercenary force two officers, Gelo and Ænesidēmus, particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo was descended from a native of Tēlos near the Triopian Cape, one of the original settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphēmus to Sicily. His immediate ancestor, named Tēlinēs, had first raised the family to distinction by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been worsted in a struggle and forced to seek shelter in the neighbouring town of Maktorium. Tēlinēs was possessed of certain peculiar sacred rites for propitiating the Subterranean Goddesses, Dēmētēr and Persephonē: 'from whom he obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus), I cannot say'; but such was the imposing effect of his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to march into Gela at the head of the exiles from Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them in power—detering the people from resistance in the same manner as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of Phyē-Athēnē in the chariot along with Peisistratus. The

¹ Diodorus ascribes the foundation of Herakleia to Dorieus; this seems not consistent with the account of Herodotus, unless we are to assume that the town of Herakleia which Dorieus founded was destroyed by the Carthaginians, and that the name Herakleia was afterwards given by Euryleon or his

successors to that which had before been called Minoa (Diodor., iv. 23).

² Herodot., v. 43, 46.

³ Herodot., vii. 153. The extreme brevity of his allusion is perplexing, as we have no collateral knowledge to illustrate it. ⁴ Polyænus, v. 6.

extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excites the admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been informed that Têlinês was of an unwarlike temperament. The restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hierophants of the two goddesses¹—a function certainly honourable, and probably lucrative, connected with the administration of consecrated property and with the enjoyment of a large portion of its fruits.

Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished hierophantic family at Gela, being the eldest of four brothers sons of Deinomenes, Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus and Thrasybulus : and he further ennobled himself by such personal exploits, in the army of the despot Hippokratês, as to be promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to the activity of Gelo that the despot owed a succession of victories and conquests, in which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of Kallipolis, Naxos, Leontini and Zanklê, were successively reduced to dependence².

The fate of Zanklê—seemingly held by its despot Skythês in a state of dependent alliance under Hippokratês, and in standing feud with Anaxilaus of Rhegium on the opposite side of the strait of Messina—was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Milêtus reconquered by the Persians (B.C. 494, 493), a natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks in Sicily towards the sufferers of the same race on the east of the Ægean sea. Projects were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees to a new abode ; and the Zanklæans, especially, invited them to form a new Pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kalê Aktê, on the north coast of Sicily, a coast presenting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was only one Grecian colony—Himera. This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos and Milêtus, who accordingly put themselves on shipboard for Zanklê, steering, as was usual, along the coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that when they reached the town of Epizephyrian Lokri, Skythês, the despot of Zanklê, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force, on an expedition against the Sikels—perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kalê Aktê. His enemy the Rhegian Prince Anaxilaus, taking advantage of this accident, proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zanklê. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with the families and property of the absent Zanklæans ; who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skythês farther invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokratês. The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skythês, whom he considered as the cause of it³. But he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captors of the city, and to betray the Zanklæans whom he had come to aid. By a convention ratified with an oath,

¹ See about Têlinês and this hereditary priesthood (Herodot., vii. 153).

It appears from Pindar that Hiero exercised this hereditary priesthood (*Olymp.*, vi. 160 (95), with the Scholia *ad loc.*, and Scholia *ad Pindar.*, *Pyth.*, ii. 27).

² Herodot., vii. 154.

³ Herodot., vi. 22, 23 : Σκυθήν μὲν τὸν μόνταρχον

τῶν Ζαγκλαίων, ὡς ἀποβαλόντα τὴν πόλιν, ὁ Ἱπποκράτης πεθίξας, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφεὸν αὐτοῦ Ἰλυθογένεα, εἰς Ἴνυκον πόλιν ἀπέπεμψε.

The words ὡς ἀποβαλόντα seem to imply the relation pre-existing between Hippokratês and Skythês, as superior and subject, and punishment inflicted by the former upon the latter for having lost an important post.

it was agreed that Hippokratês should receive for himself all the extra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property and slaves belonging to the Zanklæans, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without the walls not the least valuable part consisted in the persons of those Zanklæans whom Hippokratês had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves, excepting, however, from this lot three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered—probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were, however, spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, alike perfidious on the part of the Samians and of Hippokratês, secured to the former a flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the imprisoned Skythês found means to escape to Darius, king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter¹. The Samians, however, did not long retain possession of their conquest, but were expelled by the very person who had instigated them to seize it—Anaxilaus of Rhegium. He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian and Messenian race, re-colonizing it under the name of Messênê—a name which it ever afterwards bore²; and it appears to have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophron, until his death about B.C. 476.

Besides the conquests above-mentioned, Hippokratês of Gela was on the point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Helôrus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of the Corinthians and Korkyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having re-peopled this territory, which became thus annexed to Gela, he was prosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels, when he died or was killed at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the Geloans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom; but Gelo, the general of horse in the army, espousing the cause of the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokratês, and seized the sceptre himself³.

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the ascendancy enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, Gelo became the most powerful man in the island; but an incident which occurred a few years afterwards (B.C. 485), while it aggrandized him still farther, transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, or oligarchical

¹ Herodot., vi. 23, 24. Aristotle (*Polit.*, v. 2, xi) represents the Samians as having been first actually received into Zanklê, and afterwards expelling the prior inhabitants: his brief notice is not to be set against the perspicuous narrative of Herodotus.

² Thukyd., vi. 4; Schol. ad Pindar, *Pyth.*, ii. 84; Diodor. xi. 48.

³ [The date of the expulsion of the Samians is not certain; from the evidence of coins it would appear that it was later than 490 B.C. Nor can it be definitely said when the new name Messene was adopted. Freeman (*History of Sicily*, vol. ii., note g) argues for a late date on the strength of the passage in Diodorus, and suggests that it was not introduced till about 460, when Messenian

fugitives from the Helot revolt may have brought about the change.

But the name MEZZENION occurs on coin-types of the Samian period of occupation, and the spelling of the name (with an E, not A) indicates that it was given not by Dorian but by Ionian occupants. On later coins (about 460 B.C.) both the forms MEZZANION and ΔΑΝΚΑΛΙΟΝ are found, thus showing that the name of the city was not fixed until after the influx of Messenian Helots (Head, *Historia Numorum*, pp. 133-135; Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, iii., p. 642)—E.D.]

³ Herodot., vii. 155; Thukyd., vi. 5. The ninth Nemean Ode of Pindar (v. 40), addressed to Chromius the friend of Hiero of Syracuse, commemorates, among other exploits, his conduct at the battle of the Helôrus.

order of proprietary families, probably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helôrus, were dispossessed of the government by a combination between their serf-cultivators called the Kyllyrîi, and the smaller freemen, called the Demos; they were forced to retire to Kasmenæ, where they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore them. That ambitious prince undertook the task, and accomplished it with facility; for the Syracusan people, probably unable to resist their political opponents when backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to him without striking a blow¹. But instead of restoring the place to the previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to himself, leaving Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. He greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened its fortifications: probably it was he who first carried it beyond the islet of Ortygia, so as to include a larger space of the adjacent mainland (or rather island of Sicily) which bore the name of Achradina. To people this enlarged space he brought all the residents in Kamarina, which town he dismantled—and more than half of those in Gela; which was thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse became the first city in Sicily, and even received fresh addition of inhabitants from the neighbouring towns of Megara and Eubœa.

Both these towns, Megara and Eubœa, like Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf-cultivators dependent upon them, and a Demos or Body of smaller freemen excluded from the political franchise: both were involved in war with Gelo, probably to resist his encroachments: both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the authors as well as leaders of the war, anticipated nothing but ruin at the hands of the conqueror; while the Demos, who had not been consulted and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), felt assured that no harm would be done to them. His behaviour disappointed the expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold the Demos as slaves under covenant that they should be exported from Sicily. 'His conduct (says Herodotus²) was dictated by the conviction, that a Demos was a most troublesome companion to live with.' It appears that the state of society which he wished to establish was that of Patricians and clients, without any Plebs, something like that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary oligarchy living in the cities, with Penestæ or dependent cultivators occupying and tilling the land on their account—but no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number to form a

¹ Herodot., vii. 155.

Aristotle (*Politic.*, v. 2, § 6) alludes to the Syracusan democracy prior to the despotism of Gelo as a case of democracy ruined by its own lawlessness and disorder. But such can hardly have been the fact, if the narrative of Herodotus is to be trusted. The expulsion of the Gamorî was not an act of lawless democracy, but the rising of free subjects and slaves against a governing oligarchy. After the Gamorî were expelled, there was no time for the democracy to constitute itself, or to show in what degree it possessed capacity for government, since the narrative of Herodotus indicates that the restoration by Gelo followed closely upon the expulsion. And the superior force which Gelo brought to the aid of the expelled Gamorî is quite sufficient to explain the submission of the Syracusan people, had they been ever so well administered. Perhaps Aristotle may have had before him reports different from those of Herodotus; unless, indeed, we might venture to suspect that

the name of *Gelo* appears in Aristotle by lapse of memory in place of that of *Dionysius*. It is highly probable that the partial disorder into which the Syracusan democracy had fallen immediately before the despotism of Dionysius, was one of the main circumstances which enabled him to acquire the supreme power; but a similar assertion can hardly be made applicable to the early times preceding Gelo, in which, indeed, democracy was only just beginning in Greece.

The confusion often made by hasty historians between the names of Gelo and Dionysius, is severely commented on by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (*Antiq. Roman.*, vii. 1, p. 1314). We must accept the supposition of Larcher, that Pausanias (vi. 9, 2), while professing to give the date of Gelo's occupation of *Syracuse*, has really given the date of Gelo's occupation of *Gela* (see Fynes Clinton, *Fast. Hellen. ad ann.*, 491 B.C.).

² Herodot., vii. 156.

recognised class. And since Gelo was removing the free population from these conquered towns, leaving in or around the towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we may presume that the oligarchical proprietors when removed might still continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by others: but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no serfs.

So large an accession of size, walls, and population rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo, embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, was the greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised the Grecian cities on the east and south-east of the island from the borders of Agrigentum to those of Zanklê or Messênê, together with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. Messênê was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, Agrigentum under that of Thêro, son of Ænesidêmus; Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the borders of Egesta and the Carthaginian possessions, had its own government free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage¹. A dominion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute, besides which Gelo, having conquered and disposed many landed proprietors and having re-colonized Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense adherents². Hence he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transmitted to him by Hippokratês, and to form a naval force besides. Moreover, during the ten years between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, when not only so large a portion of the Greek cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect of Persian invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper—the increased feeling of insecurity throughout the latter probably rendered emigration to Sicily unusually inviting.

These circumstances in part explain the immense power and position which Herodotus represents Gelo to have enjoyed, towards the autumn of 481 B.C., when the Greeks from the Isthmus of Corinth, confederated to resist Xerxês, sent to solicit his aid³. He was then imperial leader of Sicily: he could offer to the Greeks (so the historian tells us) 20,000 hoplites, 200 triremes, 2,000 cavalry, 2,000 archers, 2,000 slingers, 2,000 light-armed horse, besides furnishing provisions for the entire Grecian force as long as the war might last⁴. If this numerical statement could

¹ Diodor., xi. 21.

² Pausan., v. 27, 1, 2. We find the elder Dionysius, about a century afterwards, transferring the entire free population of conquered towns (Kaulonia and Hipponium in Italy, etc.) to Syracuse (Diodor., xiv. 106, 107).

³ Polybius (xii. 26b) and Schol. (*Pyth.*, i. 146) represent this as a spontaneous offer from Gelo, transmitted by an envoy to Greece. If Gelo had already finished his Sicilian campaign, this offer, coming later in 480 B.C., is probable enough (*cf.* Freeman, *History of Sicily*, ii., pp. 515-517).—Ed.

⁴ Herodot., vii. 157: σὺ δὲ δυνάμις τε ἥκεις μεγάλη, καὶ μοῖρά τοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἐλαχίστη μέτα, ἀρχοντί γε Σικελίης; and even still stronger, c. 163: ὥν Σικελίης τύραννος.

The word ἀρχων corresponds with ἀρχή, such as that of the Athenians, and is less strong than τύραννος. The numerical statement is contained in the speech composed by Herodotus for Gelo (vii. 158).

[The title βασιλεύς is found (1) in the speech of the Athenian envoys (Herodot., vii. 161); (2) in

Diod., xi. 26, who recounts how Gelo was publicly acclaimed king after the victory of Himera; (3) in Pindar (*Ol.*, i. 23; *Pyth.*, iii. 70). But it never occurs in Bacchylidês.

The title στρατηγός is used by Bacchylidês (v., l. 1, 2); and Diodorus (xiii. 94) mentions that the later tyrant Dionysius styled himself στρατηγός αυτοκράτωρ, after the example of Gelo. The same title was at first adopted by Agathoklês (317-310).

Some passages in Pindar and Bacchylidês suggest that Gelo and Hiero combined the military dictatorship with some civil office (Pind., *Ol.*, i. 12; Bacch., iii. 70). See Bury, in *Class. Rev.*, March, 1899, pp. 98, 99. For this we may compare the joint tenure of proconsular imperium and tribunicia potestas by the Roman emperors. In the same way the unofficial title ἀρχων (probably also used by the Athenians in reference to Dionysius—Hicks and Hill, *Historical Inscriptions*, No. 91) corresponds to the common appellation of the Roman autocrat-princes.

Neither Gelo's dynasty nor Dionysius in any way altered the republican coin-types of Syracuse.—Ed.]

be at all trusted (which I do not believe), Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying that there was no other Hellenic power which would bear the least comparison with that of Gelo¹: and we may well assume such general superiority to be substantially true, though the numbers above-mentioned may be an empty boast rather than a reality.

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily to combined and central operations. It appears that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek forces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Carthaginians and Egestæans, either wholly or partially, from their maritime possessions in the western corner of the island, and of avenging the death of the Spartan prince Dorieus—that he even attempted, though in vain, to induce the Spartans and other central Greeks to coöperate in this plan—and that upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with the Sicilian forces alone². We have nothing but a brief and vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief and champion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily—the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathoklês. But he had already begun to conceive himself, and had already been recognised by others, in this commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Athens, Corinth, etc., reached him from the Isthmus of Corinth, in 481 B.C., to entreat his aid for the repulse of the vast host of invaders about to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding them that they had refused a similar application for aid from him, said that, far from requiting them at the hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit, he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the numbers as given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon one condition only—that he should be recognised as generalissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the Spartan envoy: and Gelo then so far abated in his demand, as to be content with the command either of the land-force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest.—‘Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring.’

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxês, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed: but the reason assigned for refusal—conflicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen less from historical transmission, than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece; and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for pre-eminence and command which Herodotus has dramatized. The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had another and a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He was attacked at home, and was fully employed in defending himself.

¹ Herodot., vii. 145.

² *Ibid.*, vii. 158.

It is much to be regretted that we have no farther information respecting the events which these words glance at. They seem to indicate

that the Carthaginians and Egestæans had made some encroachments and threatened to make more: that Gelo had repelled them by actual and successful war.

The same spring which brought Xerxês across the Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a formidable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Gelo had already been engaged in war against them (as has been above stated), and had obtained successes, which they would naturally seek the first opportunity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion of Greece, organized for three years before, and drawing contingents not only from the whole eastern world, but especially from their own metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated to encourage them : and there seems good reason for believing that the simultaneous attack on the Greeks both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, was concerted between the Carthaginians and Xerxês¹—probably by the Phenicians on behalf of Xerxês. Nevertheless, this alliance does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation and with help. Agrigentum, though not under the dominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and relative Thêro ; while Rhegium and Messênê under the government of Anaxilaus—Himera under that of his father-in-law Terillus—and Selinus—seem to have formed an imposing minority among the Sicilian Greeks, at variance with Gelo and Thêro, but in amity and correspondence with Carthage². It was seemingly about the year 481 B.C. that Thêro, perhaps invited by an Himeræan party, expelled from Himera the despot Terillus, and became possessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid to Carthage, backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so warmly, as even to tender his own children as hostages to Hamilcar, the Carthaginian Suffes or general, the personal friend or guest of Terillus. The application was favourably entertained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in the eventful year 480 B.C., with a fleet of 3,000 ships of war and a still larger number of store ships, disembarked a land-force of 300,000 men : which would have been even larger, had not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the chariots happened to be dispersed by storms³. These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any farther than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom Herodotus reports the land-force to have consisted are trustworthy and curious : it included Phenicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki, Sardinians, and Corsicans⁴. This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language⁵, in order to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against the general.

Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town ; while the Himerians, reinforced by Thêro and the army of Agrigentum, determined on an obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were despatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to 50,000 foot and 5,000 horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the

¹ Ephorus, *Fragment* III, ed. Didot ; Diodor., xi. 1, 20.

² Herodot., vii. 165 ; Diodor., xi. 23 : compare also xiii. 55, 59. In like manner Rhegium and Messênê formed the opposing interest to Syracuse, under Dionysius the elder (Diodor., xiv. 44).

³ Herodotus (vii. 165) and Diodorus (xi. 20) both give the number of the land-force : the latter alone gives that of the fleet.

⁴ Herodot., vii. 165. The Ligyes came from the southern junction of Italy and France, the Gulfs of Lyons and Genoa. The Helisyki cannot be satisfactorily verified : Niebuhr considers them to have been the *Volsci*, an ingenious conjecture.

⁵ Polyb., i. 67. His description of the mutiny of the Carthaginian mercenaries, after the conclusion of the first Punic war, is highly instructive.

inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sun-rise until late in the afternoon, and its success was mainly determined by an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo—a communication from the Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructed to personate this reinforcement from Selinus, were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships; while the Greek army, brought to action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus¹, 150,000 men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians; the rest fled—partly to the Sikanian mountains, where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines—partly to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion. Twenty ships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a storm on the passage, so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous tidings². Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire wherein he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the beast³) to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed.

We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably other Greeks besides. All of them were now compelled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependent allies, which was granted to them without any harder imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation⁴. Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained mainly

¹ Diodorus' account has been shown to rest upon Timæus (Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, iii., p. 397). It can therefore be accepted as mainly correct in its facts, but allowance should be made for Timæus' anti-tyrannical bias or Sicilian patriotism.—Ed.

² Diodor., xi. 21-24.

³ Herodotus, vii. 167, σῶματα ὅλα καταΐζων. This passage of Herodotus receives illustration from the learned comment of Movers on the Phœnician inscription recently discovered at Marseilles. It was the usual custom of the Jews, and it had been in old times the custom with the Phœnicians (Porphyr. *de Abst.*, iv. 15), to burn the victim entire: the Phœnicians departed from this practice, but the departure seems to have been considered as not strictly correct, and in times of great misfortune or anxiety the old habit was resumed (Movers, *Das Opferwesen der Karthager*, Breslau, 1847, pp. 71-118).

Hamilkar was son of a Syracusan mother: a curious proof of connubium between Carthage and Syracuse. At that moment when the elder Dionysius declared war against Carthage, in 398 B.C., there were many Carthaginian merchants dwelling both in Syracuse and in other Greco-

Sicilian cities, together with ships and other property. Dionysius gave licence to the Syracusans, at the first instant when he had determined on declaring war, to plunder all this property (Diodor., xiv. 46). This speedy multiplication of Carthaginians with merchandise in the Grecian cities so soon after a bloody war had been concluded, is a strong proof of the spontaneous tendencies of trade.

⁴ Diodor., xiii. 62. According to Herodotus, the battle of Himera took place on the same day as that of Salamis; according to Diodorus, on the same day as that of Thermopylæ. It seems more probable that neither is correct.

As far as we can judge from the brief allusions to Herodotus, he must have conceived the battle of Himera in a manner totally different from Diodorus.

[Herodotus seems to have drawn from a Carthaginian source; Diodorus gives a 'patriotic' Sicilian version (cf. Freeman, *History of Sicily*, ii. p. 518 & seq.).—Ed.]

⁵ I presume this treatment of Anaxilaus by Gelo must be alluded to in Diodorus, xi. 66: at least, it is difficult to understand what other 'great benefit' Gelo had conferred on Anaxilaus.

by the solicitation of Damaretê, wife of Gelo, on condition of paying 2,000 talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded¹. If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human sacrifices in their religious worship². But such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know, moreover, that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage³. Indeed, we may reasonably suspect that Diodorus, copying from writers like Ephorus and Timæus long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the amercement of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after the battle of Himera, represent a fresh Carthaginian invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm⁴: and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and successor of Gelo.

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war, together with a rich plunder. Splendid offerings of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi⁵, while the epigram of Simonidês⁶, composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gelo with his three brothers Hiero, Polyzêlus, and Thrasybulus, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victors of Salamis and Plataea. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending reinforcements to the Greeks against Xerxês, in spite of the necessity of submitting to Spartan command, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement—that he sent a confidential envoy named Kadmus to Delphi with orders to watch the turn of the Xerxean invasion, and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse⁷. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis and of the Carthaginians at Himera cleared away suddenly and unexpectedly the terrific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for recompense as well as distribution. Among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on Gelo, but especially the two last-mentioned, were thus put in possession of a number of slaves as public property, who were kept in chains to work⁸, and were either employed on public undertakings for defence, ornament, and religious solemnity—or let out to private masters so as to afford a revenue to the State. So great

¹ Diodor., xi. 26.

² Schol. ad Pindar, *Pyth.*, ii. 3; Plutarch, *De Sera Numinis Vindictâ*, p. 552, c. 6.

³ Diodor., xx. 14.

⁴ Pindar, *Nem.*, ix. 67 (=28 B.) with the Scholia.

⁵ The base of the tripod dedicated has been recovered (cf. the *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, 1897, p. 588 et seq.; Hicks and Hill, *Historical Inscriptions*, No. 16).—Ed.

⁶ Simonidês, *Epigr.* 141, ed. Bergk.

⁷ Herodot., vii. 163-165; compare Diodor., xi. 26; Ephorus, *Fragm.* 111, ed. Didot.

[Herodotus' story seems drawn from some anti-tyrannical source (cf. Grundy, *Great Persian War* p. 247). The odious motive here assigned to him is eminently improbable in such a spirited defender of Hellenic liberty. The tale is probably nothing more than a distortion of an offer made by Gelo to help the Greeks after the battle of Himera (cf. Diod., *loc. cit.*, and note 3, on p. 251).—Ed.]

⁸ Diodor., xi. 25.

For analogous instances of captives taken in war being employed in public works by the captors, and labouring in chains, see the cases of Tegea and Samos in Herodot., i. 66; iii. 39.

was the total of these public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Carthaginians, there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment¹.

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek towns on the east of the island, while Thêro governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydæus in Himera. In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover, he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thêro. His conduct, both at Syracuse and towards the cities dependent upon him, was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the glories of that day were fresh in everyone's recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless, the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, fifteen miles distant; nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot, and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. The respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera never afterwards died out among the Syracusan people, though his tomb was defaced first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despot Agathoklès². And when we recollect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse³, that Gelo was thus solemnly worshipped. The size, the strength, and the population, of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of the new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblæan Megara, and the Sicilian Eubœa, we are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less than 10,000 mercenary soldiers. It will, moreover, appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia⁴—the interior stronghold of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided new lands for so large a number of new-comers: but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

Gelo left a son in tender years, but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzêlus and Hiero, the former of whom married

¹ Diodor., xi. 25. Respecting slaves belonging to the public, and let out for hire to individual employers, compare the large financial project conceived by Xenophon, *De Vectigaliis*, cc. 3 and 4.

² Diodor., xi. 38, 67: Plutarch, *Timoleon*, c. 29; Aristotle, *Πολίτεια*; *Fragm.*, p. 106, ed. Neumann.

³ Diodor., xi. 49.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xi. 72, 73.

the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force—while Hiero was intended to enjoy the government of the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero, a man of energy and determination, and munificent as a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Simonidès, Bacchylidès, Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others, but the victim of a painful internal complaint—jealous in his temper—cruel, and rapacious in his government¹—and noted as an organizer of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects. Especially jealous of his brother Polyzêlus, who was very popular in the city, he despatched him on a military expedition against the Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction. But Polyzêlus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought protection from his brother-in-law the despot Thêro, from whom Hiero redemanded him, and on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken place. It is interesting to hear that Simonidès the poet, esteemed and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between them².

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, between these two powerful despots, proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thêro, was administered by his son Thrasydæus—a youth whose oppressive conduct speedily excited the strongest antipathy. The Himeræans, knowing that they had little chance of redress from Thêro against his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and Hiero to make propositions to the latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydæus, tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys and Hippokratès, cousins of Thêro, but at variance with him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this scheme for detaching Himera from the dominion of Thêro. But so soon as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to Thêro both the schemes and the malcontents at Himera. We seem to make out that Kapys and Hippokratès collected some forces to resist Thêro, but were defeated by him at the river Himera³: his victory was followed up by seizing and putting to death a large number of Himeræan citizens. So great was the number slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for fear of being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly and inconveniently diminished. Thêro invited and enrolled a large addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood⁴.

The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Thêro and with his brother Polyzêlus, is marked by several circumstances as no way inferior to that of Gelo, and probably the greatest, not merely in Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. The citizens of the distant city of Cumæ, on the coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian fleets, entreated his aid, and received from him a squadron which defeated and drove off

¹ Diodor., xi. 67; Aristotle, *Politic.*, v. 9, 3. In spite of the compliments directly paid by Pindar to Hiero (πρὸς ἄστροις, οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς, ξείνοισι δὲ θαυμαστὸς πατριῇ, *Pyth.*, lii. 71=125), his indirect admonitions and hints sufficiently attest the real character (see Dissen ad Pindar., *Pyth.*, i. and ii., pp. 161-182).

² Diodor., xi. 48; Schol. Pindar, *Olymp.*, ii. 29.

³ Schol. ad Pindar., *Olymp.*, ii. 173. The Scholiasts of Pindar are occasionally useful in explaining the brief historical allusions of the poet. [Their ultimate source is mostly Ephorus (*cf.* Freeman, *History of Sicily*, ii., p. 516).—Ed.]

⁴ Diodor., xi. 48, 49.

their enemies¹: he even settled a Syracusan colony in the neighbouring island of Pithekusa. Anaxilaus, despot of Rhegium and Messênê, had attacked, and might probably have overpowered, his neighbours the Epizephyrian Lokrians; but the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to desist². Those heroic honours, which in Greece belonged to the Ækist of a new city, were yet wanting to him. He procured them by the foundation of the new city of Ætna³, on the site and in the place of Katana, the inhabitants of which he expelled, as well as those of Naxos. While these Naxians and Katanæans were directed to take up their abode at Leontini along with the existing inhabitants, Hiero planted 10,000 new inhabitants in his adopted city of Ætna, 5,000 of them from Syracuse and Gela, with an equal number from Peloponnesus. They served as an auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the event of discontents at Syracuse, as we shall see by the history of his successor: he gave them not only the territory which had before belonged to Katana, but also a large addition besides, chiefly at the expense of the neighbouring Sikel tribes. His son Deinomenês, and his friend and confidant Chromius, enrolled as an Ætnæan, became joint administrators of the city, whose religious and social customs were assimilated to the Dorian model⁴. Pindar dreams of future relations between the despot and citizens of Ætna, analogous to those between king and citizens at Sparta. Both Hiero and Chromius were proclaimed as Ætnæans at the Pythian and Nemean games, when their chariots gained victories; on which occasion the assembled crowd heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of Ætna. We see, by the compliments of Pindar⁵, that Hiero was vain of his new title of founder. But we must remark that it was procured, not, as in most cases, by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian citizens, who seem to have given no ground of offence. Both in Gelo and Hiero we see the first exhibition of that propensity to violent and wholesale transplantation of inhabitants from one seat to another, which was not uncommon among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which was exhibited on a still larger scale by the successors of Alexander the Great in their numerous new-built cities.

Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that message of Hiero which had compelled him to spare the Lokrians. Such was the esteem entertained for his memory, and so efficient the government of Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he constituted regent, that Rhegium and

¹ The brazen helmet, discovered near the site of Olympia with the name of Hiero and the victory at Cumæ inscribed on it, yet remains as an interesting relic to commemorate this event: it was among the offerings presented by Hiero to the Olympic Zeus (see Boeckh, *Corp. Inscript. Græc.*, No. 16, part i., p. 34).

[For the inscription, cf. also Hicks and Hill, *op. cit.*, No. 22. The helmet itself is preserved in the British Museum (No. 250 in the Bronze Gallery).

The naval victory of Cumæ seems to have had the effect of crippling Etruscan supremacy in Southern Italy, which in the course of the fifth century passed into the hands of the Oscan tribes. Not long after this battle the conclusion of a favourable peace between the Etrurians and Romans is recorded (cf. Holm, *Greek History*, Engl. transl., ii., p. 85). It is not impossible that Hiero's victory prevented the little Latin republic from

being swallowed up at this time by her formidable neighbour.—Ep.]

² Diodor., xi. 51; Pindar., *Pyth.*, i. 74 (= 140); ii. 17 (= 35) with the Scholia; Epicharmus, *Fragment*, p. 19, ed. Krusemann; Schol. Pindar., *Pyth.*, i. 98; Strabo, v., p. 247.

³ ἔργον οἰκιστῆς ἀντὶ τυράννου θουλόμενος εἶναι, Κατάνην ἐξελὼν Αἰτνὴν μετωνόμασε τὴν πόλιν, ταύτην οἰκιστὴν προσάγορεύσας (Schol. ad Pindar., *Nem.*, i. 1).

⁴ Chromius ἐπίτροπος τῆς Αἰτνῆς (Schol. Pind., *Nem.*, ix. 1). About the Dorian institutions of Ætna, etc., Pindar., *Pyth.*, i. 60-71.

⁵ Pindar., *Pyth.*, i. 60 (= 117); iii. 69 (= 121). Pindar., *ap. Strabo*, vi., p. 269. Compare *Nemæa*, ix. 1-30, addressed to Chromius. Hiero is proclaimed in some odes as a Syracusan: but Syracuse and the newly-founded Ætna are intimately joined together (see *Nemæa*, i. *imil.*).

Messênê were preserved for his children, yet minors¹. But a still more important change in Sicily was caused by the death of the Agrigentine Thêro, which took place seemingly about 472 B.C. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the laureate strains of Pindar: and his memory doubtless became still farther endeared from comparison with his son and successor. Thrasydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling himself detested by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries, that he became master of a force of 20,000 men, horse and foot. And in his own territory, perhaps, he might long have trodden with impunity in the footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently provoked his more powerful neighbour Hiero. In an obstinate and murderous battle between these two princes, 2,000 men were slain on the side of the Syracusans, and 4,000 on that of the Agrigentines, an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Hellenic mercenaries². But the defeat of Thrasydæus was so complete, that he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: he retired to Megara in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to death and perished³. The Agrigentines, thus happily released from their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero. They are said to have established a democratical government, but we learn that Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera, as well as from Gela⁴, nor can we doubt that all the three were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the Theronian.

The victory over Thrasydæus rendered Hiero more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last act which we hear of him is his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law⁵, the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who were now of age to govern. He encouraged them to prefer, and probably showed himself ready to enforce, their claim against Mikythus, who had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus, for the property as well as the sceptre. Mikythus complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful, that the sons of Anaxilaus themselves entreated him to remain and govern—or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly afterwards, of the complaint under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years⁶.

On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed between his brother Thrasybulus, and his nephew the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partisans

¹ Justin., iv. 2.

² So I conceive the words of Diodorus are to be understood—*πλείστοι τῶν παραταξαμένων Ἑλλήνων πρὸς Ἑλλάδας ἦσαν* (Diodor., xi. 53).

³ Diodor., xi. 53. This is a remarkable specimen of the feeling in a foreign city towards an oppressive *tyrannos*. The Megarians of Greece Proper were much connected with Sicily, through the Hyblæan Megara, as well as Selinus.

⁴ Diodor., xi. 76.

⁵ Hiero had married the daughter of Anaxilaus,

but he seems also to have had two other wives—the sister or cousin of Thêro, and the daughter of a Syracusan named Nikoklês: this last was the mother of his son Deinomenês (Schol. Pindar, *Pyth.*, i. 112).

We read of Kleophon, son of Anaxilaus, governing Messênê during his father's lifetime: probably this young man must have died, otherwise Mikythus would not have succeeded (Schol. Pindar, *Pyth.*, ii. 34).

⁶ Diodor., xi. 66.

of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus, surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the government for himself¹. This family division—a curse often resting upon the blood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading to the greatest atrocities²—coupled with the conduct of Thrasybulus himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, but without his accompanying energy, in Thrasybulus, who put to death many citizens, and banished still more, for the purpose of seizing their property, until at length he provoked among the Syracusans intense and universal hatred, shared even by many of the old Gelonian partisans. Though he tried to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary force, he could not prevent a general revolt from breaking out among the Syracusan population. By summoning those cities which Hiero had planted in his new city of Ætna, as well as various troops from his dependent allies, he found himself at the head of 15,000 men, and master of the inner city, that is, the islet of Ortygia, which was the primitive settlement of Syracuse, and was not only distinct and defensible in itself, but also contained the docks, the shipping, and command of the harbour. The revolted people on their side were masters of the outer city, better known under its later name of Achradina, which lay on the adjacent mainland of Sicily, was surrounded by a separate wall of its own, and was divided from Ortygia by an intervening space of low ground used for burials³. Though superior in number, yet being no match in military efficiency for the forces of Thrasybulus, they were obliged to invoke aid from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes—proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot like the powerful Thêro to espouse the cause of Thrasybulus. Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Himera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that a large force, both

¹ Aristotle, *Polit.*, v. 8, 19. Diodorus does not mention the son of Gelo.

Fynes Clinton (*Fasti Hellenici*, App. chap. 10, p. 264 *et seq.*) has discussed all the main points connected with Syracusan and Sicilian chronology.

² Xenophon, *Hiero*, iii. 8: *Εἰ τοῖνυν ἐθέλεις κατανοῆναι, εὐρήσεις μὲν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα φιλομένους, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους πολλοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἐαυτῶν ἀπεκτονήκοντας, πολλοὺς δ' ὑπὸ παίδων αὐτοῦς ἀπολωλότες, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδελφοὺς ἐν τυραννίᾳ ἀλλήλοφόνους γεγεννημένους, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ γυναικῶν τῶν ἐαυτῶν τυράννους διεφθαρμένους, καὶ ὑπὸ ἐταίρων γὰρ τῶν μάλιστα δοκούτων φίλων εἶναι*: compare Isokrates, *De Pace*, Orat. viii., p. 182, § 138.

So also Tacitus (*Hist.*, v. 9) respecting the native kings of Judæa, after the expulsion of the Syrian dynasty—'Sibi ipsi reges impoſuere: qui, nobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumpti per arma dominatione, fugas civium, urbium everſiones,—*fratrum, conjugum, parentum, neces—aliaque solita regibus ausi*, etc.

³ Diodorus here states (xi. 67, 68) that Thrasybulus was master both of the Island (Ortygia) and Achradina, while the revolted Syracusans held the rest of the city, of which Itykê or Tychê was a part. He evidently conceives Syracuse as having comprised, in 463 B.C., substantially the same great space and the same number of four quarters or portions, as it afterwards came to contain from the time of the despot Dionysius down to the Roman empire, and as it is set forth in the de-

scription of Cicero (*Orat. In Verr.*, iv. 53, 118-120) enumerating the four quarters Ortygia, Achradina, Tychê, and Neapolis. I believe this to be a mistake. I take the general conception of the topography of Syracuse given by Thukydides in 415 B.C., as representing in the main what it had been fifty years before. Thukydides (vi. 3) mentions only the Inner City, which was in the Islet of Ortygia (ἡ πόλις ἡ ἐντός)—and the Outer City (ἡ πόλις ἡ ἔξω). This latter was afterwards known by the name of Achradina, though that name does not occur in Thukydides. Diodorus expressly mentions that both Ortygia and Achradina had each separate fortifications (xi. 73).

In these disputes connected with the fall of the Gelonian dynasty, I conceive Thrasybulus to have held possession of Ortygia, which was at all times the inner stronghold and the most valuable portion of Syracuse; inasmuch that under the Roman dominion, Marcellus prohibited any native Syracusan from dwelling in it (Cicero, *In Verr.*, v. 32-84, 38, 98). The enemies of Thrasybulus, on the contrary, I conceive to have occupied Achradina.

There is no doubt that this bisection of Syracuse into two separate fortifications must have afforded great additional facility for civil dispute, if there were any causes abroad tending to foment it; conformably to a remark of Aristotle (*Polit.*, v. 2, 12), which the philosopher illustrates by reference to Kolophon and Notium, as well as to the insular and continental portions of Klazomenæ.

military and naval, came to reinforce the Syracusans; and Thrasybulus, being totally defeated, first in a naval action, next on land, was obliged to shut himself up in Ortygia, where he soon found his situation hopeless. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended in his abdication and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart unmolested¹. The expelled Thrasybulus afterwards lived and died as a private citizen at Lokri—a very different fate from that which had befallen Thrasydæus (son of Thêro) at Megara, though both seem to have given the same provocation.

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a continuance of eighteen years². Its fall was nothing less than an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his separate mercenary force, acting as the instruments, and relying on the protection, of the great despot at Syracuse. All these were now expelled, and governments more or less democratical were established everywhere³. The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves a little longer at Rhegium and Messênê, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire⁴, and began their æra of freedom.

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been expelled, the free governments established in their place were exposed at first to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hiero, Thêro, Thrasydæus, Thrasybulus, etc., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property, and had planted on the soil new citizens and mercenaries, in numbers no less considerable. To what race these mercenaries belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as of feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of compression was removed. This source of angry dissension was common to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new mercenaries last introduced by Thrasybulus had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hieronian city of Ætna, from whence they had been brought. But there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero, the former alone having enrolled 10,000, of whom more than 7,000 yet remained. What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late revolution we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Thrasybulus as a body, and probably many of them took part against him.

After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syracusans was convened, in which the first resolution was to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution, and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dynasty, that the whole body of new citizens,

¹ Diodor., ix. 67, 68.

² Aristotle, *Polit.*, v. 8, 23.

³ Diodor., xi. 68.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xi. 76.

who had been domiciled under Gelo and Hiero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honour. This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favoured partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner section of Syracuse¹—Ortygia—placed themselves in open revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of the outer city, were not strong enough to assail with success this defensible position². But they contrived to block it up nearly altogether, and to intercept both its supplies and its communication with the country, by means of a new fortification, carried out from the outer city towards the Great Harbour, and stretching between Ortygia and Epipolæ. The garrison within could thus only obtain supplies at the cost of perpetual conflicts. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial engagements both by land and sea: whereby the general body of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of 600 trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to hazard a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of 600, who had eminently contributed to this victory, received from their fellow-citizens a crown of honour, and a reward of one mina per head³.

The meagre annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably many of the Gelonians were expelled: but we may assume as certain, that they were deprived of the dangerous privilege of a separate residence in the inner stronghold or islet Ortygia⁴.

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders analogous in character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigentum, at Himera, the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispossessed exiles, who, claiming restitution of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katanæans, whom Hiero had driven from their own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his own settlement Ætna, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the Sikel Prince Duketius, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the Sikels that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the Ætnæan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the neighbourhood of these

¹ Aristotle (*Polit.*, v. 2, 11) mentions, as one of his illustrations of the mischief of receiving new citizens, that the Syracusans, after the Gelonian dynasty, admitted the foreign mercenaries to citizenship, and from hence came to sedition and armed conflict. But the incident cannot fairly be quoted in illustration of that principle which he brings it to support. The mercenaries, so long as the dynasty lasted, had been the first citizens in the community: after its overthrow, they became the inferior, and were rendered inadmissible to honours. It is hardly matter of surprise that so great a change of position excited them to rebel: but this is not a case properly adducible to prove the difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens.

After the expulsion of Agathoklés from Syracuse, nearly two centuries after these events, the

same quarrel and sedition was renewed, by the exclusion of his mercenaries from magistracy and posts of honour (Diodor., xxi., *Fragm.*, p. 282).

² Diodor., xi. 73.

Diodorus here repeats the same misconception as I have noticed in a previous note. He supposes that the Gelonians were in possession both of Ortygia and of Achradina, whereas they were only in possession of the former, as Thrasybulus had been in the former contest.

The opposing party were in possession of the outer city or Achradina: and it would be easy for them, by throwing out a fortification between Epipolæ and the Great Harbour, to straiten the communication of Ortygia with the country around.

³ Diodor., xi. 73, 76.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xiv. 7.

Hieronian partisans was dangerous: but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the Ætnæans. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory (seemingly Sikel) of Ennesia or Inessa, upon which they bestowed the name of Ætna, with monuments commemorating Hiero as the founder—while the tomb of the latter at Katana was demolished by the restored inhabitants¹.

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to re-admit the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers everywhere: but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory of Messênê. It appears that the exiles received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own exiles by re-establishing the city of Kamarina², which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hippokratês, despot of Gela, but which Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it—a cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among the new-comers transferred by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamarinæans, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela³. For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Geloan exiles; and we may farther presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as an independent city, with Dorian rites and customs: its lands were distributed anew, and among its settlers were men rich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victories of the Kamarinæan Psaumis secured for his new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it had hardly yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settlement⁴.

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violences of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their transplantations and expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new enrolments of citizens took place without any rightful claim⁵, probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos or aggregate of small self-working proprietors was considered as 'a troublesome yoke-fellow', fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation. It is highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included that class of men in larger number than ever, on principles

¹ Diodorus, xi. 76; Strabo, vi. 268. Compare, as an analogous event, the destruction of the edifices erected in the market-place of Amphipolis, in honour of the Athenian Hagnon the oekist, after the revolt of that city from Athens (Thukyd., v. 11).

² Diodor., xi. 76.

³ Herodot., vii. 155.

⁴ See the fourth and fifth Olympic odes of Pindar, referred to Olympiad 82, or 452 B.C., about nine years after the Geloans had re-established Kamarina. *Τὰν νέοικον ἔδραν* (Olymp., v. 9); *ἀπ' ἀμαχανίας ἄγων ἐς φάος τόνδε δαμον ἄστων* (Olymp., v. 14).

⁵ Diodor., xi. 86.

analogous to the liberal enrolments of Kleisthenès at Athens. In spite of all the confusion, however, with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism of the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history.

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year 473 B.C., that the Tarentines undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic neighbours, the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, despatched 3,000 of them by constraint as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of 20,000 men, encountered the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely defeated them. The battle having taken place in a hostile country, it seems that the larger portion both of Rhegians and Tarentines perished, insomuch that Herodotus pronounces it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge¹. Of the Tarentines slain a great proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the loss of whom sensibly affected the government of the city, strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical. In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular².

CHAPTER XIV [XLIV.]

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALÊ DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLÊS AND ARISTEIDÊS

AFTER having in the last chapter followed the repulse of the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return to the central Greeks and the Persians—a case in which the triumph was yet more interesting to the cause of human improvement generally.

The disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxès, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both a contempt for Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war

¹ Herodot., vii. 170; Diodor., xl. 52. The latter asserts that the Iapygian victors divided their forces, part of them pursuing the Rhegian fugitives, the rest pursuing the Tarentines. Those who followed the former were so rapid in their movements, that they entered (he says) along with the fugitives into the town of Rhegium, and even became masters of it.

To say nothing of the fact that Rhegium continues afterwards, as before, under the rule of

Mikythus—we may remark that Diodorus must have formed to himself a strange idea of the geography of Southern Italy, to talk of pursuit and flight from Iapygia to Rhegium.

² Aristotle, *Polit.*, v. 2, 8. (On the other hand, the sudden adoption of a new coin-type with a figure of Demos about this period points to a revolution which introduced a democracy for the first time (cf. Head, *Historia Numorum*, p. 45).—Ed.]

(which we may liken to that of the modern Turks, now that the period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was comparatively disorderly and inefficient. The men indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organization were wretched. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were comparatively superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms : but here too the leadership was defective, and the disunion a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the Malignity of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks throughout these critical years, are forced to deal harshly with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts depends. That witness intimates plainly that, in spite of the devoted courage displayed, not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ, than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the imbecility of Xerxês¹. Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus, or the judgment of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of management, or any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great a superiority of force. But it is certain that all their courage as soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit of coöperation, than that which they actually manifested.

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long interval—that the scheme of defence under Darius Codomannus labours under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxês. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great : the orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained and even augmented, while the generalship and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may be esteemed a sort of creation during this interval, and will be found to go through various stages—Demosthenês and Brasidas—the Cyreian army and Xenophon—Agésilas—Iphikratês—Epaminondas—Philip of Macedon—Alexander² : for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxês and that of Alexander, we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe—with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxês that those new powers of combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian history during the next century and more, take their rise. They are brought into agency through the altered position and character of the Athenians—improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and manœuvring in Greece—and the earliest of all

¹ Thukyd., i. 69 : ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὐτῷ τὰ πλεῖω σφολέιντα.

² See a remarkable passage in the third Philippic of Demosthenês, c. 10, p. 123.

Greeks who showed themselves capable of organizing and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member. But without any difference in ostensible rank she was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put together. After the victory of Mykalê, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals, gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous contest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians : first, Themistoklês ; next, Aristeidês,

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their moveable property irrecoverably destroyed, we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the old selfishness again prevalent among them.

The Athenians, on returning from Salamis after the battle of Platæa, began to rebuild their city and its fortifications on a scale of enlarged size in every direction. But as soon as they were seen to be employed on this indispensable work, without which neither political existence nor personal safety was practicable, the allies took the alarm, preferred complaints to Sparta, and urged her to arrest the work. The Spartans, perfectly sympathizing with their allies, were even disposed, from old association, to carry their dislike of fortifications still farther, so that they would have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities systematically defenceless like Sparta itself. But while sending an embassy to Athens, to offer a friendly remonstrance against the project of re-fortifying the city, they could not openly and peremptorily forbid the exercise of a right common to every autonomous community. They affected to offer prudential reasons against the scheme, founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion, in which case it would be a dangerous advantage for the invader to find any fortified city outside of Peloponnesus to further his operations, as Thebes had recently seconded Mardonius. They proposed to the Athenians, therefore, not merely to desist from their own fortifications, but also to assist them in demolishing all fortifications of other cities beyond the limits of Peloponnesus—promising shelter within the Isthmus, in case of need, to all exposed parties.

A statesman like Themistoklês was not imposed upon by this diplomacy : but he saw that the Spartans had the power of preventing the work if they chose, and that it could only be executed by the help of successful deceit. By his advice the Athenians dismissed the Spartan envoys, saying that they would themselves send to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly Themistoklês himself was presently despatched

thither, as one among three envoys instructed to enter into explanations with the Spartan authorities. But his two colleagues, Aristeidēs and Abronichus, by previous concert, were tardy in arriving, and he remained inactive at Sparta, making use of their absence as an excuse for not even demanding an audience, yet affecting surprise that their coming was so long delayed. But while Aristeidēs and Abronichus were thus studiously kept back, the whole population of Athens laboured unremittingly at the walls. Men, women, and children all tasked their strength to the utmost during this precious interval. Neither private houses nor sacred edifices were spared to furnish materials; and such was their ardour in the enterprise, that before the three envoys were united at Sparta, the wall had already attained a height sufficient at least to attempt defence¹. Yet the interval had been long enough to provoke suspicion, even in the slow mind of the Spartans; while the more watchful Æginetans sent them positive intelligence that the wall was rapidly advancing.

Themistoklēs, on hearing this allegation, peremptorily denied the truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained towards him was at that time so great, that his assurance obtained for some time unqualified credit, until fresh messengers again raised suspicions in the minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, Themistoklēs urged the Ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus convince themselves of the state of the facts. They unsuspectingly acted upon his recommendation, while he at the same time transmitted a private communication to Athens, desiring that the envoys might not be suffered to depart until the safe return of himself and his colleagues, which he feared might be denied them when his trick came to be divulged. Aristeidēs and Abronichus had now arrived—the wall was announced to be of a height at least above contempt—and Themistoklēs at once threw off the mask.

Mortified as the Spartans were by a revelation which showed that they had not only been detected in a dishonest purpose, but completely outwitted—they were at the same time overawed by the decisive tone of Themistoklēs, whom they never afterwards forgave. To arrest beforehand erection of the walls, would have been practicable; to deal by force with the fact accomplished was perilous in a high degree. Moreover, the inestimable services just rendered by Athens became again predominant in their minds, so that sentiment and prudence for the time coincided. They affected, therefore, to accept the communication without manifesting any offence, nor had they indeed put forward any pretence which required to be formally retracted. The envoys on both sides returned home, and the Athenians completed their fortifications, without obstruction².

The intention of the allies to obstruct the fortifications must have been known to every soul in Athens, from the universal press of hands required to hurry the work and escape interference; just as it was proclaimed to

¹ Only about 4 feet of the wall was built with dressed stone; the rest consisted of sun-dried brick which could be run up rapidly even by inexperienced hands. Hence Beloch's (*Gr. Gesch.*, i., 458) impeachment of Thukydides' veracity is unconvincing. Cf. E. Meyer in *Hermes*, xl. (October, 1905), pp. 561-569.—Ed.

² This is the first incident which Thukydides relates in that general sketch of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars which precedes

his professed history (i. 89-92). Diodorus (xi. 39, 40), Plutarch (*Themistoklēs*, c. 19), and Cornelius Nepos (*Themist.*, c. 6, 7) seem all to have followed Thukydides, though Plutarch also notices a statement of Theopompus that Themistoklēs accomplished his object by bribing the Ephors. This would not be improbable in itself—nor is it inconsistent with Thukydides; but the latter either had not heard or did not believe it.

after-generations by the shapeless fragments and irregular structure of the wall, in which even sepulchral stones and inscribed columns were seen imbedded. Assuredly the sentiment connected with this work—performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strong and weak—men, women, and children—must have been intense as well as equalizing. All had endured the common miseries of exile, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigue for the defence of their recovered city. We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians and acting upon a generation which had now been nursed in democracy for a quarter of a century, and had achieved unaided the victory of Marathon—if we would understand that still stronger burst of aggressive activity, persevering self-confidence, and aptitude as well as thirst for command—together with that still wider spread of democratical organization—which marks their character during the age immediately following.

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a scale not unworthy of the future grandeur of the city. Its circuit was sixty stadia or about seven miles, with the Acropolis nearly in the centre¹: but the circuit of the previous walls is unknown, so that we are unable to measure the extent of that enlargement which Thukydides testifies to have been carried out on every side. It included within the town the three hills of the Areopagus, Pnyx, and the Museum; while on the south of the town it was carried for a space even on the southern bank of the Ilissus, thus also comprising the fountain Kallirhoë. In spite of the excessive hurry in which it was raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and sufficient against every external enemy, but there is reason to believe that its very large inner area was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces, for the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in from the country with their property, were eminently useful to a Grecian city-community; to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal strength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually resided in large proportion in their separate demes throughout Attica.

But Themistoklês, to whom the Athenians owed the late successful stratagem, had conceived plans of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few years, and which had so recently proved their salvation. He saw in that force both the only chance of salvation for the future, in case the Persians should renew their attack by sea—a contingency at that time seemingly probable—and boundless prospects of future ascendancy over the Grecian coasts and islands. The moment that the walls of the city had been finished, he brought back the attention of his countrymen to those wooden walls which had served them as a refuge against the Persian monarch. He prevailed upon them to provide harbour-room at once safe and adequate, by the enlargement and fortification of the Peiræus. This again was only the prosecution of an enterprise previously begun; for he had already, while in office some years before², made his countrymen sensible that the open roadstead of Phalærum was thoroughly insecure, and had prevailed upon them to improve and employ in part the more spacious harbours of Peiræus and Munychia—three

¹ See F. Gardner, *Ancient Athens*, pp. 48-50.—Ed.

² For the date, see note above, p. 133.—Ed.

natural basins, all capable of being closed and defended. Something had then been done towards the enlargement of this port, though it had probably been subsequently ruined by the Persian invaders. But Themistoklès now resumed the scheme on a scale far grander than he could then have ventured to propose—a scale which demonstrates the vast auguries present to his mind respecting the destinies of Athens.

Peiræus and Munychia, in his new plan, constituted a fortified space as large as the enlarged Athens, and with a wall far more elaborate and unassailable. The wall which surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit, was intended by him to be so stupendous, both in height and thickness, as to render assault hopeless, and to enable the whole military population to act on shipboard, leaving only old men and boys as a garrison. We may judge how vast his project was, when we learn that the wall, though in practice always found sufficient, was only carried up to half the height which he had contemplated. In respect to thickness, however, his ideas were exactly followed: two carts meeting one another brought stones which were laid together right and left on the outer side of each, and thus formed two primary parallel walls, between which the interior space (of course at least as broad as the joint breadth of the two carts) was filled up, 'not with rubble, in the usual manner of the Greeks, but constructed, throughout the whole thickness, of squared stones, cramped together with metal'. The result was a solid wall, probably not less than fourteen or fifteen feet thick, since it was intended to carry so very unusual a height. In the exhortations whereby he animated the people to this fatiguing and costly work, he laboured to impress upon them that Peiræus was of more value to them than Athens itself, and that it afforded a shelter into which, if their territory should be again overwhelmed by a superior land-force, they might securely retire.

Forty-five years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall hear from Periklès, who espoused and carried out the large ideas of Themistoklès, this same language about the capacity of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively or chiefly upon maritime action. But the Athenian empire was then an established reality, whereas in the time of Themistoklès it was yet a dream, and his bold predictions, surpassed as they were by the future reality, mark that extraordinary power of practical divination which Thukydidès so emphatically extols in him. And it proves the exuberant hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian people, when we find them, on the faith of these predictions, undertaking a new enterprise of so much toil and expense; and that too when just returned from exile into a desolated country, at a moment of private distress and public impoverishment.

However, Peiræus served other purposes besides its direct use as a dockyard for military marine. Its secure fortifications and the protection of the Athenian navy were well calculated to call back those metics or resident foreigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of Xerxès. To invite them back, and to attract new residents of a similar description, Themistoklès proposed to exempt them from the *Metoikion* or non-freeman's annual tax²: but this exemption can only have lasted for a

¹ Thukyd., i. 93. The expressions are those of Colonel Leake, derived from inspection of the scanty remnant of these famous walls still to be seen—*Topography of Athens*, ch. ix., p. 411.

[E. Gardner, *Ancient Athens*, pp. 50-52.—Ed.] Compare Aristophan., *Aves*, 1127, about the breadth of the wall of Nephelokokkugia.

² Diodor., xi. 43.

time, and the great temptation for them to return must have consisted in the new securities and facilities for trade, which Athens, with her fortified ports and navy, now afforded. The presence of numerous metics was profitable to the Athenians, both privately and publicly. Much of the trading, professional, and handicraft business was in their hands: and the Athenian legislation, while it excluded them from the political franchise, was in other respects equitable and protective to them. In regard to trading pursuits, the metics had this advantage over the citizen—that they were less frequently carried away for foreign military service. The great increase of their numbers, from this period forward, while it tended materially to increase the value of property all throughout Attica, but especially in Peiræus and Athens, where they mostly resided, helps us to explain the extraordinary prosperity, together with the excellent cultivation, prevalent throughout the country before the Peloponnesian war. The barley, vegetables, figs, and oil, produced in most parts of the territory—the charcoal prepared in the flourishing deme of Acharnæ¹—and the fish obtained in abundance near the coast—all found opulent buyers and a constant demand from the augmenting town population.

We are farther told that Themistoklēs² prevailed on the Athenians to build every year twenty new ships of the line—so we may designate the trireme. Whether this number was always strictly adhered to, it is impossible to say: but to repair the ships, as well as to keep up their numbers, was always regarded among the most indispensable obligations of the executive government.

It does not appear that the Spartans offered any opposition to the fortification of the Peiræus, though it was an enterprise greater, more novel, and more menacing, than that of Athens. But Diodorus tells us, probably enough, that Themistoklēs thought it necessary to send an embassy to Sparta³, intimating that his scheme was to provide a safe harbour for the collective navy of Greece, in the event of future Persian attack.

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a considerable time, and absorbed much of the Athenian force: yet they did not prevent Athens from lending active aid towards the expedition which, in the year after the battle of Platæa (B.C. 478), set sail for Asia under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships from the various cities of Peloponnesus were under his command: the Athenians alone furnished thirty, under the orders of Aristeidēs and Kimon: other triremes also came from the Ionian and insular allies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which island they liberated most of the Grecian cities from the Persian government. Next they turned to the Bosphorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, which, like the Sestus in the Chersonese, was a post of great moment as well as of great strength—occupied by a considerable Persian force, with several leading Persians and even kinsmen of the monarch. The place was captured, seemingly after a prolonged siege, and the line of communication between the Euxine sea and Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a capital and unexpected change in the relations of the various Grecian cities, a change, of which the proximate cause lay in the misconduct of Pausanias, but towards which other causes, deep-seated as well as various, also tended.

¹ Respecting the advantages derived from the residence of metics and from foreign visitors, compare the observations of Isokratēs, more than

a century after this period, *Orat. iv., De Pace*, p. 163, and Xenophon, *De Vectigalibus*, c. iv.

² Diodor., xi. 43.

³ *Ibid.*

In recounting the history of Miltiadês¹, I noticed the deplorable liability of the Grecian leading men to be spoiled by success. This distemper worked with singular rapidity on Pausanias. As conqueror of Plataea, he had acquired a renown unparalleled in Grecian experience, together with a prodigious share of the plunder. The concubines, horses, camels, and gold plate, which had thus passed into his possession, were well calculated to make the sobriety and discipline of Spartan life irksome, while his power also, though great on foreign command, became subordinate to that of the Ephors when he returned home. His newly-acquired insolence was manifested immediately after the battle, in the commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, which proclaimed himself by name and singly, as commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians—an unseemly boast, of which the Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation, by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who had taken part in the combat to be all enumerated on the tripod². Nevertheless he was still sent on the command against Cyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture of this latter place that his ambition and discontent first ripened into distinct treason. He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile (now a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government of a district in Mysia), to whom he entrusted his new acquisition of Byzantium, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it.

These prisoners were presently sent away underhand to Xerxês, together with a letter from the hand of Pausanias himself, to the following effect:—'Pausanias, the Spartan commander, having taken these captives, sends them back in his anxiety to oblige thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the rest of Greece: with thy aid I think myself competent to achieve this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person down to the seaboard, through whom we may hereafter correspond.' Xerxês, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately sent down Artabazus (the same who had been second in command in Bœotia) to supersede Megabâtês in the satrapy of Daskylium. The new satrap, furnished with a letter³ of reply bearing the regal seal, was instructed to promote actively the projects of Pausanias.

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausanias had been insolent and domineering, degrading the allies at quarters and watering-places in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans, and treating the whole armament in a manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, even in a Spartan Herakleid and a victorious general. But when he received the letter from Xerxês, and found himself in immediate communication with Artabazus, as well as supplied with funds for corruption⁴, his insane hopes knew no bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately for Greece, his treasonable plans were neither deliberately laid, nor veiled until ripe for execution. He clothed himself in Persian attire—he traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards—he copied the Persian

¹ See Chapter VII.

² In the Athenian inscriptions on the votive offerings dedicated after the capture of Eion, as well as after the great victories near the river Eurymedon, the name of Kimon the commander is not even mentioned (Plutarch, *Kimôn*, c. 7; Diodor., xi. 62).

³ These letters are given by Thukydides verbatim (i. 128, 129): he had seen them or obtained copies (*ὡς ὁρτοπον ἀνευρέθη*)—they were doubtless communicated along with the final revelations of the confidential Argilian slave.

⁴ Diodor., xi. 44.

chiefs both in the luxury of his table and in his conduct towards the free women of Byzantium. Moreover, his haughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered him unapproachable, and the allies at length came to regard him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous behaviour, and the manifest evidences of his alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who recalled him to answer for his conduct, and seemingly the Spartan vessels along with him¹.

In spite of his flagrant conduct, the Lacedæmonians acquitted him on the allegations of positive and individual wrong; yet mistrusting his conduct in reference to collusion with the enemy, they sent out Dorkis to supersede him as commander. But a revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken place in the minds of the allies. The headship, or hegemony, was in the hands of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartan found the allies not disposed to recognise his authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been raised², whether Athens was not entitled to the command at sea, in consequence of the preponderance of her naval contingent. The repugnance of the allies to any command except that of Sparta, either on land or water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions at that critical moment. But the subsequent victories had materially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece; while the armament now serving, differently composed from that which had fought at Salamis, contained a large proportion of the newly-enfranchised Ionic Greeks, who not only had no preference for Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians on every ground—as well from kindred race, as from the certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector upon whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it happened that the Athenian generals on this expedition, Aristeidēs and Kimon, were personally just and conciliating, forming a striking contrast with Pausanias. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that the behaviour of the latter was not only oppressive towards themselves but also revolting to Grecian sentiment generally—addressed themselves to the Athenian commanders for protection and redress, on the plausible ground of kindred race, entreating to be allowed to serve under Athens, as leader instead of Sparta.

Plutarch tells us that Aristeidēs not only tried to remonstrate with Pausanias, who repelled him with arrogance—which is exceedingly probable—but that he also required, as a condition of his compliance with the request of the Ionic allies, that they should personally insult Pausanias, so as to make reconciliation impracticable: upon which a Samian and a Chian captain deliberately attacked and damaged the Spartan admiralship in the harbour of Byzantium³. The historians from whom Plutarch copied this latter statement must have presumed in the Athenians a disposition to provoke that quarrel with Sparta which afterwards sprung up as it were spontaneously: but the Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit the story, which is, moreover, unnoticed by Thukydides. To give the Spartans a just ground of indignation, would have been glaring imprudence on the part of Aristeidēs. Yet having every motive to entertain the request of the allies, he began to take his measures for acting as their protector and chief. And his proceedings were much

¹ Thukyd., i. 95-131: compare Duris and Nymphis *apud* Athenæus, xii. p. 536A. [*Frag. Hist. Gr.*, vol. iii., Nymphis, No. 14.—ED.]

² Herodot., viii. 2, 3. Compare the language

of the Athenian envoy, as it stands in Herodotus (vii. 155), addressed to Gelo.

³ Plutarch, *Aristeidēs*, c. 23.

facilitated by the recall of Pausanias, who seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him—even the small Spartan squadron accompanied him home: so that the Athenian generals had the best opportunity for ensuring to themselves and exercising that command which the allies besought them to undertake. When Dorkis arrived to replace Pausanias, they were already in full supremacy; while Dorkis, having only a small force, and being in no condition to employ constraint, found himself obliged to return home.

This incident, though not a declaration of war against Sparta, was the first open renunciation of her authority as presiding state among the Greeks, the first separation of Greece (considered in herself alone and apart from foreign solicitations such as the Persian invasion) into two distinct organized camps, each with collective interests and projects of its own. In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was constrained, and even in some points of view not indisposed, to patient acquiescence. She had no means of forcing the dispositions of the Ionic allies, while the war with Persia altogether—having now become no longer strictly defensive, and being withal maritime as well as distant from her own territory—had ceased to be in harmony with her home-routine and strict discipline. Her grave senators even treated it as an advantage, that Athens should take the lead in carrying on the Persian war, since it could not be altogether dropped, nor had the Athenians as yet manifested any sentiments positively hostile, to excite their alarm¹. Nay, the Spartans actually took credit in the eyes of Athens, about a century afterwards, for having themselves advised this separation of command at sea from command on land². Moreover, if the war continued under Spartan guidance, there would be a continued necessity for sending out their kings or chief men to command, and the example of Pausanias showed them the depraving effect of such military power, remote as well as unchecked.

The example of their king Leotychidês, too, near about this time, was a second illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians, Leotychidês was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down the Aleuadæ and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxês and Mardonius. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed, and was even detected with a large sum of money actually on his person. In consequence of this the Lacedæmonians condemned him to banishment and razed his house to the ground. He died afterwards in exile at Tegea³.

¹ Thukyd., i. 95. Following Thukydides in his conception of these events, I have embodied in the narrative as much as seems consistent with it in Diodorus (xi. 50), who evidently did not here copy Thukydides, but probably had Ephorus for his guide.

² Xenophon, *Hellen.*, vi. 5, 34. It was at the moment when the Spartans were soliciting Athenian aid, after their defeat at Leuktra.

³ Herodot., vi. 72; Diodor., xi. 48; Pausanias, iii. 7, 8: compare [Plutarch], *De Herodoti Malign.*, c. 21, p. 859.

Considering how imperfectly we know the Lacedæmonian chronology of this date, it is very possible that some confusion may have arisen in the case of Leotychidês from the difference between the date of his *banishment* and that of his *death*. The date of Archidamus may perhaps have been reckoned in one account from the *banishment* of Leotychidês—in another from his *death*. And the

date which Diodorus has given as that of the death of Leotychidês, may really be only the date of his banishment, in which he lived until 469 B.C.

[The chronological problem above discussed admits of another solution. Herodotus (*loc. cit.*) states that the Thessalian expedition failed owing to the corruption of Leotychidês, who was caught *ἐν αὐτοφύρῳ* with a gauntlet full of silver. It would follow that Leotychidês was expelled from Sparta not later than 476. Now though Diodorus (xi. 48) states that Leotychidês *died* in 476, he says also that he reigned twenty-two years, and Archidamus forty-two. But Leotychidês became king in 491; therefore his deposition must be fixed in 469—a date which fits in with the reign of Archidamus, who died in 427. It is curious that Diodorus is thus correct in giving a sum of sixty-four years to the two kings, and yet inconsistent in making Leotychidês die in 476. Again, why does Diodorus state that Archidamus died in 434,

Two such instances were well calculated to make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of their Herakleid leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic headship in favour of Athens. It appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks.

According to the tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and more the president of something like a Pan-hellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian states. Such at least was the point towards which things seemed to be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union, none of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except the obsolete and impotent pretensions of Argos.

Sparta had risen to such ascendancy, not from her superior competence in the management of collective interests, nor even, in the main, from ambitious efforts on her own part to acquire it—but from the converging tendencies of Grecian feeling, which required some such presiding state—and from the commanding military power, rigid discipline, and ancient undisturbed constitution, which attracted that feeling towards Sparta. The necessities of common defence against Persia greatly strengthened these tendencies; and the success of the defence, whereby so many Greeks were emancipated who required protection against their former master, seemed destined to have the like effect still more. For an instant, after the battles of Platæa and Mykalê, Sparta was exalted to be the chief of a full Pan-hellenic union, Athens being only one of the principal members. And had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive policy, of self-directed and persevering efforts, or of the requisite flexibility of dealing, embracing distant Greeks as well as near—her position was now such that her own ascendancy, together with undivided Pan-hellenic union, might long have been maintained. But she was lamentably deficient in all the requisite qualities, and the larger the union became, the more her deficiency stood manifest. On the other hand, Athens, now entering into rivalry as a sort of leader of opposition, possessed all those qualities in a remarkable degree, over and above that actual maritime force which was

exactly forty-two years after 476, and yet speak of him as alive in 427? A feasible explanation is as follows. In speaking of Archidamus III. he similarly relates his death twice, in 346 and 338. Now the reason given for the death of Archidamus III. was that it was a punishment for sacrilege, and, therefore, Diodorus fixes it immediately after the Sacred War—i.e., in 346. He is, perhaps, using a public record which gave *lengths*, not *dates*, of reigns, and working backward both from 338 and 346 he arrives at the same complication in the case of Leotychidês. We incline to accept the view that Leotychidês died in 469, and, therefore, retaining 476 as the latest possible date of the Thessalian expedition, would suggest as an alternative to Grote's explanation that the story in Herodotus is a fiction to account for his disappearance. It is possible that the above credits Diodorus with more elaborate calculation than we have any reason to assume, and that he merely made similar blunders in the two cases. But the coincidence of the same chronological discrepancy is at least remarkable.

It is attractive to deduce from the successive falls of Pausanias (471-470) and Leotychidês (on

this hypothesis) a recrudescence of the predominance of the Ephors, who had hitherto been treated with scant respect by Pausanias. It would seem that (in 471-469) they ousted both these kings by raking up charges of corruption some eight years old. Thukydidês' account does not exactly warrant this suggestion, but the value of his statements concerning Spartan internal affairs at this period is very doubtful.

Clinton (*Fasti Hellenici*, app., ch. iii.) assigns the Thessalian expedition to 469. But Plutarch (*ad loc.*) speaks of 'the Greek expedition' which, 'after the departure of Xerxês, went to Pagasæ and wintered'. The only fleet which could be so described between Salamis and 464, and was commanded by Leotychidês, was the fleet which had won Mykalê. Of this fleet the Athenian contingent besieged Sestus, and there wintered (*Hdt.*, ix. 114). It is more than probable that Leotychidês led the Spartan contingent to Pagasæ to drive out the Medizing party in Thessaly, and that it was to this expedition that Herodotus assigns the picturesque story above rejected. There is no reason for assuming another expedition in 469.—*Ed.]*

the want of the day ; so that the opening made by Spartan incompetence and crime (so far as Pausanias was concerned) found her in every respect prepared.

The departure of the Spartan Dorkis left the Athenian generals at liberty ; and their situation imposed upon them the duty of organizing the new confederacy which they had been chosen to conduct. The Ionic allies, for once unanimous, acted as the forward movers in the enterprise, for they stood in obvious need of protection against the attacks of Persia, and had no farther kindness to expect from Sparta or the Peloponnesians. But even had they been less under the pressure of necessity, the conduct of Athens, and of Aristeidēs as the representative of Athens, might have sufficed to bring them into harmonious coöperation. The new leader was no less equitable towards the confederates than energetic against the common enemy. The general conditions of the confederacy were regulated in a common synod of the members, appointed to meet periodically for deliberative purposes, in the temple of Apollo and Artemis at Delos—of old the venerated spot for the religious festivals of the Ionic cities, and at the same time a convenient centre for the members. A definite obligation, either in equipped ships of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city, and the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form contribution should be made by each. Their assessment must of course have been reviewed by the synod. They had no power at this time to enforce any regulation not approved by that body.

Aristeidēs' assessment not only found favour at the time of its original proposition, when it must have been freely canvassed by the assembled allies—but also maintained its place in general esteem, as equitable and moderate, after the once responsible headship of Athens had degenerated into an unpopular empire¹.

Respecting this first assessment we are scarcely told more than one single fact—the aggregate in money was 460 talents² (= about 106,000*l.* sterling). Of the items composing such aggregate—of the individual cities which paid it—of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to furnish money—we are entirely ignorant. The information which we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later [454]. Thukydides in his brief sketch makes us clearly understand the difference between *presiding* Athens with her autonomous and regularly assembled allies in 476 B.C., and *imperial* Athens with her subject allies in 432 B.C. The Greek word equivalent to *ally* left either of these epithets to be understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenient to the powerful states. From the same author, too, we learn the general causes of the change : but he gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none at all as to the first start. He tells us only that the Athenians

¹ Thukyd., v. 18 ; Plutarch, *Aristeidēs*, c. 24. Plutarch states that the allies expressly asked the Athenians to send Aristeidēs for the purpose of assessing the tribute. This is not at all probable : Aristeidēs, as commander of the Athenian contingent under Pausanias, was at Byzantium when the mutiny of the Ionians against Pausanias occurred, and was the person to whom they applied for protection. As such, he was the natural person to undertake such duties as devolved upon Athens, without any necessity of supposing that he was specially asked for to perform it.

² The Tribute can scarcely have been 460 talents till about 454. For (1) Lykia and Karia did

not join the League till 466 (Plut., *Kimon*, 12) ; (2) Lampsakus and Myus were in the possession of Themistokles as late as 463 (Thukyd., i. 138) ; (3) Eion, the first Thracian town in the League, was only taken in 476-475 (Thukyd., i. 98). Hence, since the assessment made by Aristeidēs was regarded as fair, and the Athenians never boasted of having reduced the contributions, it is inconceivable that the Tribute amounted to 460 talents in 478. It is noteworthy that Thukydides (i. 96) is similarly wrong in speaking of *Athenian* treasurers in 478 (these having been instituted in 454).—ED.

appointed a peculiar board of officers called the *Hellênotamizæ*, to receive and administer the common fund—that Delos was constituted the general treasury, where the money was to be kept—and that the payment thus levied was called the *phorus*.

The Phœnician fleet, and the Persian land-force, might at any moment reappear, and there was no hope of resisting either except by confederacy : so that confederacy under such circumstances became with these exposed Greeks not merely a genuine feeling, but at that time the first of all their feelings. It was their common fear, rather than Athenian ambition, which gave birth to the alliance ; and they were grateful to Athens for organizing it.* The public import of the name *Hellênotamizæ*, coined for the occasion—the selection of Delos as a centre—and the provision for regular meetings of the members—demonstrate the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth the protection of the *Ægean* sea against foreign maritime force and lawless piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus against the transit of a Persian were, was a purpose essentially public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to provide by way of common contribution. Any island or seaport which might refrain from contributing, was a gainer at the cost of others. The general feeling of this common danger, as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia was yet serious, was the real cause which brought together so many contributing members, and enabled the forward parties to shame into concurrence such as were more backward. How the confederacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes of Athenian ambition, we shall see at the proper time : but in its origin it was an equal alliance, in so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be equal—not an Athenian empire. Nay, it was an alliance in which every individual member was more exposed, more defenceless, and more essentially benefited in the way of protection, than Athens. We have here in truth one of the few moments in Grecian history wherein a purpose at once common, equal, useful, and innocent, brought together spontaneously many fragments of this disunited race, and overlaid for a time their fatal bent towards petty and isolated autonomy. It was a proceeding equitable and prudent, in principle as well as in detail, promising at the time the most beneficent consequences—not merely protection against the Persians, but a standing police of the *Ægean* sea, regulated by a common superintending authority. And if such promise was not realized, we shall find that the inherent defects of the allies, indisposing them to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much chargeable with the failure as the ambition of Athens. We may add, that in selecting Delos as a centre, the Ionic allies were conciliated by a renovation of the solemnities which their fathers, in the days of former freedom, had crowded to witness in that sacred island.

Pausanias, as we have seen, had been acquitted of the charges of wrong and oppression against individuals. Yet the presumptions of *medism* (or treacherous correspondence with the Persians) appeared so strong, that, though not found guilty, he was still not reappointed to the command. Such treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution of his designs against Greece, for which purpose he came out to Byzantium under pretence of aiding as a volunteer without any formal

authority in the war. He there resumed his negotiations with Artabazus. His great station and celebrity still gave him so strong a hold on men's opinions, that he appears to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence the Athenians, already recognised heads of the confederacy, were constrained to expel him by force¹. He then retired to Kolônæ in the Troad, where he continued for some time in the farther prosecution of his schemes, despatching emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities of Greece². At length the Spartan authorities, apprised of his proceedings, sent a herald out to him with peremptory orders that he should come home immediately along with the herald: if he disobeyed, 'the Spartans would declare war against him', or constitute him a public enemy. ✕

As the execution of this threat would have frustrated all the ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he thought it prudent to obey, the rather, as he felt entire confidence of escaping all the charges against him at Sparta by the employment of bribes, the means for which were doubtless abundantly furnished to him through Artabazus. He was, in the first moments of indignation, imprisoned by order of the Ephors—who, it seems, were legally competent to imprison him, even had he been king instead of regent. But he was soon let out, on his own requisition and under a private arrangement with friends and partisans, to take his trial against all accusers. Even to stand forth as accuser against so powerful a man was a serious peril: to undertake the proof of specific matter of treason against him, was yet more serious, nor does it appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. Accordingly Pausanias remained not only at large but unaccused, still audaciously persisting both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence abroad with Artabazus. He ventured to assail the unshielded side of Sparta by opening negotiations with the Helots, and instigating them to revolt, promising them both liberation and admission to political privilege³ with a view, first to destroy the board of Ephors and render himself despot in his own country—next, to acquire through Persian help the supremacy of Greece. Some of these Helots to whom he addressed himself revealed the plot to the Ephors, who nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take measures against Pausanias upon no better information—so imposing was still his name and position. Suspected as Pausanias was, yet by the fears of some and the connivance of others, he was allowed to bring his plans to the very brink of consummation; and his last letters to Artabazus, intimating that he was ready for action, and bespeaking immediate performance of the engagements concerted between them, were actually in the hands of the messenger. Sparta was saved by a mere accident.

The messenger to whom these last letters were entrusted was a favourite and faithful slave of Pausanias. It was by no means the intention of this Argilian to betray his master. But, on receiving the letter to carry, he recollected that none of the previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly he broke the seal and found his suspicions confirmed by an

¹ Thukyd., i. 130, 131.

[To this occasion should be referred the story (Plut., *Kimón*, 9) that Kimon, as commander-in-chief, secured a vast amount of spoil for the Athenian armament; during the first siege of Byzantium Kimon was subordinate to Aristeidēs. Perhaps, however, the incident should be rejected as unhistorical.—Ed.]

² See Demosthen., *Philippic*, iii. c. 9, p. 122, and *De Fals. Legat.*, c. 76, p. 428; Æschyn., *Cont. Ktesiphont.*, ad fin.; Harpokrat., v. *Arquos*—Deinarchus, *Cont. Aristogeiton*, § 25, 26.

³ Aristotel., *Polit.*, iv. 13, 13; v. 1, 5; v. 6, 2; Herodot., v. 32.

express injunction that the bearer was to be put to death—a discovery which left him no alternative except to deliver it to the Ephors. But those magistrates, who had before disbelieved the Helot informers, still refused to believe even the confidential slave with his master's autograph and seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not omitting copies of those letters between Pausanias and Xerxēs which I have already cited from Thukydides—for in no other way can they have become public. Partly from the suspicion which in antiquity always attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained under the pretended guarantee of torture—partly from the peril of dealing with so exalted a criminal—the Ephors would not be satisfied with any evidence less than his own speech and their own ears. They directed the slave to plant himself as a suppliant in the sacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Tænarus, under the shelter of a double tent or hut, behind which two of them concealed themselves. Pausanias hastened to the temple, upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of the contents of the letter. Pausanias, admitting the facts, tried to appease the slave's disquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary, urging him at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that the schemes in progress might not be retarded.

All this passed within the hearing of the concealed Ephors, who at length, thoroughly satisfied, determined to arrest Pausanias immediately on his return to Sparta. They met him in the public street, not far from the temple of Athênē Chalkiækus (or of the Brazen House). But as they came near, either their menacing looks, or a significant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man their purpose. He fled for refuge to the temple, and planted himself as a suppliant in a narrow roofed chamber belonging to the sacred building. There the Ephors, not warranted in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to a current story¹ not recognised by Thukydides, yet consistent with Spartan manners, his own mother was the person who placed the first stone to build up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason. His last moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the temple. He was buried not far off, until some time afterwards, under the mandate of the Delphian oracle, his body was exhumed and transported to the exact spot where he had died. However, the oracle, not satisfied even with this re-interment, pronounced the whole proceeding to be a profanation of the sanctity of Athênē, enjoining that two bodies should be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried away.

The chronology of this important period is not so fully known as to enable us to make out the precise dates of particular events. But we are obliged to admit an interval of about nine years between the retirement of Pausanias from his command at Byzantium and his death. To suppose so long an interval engaged in treasonable correspondence is perplexing, and we can only explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their movements, and

¹ Diodor., xi. 45; Cornel. Nepos, *Pausan.*, c. 5; *Polyæn.*, viii. 51.

that the suspected regent may perhaps have communicated with partisans, real or expected, in many parts of Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplice was Themistoklēs, still in great power—though, as it would seem, in declining power—at Athens. The charge of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxēs, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of coöperation against a common enemy. And apparently it was not resumed during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both, in effective service and in prominent posts¹. Themistoklēs stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Peiræus: Aristeidēs is commander of the fleet, and first organizer of the confederacy of Delos. Moreover, we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest against Themistoklēs as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact, a fact of overwhelming influence on the destinies and character, public as well as private, of the Athenians. We ought to add, at the same time, that the recent predominance of the fleet was attended with no detriment either to the land-force or to the landed cultivation of Attica, both of which will be found to acquire extraordinary development during the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Still the triremes, and the men who manned them taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state.

The political change arising from hence in Athens was not less important than the military. 'The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis'², and instruments of the new vocation of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political constitution also, not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognised political inequalities. Nor was it likely that this multitude, after a trying period of forced equality, during which political privilege had been effaced, would patiently acquiesce in the full restoration of such privilege at home. We see by the active political sentiment of the German people, after the great struggles of 1813 and 1814, how much an energetic and successful military effort of the people at large, blended with endurance of serious hardship, tends to stimulate the sense of political dignity and the demand for developed citizenship: and if this be the tendency even among a people habitually passive on such subjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian population, who had gone through a previous training of near thirty years under the democracy of Kleisthenēs.

Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenean constitution seems to have been enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian census

¹ The distinction between the positions of Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs in *Ath. Pol.*, ch. 23, seems to be based on mere conjecture.—Ed.

² Aristotel., *Politik.*, v. 3, 5: Καὶ πάλιν ὁ

ναυτικός ὄχλος, γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νίκης, καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν.

were not admissible to offices of state. This restriction was now partially annulled¹.

In the new position into which Athens was now thrown, with so great an extension of what may be termed her foreign relations, and with a confederacy which imposed the necessity of distant military service, the functions of the *Stratēgi* naturally tended to become both more absorbing and complicated; while the civil administration became more troublesome if not more difficult, from the enlargement of the city and the still greater enlargement of *Peiræus*—leading to an increase of town population, and especially to an increase of the metics or resident non-freemen. And it was probably about this period, during the years immediately succeeding the battle of *Salamis*—when the force of old habit and tradition had been partially enfeebled by so many stirring novelties—that the Archons were withdrawn altogether from political and military duties, and confined to civil or judicial administration. At the battle of *Marathon*, the *Polemarch* is a military commander, president of the ten *Stratēgi*: we know him afterwards only as a civil magistrate, administering justice to the metics or non-freemen, while the *Stratēgi* perform military duties without him. I conceive that this alteration, indicating as it does a change in the character of the Archons generally, must have taken place at the time which we have now reached—a time when the Athenian establishments on all sides required a more elaborate distribution of functionaries. The distribution of so many Athenian boards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city, and part in the *Peiræus*, cannot have commenced until after this period, when *Peiræus* had been raised by *Themistoklēs* to the dignity of town, fortress, and state-harbour. Such boards were the *Astynomi* and *Agoranomi*, who maintained the police of streets and markets—the *Metronomi*, who watched over weights and measures—the *Sitophylakes*, who carried into effect various state regulations respecting the custody and sale of corn—with various others who acted not less in *Peiræus* than in the city². We may presume that each of these boards was originally created as the exigency appeared to call for it, at a period later than that which we have now reached, most of these duties of detail having been at first discharged by the Archons, and afterwards (when these latter became too full of occupation) confided to separate administrators. The special and important change which characterized the period immediately succeeding the battle of *Salamis* was the more accurate line drawn between the Archons and the *Stratēgi*, assigning the foreign and military department entirely to the *Stratēgi*, and rendering the Archons purely civil magistrates—administrative as well as judicial: while the first creation of the separate boards above-named was probably an ulterior enlargement, arising out of increase of population, power, and trade, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. It was by some

¹ Plutarch (*Arist.*, 22) is here contradicted by the *Ath. Pol.* (c. 26), which states that the archonship was thrown open to the Zeugites in the sixth year after the death of *Ephialtēs*, and (c. 7) that even in the fourth century the *Thêtes* were technically ineligible for office, though they might be elected by posing as Zeugites. If the latter statement is true Plutarch misconceived the whole situation, for he gives the impression that *Aristeidēs* threw open the office to all as a reward to the *παυροὶς ὄχλος*, who were *Thêtes*, and would, therefore, not have gained by a concession to the Zeugites. Probably *Aristeidēs* merely introduced

the system of 'mixed sortition' (see note to p. 179), and the extension of the archonship to the third class took place in 457. At the most he may have admitted the *Hippis*. Further, when Plutarch speaks of archons 'elected by all' he is clearly at fault; the lot was introduced in 487. It has been suggested that Plutarch is quoting from *Kraterus' ψηφισμάτων συναγωγή*, but no psephism could have begun *κοινὸς ἔστω ἡ πολιτεία*. Similar references to *hētious ψηφίσματα* are found in c. 10 and 21 of this almost worthless biography.—Ed.

² For lists of such magistrates, see *Ath. Pol.*, c. 24, and 42 ff.—Ed.

such steps that the Athenian administration gradually attained that complete development which it exhibits in practice during the century from the Peloponnesian war downward, to which nearly all our positive and direct information relates.

While Aristeidēs' popularity was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief by his function as assessor to the new Delian confederacy, the ascendancy of Themistoklēs, though so often exalted by his unrivalled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity and thirst for money. New political opponents sprang up against him, men sympathizing with Aristeidēs and far more violent in their antipathy than Aristeidēs himself. Of these the chief were Kimon (son of Miltiadēs) and Alkmæon¹. The Lacedæmonian influence, then not inconsiderable in Athens, was employed to second the political combinations against him². He is said to have given offence by manifestations of personal vanity—by continual boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honour of Artemis Aristobulē, or Artemis of admirable counsel.

But the main cause of his discredit was the prostitution of his great influence for corrupt purposes. In the unsettled condition of so many different Grecian communities, recently emancipated from Persia, when there was past misrule to avenge, wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished, exiles to be restored, and all the disturbance and suspicions accompanying so great a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy—the influence of the leading men at Athens must have been great in determining the treatment of particular individuals. Themistoklēs, placed at the head of an Athenian squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for the purposes of war against Persia, partly for organizing the new confederacy, is affirmed to have accepted bribes without scruple, for executing sentences just and unjust—restoring some citizens, expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of Themistoklēs—the poet Timokreon of Ialysus in Rhodes, who had expected his own restoration from the Athenian commander, but found that it was thwarted by a bribe of three talents from his opponents, so that he was still kept in exile on the charge of *medism*. The assertions of Timokreon, personally incensed on this ground against Themistoklēs, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless they are a valuable memorial of the feelings of the time, and are far too much in harmony with the general character of this eminent man to allow of our disbelieving them entirely. Timokreon is as emphatic in his admiration of Aristeidēs as in his censure of Themistoklēs, whom he denounces as 'a lying and unjust traitor'³.

Such conduct must have caused Themistoklēs to be both hated and feared among the insular allies, whose opinion was now of considerable importance to the Athenians. A similar sentiment grew up against him in Athens itself, and appears to have been connected with suspicions of

¹ Kimon was a member of the Philaid family, and had married into the clan of the Alkmæonidae, with which Alkmæon and Xanthippus were connected by marriage and Aristeidēs by friendship. Themistoklēs, therefore, was in the position of a *novus homo* struggling against a coalition of

aristocrats who probably looked upon supremacy almost as their prescriptive right. Cf. Holm, *Gk. Hist.* (Eng. trans.), ii., pp. 96, 97, 120.—Ed.

² Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 16; Scholion 2 to Aristophan., *Equit.*, 84.

³ Plutarch., *Themist.*, c. 21.

treasonable inclinations towards the Persians. As the Persians could offer the highest bribes, a man open to corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations towards their cause; and if Themistoklēs had rendered pre-eminent service against them, so also had Pausanias, whose conduct had undergone so fatal a change for the worse. It was the treason of Pausanias—suspected and believed against him by the Athenians even when he was in command at Byzantium, though not proved against him at Sparta until long afterwards—which first seems to have raised the presumption of *medism* against Themistoklēs also, when combined with the corrupt proceedings which stained his public conduct. We must recollect also, that Themistoklēs had given some colour to these presumptions even by the stratagems in reference to Xerxēs, which wore a double-faced aspect, capable of being construed either in a Persian or in a Grecian sense¹. At some period between 476 and 471 a vote of ostracism was resorted to, which ended in the temporary banishment of Themistoklēs.

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, whither he carried a considerable property, yet occasionally visiting other parts of Peloponnesus, when the exposure and death of Pausanias, together with the discovery of his correspondence, took place at Sparta. Among this correspondence were found proofs, which Thukydides seems to have considered as real and sufficient, of the privity of Themistoklēs. By Ephorus and others, he is admitted to have been solicited by Pausanias, and to have known his plans—but to have kept them secret while refusing to coöperate in them². Probably after his exile he took a more decided share in them than before, being well-placed for that purpose at Argos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, but strongly believed to have been in collusion with Xerxēs at his invasion of Greece. On this occasion the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens publicly to prefer a formal charge of treason against him, and to urge the necessity of trying him as a Panhellenic criminal before the synod of the allies assembled at Sparta³.

No sooner was he apprised that joint envoys from Sparta and Athens had been despatched to arrest him, than he fled forthwith from Argos to Korkyra. The inhabitants of that island, though owing gratitude to him and favourably disposed, could not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in Greece, but sent him to the neighbouring continent. Here, however, being still tracked and followed by the envoys, he was obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy—Admētus, king of the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, Admētus was not at home; and Themistoklēs, becoming a suppliant to his wife, conciliated her sympathy so entirely, that she placed her child in his arms and planted him at the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admētus returned, Themistoklēs revealed his name and his danger—entreating

¹ Diodorus (xi. 54) mentions an impeachment of Themistoklēs previous to his ostracism. Grote is inclined to identify this with the *εἰσαγγελία* brought forward by Leobotas, son of Alkmaeon (Plutarch, *Themist.*, c. 23). But (1) this *εἰσαγγελία* might equally well refer to an action carried by default on the occasion of Themistoklēs' ultimate disgrace, especially as this charge was preferred at the instigation of Sparta. (2) The double arraignment of Themistoklēs creates a suspicious parallelism with the twofold recall of Pausanias.

(3) Diodorus makes this first trial a consequence of the disclosures about Pausanias, which only took place when Themistoklēs was at Argos. (4) A charge of medism against a statesman as yet not publicly discredited would betoken extreme rashness on the part of his adversaries.—En.

² Thukyd., i. 135; Ephorus *ap.* [Plutarch], *De Malign. Herodoti*, c. 5, p. 855; Diodor., xi. 54; Plutarch, *Themist.*, c. 23.

³ Diodor., xi. 55.

protection as a helpless suppliant. Admētus raised him up from the hearth with the child in his arms,—an evidence that he accepted the appeal and engaged to protect him—refusing to give him up to the envoys, and at last only sending him away on the expression of his own wish to visit the King of Persia. Two Macedonian guides conducted him across the mountains to Pydna in the Thermaic gulf, where he found a merchant-ship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage on board, neither the master nor the crew knowing his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos¹, at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament. Had he been forced to land there, he would of course have been recognised and seized, but his wonted subtlety did not desert him. Having communicated both his name and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the crew to land, menacing that if by any accident he were discovered, he would bring the master to ruin along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistoklēs: on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large reward. Such promises and threats weighed with the master, who controlled his crew, and forced them to beat about during a day and a night off the coast without seeking to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated and the ship reached Ephesus in safety.

Thus did Themistoklēs, after a series of perils, find himself safe on the Persian side of the Ægean. At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property confiscated. Nevertheless (as frequently happened in cases of confiscation), his friends sent a considerable sum over to him in Asia, together with the money which he had left at Argos, so that he was thus enabled liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment was found to amount to 80 talents according to Theophrastus—to 100 talents, according to Theopompus. In contrast with this large sum, it is melancholy to learn that he had begun his political career with a property not greater than three

¹ The history of the later years of the life of Themistoklēs is beset with difficulties, the full extent of which is not shown in the above account. The last certain date in Themistoklēs' career is 476, when he held the position of *choregus* (Plut., *Them.*, v. 6). Thukydides, whose account of the whole period (i. 135-138) is very meagre, makes two important statements about Themistoklēs. He says (1) that Themistoklēs came to Susa soon after Artaxerxes became king, and (2) that he nearly fell into the hands of the Athenians who were besieging Naxos. Now Artaxerxes became king in 464 (spring), and the siege of Naxos took place perhaps in 469, certainly not later than 467. It would follow from this that Themistoklēs spent either five or three years in Asia Minor before going to Susa, a delay which is quite inexplicable, and which is not even noticed by Thukydides. Plutarch (*Them.*, 25, 26) observed the difficulty. For though the name Naxos appears in his quotation from Thukydides it seems almost certain that this name is a subsequent correction in another hand for Thasos to make the quotation agree with Thukydides (Meyer, *Forsch.*). Moreover, Plutarch adds that Thukydides landed not at Ephesus, but at Kymē in Æolis, which presupposes a delay not off Naxos, but off Thasos.

Now the siege of Thasos lasted from 465 to 463, and, therefore, the difficulty disappears. A less

satisfactory solution is as follows. Stesimbrotus (almost a contemporary) states that Themistoklēs leaving Admetus went to Hiero of Syracuse (d. 467), and thence to Ephesus. (Stes., fr. 2 in *Frag. Hist. Gr.*, ii. p. 54, quoted by Plut., *Them.*, 24.) This would seem to imply that Themistoklēs came not to Artaxerxes but to Xerxes. Fourth-century writers (e.g., Ephorus) agree in substituting Xerxes for Artaxerxes. The romantic propriety of this view renders it suspicious, especially in the writings of fourth-century rhetoricians, and it is safer to accept the account of Thukydides, either substituting Thasos for Naxos, or leaving the interval unexplained. This view is corroborated by Charon of Lampsakus, who, as a native of one of the towns assigned by Artaxerxes as a source of revenue to Themistoklēs and where even in the second century he was remembered with honour, was probably well informed on the point.

All statements found only in minor authorities regarding the last years of Themistoklēs' life are open to doubt. They either conflict with Thukydides, or are demonstrably untrue. Plutarch, Theopompus, and Ephorus are equally untrustworthy, and the *Ath. Pol.* (c. 25, 3) reaches the acme of absurdity in connecting Themistoklēs with Ephialtēs in the attack on the Areopagus, and in an untenable comparison of Themistoklēs and Aristeidēs (c. 23).—ED.

talents¹. The poverty of Aristeidēs at the end of his life presents an impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

According to Thukydidēs, the exile presented himself as a deserter from Greece, and was accepted as such : moreover, he was received as an actual benefactor of the Persian king, and a sufferer from the Greeks on account of such dispositions, in consequence of his communications made to Xerxēs respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the Hellespontine bridge.

No Greek (says Thukydidēs) had ever before attained such a commanding influence and position at the Persian court. His ingenuity was now displayed in laying out schemes for the subjugation of Greece to Persia, which were evidently captivating to the monarch, who rewarded him with a Persian wife and large presents, sending him down to Magnesia on the Mæander not far from the coast of Ionia. The revenues of the district round that town, amounting to the large sum of fifty talents yearly, were assigned to him for bread : those of the neighbouring seaport of Myus, for articles of condiment to his bread, which was always accounted the main nourishment : those of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, for wine. After having visited various parts of Asia², he lived for a certain time at Magnesia, in which place his family joined him from Athens.

How long his residence at Magnesia lasted, we do not know, but seemingly long enough to acquire local estimation and leave mementos behind him. He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five years old, without having taken any step towards the accomplishment of those victorious campaigns which he had promised to Artaxerxes. As against the rumour that his body was secretly buried in Attica, we may affirm with confidence that the inhabitants of Magnesia, when they showed the splendid sepulchral monument erected in honour of Themistoklēs in their own marketplace, were persuaded that his bones were really enclosed within it³.

Aristeidēs died about three or four years after the ostracism of Themistoklēs⁴ ; but respecting the place and manner of his death, there were several contradictions among the authors whom Plutarch had before him. Some affirmed that he perished on foreign service in the Euxine sea ; others, that he died at home, amidst the universal esteem and grief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confined to the single statement of Kraterus, and strenuously rejected by Plutarch, represents Aristeidēs as having been falsely accused before the Athenian judicature and condemned to a fine of fifty minæ, on the allegation of having taken bribes during the assessment of the tribute upon the allies—which fine he was unable to pay, and was therefore obliged to retire to Ionia, where he died. Dismissing this last story, we find nothing certain about his death except one fact—but that fact at the same time the most honourable of all—that he died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave enough to pay funeral expenses—that a sepulchre was provided for him at Phalêrum at

¹ Plutarch, *Themist.*, c. 25.

² Plutarch, *Themistoklēs*, c. 31 ; this statement seems probable enough, though Plutarch rejects it.

³ The cult of Themistoklēs as a deified hero is attested by a coin of Magnesia, on which he (or his statue) is represented with a patera in one hand (Rhousopoulos, *Ath. Myth.*, xxi., 1896, p. 22). A slain sacrificial bull at his feet possibly gave rise

to the legend (Aristoph., *Eq.* 83, followed by Diod., xi. 58, and Plut., *Them.*, 31) that he killed himself by drinking bull's blood. The memorial mentioned in Thukydidēs (i. 138) is conceivably preserved to us in the wrongly-restored "heroic king" in Munich.—Ed.

⁴ Respecting the probity of Aristeidēs, see an interesting fragment of Eupolis the comic writer (*Δῖνοι*, *Fragm.*, iv., p. 457, ed. Meineke).

the public cost, besides a handsome donation to his son Lysimachus and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the two or three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued poor, and even at that remote day some of them received aid out of the public purse, from the recollection of their incorruptible ancestor. On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Aristeidēs with Themistoklēs. The latter, having distinguished himself by ostentatious cost at Olympia, and by a choregic victory at Athens, with little scruple as to the means of acquisition—ended his life at Magnesia in dishonourable affluence greater than ever, and left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant the Athenian Themistoklēs attended the lectures of the philosopher Ammonius at Athens, as the comrade and friend of Plutarch himself¹.

CHAPTER XV [XLV]

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD—FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

I HAVE already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from the Spartan Pausanias, entreated Athens to organize a new confederacy, and to act as presiding city, and how this confederacy, framed not only for common and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal rights and constant control on the part of the members, attracted soon the spontaneous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, insular or maritime, near the Ægean sea.

Thukydidēs marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the character of the new confederacy during the first years after its commencement. But unhappily he gives us scarcely any particular facts; and in the absence of such controlling evidence, a habit has grown up of describing loosely the entire period between 477 B.C. and 405 B.C. (the latter date is that of the battle of Ægos-potami) as constituting 'the Athenian empire'. This word denotes correctly enough the last part, perhaps the last forty years, of the seventy-two years indicated; but it is misleading when applied to the first part, nor indeed can any single word be found which faithfully characterizes as well the one part as the other. A great and serious change had taken place, and we disguise the fact of that change if we talk of the Athenian hegemony or headship as a portion of the Athenian empire. Thukydidēs carefully distinguishes the two, speaking of the Spartans as having lost, and of the Athenians as having acquired, not empire, but headship or hegemony².

¹ Plutarch, *Themist.*, c. 5-32.

² Thukyd., i. 94. ἐξεπολιόρκησαν (Βυζάντιον) ἐν τῇδε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ—i.e., under the Spartan hegemony, before the Athenians were invited to assume the hegemony: compare ἡγούμενοι, i. 77, and Herodot., viii. 2, 3. Next we have (i. 95) φοιτῶντες τε (the Ionians, etc.) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡσιῶν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἐγγυγενές. Again, when the Spartans send out Dorkis in place of Pausanias, the allies οὐκ ἐτίθεισαν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. Then, as to the ensuing proceedings of the Athenians (i. 96)—παρὰ λαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκόντων τῶν συμμάχων διὰ τὸ Πανστανίου

μίσος, etc.: compare i. 75—ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν συμμάχων καὶ αὐτὸν δεσφέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστήναι, and vi. 76.

Then the transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή (i. 97)—ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν συμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνοδῶν βουλευόντων, τόσῳδε ἐπ' ἡλθον πολέμῳ τε καὶ διαχείρισει πραγμάτων μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ.

Thukydidēs then goes on to say that he shall notice these 'many strides in advance'—which Athens made, starting from her original hegemony, so as to show in what manner the Athenian empire or ἀρχή was originally formed—ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς

The Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to affirm that their empire had been of this same character ever since the repulse of the Persians—an inaccuracy so manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the Athenian Euphêmus at Kamarina in 415 B.C. to have been heard by Themistoklês or Aristeidês fifty years before, it would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the one and to the justice of the other.

The imperial condition of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her allies (except Chios and Lesbos) were tributary subjects, and when the Ægean sea was an Athenian lake, was of course the period of her greatest splendour and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period most impressive to historians, orators, and philosophers—suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion over the Ægean, as the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta, and even bringing up by association into men's fancies the mythical Minos of Crete, and others, as having been rulers of the Ægean in times anterior to Athens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good accounts of the incidents between 479-450 B.C. For we may gather from the intimation of Thukydidês, as well as from his barrenness of facts, that while there were chroniclers both for the Persian invasion and for the times before it, no one cared for the times immediately succeeding. Hence, the little light which has fallen upon this blank has mostly been borrowed (if we except the careful Thukydidês) from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire. Credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian war downwards at results, which perhaps Themistoklês¹ may have partially divined, but which only time and successive accidents opened even to distant view. But such systematic anticipation of subsequent results is fatal to any correct understanding, either of the real agents or of the real period. When Aristeidês and Kimon dismissed the Lacedæmonian admiral Dorkis, and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second arrival, they had to deal with the problem immediately before them. They had to complete the defeat of the Persian power, still formidable—and to create and organize a confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough to occupy their attention, without ascribing to them distant views of Athenian maritime empire.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the Peloponnesian war, which Thukydidês introduces as a digression from his narrative, he neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete enumeration of all which actually occurred. During the interval between the first desertion of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, in 477 B.C.—and the revolt of Naxos² in 466 B.C.—

ἀρχῆς ἀπέδειξεν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐν οἷς τροπῇ κατέστη. The same transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή is described in the oration of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war (i. 75).

It is to be recollected that the word *hegemony* or *headship* is extremely general, denoting any case of following a leader, and of obedience, however temporary, qualified, or indeed little more than honorary.

The words ἀρχή, ἀρχεῖν, ἀρχεσθαι, *voc. pass.*, are more specific in their application, and imply both superior dignity and coercive authority to a

greater or less extent: compare Thukyd., v. 69; ii. 8, etc. The πόλις ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα is analogous to ἀνὴρ τύραννος (vi. 85).

¹ Thukyd., i. 93.

² Speaking of the siege later on (p. 291) Grote speaks of it as 'two years or more' after the recovery of the bones of Theseus (469). Even on this showing the date of the revolt of Naxos need not be fixed later than 467. There are good reasons for fixing it in 469, for the island must have been subdued at least one campaign before that of the Eurymedon.—Ed.

he recites three incidents only : first, the siege and capture of Eion on the Strymon with its Persian garrison—next, the capture of Skyros, and appropriation of the island to Athenian *kleruchs* or out-citizens—thirdly, the war with Karystus in Eubœa, and reduction of the place by capitulation. It has been too much the practice to reason as if these three events were the full history of ten or eleven years. Considering what Thukydîdês states respecting the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that they were all which he could learn about it on good authority : and they are all, in truth, events having a near and special bearing on the subsequent history of Athens herself—for Eion was the first stepping-stone to the important settlement of Amphipolis, and Skyros in the time of Thukydîdês was the property of outlying Athenian citizens or *kleruchs*. Still, we are left in almost entire ignorance of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the newly-established confederate force : for it is certain that the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have been years of most active warfare against the Persians. One positive testimony to this effect has been accidentally preserved to us by Herodotus [i. 106, 107], who mentions that ‘before the invasion of Xerxês, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont, all of whom were conquered by the Greeks after that invasion, with the single exception of Maskamês, governor of Doriskus, who could never be taken, though many different Grecian attempts were made upon the fortress’.

Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made any defence sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxês, except Bogês, governor of Eion. Bogês, after bravely defending himself, and refusing offers of capitulation, found his provisions exhausted, and farther resistance impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral pile—slew his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast them into it—threw his precious effects over the wall into the Strymon—and lastly, precipitated himself into the flames. His brave despair was the theme of warm encomium among the Persians, and his relatives in Persia were liberally rewarded by Xerxês. This capture of Eion, effected by Kimon, has been mentioned (as already stated) by Thukydîdês ; but Herodotus here gives us to understand that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed by Thukydîdês, against the Persians. Nay, it would seem from his language that Maskamês maintained himself in Doriskus during the whole reign of Xerxês, and perhaps longer, repelling successive Grecian assaults.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus would be of itself a sufficient proof that the first years of the Athenian hegemony were full of busy and successful hostility against the Persians. The battles of Salamis, Plataea, and Mykalê, drove the Persians out of Greece, but did not remove them at once from all the various posts which they occupied throughout the Ægean and Thrace. Without doubt the Athenians had to clear the coasts and the islands of a great number of different Persian detachments—an operation neither short nor easy, with the then imperfect means of siege, as we may see by the cases of Sestus and Eion, nor indeed always practicable, as the case of Doriskus teaches us. It was by these years of active operations at sea against the common enemy, that the Athenians first established that constant, systematic, and laborious training, among their own ships’ crews, which transmitted itself with continual

improvements down to the Peloponnesian war. It was by these, combined with present fear, that they were enabled to organize the largest and most efficient confederacy ever known among Greeks—to bring together deliberative deputies—to plant their own ascendancy as enforcers of the collective resolutions—and to raise a prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was by the same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to remove present alarm, that they at length fatigued the more lukewarm and passive members of the confederacy, and created in them a wish either to commute personal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape from the obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical training would never have been acquired—the confederacy would never have become a working reality—the fatigue and discontents among its members would never have arisen—unless there had been a real fear of the Persians, and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organized operations against them, during the ten years between 477 and 466 B.C.

We must recollect that this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy of each member, both conferring definite rights, and imposing definite obligations. Solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristeidēs on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the members in perpetuity—marked even in the form of the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lumps of iron into the sea never again to be seen¹. As this confederacy was thus both perpetual and peremptory, binding each member to the rest and not allowing either retirement or evasion, so it was essential that it should be sustained by some determining authority and enforcing sanction. The determining authority was provided by the synod at Delos: the enforcing sanction was exercised by Athens as president. She exacted from every member the regulated quota of men or money, employing coercion against recusants, and visiting neglect of military duty with penalties. In all these requirements she only discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of the confederacy. There can be no reasonable doubt that the general synod went cordially along with her² in strictness of dealing towards those defaulters who obtained protection without bearing their share of the burthen.

But after a few years, several of the confederates, becoming weary of personal military service, prevailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and men in their place, and imposed upon themselves in exchange a money payment of suitable amount. This commutation, at first probably introduced to meet some special case of inconvenience, was found so suitable to the taste of all parties, that it gradually spread through the larger portion of the confederacy. To unwarlike allies, hating labour and privation, it was a welcome relief, while to the Athenians, full of ardour, and patient of labour as well as discipline for the aggrandizement of their country, it afforded constant pay for a fleet more numerous than they could otherwise have kept afloat. It is plain from the statement of Thukydidēs that this altered practice was introduced from the petition of the confederates themselves, not from any pressure or stratagem on the part of Athens. But though such was its real source, it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extinguish the

¹ Plutarch, *Aristeidēs*, c. 24.

² Such concurrence of the general synod is in fact implied in the speech put by Thukydidēs into

the mouth of the Mitylenæan envoys at Olympia, in the third year of the Peloponnesian war (Thukyd., iii. 11).

original feeling of equal rights and partnership in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as of glory, which had once bound them together. The Athenians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as they thought expedient—but whom they were also bound to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous resolves of Athens¹ were less and less paralysed by the contentions and irregularity of a synod: so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther removed.

Under such circumstances, several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute, and averse to continuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede, but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, repressed their attempts one after the other—conquering, fining, and disarming the revolvers, which was the more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years—the number of mere tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolvers continually increasing—so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy. The allies slid unconsciously into subjects, while Athens, without any pre-determined plan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing coercion against revolvers, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power—and that too without any guilt of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined. It would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practised by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendancy as well as a lucrative revenue. Least of all was such an idea likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendancy was both passion and patriotism².

There were two other causes, besides that which has been just adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the

¹ See the contemptuous remarks of Periklēs upon the debates of the Lacedæmonian allies at Sparta (Thukyd., i. 141).

² The speech of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, a little before the Peloponnesian war, sets forth the growth of the Athenian empire, in the main, with perfect justice (Thukyd., i. 75, 76). He admits and even exaggerates its unpopularity, but shows that such unpopularity was, to a great extent and

certainly as to its first origin, unavoidable as well as undeserved. He, of course, as might be supposed, omits those other proceedings by which Athens had herself aggravated it.

The whole speech well merits attentive study: compare also the speech of Periklēs at Athens, in the second year of the Peloponnesian war (Thukyd., ii. 63).

general instinct of the Greek mind, tending towards separate political autonomy of each city—as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synod of Delos on its first large and equal basis. Next—and this is the great cause of all—Athens, having defeated the Persians and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain from success—and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head the subject-allies had great reason to complain, throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek for the purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance.

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal effort, which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money-payment as a substitute for military service, also induced them to neglect attendance at the synod. But we do not know the steps whereby this assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form and vanished. Nothing, however, can more forcibly illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of Athens and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta than the fact that while the former shrank from personal service and thought it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it, the latter were 'ready enough with their bodies', but uncomplying and impracticable as to contributions¹. The contempt felt by these Dorian landmen for the military efficiency of the Ionians recurs frequently, and appears even to exceed what the reality justified. To appreciate fully the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the patient endurance of laborious maritime training, which characterized the Athenians of that day, we have only to contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amidst such glaring inequalities of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible. It was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transmuted into an Athenian empire.

Without some such preliminary statements as those just given, the reader would hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which our authorities enable us to recount—events unhappily few in number, though the period must have been full of action, and not well-authenticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity (whether the first absolutely or not we cannot determine) between 476 B.C. and 466 B.C. was the conquest of the important post of Eion on the Strymon. The next events named are their enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros (seemingly about 470 B.C.) and the Dryopes in the town and district of Karystus in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously dealt with and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and had little to recommend it except a good maritime position and an excellent harbour; while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lemnos prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were piratical and cruel. Some Thessalian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphictyonic synod, which con-

¹ Thukyd., i. 141.

demned the island to make restitution. The mass of the islanders threw the burden upon those who had committed the crime: and these men, in order to evade payment, invoked Kimon with the Athenian armament. He conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens as guardian of the Ægean sea against piracy: but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lemnos (which the Athenians had doubtless re-occupied after the expulsion of the Persians), and became, as well as Lemnos, a recognised adjunct or outlying portion of Attica. Moreover, there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus, whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar favour at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 476 B.C., that the oracle had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city. They had tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of the Dolopians had prevented a search, and it was only after Kimon had taken the island that he found, or pretended to find, the body. It was brought to Athens in the year 469 B.C.¹, and after being welcomed by the people in solemn and joyous procession, as if the hero himself had come back, was deposited in the interior of the city.

It was about two years or more after this incident that the first breach of union in the Confederacy of Delos took place. The important island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades, revolted, on what special ground we do not know, but probably the greater islands fancied themselves better able to dispense with the protection of the confederacy than the smaller—at the same time that they were more jealous of Athens. After a siege of unknown duration, by Athens and the confederate force, it was forced to surrender, and reduced to the condition of a tributary subject, its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed. Whether any fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have no information.

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful island, however untoward in its effects upon the equal and self-maintained character of the confederacy, strengthened its military force by placing the whole Naxian fleet with new pecuniary contributions in the hands of the chief. Nor is it surprising to hear that Athens sought both to employ this new force, and to obliterate the late act of severity, by increased exertions against the common enemy. Though we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on; but the expedition under Kimon, undertaken not long after the Naxian revolt, was attended with memorable results. That

¹ Clinton (*Fasti Hellenic.*, ad ann. 476 B.C.) places the conquest of Skyros by Kimon in the year 476 B.C.

Plutarch states that the oracle was given in (476 B.C.) the year of the archon Phadon; and that the body of Theseus was brought back to Athens in (469 B.C.) the year of the archon Apepsion. There is nothing to contradict either statement; nor do the passages of Thukydides and Diodorus, which Clinton adduces, prove that which he asserts.

The two passages of Diodorus have indeed no bearing upon the event, and in so far as Diodorus is in this case an authority at all, he goes against Clinton, for he states Skyros to have been conquered in 470 B.C. (Diodor., xi. 60). Thukydides only tells us that the operations against Eion, Skyros, and Karystus, took place in the order here indicated, and at some periods between 476 and 466 B.C., but he does not enable us to determine positively the date of either.

commander, having under him 200 triremes from Athens, and 100 from the various confederates, was despatched to attack the Persians on the south-western and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from various Grecian settlements, both in Karia and in Lykia: among others, the important trading city of Phaselis, though at first resisting and even standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians in Kimon's armament to pay a contribution of ten talents and join in the expedition. From the length of time occupied in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, under the command of Tithraustês and Pherendatês, both of the regal blood. The fleet, chiefly Phenician, seems to have consisted of 200 ships, but a farther reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships was expected, and was actually near at hand, so that the commanders were unwilling to hazard a battle before its arrival. Kimon attacked them vigorously. Partly from their inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. They were put to flight and driven ashore so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Kimon was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Kimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription on the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the tithe of the spoils¹. The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

It has been already stated that the Athenians had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the important post of Eion on the

¹ For the battles of the Eurymedon, see Thukyd., i. 200; Diodor., xi. 60-62; Plutarch, *Kimon*, 12, 13. The accounts of the two latter appear chiefly derived from Ephorus and Kallisthenês, authors of the following century, and from Phanodemus, an author later still. I borrow sparingly from them, and only so far as consists with the brief statement of Thukydides. The narrative of Diodorus is exceedingly confused, indeed hardly intelligible.

Phanodemus stated the number of the Persian fleet at six hundred ships; Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty. Diodorus (following the latter) gives three hundred and forty. Plutarch mentions the expected reinforcement of eighty Phenician ships; which appears to me a very credible circumstance, explaining the easy nautical victory of Kimon at the Eurymedon. From Thukydides we know that the vanquished fleet at the Eurymedon consisted of no more than two hundred ships. For so I venture to construe the words of Thukydides, in spite of the authority of Dr. Arnold—*Kai*

είλον (Ἀθηναῖοι) τριήρεις Φοινίκων καὶ διέβησαν τὰς πᾶσας ἐς (τὰς) διακοσίας. Upon which Dr. Arnold observes: 'Amounting in all to two hundred; that is, that the whole number of ships taken or destroyed was two hundred—not that the whole fleet consisted of no more.' Admitting the correctness of this construction (which may be defended by viii. 21), we may remark that the defeated Phenician fleet, according to the universal practice of antiquity, ran ashore to seek protection from its accompanying land-force. When, therefore, this land-force was itself defeated and dispersed, the ships would *all* naturally fall into the power of the victors; or if any escaped, it would be merely by accident. Moreover, the smaller number is in this case more likely to be the truth, as we must suppose an easy naval victory, in order to leave strength for a strenuous land battle on the same day.

[For an exhaustive discussion of the ancient authorities, see E. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, vol. ii, pp. 1-88.—Ed.]

Strymon, the most convenient post for the neighbouring region of Thrace, which was not less distinguished for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edonian Thracians; and it is extremely probable that many private settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring grants, or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæus. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip of land, with various dependent towns on the continent of Thrace, and derived a large revenue from the mines of Skaptê Hylê, as well as from others in the neighbourhood. The condition of Thasos at this time (about 465 B.C.) indicates to us the progress which the Grecian states in the Ægean had made since their liberation from Persia. It had been deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime force, by order of Darius, about 491 B.C., and must have remained in this condition until after the repulse of Xerxês; but we now find it well-fortified and possessing a powerful maritime force.

In what precise manner the quarrel between the Thasians and the Athenians of Eion manifested itself, respecting the trade and the mines in Thrace, we are not informed. But it reached such a height that the Athenians were induced to send a powerful armament against the island, under the command of Kimon. Having vanquished the Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various battles, and blocked up the city by land as well as by sea. And at the same time they undertook—what seems to have been part and parcel of the same scheme—the establishment of a larger and more powerful colony on Thracian ground not far from Eion. On the Strymon, about three miles higher up than Eion, near the spot where the river narrows itself again out of a broad expanse of the nature of a lake, was situated the Edonian town or settlement called Ennea Hodoi (Nine Ways), a little above the bridge, which here served as an important communication for all the people of the interior. Both Histiaëus and Aristagoras, the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by the advantages of this place to commence a settlement there: both of them had failed, and a third failure on a still grander scale was now about to be added. The Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists¹, ten thousand in number, partly from their own citizens, partly collected from their allies, the temptations of the site probably rendering volunteers numerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was concerned, they were successful in conquering it and driving away the Edonian possessors. But on trying to extend themselves farther to the eastward, to a spot called Drabêskus convenient for the mining region, they encountered a more formidable resistance from a powerful alliance of Thracian tribes. All or most of the ten thousand colonists were slain in this warfare, and the new colony was for the time completely abandoned.

Disappointed as the Athenians were in this enterprise, they did not abandon the blockade of Thasos, which held out more than two years, and only surrendered in the third year. Its fortifications were razed;

¹ An abortive attempt at colonization in 476, at the time of the capture of Eion, is recorded in

Schol. Æsch., *De Fals. Leg.*, 3r. Cf. Holm., *Greek Hist.*, ii. 128.—Ed.

its ships of war, thirty-three in number, were taken away¹; its possessions and mining establishments on the opposite continent were relinquished. Moreover, an immediate contribution in money was demanded from the inhabitants, over and above the annual payment assessed upon them for the future². The subjugation of this powerful island was another step in the growing dominion of Athens over her confederates.

The year before the Thasians surrendered, however, they had taken a step which deserves particular notice, as indicating the newly-gathering clouds in the Grecian political horizon. They had made secret application to the Lacedæmonians for aid, entreating them to draw off the attention of Athens by invading Attica; and the Lacedæmonians, without the knowledge of Athens, having actually engaged to comply with this request, were only prevented from performing their promise by a grave and terrible misfortune at home³. Though accidentally unperformed, this hostile promise is a most significant event.

We are told by Plutarch, that the Athenians, after the surrender of Thasos and the liberation of the armament, had expected from Kimon some farther conquests in Macedonia, and even that he had actually entered upon that project with such promise of success, that its farther consummation was certain as well as easy. Having under these circumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was accused by Periklês and others of having been bought off by bribes from the Macedonian king Alexander, but was acquitted after a public trial⁴.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central Greece during the twelve or fifteen years immediately succeeding the battle of Plataea, we have scarcely any information. At the meeting of the Amphiktyonic synod which succeeded the expulsion of the invaders, it was proposed by Lacedæmon that all the *medizing* Greeks should be expelled from the synod⁵—a proposition which the more long-sighted views of Themistoklês successfully resisted. Even the stronger measure of razing the fortifications of all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, from fear that they might be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested itself to the Lacedæmonians—as we see from their language on the occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens. In regard to Bœotia, it appears that the headship of Thebes as well as the coherence of the federation was for the time almost suspended. The destroyed towns of Plataea and Thespiæ were restored, and the latter in part repopled, under Athenian influence. The general sentiment of Peloponnesus as well as of Athens would have sustained these towns against Thebes, if the latter had tried at that time to enforce her supremacy over them in the name of ancient Bœotiân right and usage.

During the twenty years after the formation of the Delian League, we

¹ Plutarch, *Kimôn*, c. 14.

² This assessment at first was exceedingly light. In 449 (C.I.A., i. 231) the total is only about 2½ talents; from 445 onwards (C.I.A., i. 235, 242) the normal amount is 30 talents—a sum only equalled by Ægina. These fluctuations may indicate that the reduction of Thasos was followed by a confiscation of its valuable land-possession, which were subsequently restored; or else the Athenians lowered the tribute pending the payment of the war contribution.—Ed.

³ Thukyd., i. 101: οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχεοντο μὲν κρύφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἔμελλον, διεκκληύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γενομένου σκίσματος.

[This Spartan promise, as recorded by Thuky-

dides, was of a very half-hearted character. We may suspect that it was not seriously meant, but was intended merely to amuse the envoys and spare their feelings without committing an unfriendly act against Athens. At no period of the earlier fifth century do we find the Spartans genuinely eager to make war upon Athens, whose mission as champion of Greece against the Persian peril seems to have been respected by her former ally till a much later period.—Ed.]

⁴ Plutarch, *Kimôn*, c. 14. [Kimon's acquittal on this charge is important in view of his subsequent ostracism and its date (see p. 319, n. 3 below).—Ed.]

⁵ Plutarch, *Themistoklês*, c. 20.

know that Sparta had had more than one battle to sustain in Arcadia¹ against the towns and villages of that country, in which she came forth victorious: but we have no particulars respecting these incidents. We know also that a few years after the Persian invasion, the inhabitants of Elis concentrated themselves from many dispersed townships into the one main city of Elis²: and it seems probable that Lepreum in Triphylia, and one or two of the towns of Achaia, were either formed or enlarged by a similar process near about the same time³. Such aggregation of towns out of pre-existing separate villages was not conformable to the views nor favourable to the ascendancy of Lacedæmon. But there can be little doubt that her foreign policy after the Persian invasion was both embarrassed and discredited by the misconduct of her two contemporary kings, Pausanias (who though only regent was practically equivalent to a king) and Leotyichidēs—not to mention the rapid development of Athens and Peiræus.

Moreover, in the year B.C. 464, a misfortune of yet more terrific moment befel Sparta. A violent earthquake took place in the immediate neighbourhood of Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of the town, and a vast number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was the judgment of the earth-shaking god Poseidon (according to the view of the Lacedæmonians themselves) for a recent violation of his sanctuary at Tænarus, from whence certain suppliant Helots had been dragged away not long before for punishment⁴, not improbably some of those Helots whom Pausanias had instigated to revolt. The sentiment of the Helots, at all times one of enmity towards their masters, appears at this moment to have been unusually inflammable: so that an earthquake at Sparta, especially an earthquake construed as divine vengeance for Helot blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of them at once into revolt, together with some even of the Periœki. The insurgents took arms and marched directly upon Sparta, which they were on the point of mastering during the first moments of consternation, had not the bravery and presence of mind of the young king Archidamus reanimated the surviving citizens and repelled the attack. But, though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued. They maintained the field against the Spartan force, sometimes with considerable advantage, since Aemnêstus (the warrior by whose hand Mardonius had fallen at Platæa) was defeated and slain with 300 followers in the plain of Stenyklêrus, overpowered by superior numbers⁵. When at length defeated, they occupied and fortified the memorable hill of Ithômê, the ancient citadel of their Messenian forefathers. Here they made a long and obstinate defence, supporting themselves doubtless by incursions throughout Laconia. Defence indeed was

¹ The history of Spartan military operations in the Peloponnese between 469 and the Helot rising is obscure. From Herodotus (ix. 35) we learn of two great battles—Tegea and Dipæa. Assuming that the battle of Tegea was subsequent to the flight of Leotyichides (otherwise he would not have sought safety there), we must suppose that it took place not later than 468, and Dipæa in 468-467. The Argives who fought at Tegea were not present at Dipæa in 468-467, where all the Arcadians, save the Mantineans, fought: they were engaged in their final destruction of Mykênæ. After Dipæa the Spartans were able to set up philo-Laconian oligarchs in Arcadia, and Argive pretensions to a Peloponnesian hegemony were again frustrated.

The Stoa Poikilê, painted about this time, has on one side-piece the 'battle of Oinôê' as a pendant to Marathon. Perhaps this was painted in the first joy of a victory gained in conjunction with the Argives in the Mykênæ campaign (cf. Robert, *Hermes*, xxv., 1896, pp. 412 ff.) Hicks and Hill No. 31 = C.I.G. 29) mention an Argive offering of a Corinthian helmet at Olympia; the epigraphy points to the period under discussion.

For the destruction of Mykênæ, see also p. 297, and note.—Ed.

² Diodor., xi. 54; Strabo, viii., p. 337.

³ Strabo, viii., pp. 337, 348, 356.

⁴ Thukyd., i. 101-128; Diodor., xi. 62.

⁵ Herodot., ix. 64.

not difficult, seeing that the Lacedæmonians were at that time confessedly incapable of assailing even the most imperfect species of fortification. After the siege had lasted some two or three years, without any prospect of success, the Lacedæmonians, beginning to despair of their own sufficiency for the undertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies, among whom we find specified the Æginetans, the Athenians, and the Platæans¹. The Athenian troops are said to have consisted of 4,000 men, under the command of Kimon, Athens being still included in the list of Lacedæmonian allies.

So imperfect were the means of attacking walls at that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, that this increased force made no immediate impression on the fortified hill of Ithômê. And when the Lacedæmonians saw that their Athenian allies were not more successful than they had been themselves, they soon passed from surprise into doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops had given no ground for such a feeling, while Kimon their general was notorious for his attachment to Sparta. Yet the Lacedæmonians could not help suspecting the ever-wakeful energy and ambition of these Ionic strangers whom they had introduced into the interior of Laconia. They, therefore, dismissed the Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretence of having no farther occasion for them, while all the other allies were retained, and the siege or blockade went on as before.

This dismissal, ungracious in the extreme, and probably rendered even more offensive by the habitual roughness of Spartan dealing, excited the strongest exasperation both among the Athenian soldiers and the Athenian people — an exasperation heightened by circumstances immediately preceding. For the resolution to send auxiliaries into Laconia, when the Lacedæmonians first applied for them, had not been taken without considerable debate at Athens. The party of Periklês and Ephialtês, habitually in opposition to Kimon, and partisans of the forward democratical movement, had strongly discountenanced it, and conjured their countrymen not to assist in renovating and strengthening their most formidable rival. Perhaps the previous engagement of the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica on behalf of the Thasians may have become known to them, though not so formally as to exclude denial. And even supposing this engagement to have remained unknown at that time to everyone, there were not wanting other grounds to render the policy of refusal plausible. But Kimon employed all his credit and influence in seconding the application. The maintenance of alliance with Sparta on equal footing—peace among the great powers of Greece and common war against Persia—together with the prevention of all farther democratical changes in Athens—were the leading points of his political creed.

¹ Thukyd., i. 102; iii. 54; iv. 57.

Clinton (*Fast. Hellen.*, ann. 464-461 B.C.) following Plutarch, recognises two Lacedæmonian requests to Athens, and two Athenian expeditions to the aid of the Spartans, both under Kimon; the first in 464 B.C., immediately on the happening of the earthquake and consequent revolt—the second in 461 B.C., after the war had lasted some time.

In my judgment, there is no ground for supposing more than one application made to Athens, and one expedition. The duplication has arisen from Plutarch, who has construed too much as historical reality the comic exaggeration of Aristophanês (Aristoph., *Lysistrat.*, 1138)—'Your envoy Peri-

kleidas came to Athens, pale with terror, while Poseidon was still shaking the earth and the Mesenians were pressing you hard: then Kimon with 4,000 hoplites went and achieved your complete salvation.'

We know that the earthquake took place at the time when the siege of Thasos was yet going on, because it was the reason which prevented the Lacedæmonians from aiding the besieged by an invasion of Attica. But Kimon commanded at the siege of Thasos (Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 14), accordingly he could not have gone as commander to Laconia at the time when this first expedition is alleged to have been undertaken.

As yet, both his personal and political ascendancy were predominant over his opponents. As yet, there was no manifest conflict, which had only just begun to show itself in the case of Thasos, between the maritime power of Athens and the union of land-force under Sparta: and Kimon could still treat both of these phænomena as coexisting necessities of Hellenic well-being. Though noway distinguished as a speaker, he carried with him the Athenian assembly by appealing to a large and generous patriotism, which forbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta. 'Consent not to see Hellas lamed of one leg and Athens drawing without her yoke-fellow'¹—such was his language, as we learn from his friend and companion the Chian poet Ion: and in the lips of Kimon it proved effective.

Both in the internal constitution, indeed (of which more presently), and in the external policy, of Athens, the dismissal of these soldiers was pregnant with results. The Athenians immediately passed a formal resolution to renounce the alliance between themselves and Lacedæmon against the Persians. They did more: they looked out for land-enemies of Lacedæmon, with whom to ally themselves.

Of these by far the first, both in Hellenic rank and in real power, was Argos. That city, neutral during the Persian invasion, had now recovered the effects of the destructive defeat suffered about thirty years before from the Spartan king Kleomenês. The sons of the ancient citizens had grown to manhood, and the temporary predominance of the Periœki, acquired in consequence of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had been again put down. In the neighbourhood of Argos, and dependent upon it, were situated Mykenæ, Tiryns, and Mideæ—small in power and importance, but rich in mythical renown. Disdaining the inglorious example of Argos at the period of danger, these towns had furnished contingents both to Thermopylæ and Plataea, which their powerful neighbour had been unable either to prevent at the time or to avenge afterwards, from fear of the intervention of Lacedæmon. But so soon as the latter was seen to be endangered and occupied at home, the Argeians availed themselves of the opportunity to attack not only Mykenæ and Tiryns, but also Orneæ, Mideæ, and other semi-dependent towns around them. Several of these were reduced, and the inhabitants, robbed of their autonomy, were incorporated with the domain of Argos; but the Mykenæans, partly from the superior gallantry of their resistance, partly from jealousy of their mythical renown, were either sold as slaves or driven into banishment². Through these victories Argos was now more powerful than ever, and the propositions of alliance made to her by Athens, while strengthening both the two against Lacedæmon, opened to her a

¹ Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 16.

² Diodor., xi. 65; Strabo, viii., p. 372; Pausan., ii. 16, 17, 25. Diodorus places this incident in 468 B.C.

[In this passage it is recorded that Sparta was unable to prevent the Argives, but no mention is made of the earthquake of 464. Strabo (viii. 377) gives no exact date, but states that contingents from Tegea and Kleonæ joined the Argive expedition, which confirms the chronology of Diodorus. Pausanias (ii. 25-28) tells us that Tiryns was likewise depopulated on this occasion.

Mabaffy (*Problems in Greek History*, ch. 5) would place the destruction of these sites and the transplantation of the inhabitants two centuries earlier in the era of Pheidon. His objections to the

fifth-century date are founded (1) on the lack of remains later than the seventh century on the sites, (2) the silence of the Attic dramatists with regard to Mykenæ. But the tragedians belonged to a city allied with Argos (*cf.* *Æsch.*, *Eum.*, 287), and could not officially sympathize with the enemies of Argos, while the negative testimony of archaeological research has repeatedly been proved unsatisfactory.

In addition to the various notices which would lead us to believe that Mykenæ and Tiryns existed in 480 and even later, we may mention the occurrence of an Olympian victor from Tiryns in 468, recorded in *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, ii., p. 85 (No. 222, l. 42). Bury does not question the received date. See also note on p. 295.—ED.]

new chance of recovering her lost headship in Peloponnesus. The Thesalians became members of this new alliance, which was a defensive alliance against Lacedæmon, and hopes were doubtless entertained of drawing in some of the habitual allies of the latter.

The new character which Athens had thus assumed, as a competitor for landed alliances not less than for maritime ascendancy, came opportunely for the protection of the neighbouring town of Megara. It appears that Corinth had been making border encroachments on the one side upon Kleônæ—on the other side upon Megara¹: on which ground the latter obtained permission to enrol herself as an ally of Athens. This was an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians, since it both opened to them the whole range of territory across the outer Isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Krissæan Gulf, on which the Megarian port of Pêgæ was situated—and placed them in possession of the passes of Mount Geraneia, so that they could arrest the march of a Peloponnesian army over the Isthmus, and protect Attica from invasion. It was, moreover, of great importance in its effects on Grecian politics: for it gave deadly offence to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flames of war between them and Athens, their allies the Epidaurians and Æginetans taking their part. Though Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust encroachment against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition and energy had inspired universal awe; while the maritime states in the neighbourhood, such as Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina, saw these terror-striking qualities threatening them at their own doors, through her alliance with Argos and Megara. Moreover, it is probable that the ancient feud between the Athenians and Æginetans, though dormant since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been appeased or forgotten: so that the Æginetans, dwelling within sight of Peiræus, were at once best able to appreciate, and most likely to dread, the enormous maritime power now possessed by Athens. Periklês was wont to call Ægina the eyesore of Peiræus²: but we may be sure that Peiræus, grown into a vast fortified port within the existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the eyesore of Ægina³.

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting the war against Persia, having a fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving in Cyprus and on the Phenician coast. Moreover, the revolt of the Egyptians under Inaros (about 460 B.C.) opened to them new means of action against the Great King. Their fleet, by invitation of the revolters, sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian dominion. Yet in spite of so great an abstraction from their disposable force, their military operations near home were conducted with unabated vigour, and the inscription which remains⁴—a commemoration of their citizens of the Erechtheid tribe who were slain in one and the same year in Cyprus, Egypt, Phenicia, the Halieis, Ægina, and Megara—brings

¹ Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 17.

² Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 8.

³ The chief motive of this war is to be sought in the commercial rivalry between the ports on the Saronic gulf. In the days of Æginetan predominance we find the Corinthians and Athenians joining hands (Herodot., v. 89). The fear of an Athenian trade-monopoly would at this late period suffice to unite the Æginetans and Corinthians.

By securing the territory of Megara the Athenians obtained a base for attacking Corinthian trade with the west as well. This competition between Athens and Corinth for the western trade, which influenced the operations of the succeeding years (*cf.* p. 303 and note), continues to be of the greatest significance in fifth-century politics.—Ed.

⁴ C.I.G. 165; Hicks and Hill, 26.

forcibly before us that energy which astonished and even alarmed their contemporaries.

Their first proceedings at Megara were of a nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It was necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally against the superiority of Peloponnesian land-force, and to ensure a constant communication with it by sea. But the city (like most of the ancient Hellenic towns) was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its port Nisæa by a space of nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two lines of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting the city with Nisæa, so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress, wherein a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant means of succour from Athens in case of need. These 'Long Walls', though afterwards copied in other places and on a larger scale, were at that juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of extending the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Corinth, however, were not directed against Megara. The Athenians, having undertaken a landing in the territory of the Halieis (the population of the southern Argolic peninsula, bordering on Trœzen and Hermionê), were defeated on land by the Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: possibly it may have been in this expedition that they acquired possession of Trœzen, which we find afterwards in their dependence, without knowing when it became so. But in a sea-fight which took place off the island of Kekryphaleia (between Ægina and the Argolic peninsula) the Athenians gained the victory. After this victory and defeat—neither of them apparently very decisive—the Æginetans began to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out their full naval force together with that of their allies—Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians: while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning her allies also; though we do not know the actual numbers on either side. In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Ægina, the superiority of the new nautical tactics acquired by twenty years' practice of the Athenians since the Persian war over the old Hellenic ships and seamen was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive. The maritime power of Ægina was irrecoverably ruined. The Athenians captured seventy ships of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced the siege of the city by land as well as by sea.

The Corinthians and Epidaurians, while they carried to Ægina a reinforcement of 300 hoplites, did their best to aid her farther by an attack upon Megara; which place, it was supposed, the Athenians could not possibly relieve without withdrawing their forces from Ægina, inasmuch as so many of their men were at the same time serving in Egypt. But the Athenians showed themselves equal to all these three exigencies at one and the same time—to the great disappointment of their enemies. Myrônidês marched from Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two extremes of military age, old and young, these being the only troops at home. He fought the Corinthians near the town, gaining a slight, but debateable, advantage, which he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Corinthians had returned home. But the latter, when they arrived at home, were so much reproached by their own old citizens, for

not having vanquished the refuse of the Athenian military force, that they returned back at the end of twelve days and erected a trophy on their side, laying claim to a victory in the past battle. The Athenians, marching out of Megara, attacked them a second time, and gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat; for a body of them, missing their road, became entangled in a space of private ground enclosed on every side by a deep ditch, and having only one narrow entrance. Myrônîdēs, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his hoplites at the entrance to prevent their escape, and then surrounded the enclosure with his light-armed troops, who with their missile weapons slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without possibility either of flight or resistance.

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been during this year, both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee that the power of their enemies might presently be augmented by the Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account—partly also from the more energetic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views of Periklēs, which were now becoming ascendent in the city—the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been first suggested by the recent erection of long walls, though for so much smaller a distance, between Megara and Nisæa: for without such an intermediate stepping-stone, the project of a wall forty stadia (= about $4\frac{1}{2}$ Engl. miles) to join Athens with Peiræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (= nearly 4 Engl. miles) to join it with Phalêrum¹, would have appeared extravagant even to the sanguine temper of Athenians—as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier to Themistoklēs himself. Coming as an immediate sequel of great recent victories, and while Ægina, the great Dorian naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited the utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians—being regarded as the second great stride², at once conspicuous and of lasting effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification of Peiræus.

But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure was also interwoven with the formidable contention of political parties then going on at Athens. Kimon had been recently ostracized, and the democratical movement pressed by Periklēs and Ephialtēs (of which more presently) was in its full tide of success. The long walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Periklēs, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistoklēs when he first schemed the Peiræus. They were framed to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority of landed attack, and of bidding defiance to the united force of Peloponnesus.

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to undertake an expedition out of Peloponnesus, although the Helots in Ithômê were not yet reduced to surrender. Their force consisted of 1,500 troops of their own, and 10,000 of their various allies, under the regent Nikomêdēs. The ostensible motive, or the pretence, for this march, was the protection

¹ For the Long Walls, see E. Gardner, *Ancient Athens*, pp. 56-58, 68-72; and Wachsmuth, *Stadt Athen*, i. 556-559.—ED.

² Καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἰτίαι, τὸ τε πρῶτον ἰάσαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῆναι, καὶ

ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στήσαι τεῖχη—is the language addressed by the Corinthians to the Spartans, in reference to Athens, a little before the Peloponnesian war (Thukyd., i. 69).

of the little territory of Doris against the Phokians, who had recently invaded it and taken one of its three towns. The mere approach of so large a force immediately compelled the Phokians to relinquish their conquest, but it was soon seen that this was only a small part of the objects of Sparta, and that her main purpose, under instigation of the Corinthians, was to arrest the aggrandizement of Athens. It could not escape the penetration of Corinth, that the Athenians might presently either enlist or constrain the towns of Bœotia into their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, in addition to their previous ally Plataea: for the Bœotian federation was at this time much disorganized, and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered her ascendancy since the discredit of her support lent to the Persian invasion. To strengthen Thebes and to render her ascendancy effective over the Bœotian cities, was the best way of providing a neighbour at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, so as to prevent their farther aggrandizement by land: it was the same policy as Epaninondas pursued eighty years afterwards, in organizing Arcadia and Messenê against Sparta. Accordingly the Peloponnesian force was now employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the fortifications of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other Bœotian cities into effective obedience to her supremacy, probably by placing their governments in the hands of citizens of known oligarchical politics¹. To this scheme the Thebans lent themselves with earnestness, promising to keep down for the future their border neighbours, so as to spare the necessity of armies coming from Sparta².

But there was also a farther design, yet more important, in contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. The oligarchical opposition at Athens were so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to Periklēs, and to the democratical movement, that several of them opened a secret negotiation with the Peloponnesian leaders, inviting them into Attica, and entreating their aid in an internal rising for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the Long Walls, but also of subverting the democracy. The Peloponnesian army, while prosecuting its operations in Bœotia, waited in hopes of seeing the Athenian malcontents in arms, and encamped at Tanagra on the very borders of Attica for the purpose of immediate coöperation with them. The juncture was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens, especially as the ostracized Kimon and his remaining friends in the city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. But the Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedæmonian operations in Bœotia, knew also what was meant by the presence of the army on their immediate borders—and took decisive measures to avert the danger. Having obtained a reinforcement of 1,000 Argeians and some Thessalian horse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the full Athenian force then at home; this must of course have consisted chiefly of the old and the young, the same who had fought under Myrônidēs at Megara, for the blockade of Ægina was still going on. Nor was it possible for the Lacedæmonian army to return into Peloponnesus without fighting; for the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in possession of the difficult high lands of Geraneia, the road of march along the isthmus, while the Athenian fleet, by means of the harbour of Pêgæ, was prepared to intercept them if they

¹ Diodor., xii. 81; Justin, iii. 6. Τῆς μὲν τῶν
Θηβαίων πόλεως μείζονα τὸν περίβολον κατασκευύ-

σαν, τὰς δ' ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις ἡνάγκασαν ὑποτάτ-
τεσθαι τοῖς Θηβαίοις.

² Diodor., loc. cit.

tried to come by sea across the Krissæan Gulf, by which way it would appear that they had come out. Near Tanagra a bloody battle took place between the two armies, wherein the Lacedæmonians were victorious, chiefly from the desertion of the Thessalian horse who passed over to them in the very heat of the engagement. But though the advantage was on their side, it was not sufficiently decisive to favour the contemplated rising in Attica. Nor did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it except an undisturbed retreat over the high lands of Geraneia, after having partially ravaged the Megarid¹.

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens. The ostracized Kimon presented himself on the field, as soon as the army had passed over the boundaries of Attica, requesting to be allowed to occupy his station as a hoplite and fight in the ranks of his tribe. But permission was refused, and he was forced to retire. In departing he conjured his personal friends to behave in such a manner as might wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upon theirs. His friends entered the engagement with desperate resolution, and one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Periklēs, on his part, who was present among the hoplites of his own tribe, thought it incumbent upon him to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual recklessness of life and safety, though it happened that he escaped unwounded. All these incidents brought about a spirit of compromise among the contending parties at Athens; while the unshaken patriotism of Kimon and his friends discountenanced and disarmed those conspirators who had entered into correspondence with the enemy. Such was the happy working of this new sentiment that a decree was shortly proposed and carried—proposed too by Periklēs himself—to abridge the ten years of Kimon's ostracism, and permit his immediate return².

So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and unanimity after the battle of Tanagra, that the Athenians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the stain of their defeat. It was on the sixty-second day after the battle that they undertook an aggressive march under Myrōnidēs into Bœotia: the extreme precision of this date—being the single case throughout the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars wherein Thukydides is thus precise—marks how strong an impression it made upon the memory of the Athenians. At the battle of Œenophyta, engaged against the aggregate Theban and Bœotian forces—or, if Diodorus is to be trusted, in two battles, of which that of Œenophyta was the last—Myrōnidēs was completely victorious. The Athēnians became masters of most of the Bœotian towns save Thebes, reversing all the arrangements recently made by Sparta—establishing democratical governments—and forcing the aristocratical leaders, favourable to Theban ascendancy and Lacedæmonian connection, to become exiles³. Nor was it only Bœotia which the Athenians thus acquired: Phokis and Lokris were both suc-

¹ A reason for this Spartan retreat has been sought in the approach of harvest-tide, which was apt to break up a Peloponnesian armament (Thuk., iii. 15; see E. Meyer, *Gesch. des Alterthums*, vol. iii., ch. 6), or in a threatening move by the Argives. It may simply be an instance of Sparta's unwillingness to crush Athens, as in 446 and 404.—Ed.

² As to this point, see note, p. 320 below, where

reasons are given for believing that Kimon was not recalled till 453 or 451.—Ed.

³ The reorganization of Bœotia by the Athenians is illustrated by the coinages of the various cities from 457 to 447: during this interval (as again under the Spartan suzerainty of 387-374) the federal type with the shield of Heraklēs (the 'city arms' of Thebes) is replaced by purely autonomous issues. Cf. Head, *Historia Numorum*.—Ed.

cessively added to the list of their dependent allies—the former being in the main friendly to Athens and not disinclined to the change, while the latter were so decidedly hostile that one hundred of their chiefs were detained and sent to Athens as hostages. The Athenians thus extended their influence—maintained through internal party-management, backed by the dread of interference from without in case of need—from the borders of the Corinthian territory, including both Megara and Pêgæ, to the strait of Thermopylæ¹.

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the completion of the Long Walls and the conquest of Ægina. That island, doubtless starved out by its protracted blockade, was forced to capitulate on condition of destroying its fortifications, surrendering all its ships of war, and submitting to annual tribute² as a dependent ally of Athens. The reduction of this once powerful maritime city marked Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponnesian coast not less than on the Ægean. Her admiral Tolmidês displayed her strength by sailing round Peloponnesus, and burning the Lacedæmonian ports of Methônê and Gythium. He took Chalkis, a possession of the Corinthians, and Naupaktus belonging to the Ozolian Lokrians, near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf³—disembarked troops near Sikyon, with some advantage in a battle against opponents from that town—and either gained or forced into the Athenian alliance not only Zakynthus and Kephallênia, but also some of the towns of Achaia, for we afterwards find these latter attached to Athens without knowing when the connection began⁴. During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack upon Sikyon with a force of 1,000 hoplites under Periklês himself, sailing from the Megarian harbour of Pêgæ in the Krissæan Gulf. This eminent man, however, gained no greater advantage than Tolmidês—defeating the Sikyonian forces in the field and driving them within their walls. He afterwards made an expedition into Akarnania, taking the Achæan allies in addition to his own forces, but miscarried in his attack on Æniadæ and accomplished nothing. Nor were the Athenians more successful in a march undertaken this same year against Thessaly, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of the exiled princes or nobles of Pharsalus. Though they took with them an imposing force, including their Bœotian and Phokian⁵ allies, the powerful Thessalian cavalry forced them to keep in a compact body and confined them to the ground actually occupied by their hoplites, while all their attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of internal rising were disappointed⁶.

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they would have acquired to their alliance nearly the whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece. But even without Thessaly their power was prodigious, and had now attained a maximum height from which it never varied except to decline. As a counterbalancing loss against so many successes, we have to reckon their

¹ Thukyd., i. 108; Diodor., xi. 81, 82.

² We find Ægina assessed at thirty talents (C.I.A. 230, 238), a sum equalled in the case of Thasos only. But besides her commerce Ægina had considerable industrial resources, and would hardly find the assessment excessive.—Ed.

³ The drafting of Lokrians from Opus into Naupaktus, which is recorded in an inscription of about this period (Roehl, *Inscr. Gr. Ant.*, 321; Hicks and Hill, 25) may represent a movement inspired by Corinth, with a view to strengthening

her hold on the gulf. In the Peloponnesian war the Corinthians made strenuous attempts to regain the footing they had lost here in consequence of Tolmidês' expedition.—Ed.

⁴ Thukyd., i. 108-115; Diodor., xi. 84.

⁵ From a fragment of an inscription (C.I.A., iv. 22b) we may infer that an alliance between the Athenians and Phokians was, if not effected, at least projected.—Ed.

⁶ Thukyd., i. 111; Diodor., xi. 85.

ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six years against the Persians (B.C. 460-455). At first they had gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the insurgent prince Inarôs, expelling the Persians from all Memphis except the strongest part called the White Fortress. And such was the alarm of the Persian king Artaxerxes at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that he sent Megabazus with a large sum of money to Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica. This envoy, however, failed, and an augmented Persian force, being sent to Egypt under Megabyzus, drove the Athenians and their allies, after an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of the Nile called Prosôpitis. Here they were blockaded for eighteen months, until at length Megabyzus turned the arm of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to Kyrênê: the rest were either slain or made captive, and Inarôs himself was crucified. And the calamity of Athens was farther aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athenian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it, sailed into the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and thus fell unawares into the power of the Persians and Phenicians; very few either of the ships or men escaped. The whole of Egypt became again subject to the Persians, except Amyrtæus, who contrived by retiring into the inaccessible fens still to maintain his independence. One of the largest armaments ever sent forth by Athens and her confederacy was thus utterly ruined.

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Tolmidês, that the internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians against the Helots or Messenians at Ithômê, ended¹. These besieged men, no longer able to stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced to abandon this last fortress of ancient Messenian independence, stipulating for a safe retreat from Peloponnesus with their wives and families, with the proviso that if any one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus, he should become the slave of the first person who seized him. They were established by Tolmidês at Naupaktus, where they will be found rendering good service to Athens in the following wars.

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedæmonians made no farther expeditions out of Peloponnesus for several succeeding years, not even to prevent Bœotia and Phokis from being absorbed into the Athenian alliance. The reason of this remissness lay, partly, in their general character, partly, in the continuance of the siege of Ithômê, which occupied them at home; but still more, perhaps, in the fact that the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in occupation of the road over the high lands of Geraneia, and could therefore obstruct the march of any army out from Peloponnesus. Even after the surrender of Ithômê, the Lacedæmonians remained inactive for three years, after which time a formal truce was concluded with Athens by the Peloponnesians generally, for five years longer. This truce was concluded in a great degree through the influence of Kimon², who was eager to resume effective operations against the

¹ The reading of Thuk., i. 103, *δενάρω έρει*, has been changed by Krüger (*ad loc.*), followed by Busolt (*Gr. Gesch.*, ii. 475), to *ρεράρω*. The surrender of Ithômê would thus fall in 461, and the settlement of the Messenians at Naupaktus in 460, thus supplying a further motive for the outbreak

of war between Athens and Corinth. But a ten years' blockade on an extensive plateau like Ithômê is not inconceivable, especially in view of the fact that the Spartans knew nothing of siegecraft.—ED.

² Thucopompus, *Fragm.*, 92, ed. Didot; Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 18; Diodor., xi. 86.

Persians ; while it was not less suitable to the political interest of Periklēs that his most distinguished rival should be absent on foreign service¹ so as not to interfere with his influence at home. Accordingly Kimon, having equipped a fleet of 200 triremes from Athens and her confederates, set sail for Cyprus, from whence he despatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still maintaining himself against the Persians amidst the fens—while with the remaining armament he laid siege to Kitium. In the prosecution of this siege, he died either of disease or of a wound. The armament became so embarrassed for want of provisions, that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the Phœnician and Kilikian fleet near Salamis in Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on sea and afterwards on land, though probably not on the same day, as at the Eurymedon ; after this they returned home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aiding Amyrtæus².

From this time forward no farther operations were undertaken by Athens and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King on his part promised two things : To leave free, undisturbed, and untaxed, the Asiatic maritime Greeks, not sending troops within a given distance of the coast : To refrain from sending any ships of war either westward of Phasēlis (others place the boundary at the Chelidonean islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Kyanean rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Euxine. On their side the Athenians agreed to leave him in undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt. Kallias, an Athenian of distinguished family, with some others of his countrymen, went up to Susa to negotiate this convention, and certain envoys from Argos, then in alliance with Athens, took the opportunity of going thither at the same time, to renew the friendly understanding which their city had established with Xerxēs at the period of his invasion of Greece³.

As is generally the case with treaties after hostility, this convention did little more than recognise the existing state of things, without introducing any new advantage or disadvantage on either side, or calling for any measures to be taken in consequence of it. We may hence assign a reasonable ground for the silence of Thukydidēs, who does not even notice the convention as having been made : we are to recollect always that in the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, he does not profess to do more than glance briefly at the main events. But the boastful and inaccurate authors of the ensuing century, orators, rhetors, and historians, indulged in so much exaggeration and untruth respecting this convention, both as to date and as to details—and extolled as some-

¹ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 10, and *Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep.*, p. 812.

² Thukyd., i. 112 ; Diodorus, xii. 13. Diodorus affirms that Kimon lived not only to take Kitium and Mallus, but also to gain these two victories. But the authority of Thukydides, superior on every ground to Diodorus, is more particularly superior as to the death of Kimon, with whom he was connected by relationship.

³ Herodot., vii. 151 ; Diodor., xii. 3, 4. Demosthenēs (*De Falsa Legat.*, c. 77, p. 428 R : compare *De Rhodior. Libert.*, c. 13, p. 199) speaks of this peace as τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θυλλουμένην εἰρήνην. Compare Lykurgus, *Cont. Leokrat.*, c. 17, p. 187 ;

Isokratēs (*Panegy.*, c. 33, 34, p. 244 ; *Areopagit.*, c. 37, pp. 150, 229 ; *Panathenæic.*, c. 20, p. 360).

The loose language of these orators makes it impossible to determine what was the precise limit in respect of vicinity to the coast. Isokratēs is careless enough to talk of the river Halys as the boundary ; Demosthenēs states it as 'a day's course for a horse'.

The two boundaries marked by sea, on the other hand, are both clear and natural, in reference to the Athenian empire—the Kyanean rocks at one end—Phasēlis or the Chelidonean islands (there is no material distance between these two last-mentioned places) on the other.

thing so glorious the fact of having imposed such hard conditions on the Great King — that they have raised a suspicion against themselves. Especially, they have occasioned critics to ask the very natural question, how this splendid achievement of Athens came to be left unnoticed by Thukydides? Now the answer to such question is, that the treaty itself was really of no great moment: it is the state of facts and relations implied in the treaty¹, and existing substantially before it was concluded, which constitutes the real glory of Athens. But to the later writers, the treaty stood forth as the legible evidence of facts which in their time were past and gone: while Thukydides and his contemporaries, living in the actual fulness of the Athenian empire, would certainly not appeal to the treaty as an evidence, and might well pass it over even as an event, when studying to condense the narrative. Though Thukydides has not mentioned the treaty, he says nothing which disproves its reality, and much which is in full harmony with it. For we may show even from him—1. That all open and direct hostilities between Athens and Persia ceased, after the last mentioned victories of the Athenians near Cyprus: that this island is renounced by Athens, not being included by Thukydides in his catalogue of Athenian allies prior to the Peloponnesian war; and that no farther aid is given by Athens to the revolted Amyrtæus in Egypt. 2. That down to the time when the Athenian power was prostrated by the ruinous failure at Syracuse, no tribute was collected by the Persian satraps in Asia Minor from the Greek cities on the coast, nor were Persian ships of war allowed to appear in the waters of the Ægean², nor was the Persian king admitted to be sovereign of the country down to the coast. Granting, therefore, that we were even bound, from the silence of Thukydides, to infer that no treaty was concluded, we should still be obliged also to infer, from his positive averments, that a state of historical fact, such as the treaty acknowledged and prescribed, became actually realized. But when we reflect farther, that Herodotus³ certifies the visit of Kallias and other Athenian envoys to the court of Susa, we can assign no other explanation of such visit so probable as the reality of this treaty. Certainly no envoys would have gone thither during a state of recognised war; and though it may be advanced as possible that they may have gone with the view to conclude a treaty, and yet not have succeeded, this would be straining the limits of possibility beyond what is reasonable⁴.

¹ E. Meyer (*Forschungen*, ii.) interprets the terms of Kallias' peace as a virtual cession of Cyprus and Egypt on the part of Athens to Persia. If such were the real meaning of the agreement the silence of Herodotus and Thukydides is all the more explicable.—E.

² Thukyd., viii. 5, 56.

We learn from these passages two valuable facts. 1. That the maritime Asiatic cities belonging to the Athenian empire paid no tribute to Susa, from the date of the full organization of the Athenian confederacy down to a period after the Athenian defeat in Sicily. 2. That nevertheless these cities always continued, throughout this period, to stand rated in the Persian king's books each for its appropriate tribute, the court of Susa waiting for a convenient moment to occur, when it should be able to enforce its demands, from misfortune accruing to Athens.

Herodotus, after describing the re-arrangement and re-measurement of the territories of the Ionic cities by the satrap Artaphernes (about 493 B.C. after the suppression of the Ionic revolt), proceeds to state that he assessed the tribute of each with

reference to this new measurement, and that the assessment remained unchanged until his own (Herodotus's) time. It is evident by the account of the general Persian revenues, throughout all the satrapies, which we find in the third book of Herodotus, that he had access to official accounts of the Persian finances, or at least to Greek secretaries who knew those accounts.

So much respecting the payment of tribute. As to the other point—that between 477 and 412 B.C. no Persian ships were tolerated along the coast of Ionia, which coast, though claimed by the Persian king, was not recognised by the Greeks as belonging to him—proof will be found in Thukyd., viii. 56: compare Diodor., iv. 26.

³ Herodot., viii. 151. Diodorus also states that this peace was concluded by Kallias the Athenian (xii. 4).

⁴ I conclude, on the whole, in favour of this treaty as an historical fact—though sensible that some of the arguments urged against it are not without force.

If we deny altogether the historical reality of the treaty, we must adopt some such hypothesis as

We may therefore believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens and Persia, improperly called the Kimonian treaty, improperly, since not only was it concluded after the death of Kimon, but the Athenian victories by which it was immediately brought on, were gained after his death. Nay more—the probability is, that if Kimon had lived, it would not have been concluded at all. For his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival Periklēs either as a statesman or as an orator, and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he had earned it—victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians. His death ensured more complete ascendancy to Periklēs, whose policy and character were of a cast altogether opposite¹: while even Thukydides, son of Melēsius, who succeeded Kimon his relation as leader of the anti-Periklean party, was also a man of the [council] and public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. Averse to distant enterprises and precarious acquisitions, Periklēs was only anxious to maintain unimpaired the Hellenic ascendancy of Athens, now at its very maximum. He was well aware that the undivided force and vigilance of Athens would not be too much for this object—nor did they in fact prove sufficient, as we shall presently see. With such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude a peace, which excluded the Persians from all the coasts of Asia Minor westward of the Chelidoneans, as well as from all the waters of the Ægean, under the simple condition of renouncing on the part of Athens farther aggressions against Cyprus, Phenicia, Kilikia, and Egypt. The Great King on his side had had sufficient experience of Athenian energy to fear the consequences of such aggressions. He did not lose much by relinquishing formally a tribute which at the time he could have little hope of realizing, and which of course he intended to resume on the first favourable opportunity. Weighing all these circumstances, we shall find that the peace, improperly called Kimonian, results naturally from the position and feelings of the contracting parties.

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, under the administration of Periklēs, with a great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos, had before this time been transferred to the acropolis at Athens. At what precise time such transfer took place, we cannot state². Nor are we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy, chiefly with the

that of Dahlmann, *Forschungen* (p. 40): 'The distinct mention and averment of such a peace as having been formally concluded, appears to have first arisen among the schools of the rhetors at Athens, shortly after the peace of Antalkidas, and as an oratorical antithesis to oppose to that peace.'

To which we must add the supposition that some persons must have taken the trouble to cause this fabricated peace to be engraved on a pillar, and placed either in the Metróon or somewhere else in Athens among the records of Athenian glories. For that it was so engraved on a column is certain (Theopompus *ap.* Harpokration. Ἀττικοῖς γράμμασι). The suspicion started by Theopompus (and founded on the fact that the peace was engraved, not in ancient Attic, but in Ionic letters—the latter sort having been only legalized in Athens after the archonship of Eukleides), that this treaty was a subsequent invention and not an historical reality, does not weigh with me very

much. Assuming the peace to be real, it would naturally be drawn up and engraved in the character habitually used among the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, since they were the parties most specially interested in it: or it might even have been re-engraved, seeing that nearly a century must have elapsed between the conclusion of the treaty and the time when Theopompus saw the pillar. I confess that the hypothesis of Dahlmann appears to me more improbable than the historical reality of the treaty. I think it more likely that there *was* a treaty, and that the orators talked exaggerated and false matters respecting it—rather than that they fabricated the treaty from the beginning with a deliberate purpose, and with the false name of an envoy conjoined.

¹ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 21-28.

² From the quota list, C.I.A., i. 260, we can fix the date with great probability as 454 B.C., certainly not later. See appendix to ch. 17.—ED.

freewill of its own members, became transformed from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into disarmed and passive tribute-payers defended by the military force of Athens: from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining, into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the change had been made before this time. Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an armed ally into a tributary—every subjugation of a seceder—tended of course to cut down the numbers, and enfeeble the authority, of the Delian synod. And what was still worse, it altered the reciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies—exalting the former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere passive subjects.

Of course the palpable manifestation of the change must have been the transfer of the confederate fund from Delos to Athens. The only circumstance which we know respecting this transfer is, that it was proposed by the Samians¹—the second power in the confederacy, inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favour any job or sinister purpose of the Athenians. When the synod at Delos ceased to be so fully attended as to command respect—when war was lighted up not only with Persia, but with Ægina and Peloponnesus—the Samians might not unnaturally feel that the large accumulated fund, with its constant annual accessions, would be safer at Athens than at Delos, which latter island would require a permanent garrison and squadron to ensure it against attack. But whatever may have been the grounds on which the Samians proceeded, when we find them coming forward to propose the transfer, we may fairly infer that it did not appear unjust to the larger members of the confederacy, and that it was no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is often called, on the part of Athens.

After the conclusion of the war with Ægina, and the consequences of the battle of Ænophyta, the position of Athens became altered more and more. She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly tributary, like Ægina—partly in the same relation as Chios, Lesbos, and Samos; that is, obliged only to a conformity of foreign policy and to military service. In this last category were Megara, the Bœotian cities, the Phokians, Lokrians, etc. All these, though allies of Athens, were strangers to Delos and the confederacy against Persia; and accordingly that confederacy passed insensibly into a matter of history, giving place to the new conception of imperial Athens with her extensive list of allies, partly free, partly subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state in Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta, even in land-power—possessing in her alliance Megara, Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, together with Achæa and Trœzen in Peloponnesus. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the grand cause of progress, threatened still farther increase. Occupying the Megarian harbour of

¹ Plutarch, *Aristeides*, c. 25.

Pêgæ, the Athenians had full means of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian Isthmus : but what was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of the Megarid and of the high lands of Geranea, they could restrain any land-force from marching out of Peloponnesus, and were thus (considering besides their mastery at sea) completely unassailable in Attica.

Looking at the position of Greece therefore about 448 B.C.—after the conclusion of the five years' truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-called Kimonian peace between Persia and Athens—a discerning Greek might well calculate, upon farther aggrandizement of this imperial state as the tendency of the age. And accustomed as every Greek was to the conception of separate town-autonomy as essential to a freeman and a citizen, such prospect could not but inspire aversion. The sympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islanders and ultra-maritime states, who constituted the original confederacy of Athens, was not considerable. But when the Dorian island of Ægina was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a defenceless tributary, they felt the blow sorely on every ground. The ancient celebrity, and eminent service rendered at the battle of Salamis, of this memorable island, had not been able to protect it, while those great Æginetan families, whose victories at the sacred festival-games Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the language of complaint throughout their numerous 'guests' in every Hellenic city. Putting all those circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against the upstart despot-city, whose ascendancy, newly acquired, maintained by superior force, and not recognised as legitimate, threatened nevertheless still farther increase. Sixteen years hence, this same sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian war. But it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have now reached, when Athens was much more formidable than she had come to be at the commencement of that war. We can hardly explain or appreciate the ideas of that later period, unless we take them as handed down from the earlier date of the five years' truce (about 451-446 B.C.).

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to be, however, this widespread feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so that instead of the threatened increase, the empire underwent a most material diminution. This did not arise from the attack of open enemies ; for during the five years' truce, Sparta undertook only one movement, and that not against Attica : she sent troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the Sacred War—expelled the Phokians, who had assumed to themselves the management of the temple—and restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians made no direct opposition, but as soon as the Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed the temple again in the hands of the Phokians, who were then their allies¹. The Delphians were members of the Phokian league, and there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the temple—whether it belonged to them separately or to the Phokians collectively. The favour of those who administered it counted as an element of considerable moment in Grecian politics ; the sympathies of

¹ Thukyd., i. 112 : compare Philochor., *Fragm.*, 88, ed. Didot.

the leading Delphians led them to embrace the side of Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped to counteract this tendency by means of their preponderance in Phokis. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took any ulterior step in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens—a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its greatest exaltation was struck by the subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendancy over Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, and Eubœa, was maintained, not by means of garrisons, but through domestic parties favourable to Athens, and a suitable form of government—just in the same way as Sparta maintained her influence over her Peloponnesian allies. After the victory of Œenophyta, the Athenians had broken up the governments in the Bœotian cities established by Sparta before the battle of Tanagra, and converted them into democracies. Many of the previous leading men had thus been sent into exile, and as the same process had taken place in Phokis and Lokris, there was at this time a considerable aggregate body of exiles, Bœotian, Phokian, Lokrian, Eubœan, Æginetan, etc., bitterly hostile to Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power. We learn farther that the democracy¹ which established itself at Thebes after the battle of Œenophyta failed to maintain control.

These various exiles, all joining their forces and concerting measures with their partisans in the interior, succeeded in mastering Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some other less important places in Bœotia. The Athenian general Tolmidês marched to expel them, with 1,000 Athenian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears that this march was undertaken in haste and rashness. The hoplites of Tolmidês, principally youthful volunteers and belonging to the best families of Athens, disdained the enemy too much to await a larger and more commanding force: nor would the people listen even to Periklês, when he adjured them not to attempt it without greater numbers as well as greater caution². Though Tolmidês was successful in his first enterprise—the recapture of Chæroneia, wherein he placed a garrison—yet, when departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked unawares, near Korôneia, by the united body of exiles and their partisans. No defeat in Grecian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Tolmidês himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed to evacuate Bœotia altogether. In all the cities of that country the exiles were restored, the démocratical government overthrown, and Bœotia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter enemy. Long indeed did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the memory of the Athenians³, and inspire them with an apprehension of Bœotian superiority in heavy armour on land. But if the hoplites under Tolmidês had been all slain on the field, their death would probably have been avenged and Bœotia would not have been lost—whereas in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too great to redeem

¹ Aristotel., *Politic.*, v. 2, 6.

² Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 18; also his comparison between Periklês and Fabius Maximus, c. 3.

Kleinias, father of the celebrated Alkibiadês, was slain in this battle: he had served thirty-three

years before at the sea-fight of Artemisium: he cannot, therefore, be numbered among the youthful warriors though a person of the first rank, (Plutarch, *Alkibiad.*, c. 1).

³ Xenophon., *Memorabil.*, iii. 5, 4.

them. We shall discover hereafter in the Lacedæmonians a feeling very similar, respecting their brethren captured at Sphakteria.

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in thick and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point in Bœotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from Phokis and Lokris, and to carry the flame of revolt into Eubœa. To this important island Periklês himself proceeded forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the reconquest, he was summoned home by news of a still more formidable character. The Megarians had revolted from Athens. By a conspiracy previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Sikyon, and Epidaurus, was already admitted as garrison into their city: the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the long walls had been overpowered and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified port of Nisæa. As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this disaster affected them, by throwing open the road over Geraneia—Pleistoanax king of Sparta was announced as already on his march for an invasion of Attica. He did in truth conduct an army, of mixed Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesian allies, into Attica, as far as the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. He was a very young man, so that a Spartan of mature years, Kleandridês, had been attached to him by the Ephors as adjutant and counsellor. Periklês (it is said) persuaded both the one and the other, by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. On their return the Lacedæmonians found both of them guilty of corruption. Both were banished: Kleandridês never came back, and Pleistoanax himself lived for a long time in sanctuary near the temple of Athênê at Tegea¹.

So soon as the Lacedæmonians had retired from Attica, Periklês returned with his forces to Eubœa, and reconquered the island completely. With that caution which always distinguished him as a military man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of Tolmidês, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty tiremes and 5,000 hoplites. He admitted most of the Eubœan towns to surrender, altering the government of Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called the Hippobotæ². But the inhabitants of Histiaea at the north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchantman and massacred all the crew, were more severely dealt with—the free population being all or in great part expelled, and the land distributed among Athenian kleruchs or out-settled citizens³.

Yet the reconquest of Eubœa was far from restoring Athens to the position which she had occupied before the fatal engagement of Korôneia. Her land-empire was irretrievably gone, together with her recently acquired influence over the Delphian oracle, and she reverted to her former condition of an exclusively maritime potentate. For though she still continued to hold Nisæa and Pêgæ, yet her communication with the

¹ Thukyd., i. 114; v. 16; Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 22.

² On the settlement of Eubœa, see further, C.I.A., iv. (1), 27a, p. 10 (=Hicks and Hill, 40), recording the terms of agreement with Chalkis (cf. also appendix to ch. 17), C.I.A., i. 339 (=Hicks and Hill, 42), which seems to prove a kleruchy at Eretria; and C.I.A., i. 29 which mentions *δικαιοσύνη* at Histiaea. Possibly, however, the Eubœan cities received their settlers on the occasion of Tolmidês' expedition in 447 (Diod., xi. 88; Paus., i. 27, 5).

After the year 445, Eretria and Chalkis, the only Eubœan towns which issued money, had their mints closed till the revolt of 411 (Head, *Hist. Num.*, p. 303-8).

The failure of at least twenty cities to pay tribute in 446 (C.I.A., i. 234) points to the serious danger of dissolution which threatened the League at this crisis (cf. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, ii. 554).—Ed.

³ Thukyd., i. 114; Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 23; Diodor., xii. 7.

latter harbour was now cut off by the loss of Megara and its appertaining territory, so that she thus lost her means of acting in the Corinthian Gulf, and of protecting as well as of constraining her allies in Achaia. Nor was the port of Nisæa of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which it belonged, except as a post for annoying that city.

Moreover, the precarious hold which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects, attempts which would now be seconded by Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an irresistible enemy carrying ruin over the flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens, was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. The late series of misfortunes had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage even Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect of continued war full of gloom and danger. The prudence of Periklēs would doubtless counsel the surrender of their remaining landed possessions or alliances, which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase peace. But we may be sure that nothing short of extreme temporary despondency could have induced the Athenian assembly to listen to such advice, and to accept the inglorious peace which followed. A truce for thirty years was concluded with Sparta and her allies, in the beginning of 445 B.C., whereby Athens surrendered Nisæa, Pêgæ, Achaia, and Trœzen, thus abandoning Peloponnesus altogether¹, and leaving the Megarians (with their full territory and their two ports) to be included among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.

It was to the Megarians, especially, that the altered position of Athens after this truce was owing: it was their secession from Attica and junction with the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica to invasion. Hence arose the deadly hatred on the part of the Athenians towards Megara, manifested during the ensuing years—a sentiment the more natural, as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens a few years before as a protection against the Corinthians, and had then afterwards, without any known ill-usage on the part of Athens, broken off from the alliance and become her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side.

CHAPTER XVI [XLVI]

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES²

THE period which we have now passed over appears to have been that in which the democratical cast of Athenian public life was first brought into its fullest play and development, as to judicature, legislation, and administration.

The great judicial change was made by the methodical distribution of a large proportion of the citizens into distinct judicial divisions, by the great extension of their direct agency in that department, and by the

¹ The truce having been concluded in the beginning of 445 B.C., it seems reasonable to place the revolt of Eubœa and Megara, as well as the invasion of Attica by Pleistoanax, in 446 B.C.—and

the disasters in Boœtia either in the beginning of 446 B.C., or the close of 447 B.C.

² See appendix to this chapter on the supremacy of Periklēs.—Ed.

assignment of a constant pay to every citizen so engaged. It has been already mentioned that even under the democracy of Kleisthenês large powers still remained vested both in the individual archons and in the senate of Areopagus (which latter was composed exclusively of the past archons after their year of office, sitting in it for life), though the check exercised by the general body of citizens, assembled for law-making in the Ekklesia and for judging in the Heliaea, was at the same time materially increased. We must farther recollect, that the distinction between powers administrative and judicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate governments of modern Europe since the political speculations of the [xviii]th century, was in the early history of Athens almost unknown. Like the Roman kings, and the Roman consuls before the appointment of the Prætor, the Athenian archons not only administered, but also exercised jurisdiction, voluntary as well as contentious—decided disputes, inquired into crimes, and inflicted punishment. Of the same mixed nature were the functions of the senate of Areopagus, and even of the annual *boulê* of Five Hundred, the creation of Kleisthenês. The *Stratêgi*, too, as well as the archons, had doubtless the double competence, in reference to military, naval, and foreign affairs, of issuing orders and of punishing by their own authority disobedient parties: the *imperium* of the magistrates, generally, enabled them to enforce their own mandates as well as to decide in cases of doubt whether any private citizen had or had not been guilty of infringement. Nor was there any appeal from these magisterial judgments, though the magistrates were subject, under the Kleisthenean constitution, to personal responsibility for their general behaviour, before the people judicially assembled, at the expiration of their year of office—and to the farther animadversion of the Ekklesia (or public deliberative assembly) meeting periodically during the course of that year. In some of which assemblies, the question might formally be raised for deposing any magistrate even before his year was expired. Still, in spite of such partial checks, the accumulation, in the same hand, of powers to administer, judge, punish, and decide civil disputes, without any other canon than the few laws then existing, and without any appeal—must have been painfully felt, and must often have led to corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing. And if this be true of individual magistrates, exposed to annual accountability, it is not likely to have been less true of the senate of Areopagus, which, acting collectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, and in which the members sat for life¹.

I have already mentioned that shortly after the return of the expatriated Athenians from Salamis, the abolition of pecuniary qualification for magistracies had been mooted. Notwithstanding the enlarged promise of eligibility, little change probably took place in the fact, and rich men were still most commonly chosen. Hence the magistrates, possessing the large powers administrative and judicial above described—and still more the senate of Areopagus, which sat for life—still belonging almost entirely to the wealthier class, remained animated more or less with oligarchical interests and sympathies. At the same time the demo-

¹ Æschinês (*Cont. Ktesiphont.*, c. 9, p. 373) speaks of the senate of Areopagus as *νεώθυτος*, and so it was doubtless understood to be; but it is difficult to see how accountability could be practically enforced against such a body. They could only be responsible in this sense—that if any one of

their number could be proved to have received a bribe, he would be individually punished. But in this sense the dikasteries themselves would also be responsible, though it is always affirmed of them that they were not responsible.

cratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians went on steadily increasing: Athens became more and more maritime, the population of Peiræus augmented in number as well as in importance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizen was stimulated by that collective aggrandizement of his city to which he himself individually contributed. Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning from the battle of Platæa, this new fervour of democratical sentiment made itself felt in the political contests of Athens, and found able champions in Periklēs and Ephialtēs, rivals of what may be called the conservative party headed by Kimon.

We have no positive information that it was Periklēs who introduced the lot, in place of election, for the choice of archons and various other magistrates¹, with a view of equalizing the chances of office to every candidate, poor as well as rich, who chose to give in his name and who fulfilled certain personal and family conditions ascertained in the dokimasy or preliminary examination. But it was certainly to Periklēs and Ephialtēs that Athens owed the elaborate constitution of her popular Dikasteries or Jury-courts regularly paid, which exercised so important an influence upon the character of the citizens. These two eminent men deprived both the magistrates, and the senate of Areopagus, of all the judicial and penal competence which they had hitherto possessed, save and except the power of imposing a small fine. This judicial power, civil as well as criminal, was transferred to numerous dikasts, or panels of jurors selected from the citizens, 6,000 of whom were annually drawn by lot, sworn, and then distributed into ten panels of 500 each, the remainder forming a supplement in case of vacancies. The magistrate, instead of deciding causes or inflicting punishment by his own authority, was now constrained to impanel a jury—that is, to submit each particular case, which might call for a penalty greater than the small fine to which he was competent, to the judgment of one or other among these numerous popular dikasteries. Which of the ten he should take was determined by lot, so that no one knew beforehand what dikastery would try any particular cause. The magistrate himself presided over it during the trial and submitted to it the question at issue, together with the results of his own preliminary examination; after which came the speeches of accuser and accused with the statements of their witnesses. So also the civil judicature, which had before been exercised in controversies between man and man by the archons, was withdrawn from them and transferred to these dikasteries under the presidency of an archōn. It is to be remarked, that the system of reference to arbitration, for private

¹ From the *Ath. Pol.* (c. 22) it is most likely that limited sortition was introduced for the archonship in 487 B.C. by Aristeidēs (ἐν Τελευσίῳ ἀρχόντος). The same authority says also that Solon made the magistrates κληρωτοὶ ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων—i.e., each tribe elected fifty candidates, from whom the nine archons and the *grammateus* (secretary) were chosen by lot. But this statement is (1) made like others in the Treatise as the basis of a comparison; (2) incompatible with the fact, made clear by the same authority, that between Solon and Peisistratus the archons were elected (see *Ath. Pol.*, c. 13, and cf. party strife and the *anarchia* under Damasias); and (3) this 'mixed' sortition, had it ever existed, would almost certainly have been re-established on the fall of the Tyrannis, which was not the case (*Ath. Pol.*, 22). The date 487 is much more probable. Firstly,

the author of the *Ath. Pol.* is almost certainly quoting an *Atthis* in c. 22; and, secondly, we know that the archonship had by 487 declined in importance owing to the increasing power of the *Stratēgi*. We know also that in constitutional Athens it was a cardinal principle that no office of importance should be left to the hazard of the lot. Therefore, when Herodotus speaks of the polemarch at Marathon as chosen by lot, he is probably guilty of an anachronism. On the other hand, there is no mention of a polemarch in the wars against Xerxes. It seems probable, therefore, that the change took place in the interval—i.e., in 487 B.C. In confirmation of this it is noticeable that in the list of archons after 487 there are no names of important men, whereas before this date the archons were always amongst the principal citizens.—Ed.

causes¹, was extensively applied at Athens. A certain number of public arbitrators were annually appointed, to one of whom (or to some other citizen adopted by mutual consent of the parties), all private disputes were submitted in the first instance. If dissatisfied with the decision, either party might afterwards carry the matter before the dikastery.

I do not here mean to affirm that there never was any trial by the people before the time of Periklēs and Ephialtēs. I doubt not that before their time the numerous judicial assembly, called *Heliaea*, pronounced upon charges against accountable magistrates as well as upon various other accusations of public importance; and perhaps in some cases separate bodies of them may have been drawn by lot for particular trials. But it is not the less true that the systematic distribution and constant employment of the numerous dikasts of Athens cannot have begun before the age of these two statesmen, since it was only then that the practice of paying them began². For so large a sacrifice of time on the part of poor men, wherein M. Boeckh states³ (in somewhat exaggerated language) that 'nearly one third of the citizens sat as judges every day', cannot be conceived without an assured remuneration. From and after the time of Periklēs, these dikasteries were the exclusive assemblies for trial of all causes civil as well as criminal, with some special exceptions, such as cases of homicide and a few others. We may therefore conceive how great and important was the revolution wrought by that statesman, when he first organized these dikastic assemblies into systematic action, and transferred to them nearly all the judicial power which had before been exercised by magistrates and senate. The position and influence of these latter became radically altered. The most commanding functions of the archon were abrogated, so that he retained only the power of receiving complaints, inquiring into them, exercising some small preliminary interference with the parties for the furtherance of the cause or accusation, fixing the day for trial, and presiding over the dikastic assembly by whom peremptory verdict was pronounced. His administrative functions

¹ Each arbitrator seems to have sat alone to inquire into and decide disputes: he received a small fee of one drachma from both parties. Parties might by mutual consent fix upon any citizen to act as arbitrator: but there were a certain number of public arbitrators, elected or drawn by lot from the citizens every year, and a plaintiff might bring his cause before any one of these. They were liable to be punished under *εἰσρεῖναι*, at the end of their year of office, if accused and convicted of corruption or unfair dealing.

An inscription since discovered by Professor Ross and published in his work, *Über die Demen von Attika*, p. 22, records the names of all the *Diētetai* for the year of the archon Antiklēs, A.C. 325, with the name of the tribe to which each belonged [C.I.A., ii. 869].

The total number is 104. They must have been either elected or drawn by lot from the general body of citizens, without any reference to tribes.

² There is no doubt that the payment for dikasts was introduced by Periklēs. Evidence and probability are in agreement. As to the exact date of its introduction we are left in the dark even by the *Ath. Pol.* (27, 3). It is clear that Periklēs' object was (at the end of the century) believed to be to combat the popularity of Kimon. It would follow that the innovation occurred after Kimon's return from ostracism—i.e., not before 453 or 451 (see note 4, p. 320), and before his death—i.e., not later than 449—in other words, during the tem-

porary ascendancy of the aristocratic party deduced in the note at the foot of this chapter. This date is, on the whole, corroborated by the fact that between 461 and 450 important suits (i.e., those involving *ἀτιμία*, *θάνατος*, *φυγή*; cf. app. to ch. 17) in which the subject allies were concerned began to be tried at Athens. Thus within these ten years the business of the Athenian courts would be largely increased. It must be admitted that the foregoing argument depends largely on the theory that Kimon did not return till 453 or 451. It seems, however, to offer the most coherent explanation of a chronological problem complicated by inadequate and contradictory evidence. The order of events would be: 451, return of Kimon and introduction of dikastic pay; 450, the Five Years' Truce, the Law of Citizenship (*ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀσσοῖν*), (*Ath. Pol.*, 26). The original amount of the dikastic pay is not stated. Some hold that the amount was two obols; others, on the analogy of the payment to those attending the *Ekklesia*, suppose it was one obol. It was increased to three obols by Kleon (*Schol.* on *Aristoph.*, *Wasps*, 88, 300). See Gilbert, *Constitutional Antiqu.*, pp. 343, 344.—Ed.

³ *Public Economy of the Athenians*, book ii., chap. xiv., p. 227, Engl. transl.

M. Boeckh must mean that the whole 6,000, or nearly the whole, were employed every day. It appears to me that this supposition greatly overstates both the number of days, and the number of men, actually employed.

remained unaltered, but his powers, inquisitorial and determining, as a judge, passed away¹.

In reference to the senate of Areopagus also, the changes introduced were not less considerable. That senate, anterior to the democracy in point of date, and standing alone in the enjoyment of a life-tenure, appears to have exercised an undefined and extensive control which long continuance had gradually consecrated. It was invested with a kind of religious respect, and believed to possess mysterious traditions emanating from a divine source². Especially, the cognizance which it took of intentional homicide was a part of old Attic religion not less than of judicature. During the calamitous sufferings of the Persian invasion, its forwardness and patriotism had been so highly appreciated as to procure for it an increased sphere of ascendancy. Trials for homicide were only a small part of its attributions. It exercised judicial competence in many other cases besides, and what was of still greater moment, it maintained a sort of censorial police over the lives and habits of the citizens. To crown all, the senate of Areopagus also exercised a supervision over the public assembly, taking care that none of the proceedings of those meetings should be such as to infringe the established laws of the country. These were powers immense as well as undefined, not derived from any formal grant of the people, but having their source in immemorial antiquity and sustained by general awe and reverence. When we read the serious expressions of this sentiment in the mouths of the later orators—Demosthenês, Æschinês, or Deinarchus—we shall comprehend how strong it must have been a century and a half before them, at the period of the Persian invasion. Isokratês, in his Discourse usually called *Areopagiticus*, written a century and a quarter after that invasion, draws a picture of what the senate of Areopagus had been while its competence was yet undiminished, and ascribes to it a power of interference little short of paternal despotism, which he asserts to have been most salutary and improving in its effect. That the picture of this rhetor is inaccurate—and to a great degree indeed ideal, insinuating his own recommendations under the colour of past realities—is sufficiently obvious³. But it enables us to presume generally the extensive regulating power of the senate of Areopagus, in affairs both public and private, at the time which we are now describing.

Such powers were pretty sure to be abused. When we learn that the Spartan senate⁴ was lamentably open to bribery, we can hardly presume much better of the life-sitting elders at Athens. But even if their powers

¹ Aristotle, *Politic.*, ii. 9, 3: Καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλὴν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκδούσε καὶ Περικλῆς· τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστος τῶν δημογῶν προήγαγε, αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν νῦν δημοκρατίαν.

² Deinarchus, *Cont. Demosthen.*, Or. i., p. 91: φυλάττει τὰς ἀπορήτους διαθήκας, ἐν αἷς τὰ τῆς πόλεως σωτήρια κείνται, etc. So also Æschinês calls this senate τὴν σκυθρωπὴν καὶ τὴν μεγίστην κυρίαν βουλὴν. (*Cont. Ktesiphont.*, c. 9, p. 373: compare also *Cont. Timarchum*, c. 16, p. 41; *Demosth.*, *Cont. Aristokrat.*, c. 65, p. 641). Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 19: τὴν ἀνω βουλὴν ἐπισκοποῦν πάντων καὶ φυλάκα τῶν νόμων, etc.

³ Ἐδίκασον οὖν οἱ Ἀρεοπαγῖται περὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν σφαλισμάτων καὶ παρανομιῶν, ὡς ἀπαντὰ φησιν Ἀνδρότιων ἐν πρώτῃ καὶ Φιλόχορος ἐν δευτέρῃ καὶ τρίτῃ τῶν Ἀτθίδων (Philochorus, *Fr.*, 17-58, ed. Didot, p. 19).

⁴ Isokratês may also have been the ultimate authority of the writer in *Att. Pol.* (c. xxiii.), who goes so far as to say that the Areopagus in 480 οὐδὲν δόγματι παρέλαβε τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. This shows that the author did not base his view on documentary evidence preserved in the *Atthides*; hence his most likely source of inspiration is to be found in the political speculators of Isokratês' school.

At the same time the very absence of δόγματα between 480 and 461 marks this period as a time of conservative reaction, during which the ναυτικός ὄχλος no doubt was gathering self-confidence, but preferred to leave politics in the hands of its aristocratic leaders. The account of *Att. Pol.* is at any rate much more correct than that of Plutarch, *Aristeids.*, ch. 22.—Ed.

⁴ Aristotle, *Politic.*, ii. 6, 18.

had been guided by all that beneficence of intention which Isokratēs affirms, they were in their nature such as could only be exercised over a passive and stationary people, while the course of events at Athens, at that time peculiarly, presented conditions altogether the reverse. During the pressure of the Persian invasion, indeed, the senate of Areopagus had been armed with more than ordinary authority, which it had employed so creditably as to strengthen its influence and tighten its supervision during the period immediately following. But that same trial had also called forth in the general body of the citizens a fresh burst of democratical sentiment, and an augmented consciousness of force, both individual and national. Here then were two forces, not only distinct but opposite and conflicting, both put into increased action at the same time¹. Nor was this all: a novel cast was just then given to Athenian life and public habits by many different circumstances—the enlargement of the city, the creation of the fortified port and new town of Peiræus, the introduction of an increased nautical population, the active duties of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, etc. All these circumstances tended to open new veins of hope and feeling, and new lines of action, in the Athenians between 480-460 B.C., and by consequence to render the interference of the senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashioned and conservative as it was, more and more difficult.

From the character of the senate of Areopagus and the ancient reverence with which it was surrounded, it served naturally as a centre of action to the oligarchical or conservative party, that party which desired to preserve the Kleisthenean constitution unaltered. Of this sentiment, at the time of which we are now speaking, Kimon was the most conspicuous leader. His brilliant victories at the Eurymedon, as well as his exploits in other warlike enterprises, doubtless strengthened very much his political influence at home. The same party also probably included the large majority of rich and old families at Athens.

The political opposition between Periklēs and Kimon was hereditary, since Xanthippos the father of the former had been the accuser of Miltiadēs the father of the latter. Both were of the first families in the city, and this, combined with the military talents of Kimon and the great statesmanlike superiority of Periklēs, placed both the one and the other at the head of the two political parties which divided Athens. Periklēs must have begun his political career very young, since he maintained a position first of great influence, and afterwards of unparalleled moral and political ascendancy, for the long period of forty years², against distinguished rivals, bitter assailants; and unscrupulous libellers (about 467-428 B.C.). His public life began perhaps about the time when Themistoklēs was ostracized, and when Aristeidēs was passing off the stage. His military duties as a youthful citizen were faithfully and strenuously performed, but he was timid in his first political approaches to the people—a fact perfectly in unison with the caution of his temperament, but which some of his biographers³ explained by saying that he was afraid of being

¹ Aristotle particularly indicates these two conflicting tendencies in Athens, the one immediately following the other, in a remarkable passage of his *Politics* (v. 3, 5):

Μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκίμησθαι τι ἢ αὐξήσθηναι ἢ ἀρχεῖον ἢ μῦθον τῆς πόλεως· ὅλον, ἢ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῃ βουλῇ εὐδοκίμησασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς εδοξε

συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τὴν πολιτείαν. Καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικός ὄχλος γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμῖνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν.

² For an examination of this point, see appendix to this chapter.—Ed.

³ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 4-7 et seq.

ostracized, and that his countenance resembled that of the despot Peisistratus. We may be pretty sure, however, that this personal resemblance was an after-thought of enemies when his ascendancy was already established—and that young beginners were in little danger of ostracism.

It was to this democratical party—the party of movement against that of resistance, or of reformers against conservatives, if we are to employ modern phraseology—that Periklēs devoted his great rank, character, and abilities. He was indefatigable in his attention to public business, but he went little into society, and disregarded almost to excess the airs of popularity. His eloquence was irresistibly impressive, yet he was by no means prodigal of it, taking care to reserve himself, like the Salaminian trireme, for solemn occasions, and preferring for the most part to employ the agency of friends and partisans¹. Moreover, he imbibed from his friend and teacher Anaxagoras a tinge of physical philosophy which greatly strengthened his mind² and armed him against many of the reigning superstitions—but which at the same time tended to rob him of the sympathy of the vulgar, rich as well as poor. The arts of demagogy were in fact much more cultivated by the oligarchical Kimon, whose open-hearted familiarity of manner was extolled, by his personal friend the poet Ion, in contrast with the reserved and stately demeanour of his rival Periklēs. Kimon employed the rich plunder, procured by his maritime expeditions, in public decorations as well as in largesses to the poorer citizens, throwing open his fields and fruits to all the inhabitants of his deme, and causing himself to be attended in public by well-dressed slaves, directed to tender their warm tunics in exchange for the threadbare garments of those who seemed in want. In taste, in talent, and in character, Kimon was the very opposite of Periklēs—a brave and efficient commander, a lavish distributor, a man of convivial and amorous habits—but incapable of sustained attention to business, and endued with Laconian aversion to rhetoric and philosophy; while the ascendancy of Periklēs was founded on his admirable combination of civil qualities—probity, firmness, diligence, judgment, eloquence, and power of guiding partisans.

Ephialtēs, son of Sophônidēs, was at this time another leading democrat, seemingly indeed the equal of Periklēs, and no way inferior to him in personal probity, though he was a poor man³. As to aggressive political warfare, he was even more active than Periklēs, who appears throughout his long public life to have manifested but little bitterness against political enemies. Unfortunately our scanty knowledge of the history of Athens brings before us only some general causes and a few marked facts. Before Ephialtēs advanced his main proposition for abridging the competence of the senate of Areopagus, he appears to have been strenuous in repressing the practical abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations brought against the magistrates at the period of their regular accountability. After repeated efforts to check the practical abuse of these magisterial powers⁴, Ephialtēs and Periklēs were at last conducted to the proposition of cutting them down permanently, and introducing an altered system.

¹ Plutarch, *Reipub. Gerend. Præcept.*, p. 822; Periklēs, c. 5, 6, 7.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, c. 54, p. 270; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 8; Xenoph., *Memor.*, i. 2, 46.

³ Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 10; Ælian, *V. H.*, ii. 43; xl. 9.

⁴ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 10: compare Valer. Maxim., iii. 8, 4: 'Εφιάλτην μὲν οὖν, φοβερὸν ὄντα τοῖς ὀλιγαρχικοῖς καὶ περὶ τὰς εὐδυνας καὶ διαίσεις τῶν τὸν δῆμον ἀδικούντων ἀπαραιτήτων, ἐπιβουλευσάντες οἱ ἔχθροί δι' Ἀριστοδίκου τοῦ Ταναρχικοῦ κρυφαίως ἀνέilon, etc.

Such proceedings naturally provoked extreme bitterness of party-feeling. It is probable that this temper may have partly dictated the accusation preferred against Kimon (about 463 B.C.) after the surrender of Thasos for alleged reception of bribes from the Macedonian prince Alexander, an accusation of which he was acquitted. At this time the oligarchical or Kimonian party was decidedly the most powerful: and when the question was proposed for sending troops to aid the Lacedæmonians in reducing the revolted Helots on Ithômê, Kimon carried the people along with him to comply, by an appeal to their generous feelings, in spite of the strenuous opposition of Ephialtês¹. But when Kimon and the Athenian hoplites returned home, having been dismissed by Sparta under circumstances of insulting suspicion, the indignation of the citizens was extreme. They renounced their alliance with Sparta, and entered into amity with Argos. Of course the influence of Kimon, and the position of the oligarchical party, was materially changed by this incident. And in the existing bitterness of political parties, it is not surprising that his opponents should take the opportunity for proposing soon afterwards a vote of ostracism². The vote ended in the expulsion of Kimon, a sure proof that his opponents were now in the ascendant.

It was now³ that Periklês and Ephialtês carried their important scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areopagus was deprived of its discretionary censorial power, as well as of all its judicial competence, except that which related to homicide. The individual magistrates, as well as the senate of Five Hundred, were also stripped of their judicial attributes (except the power of imposing a small fine⁴), which were transferred to the newly-created panels of salaried dikasts, lotted off in ten divisions from the aggregate *Heliaea*. Ephialtês⁵ first brought down the laws of Solon from the acropolis to the neighbourhood of the market place, where the dikasteries sat — a visible proof that the judicature was now popularized.

In the representations of many authors, the full bearing of this great constitutional change is very inadequately conceived. What we are commonly told is that Periklês was the first to assign a salary to these numerous dikasteries at Athens. He bribed the people with the public money (says Plutarch), in order to make head against Kimon, who bribed them out of his own private purse, as if the pay were the main feature in the case, and as if all which Periklês did was, to make himself popular by paying the dikasts for judicial service which they had before rendered gratuitously. The truth is, that this numerous army of dikasts, distri-

¹ Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 16.

² *Ibid.*, c. 17.

³ The order of events given in the text (1, failure of Messenian Expedition; 2, ostracism of Kimon; 3, overthrow of the Areopagus) is not generally accepted by recent writers, who, on the strength of Plutarch, *Kimon*, 15, assert that the overthrow of the Areopagus took place before Kimon returned from Ithômê, and that Kimon's ostracism was due to an attempt which he made on his return to reinstate the Areopagus. This theory is largely based on the fact that there is no account of any opposition to Ephialtês' reforms on the part of Kimon. The real reason for this is that Kimon was ostracized after the failure of the expedition, and before the downfall of the Areopagus. It is quite clear that until the expedition proved a failure the Kimonian party was in the ascendant

and the democrats, who had failed to prevent the expedition, could not have hoped (as E. Meyer suggests) to pass so drastic a reform as the overthrow of the Areopagus, the stronghold of Kimon's party. Moreover, it is equally clear that had the constitutional reform preceded Kimon's return it would have been ludicrous on Kimon's part to attempt to reverse it when his prestige was ruined by the Messenian fiasco and the foreign policy of the state had become violently anti-Laconian (see previous chapter, p. 296). From the *Ath. Pol.* we learn that the law of Ephialtês was passed in the archonship of Konôn (462-461); therefore the ostracism of Kimon must be fixed between March and July, 462.—Ed.

⁴ Demosthen., *Cont. Evurg. et Mnesibul.*, c. 12.

⁵ Harpokration — *Ὁ καθ' ὅσον νόμος* — Pollux xiii. 128.

buted into ten regiments, and summoned to act systematically throughout the year, was now for the first time organized. What Periklēs really effected was, to sever for the first time from the administrative competence of the magistrates that judicial authority which had originally gone along with it¹. A plaintiff having cause of civil action, or an accuser invoking punishment against citizens guilty of injury either to himself or to the state, had still to address himself to one or other of the archons, but it was only with a view of ultimately arriving before the dikastery by whom the cause was to be tried. But the cognizance of homicide was still expressly reserved to the Areopagus, for the procedure, in this latter case religious not less than judicial, was so thoroughly consecrated by ancient feeling, that no reformer could venture to disturb or remove it².

It was upon this same ground probably that the stationary party defended *all* the prerogatives of the senate of Areopagus—denouncing the curtailments proposed by Ephialtēs as impious and guilty innovations³. How extreme their resentment became, when these reforms were carried—and how fierce was the collision of political parties at this moment—we may judge by the result. The enemies of Ephialtēs caused him to be privately assassinated, by the hand of a Boeotian of Tanagra. Such a crime—rare in the political annals of Athens, for we come to no known instance of it afterwards until the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411 B.C.—marks at once the gravity of the change now introduced, the fierceness of the opposition offered, and the unscrupulous character of the conservative party. Kimon was in exile and had no share in the deed.

It is from this point that the administration of Perikles may be said to date: he was now the leading adviser (we might almost say Prime Minister) of the Athenian people. His first years were marked by a series of brilliant successes—already mentioned—the acquisition of Megara as an ally, and the victorious war against Corinth and Ægina. But when he proposed the great and valuable improvement of the Long Walls, thus making one city of Athens and Peiræus, the same oligarchical party, which had opposed his judicial changes and assassinated Ephialtēs, again stood forward in vehement resistance. Finding direct opposition unavailing, they did not scruple to enter into treasonable correspondence with Sparta—invoking the aid of a foreign force for the overthrow of the democracy. How serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the time of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted together with the rapid and unexpected reconciliation of parties after that battle. Kimon was perhaps restored from ostracism on this occasion⁴, before his full time

¹ Aristot., *Polit.*, iv. 5, 6: ἐτι δ' οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμον φασὶ δειν κρίνειν· ὁ δ' ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν· ὥστε καταλύονται πῶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί, etc.; compare vi. 1, 8.

The remark of Aristotle is not justly applicable to the change effected by Periklēs, which transferred the power taken from the magistrates, not to the people, but to certain specially constituted, though numerous and popular dikasteries, sworn to decide in conformity with known and written laws.

Plato seems also to have conceived administrative power as essentially accompanied by judicial (Legg., vi., p. 767)—πάντα ἀρχοντα ἀναγκάσιον καὶ δικαστὴν εἶναι τινῶν—an opinion doubtless perfectly just, up to a certain narrow limit: the separation between the two sorts of powers cannot be rendered *absolutely* complete.

² [Demosthen.] *Cont. Near.*, p. 1372; *Dem., Cont. Aristokrat.*, p. 642.

³ This is the language of those authors whom Diodorus copied (Diodor., xi. 77)—οὐ μὴν ἀθρόως γε διέφυγε τηλικούτοις ἀνομήμασιν ἐπιβαλλόμενος (Ephialtēs), ἀλλὰ τῆς νυκτὸς ἀναιρεθεὶς, ἀθλον εἶχε τὴν τοῦ βίου τελευτήν. Compare Pausanias, i. 29, 15.

The enemies of Periklēs circulated a report (mentioned by Idomeneus), that it was he who had procured the assassination of Ephialtēs, from jealousy of the superiority of the latter (Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 10). We may infer from this report how great the eminence of Ephialtēs was.

⁴ Most authorities accept the theory that Kimon was recalled immediately after Tanagra; in this they follow the statements in Plutarch (*Kimon*, 14), who, like other secondary authorities, adds that Kimon was recalled to arrange the Five Years' Truce. Now these two points are inconsistent; either Kimon returned in 457, in which

had expired; while the rivalry between him and Periklēs henceforward becomes mitigated, or even converted into a compromise, whereby the internal affairs of the city were left to the one, and the conduct of foreign expeditions to the other. The successes of Athens during the ensuing ten years were more brilliant than ever, and she attained the maximum of her power, which doubtless had a material effect in imparting stability to the democracy, as well as to the administration of Periklēs—and enabled both the one and the other to stand the shock of those great public reverses, which deprived the Athenians of their dependent landed alliances, during the interval between the defeat of Korōneia and the thirty years' truce.

Along with the important judicial revolution brought about by Periklēs, were introduced other changes belonging to the same scheme and system¹.

An important change, which we may possibly refer to Periklēs, is, the institution of the *Nomothetæ*². These men were in point of fact *dikasts*, members of the 6,000 citizens annually sworn in that capacity.

case his return had no special connexion with the Peace of 451, or in 451, at the end of the legal ten years' absence, if he really returned to arrange the Peace. Plutarch not only connects his return with the Five Years' Truce, but also with the expedition to Cyprus, wholly ignoring the discrepancy in the dates. Theopompus (*Frag.*, 92) says that Kimon returned 'before five years of his ostracism had elapsed' to make peace with Sparta, and that his attempt succeeded. But how are we to explain this interval of five or six years? Some suggest that the peace which Kimon arranged on his return was not the Five Years' Truce but the Four Months' Truce between Tanagra and Ænophyta, mentioned by Diodorus (xi. 80). Now, firstly, Diodorus is the only authority for the Four Months' Truce, and Thukydides (i. 108) says that Ænophyta was sixty-one days after Tanagra. Secondly, if this story be true, is it credible that Kimon, having arranged the truce, disappeared for some six years, and then reappeared to arrange another truce? Thirdly, how comes it that Kimon's return is connected with the Cyprus expedition? Moreover, the evidence of Theopompus is unsatisfactory, as there is nothing to show whether he obtained the five years of which he speaks from a separate source, or merely by assuming that the return took place after Tanagra, and subtracting 457 from 462. Now it is practically certain that he did not get the date from an *Ath. Pol.*, for in that case it would have appeared in the *Ath. Pol.*, or in *Scholia*, which is not the case.

On the other hand, Andokidēs (*De Pace*, 3) certainly connects Kimon's return with the Five Years' Truce. The passage, in other respects full of error, is presumably reporting the general opinion of the time. Secondly, if Kimon was recalled in 457, and the story of the compact between him and Periklēs be true, how is it that during the warfare of the next six years Kimon did not command any single expedition (the names of all the leaders being known)? The hypothesis that Kimon returned in 457, was then reostracized, and recalled again in 451 is scarcely within the pale of probability. Finally, as Grote pointed out, it is obvious that Plutarch is wrong in saying that the Athenians recalled Kimon because they feared the Lacedæmonians; there was no sufficient reason for the recall in 457. On the whole it seems much more probable that Kimon returned in the ordinary course of events in 451. It is not impossible, however, that he was recalled not before

Tanagra, but in 453 (*cf.* Diodorus, xi. 86). In favour of this may be mentioned the general opinion of antiquity that his return was due to a special decree. It may well be that opinion veered round in his favour in 453, and that he actually returned in 451 (see note on supremacy of Periklēs, p. 332).—Ed.

¹ Most recent scholars disbelieve in the existence of Nomophylakes in the fifth century. The name is not mentioned by the author of the *Ath. Pol.*; as Grote pointed out, they did not intervene, so far as we know, at the trial of the generals after Arginusæ, nor during the rule of the Four Hundred, both crises during which such a board must surely have come into prominence. Further, it is noticeable that the sixth book of Philochorus's history—the only authority for the statement that Ephialtēs appointed the board—was concerned with the years 317 to 307 B.C., when Demetrius of Phalerum was ruler in Athens, and that Demetrius gave the name Nomophylakes to the body previously called 'the Eleven'. The Nomophylakes mentioned by Xenophon, Aristotle, and Plato were not Athenian officials; such a board existed at Sparta; Ellis, Locri, etc. *Cf.* Gilbert's *Gk. Constitutional Antiq.* (Eng. trans., 1895, pp. 155, 160), where authorities are quoted. It is worth noticing that Demetrius was careful to hide the iron hand under a velvet glove (*cf.* his title *ἐπιμελητὴς τῆς Πόλεως*), and, therefore, the title 'Guardians of the Law' was quite a natural one for him to select. Moreover, it was quite alien from the spirit of the Athenian democracy to supplement the *γραφὴ παρανόμων* by a professional board of jurists.—Ed.

² The first mention of *νομοθέται* is in Thuk., viii. 97, where the reconstitution of the democracy after the rule of the 400 in 411 B.C. is described. In all probability this is the first occasion on which such a board was created. In Periklēs' time the need for an elaborate revision of statutes, such as is here described in the text, cannot yet have made itself felt, nor did the constitutional danger of neglecting the archives appear until the 400 achieved their *coup d'état*. The other fifth-century reference (Andok., *De Myst.*, §§ 82, 83) expressly stipulates that the *νομοθέται* should look for all the ambiguous and obsolete measures on the statute-book, which the thirty tyrants, like the revolutionaries of 411, had manipulated to subserve their own ends. Under the quiet administration of Periklēs and his successors the constitution worked perfectly well without such a provision.—Ed.

But they were not, like the dikasts for trying causes, distributed into panels or regiments known by a particular letter and acting together throughout the entire year : they were lotted off to sit together only on special occasion and as the necessity arose. According to the reform now introduced, the Ekklesia or public assembly, even with the sanction of the [council] of Five Hundred, became incompetent either to pass a new law or to repeal a law already in existence ; it could only enact a *psephism*—that is, properly speaking, a decree applicable only to a particular case, though the word was used at Athens in a very large sense, sometimes comprehending decrees of general as well as permanent application. In reference to laws, a peculiar judicial procedure was established. The Thesmothetæ were directed annually to examine the existing laws, noting any contradictions or double laws on the same matter ; and in the first prytany (tenth part) of the Attic year, on the eleventh day, an Ekklesia was held, in which the first business was to go through the laws *seriatim*, and submit them for approval or rejection, first beginning with the laws relating to the [council], next coming to those of more general import, especially such as determined the functions and competence of the magistrates. If any law was condemned by the vote of the public assembly, or if any citizen had a new law to propose, the third assembly of the Prytany was employed, previous to any other business, in the appointment of Nomothetæ and in the provision of means to pay their salary. Previous notice was required to be given publicly by every citizen who had new propositions of the sort to make, in order that the time necessary for the sitting of the Nomothetæ might be measured according to the number of matters to be submitted to their cognizance. Public advocates were farther named to undertake the formal defence of all the laws attacked, and the citizen who proposed to repeal them had to make out his case against this defence, to the satisfaction of the assembled Nomothetæ. These latter were taken from the 6,000 sworn dikasts, and were of different numbers according to circumstances : sometimes we hear of them as 500, sometimes as 1,000 — and we may be certain that the number was always considerable.

The effect of this institution was, to place the making or repealing of laws under the same solemnities and guarantees as the trying of causes or accusations in judicature. How much the oath sworn was brought to act upon the minds of the dikasts, we may see by the frequent appeals to it in the orators, who contrast them with the unsworn public assembly¹. And there can be no doubt that the Nomothetæ afforded much greater security than the public assembly, for a proper decision. That security depended upon the same principle as we see pervading all the constitutional arrangements of Athens—upon a fraction of the people casually taken, but sufficiently numerous to have the same interest with the whole—assembled under a solemn sanction — and furnished with a full exposition of both sides of the case. The power of passing psephisms, or special decrees, still remained with the public assembly, which was doubtless much more liable to be surprised into hasty or inconsiderate decision than either the Dikastery or the Nomothetæ—in spite of the necessity of previous authority from the [council] of Five Hundred, before any proposition could be submitted to it.

¹ Demosthen., *Cont. Timokrat.*, c. 20, pp. 725, 726. Compare Demosthen., *Cont. Eubulid.*, c. 15.

As a security to the public assembly against being entrapped into decisions contrary to existing law, a remarkable provision has to be mentioned. This was the *Graphê Paranomôn*¹—indictment for informality or illegality—which might be brought on certain grounds against the proposer of any law or any psephism, and rendered him liable to punishment by the dikastery. He was required in bringing forward his new measure to take care that it should not be in contradiction with any pre-existing law—or if there were any such contradiction, to give formal notice of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and to write up publicly beforehand what his proposition was—in order that there might never be two contradictory laws at the same time in operation, nor any illegal decree passed either by the senate or by the public assembly. If he neglected this precaution, he was liable to prosecution under the *Graphê Paranomôn*, which any Athenian citizen might bring against him before the dikastery, through the intervention and under the presidency of the Thesmothetæ.

Judging from the title of this indictment, it was originally confined to the special ground of formal contradiction between the new and the old. But it had a natural tendency to extend itself; the citizen accusing would strengthen his case by showing that the measure which he attacked contradicted not merely the letter, but the spirit and purpose of existing laws—and he would proceed from hence to denounce it as generally mischievous and disgraceful to the state. In this unmeasured latitude we find the *Graphê Paranomôn*, at the time of Demosthenês. If found guilty by the dikastery, the punishment inflicted upon him by them was not fixed, but variable according to circumstances. At the same time, the accuser himself (as in other public indictments) was fined in the sum of 1,000 drachms, unless the verdict of guilty obtained at least one-fifth of the suffrages of the dikastery. The personal responsibility of the mover, however, continued only one year after the introduction of the new law. If the accusation was brought at a greater distance of time than one year, the accuser could invoke no punishment against the mover, and the sentence of the dikasts neither absolved nor condemned anything but the law. Their condemnation of the law with or without the author, amounted *ipso facto* to a repeal of it.

Such indictment against the author of a law or of a decree might be preferred either at some stage prior to its final enactment—as after its acceptance simply by the [council], if it was a decree, or after its approval by the public assembly, and prior to its going before the Nomothetæ, if it was a law—or after it had reached full completion by the verdict of the Nomothetæ.

This regulation is framed in a thoroughly conservative spirit, to guard the existing laws against being wholly or partially nullified by a new proposition. As, in the procedure of the Nomothetæ, whenever any proposition was made for distinctly repealing any existing law, it was thought unsafe to entrust the defence of the law so assailed to the chance of some orator gratuitously undertaking it. Paid advocates were appointed for the purpose. So also, when any citizen made a new positive proposition, sufficient security was not supposed to be afforded by the chance of

¹ No authority gives the exact date of the institution. It was in existence in 411 (Thuk., viii. 67), and was then apparently regarded as the

corner-stone of the constitution. Before the overthrow of the Areopagus (462) there was no need for it.—Ed.

opponents rising up at the time. Accordingly, a farther guarantee was provided in the personal responsibility of the mover. That the latter, before he proposed a new decree or a new law, should take care that there was nothing in it inconsistent with existing laws—or, if there were, that he should first formally bring forward a direct proposition for the repeal of such preëxistent law—was in no way unreasonable. It served as a check upon the use of that right, of free speech and initiative in the public assembly, which belonged to every Athenian without exception¹, and which was cherished by the democracy as much as it was condemned by oligarchical thinkers. In modern European governments, even the most free and constitutional, laws have been both made and applied either by select persons or select assemblies, under an organization so different as to put out of sight the idea of personal responsibility on the proposer of a new law. Moreover, even in such assemblies, private initiative has either not existed at all, or has been of comparatively little effect, in law-making, while in the application of laws when made, there has always been a permanent judicial body exercising an action of its own, more or less independent of the legislature, and generally interpreting away the text of contradictory laws so as to keep up a tolerably consistent course of forensic tradition. But at Athens, the fact that the proposer of a new decree, or of a new law, had induced the senate or the public assembly to pass it, was by no means supposed to cancel his personal responsibility, if the proposition was illegal. He had deceived the senate or the people in deliberately keeping back from them a fact which he knew, or at least might and ought to have known.

But though a full justification may thus be urged on behalf of the *Graphê Paranomôn* as originally conceived and intended, it will hardly apply to that indictment as applied afterwards in its plenary and abusive latitude. Thus *Æschinês* indicts *Ktesiphon* under it for having under certain circumstances proposed a crown to *Demosthenês*.

That this indictment was largely applied and abused at Athens, is certain. But though it probably deterred unpractised citizens from originating new propositions, it did not produce the same effect upon those orators who made politics a regular business, and who could therefore both calculate the temper of the people, and reckon upon support from a certain knot of friends. *Aristophon*, towards the close of his political life, made it a boast that he had been thus indicted and acquitted seventy-five times. Probably the worst effect which it produced was that of encouraging the vein of personality and bitterness which pervades so large a proportion of Attic oratory, even in its most illustrious manifestations, turning deliberative into judicial eloquence, and interweaving the discussion of a law or decree along with a declamatory harangue against the character of its mover. We may at the same time add that the *Graphê Paranomôn* was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a psephism repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period had passed over, and when the mover was therefore out of danger—the indictment being then brought only against the law or decree, as in the case which forms the subject of the harangue of *Demosthenês* against *Leptinês*.

¹ The privation of this right of public speech (*ραπέρεια*) followed on the condemnation of any citizen to the punishment called *ἀρκυία*, disfranchisement, entire or partial ([*Demosthen.*]

Cont. Near., p. 1352, c. 9; *Cont. Meidiam*, p. 545, c. 27). Compare for the oligarchical sentiment [*Xenophon*], *Republ. Athen.*, i. 9.

The dikasteries provided under the system of Periklēs varied in number of members: we never hear of less than 200 members—most generally of 500—and sometimes also of 1,000, 1,500, 2,000 members, on important trials¹. Each man received pay from the treasurers called Kolakretæ, after his day's business was over, of three oboli or half a drachm: at least this was the amount paid during the early part of the Peloponnesian war. Boeckh supposes that the original pay proposed by Periklēs was one obolus, afterwards tripled by Kleon². As to the number of dikasts actually present on each day of sitting, or the minimum number requisite to form a sitting, we are very imperfectly informed. Certain it is, however, that the dikasteries were always numerous, and that none of the dikasts could know in what causes they would be employed, so that it was impossible to tamper with them beforehand³.

Such were the great constitutional innovations of Periklēs and Ephialtēs—changes full of practical results—the transformation, as well as the complement, of that democratical system which Kleisthenēs had begun and to which the tide of Athenian feeling had been gradually mounting up during the preceding twenty years. The entire force of these changes is generally not perceived, because the popular dikasteries and the Nomothetæ are so often represented as institutions of Solon, and as merely supplied with pay by Periklēs. This erroneous supposition prevents all clear view of the growth of the Athenian democracy by throwing back its last elaborations to the period of its early and imperfect start. To strip the magistrates of all their judicial power, except that of imposing a small fine, and the Areopagus of all its jurisdiction except in cases of homicide—providing popular, numerous, and salaried dikasts to decide all the judicial business at Athens as well as to repeal and enact laws—this was the consummation of the Athenian democracy. No serious constitutional alteration (I except the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty) was afterwards made until the days of Macedonian interference. As Periklēs made it, so it remained in the days of Demosthenēs—though with a sensible change in the character, and abatement in the energies, of the people, rich as well as poor.

In appreciating the practical working of these numerous dikasteries at Athens, in comparison with such justice as might have been expected from individual magistrates, we have to consider, first—that personal and pecuniary corruption seems to have been a common vice among the

¹ Andokidēs mentions a trial under the indictment of γραφή παρανόμων, brought by his father Leogoras against a senator named Speusippus, wherein 6,000 dikasts sat—that is, the entire body of Heliaists. However, the loose speech so habitual with Andokidēs renders this statement very uncertain (Andokidēs, *De Mysteries*, p. 3, § 29).

² See on this question Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens*, ch. xv., p. 233.

Certain passages from the Scholiast, stating that the pay of the dikasts fluctuated (οὐχ ἑστῆκεν—ἀλλοτε ἄλλως ἐδίδοντο) do not so naturally indicate a rise from one obolus to three, as a change backwards and forwards according to circumstances. Now it seems that there were some occasions when the treasury was so very poor that it was doubtful whether the dikasts could be paid: see Lysias, *Cont. Epikrat.*, c. 1; *Cont. Nikomach.*, c. 22; and Aristophan., *Equit.*, 1370. The amount of pay may therefore have been sometimes affected by this cause.

³ There is a remarkable passage on this point in

the treatise of [Xenophon], *De Republic. Athen.*, iii. 6. He says: Φέρε δὴ, ἀλλὰ ἥσφι τις χρεῖαν δικάζειν μὲν, ἐλάττους δὲ δικάζειν. Ἀνάγκη γοῖνον, εἰ μὲν πολλὰ ποιοῦνται δικαστήρια, ὅλγιος ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσονται τῷ δικαστηρίῳ· ὥστε καὶ διασκευασσάσθαι ῥάδιον ἔσται πρὸς ὀλίγους δικαστάς, καὶ συνδεδάσθαι (so Schneider and Matthiæ in place of συνδεδάσθαι) πολὺ ἥττον δικαίως δικάζειν.

That there was a good deal of bribery at Athens, where individuals could be approached and dealt with, is very probable (see [Xenoph.], *De Republic. Ath.*, iii. 3): and we may well believe that there were also particular occasions on which money was given to the dikasts, some of whom were punished with death for such corrupt receipt (*Æschinēs, Cont. Timarch.*, c. 17-22, p. 12-15). But the passage above quoted from pseudo-Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, shows that the precautions taken to prevent corruption of the dikasteries were well-devised and successful, though these precautions might sometimes be eluded.

leading men of Athens and Sparta, when acting individually or in boards of a few members, and not uncommon even with the kings of Sparta, —next, that in the Grecian cities generally, as we know even from the oligarchical pseudo-Xenophon (he particularly excepts Sparta), the rich and great men were not only insubordinate to the magistrates, but made a parade of showing that they cared nothing about them¹. We know also that, while the poorer Athenian citizens who served on shipboard were distinguished for the strictest discipline, the hoplites or middling burghers who formed the infantry were less obedient, and the rich citizens who served on horseback the most disobedient of all². To make rich and powerful criminals effectively amenable to justice has indeed been found so difficult everywhere, until a recent period of history, that we should be surprised if it were otherwise in Greece. When we follow the reckless demeanour of rich men like Kritias, Alkibiadēs³, and Meidias, even under the full-grown democracy of Athens, we may be sure that their predecessors under the Kleisthenean constitution would have been often too formidable to be punished or kept down by an individual archon of ordinary firmness⁴, even assuming him to be upright and well-intentioned. Now the dikasteries established by Periklēs were inaccessible both to corruption and intimidation: their number, their secret suffrage, and the impossibility of knowing beforehand what individuals would sit in any particular cause, prevented both the one and the other. And besides that, the magnitude of their number, extravagant according to our ideas of judicial business, was essential to this tutelary effect⁵—it served farther to render the trial solemn and the verdict imposing on the minds of parties and spectators, as we may see by the fact, that in important causes the

¹ [Xenophon.], *De Republ. Laced.*, c. 8, 2. *Τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ταῦτα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οἱ δυνατώτεροι οὐνὲ βούλονται δοκεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς φοβεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ νομίζουσι τοῦτο ἀνελύθερον εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῇ Σπάρτῃ οἱ κράτιστοι καὶ ὑπέρχονται μάλα τὰς ἀρχάς, etc.*

Respecting the violent proceedings committed by powerful men at Thebes, whereby it became almost impossible to procure justice against them for fear of being put to death, see Dikearchus, *Vit. Græc.*, *Fragm.* ed. Fabr., p. 143, and Polybius, *xx.* 4, 6; *xxiii.* 2.

² Xenophon, *Memorab.*, *iii.* 5, 18.

³ See Xenophon, *Memorab.*, *i.* 2, 12-25; Thukyd., *vi.* 15, and the speech which he gives as spoken by Alkibiadēs in the assembly, *vi.* 17; Plutarch, *Alkibiad.*, c. 7-8-16, and the Oration of Demosthenis against Meidias throughout; also *Fragm.* V. of the *Πέλλαροι* of Aristophanēs, Meineke, *ii.*, p. 1128.

⁴ Sir Thomas Smith, in his *Treatise on the Commonwealth of England*, explains the Court of Star-Chamber as originally constituted in order 'to deal with offenders too stout for the ordinary course of justice'. The abundant compounds of the Greek language furnish a single word exactly describing this same class of offenders—*Υβριστάδικαι*—the title of one of the lost comedies of Eupolis; see Meineke, *Historia Critica Comicorum Græcorum*, vol. *i.*, p. 145.

A passage among the *Fragmenta* of Sallust, gives a striking picture of the conduct of powerful citizens under the Roman Republic. (*Fragm.*, *lib.* *i.*, p. 158, ed. Delph.)

⁵ At discordia, et avaritia, et ambitio, et cætera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala, post Carthaginis exitum maxime aucta sunt. Nam injuria validiorum fuisse jam inde a principio: neque amplius, quam regibus exactis, dum metus a Tarquinio et

bellum grave cum Etruriâ positum est, æquo et modesto jure agitatum: dein, servili imperio patres plebem exercere: de vitâ atque tergo, regio more consulari.

Compare the exposition of the condition of the cities throughout Europe in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, in Hüllmann's *Städte-Wesen des Mittelalters*, especially vol. *iii.*, pp. 196-199 et seq.

The memorable institution which spread through nearly all the Italian cities during these centuries, of naming as Podesta or supreme magistrate a person not belonging to the city itself, to hold office for a short time—was the expedient which they resorted to for escaping the extreme perversion of judicial and administrative power, arising out of powerful family connections.

Machiavel's *History of Florence* illustrates throughout the inveterate habit of the powerful families to set themselves above the laws and judicial authority. 'The people (he says) desire to live according to the laws; the great men desire to overrule the laws: it is therefore impossible that the two should march in harmony' (Machiavelli, *Istorie Fiorentine*, *liv.* *ii.*, p. 79, ad *ann.* 1282).

⁵ The number of Roman judges employed to try a criminal cause under the *questiones perpetuæ* in the last century and a half of the Republic, seems to have varied between 100, 75, 70, 56, 51, 32, etc. In the time of Augustus, there was a total of 4,000 judges at Rome, distributed into four decuries (Pliny, *H. N.*, *xxxiii.* 1, 31).

The venality as well as the party corruption of these Roman judges or jurors, taken from the senatorial and equestrian orders, the two highest and richest orders in the state, was well known and flagrant (Appian, *Bell. Civ.*, *i.* 22, 35, 37; Asconius in Cicero, *Verrin.*, pp. 141-145, ed. Orell.; and Cicero himself, in the remarkable letter to Atticus, *Ep. ad Attic.*, *i.* 16).

dikastery was doubled or tripled. Nor was it possible by any other means than numbers¹ to give dignity to an assembly of citizens, of whom many were poor, some old, and all were despised individually by rich accused persons who were brought before them—as Aristophanēs and pseudo-Xenophon give us plainly to understand².

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, we shall find that they are nothing but Jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic, unaided, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience—and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury-system, as compared with decision by trained and professional judges. All the encomiums, which it is customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will be found predicable of the Athenian dikasteries in a still greater degree: all the reproaches, which can be addressed on good ground to the dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a less degree. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the theory of jury-trial as it has prevailed in England since the Revolution of 1688, are one and the same: recourse to a certain number of private citizens, taken by chance or without possibility of knowing beforehand who they will be, sworn to hear fairly and impartially plaintiff and defendant, accuser and accused, and to find a true verdict according to their consciences upon a distinct issue before them. But in Athens this theory was worked out to its natural consequences, while English practice, in this respect as in so many others, is at variance with English theory. The jury, though an ancient and a constant portion of the judicial system, has never been more than a portion—kept in subordination, trammels, and pupillage, by a powerful crown and by judges presiding over an artificial system of law. And though, for the last century and a half, the verdict of the jury has been free as to matters of fact, new trials having taken the place of the old attain—yet the ascendancy of the presiding judge over their minds, and his influence over the procedure as the authority on matters of law, has always been such as to overrule the natural play of their feelings and judgment as men and citizens—sometimes to the detriment, much oftener to the benefit (always excepting political trials), of substantial justice. But in Athens the dikasts judged of the law as well as of the fact. The laws were not numerous, and were couched in few, for the most part familiar, words. To determine how the facts stood, and whether, if the facts were undisputed, the law invoked was properly applicable to them, were parts of the integral question submitted to them, and comprehended in their verdict. Moreover, each dikastery

¹ Numerous dikasteries taken by lot seem to have been established in later times in Rhodes and other Grecian cities (though Rhodes was not democratically constituted), and to have worked satisfactorily.

The necessity of a numerous judicature, in a republic where there is no standing army or official force professionally constituted, as the only means of enforcing public-minded justice against powerful criminals, is insisted upon by Machiavel, *Discorsi sopra Tito Livio*, lib. i., c. 7.

² Aristophan., *Vesp.*, 570; [Xenophon], *Rep. Ath.*, i. 18.

The statement of [Aristotle], *Ath. Pol.*, ch. 27, § 5 [compare Harpokraton v. Δεκάγει; Plutarch, *Coriolan.*, c. 14; and *Pollux*, viii. 121] intimates that Anytus was the first person who taught the art τοῦ δεκάγειν τὰ δικαστήρια, a short time before the battle of Ægospotami. But besides

that the information on this point is to the last degree vague, we may remark that between the defeat of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, and the battle of Ægospotami, the financial and political condition of Athens was so exceedingly embarrassed that it may well be doubted whether she could maintain the paid dikasteries on the ordinary footing. If, therefore, in this time of distress the dikasteries were rarely convoked, and without any certainty of pay, a powerful accused person might find it more easy to tamper with them beforehand, than it had been before, or than it came to be afterwards, when the system was regularly in operation. We can hardly reason with safety, therefore, from the period shortly preceding the battle of Ægospotami, either to that which preceded the Sicilian expedition, or to that which followed the subversion of the Thirty.

construed the law for itself without being bound to follow the decisions of those which had preceded it; except in so far as such analogy might really influence the convictions of the members. They were free, self-judging persons—unassisted by the schooling, but at the same time untrammelled by the awe-striking ascendancy, of a professional judge—obeying the spontaneous inspirations of their own consciences, and recognising no authority except the laws of the city, with which they were familiar.

Trial by jury, as practised in England since 1688, has been politically most valuable, as a security against the encroachments of an anti-popular executive. But when we read these encomiums in modern authors, we shall find that both the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in ensuring pure and even-handed justice, and still more its indirect benefits in improving and educating the citizens generally—might have been set forth yet more emphatically in a laudatory harangue of Periklês about the Athenian dikasteries. If it be true that an Englishman or an American counts more certainly on an impartial and uncorrupt verdict from a jury of his country than from a permanent professional judge, much more would this be the feeling of an ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with the archon. As to the effects of jury-trial in diffusing respect to the laws and constitution—in giving to every citizen a personal interest in enforcing the former and maintaining the latter—in imparting a sentiment of dignity to small and poor men, through the discharge of a function exalted as well as useful—all these effects were produced in a still higher degree by the dikasteries at Athens from their greater frequency, numbers, and spontaneity of mental action, without any professional judge, upon whom they could throw the responsibility of deciding for them.

On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury-trial were likewise disclosed in an exaggerated form under the Athenian system. Both juror and dikast represent the average man of the time and of the neighbourhood, exempt indeed from pecuniary corruption or personal fear, but not exempt from sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices, all of which act the more powerfully because there is often no consciousness of their presence, and because they even appear essential to his idea of plain and straightforward good sense. According as a jury is composed of Catholics or Protestants, Irishmen or Englishmen, tradesmen, farmers, or inhabitants of a frontier on which smuggling prevails—there is apt to prevail among them a corresponding bias. At the time of any great national delusion, such as the Popish Plot—or of any powerful local excitement, such as that of the Church and King mobs at Birmingham in 1791 against Dr. Priestley and the Dissenters—juries are found to perpetrate what a calmer age recognises to have been gross injustice. Juries bring the common feeling as well as the common reason of the public—or often indeed only the separate feeling of particular fractions of the public—to dictate the application of the law to particular cases. They are a protection against anything worse—especially against such corruption or servility as are liable to taint permanent official persons—but they cannot possibly reach anything better. Now the dikast trial at Athens effected the same object, and had in it only the same ingredients of error and misdecision, as the English jury: but it had them in stronger dose, without the counteracting

authority of a judge, and without the benefit of a procedure such as has now been obtained in England. The feelings of the dikasts counted for more, and their reason for less, not merely because of their greater numbers, which naturally heightened the pitch of feeling in each individual—but also because the addresses of orators or parties formed the prominent part of the procedure, and the depositions of witnesses only a very subordinate part. The dikast therefore heard little of the naked facts, the appropriate subjects for his reason—but he was abundantly supplied with the plausible falsehoods, calumnies, irrelevant statements and suggestions, etc., of the parties, and that too in a manner skilfully adapted to his temper. To keep the facts of the case before the jury, apart from the falsehood and colouring of parties, is the most useful function of the modern judge, whose influence is also considerable as a restraint upon the pleader. We see in the remaining productions of the Attic orators how much there is of plausible deception, departure from the true issue, and appeals to sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices of every kind, addressed to the dikasteries. We have no means of knowing to what extent they actually perverted the judgment of the hearers¹. Probably the frequent habit of sitting in dikastery gave them a penetration in detecting sophistry not often possessed by non-professional citizens. Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that in a considerable proportion of cases, success depended less upon the intrinsic merits of a case than upon apparent airs of innocence and truth-telling, dexterity of statement, and good general character, in the parties, their witnesses, and the friends who addressed the court on their behalf. The accusatory speeches in Attic oratory, wherein punishment is invoked upon an alleged delinquent, are expressed with a bitterness which is now banished from English criminal judicature, though it was common in the state trials of two centuries ago. Against them may be set the impassioned and emphatic appeals made by defendants and their friends to the commiseration of the dikasts, appeals the more often successful, because they came last, immediately before decision was pronounced. This is true of Rome as well as of Athens².

As an organ for judicial purposes, the Athenian dikasteries were thus a simple and plenary manifestation of jury-trial, with its inherent excellences and defects both brought out in exaggerated relief. They ensured a decision at once uncorrupt, public-minded, and imposing—together with the best security which the case admitted against illegal violence on the part of the rich and great³. Their extreme publicity—as well as their simple and oral procedure, divested of that verbal and ceremonial technicality which marked the law of Rome even at its outset, was no small benefit. But whatever may have been their defects as judicial instruments, as a stimulus both to thought and speech, their efficacy was unparalleled, in the circumstances of Athenian society. Doubtless they would not have produced the same effect if established at Thebes or Argos. The

¹ Demosthenes (*Cont. Phormio*, p. 913, c. 2) emphatically remarks how much more cautious witnesses were of giving false testimony before the numerous dikastery, than before the arbitrator.

² Asconius gives an account of the begging off and supplication to the judges at Rome, when sentence was about to be pronounced upon Scaurus, whom Cicero defended (ed. Ciceron., *Orat. pro Scauro*, p. 28, ad Orell.).

Compare also Cicero, *Brutus*, c. 23, about the defence of Sergius Galba; Quintilian, *I. O.*, ii. 15.

³ Plato, in his Treatise, *De Legibus* (vi., p. 768), adopts all the distinguishing principles of the Athenian dikasteries. He particularly insists, that the citizen who does not take his share in the exercise of this function, conceives himself to have no concern or interest in the commonwealth—*ὅτι παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι*.

susceptibilities of the Athenian mind, as well as the previous practice and expansive tendencies of democratical citizenship, were also essential conditions—and that genuine taste for sitting in judgment and hearing both sides fairly, which, however Aristophanēs may caricature and deride it, was alike honourable and useful to the people. The first establishment of the dikasteries is nearly coincident with the great improvement of Attic tragedy in passing from Æschylus to Sophoklēs. The same development of the national genius, now preparing splendid manifestations both in tragic and comic poetry, was called with redoubled force into the path of oratory, by the new judicial system. A certain power of speech now became necessary, not merely for those who intended to take a prominent part in politics, but also for private citizens to vindicate their rights or repel accusations, in a court of justice. It was an accomplishment of the greatest practical utility, even apart from ambitious purposes, hardly less so than the use of arms or the practice of the gymnasium. Accordingly, the teachers of grammar and rhetoric, and the composers of written speeches to be delivered by others, now began to multiply and to acquire an unprecedented importance—as well at Athens as under the contemporary democracy of Syracuse¹, in which also some form of popular judicature was established.

We begin to hear, in the generation now growing up, of the rhetor and the sophist, as persons of influence and celebrity. These two names denoted persons of similar moral and intellectual endowments, or often indeed the same person, considered in different points of view², either as professing to improve the moral character, or as communicating power and facility of expression³. Antipho of the deme Rhamnus in Attica, Thrasymachus of Chalkēdon, Tisias of Syracuse, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdēra, Prodikus of Keōs, Theodōrus of Byzantium, Hippias of Elis, Zeno of Elea, were among the first who distinguished themselves in these departments of teaching. Antipho was the author of the earliest composed speech really spoken in a dikastery and preserved down to the later critics⁴. These men were mostly not citizens of Athens, though many of them belonged to towns comprehended in the Athenian empire, at a time when important judicial causes belonging to these towns were often carried up to be tried at Athens—while all of them looked to that city as a central point of action and distinction. The term 'Sophist', which Herodotus⁵ applies with sincere respect to men of distinguished wisdom such as Solon, Anacharsis, Pythagoras, etc., now came to be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conversation, and disputation, many of

¹ Aristot. *ap.* Cicero, *Brut.*, c. 12. Compare Diodor., xi. 87; Pausan., vi. 17, 8.

² Plato (*Gorgias*, c. 20-75; *Protagoras*, c. 9). Lysias is sometimes designated as a sophist ([Demosth.] *Cont. Neer.*, c. 7, p. 1351; Athenæ., xiii., p. 592).

³ See the first book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (alluded to in a former note) for his remarks on the technical teachers of rhetoric before his time. He remarks (and Plato had remarked before him) (i. 1 and 2) that their teaching was for the most part thoroughly narrow and practical, bearing exclusively on what was required for the practice of the dikastery (περί τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες περὶ ὧν τὰ τεχνολογείν). And though he himself lays down a far more profound and comprehensive theory of rhetoric and all matters appertaining to it (in a treatise which has rarely been surpassed in power of philosophical analysis), yet when he is recom-

mending his speculations to notice, he appeals to the great practical value of rhetorical teaching, as enabling a man to 'help himself' and fight his own battles in case of need—'ἄνθρωπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχροῦ μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτοῦ, λόγῳ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχροῦ' (i. 1, 3; compare iii. 1, 2; Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 41-55; *Protagoras*, c. 9; *Phædrus*, c. 43-50; *Euthydem.*, c. 1-31; and Xenophon, *Memorab.*, iii. 12, 2, 3).

See also the character of Proxenus in the *Anabasis* of Xenophon, ii. 6, 16; (Plutarch), *Vit. X. Orator.*, p. 307; Aristoph., *Nubes*, 1108; Xenophon, *Memorab.*, i. 2, 48; Plato, *Alkibiadēs*, i. c. 31, p. 119; and a striking passage in Plutarch's *Life of Cato the Elder*, c. 1.

⁴ [Plutarch], *Vit. X. Orator.*, p. 832; Quintilian, iii., 1, 10. Antipho is said to have been the teacher of the historian Thukydides.

⁵ Herodot., i. 29; iv. 95.

whom professed acquaintance with the whole circle of human science, physical as well as moral (then narrow enough), so far as was necessary to talk about any portion of it plausibly and effectively, and to answer any question which might be proposed to them. Though they passed from one Grecian town to another, partly in the capacity of envoys from their fellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents to numerous hearers, with much renown and large gain¹—they appear to have been viewed with jealousy and dislike by a large portion of the public². For at a time when every citizen pleaded his own cause before the dikastery, they imparted, to those who were rich enough to purchase it, a peculiar skill in the common weapons, which made them seem like fencing-masters or professional swordsmen amidst a society of untrained duellists³. Moreover, Sokratēs himself—a product of the same age, a disputant on the same subjects, and bearing the same name of a ‘Sophist’⁴—but despising political and judicial practice, and looking to the production of intellectual stimulus and moral impressions upon his hearers—Sokratēs—or rather, Plato speaking through the person of Sokratēs—carried on throughout his life a constant polemical warfare against the sophists and rhetors, in that negative vein in which he was unrivalled.

This is not the opportunity, however, for trying to distinguish the good from the evil in the working of the sophists and rhetors. At present it is enough that they were the natural product of the age, supplying those wants, and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly from the deliberations of the Ekklesia, but still more from the contentions before the dikastery—in which latter a far greater number of citizens took active part, with or without their own consent. The public and frequent dikasteries constituted by Periklēs opened to the Athenian mind precisely that career of improvement which was best suited to its natural aptitude. They were essential to the development of that demand out of which grew not only Grecian oratory, but also, as secondary products, the speculative moral and political philosophy, and the didactic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, which long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed away. And it was one of the first measures of the oligarchy of Thirty⁵, to forbid, by an express law, any teaching of the art of speaking. Aristophanēs derides the Athenians for their love of talk and controversy, as if it had enfeebled their military energy; but in his time most

¹ Plato (*Hippias Major*, c. 1, 2; *Menon*, p. 95; and *Gorgias*, c. 1, with Stallbaum’s note); Diodor., xii. 53; Pausan., vi. 17, 8.

² Xenophon, *Memorab.*, i. 2, 31. To teach or learn the art of speech was the common reproach made by the vulgar against philosophers and lettered men—τὸ κοινὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον (Xenoph., *Memor.*, i. 2, 31). Compare Æschinēs, *Cont. Timar.*, about Demosthenēs, c. 25, 27.

³ Such is probably the meaning of that remarkable passage in which Thukydides describes the Athenian rhetor Antipho (viii. 68): ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παρίων οὐδ’ ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἑκούσιος οὐδὲνα, ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ πῶτος τῷ πλῆθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μὲντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικάστηρι καὶ ἐν δῆμῳ, πλείστα εἰς ἀνῆρ, ὅστις ἐμβουλευσάτω τι, δυναμένος ὠφελεῖν. Compare Plato (*Protagoras*, c. 8; *Phædrus*, c. 86), Isokratēs, *Cont. Sophistas*, Or. xiii., p. 293, where he complains of the teachers—οἵτινες ὑπέσχετο, δικάσσειν διδάσκειν, ἐκλεξάμενοι τὸ δυσχερέστατον τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὃ τῶν φθοιούτων

ἔργον εἶναι λέγειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῶν προεστώτων τῆς τοιαύτης παιδείσεως, Demosthen., *De Fals. Legal.*, c. 70, 71, p. 417-420; and Æschin., *Cont. Ktesiphon*, c. 9, p. 371—κακοῦργον σοφιστήν, οἰόμενον ῥήμασι τοὺς νόμους ἀναρῆσειν.

⁴ Æschinēs, *Cont. Timarch.*, c. 34, p. 74. Ὑμεῖς μὲν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτην μὲν τὸν σοφιστήν ἀπεκρίνατε.

Among the sophists whom Isokratēs severely criticises, he evidently seems to include Plato, as may be seen by the contrast between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, which he particularly notes, and which is so conspicuously set forth in the Platonic writings (Isokratēs, *Cont. Sophistas*, Or. xiii., p. 293; also p. 295). We know also that Lysias called both Plato and Æschinēs the disciple of Sokratēs, by the name of *Sophists* (Aristeidēs, *Oral. Platonic.*, xlv. Ὑπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, p. 407, vol. ii., ed. Dindorf). Aristeidēs remarks justly that the name ‘Sophist’ was a general name, including all the philosophers, teachers, and lettered men.

⁵ Xenoph., *Memor.*, i. 2, 31: λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν.

undoubtedly, that reproach was not true—nor did it become true, even in part, until the crushing misfortunes which marked the close of the Peloponnesian war. During the course of that war, restless and energetic action was the characteristic of Athens even in a greater degree than oratory or political discussion, though before the time of Demosthenes a material alteration had taken place.

The establishment of these paid dikasteries at Athens was thus one of the most important and prolific events in all Grecian history. The pay helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the age of military service. Elderly men were the best persons for such a service, and were preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta, and as it seems, in heroic Greece. Periklēs has been often censured for this institution, as if he had been the first to ensure pay¹ to dikasts who before served for nothing, and had thus introduced poor citizens into courts previously composed of citizens above poverty. But in the first place, this supposition is not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were no such constant dikasteries previously acting without pay; next, if it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor citizens would have nullified the popular working of these bodies, and would have prevented them from answering any longer to the reigning sentiment at Athens. Nor could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay to those who thus rendered regular service. It was indeed an essential item in the whole scheme and purpose, so that the suppression of the pay of itself seems to have suspended the dikasteries, while the oligarchy of Four Hundred was established—and it can only be discussed in that light.

APPENDIX

THE account of the ascendancy of Periklēs in the foregoing pages is derived from the statements of Plutarch (*Periklēs*, xvi.) and Cicero (*De Oratore*, iii. 39, 138)—namely, that Periklēs was supreme in Athens from 469 to 429. This idea is, perhaps, derived ultimately from Theopompus, but it is not upheld by the *Ath. Pol.* (c. 27). It appears rather (1) that Periklēs did not become leader of the democratic party till the death of Ephialtēs, and (2) that his ascendancy was seriously threatened by a revival of aristocratic power in 453-451. For, as to (1), we learn that Periklēs' first appearance in public life was in 463 at the trial of Kimon, when he was still a young man. This statement is corroborated by the fact that there is no trace of any prominent activity on the part of Periklēs either

¹ The first mention of a paid jury occurs in the inscription recording the settlement at Halikarnassus after the expulsion of the tyrant Lygdamis, probably between 460 and 455 (Roehl, *Inscr. Gr. Ant.*, 500; Hicks and Hill, 27, l. 26 ff.). But this was a special body adjudicating on property claims where high ability and integrity were required.

In this connexion we may also mention a measure carried by Periklēs in 451 (*Ath. Pol.*, c. 26, 5)—i.e., when this statesman was organizing the paid juries in opposition to Kimon; the franchise (and with it the right of sitting on paid juries) was to be restricted to those who could prove Athenian parentage on both sides. That this measure was strictly enforced is proved by the story in Philoch. (fr. 90) and Plutarch (*Periklēs*, c. 37), that on the occasion of Psammetichus, 'king of Libya', sending a dole of corn (445 B.C.) 4,760 were disfranchised by a revision of the voters' list. If the restoration in *Ath. Pol.* (fr. c. 18, διαφρόσις τῶν δικαστῶν) is correct, the true purpose of this restriction of franchise becomes clear. This measure is also of

interest as illustrating the exclusive policy of Periklēs towards members of the Delian League, which Grote himself censures (pp. 335, 347), and Duruy (*Hist. of Greece*, Engl. transl., ii. 2, p. 490 ff.) contrasts with the liberal grants of connubium which Rome extended towards her socii. Indeed the short-sightedness of this enactment is so apparent that it would be tempting to follow Duncker's (*Berl. Akad. Sitzungsberichte*, p. 936 ff.) rejection of it as a later fabrication. But the statement of *Ath. Pol.* is here based on an Athenian official document, and cannot therefore be disregarded.

Payment for the troops (in addition to the former kit-money) is also mentioned as a Periklean innovation in Plut., *Per.*, ii.

It is not unlikely that Periklēs also introduced the βουλευτικός μισθός, which certainly existed in 411 (Thuk., viii. 69). At any rate, the functions of the boulē, like those of the dikasteries, grew much more complex under the democratic bureaucracy established by Periklēs (cf. [Xen.], *Resp. Ath.*, iii. 1.—Ed.

in war or in politics before this. Moreover, Periklēs was only one of the accusers in this trial, and his part was merely formal. It would appear from this that his connexion with the trial was afterwards remembered not for its intrinsic importance, but as the first public action of a man afterwards famous. Again, in the overthrow of the Areopagus, there is every reason to regard Ephialtēs, not Periklēs, as the democratic protagonist, and this in spite of the testimony of secondary authorities, who agree in regarding the struggle as a duel between Periklēs and Kimon. It is true that the *Ath. Pol.* is utterly wrong in associating Themistoklēs with Ephialtēs, yet it is equally clear that the laws made at this crisis are not attributable to Periklēs, for the Thirty in repealing these laws are spoken of as abolishing the 'laws of Ephialtēs and Archedestratus' (*Ath. Pol.*, c. 35). Further in the *Atthis* of Philochorus it is stated that Ephialtēs left to the Areopagus only τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος. Now obviously the man who led the democratic revolt at this crucial moment must have been the recognised party leader—i.e., Ephialtēs, not Periklēs, was pre-eminent up to 461. Among other evidence pointing in the same direction may be quoted Plutarch's *Kimon* (16), which shows that Kimon's proposal to aid Sparta against the Helots was opposed by Ephialtēs, who also is described as 'a terror to the oligarchs' by his attacks on official corruption and incapacity. Further, it was Ephialtēs who was assassinated, and the story that Periklēs procured this deed only confirms the view that Ephialtēs was regarded as the prime mover in the agitation (*cf.* p. 320, n. 3).

As to (2), on the hypothesis above maintained (see note, p. 320) concerning Kimon's return from ostracism, it follows that Periklēs was hard pressed by the oligarchs in 453-451. We shall be forced to conclude that, on the failures in Egypt (454) and Acarnania, public feeling veered round in favour of Kimon, who returned probably in 451 (spring). All expeditions against Greek states were discontinued after 453. In the summer of 451 Greek unity was cemented by the Thirty Years' Agreement (which we know was about to elapse in 421) between Sparta and Argos, and in 450 by the Five Years' Peace between Athens and Sparta. This philo-Laconian attitude, the prime factor in the Kimonian policy, constitutes a complete reversal of the orthodox democratic policy since 461. If we further adopt the chronology given above for the Perikleian law of citizenship (note, p. 332), the introduction of pay for the dikasts (note, p. 332), we shall see that during these years Periklēs was doing his utmost to reinstate himself in the favour of the Ekklesiā, wherein the influence of Kimon had temporarily superseded his own. It follows that the forty years' ascendancy of Periklēs is a false inference on the part of writers to whom Periklēs stood for the period of Athenian greatness. His pre-eminence will be seen to begin not earlier than 461, to be seriously menaced between 453 and 449, and to have been established finally only on the ostracism of Thukydidēs. Ephialtēs was the opponent of Kimon, Thukydidēs (son of Melesias) of Periklēs.—Ed.

CHAPTER XVII [XLVII]

FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

THE judicial alterations effected at Athens by Periklēs and Ephialtēs, described in the preceding chapter, gave to a large proportion of the citizens direct jury functions and an active interest in the constitution, such as they had never before enjoyed, the change being at once a mark of previous growth of democratical sentiment during the past, and a cause of its farther development during the future. The Athenian people were at this time ready for personal exertion in all directions. Military service on land or sea was not less conformable to their dispositions than attendance in the ekklesia or in the dikastery at home. The naval service

especially was prosecuted with a degree of assiduity which brought about continual improvement in skill and efficiency ; while the poorer citizens, of whom it chiefly consisted, were more exact in obedience and discipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom the infantry or the cavalry were drawn¹. The maritime multitude, in addition to self-confidence and courage, acquired by this laborious training an increased skill, which placed the Athenian navy every year more and more above the rest of Greece. And the perfection of this force became the more indispensable as the Athenian empire was now again confined to the sea and seaport towns.

The maritime confederacy—originally commenced at Delos under the headship of Athens, but with a common synod and deliberative voice on the part of each member—had now become transformed into a confirmed empire on the part of Athens, over the remaining states as foreign dependencies, all of them rendering tribute except Chios, Samos, and Lesbos. These three still remained on their original footing of autonomous allies, retaining their armed force, ships, and fortifications, with the obligation of furnishing military and naval aid when required, but not of paying tribute. We must recollect that the confederacy, even in its original structure, was contracted for permanent objects, and was permanently binding by the vote of its majority, like the Spartan confederacy, upon every individual member². It was destined to keep out the Persian fleet, and to maintain the police of the Ægean. Consistently with these objects, no individual member could be allowed to secede from the confederacy, and thus to acquire the benefit of protection at the cost of the remainder : so that when Naxos and other members actually did secede, the step was taken as a revolt, and Athens only performed her duty as president of the confederacy in reducing them.

It was not likely that the allies should conspire unanimously to break up the confederacy, and discontinue the collection of contribution from each of the members ; nor would it have been at all desirable that they should do so. For while Greece generally would have been a great loser by such a proceeding, the allies themselves would have been the greatest losers of all, inasmuch as they would have been exposed without defence to the Persian and Phœnician fleets. But the Athenians committed the capital fault of taking the whole alliance into their own hands, and treating the allies purely as subjects, without seeking to attach them by any form of political incorporation or collective meeting and discussion—without taking any pains to maintain community of feeling or idea of a joint interest—without admitting any control, real or even pretended, over themselves as managers. Had they attempted to do this, it might have proved difficult to accomplish—so powerful was the force of geographical dissemination, the tendency to isolated civic life, and the repugnance to any permanent extramural obligations, in every Grecian community. But they do not appear ever to have made the attempt. Finding Athens exalted by circumstances to empire, and the allies degraded into subjects, the Athenian statesmen grasped at the exaltation as a matter of pride as well as profit. Even Periklēs, the most prudent and far-sighted of them, betrayed no consciousness that an empire without the cement of

¹ Xenophon, *Memorab.*, lii. 3, 18.

² Thukyd., i. 11, 30 : about the Spartan confederacy—*εἰρημένον, κύριον εἶναι, ὅ, τι ἀν τὸ πλῆθος τῶν*

ἐνυμμάχων ψηφίσσεται, ἥν μή τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ.

some all-pervading interest or attachment, although not practically oppressive, must nevertheless have a natural tendency to become more and more unpopular, and ultimately to crumble in pieces.

Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of equal alliance, Periklēs formally disclaimed it. He maintained that Athens owed to her subject allies no account of the money received from them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy and maintaining the safety of the Ægean waters¹. This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had undertaken, and provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies had no right to ask questions or exercise control. That it was faithfully discharged no one could deny. No ship of war except from Athens and her allies was ever seen between the eastern and western shores of the Ægean. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes was kept on duty in these waters, chiefly manned by Athenian citizens, and beneficial as well from the protection afforded to commerce as for keeping the seamen in constant pay and training². And such was the effective superintendence maintained, that in the disastrous period preceding the thirty years' truce, when Athens lost Megara and Bœotia, and with difficulty recovered Eubœa, none of her numerous maritime subjects took the opportunity to revolt.

The total of these distinct tributary cities is said to have amounted to 1,000, according to a verse of Aristophanēs³, which cannot be under the truth, though it may well be, and probably is, greatly above the truth. The annual tribute was placed under the superintendence of the Hellenotamiæ, originally officers of the confederacy, but now removed from Delos to Athens, and acting altogether as an Athenian treasury-board. The sum total of the Athenian revenue⁴ from all sources, including this tribute, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war is stated by Xenophon at 1,000 talents. Customs, harbour and market-dues, receipts from the silver-mines at Laurium, rents of public property, fines from judicial sentences, a tax per head upon slaves, the annual payment made by each metic, etc., may have made up a larger sum than 400 talents; which sum, added to the 600 talents from tribute, would make the total named by Xenophon. Whatever may have been the actual magnitude of the Athenian budget prior to the Peloponnesian war, we know that during the larger part of the administration of Periklēs, the revenue including tribute was so managed as to leave a large annual surplus⁵; insomuch that a treasure of coined money was accumulated in the Acropolis during the years preceding the Peloponnesian war—which treasure when at its maximum reached the great sum of 9,700 talents (= 2,230,000*l.*), and was still at 6,000 talents, after a serious drain for various purposes, at the moment when that war began⁶. This system of public economy, constantly laying by a considerable sum year after year—in which Athens stood alone, since none of the Peloponnesian states had any public reserve

¹ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 12.

² *Ibid.*, c. 11.

³ Aristophan., *Vesp.*, 707.

⁴ Xenophon, *Anab.*, vii. 1, 27: οὐ μείων χιλίων ταλάντων: compare Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens*, b. iii., ch. 7, 15, 19.

⁵ It is probable that the bulk of the Acropolis fund already existed at the date of the transference of the treasury from Delos (454 B.C.), being chiefly the outcome of Kimon's victorious campaigns (*cf.* note to app. on p. 365, n. 1). After Kimon's death the League funds were called upon to defray,

not merely the expenditure during the campaigns of 447-445 and 440-439, but the outlay on the new Athenian buildings. At the same time a squadron of 60 triremes (Plut., *Per.*, 11) continued to be kept in commission, hence the surplus cannot have run up to an appreciable total. Holm (*Gk. Hist.*, Eng. transl., ii., pp. 214, 215) calculates that to maintain a fleet of 66 triremes for one year would cost 460 talents—i.e., would swallow up all the regular tribute.—Ed.

⁶ Thukyd., ii. 13.

whatever¹, goes far of itself to vindicate Periklēs from the charge of having wasted the public money in mischievous distributions for the purpose of obtaining popularity; and also to exonerate the Athenian Demos from that reproach of a greedy appetite for living by the public purse which it is common to advance against them. After the death of Kimon, no farther expeditions were undertaken against the Persians. Even for some years before his death, not much appears to have been done. The tribute money thus remained unexpended, and kept in reserve, as the presidential duties of Athens prescribed, against future attack, which might at any time be renewed.

Athens was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, with Attica for her territory. She was a capital or imperial city—a despot-city, was the expression used by her enemies, and even sometimes by her own citizens²—with many dependencies attached to her, and bound to follow her orders. To establish Athenian interests among the dependent territories was one important object in the eyes of Periklēs. While discouraging all distant³ and rash enterprises, such as invasions of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out many kleruchies⁴, and colonies of Athenian citizens intermingled with allies, on islands and parts of the coast. He conducted 1,000 citizens to the Thracian Chersonese, 500 to Naxos, and 250 to Andros. In the Chersonese, he farther repelled the barbarous Thracian invaders from without, and even undertook the labour of carrying a wall of defence across the isthmus which connected the peninsula with Thrace, since the barbarous Thracian tribes, though expelled some time before by Kimon⁵, had still continued to renew their incursions from time to time. Ever since the occupation of the elder Miltiadēs about eighty years before, there had been in this peninsula many Athenian proprietors, apparently intermingled with half-civilized Thracians: the settlers now acquired both greater numerical strength and better protection, though it does not appear that the cross-wall was permanently maintained. The maritime expeditions of Periklēs even extended into the Euxine sea, as far as the important Greek city of Sinôpê, then governed by a despot named Timesilaus, against whom a large proportion of the citizens were in active discontent. Lamachus was left with thirteen Athenian triremes to assist in expelling the despot, who was driven into exile along with his friends and party. The properties of these exiles were confiscated, and assigned to the maintenance of six hundred Athenian citizens, admitted to equal fellowship and residence with the Sinôpians. We may presume that on this occasion Sinôpê became a member of the Athenian tributary

¹ Thukyd., i. 80.

² By Periklēs, Thukyd., ii. 63. By Kleon, Thukyd., iii. 37. By the envoys at Mélos, v. 89. By Euphemus, vi. 85. By the hostile Corinthians, i. 124, as a matter of course.

³ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 20.

⁴ In addition to the literary evidence a good deal of information concerning the kleruchies is to be derived from inscriptions. The tribute-lists often confirm the statements of authors by showing a reduction of tribute in places newly colonized, and sometimes enable us to fix the date: thus Andros must have received its settlers in 450, Naxos by 447, the Chersonese in 447 (though Diodorus, xi., 58, gives 453-452), Lemnos and Imbros by 447, Chalkis and Eretria by 445. C.I.A., i. 31 (Hicks and Hill, 41) gives details concerning the settlement of Brea (which, however, was strictly a colony, not a kleruchy) in Thrace (cf. Plut., *Per.*, i. 1);

C.I.A., 340 (Hicks and Hill, 59) mentions the kleruchy at Potidæa; C.I.A., 13, at Kolophon (by 446); C.I.A., i. 226 and 230, at Astakus in the Black Sea (cf. Strabo, xii., p. 563), and a coin inscribed *Περικλέους* (?) a new settlement at Amisus (Brit. Mus. Cat., *Pontus*, pl. ii., No. 9, and Strabo, xii., p. 547). The total number of kleruchs sent by Periklēs was, according to Duncker (*Gesch. des Alt.*, ix. 237), 15,000.

It is important to distinguish between three kinds of kleruchies: (1) Those where the original inhabitants were all expelled (e.g., Potidæa, Ægina, and Mélos), which thus became a part of the 'ager Atticus', and paid no further tribute; (2) where the settlers were only a small proportion of the community (e.g., Naxos and Andros); (3) where they did not reside on their holdings, but formed a garrison in the capital (e.g., Lesbos).—Ed.

⁵ Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 14.

alliance, if it had not been so before. Moreover the numerous and well-equipped Athenian fleet under the command of Periklēs produced an imposing effect upon the barbarous princes and tribes along the coast¹, contributing certainly to the security of Grecian trade, and probably to the acquisition of new dependent allies².

It was by successive proceedings of this sort that many detachments of Athenian citizens became settled in various portions of the maritime empire of the city—some rich, investing their property in the islands as more secure (from the incontestable superiority of Athens at sea) even than Attica, which since the loss of the Megarid could not be guarded against a Peloponnesian land invasion³—others poor, and hiring themselves out as labourers⁴. The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, as well as the territory of Histiaæ, on the north of Eubœa, were completely occupied by Athenian proprietors and citizens: other places were partially so occupied. And it was doubtless advantageous to the islanders to associate themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of the Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations occasionally for the commerce of her dependent allies, as we see by the fact that shortly before the Peloponnesian war she excluded the Megarians from all their ports. The commercial relations between Peiræus and the Ægean reached their maximum during the interval immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war⁵. These relations were not confined to the country east and north of Attica: they reached also the western regions. The most important settlements founded by Athens during this period were Amphipolis in Thrace and Thurii in Italy.

Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and other Greeks, under the conduct of the Athenian Hagnon, in 437 B.C. It was situated near the river Strymon in Thrace, on the eastern bank, and at the spot where the Strymon resumes its river-course after emerging from the lake above. It was originally a township or settlement of the Edonian

¹ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 19, 20.

² Besides the settlements at Sinôpe, Amisus, and Astakus, the spread of Athenian influence to the Euxine Sea is proved by a tribute-list (C.I.A., i. 37) which enumerates seventeen dependencies in this region. The chief contributors are Nymphæum and Olbia on the Skythian coast, which must have acquired their intimate relations with Athens by reason of the great corn-trade which plied between these places. The closeness and permanence of this intimacy is shown by the fact that Leucon, the third ruler (387–347) of the Bosphoran kingdom of the Spartocid dynasty, received the Athenian citizenship. It is interesting that the princes of this dynasty frequently used the title of 'Archon', and that, though strictly tyrants, they were always spoken of as dynasts. See V. V. Latyshev, *Inscr. orae Septent. Ponti Euxini* (Petersburg, 1890).—Ed.

³ [Xenophon], *Resp. Ath.*, ii. 16. Compare also Xenophon (*Memorabil.*, ii. 8, 1, and *Symposion*, iv. 31).

⁴ See the case of the free labourer and the husbandman at Naxos, Plato, *Euthyphro*, c. 3.

⁵ The extensive commercial relations of Athens both with the Levant and the West are vouched for by [Xenophon], *Resp. Ath.*, ii. 7, which mentions intercourse with Egypt, Cyprus, Lydia, Pontus, Peloponnese, Sicily, and Italy; and Hermippus, *Phormion*, fr. 63, which enumerates Athenian imports. Various archaeological documents attest the same fact. Thus (a) inscriptions (C.I.A., i. 40, 42—cf. Hicks and Hill, 60; Meyer, *Gesch.*

des Ath., iv., ch. 2, § 426) illustrate the corn-trade with the Black Sea and the timber shippings from Macedonia. (b) The finds of vases in South Russia help to explain how Athens paid for her corn, and the plentiful collections of Attic pottery in Etruria and South Italy prove that the Corinthians were being successfully opposed in their Western trade. (c) The prevalence of Athenian coinage throughout the Ægean (where many other towns closed their mints in the fifth century), and even so far as Naukratis (Holm, *Gk. Hist.*, ii., p. 258), and the widespread adoption of the Attic standard of coin-weights point to something like a monopoly of Levantine trade.

In this respect the comparison of Periklean Athens with the mercantile republics of Italy is well worth working out on the lines laid down by Holm (*Gk. Hist.* passim), and indeed the influence of trade on the finances and the politics of the city cannot easily be exaggerated. Even Thukydides, despite his studied neglect of the social and economical phenomena of the day, occasionally drops a hint about the importance of commercial considerations (iii. 86, iv. 108, vi. 90). It should therefore, be remembered that besides the purely political factors which determined the course of fifth-century history in Greece there were other less conspicuous yet more lasting and cogent influences at work; the student who would explain the phenomena of the period with the evidence of Thukydides alone will inevitably obtain a distorted picture of the situation.—Ed.

Thracians, called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways—in a situation doubly valuable, both as being close upon the bridge over the Strymon, and as a convenient centre for the ship-timber and gold and silver mines of the neighbouring region. It was distant about three English miles from the Athenian settlement of Eion at the mouth of the river. It is highly probable that individual Athenian citizens, from Eion and from Thasus, connected themselves with powerful Thracian families, and became in this manner actively engaged in mining—to their own great profit, as well as to the profit of the city collectively, since the property of the kleruchs, or Athenian citizens occupying colonial lands, bore its share in case of direct taxes being imposed on property generally. Among such fortunate adventurers we may number the historian Thukydides himself, seemingly descended from Athenian parents intermarrying with Thracians, and himself married to a wife either Thracian or belonging to a family of Athenian colonists in that region, through whom he became possessed of a large property in the mines, as well as of great influence in the districts around¹.

The colony under Hagnon, despatched from Athens in the year 437 B.C., appears to have been both numerous and well-sustained, inasmuch as it conquered and maintained the valuable position of Ennea Hodoi in spite of those formidable Edonian neighbours who had baffled the two preceding attempts. Its name of Ennea Hodoi was exchanged for that of Amphipolis—the hill on which the new town was situated being bounded on three sides by the river. The settlers seem to have been of mixed extraction, comprising no large proportion of Athenians. Amphipolis, connected with the sea by the Strymon and the port of Eion, became the most important of all the Athenian dependencies in reference to Thrace and Macedonia.

The colony of Thurii on the coast of the Gulf of Tarentum in Italy, near the site and on the territory of the ancient Sybaris, was founded by Athens about seven years earlier than Amphipolis, not long after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce with Sparta, B.C. 443. Since the destruction of the old Sybaris by the Krotoniates, in 509 B.C., its territory had for the most part remained unappropriated. The descendants of the former inhabitants dispersed at Laüs and in other portions of the territory, were not strong enough to establish any new city: nor did it suit the views of the Krotoniates themselves to do so. After an interval of more than sixty years, however, during which one unsuccessful attempt at occupation had been made by some Thessalian settlers, these Sybarites at length prevailed upon the Athenians to undertake and protect the re-colonization, the proposition having been made in vain to the Spartans. Lampon and Xenokritus, the former a prophet and interpreter of oracles, were sent by Periklēs² with ten ships as chiefs of the new colony of Thurii,

¹ Thukyd., iv. 105; Marcellinus, *Vit. Thucyd.*, c. 19. The historian was connected by blood with Miltiadēs and Kimon, as well as with Olorus king of one of the Thracian tribes, whose daughter Hegesipylē was wife of Miltiadēs the conqueror of Marathon.

² It has been argued that the colonization of Thurii was proposed by the opponents of Periklēs, and that the latter was merely able to modify the original scheme. This 'opposition' scheme cannot have originated with the aristocrats, for the policy of Kimon (and later on of Nikias) was entirely concentrated on Ægean and Eastern expansion. On the other hand, the democrats ever since Themistoklēs had an eye on the West, and in the days of Periklēs those rash enterprises against

'Sicily, Carthage, and Etruria', which during the Peloponnesian war were first carried into effect were being freely mooted.

But if Periklēs (Plut., *Per.*, 20) set himself against such reckless adventures it does not follow that he was altogether averse to Western expansion. Indeed, there is evidence of such tentative operations in the days of Periklēs' first ascendancy (*cf.* ch. 27, introduction); moreover, his aggressive policy in the Corinthian gulf is more intelligible if we attribute to him some such ulterior scheme, and his alliance with Korkyra was clearly based on similar considerations (Thuk., i. 36).

It should also be observed that Lampon and Hippodamus were personal friends of Periklēs.

The incomplete character of the Thurian scheme,

founded under the auspices of Athens. The settlers, collected from all parts of Greece, included Dorians, Ionians, islanders, Bœotians, as well as Athenians. But the descendants of the ancient Sybarites procured themselves to be treated as privileged citizens, monopolizing for themselves the possession of political powers as well as the most valuable lands in the immediate vicinity of the wall. Such spirit of privilege and monopoly appears to have been a frequent manifestation among the ancient colonies, and often fatal either to their tranquillity or to their growth, sometimes to both. In the case of Thurii, founded under the auspices of the democratical Athens, it was not likely to have any lasting success. And we find that after no very long period, the majority of the colonists rose in insurrection against the privileged Sybarites, either slew or expelled them, and divided the entire territory of the city upon equal principles among the colonists of every different race. And the city from this time forward, democratically governed, appears to have flourished steadily and without internal dissension for thirty years, until the ruinous disasters of the Athenians before Syracuse occasioned the overthrow of the Athenian party at Thurii. How miscellaneous the population of Thurii was, we may judge from the denominations of the ten tribes—such was the number of tribes established, after the model of Athens—Arkas, Achaïs, Eleia, Bœotia, Amphiktyonis, Doris, Ias, Athenais, Euboïs, Nesiôtis. From this mixture of race they could not agree in recognising or honouring an Athenian Ækist, or indeed any Ækist except Apollo¹. The Spartan general Kleandridas, banished a few years before for having suffered himself to be bribed by Athens along with King Pleistoanax, removed to Thurii and was appointed general of the citizens in their war against Tarentum. That war was ultimately adjusted by the joint foundation of the new city of Herakleia half-way between the two—in the fertile territory called Siritis².

The most interesting circumstance respecting Thurii is that the rhetor Lysias, and the historian Herodotus were both domiciliated there as citizens. The city was connected with Athens, yet seemingly only by a feeble tie; it was not numbered among the tributary subject allies. From the circumstance that so small a proportion of the settlers at Thurii were native Athenians, we may infer that not many of the latter at that time were willing to put themselves so far out of connection with Athens—even though tempted by the prospect of lots of land in a fertile and promising territory. And Periklês was probably anxious that those poor citizens, for whom emigration was desirable, should rather become kleruchs in some of the islands or ports of the Ægean, where they would serve (like the colonies of Rome) as a sort of garrison for the maintenance of the Athenian empire³.

The fourteen years between the Thirty years' truce and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war are a period of full maritime empire on the part of Athens—partially indeed resisted, but never with success. They are a period of peace with all cities extraneous to her own empire, and of

with its small proportion of Athenian colonists (only 10 per cent. Athenians and 30 per cent. from other parts of the League) may be attributed not so much to the stress of party politics as to the distance of the settlement and to the fact that the Athenian surplus population had already been diminished by perhaps 15,000 by Periklês, numerous kleruchies. That such a drain was

proving excessive is clearly shown by the international character of the Amphipolis foundation; Periklês would surely have secured this post for Athenian settlers only, had this been at all feasible.—Ed.

¹ Diodor., xii. 35. [This occurred in 434.—Ed.]

² Diodor., xii. 11, 12; Strabo, vi. 264; Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 22.

³ Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 11.

splendid decorations to the city itself, emanating from the genius of Pheidias and others, in sculpture as well as in architecture.

Since the death of Kimon, Periklès had become, gradually but entirely, the first citizen in the commonwealth. His qualities told for more, the longer they were known, and even the disastrous reverses which preceded the Thirty years' truce had not overthrown him, since he had protested against that expedition of Tolmidès into Bœotia out of which they first arose. But if the personal influence of Periklès had increased, the party opposed to him seems also to have become stronger and better organized than before, and to have acquired a leader in many respects more effective than Kimon—Thukydidès son of Melèsias¹. The new chief was a near relative of Kimon, but of a character and talents more analogous to that of Periklès—a statesman and orator rather than a general. Under Thukydidès, the political and parliamentary opposition against Periklès assumed a constant character and an organization, such as Kimon with his exclusively military aptitudes had never been able to establish. The aristocratical party in the commonwealth—the 'honourable and respectable citizens' as we find them styled, adopting their own nomenclature—now imposed upon themselves the obligation of undeviating regularity in their attendance on the public assembly, sitting together in a particular section so as to be conspicuously parted from the Demos. In this manner their applause and dissent, their mutual encouragement to each other, their distribution of parts to different speakers, was made more conducive to the party purposes than it had been before when these distinguished persons were intermingled with the mass of citizens².

Such an opposition, made to Periklès in all the full licence which a democratical constitution permitted, must have been both efficient and embarrassing. But the pointed severance of the aristocratical chiefs, which Thukydidès son of Melèsias introduced, contributed probably at once to rally the democratical majority round Periklès, and to exasperate the bitterness of party conflict³. As far as we can make out the grounds of the opposition, it turned partly upon the pacific policy of Periklès towards the Persians, partly upon his expenditure for home ornament. Thukydidès contended that Athens was disgraced in the eyes of the Greeks by having drawn the confederate treasure from Delos to her own acropolis, under pretence of greater security—and then employing it, not in prosecuting war against the Persians⁴, but in beautifying Athens by new temples and costly statues. To this Periklès replied that Athens had undertaken the obligation, in consideration of the tribute-money, to protect her allies and keep off from them every foreign enemy—that she had accomplished this object completely at the present, and retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security for the future—that under such circumstances, she owed no account to her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, but was at liberty to employ it for purposes useful and honourable to the city. In this point of view it was an object of great

¹ Thukydidès, Nikias, and Thérarménès are described by the *Ath. Pol.* (c. 28) as the three best statesmen after the 'ancients'.—Ed.

² Compare the speech of Nikias, in reference to the younger citizens and partisans of Alkibiadès sitting together near the latter in the assembly (Thukyd., vi. 13). See also Aristophanes, *Ekklesiaz.*, 298 *et seq.*, about partisans sitting near together.

³ Plutarch, *Periklès*, c. 11.

⁴ *Ibid.*, c. 12.

Compare the speech of the Leshians, and their complaints against Athens, at the moment of their revolt in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war (Thukyd., iii. 10), where a similar accusation is brought forward.

public importance to render Athens imposing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas generally, by improved fortifications—by accumulated embellishments, sculptural and architectural—and by religious festivals frequent, splendid, musical, and poetical.

Considering the grounds of the debate on both sides, the answer was perfectly satisfactory. For when we look at the very large sum which Periklēs continually kept in reserve in the treasury, no one could reasonably complain that his expenditure for ornamental purposes was carried so far as to encroach upon the exigencies of defence. What Thukydidēs and his partisans appear to have urged was that this common fund should still continue to be spent in aggressive warfare against the Persian king, in Egypt and elsewhere—conformably to the projects pursued by Kimon during his life¹. But Periklēs was right in contending that such outlay would have been simply wasteful, of no use either to Athens or her allies, though risking all the chances of distant defeat, such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt. The *allies* indeed might have had some ground of complaint against Periklēs, either for not reducing the amount of tribute required from them, seeing that it was more than sufficient for the legitimate purposes of the confederacy—or for not having collected their positive sentiment as to the disposal of it. But we do not find that this was the argument adopted by Thukydidēs and his party; nor was it calculated to find favour either with aristocrats, or democrats, in the Athenian assembly.

Admitting the injustice of Athens—an injustice common to both the parties in that city, not less to Kimon than to Periklēs—in acting as despot instead of chief, and in discontinuing all appeal to the active and hearty concurrence of her numerous allies, we shall find that the schemes of Periklēs were nevertheless eminently Pan-Hellenic. In strengthening and ornamenting Athens, in developing the full activity of her citizens, in providing temples, religious offerings, works of art, solemn festivals, all of surpassing attraction—he intended to exalt her into something greater than an imperial city with numerous dependent allies. He wished to make her the centre of Grecian feeling, the stimulus of Grecian intellect, and the type of strong democratical patriotism combined with full liberty of individual taste and aspiration. He wished not merely to retain the adherence of the subject states, but to attract the admiration and spontaneous deference of independent neighbours, so as to procure for Athens a moral ascendancy much beyond the range of her direct power. And he succeeded in elevating the city to a visible grandeur, which made her appear even much stronger than she really was—and which had the farther effect of softening to the minds of her subjects the humiliating sense of obedience.

So bitter, however, was the opposition made by Thukydidēs and his party to this projected expenditure, that the dispute came after no long time to a vote of ostracism. The result of the voting was such that an adequate legal majority condemned Thukydidēs to ostracism². And it seems that the majority must have been very decisive, for the party of Thukydidēs was completely broken by it. We hear of no other single individual equally formidable, as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining life of Periklēs.

¹ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 20.

² *Ibid.*, c. 11-14.

The ostracism of Thukydídēs apparently took place about two years¹ after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce (443-442 B.C.), and it is to the period immediately following, that the great Perikleian works belong. The southern wall of the acropolis had been built out of the spoils brought by Kimon from his Persian expeditions; but the third of the long walls connecting Athens with the harbour was the proposition of Periklēs, at what precise time we do not know. The long walls originally completed (not long after the battle of Tanagra, as has already been stated) were two, one from Athens to Peiræus, another from Athens to Phalērum²: the space between them was broad, and if in the hands of an enemy, the communication with Peiræus would be interrupted. Accordingly Periklēs now induced the people to construct a third or intermediate wall, running parallel with the first wall to Peiræus, and within a short distance (seemingly near one furlong) from it: so that the communication between the city and the port was placed beyond all possible interruption, even assuming an enemy to have got within the Phalēric wall. It was seemingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and arsenal in Peiræus, alleged by Isokratēs to have cost 1,000 talents, were constructed³; while the town itself of Peiræus was laid out anew with straight streets intersecting at right angles. Apparently this was something new in Greece—the towns generally, and Athens itself in particular, having been built without any symmetry, or width, or continuity of streets⁴. Hippodamus the Milesian, a man of considerable attainments in the physical philosophy of the age, derived much renown as the earliest town architect, for having laid out the Peiræus on a regular plan. Moreover, we are told that the new colonial town of Thurii, to which Hippodamus went as a settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form as to straight and wide streets⁵.

The new scheme upon which the Peiræus was laid out was not without its value as one visible proof of the naval grandeur of Athens. But the buildings in Athens and on the acropolis formed the real glory of the Perikleian age. A new theatre, termed the Odeon, was constructed for musical and poetical representations at the great Panathenaic solemnity; next, the splendid temple of Athênē, called the Parthenon, with all its masterpieces of decorative sculpture, friezes, and reliefs; lastly, the costly portals erected to adorn the entrance of the acropolis, on the western side of the hill, through which the solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It appears that the Odeon and the Parthenon were both finished between 445 and 437 B.C.⁶, the Propylæa somewhat later, between 437 and 431 B.C., in which latter year the Peloponnesian war began⁷. Progress was also made in restoring or reconstructing the

¹ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 16: the indication of time, however, is vague.

² E. Gardner (*Ancient Athens*, pp. 68-72), gives reasons for holding that no further wall was built in the later years of Periklēs, but that the original pair of walls ran almost parallel to the two extremes of the Aktē promontory on which the Peiræus lies. The southernmost wall in this case was directed *Φαληρικῶς* (Thuk., i. 107), in the sense that it ran to the edge of the Phalēric bay (near modern Phalērum), without including the whole sweep of that bay.—E.O.

³ Isokratēs, *Orat.*, vii.; *Areopagit.*, p. 153, c. 27.

⁴ See Dikæarchus, *Vit. Græciæ*, Fragn. ed. Fuhr.,

p. 140: compare the description of Platea in Thukydídēs, ii. 3.

All the older towns now existing in the Grecian islands are put together in this same manner—narrow, muddy, crooked ways—few regular continuous lines of houses (see Ross, *Reisen in den Griechischen Inseln*, Letter xxvii., vol. ii., p. 20). [The older parts of modern Athens abound in narrow, crooked alleys.—E.O.]

⁵ Diodor., xii. 9.

⁶ Duruy says that the Parthenon was finished in 435; but the recognised date, based on Philochorus, is 438.—E.O.

⁷ Leake, *Topography of Athens*, Append. ii. and iii., p. 328-336, 2nd edit.

Erechtheion, or ancient temple of Athênê Polias¹, the patron goddess of the city—which had been burnt in the invasion of Xerxês. But the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war seems to have prevented the completion of this, as well as of the great temple of Dêmêter at Eleusis, for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries—that of Athênê at Sunium—and that of Nemesis at Rhamnus. Nor was the sculpture less memorable than the architecture. Three statues of Athênê, all by the hand of Pheidias, decorated the acropolis—one colossal, 47 feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon²—a second of bronze, called the Lemnian Athênê—a third of colossal magnitude, also in bronze, called Athênê Promachos, placed between the Propylæa, and the Parthenon.

It is not, of course, to Periklês that the renown of these splendid productions of art belongs. One man especially, of immortal name—Pheidias³—was the great director and superintendent of all those decorative additions, whereby Periklês imparted to Athens a majesty such as had never before belonged to any Grecian city. The architects of the Parthenon and the other buildings—Iktinus, Kallikratês, Korœbus, Mnesiklês, and others—worked under his instructions: and he had besides a school of pupils and subordinates to whom the mechanical part of his labours was confided. With all the great contributions which Pheidias made to the grandeur of Athens, his last and greatest achievement was far away from Athens—the colossal statue of Zeus, in the great temple of Olympia, executed in the years immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. This stupendous work was sixty feet high, of ivory and gold, embodying in visible majesty some of the grandest conceptions of Grecian poetry and religion. Its effect upon the minds of all beholders, for many centuries successively, was such as never has been, and probably never will be, equalled in the annals of art, sacred or profane.

Considering these prodigious achievements in the field of art only as they bear upon Athenian and Grecian history, they are phænomena of extraordinary importance. When we learn the profound impression which they produced upon Grecian spectators of a later age, we may judge how immense was the effect upon that generation which saw them both begun and finished. In the year 480 B.C., Athens had been ruined by the occupation of Xerxês. Since that period, the Greeks had seen, first the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an enlarged scale—next, the addition of Peiræus with its docks and magazines—thirdly, the junction of the two by the long walls, thus including the most numerous concentrated population, wealth, arms, ships, etc., in Greece—lastly the rapid creation of so many new miracles of art—the sculptures of Pheidias as well as the paintings of the Thasian painter Polygnôtus, in the temple of Theseus, and in the portico called Pœkilê. Plutarch observes⁴ that the celerity with which the works were completed was the most remarkable circumstance connected with them. The cost was prodigious, and could only have been borne at a time when there was a large treasure in the acropolis, as well as a considerable tribute annually coming in. If

¹ The controversy as to whether this temple was rebuilt or entirely supplanted by the fifth century Erechtheion is still raging (see Miss Harrison, *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*; and Furtwängler, *Masterpieces of Greek Sculpture*, Engl. transl., Appendix).—Ed.

² See Leake, *Topography of Athens*, 2nd ed.,

p. III, Germ. transl. [Overbeck, *Die Antiken Schriftquellen*, pp. 113-144.—Ed.]

³ Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 13-15. [Cf. also E. Gardner, *Ancient Athens*, c. 6-8; Waldstein, *Essays on Art of Pheidias*; Furtwängler, *Masterpieces of Greek Sculpture* (Engl. transl.), c. 1.—Ed.]

⁴ Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 13.

we may trust a computation which seems to rest on plausible grounds, it cannot have been much less than 3,000 talents in the aggregate (about 690,000*l.*)¹. The expenditure of so large a sum was, of course, a source of great private gain to contractors, tradesmen, merchants, artisans of various descriptions, etc., concerned in it. In one way or another, it distributed itself over a large portion of the whole city. A large expenditure for such purposes, considered as pious towards the gods, was at the same time imposing in reference to Grecian feeling, which regarded with admiration every variety of public show and magnificence, and repaid with grateful deference the rich men who indulged in it. Periklēs knew well that the visible splendour of the city, so new to all his contemporaries, would cause her great power to appear greater still, and would thus procure for her a real, though unacknowledged influence—perhaps even an ascendancy—over all cities of the Grecian name.

A step taken by Periklēs evinces how much this ascendancy was in his direct aim, and how much he connected it with views both of harmony and usefulness for Greece generally. He prevailed upon the people to send envoys to every city of the Greek name, great and small, inviting each to appoint deputies for a congress to be held at Athens. Three points were to be discussed in this intended congress. 1. The restitution of those temples which had been burnt by the Persian invaders. 2. The fulfilment of such vows, as on that occasion had been made to the gods. 3. The safety of the sea and of maritime commerce for all².

Twenty elderly Athenians were sent round to obtain the convocation of this congress at Athens—a Pan-hellenic congress for Pan-hellenic purposes. But those who were sent to Bœotia and Peloponnesus completely failed in their object, from the jealousy, noway astonishing, of Sparta and her allies. Of the rest we hear nothing, for this refusal was quite sufficient to frustrate the whole scheme. It is to be remarked that the dependent allies of Athens appear to have been summoned just as much as the cities perfectly autonomous; so that their tributary relation to Athens was not understood to degrade them. We may sincerely regret that such congress did not take effect, as it might have opened some new possibilities of converging tendency and alliance for the dispersed fractions of the Greek name.

The interval of fourteen years, between the beginning of the Thirty years' truce and that of the Peloponnesian war, was by no means one of undisturbed peace to Athens. In the sixth year of that period occurred the formidable revolt of Samos.

That island appears to have been the most powerful of all the allies of Athens³. It surpassed even Chios or Lesbos, standing on the same footing as these two, that is, paying no tribute-money, but furnishing ships and men when called upon, and retaining, subject to this condition, its complete autonomy, its oligarchical government, its fortifications, and its

¹ See Leake, *Topography of Athens*, Append. iii., p. 329, 2nd ed., Germ. transl.

² Plutarch (*Periklēs*, c. 17) leaves the date uncertain. Grote is clearly right in refusing to place this event earlier than 460, because Periklēs would not then have had sufficient influence. Again, the period 460-451 was a time of war. The following considerations suggest 448 as the most likely date: (1) After the disasters of 447-445 such a proposal on the part of Athens would have been presumptuous; (2) the congress would naturally be summoned before the erection of the Parthenon was begun—i.e., before 447-446; (3) the congress might well be interpreted as a recognition of the fact that Athens had fulfilled her duty in punishing the Mede, and hence would be specially appropriate after Kimon's last campaign and the cessation of hostilities against Persia.—Ed.

³ Thukyd., i. 115; viii. 76; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 28.

military force. Like most of the other islands near the coast, Samos possessed a portion of territory on the Asiatic mainland, between which and the territory of Milētus lay the small town of Priênê, one of the twelve original members contributing to the Pan-Ionic solemnity. Respecting the possession of this town of Priênê, a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians, in the sixth year of the Thirty years' truce (B.C. 440-439). In this war the Milesians were worsted, and Priênê fell into the hands of the Samians. The defeated Milesians, enrolled as they were among the tributary allies of Athens, complained to her of the conduct of the Samians, and their complaint was seconded by a party in Samos itself, opposed to the oligarchy and its proceedings. The Athenians required the two disputing cities to bring the matter before discussion and award at Athens. But the Samians refused to comply¹: whereupon an armament of forty ships was despatched from Athens to the island, and established in it a democratical government, leaving in it a garrison and carrying away to Lemnos fifty men and as many boys from the principal oligarchical families, to serve as hostages. Of these families, however, a certain number retired to the mainland, where they entered into negotiations with Pissuthnes the satrap of Sardes, to procure aid and restoration. Obtaining from him seven hundred mercenary troops, and passing over in the night to the island, by previous concert with the oligarchical party, they overcame the Samian democracy as well as the Athenian garrison, who were sent over as prisoners to Pissuthnes. They were farther lucky enough to succeed in stealing away from Lemnos their own recently deposited hostages, and they then proclaimed open revolt against Athens, in which Byzantium also joined. It seems remarkable, that though by such a proceeding they would, of course, draw upon themselves the full strength of Athens, yet their first step was to resume aggressive hostilities against Milētus, whither they sailed with a powerful force of seventy ships, twenty of them carrying troops.

Immediately on the receipt of this grave intelligence, a fleet of sixty triremes was despatched to Samos under ten generals, two of whom were Periklēs himself and the poet Sophoklēs², both seemingly included among the ten ordinary Stratēgi of the year. But it was necessary to employ sixteen of these ships, partly in summoning contingents from Chios and Lesbos, partly in keeping watch off the coast of Karia for the arrival of the Phœnician fleet, which report stated to be approaching; so that Periklēs had only forty-four ships remaining in his squadron. Yet he did not hesitate to attack the Samian fleet of seventy ships on his way back from Milētus, near the island of Tragia, and was victorious in the action. Presently he was reinforced by forty ships from Athens and by twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, so as to be able to disembark at Samos, where he overcame the Samian land-force and blocked up the harbour with a portion of his fleet, surrounding the city on the land-side with a triple wall. Meanwhile the Samians had sent Stesagoras with five ships to press the coming of the Phœnician fleet, and the report of their approach became again so prevalent that Periklēs felt obliged to take sixty ships (out of the total 125) to watch for them off the coast of Kaunos and Karia, where

¹ Thukyd., i. 115; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 25. Most of the statements which appear in this chapter of Plutarch appear to be borrowed from exaggerated party stories of the day.

² Strabo, xiv., p. 638.

See the interesting particulars recounted respecting Sophoklēs by the Chian poet Ion, who met and conversed with him during the course of this expedition (Athenæus, xiii., p. 603).

he cruised for about fourteen days. The Phœnician fleet never came in sight, though Diodorus¹ affirms that it was actually on its voyage. I incline to believe that, though willing to hold out hopes and encourage revolt among the Athenian allies, the satrap did not choose openly to violate the convention of Kallias, whereby the Persians were forbidden to send a fleet westward of the Chelidonian promontory. The departure of Periklēs, however, so much weakened the Athenian fleet off Samos, that the Samians, suddenly sailing out of their harbour at the instigation and under the command of one of their most eminent citizens, the philosopher Melissus, surprised and disabled the blockading squadron, and even gained a victory over the remaining fleet before the ships could be fairly got clear of the land². For fourteen days they remained masters of the sea, carrying in and out all that they thought proper. It was not until the return of Periklēs that they were again blockaded. Reinforcements, however, were now multiplied to the investing squadron—sixty ships from Athens, besides thirty from Chios and Lesbos—making altogether near two hundred sail. Against this overwhelming force Melissus and the Samians made an unavailing attempt at resistance, but were presently quite blocked up, and remained so for nearly nine months until they could hold out no longer. They then capitulated, being compelled to raise their fortifications, to surrender all their ships of war, to give hostages for their future conduct, and to make good by stated instalments the whole expense of the enterprise, said to have reached 1,000 talents. The Byzantines, too, made their submission at the same time³.

Two or three circumstances deserve notice respecting this revolt, as illustrating the existing condition of the Athenian empire. First, that the whole force of Athens, together with the contingents from Chios and Lesbos, was necessary in order to crush it, so that Byzantium, which joined in the revolt, seems to have been left unassailed. Now it is remarkable that none of the dependent allies near Byzantium or anywhere else availed themselves of so favourable an opportunity to revolt also⁴, a fact which seems plainly to imply that there was little positive discontent then prevalent among them. Had the revolt spread to other cities, probably Pissuthnes might have realized his promise of bringing up the Phœnician fleet, which would have been a serious calamity for the Ægean Greeks, and was only kept off by the unbroken maintenance of the Athenian empire.

¹ Diodor., xi. 27.

² Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 26. Plutarch seems to have had before him accounts respecting this Samian campaign not only from Ephorus, Stesimbrotus, and Duris, but also from Aristotle: and the statements of the latter must have differed thus far from Thukydides, that he affirmed Melissus the Samian general to have been victorious over Periklēs himself, which is not to be reconciled with the narrative of Thukydides.

The Samian historian Duris, living about a century after this siege, seems to have introduced many falsehoods respecting the cruelties of Athens; see Plutarch, *loc. cit.*

³ Thukyd., i. 117; Diodor., xii. 27, 28; Isokratēs, *De Permutat.*, Or. xv., sect. 118; Cornel. Nepos, *Vit. Timoth.*, c. 1.

The assertion of Ephorus (see Diodorus, xii. 28, and Ephori Fragm. 117, ed. Marx, with the note of Marx) that Periklēs employed battering machines against the town, under the management of the Klazomenian Artemon, was called in question by Herakleides Ponticus, on the ground that Artemon was a contemporary of Anakreon, near a century

before: and Thukydides represents Periklēs to have captured the town altogether by blockade.

A short fragment remaining from the comic poet Eupolis (Κόλακες, Fr. xvi., p. 493, ed. Meineke), attests the anxiety at Athens about the Samian war, and the great joy when the island was reconquered: compare Aristophan., *Vesp.*, 283.

⁴ It is important to notice that the tribute of eleven Thracian cities was raised in 439 B.C. It is not unreasonable to infer that the disturbance spread somewhat further than the above statement allows. The tribute of six Thracian cities is missing in 440 B.C., while in the following year eleven towns of that district had their assessment raised (C.I.A., i. 237, 244). It is also noticeable that in 438 and 436 an additional contribution was levied in the Hellespontine district, while the assessment of Byzantium was raised from 15.7 to 18.3 talents (C.I.A., i. 238, 242, 244). In C.I.A., iv. (1) 446a (Hicks and Hill, 46) Athenian losses *ἐν Χερσονήσῳ* are recorded. From C.I.A., i. 177, the sum-total of expenses incurred through the operations against the rebels can be calculated as at least 1,400 talents.—Ed.

Next, the revolted Samians applied for aid, not only to Pissuthnes, but also to Sparta and her allies, among whom at a special meeting the question of compliance or refusal was formally debated. Notwithstanding the Thirty years' truce then subsisting, of which only six years had elapsed, and which had been noway violated by Athens, many of the allies of Sparta voted for assisting the Samians. What part Sparta herself took, we do not know, but the Corinthians were the main and decided advocates for the negative. They not only contended that the truce distinctly forbade compliance with the Samian request, but also recognised the right of each confederacy to punish its own recusant members. If the contrary policy had been pursued, the Athenian empire might have been in great danger—the Phœnician fleet would probably have been brought in also—and the future course of events greatly altered.

Again, after the reconquest of Samos, we should assume it almost as a matter of certainty that the Athenians would renew the democratical government which they had set up just before the revolt. Yet if they did so, it must have been again overthrown, without any attempt to uphold it on the part of Athens. For we hardly hear of Samos again, until twenty-seven years afterwards, towards the latter division of the Peloponnesian war, in 412 B.C., and it then appears with an established oligarchical government of Geomori or landed proprietors, against which the people make a successful rising during the course of that year. As Samos remained, during the interval between 439 B.C. and 412 B.C., unfortified, deprived of its fleet, and enrolled among the tribute-paying¹ allies of Athens—and as it nevertheless either retained, or acquired, its oligarchical government, so we may conclude that Athens cannot have systematically interfered to democratize by violence the subject-allies in cases where the natural tendency of parties ran towards oligarchy. The condition of Lesbos at the time of its revolt (hereafter to be related) will be found to confirm this conclusion².

We do not hear of any farther tendencies to disaffection among its members, until the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war. The feeling common among them towards Athens, seems to have been neither attachment nor hatred, but simple indifference and acquiescence in her supremacy. Such amount of positive discontent as really existed among them, arose, not from actual hardships suffered, but from the general political instinct of the Greek mind—desire of separate autonomy. According to that sentiment, the condition of a subject-ally of Athens was treated as one of degradation and servitude. In proportion as fear and hatred of Athens became predominant among the allies of Sparta, these latter gave utterance to the sentiment more and more emphatically, so as to encourage discontent artificially among the subject-allies of the Athenian empire. Possessing complete mastery of the sea, and every sort of superiority requisite for holding empire over islands, Athens had yet no sentiment to appeal to in her subjects, calculated to render her empire popular, except in part that of common democracy, which seems

¹ The exact relation of Samos to the Delian League is not clear. The statement that it paid no tribute is no doubt true technically, but (in vii. 5, 7, 4) Thucydides classes it among the *ὑποχρεωμένοι* *φύρον*, and we may reasonably conclude that the Samians did make some contribution to the funds of the League. Possibly their quota went to the

Samian Héra: for a similar arrangement, cf. Methônē in Hicks and Hill, lx.; C.I.A., i. 40. It is less probable that this *φóρος* refers to instalments of the war-indemnity.—Ed.

² But see appendix to this chapter, part ii., *ad fin.*—Ed.

at first to have acted without any care on her part to encourage it, until the progress of the Peloponnesian war made such encouragement a part of her policy. And even had she tried to keep up in the allies the feeling of a common interest and the attachment to a permanent confederacy, the instinct of political separation would probably have baffled all her efforts. But she took no such pains. With the usual morality that grows up in the minds of the actual possessors of power, she conceived herself entitled to exact obedience as her right. Some of the Athenian speakers in Thukydides go so far as to disdain all pretence of legitimate power, even such as might fairly be set up, resting the supremacy of Athens on the naked plea of superior force¹. As the allied cities were mostly under democracies—through the indirect influence rather than the systematic dictation of Athens—yet each having its own internal aristocracy in a state of opposition; so the movements for revolt against Athens originated with the aristocracy or with some few citizens apart; while the people, though sharing more or less in the desire for autonomy, had yet either a fear of their own aristocracy or a sympathy with Athens, which made them always backward in revolting, sometimes decidedly opposed to it.

We shall find that in most of those cases of actual revolt where we are informed of the preceding circumstances, the step is adopted or contrived by a small number of oligarchical malcontents, without consulting the general voice; while in those cases where the general assembly is consulted beforehand, there is manifested indeed a preference for autonomy, but nothing like a hatred of Athens or decided inclination to break with her.

The particular modes, in which Athenian supremacy pressed upon the allies and excited complaints, appear to have been chiefly three. 1. The annual tribute. 2. The encroachments or other misdeeds committed by individual Athenians, taking advantage of their superior position: citizens either planted out by the city as *Kleruchs* (out-settlers), on the lands of those allies who had been subdued—or serving in the naval armaments—or sent round as inspectors—or placed in occasional garrison—or carrying on some private speculation. 3. The obligation under which the allies were laid of bringing a large proportion of their judicial trials to be settled before the *dikasteries* at Athens.

As to the tribute, I have before remarked that its amount had been but little raised² from its first settlement down to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war³. It appears to have been reviewed, and the apportionment corrected, in every fifth year, at which period the collecting officers may probably have been changed. The same gradual increase may probably be affirmed respecting the second head of inconvenience—vexation caused to the allies by individual Athenians, chiefly officers of

¹ Thukyd., iii. 37; ii. 63. See the conference, at the island of Melos in the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war (Thukyd., v. 89 *et seq.*), between the Athenian commissioners and the Melians.

² The *κεφάλαια*, i.e., the sum-totals, of the tribute-lists prove a gradual decrease in the contributions from 454 to 426, which can only in part be accounted for by successful defections. (1) In the period 454-451 the nominal total is about 495 talents; (2) 450-447 there is a drop to 455 talents; (3) 446-440 to 414 talents; (4) 439-437 the total rises again to about 435 talents; (5) 428-426 it has

sunk again to 410 talents (C.I.A., i. 226 ff.). The contributions of individual cities sometimes underwent considerable reduction; where this is not due to confiscation of land for the settlement of *kleruchs*, we may perhaps attribute the change to commercial depression (E. Meyer, *Gesch. des Alt.*, iv., ch. 2).—Ed.

³ [Xenophon], *Repub. Athen.*, iii. 5: πλὴν αἱ τὰς εἰς τοῦ φόρου· τοῦτο δὲ γίγνεται ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δι' ἑτους πέμπτου. [On the arguments contained in the following pages, see appendix at end of this chapter.—Ed.]

armaments or powerful citizens¹. Doubtless this was always more or less a real grievance, from the moment when the Athenians became despots in place of chiefs. But it was probably not very serious in extent until after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, when revolt on the part of the allies became more apprehended, and when garrisons, inspectors, and tribute-gathering ships became more essential in the working of the Athenian empire.

But the third circumstance above-noticed—the subjection of the allied cities to the Athenian dikasteries—has been more dwelt upon as a grievance than the second, and seems to have been unduly exaggerated. We can hardly doubt that the beginning of this jurisdiction exercised by the Athenian dikasteries dates with the synod of Delos, at the time of the first formation of the confederacy. It was an indispensable element of that confederacy, that the members should forego their right of private war among each other, and submit their differences to peaceable arbitration—a covenant introduced even into alliances much less intimate than this was, and absolutely essential to the efficient maintenance of any common action against Persia². Of course, many causes of dispute, public as well as private, must have arisen among these wide-spread islands and seaports of the Ægean, connected with each other by relations of fellow-feeling, of trade, and of common apprehensions. The synod of Delos, composed of the deputies of all, was the natural board of arbitration for such disputes. Now from the beginning the Athenians were the guiding and enforcing presidents of this synod. When it gradually died away, they were found occupying its place as well as clothed with its functions. It was in this manner that their judicial authority over the allies appears first to have begun, as the confederacy became changed into an Athenian empire—the judicial functions of the synod being transferred along with the common treasure to Athens, and doubtless much extended. And on the whole, these functions must have been productive of more good than evil to the allies themselves, especially to the weakest and most defenceless among them.

Among the towns which paid tribute to Athens, if a small town, or one of its citizens, had cause of complaint against a larger, there was no channel except the synod of Delos, or the Athenian tribunal, through which it could have any reasonable assurance of fair trial or justice. It is not to be supposed that *all* the private complaints and suits between citizen and citizen, in each respective subject town, were carried up for trial to Athens: yet we do not know distinctly how the line was drawn,

¹ [Xenophon], *Repub. Athen.*, i. 14: *Περὶ δὲ τῶν συμμάχων, οἱ ἐκπλέοντες συκοφαντοῦσιν, ὡς δοκοῦσι, καὶ μισοῦσι τοὺς χρηστοὺς*, etc.

Who are the persons designated by the expression of *ἐκπλέοντες*, appears to be specified more particularly a little farther on (i. 18); it means the generals, the officers, the envoys, etc., sent forth by Athens.

In respect to the Kleruchies, or out-settlements of Athenian citizens on the lands of allies revolted and reconquered—we may remark that they are not noticed as a grievance in this treatise of Xenophon, nor in any of the anti-Athenian orations of Thucydides. They appear, however, as matters of crimination after the extinction of the empire, and at the moment when Athens was again rising into a position such as to inspire the hope of reviving it. For at the close of the Peloponnesian

war, which was also the destruction of the empire, all the Kleruchs were driven home again, and deprived of their outlying property, which reverted to various insular proprietors. These latter were terrified at the idea that Athens might afterwards try to resume these lost rights: hence the subsequent outcry against the Kleruchies.

² See the expression in Thucydides (v. 27), describing the conditions required when Argos was about to extend her alliances in Peloponnesus. The conditions were two:—1. That the city should be autonomous. 2. Next, that it should be willing to submit its quarrels to equitable arbitration—*ἥτις αὐτὸν νόμος τέ ἐστι, καὶ δίκας ἴσας καὶ ἁμίας δίδωσι*. [Cf. the compulsory arbitration-treaties which Artaphernes imposed upon the Ionians after their revolt (Herodot., vi. 42).—ED.]

between matters carried up thither, and matters tried at home. The subject cities appear to have been interdicted from the power of capital punishment, which could only be inflicted after previous trial and condemnation at Athens¹: so that the latter reserved to herself the cognizance of most of the grave crimes—or what may be called 'the higher justice' generally. And the political accusations preferred by citizen against citizen, in any subject city, for alleged treason corruption, non-fulfilment of public duty, etc., were doubtless carried to Athens for trial—perhaps the most important part of her jurisdiction.

But the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was not intended by Athens for the substantive object of amending the administration of justice in each separate allied city. It went rather to regulate the relations between city and city—between citizens of different cities—between Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these allied cities with which they had relations—between each city itself, as a dependent government with contending political parties, and the imperial head Athens. All these being problems which imperial Athens was called on to solve, the best way of solving them would have been through some common synod emanating from all the allies. Putting this aside, we shall find that the solution provided by Athens was perhaps the next best, and we shall be the more induced to think so when we compare it with the proceedings afterwards adopted by Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. Now the Athenians did not, as a system, place in their dependent cities governors analogous to the harmosts, though they did so occasionally under special need. But their fleets and their officers were in frequent relation with these cities, and as the principal officers were noways indisposed to abuse their position, so the facility of complaint, constantly open, to the Athenian popular dikastery, served both as redress and guarantee against misrule of this description. It was a guarantee which the allies themselves sensibly felt and valued, as we know from Thukydides. The chief source from whence they had to apprehend evil was, the misconduct of the Athenian officials and principal citizens, who could misemploy the power of Athens for their own private purposes—but they looked up to the 'Athenian Demos as a chastener of such evil-doers and as a harbour of refuge to themselves'². If the popular dikasteries at Athens had not been thus open, the allied cities would have suffered much more severely from the captains and officials of Athens in their individual capacity.

So, again, it is to be recollected that Athenian private citizens, not officially employed, were spread over the whole range of the empire as kleruchs, proprietors, or traders. Of course, therefore, disputes would arise between them and the natives of the subject cities, as well as among these latter themselves, in cases where both parties did not belong to

¹ Antipho, *De Cade Herodis*, c. 7. p. 135: ὁ οὐδὲ πόλει ἱστῶν, ἀνὲν Ἀθηναίων, οὐδένα θανάτῳ ζημιώσαι.

² Thukyd., viii. 48.

[Xenophon] (*Rep. Ath.*, i. 14, 15) affirms that the Athenian officers on service passed many unjust sentences upon the oligarchical party in the allied cities—fines, sentences of banishment, capital punishments, and that the Athenian people, though they had a strong public interest in the prosperity of the allies in order that their tribute might be larger, nevertheless thought it better

that any individual citizen of Athens should pocket what he could out of the plunder of the allies, and leave to the latter nothing more than was absolutely necessary for them to live and work, without any superfluity such as might tempt them to revolt.

That the Athenian officers on service may have succeeded too often in unjust peculation at the cost of the allies, is probable enough: but that the Athenian people were pleased to see their own individual citizens so enriching themselves, is certainly not true.

the same city. If a Thasian citizen believed himself aggrieved by the historian Thukydides, either as commander of the Athenian fleet on that station, or as proprietor of gold mines in Thrace, he had his remedy against the latter by accusation before the Athenian dikasteries, to which the most powerful Athenian was amenable not less than the meanest Thasian. To a citizen of any allied city it might be an occasional hardship to be sued before the courts at Athens; but it was also often a valuable privilege to him to be able to sue, before those courts, others whom else he could not have reached. He had his share of the benefit as well as of the hardship.

Pseudo-Xenophon, in the dark and one-sided representation which he gives of the Athenian democracy, remarks, that if the subject-allies had not been made amenable to justice at Athens they would have cared little for the people of Athens, and would have paid court only to those individual Athenians, generals, trierarchs, or envoys, who visited the islands on service; but under the existing system, the subjects were compelled to visit Athens either as plaintiffs or defendants, and were thus under the necessity of paying court to the bulk of the people also—that is, to those humbler citizens out of whom the dikasteries were formed; they supplanted the dikasts in court for favour or lenient dealing¹. But this is only an invidious manner of discrediting what was really a protection to the allies, both in purpose and in reality. For it was a lighter lot to be brought for trial before the dikastery, than to be condemned without redress by the general on service, or to be forced to buy off his condemnation by a bribe.

Assuming the dikasteries at Athens to be ever so defective as tribunals for administering justice, we must recollect that they were the same tribunals under which every Athenian citizen held his own fortune or reputation, and that the native of any subject city was admitted to the same chance of justice as the native of Athens. Accordingly we find the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian war, taking peculiar credit to the imperial city on this ground, for equal dealing with her subject-allies. 'If our power (he says) were to pass into other hands, the comparison would presently show how moderate we are in the use of it: but as regards us, our very moderation is unfairly turned to our disparagement rather than to our praise. For even though we put ourselves at disadvantage in matters litigated with our allies, and though we have appointed such matters to be judged among ourselves, and under laws equal to both parties, we are represented as animated by nothing better than a love of litigation'². 'Our allies (he adds) would

¹ [Xenophon], *Rep. Athen.*, i. 18: Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐπὶ δικᾶς ἦσαν οἱ σύμμαχοι, τοὺς ἐκπλέοντας Ἀθηναίους ἐτίμων ἂν μόνους, τοὺς τε στρατηγούς καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ πρέσβεις· νῦν δ' ἠνάγκασται τὸν δῆμον κολακεύειν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἕκαστος τῶν συμμαχῶν, γιγνώσκων ὅτι δεῖ μὲν ἀφικόμενον Ἀθήνας εἰσὶν δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις τισιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ὅς ἐστι διὰ νόμος Ἀθηναίων. Καὶ ἀντιβολῆσαι ἀναγκάζεται ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, καὶ εἰσιόντός του, ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς χειρὸς. Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν οἱ σύμμαχοι δοῦλοι τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων καθίσταται μάλλον.

² Thukyd., i. 76, 77.

I construe *ἐνυμβολαίαις* *δικαίαις* as connected in meaning with *ἐνυμβόλαιαι* and not with *ἐνυμβολαί*—following Duker and Bloomfield in preference to

Poppo and Gölter: see the elaborate notes of the two latter editors. *Δικαίαις* *ἀπὸ ἐνυμβόλων* indicated the arrangements concluded by special convention between two different cities, by consent of both, for the purpose of determining controversies between their respective citizens: they were something essentially apart from the ordinary judicial arrangements of either state. Now what the Athenian orator here insists upon is exactly the contrary of this idea: he says that the allies were admitted to the benefit of Athenian trial and Athenian laws, in like manner with the citizens themselves. The judicial arrangements by which the Athenian allies were brought before the Athenian dikasteries cannot with propriety be said to be *δικαίαις* *ἀπὸ ἐνυμβόλων*; unless the act of original incorporation into the confederacy of

complain less if we made open use of our superior force with regard to them; but we discard such maxims, and deal with them upon an equal footing, and they are so accustomed to this that they think themselves entitled to complain at every trifling disappointment of their expectations. They suffered worse hardships under the Persians before our empire began, and they would suffer worse under you (the Spartans) if you were to succeed in conquering us and making our empire yours.'

History bears out the boast of the Athenian orator, both as to the time preceding and following the empire of Athens¹. And an Athenian citizen indeed might well regard it not as a hardship, but as a privilege to the subject-allies, that they should be allowed to sue him before the dikastery, and to defend themselves before the same tribunal either in case of wrong done to him, or in case of alleged treason to the imperial authority of Athens: they were thereby put upon a level with himself. That complaints were raised against it among the subject-allies is noway surprising. For the empire of Athens generally was inconsistent with that separate autonomy to which every town thought itself entitled; and this central judicature was one of its prominent and constantly operative institutions, as well as a striking mark of dependence to the subordinate communities. Yet we may safely affirm that if empire was to be maintained at all, no way of maintaining it could be found at once less oppressive and more beneficial than the superintending competence of the dikasteries².

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the Peloponnesian war. The policy of Periklês, now in the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative, averse to forced extension of empire as well as to those increased burdens on the dependent allies which such schemes would have entailed, and tending to maintain that assured commerce in the Ægean by which all of them must have been gainers. If we read in Thukydides the speech of the envoy from

Delos is to be regarded as a *ξύμβολον* or agreement—which in a large sense it might be, though not in the proper sense in which *δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων* are commonly mentioned. Moreover, I think that the passage of Antipho (*De Cade Herodis*, p. 745) proves that it was the citizens of places *not in alliance with Athens* who litigated with Athenians according to *δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων*—not the allies of Athens while they resided in their own native cities; for I agree with the interpretation which Boeckh puts upon this passage (Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens*, book iii., ch. xvi., p. 403, Eng. transl.).

The passages in [Demosthenes], *Orat. de Halones*, c. 3, pp. 98, 99; and [Andokides], *Cont. Alkibiad.*, c. 7, p. 121, give us a sufficient idea of these judicial conventions, or *ξύμβολα*—special and liable to differ in each particular case.

M. Boeckh draws a distinction between the *autonomous* allies (Chios and Lesbos, at the time immediately before the Peloponnesian war) and the *subject-allies*; 'the former class (he says) retained possession of unlimited jurisdiction, whereas the latter were compelled to try all their disputes in the courts of Athens'. Doubtless this distinction would prevail to a certain degree, but how far it was pushed we can hardly say. [Hicks and Hill, 36 (C.I.A., ii. 9), shows that private suits could be decided in the city where the contract took place; there would seem to have been no uniform rule on these points.—Ed.]

I think it probable that those statements of the grammarians, which represent the allies as

carrying on *δίκας ἀπὸ συμβόλων* in ordinary practice with the Athenians, may really be true about the second empire or alliance. Bekker, *Anecdota*, p. 436: 'Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ συμβόλων εἰδικάζον τοῖς ὑπακόοις· οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης. Pollux, viii. 63: 'Ἀπὸ συμβόλων δὲ δίκη ἦν, ὅτε οἱ σύμμαχοι εἰδικάζοντο. Also Hesychius, i. 489. In the second empire the Athenians may really have had *σύμβολα*, or special conventions for judicial business, with many of their principal allies, instead of making Athens the authoritative centre, and heir to the Delian synod, as they did during the first.

¹ Compare Isokrates, *Or. iv.*, *Panegyric*, pp. 62, 66, sect. 116-138; and *Or. xii.*, *Panathenaic*, pp. 247-254, sect. 72-111; *Or. viii.*, *De Pace*, p. 178, sect. 119 *et seq.*; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 13; Cornel. Nepos, *Lysand.*, c. 2, 3.

² [Xenophon], *Repub. Ath.*, i. 16. He states it as one of the advantageous consequences, which induced the Athenians to bring the suits and complaints of the allies to Athens for trial—that the *prytaneia*, or fees paid upon entering a cause for trial, became sufficiently large to furnish all the pay for the dikasts throughout the year.

But in another part of his treatise (iii. 2, 3) he represents the Athenian dikasteries as overloaded with judicial business, much more than they could possibly get through; inasmuch that there were long delays before causes could be brought on for trial. It could hardly be any great object therefore to multiply complaints artificially, in order to make fees for the dikasts.

Mitylênê¹ at Olympia, delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city from Athens, we shall be surprised how weak the case is and how much the speaker is conscious of its weakness. He has nothing to say except that they were defenceless and degraded subjects, and that Athens held authority over them without and against their own consent: and in the case of Mitylênê, not so much as this could be said, since she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and autonomous ally. Of course, this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or such of them as could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably shake off whenever they had an opportunity. But the negative evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylenæan orator, goes far to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta immediately before the war—that, beyond the fact of such forced dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city like Mitylênê might be strong enough to protect itself and its own commerce without the help of Athens. But to the weaker allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the waters of the Ægean, and their freedom would thus have been purchased at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages².

Nearly the whole of the Grecian world (putting aside Italian, Sicilian, and African Greek) was at this time included either in the alliance of Lacedæmon or in that of Athens, so that the truce of thirty years ensured a suspension of hostilities everywhere. Moreover, the Lacedæmonian confederates had determined by a majority of votes to refuse the request of Samos for aid in her revolt against Athens, whereby it seemed established as practical international law that neither of these two great aggregate bodies should intermeddle with the other, and that each should restrain or punish its own disobedient members³.

Of this refusal, which materially affected the course of events, the main advisers had been the Corinthians, whose position was peculiar; for while Sparta and her other allies were chiefly land-powers, Corinth had been from early times maritime, commercial, and colonizing. She had indeed once possessed the largest navy in Greece, along with Ægina; but either she had not increased it at all during the last forty years, or if she had, her comparative naval importance had been sunk by the gigantic expansion of Athens. The Corinthians had both commerce and colonies—Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Korkyra, etc., along or near the coast of Epirus; they had also their colony Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallênê in Thrace, and intimately connected with them; and the interest of their commerce made them averse to collision with the superior navy of the Athenians. It was this consideration which had induced them to resist the impulse of the Lacedæmonian allies towards war on behalf of Samos. For though their feelings both of jealousy and hatred against

¹ Thukyd., iii. 11-14.

² It is to be recollected that the Athenian empire was essentially a *government of dependencies*: Athens as an imperial state exercising authority over subordinate governments. To maintain beneficial relations between two governments,—one supreme—the other subordinate—and to make the system work to the satisfaction of the people in the one as well as of the people in the other—has always been found a problem of great

difficulty. See Sir G. C. Lewis, *Essay on the Government of Dependencies*, p. 367.

³ See the important passage already adverted to in a prior note.

Thukyd., i. 40: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίων ἀποστάντων ψήφον προσεθέμεθα ἐναντίαν ὑμῖν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων διχα ἐψηφισμένων εἰ χρή αὐτοῖς ἀμύνειν, φανερώς δὲ ἀντείστομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμάχους αὐτῶν τίνα κολάζειν.

Athens were even now strong, arising greatly out of the struggle a few years before the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian alliance, prudence indicated that in a war against the first naval power in Greece, they were sure to be the greatest losers.

So long as the policy of Corinth pointed towards peace, there was every probability that war would be avoided, or at least accepted only in a case of grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian alliance. But a contingency, distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years after the revolt of Samos, reversed all these chances, and not only extinguished the dispositions of Corinth towards peace, but even transformed her into the forward instigator of war.

Amidst the various colonies planted from Corinth along the coast of Epirus, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony or supremacy. What extent of real power and interference this acknowledgement implied, in addition to the honorary dignity, we are not in a condition to say¹. But the Corinthians were popular, and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the colonists themselves found acceptable. To these amicable relations, however, the powerful Korkyra formed a glaring exception—having been generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility, with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed tributes of filial respect. It was amidst such relations of habitual ill-will between Corinth and Korkyra that a dispute grew up respecting the city of Epidamnus—a colony founded by the Korkyræans on the coast of Illyria in the Ionic Gulf, considerably to the north of their own island. So strong was the sanctity of Grecian custom in respect to the foundation of colonies, that the Korkyræans, in spite of their enmity to Corinth, had been obliged to select the *Ækist* (or Founder-in-Chief) of Epidamnus from that city—a citizen of Herakleid descent—along with whom there had also come some Corinthian settlers. And thus Epidamnus, though a Korkyræan colony, was nevertheless a recognised grand-daughter (if the expression may be allowed) of Corinth, the recollection of which was perpetuated by the solemnities periodically celebrated in honour of the *Ækist*.

Founded on the isthmus of an outlying peninsula on the sea-coast of the Illyrian Taulantii, Epidamnus was at first prosperous. But during the years immediately preceding the period which we have now reached, it had been exposed to great reverses. Internal sedition between the oligarchy and the people, aggravated by attacks from the neighbouring Illyrians, had crippled its power; and a recent revolution, in which the people put down the oligarchy, had reduced it still farther—since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a force and allying themselves with the Illyrians, harassed the city grievously both by sea and land. The Epidamnian democracy was in such straits as to be forced to send to Korkyra for aid. Though the Korkyræans, themselves democratically governed, might have been expected to sympathize with these suppliants and their prayers, yet their feeling was decidedly opposite. For it was the Epidamnian oligarchy who were principally connected with Korkyra, while

¹ The coins of the Corinthian colonies are identical in type with those of the mother-city, being distinguished from the latter by carrying the initial letter of their respective city-names. Hence it has been doubted where they coined their own pieces at all. In any case it is plain that the bond

between Corinth and her colonies remained unusually close. The coins of Korkyra are struck on a different standard, and bear a totally different type, derived from her original parent-city, Eretria. Cf. Head, *Hist. Num.*, p. 275.—Ed.

the Demos, or small proprietors and tradesmen of Epidamnus, may perhaps have been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate had no visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-island. Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their distressed condition insupportable, the Epidamnians next thought of applying to Corinth. But as this was a step of questionable propriety, their envoys were directed first to take the opinion of the Delphian god. His oracle having given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to Corinth with their mission. It was found easy to persuade the Corinthians, who, looking upon Epidamnus as a joint colony from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not only authorized, but bound, to undertake its defence—a resolution much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They speedily organized an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers, partly of a protecting military force—Corinthian, Leukadian, and Ambrakiôtic. This combined body, in order to avoid opposition from the powerful Korkyræan navy, was marched by land as far as Apollônia, and transported from thence by sea to Epidamnus.

The arrival of such a reinforcement rescued the city for the moment, but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from the Korkyræans, who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of their rights, and resented it in the strongest manner. The Epidamnian oligarchical exiles were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five triremes, which was sent to Epidamnus with the requisition that they should be forthwith restored and the new-comers from Corinth dismissed. No attention being paid to such demands, the Korkyræans commenced the blockade of the city with forty ships and with an auxiliary land-force of Illyrians. The Corinthians immediately hastened the equipment of a second expedition—sufficient not only for the rescue of the place, but to surmount that resistance which the Korkyræans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty triremes, and three thousand hoplites, of their own, they solicited aid both in ships and money from many of their allies. Eight ships fully manned were furnished by Megara, four by Palês in the island of Kephallenia, five by Epidaurus, two by Trœzen, one by Hermionê, ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia—together with pecuniary contributions from Thebes, Phlius, and Elis. They farther proclaimed a public invitation for new settlers to Epidamnus, promising equal political rights to all, an option being allowed to anyone, who wished to become a settler without being ready to depart at once, to ensure future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas¹. Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were full of doubt and danger, yet such was the confidence entertained in the metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to join the fleet, as to pay down the deposit for liberty of future junction.

The Korkyræans, well aware of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth and of the union among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force of 120 triremes, inferior only to that of Athens. They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceable means, prevailing upon some mediators from Sparta and Sikyon to accompany them to

¹ Such a precaution against procuring bogus settlers seems to have been not uncommon. *Cf.* the provisions of the settlement of Brea (C.I.A., i. 31; Hicks and Hill, 41).—Ed.

Corinth, where, while they required that the forces and settlers recently despatched to Epidamnus should be withdrawn, denying all right on the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony, they at the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer it for arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian city, or to the Delphian oracle; such arbiter to determine to which of the two cities Epidamnus as a colony really belonged. To this the Corinthians answered that they could entertain no proposition until the Korkyræan besieging force was withdrawn from Epidamnus. Whereupon the Korkyræans rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided the new settlers and the troops sent by Corinth were removed at the same time.

Although the Korkyræans had been unwarrantably harsh in rejecting the first supplication from Epidamnus, yet in their propositions made at Corinth, right and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too decidedly aggressive, to admit of listening to arbitration. Accordingly, so soon as their armament was equipped, they set sail for Epidamnus, despatching a herald to declare war formally against the Korkyræans. When the armament, consisting of seventy-five triremes, with 2,000 hoplites, had reached Cape Aktium at the mouth of the Ambrakian Gulf, it was met by the Korkyræan fleet. Out of the 120 triremes which constituted the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus, but all the remaining eighty were now brought into service. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen Corinthian ships, and taking a considerable number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidamnus surrendered to their besieging fleet, under covenant that the Corinthians within it should be held as prisoners, and that the other new-comers should be sold as slaves. The Corinthians and their allies did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while the Korkyræans remained undisputed masters of the neighbouring sea. They proceeded, according to the melancholy practice of Grecian warfare, to kill all their prisoners—except the Corinthians, who were carried home and detained as prizes of great value for purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those allies of Corinth who had lent assistance to the recent expedition: they ravaged the territory of Leukas, burnt Kyllênê the seaport of Elis, and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were compelled towards the end of the summer to send a second armament to Cape Aktium, for the defence of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. The Korkyræan fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimmê, but no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded.

Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, together with the dispersion of the settlers whom they had brought together; and though their original project was frustrated by the loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves for two entire years after the battle in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purposes: and in particular, they sent round not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of seamen. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned Corinthian ships were ready to set sail

in the third year after the battle. The entire fleet, when reinforced by the allies, amounted to not less than 150 sail, twenty-seven triremes from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from Elis, as many from Leukas, and one from Anaktorium.

So formidable an attack was more than the Korkyræans could venture to brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedæmon. It had been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action, which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their island; from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands in the Ægean, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to maintain any real independence, if that empire had been broken up. But though Korkyra had been secure in this policy of isolation up to the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no longer. To apply for admission into the Lacedæmonian confederacy, wherein her immediate enemy exercised paramount influence, being out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionic Gulf; she was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous amicable relations with the Dorian Korkyra. But if there was thus no previous fact or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there anything to forbid it; for in the truce between Athens and Sparta, it had been expressly stipulated that any city, not actually enrolled in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at pleasure.

According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be entrusted to the executive government apart from the representative assembly. According to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of the people: and in point of fact they were so submitted, even under governments only partially democratical, much more, of course, under the complete democracy of Athens. The Korkyræan envoys on reaching that city would first open their business to the *Stratēgi* or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand to the citizens. The mission was no secret, for the Korkyræans had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time when they proposed reference of the quarrel to arbitration. Even without such notice, the political necessity of the step was obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, their *proxeni* at Athens (Athenian citizens who watched over Corinthian interests public and private, in confidential correspondence with that government—and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern times) would communicate to them the arrival of the Korkyræan envoys. So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them and to oppose the granting of their prayer.

Thukydides has given in his history the speeches of both; that is,

speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps himself heard. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the plainest and most business-like in his whole work, bringing before us thoroughly the existing situation.

The Korkyræans presented themselves as claimants for the friendship of Athens on the strongest grounds of common interest and reciprocal usefulness. They had proposed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidamnus, and their application had been refused—which showed where the right of the case lay : moreover, they were now exposed single-handed, not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a formidable confederacy organized under her auspices, including choice mariners hired even from the allies of Athens. In granting their prayer, Athens would in the first place neutralize this misemployment of her own mariners, and would at the same time confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of right, and secure to herself an important reinforcement. For next to her own, the Korkyræan naval force was the most powerful in Greece, and this was now placed within her reach. If by declining the present offer she permitted Korkyra to be overcome, that naval force would pass to the side of her enemies : for such were Corinth and the Peloponnesian alliance—and such they would soon be openly declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision between that alliance and Athens could not long be postponed. It was with a view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to seize Korkyra along with her naval force. The policy of Athens, therefore, imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design, by now assisting the Korkyræans. She was permitted to do this by the terms of the Thirty years' truce. And although some might contend that in the present critical conjuncture, acceptance of Korkyra was tantamount to a declaration of war with Corinth, yet the fact would falsify such predictions ; for Athens would so strengthen herself that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to attack her. She would not only render her naval force irresistibly powerful, but would become mistress of the communication between Sicily and Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the Sicilian Dorians from sending reinforcements to the Peloponnesians¹.

To these representations on the part of the Korkyræans, the Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the selfish and iniquitous policy pursued by Korkyra, not less in the matter of Epidamnus than in all former time². Above all things, she had always acted undutifully and wickedly towards Corinth her mother-city, to whom she was bound by those ties of colonial allegiance which Grecian morality recognised, and which the other Corinthian colonies cheerfully obeyed³. Epidamnus was

¹ Thukyd., i. 32-36.

² The description given by Herodotus (vii. 168 : compare Diodor., xl. 15) of the duplicity of the Korkyræans when solicited to aid the Grecian cause at the time of the invasion of Xerxes, seems to imply that the unfavourable character of them given by the Corinthians coincided with the general impression throughout Greece. [It may be, however, that Herodotus conceived his dislike for the Korkyræans from Athenian public opinion early in the Peloponnesian war, when the lukewarm attitude of the new ally may have given rise to many hard sayings.—Ed.]

Respecting the prosperity and insolence of the Korkyræans, see Aristotle *apud* Zenob., *Proverb.*, iv. 49.

³ Thukyd., i. 38, contains a remarkable passage in illustration of the position of a metropolis in regard to her colony. The relation was such as to be comprised under the general word *hegemony* ; superiority and right to command on the one side, inferiority with duty of reverence and obedience on the other—limited in point of extent, though we do not know where the limit was placed, and varying probably in each individual case.

not a Korkyræan, but a Corinthian colony. The Korkyræans, having committed wrong in besieging it, had proposed arbitration without being willing to withdraw their troops while arbitration was pending. The provision of the Thirty years' truce might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as allies: but that provision was not intended to permit the reception of cities already under the tie of colonial allegiance elsewhere—still less the reception of cities engaged in an active and pending quarrel. If either party had a right to invoke the aid of Athens on this occasion, Corinth had a better right than Korkyra. For the latter had never had any transactions with the Athenians, while Corinth was not only still under covenant of amity with them, through the Thirty years' truce—but had also rendered material service to them by dissuading the Peloponnesian allies from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissuasion, the Corinthians had upheld the principle of Grecian international law, that each alliance was entitled to punish its own refractory members. They now called upon Athens to respect this principle by not interfering between Corinth and her colonial allies, especially as the violation of it would recoil inconveniently upon Athens herself with her numerous dependencies. As for the fear of an impending war between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such a contingency was as yet uncertain—and might possibly never occur at all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to conciliate Corinth on this critical occasion. But it would assuredly occur if she refused such conciliation, and the dangers thus entailed upon Athens would be far greater than the promised naval co-operation of Korkyra would compensate.

Such was the substance of the arguments urged by the contending envoys. For two days did the debate continue, the assembly being adjourned over to the morrow. Unluckily Thukydides does not give us any of these Athenian discourses—not even that of Periklēs, who determined the ultimate result.

Epidaunus with its disputed question of metropolitan right occupied little the attention of the Athenian assembly. But the Korkyræan naval force was indeed an immense item, since the question was whether it should stand on their side or against them—an item which nothing could counterbalance except the dangers of a Peloponnesian war. Of the two parties, the Corinthian was at first decidedly preponderant in the assembly; but they gradually came round to favour the Korkyræan alliance, deeming the conflict inevitable, which was conformably to the steady conviction of Periklēs¹. It was, however, resolved to take a sort of middle course,

¹ In this connexion we may quote the so-called 'psephism of Kallias' (C.I.A., I. 324; Hicks and Hill, 51), which has been shown to belong to the year 435-434. This decree provides (1) for the regulation of the accounts of the various temple-treasuries, into which all outstanding debts to the gods were to be paid; (2) for the creation of a special fund of 3,000 talents in the treasury of Athênē, which might only be drawn upon to meet special occasions (*cf.* E. Meyer, *Forschungen*, vol. ii., p. 88 ff). From this inscription it is clear that Athenian opinion had contemplated the possibility of war and the need of future economy ever since the beginning of the Korkyra episode. It is not quite easy, however, to make out the reasons for this changed attitude. The open-handed way in which Periklēs devoted the League funds to artistic purposes till at least 438 shows how little he anticipated an attack up to this period. More-

over, an impartial review of the attitude of Sparta towards Athens throughout the earlier century will hardly bear out Thukydides' statement (i. 23) that Sparta had all along decided to gratify her jealousy by making war on the first suitable occasion.

If Periklēs was right in his conviction of impending war, the cause is most probably to be sought in those commercial rivalries which, in spite of the silence of our literary authorities, must have been constantly at work. The Corinthian merchants may well have been alarmed at the growth of Athenian commerce, and this fear would account for the intensity of Corinthian hostility, which the episodes of Korkyra and Potidæa alone could hardly have aroused.

But even if war was inevitable, it is doubtful whether Athens did well to interfere at this point. Had the issue been left clear between Corinth and

so as to save Korkyra, and yet, if possible, to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent Peloponnesian war. Accordingly nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes strictly defensive, to preserve Korkyra and her possessions in case they were attacked: nor was any greater force equipped to back this resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lacedæmonius, son of Kimon. The smallness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it would save Korkyra from ruin, and would in fact feed the war so as to weaken and cripple the naval force of both parties—which was the best result that Athens could hope for.

The great Corinthian armament of 150 sail soon took its departure from the Gulf, and reached a harbour on the coast of Epirus at the Cape called Cheimerium, nearly opposite to the southern extremity of Korkyra. They there established a naval station and camp, summoning to their aid a considerable force from the friendly Epirotic tribes in the neighbourhood. The Korkyræan fleet of 110 sail, together with the ten Athenian ships, took station at one of the adjoining islands called Sybota, while the land force and 1,000 Zakynthian hoplites were posted on the Korkyræan Cape Leukimmê. Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians sailed by night from Cheimerium, and encountered in the morning the Korkyræan fleet advancing towards them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corinthians: next came the various allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle. But the tactics and manœuvring were not commensurate to the numbers. The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers below, on the Korkyræan side at least, were in great part slaves. The ships on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct impact prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each, as if they were on land—all upon the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those improvements introduced into the Athenian navy during the last generation.

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Korkyræans was victorious. Their twenty ships drove back the Ambrakiot allies of Corinth, and not only pursued them to the shore, but also landed and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus keeping so long out of the battle proved incalculably mischievous, the rather as their total number was inferior, for their right wing, opposed to the best ships of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. Many of the ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat as they could—a retreat which the victorious ships on the other wing might have protected, had there been any effective discipline in the fleet. Though at first they obeyed the instructions from home in abstaining from actual blows, yet—when the battle became doubtful, and still more, when the Corinthians were pressing their victory

Korkyra, it is doubtful whether the former city could have recruited so large a force from Megara and other towns (i. 46); and even though this confederate fleet might have swept the Korkyræans off the high seas, it does not follow that they could have reduced the island, a task which baffled the

victorious Spartan admiral Mnasiippus in 375 (Xen., *Hellen.*, vi. 2, §§ 3-8, 18-23). In this way the Athenians might have achieved their desire—the mutual weakening of the antagonists—without committing 'unfriendly acts'.—Ed.

—the Athenians could no longer keep aloof, but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the defeated Korkyræans. As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene of action, which was covered with crippled and water-logged ships. Through these disabled vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners, but putting the greater number to death. The Corinthians, having picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epirus, after which they again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume the attack against the Korkyræans on their own coast. The latter got together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the small reserve which had remained in harbour, in order to prevent at any rate a landing on the coast: and the Athenian ships, now within the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to co-operate with full energy in the defence. It was already late in the afternoon: but the Corinthian fleet were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing; presently they pulled round, and steered direct for the Epirotic coast. The Korkyræans did not comprehend the cause of this sudden retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching, which the Corinthians had been the first to descry, and had even believed to be the forerunners of a larger fleet.

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, they were found sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding action the Korkyræans had had seventy ships sunk or disabled—the Corinthians only thirty—so that the superiority of numbers was still on the side of the latter, who were however encumbered with the care of 1,000 prisoners. Even apart from this embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to hazard a second battle against thirty Athenian ships in addition to the remaining Korkyræans. And when their enemies sailed across to offer them battle on the Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but thought of nothing but immediate retreat. In their voyage homeward the Corinthians surprised Anaktorium at the mouth of the Ambrakiotic Gulf, which they had hitherto possessed jointly with the Korkyræans, planting in it a reinforcement of Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching Corinth, the armament was dismissed, and the great majority of the prisoners taken, 800 slaves, were sold; but the remainder, 250 in number, were detained, and treated with peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest families in Korkyra, and the Corinthians designed to gain them over, so as to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in the island.

From this time forward the Corinthians considered the Thirty years' truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens, so that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy through one of her wide-spread dependencies.

On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pallênê (which forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater Thracian peninsula

called Chalkidikê, between the Thermaic and Strymonic Gulfs), was situated the Dorian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary allies of Athens, but originally colonized from Corinth and still maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance towards the latter, insomuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates under the title of Epidemiurgi. On various points of the neighbouring coast also there were several small towns belonging to the Chalkidians and Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neighbouring inland territory¹ was held by the Macedonian king Perdikkas, son of that Alexander who had taken part fifty years before in the expedition of Xerxês. These two princes appear gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the territory between the rivers Axios and Strymon. Now Perdikkas had been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip, and Derdas, holding independent principalities in the upper country, with whom he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens, Perdikkas from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over the seaports on the mainland than over the islands². For the former were always more or less dependent on any powerful land-neighbour, sometimes more dependent on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens herself cultivating assiduously the favour of Sitalkes and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the seaports³. Perdikkas immediately began to incite and aid the Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens, and not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian league to a general declaration of war against Athens. And he farther prevailed on many of the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small town on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea.

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth. Immediately after the Korkyræan sea-fight they sent to take precautions against the revolt of Potidæa⁴, requiring the inhabitants to take down their wall on the side of Pallênê, so as to leave the town open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea-side, and fortified only towards the mainland—requiring them farther both to deliver hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and 1,000 hoplites, despatched to act against

¹ The words τὰ ἐνὶ Θράκῃς—τὰ ἐνὶ Θράκῃς χώρια (Thukyd., ii. 29) denote generally the towns in Chalkidikê—places in the direction or in the skirts of Thrace, rather than parts of Thrace itself.

² See two remarkable passages illustrating this difference, Thukyd., iv. 120-122.

³ Thukyd., ii. 29-38. Isokrates has a remarkable passage on this subject in the beginning of *Or. v., Ad Philippon*, sect. 5-7. After pointing out the imprudence of founding a colony on the skirts of the territory of a powerful potentate, and the excellent site which had been chosen for Kyrênê,

as being near only to feeble tribes—he goes so far as to say that the possession of Amphipolis would be injurious rather than beneficial to Athens, because it would render her dependent upon Philip, through his power of annoying her colonists—just as she had been dependent before upon Medokus the Thracian king in consequence of her colonists in the Chersonese.

⁴ It would appear that Potidæa had been guilty of disaffection about the time of the Samian revolt, for we find that in 437 or 436 her tribute was raised from 6 to 15 talents (C.I.A., i. 242, 244).—ED.

Perdikkas in the Thermaic Gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidæa, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighbouring Chalkidians. Immediately on receiving the requisitions, the Potidæans sent envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining time—and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities¹ they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the Thirty years' truce still subsisting. At Athens they had no successes, and they accordingly openly revolted (seemingly about midsummer 432 B.C.) at the same time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalkidians and Bottiæans revolted also, at the express instigation of Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance². Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, found them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perdikkas in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therma, in co-operation with the Macedonian troops from the upper country under Philip and the brothers of Derdas; after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. But it would probably have been wiser had he turned his whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidæa; for during the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to Potidæa a reinforcement of 1,600 hoplites and 400 light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians hired for the occasion—under Aristeus son of Adeimantus, a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put in a state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to attack it. A second armament, however, was speedily sent forth—forty triremes and 2,000 Athenian hoplites under Kallias son of Kalliades³, who, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pydna. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could with Perdikkas, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations against Aristeus and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, attacking, though without effect, the town of Berœa—and then marching by land along the eastern coast of the Gulf, in the direction of Potidæa⁴.

In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdikkas, whose character for faithlessness we shall have more than one occasion to notice, was now again on the side of the Chalkidians, and sent 200 horse to join them. Aristeus posted his Corinthians and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa, providing a market without the walls in order that they might not stray in quest of provisions. His position was on the side

¹ This promise is only attributed to τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων—i.e., the ephors—and nothing is said about the consent of the assembled people, which alone could authorize so serious an enterprise as the invasion of Attica (Thukyd., i. 58). The ephors probably had as little intention of pledging themselves to war with Athens as they had on the occasion of the Thasian revolt (*cf.* p. 294, n. 3).—ED.

² Thukyd., v. 30.

³ Kallias was a young Athenian of noble family, who had paid the large sum of 100 minæ to Zeno of Elea the philosopher, for rhetorical, philosophical, and sophistical instruction (Plato, *Alcibiades*, i., c. 31, p. 119).

⁴ Thukyd., i. 61. The statement of Thukydides presents some geographical difficulties.

towards Olynthus—which was about seven miles off, but within sight, and in a lofty and conspicuous situation. He here awaited the approach of the Athenians, calculating that the Chalkidians from Olynthus would, upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to place in reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against Olynthus, while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued, Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them, and pursuing for a considerable distance. But the remaining Potidæans and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious Athenians between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative either of cutting his way through them into the latter town, or of making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the least of two hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the Athenians, wading into the sea in order to turn the extremity of the Potidæan wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus with a mole running out at each end into the water. He effected this daring enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile, the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could make any effective diversion. The defeated Potidæans and Corinthians, having the town immediately in their rear, lost only 300 men, while the Athenians lost 150, together with the general Kallias.

The victory was, however, quite complete, and the Athenians immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all communication with Olynthus and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other side towards Pallênê: but they had not force enough to detach a completely separate body for this purpose, until after some time they were joined by Phormio with 1,600 fresh hoplites from Athens. That general marched slowly up to Potidæa, ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle. But the challenge not being accepted, he undertook and finished without obstruction the blockading wall on the side of Pallênê, so that the town was now completely enclosed and the harbour watched by the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard it, leaving Phormio at liberty to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalkidic and Bottiæan townships. The capture of Potidæa being now only a question of more or less time, Aristeus, in order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose a favourable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly from the harbour, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only 500 defenders behind. Though he offered himself to be among those left, he could not determine the citizens to so bold an enterprise, and therefore sallied forth, in the way proposed, with a small detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without—especially some aid or diversion from Peloponnesus.

But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond some partial warlike operations among the Chalkidians, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded town. It had, however, been so well-provisioned that it held out for two whole years—a period full of important events elsewhere.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at Korkyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprang those important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted in the next chapter.

APPENDIX

THE whole question of the relation between Athens and her allies has been very largely simplified by recent discoveries. It may be treated most satisfactorily under two heads: (1) the payment of tribute, and (2) government and jurisdiction. It cannot be claimed that all the problems are finally solved, but much additional light has undoubtedly been cast upon a subject of prime historical importance and of great interest to the comparative historian.

I. THE TRIBUTE OF THE ALLIES

Of recent years a fuller investigation of the tribute-lists has largely modified and supplemented the views expressed in the preceding chapter.

1. The chronological references of C.I.A., i. 260 (Hill's *Sources*, p. 22) prove that the first list of the series was published in 454, from which fact it is fairly safe to infer that the transference of the Treasury from Dêlos to Athens took place in this year¹. The date 454 fits in well with the supposition that about this time the Athenians must have heard of the approaching disaster to the Egyptian Expedition, and therefore had reason to fear for the safety of the Ægean sea.

2. As to the amount of the tribute, we have seen that Thukydides was probably wrong in estimating the original contribution at 460 talents—this total hardly being conceivable before the campaign of 466 (see note to p. 275). Again, the lists do not bear out his statement (ii. 13) that the tribute at the outset of the Peloponnesian war amounted to 600 talents. The explanation of this discrepancy is not quite certain. Busolt (*Philol.*, 41, p. 703) suggests that Thukydides included in his total the Samian war-indemnity (but see Beloch, *N. Rhein. Mus.*, vol. 39, 34 ff., and vol. 48). For an alternative explanation, *cf.* note on p. 387.

From the list of total contributions in 425 (C.I.A., i. 37; Hicks and Hill, 64) we learn that the tribute was largely increased, thus confirming the later authorities against the silence of Thukydides and the doubts of Grote (*cf.* Appendix, ch. 22).

The moderation of the original total is shown by the fact that while Paros under the new conditions paid thirty talents, Naxos and Andros fifteen, Athens had three years before collected from her own citizens a year's income-tax amounting to 200 talents (Thuk., iii. 19). Further, since in 413 the tribute was replaced largely or entirely by a 5 per cent. duty on imports and exports in the hope of *increasing* the revenue (Thuk., vii. 28) it is clear that the allies were not overtaxed.

3. The fivefold division of the tributary states existed only from 443 to 436 (C.I.A., i. 237-244). Before this period there was no real geographical arrangement, and afterwards there were only four divisions—the Ionian and Karian *φόροι* being combined as Ionian.

¹ The date given by pap. Argentinensis is 450, which attributes the transference to Periklēs. An attempt has been made to reconcile this statement with the evidence of the quota-lists by assigning to 454 the nominal, to 450 the actual change of control. But apart from the late date and doubtful authority of the papyrus, its evidence is vitiated by the statement that the sum trans-

ferred was 5,000 talents. Considering the drain on Athenian resources in the ensuing years, this leaves the accumulation of 9,700 talents by 440 unexplained. Here, too, we must reject the testimony of the papyrus in favour of Diodorus' (xii. 38) estimate of 8,000 talents—a total which the spoils of the early Persian campaigns would soon produce.

4. As to the number of the tributaries, Kirchhoff in C.I.A., (i. 226 ff.) gives a list of about 200. Some authorities even give 290. The number (1,000) given by Aristophanes far exceeds that given in the lists. The discrepancy is partly explained by the fact that several cities were in some cases grouped together as single units (*συνερείς*). (Cf. Antiphon, xv., fr. 56.)

5. *Mode of Assessment*.—The tribute-lists were revised every fourth year, originally at each Grand Panathenaea (after 454)—i.e., in the third year of each Olympiad. Afterwards (? 437 B.C.) the revision took place at the fourth year of the Olympiad (i.e., at the Lesser Panathenaea). The Boulè, assisted by the *τακται* (an elective body of eight, two for each district in the year 425-424), presented a draft for ratification by the Ekklesià. The process was as follows. Firstly, each city assessed itself before the commissioners, who brought the question before the Boulè, which might accept the suggestion, or another made by the commissioners. Those cities whose own estimate was accepted appear in the lists undescribed; they form the majority. If the matter was not settled in this simple way, it was brought before the Ekklesià for trial. Those cities who made good their case against the commissioners' assessment were described as *πόλεις ἀπὸ αὐτὰν φόρον ταξάμεναι* (C.I.A., i. 243, 244, 256); those who lost their case were distinguished as *πόλεις ἃς ἔταξαν οἱ τακται* (C.I.A., i. 266). If a private citizen proposed a third amount (in the Ekklesià, or, according to Köhler, in the Boulè), and the Ekklesià accepted it, the city was grouped with those *ἃς οἱ ἰδιῶται ἔταξαν* (C.I.A., i. 266), or *ἐνέγραψαν φόρον φέρειν* (C.I.A., i. 243, 244, 256). A fourth class consisted of those *ἃς ἡ βουλὴ καὶ οἱ πεντακόσιοι [οἱ ἡλιασταὶ] ἔταξαν*. The reading is not certain, but it is clear that the allies had the privilege (like the ordinary Athenian) of carrying their cause before a law-court (C.I.A., i. 266). The records preserved are the so-called quota-lists, which give the names of the cities, and that proportion ($\frac{1}{50}$) which was paid into the treasury of Athena, but see Busolt in *Philologus*, xli., pp. 652-718).

6. Payments were made to the Hellenotamiæ before the Boulè in the month Elaphëbolion (February-March). When cities were behindhand in payment, officers called *ἐκλογεῖς* (Antiphon, xv., fr. 52 (53); Lysias, fr. vii. 9) were sent out to them, protected in time of war by a squadron of ships (*ἀργυρολόγοι νῆες*, Thuk., iii. 19; iv. 50, 75).

7. Boeckh's theory that the Kleruchs paid tribute is refuted by the lists, which show that cities to which Kleruchies were sent paid less after their settlement than before (e.g., Andros paid twelve talents in 450, only six in 449). Further, Potidæa does not occur in the lists after 430. The Kleruchs remained full citizens, and, therefore, were naturally not subject to the burdens which fell upon the allies.

II. GOVERNMENT AND JURISDICTION

Perhaps the most interesting comment on the actual condition of the first Delian Confederacy is to be found in the inscription (C.I.A., ii. 17a; Hicks, *Historical Inscriptions*) which describes the arrangement of the Second Confederacy in the archonship of Nausinikus (378-377 B.C.). After the usual preliminaries, it runs: 'If any of the Greeks or the Barbarians of the Mainland or in the Islands, not being a subject of the King (i.e., of Persia), wishes to become an ally of Athens and her allies, he shall be free and autonomous, retaining that form of government which he prefers; no garrison or military governor shall be imposed upon him; he shall be free from tribute,' etc. Further, it provides for an independent council, and says expressly that no Athenian shall be allowed to settle down in possession of land or house property in regions belonging to the allies. Any Athenian transgressing this law shall be tried before the assembly of allies, and the property in question shall go, half to the informant, and half to the treasury of the Confederacy.

There can be no doubt that this inscription specifically provides against those factors in the former league which had rendered it intolerable to the allies. Its wording suggests that Athens had not been justified in using compulsion against those allies (Naxos, Thasos, Samos, etc.) who wished to dissociate themselves. Whatever may have been the utilitarian justification for such action it would seem that it was regarded as mere aggression, and that it had not been con-

templated in the original constitution of the league (*cf.* Thuk., i. 98 *ad fin.*)¹. The second and third grievances which Grote gives in the above chapter are amply confirmed by this inscription, and by those which record the terms of 'alliance' between Athens and Erythræ, Chalkis, Milêtus (C.I.A., i. 9; iv. (1), 27a, p. 10; iv. (1), 22a; Hicks and Hill, 32 and 40). From these it is evident that the first confederacy was based to some extent on separate agreements between Athens and her allies. How far this was so we are unable to determine, but we can see that these agreements were in point of fact charters by which Athens regulated the affairs of her allies. By the inscription relating to Erythræ a constitution analogous to that of Athens is imposed. The chief deliberative and executive functions of the state are vested in a Boulê of 120 members, whose qualifications are the same as for the councillors at Athens. Similar arrangements for the *δοκιμασία* (initial scrutiny) and *εἴθυνα* are also imposed. Their election is to be controlled for the first year by two officials—the *ἐπισκόπος* (overseer) and the *φρουράρχος* (captain of the garrison), afterwards by the *φρουράρχος* and the Boulê. It is clear that the *ἐπισκόπος* was only a temporary official (see also Ar., *Av.*, 1023), while the phrourarch was permanent, and after the first year discharged certain civil duties. How far the Athenians made a practice of placing garrisons in the allied cities is not clear. Thukydides refers to *οἱ ἐν τοῖς φρουραῖς*, and speaks of a garrison left in Samos (i. 115, 3) and in Thrace (iv. 7)². These may have been exceptional cases. Still we are quite justified in inferring from these statements that it is quite wrong to suppose that the allies in the first confederacy had nothing to put up with at the hands of Athenian officials. And this is amply confirmed by the inscription quoted at the head of this note. In the Erythræan decree the councillors swear that they will not revolt against Athens nor persuade others to do so, and sentence of death is pronounced on any who should seek to re-establish tyranny in the city. Finally it is provided that all cases of treason involving capital punishment are to be tried before the Athenian courts. The charter which regulated the relations between Chalkis and Athens, besides giving the duties imposed on Athens, contains a similar provision that the *εἴθυνα* of magistrates shall take place at Chalkis, except in cases where the penalty is exile, death, or the loss of citizenship. Finally, from the inscription relating to Milêtus it is shown that the jurisdiction of the local courts extended only to cases in which the penalty involved did not exceed 100 drachmas (C.I.A., iv. 22a *fr. c.*, l. 8).

It has been held that this interference did not affect civil causes. But [Xenophon], *Resp. Ath.* (i. 16) states, no doubt with some exaggeration, that the Athenians made great profit from the court dues (*πρυτανεία*). Now these dues were payable in civil cases only, and therefore, although the case of Milêtus may have been exceptional, it is perfectly clear that the allies had very real grounds for complaint. Their freedom was curtailed; they were under the necessity of undertaking a more or less lengthy journey in order to get justice; and, rightly or wrongly, they very naturally suspected that the verdict might be to some extent influenced by extraneous considerations. However equitable the intentions of the Athenians may have been, and however beneficial the general result of this centralized jurisdiction, it is idle to pretend that such an arrangement could ever have satisfied the members of a league which had witnessed the drastic action of the Athenians in the case of Naxos and Thasos. It is not surprising that the allies complained that individuals condemned at Athens belonged to the oligarchic parties in the various states, and that the verdict was the expression of party feeling ([Xen.], *Resp. Ath.*, i. 16; Ar., *Pax*, 639).

It is stated in the above chapter that these judicial powers had previously been vested in the general synod. Had this been the case, no doubt their transference to the Athenian courts would have been perfectly natural. But in point of fact there is no evidence that the synod ever exercised the extended judicial

¹ It is possible, however, that the allies made their agreement with Athens *εἰς τὸν αἰὶ χρόνον*; this is not proved, but if it was so, the Athenians were to some extent justified in their action. Furthermore, it was of the utmost importance that there should be no island which might serve as a base for the pirates who had always infested the Ægean Sea even when a strong fleet was cruising about. The decline of Athenian sea-power led to a recrudescence of privateering,

which was only checked for a part of the later centuries by the public-spirited action of the Rhodians, and came to a head under the rule of the Roman republic. The rapid rise of this evil is strikingly attested in Isokrates' *Panegyricus* (§§ 115-119), published in 380 B.C.

² *Ath. Pol.* (c. 24) speaks of 2,500 men on garrison duty during the Peloponnesian war. *Cf.* also Ar., *Vesp.*, 236 (Byzantium), and Eupolis *fr.* 233, Kock: (Kyzikus).

functions which are established in the foregoing charters. Moreover it is not accurate to say that the jurisdiction of the Athenian courts 'went rather to regulate the relations between city and city'. The inscriptions show that Athens did, in point of fact, at least in certain cases, interfere in the intimate internal affairs of the allied states. It is beside the point to argue that the allies ought not to have complained, because they were tried by 'the same tribunals under which every Athenian citizen held his own fortune or reputation'. The fundamental fact is that such an arrangement could not possibly commend itself to the allies, who preferred to be tried by their own laws.

It remains to discuss the question as to whether the Athenians did or did not 'systematically interfere to democratize by violence the subject allies'. Aristotle (*Politics*, viii., vi. 9, 1307b, 20) says *οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι πανταχοῦ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες τοὺς δήμους κατέλυνον*¹. Isokratēs (*Paneg.*, 106) says, *τὴν αὐτὴν πολιτείαν ἤνπερ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις κατεστήσαμεν* (see also *Panathén.*, 54; Thuk., viii., 21, 48, 64, 65). Thus the general opinion in the fourth century was that Athens tended to impose a constitution similar to her own. The charter given to Erythræ confirms the view (C.I.A., i. 9; Hicks and Hill, 32; cf. Thuk., iii. 34). On the other hand, it is objected (as in the above chapter) that oligarchies existed in Chios and Lesbos and in Samos up to 440; that even if a democracy was set up in Samos in 439 the government was oligarchical in 412; that Selymbria (C.I.A., iv. (1), 61a, p. 18; Hicks and Hill, 77) was permitted to chose its own form of government. It should be observed, however, that in the early days of the confederacy Chios and Lesbos (till 428) and Samos (440) were autonomous, and that the case of Selymbria occurred when the empire was tottering to its fall (409). The history of Samos after 439 is too obscure for any valuable deduction to be based upon it. And when we observe that in the second confederacy it is specifically stated that no constitution shall be forced upon the allies, it is reasonable to conclude that the opinion of Aristotle and Isokratēs was not without foundation.

The view of the Delian League taken in the above chapter is, therefore, at least open to discussion. There is abundant evidence to show that the Athenian rule was, in some cases at least, stringent to the verge of tyranny. To reply that the allies must have been on the whole acquiescent, inasmuch as their revolts were up to the Sicilian Expedition few and infrequent is scarcely justifiable. It is perfectly clear that the islands were not likely to revolt with a powerful fleet cruising in the Ægæan, whereas inland revolts in Karia, Lykia, and Chalkidiké were common, and Thukydídēs states that they were ready to revolt *κατὰ δύνανμιν*. We must rather believe that the allies had very real and tangible grievances. They were controlled in their political affairs, their trade, and their judicature; they had to endure the presence of Athenian officers and garrisons²; and, finally, they could not but resent the steadily increasing arrogance betrayed by Athens in the terms of the charters imposed upon individual states.

The above criticisms must in no way be taken to imply that the allies were in every case the worse for Athenian interference. As we see in Hdt., vi. 42, the commercial morality of the Ionians was low, and probably the power of the Athenians to some extent checked their dishonesty. The whole point is that Athens did interfere with the private affairs of those who were nominally independent allies, and that the kinds of interference above described were to the Greek mind tyranny. Whatever may have been the Athenians' motive there is no doubt that their method was calculated ultimately to defeat their object—ED.

¹ It can be shown that Sparta did not go in for political propaganda till 418 B.C. Hence the antithesis is too strong.

² Also the employment of a secret police (Bekker, *Anecd.*, i., p. 273, l. 33).

CHAPTER XVIII [XLVIII]

FROM THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END OF THE FIRST YEAR
OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

EVEN before the recent hostilities at Korkyra and Potidæa, it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that prolonged observance of the Thirty years' truce was becoming uncertain, and that the mingled hatred, fear, and admiration, which Athens inspired throughout Greece would prompt the Spartan confederacy to seize any favourable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. Accordingly not only the Samians when they revolted had applied to the confederacy for aid, but also the Lesbians had endeavoured to open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose, though the authorities to whom alone the proposition could have been communicated, since it long remained secret and was never executed, had given them no encouragement¹.

The affairs of Athens had been administered, under the ascendancy of Periklēs, without any view to extension of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant reference to the probabilities of war, and with anxiety to keep the city in a condition to meet it.

The only known incident, wherein Athens had been brought into collision with a member of the Spartan confederacy prior to the Korkyræan dispute, was, her decree passed in regard to Megara—prohibiting the Megarians, on pain of death, from all trade or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within the Athenian empire. This prohibition was grounded on the alleged fact, that the Megarians had harboured runaway slaves from Athens, and had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon her border—partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis, partly a strip of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore left by mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent enclosure². In reference to this latter point, the Athenian herald Anthemokritus had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterwards was imputed to the Megarians³. Exclusion from Athens and all the ports in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in the Ægean, was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they loudly complained of it at Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the Thirty years' truce; though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens to enforce—and was even less harsh

¹ Thukyd., iii. 2-13. This proposition of the Lesbians at Sparta must have been made before the collision between Athens and Corinth at Korkyra.

² Thukyd., i. 139; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 30; Schol. ad Aristophan., *Pac.*, 609.

³ Thukydides (i. 139), in assigning the reasons of this sentence of exclusion passed by Athens against the Megarians, mentions only the two allegations here noticed—wrongful cultivation of territory, and reception of runaway slaves. He does not allude to the herald Anthemokritus: still less does he notice that gossip of the day which Aristophanēs and other comedians of this period turn to account in fastening the Peloponnesian war upon the personal sympathies of Periklēs—viz., that first, some young men of Athens stole away the courtesan Simætha from Megara: next, the

Megarian youth revenged themselves by carrying off from Athens 'two engaging courtezans', one of whom was the mistress of Periklēs; upon which the latter was so enraged that he proposed the sentence of exclusion against the Megarians (Aristoph., *Acharn.*, 501-516; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 30.)

Such stories are chiefly valuable as they make us acquainted with the political scandal of the time. But the story of the herald Anthemokritus and his death cannot be altogether rejected. That neither Thukydides, nor Periklēs himself, believed that the Megarians had really caused his death, is pretty certain: otherwise the fact would have been urged when the Lacedæmonians sent to complain of the sentence of exclusion—being a deed so notoriously repugnant to all Grecian feeling.

than the systematic expulsion of foreigners by Sparta, with which Periklēs compared it¹.

These complaints found increased attention after the war of Korkyra and the blockade of Potidæa by the Athenians. The sentiments of the Corinthians towards Athens had now become angry and warlike in the highest degree. It was not simply resentment for the past which animated them, but also the anxiety farther to bring upon Athens so strong a hostile pressure as should preserve Potidæa and its garrison from capture. Accordingly they lost no time in endeavouring to rouse the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to invite to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances against that city. Not merely the Megarians, but several other confederates, came thither as accusers; while the Æginetans, though their insular position made it perilous for them to appear, made themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of others, complaining that Athens withheld from them the autonomy to which they were entitled under the truce.

According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary first that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether there existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens against them-

¹ The exact circumstances of the passing of the Megarian decree are not known to us; most of the references to this measure are quite cursory, while the more detailed account in Plutarch (*Periklēs*, c. 30) is not altogether plausible, and leaves out of account the important question of the date. The termini between which the event must have fallen are the trial of Pheidias (*Ar., Pax*, 604 ff.)—i.e., not earlier than 438-437 at the outside—and the autumn of 432 (*Thukyd.*, i. 67). The most probable occasion is soon after the battle of Sybota, in which Megara had participated against an ally of Athens.

Another question arises, whether one or more decrees were passed. On the whole it seems simplest to suppose that no measures were taken until after the ill-treatment of the herald mentioned in Plutarch, upon which the Megarians were excluded from Athenian commerce. That this embargo constituted the crux of the Megarian grievance follows from *Thukyd.*, i. 67, v. 30. Hence we need not assume a previous decree of ἀσπορίας καὶ ἀσπορικῶς ἔχθρα (*Plutarch*, *loc. cit.*), or even split up the decree of prohibition into two measures (*Busolt*, *Gr. Gesch.*, iii., § 30): the ἔχθρα follows from the embargo without further formalities. Again, Charinus' decree, providing that the strategēi should take oath to invade the Megarid twice a year, is inconceivable in 432; and instead of transferring it to 431 (*Busolt*, *loc. cit.*, and *Duncker*), we may argue that Plutarch was here misled by the regular practice of the Athenians, during the early part of the war, of making such incursions. The insertion of a clause to that effect in the general's oath suggests that Plutarch's statement may be ultimately founded on a comic parody (cf. the 'curses' in *Ar., Thesmophor.*, 331-351). At any rate, τὸ Μεγαρικὸν ψήφισμα, the usual title, suggests only one decree; nor does the passage in *Ar., Ach.*, 315-339, necessarily imply more.

Whatever the circumstances under which the decree was passed, there can be no doubt of its importance as a proximate cause of the war. Apart from the notices in *Thukyd.* (i. 67, 139, 140), *Ar., Ach.*, 501 ff., and *Pax*, 604 ff. (followed by *Plut., Per.*, c. 32), and *Diod.*, xii. 38 ff. (followed by *Plut., Alkibi.*, 7), connect the outbreak of the war with Periklēs' decree, and though we need not accept the scurrilous motives here supplied, we must infer that a widespread popular opinion

made the psephism the cause of the war. The same version is given as a matter of course in *Andok., De Pace*, § 8 (390 B.C.).

If, therefore, the decree was of such importance in bringing on the final breach between Athens and Sparta, we may ask what was Periklēs' motive in issuing and upholding it. No doubt the desire of avenging the revolt and massacre of 445 counts for something. Meyer (*Gesch. d. Alt.*, vol. iv., ch. 5) suggests that Periklēs intended the decree to serve as a challenge to the enemies of Athens, showing that he could not be intimidated. But apart from the improbability of such an action on the part of a statesman like Periklēs, it is hard to see what interest Athens had in precipitating matters while she was still at war with the Chalkidians. Besides, from the offers of arbitration (*Thukyd.*, i. 78 and 140) we may gather that as late as autumn 432 Athens was willing to avoid or postpone the war.

The fact that Periklēs refused on any account to rescind this decree shows that he attached some real weight to its enforcement. Perhaps it was the strategic importance of the Megarid that determined him. The possession of the Geraneia range with its three difficult roads had proved of great value to Athens in 457, and the loss of Megara in 446 had forthwith led to an invasion of Attica. In remembrance of former wars with Sparta Periklēs may have decided, as soon as he saw the war-clouds gathering fast—i.e., after the battle of Sybota and the Spartan promises to Potidæa—on a desperate attempt to subdue and occupy the Megarid beforehand, and calculated that the pressure of famine and commercial ruin might force the Megarians to make peace or help to bring about a philo-Athenian revolution (such as actually took place in 425).

That such embargoes on trade could become efficient instruments of coercion is proved by the great success which attended Venice in enforcing such measures on refractory dependencies in the Adriatic and Ægean seas (cf. *Holm, Greek History*, ii., p. 327, n. 3), and the Italian exporters in boycotting England in 1456-1465 (*Einstein, The Renaissance in Italy*, pp. 252-256). Once such an order had been issued, it would have been suicidal to abrogate it, and so definitely to sacrifice a vital military advantage to the very problematic chance of avoiding war altogether.—Ed.

selves or against Peloponnesus—either in violation of the Thirty years' truce, or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta herself were in the negative, the case would never even be submitted to the vote of the allies. But if it were in the affirmative, then the latter would be convoked to deliver their opinion also: and assuming that the majority of votes coincided with the previous decision of Sparta, the entire confederacy stood then pledged to the given line of policy—if the majority was contrary, the Spartans would stand alone, or with such only of the confederates as concurred. Each allied city, great or small, had an equal right of suffrage. It thus appears that Sparta herself did not vote as a member of the confederacy, but separately and individually as leader—and that the only question ever submitted to the allies was, whether they would or would not go along with her previous decision. Such was the course of proceeding now followed. The Corinthians, together with such other of the confederates as felt either aggrieved or alarmed by Athens, presented themselves before the public assembly of Spartan citizens, prepared to prove that the Athenians had broken the truce and were going on in a course of wrong towards Peloponnesus.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of Greece turned, Thukydides has preserved an account unusually copious. First, the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who happening to be at the same time in Sparta on some other matters, and being present in the assembly so as to have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other complainants, obtained permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the Ephor Sthenelaidas, on putting the question for decision.

The Corinthians knew well that the audience whom they were about to address had been favourably prepared for them—for the Lacedæmonian authorities had already given an actual promise, to them and to the Potidæans at the moment before Potidæa revolted, that they would invade Attica. Great was the revolution in sentiment of the Spartans, since they had declined lending aid to the much more powerful island of Lesbos when it proposed to revolt—a revolution occasioned by the altered interests and sentiments of Corinth. Nevertheless, the Corinthians also knew that their positive grounds of complaint against Athens, in respect of wrong or violation of the existing truce, were both few and feeble. Neither in the dispute about Potidæa nor about Korkyra, had Athens infringed the truce or wronged the Peloponnesian alliance. In both she had come into collision with Corinth, singly and apart from the confederacy. She had a right, both according to the truce and according to the received maxims of international law, to lend defensive aid to the Korkyræans, at their own request: she had a right also, according to the principles laid down by the Corinthians themselves on occasion of the revolt of Samos, to restrain the Potidæans from revolting.

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, would not have suited the purpose of the Corinthian envoy; for against such, the Thirty years' truce expressly provided that recourse should be had to amicable arbitration—to which recourse he never once alludes. His business was

to show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and especially Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, not less by prudence than by duty. He employs the most animated language to depict the ambition, the unwearied activity, the quick resolves of Athens, as contrasted with the home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous routine of Sparta. He reproaches the Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not having repressed the growth of Athens before she reached this formidable height, especially in having allowed her to fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxès and afterwards to build the long walls from the city to the sea.

After half apologizing for the tartness of these reproofs—which, however, as the Spartans were now well disposed to go to war forthwith, would be well-timed and even agreeable—the Corinthian orator vindicates the necessity of plain-speaking by the formidable character of the enemy who threatened them. 'You do not reflect (he says) how thoroughly different the Athenians are from yourselves. *They* are innovators by nature, sharp both in devising and in executing what they have determined: *you* are sharp only in keeping what you have got, in determining on nothing beyond, and in doing even less than absolute necessity requires. *They* again dare beyond their means, run risks beyond their own judgment, and keep alive their hopes even in desperate circumstances: *your* peculiarity is, that your performance comes short of your power—you have no faith even in what your judgment guarantees—when in difficulties, you despair of all escape. *They* never hang back—you are habitual laggards: *they* love foreign service—you cannot stir from home: for *they* are always under the belief that their movements will lead to some farther gain, while *you* fancy that new products will endanger what you already have. When successful, they make the greatest forward march; when defeated, they fall back the least. Moreover, they task their bodies on behalf of their city as if they were the bodies of others—while their minds are most of all their own, for exertion in her service. When their plans for acquisition do not come successfully out, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them: yet the acquisitions when realized appear like trifles compared with what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the want: for with them alone the possession and the hope of what they aim at is almost simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all that they have once resolved. And in this manner do they toil throughout all their lives amidst hardship and peril, disregarding present enjoyment in the continual thirst for increase—knowing no other festival recreation except the performance of active duty—and deeming inactive repose a worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak the truth in two words, such is their inborn temper, that they will neither remain at rest themselves, nor allow rest to others.

'In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements which are sure to come out victorious: and though unchanged institutions are best, if a city be not called upon to act—yet multiplicity of active obligations requires multiplicity and novelty of contrivance. It is through these numerous trials that the means of Athens have acquired so much more new development than yours.'

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to protect

her allies against Athens—if she delayed to perform her promise made to the Potidæans of immediately invading Attica—they (the Corinthians) would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance, which they felt themselves fully justified in doing.

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited by her fiercest enemy before the public assembly at Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to recent or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless aggression which was imputed to Athens during the past—and by the certainty held out that the same system, unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed still farther in future to the utter ruin of Peloponnesus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under which it had grown up : and what was needed as information for them would be impressive as a reminder even to their seniors.

He began by disclaiming all intention of defending his native city against the charges of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the existing truce. This was no part of his mission ; nor did he recognise Sparta as a competent judge in dispute between Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against the general character of injustice and aggression imputed to her, as well as to offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the policy towards which they were obviously tending. He then dwelt upon the circumstances attending the Persian invasion, setting forth the superior forwardness and the unflinching endurance of Athens—the preponderance of her naval force in the entire armament—the directing genius of her general Themistoklès, complimented even by Sparta herself—and the title of Athens to rank on that memorable occasion as the principal saviour of Greece. This alone ought to save her empire from reproach ; but this was not all—for that empire had been tendered to her by the pressing instance of the allies, at a time when Sparta had proved herself both incompetent and unwilling to prosecute the war against Persia. By simple exercise of the constraining force inseparable from her presidential obligations, and by the reduction of various allies who revolted, Athens had gradually become unpopular, while Sparta too had become her enemy instead of her friend. To relax her hold upon her allies would have been to make them the allies of Sparta against her ; and thus the motive of fear was added to those of ambition and revenue, in inducing Athens to maintain her imperial dominion by force. In her position, no Grecian power either would or could have acted otherwise :—no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted with so much equity and moderation, or given so little ground of complaint to her subjects. Worse they *had* suffered, while under Persia ; worse they *would* suffer, if they came under Sparta, who held her own allies under the thralldom of an oligarchical party in each city ; and if they hated Athens, this was only because subjects always hated the *present* dominion, whatever that might be.

The envoy concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being hurried away by the passions and invectives of others, before she took a step from which there was no retreat, and which exposed the future

to chances such as no man on either side could foresee. He called on her not to break the truce mutually sworn to, but to adjust all differences, as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration which that truce provided.

The facts recounted in the preceding chapters will have shown, that the account given by the Athenian envoy at Sparta of the origin and character of the empire exercised by his city (though doubtless the account of a partisan) is in substance correct and equitable. But now the mind of the Spartans was made up. Having cleared the assembly of all 'strangers' and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss and determine the question among themselves. Most of their speakers held but one language—expatiating on the wrongs already done by Athens, and urging the necessity of instant war. There was, however, one voice, and that a commanding voice, raised against this conclusion: the ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it.

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind partiality to allies, looks at the question with a view to the interests and honour of Sparta only—not, however, omitting her imperial as well as her separate character. Invoking the experience of the elders his contemporaries around him, he impressed upon the assembly the grave responsibility, the uncertainties, difficulties, and perils, of the war into which they were hurrying without preparation. He reminded them of the wealth, the population (greater than that of any other Grecian city), the naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign dominion of Athens—and then asked by what means they proposed to put her down? Ships, they had few; trained seamen, yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They could indeed invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and land-force. But the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispense with the produce of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war to an end, would be a deplorable error: such proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps for a whole generation. Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more efficient means for carrying it on, and to multiply their allies not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also. While this was in process, envoys ought to be sent to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grievances of the allies. If the Athenians granted this, so much the better: if they refused, in the course of two or three years war might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded his countrymen that their allies would hold *them* responsible for the good or bad issue of what was now determined, admonishing them, in the true spirit of a conservative Spartan, to cling to that cautious policy which had been ever the characteristic of the state, despising both taunts on their tardiness and panegyric on their valour¹.

¹ The way in which the features of Spartan character are deduced from Spartan institutions, as well as the pride which Archidamus expresses in the ignorance and narrow mental range of his countrymen, are here remarkable. A similar championship of ignorance and narrow-mindedness

is not only to be found among those who deride the literary and oratorical tastes of the Athenian democracy (see Aristophanès, *Ran.*, 1070: compare Xenophon, *Memorab.*, i. 2, 9-49), but also in the speech of Kleon (*Thukyd.* iii. 37).

The speech of Archidamus was not only in itself full of plain reason and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan, appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal esteem entertained for the speaker, the tide of feeling in the opposite direction was at that moment irresistible. Sthenelaidas—one of the five Ephors, to whom it fell to put the question for voting—closed the debate. His few words mark at once the character of the man—the temper of the assembly—and the simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgement, for which Archidamus had taken credit to his countrymen.

‘I don’t understand (he said) these long speeches of the Athenians. They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted what is laid to their charge—that they are guilty of wrong against our allies and against Peloponnesus. Now if in former days they were good men against the Persians, and are now evil-doers against us, they deserve double punishment as having become evil-doers instead of good. But *we* are the same now as we were then : we know better than to sit still while our allies are suffering wrong : we shall not adjourn our aid, while they cannot adjourn their sufferings. Others have in abundance wealth, ships, and horses—but *we* have good allies, whom we are not to abandon to the mercy of the Athenians : nor are we to trust our redress to arbitration and to words, when our wrongs are not confined to words. We must help them speedily and with all our strength. Let no one tell us that we can with honour deliberate when we are actually suffering wrong : it is rather for those who intend to do the wrong, to deliberate well beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, in a manner worthy of Sparta. Suffer not the Athenians to become greater than they are : let us not betray our allies to ruin, but march with the aid of the gods against the wrong-doers.’

With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the prudential admonitions of Archidamus, Sthenelaidas put the question for the decision of the assembly—which at Sparta was usually taken neither by show of hands, nor by deposit of balls in an urn, but by cries analogous to the *Ay* or *No* of the English House of Commons—the presiding Ephor declaring which of the cries predominated. Sthenelaidas affected inability to determine which of the two was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse for bringing about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and a stronger apparent majority—since a portion of the minority would probably be afraid to show their real opinions as individuals openly. He therefore directed a division, and the majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important decision, was to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war. The answer brought back (Thukydides seems hardly certain that it was really given) was—that if they did their best they would be victorious, and that the god would help them, invoked or uninvoked. They at the same time convened a general congress of their allies to Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their recent resolution to the vote of all.

To the Corinthians, in their anxiety for the relief of Potidæa, the decision to be given by this congress was not less important than that which

the Spartans had just taken separately. They sent round envoys to each of the allies, entreating them to authorize war without reserve. Most of the speakers were full of invective against Athens and impatient for action, while the Corinthians, waiting as before to speak the last, wound up the discussion by a speech well calculated to ensure a hearty vote. Their former speech had been directed to shame, exasperate, and alarm the Lacedæmonians; this point having now been carried, they had to enforce, upon the allies generally, the dishonour as well as the impolicy of receding from a willing leader. There were good hopes that the war would not last long—so decided was the superiority of the confederacy, in numbers, in military skill, and in the equal heart and obedience of all its members. The naval superiority of Athens depended chiefly upon hired seamen—so that the confederacy, by borrowing from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia, would soon be able to overbid her, take into pay her best mariners, and equal her equipment at sea. They would excite revolt among her allies and establish a permanent fortified post for the ruin of Attica. The Delphian god had promised them his co-operation; and the whole of Greece would sympathize in the cause, either from fear of the despotism of Athens, or from hopes of profit. They would not be the first to break the truce, for the Athenians had already broken it, as the declaration of the Delphian god distinctly implied. Let them lose no time in sending aid to the Potidæans, a Dorian population now besieged by Ionians, as well as to those other Greeks whom Athens had enslaved.

After the Corinthian had concluded, the question was put to the deputies of every city, great and small indiscriminately, and the majority decided for war. This important resolution was adopted about the end of 432 B.C.: the previous decision of the Spartans separately, may have been taken about two months earlier, in the preceding October or November, 432 B.C.

Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this momentous juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had done nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the Thirty years' truce: while for such of her acts as were alleged to be such, she offered to submit them to that amicable arbitration which the truce itself prescribed. If Sparta, usually so backward, now came forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, this fact has been ascribed partly to her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, partly to the pressure of her allies, especially of the Corinthians.

Thukydides seems to consider the fear and hatred of Athens as having contributed more to determine Sparta than the urgency of her allies¹. That the extraordinary aggrandizement of Athens, during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion, was well-calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesus, is indisputable. But if we take Athens as she stood in 432 B.C., it deserves notice that she had neither made, nor (so far as we know) tried to make, a single new acquisition during the whole fourteen years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce—and moreover that that truce marked an epoch of signal humiliation and reduction of her power. We see that

¹ Thukyd., i. 88: compare also c. 23 and 117.

even before the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, sagacious Greeks everywhere anticipated war as not far distant. It was near breaking out even on occasion of the revolt of Samos, peace being then preserved partly by the commercial and nautical interests of Corinth, partly by the quiescence of Athens. But the quarrel of Corinth and Korkyra—and the junction of Korkyra with Athens—exhibited the latter as again in a career of aggrandizement, and converted Corinth from the advocate of peace into a clamorous organ of war. The revolt of Potidæa—fomented by Corinth and encouraged by Sparta in the form of a positive promise to invade Attica—was in point of fact the first distinct violation of the truce, and the initiatory measure of the Peloponnesian war. The Spartan meeting, and the subsequent congress of allies at Sparta, served no other purpose than to provide such formalities as were requisite to ensure the concurrent and hearty action of numbers.

The sentiment in Peloponnesus at this moment was not the fear of Athens, but the hatred of Athens—and the confident hope of subduing her. And, indeed, such confidence was justified by plausible grounds. Men might well think that the Athenians could never endure the entire devastation of their highly cultivated soil—or at least that they would certainly come forth to fight for it in the field, which was all that the Peloponnesians desired.

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very different aspect, holding out nothing less than the certainty of prodigious loss and privation. By Periklēs, and by the more long-sighted Athenians, the chance of unavoidable war was foreseen even before the Korkyraean dispute¹. But Periklēs was only the first citizen in a democracy, esteemed, trusted, and listened to, more than anyone else, by the body of citizens, but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens. The formal determination of the Lacedæmonians, to declare war, must, of course, have been made known at Athens, by those Athenian envoys who had entered an unavailing protest against it in the Spartan assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies and their pronounced confirmatory vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald, or make any formal declaration. They despatched various propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war; but with the contrary purpose—of multiplying demands, and enlarging the grounds of quarrel.

The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a political manœuvre aimed at Periklēs, their chief opponent in that city. His mother Agaristē belonged to the great family of the Alkmæônids, who were supposed to be under an inexpiable hereditary taint, in consequence of the sacrilege committed by their ancestor Megaklēs nearly two centuries before, in the slaughter of the Kylonian suppliants². Shortly after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, this pretext had been so employed by the Spartan king Kleomenēs, who at that time exacted from the Athenians a clearance of the ancient sacrilege, to be effected by the banishment of Kleisthenēs and his chief partisans. This demand, addressed by Kleo-

¹ Thukyd., i. 45; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 8.

² See the account of the Kylonian troubles, and

the sacrilege which followed, in this History, p. 9.

menês to the Athenians at the instance of Isagoras the rival of Kleisthenês¹, had been then obeyed, and had served well the purposes of those who sent it. A similar blow was now aimed by the Lacedæmonians at Periklês (the grand-nephew of Kleisthenês), and doubtless at the instance of his political enemies. Religion required, it was pretended, that 'the abomination of the goddess should be driven out'. If the Athenians complied with this demand, they would deprive themselves, at this critical moment, of their ablest leader. But the Lacedæmonians, not expecting compliance, reckoned at all events upon discrediting Periklês with the people, as being partly the cause of the war through family taint of impiety, and this impression would doubtless be loudly proclaimed by his political opponents in the assembly.

Not long before this period, he had been indirectly assailed through the medium of accusations against three different persons, all more or less intimate with him—his mistress Aspasia, the philosopher Anaxagoras, and the sculptor Pheidias.

We cannot make out either the exact date, or the exact facts of either of these accusations. Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, was a native of Miletus, beautiful, well-educated, and aspiring. She resided at Athens, and is affirmed (though upon very doubtful evidence) to have kept slave-girls to be let out as courtizans. Whatever may be the case with this report, which is most probably one of the scandals engendered by political animosity against Periklês², it is certain that so remarkable were her own fascinations, her accomplishments, and her powers not merely of conversation, but even of oratory and criticism, that the most distinguished Athenians of all ages and characters, Sokratês among the number, visited her, and several of them took their wives along with them to hear her also.

Periklês had been determined in his choice of a wife by those family considerations which were held almost obligatory at Athens, and had married a woman very nearly related to him, by whom he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. But the marriage having never been comfortable, was afterwards dissolved by mutual consent, according to that full liberty of divorce which the Attic law permitted³. He then took Aspasia to live with him, had a son by her who bore his name, and continued ever afterwards on terms of the greatest intimacy and affection with her.

While the comic writers attacked Periklês himself for alleged intrigues with different women, they treated the name of Aspasia as public property without any mercy or reserve: she was the Omphalê, the Deianeira, or the Hêrê, to this great Hêraklês or Zeus of Athens. At length one of these comic writers, Hermippus, not contented with scenic attacks, indicted her before the dikastery for impiety, as participant in the philosophical discussions held, and the opinions professed, among the society of Periklês, by Anaxagoras and others. Against Anaxagoras himself, too, a similar indictment is said to have been preferred, either by Kleon or by Thukydidês son of Melesias, under a general resolution recently passed in the public assembly at the instance of Diopieithês. The latter retired from Athens, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him in

¹ See Herodot., v. 70; compare vi. 131; Thukyd., i. 126; and c. iv. of this History.

² Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 24. Respecting Aspasia,

see Plato, *Menæxenus*, c. 3, 4; Xenophon, *Memorab.*, ii. 6, 36; Harpokration, v. *Aspasia*.

³ Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 24.

his absence¹. But Periklēs himself defended Aspasia before the dikastery, and procured a verdict of acquittal.

It appears also, as far as we can judge amidst very imperfect data, that the trial of the great sculptor Pheidias, for alleged embezzlement in the contract for his celebrated gold and ivory statue of Athēnē², took place nearly at this period. That statue had been finished and dedicated in the Parthenon in 437 B.C., since which period Pheidias had been engaged at Olympia in his last and great masterpiece, the colossal statue of the Olympian Zeus. On his return to Athens from the execution of this work, about 433 or 432 B.C., the accusation of embezzlement was instituted against him by the political enemies of Periklēs³. A slave of Pheidias revealed various statements so greatly impeaching the pecuniary probity of Pheidias, that the latter was put in prison, awaiting the day for his trial before the dikastery. The gold employed and charged for in the statue, however, was all capable of being taken off and weighed, so as to verify its accuracy, which Periklēs dared the accusers to do. Besides the charge of embezzlement, there were other circumstances which rendered Pheidias unpopular. It had been discovered that, in the reliefs on the frieze of the Parthenon, he had introduced the portraits of himself and Periklēs in conspicuous positions⁴. It seems that Pheidias died in prison before the day of trial; and some even said that he had been poisoned by the enemies of Periklēs, in order that the suspicions against the latter, who was the real object of attack, might be aggravated. It is said also that Drakontidēs proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, that Periklēs should be called on to give an account of the money which he had expended, and that the dikasts, before whom the account was rendered, should give their suffrage in the most solemn manner from the altar. This latter provision was modified by Hagnon, who, while proposing that the dikasts should be 1,500 in number, retained the vote by pebbles in the urn according to ordinary custom⁵.

If Periklēs was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt that he was honourably acquitted: for the language of Thukydides respecting his pecuniary probity is such as could not have been employed if a verdict of guilty on a charge of peculation had been publicly pronounced⁶.

¹ This seems the more probable story; but there are differences of statement, and uncertainties upon many points: compare Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 16-32; Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 23; Diogen. Laërt., ii. 12, 13.

² Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 31: *Φειδίας—ἐργάλαος τοῦ ἀγάλματος*.

³ This tale, about protecting Pheidias under the charge of embezzlement, was the story most widely in circulation against Periklēs—*ἡ χειριστὴ αἰτία πᾶσαν, ἔχουσα δὲ πλείστους μάρτυρας* (Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 31).

⁴ The opinion of archaeologists is much divided on the question whether Pheidias executed his work at Olympia before or after the dedication of the Parthenon (cf. E. Gardner, *Handbook of Greek Sculpture*, pp. 251, 252; and Furtwängler, *Masterpieces of Greek Sculpture*, Engl. transl., pp. 36-50). Hence we cannot say for certain whether the trial took place after Pheidias' return from Olympia. Nor can we place much trust in Schol. Ar., *Pax*, 604 ff., which gives the date 438. Probably Philochorus, from whom this date is derived, meant only the dedication of the Parthenon to fall under that year, without the other events which he simply mentions as happening *subsequently*. It is highly unlikely that Pheidias was subjected to pettifoggery charges immediately after the unveiling of his great Athēnē statue: his prestige at the time

would save him. It seems reasonable to bring the trial as near the Megarian decree as possible—*i.e.*, about 433—otherwise the widely accredited version of Ar., *Pax*, 604 ff. (cf. Plut., *Per.*, c. 31) would lose its point.—Ed.

⁴ These alleged portraits are still discernible on the 'Strangford Shield' in the British Museum, which is a copy of Athēnē's shield.—Ed.

⁵ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 13-32.

Diodorus (xii. 38-40) (as well as Plutarch, *Alkibiadēs*, c. 7) relates another tale, that Alkibiadēs once approached Periklēs when he was in evident low spirits and embarrassment, and asked him the reason. Periklēs told him that the time was near at hand for rendering his accounts, and that he was considering how this could be done: upon which Alkibiadēs advised him to consider rather, how he could evade doing it. The result of this advice was that Periklēs plunged Athens into the Peloponnesian war.

⁶ The circumstances of this trial, which may ultimately come from Kraterus, more probably belong to the indictment preferred in 430, and attested by Thukyd., ii. 65 (Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, vol. iv., ch. 5). On this earlier occasion the accusation would more naturally have been preferred under the head of impiety, rather than peculation.—Ed.

All that we can make out, amidst these uncertified allegations, is, that in the year or two immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war, Periklēs was hard-pressed by the accusations of political enemies¹. And it was in this turn of his political position, that the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens the above-mentioned requisition. On this occasion, however, the manœuvre did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen to the requisition for banishing the sacrilegious Alkmæônids. On the contrary, they replied that the Spartans too had an account of sacrilege to clear off; for they had violated the sanctuary of Poseidōn at Cape Tænarus, in dragging from it some helot suppliants to be put to death—and the sanctuary of Athênē Chalkiœkus at Sparta, in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias.

Other Spartan envoys shortly afterwards arrived with fresh demands. The Athenians were now required—1. To withdraw their troops from Potidæa. 2. To replace Ægina in its autonomy. 3. To repeal the decree of exclusion against the Megarians.

It was upon the latter that the greatest stress was laid, an intimation being held out that war might be avoided if such repeal were granted. We see plainly from this proceeding that the Lacedæmonians acted in concert with the anti-Periklêan leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her confederacy the decree against the Megarians was of less importance than the rescue of the Corinthian troops now blocked up in Potidæa. But, on the other hand, the party opposed to Periklēs would have much better chance of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of the Megarians: and this advantage, if gained, would serve to enfeeble his influence generally. No concession was obtained, however, on either of the three points: even in respect to Megara, the decree of exclusion was vindicated and upheld against all the force of opposition. At length the Lacedæmonians sent a third batch of envoys with a proposition which at least had the merit of disclosing their real purpose without disguise: 'The Lacedæmonians wish the peace to stand; and it *may* stand, if you will leave the Greeks autonomous.' Upon this demand, so very different from the preceding, the Athenians resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or peace, to open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine once for all on a peremptory answer.

The last demands presented on the part of Sparta, which went to nothing less than the entire extinction of the Athenian empire, seemed likely to produce unanimity at Athens, and to bring together this important assembly under the universal conviction that war was inevitable. Such, however, was not the fact. The reluctance to go to war was sincere amidst the large majority of the assembly, while among a considerable portion of them it was so preponderant, that they even now reverted to the opening which the Lacedæmonians had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as if that were the chief cause of war. Against this opinion Periklēs entered his protest, in an harangue decisive and encouraging, which Dionysius of Halikarnassus ranks among the best speeches in Thukydidēs. The latter historian may probably himself have heard the original speech.

¹ It would appear that not only Aspasia and Anaxagoras, but also the musician and philosopher Damon, the personal friend and instructor of Periklēs, must have been banished at a time when

Periklēs was old—perhaps somewhere near about this time. Damon is said to have been ostracized—perhaps he was tried and condemned to banishment: for the two are sometimes confounded.

'I continue, Athenians, to adhere to the same conviction, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians. I have only to repeat now what I have said on former occasions—and I adjure you who follow my views to adhere to what we jointly resolve, though the result should be partially unfavourable. For it is very possible that the contingencies of events may depart more from all reasonable track than the counsels of man: such are the unexpected turns which we familiarly impute to Fortune. The Lacedæmonians have before now manifested their hostile aims against us, but on this last occasion more than ever. While the truce prescribes that we are to give and receive amicable satisfaction for our differences, and each to retain what we possess, they not only have not asked for such satisfaction, but repudiate it when tendered. They choose to settle complaints by war and not by discussion: they have got beyond the tone of complaint, and are here already with that of command. For they enjoin us to withdraw from Potidæa, to leave Ægina free, and to rescind the decree against the Megarians: nay, these last envoys are even come to proclaim to us, that we must leave all the Greeks free. Now let none of you believe, that we shall be going to war about a trifle, if we refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—which they chiefly put forward, as if its repeal would avert the war. Let none of you take blame to yourselves as if we had gone to war about a small matter. For this small matter contains in itself the whole test and trial of your mettle: if ye yield it, ye will presently have some other greater exaction put upon you, like men who have already truckled on one point from fear: whereas if ye hold out stoutly, ye will make it clear to them that they must deal with you more upon a footing of equality.'

Periklēs then examined the relative strength of parties and the chances of war. The Peloponnesians were a self-working population, with few slaves, and without wealth, either private or public: they had no means of carrying on distant or long-continued war. They were ready to expose their persons, but not at all ready to contribute from their very narrow means. In a border-war, or a single land-battle, they were invincible, but for systematic warfare against a power like Athens, they had neither competent headship nor money to profit by opportunities for successful attack. They might perhaps establish a fortified post in Attica, but it would do little serious mischief, while at sea, their inferiority and helplessness would be complete, and the irresistible Athenian navy would take care to keep it so. Nor would they be able to reckon on tempting away the able foreign seamen from Athenian ships by means of funds borrowed from Olympia or Delphi¹. For besides that the mariners of the dependent islands would find themselves losers even by accepting a higher pay, with the certainty of Athenian vengeance afterwards—Athens herself would suffice to man her fleet in case of need, with her own citizens and metics: she had within her own walls steersmen and mariners better, as well as more numerous, than all Greece besides. There was but one side on which Athens was vulnerable: Attica unfortunately

¹ This is in reply to those hopes which we know to have been conceived by the Peloponnesian leaders, and upon which the Corinthian speaker in the Peloponnesian congress had dwelt (i. 121). Doubtless Periklēs would be informed of the tenor of all these public demonstrations at Sparta.

[We may agree with Periklēs that the occupation of a post such as Dekeleia would have been of

little use in 431. Until the Sicilian expedition the Athenians could have equipped a sufficient force to keep in check such a standing garrison as the Peloponnesians could afford to maintain. The advantages of Athens' maritime supremacy, and the dangers of her continental position, are more fully worked out in [Xenophon], *Resp. Ath.*, ii., §§. 1-15.—ED.]

was not an island—it was exposed to invasion and ravage. To this the Athenians must submit, without committing the imprudence of engaging a land battle to avert it. They had abundant lands out of Attica, insular as well as continental, to supply their wants, while they could in their turn, by means of their navy, ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no subsidiary lands to recur to.

'Let us dismiss these envoys with the answer:—That we will permit the Megarians to use our markets and harbours, if the Lacedæmonians on their side will discontinue their summary expulsions of ourselves and our allies from their own territory: That we will leave the Grecian cities autonomous, if we *had* them as autonomous at the time when the truce was made—and as soon as the Lacedæmonians shall grant to *their* allied cities autonomy such as each of them shall freely choose, not such as is convenient to Sparta: That while we are ready to give satisfaction according to the truce, we will not begin war, but will repel those who do begin it. We ought to make up our minds that war is inevitable: the more cheerfully we accept it, the less vehement shall we find our enemies in their attack: and where the danger is greatest, there also is the final honour greatest, both for a state and for a private citizen. Assuredly our fathers, when they bore up against the Persians—having no such means as we possess to start from, and even compelled to abandon all that they did possess—both repelled the invader and brought matters forward to our actual pitch, more by advised operation than by good fortune, and by a daring courage greater than their real power. We ought not to fall short of them: we must keep off our enemies in every way, and leave an unimpaired power to our successors.'

These animating encouragements of Periklēs carried with them the majority of the assembly, so that answer was made to the envoys, such as he recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was announced to them, moreover, on the general question of peace or war, that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of complaint against them, pursuant to the truce, by equal and amicable arbitration—but that they would do nothing under authoritative demand.

It seems evident, from the account of Thukydidēs, that the Athenian public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance. But we may also decidedly infer from the same historian—especially from the proceedings of Corinth and Sparta as he sets them forth—that Athens could not have avoided the war without such an abnegation both of dignity and power as no nation under any government will ever submit to, and as would even have left her without decent security for her individual rights. As the account of Thukydidēs bears out the judgment of Periklēs on this important point¹, so it also shows us that Athens was not less in the right upon the received principles of international dealing. It was not Athens (as the Spartans² themselves afterwards came to feel), but her enemies, who broke the provisions of the truce, by encouraging the revolt of Potidæa and by promising invasion of Attica: it was not

¹ In spite of the contrary view taken by Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 31; and in his *Comparison of Perikl.* and *Fab. Max.*, c. 3.

² Thukyd., iv. 2f.

See also an important passage (vii. 18) about the feelings of the Spartans. The Spartans thought, says Thukydidēs, *ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ* (the be-

ginning of the Peloponnesian war) *σφότερον τὸ παρανόμημα μάλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Ἕθβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ἐνθίκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν ἢν δίκας θέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων* καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, etc.

Athens, but her enemies, who after thus breaking the truce, made a string of exorbitant demands in order to get up as good a case as possible for war. And though it is perfectly true, that the ambition of Athens had been great, and the increase of her power marvellous, during the thirty-five years between the repulse of Xerxēs and the Thirty years' truce—it is not less true that by that truce she lost very largely, and that she acquired nothing to compensate such loss during the fourteen years between the truce and the Korkyræan alliance. The policy of Periklēs had not been one of foreign aggrandizement, or of increasing vexation and encroachment towards other Grecian powers. Even the Korkyræan alliance was no way courted by him, and was in truth accepted with paramount regard to the obligations of the existing truce, while the circumstances, out of which that alliance grew, testify a more forward ambition on the part of Corinth than on that of Athens, to appropriate to herself the Korkyræan naval force. The aggressive sentiment, partly fear, partly hatred, was on the side of the Peloponnesians. It was their purpose to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, wrongful, and anti-Hellenic. The war was thus partly a contest of principle, involving the popular proclamation of the right of every Grecian state to autonomy, against Athens: partly a contest of power, wherein Spartan and Corinthian ambition was not less conspicuous, and far more aggressive in the beginning, than Athenian.

A few weeks passed in restricted and mistrustful intercourse. Had the excess of ambition been on the side of Athens compared with her enemies, this was the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of course great probability of success, before their preparations were completed. But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, while the disastrous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear in pieces the entrails of Hellas, was opened by her enemy and her neighbour.

The little town of Platæa was the scene of this unforeseen enterprise. It stood in Bœotia, immediately north of Kithærôn, with the borders of Attica on one side, and the Theban territory (from which it was separated by the river Asôpus) on the other, the distance between Platæa and Thebes being about seventy stadia, or eight miles. Though Bœotian by descent, the Platæans were completely separated from the Bœotian league, and in hearty alliance with the Athenians, who had protected them against the bitter enmity of Thebes, for a period of now nearly three generations. But in spite of this long prescription, the Thebans, as chiefs of the Bœotian league, still felt themselves wronged by the separation of Platæa. An oligarchical faction of wealthy Platæans espoused their cause, with a view of subverting the democratical government of the town and of establishing an oligarchy with themselves as the chiefs. To this faction and to the oligarchy of Thebes, it appeared a tempting prize, since war was close at hand, to take advantage of this ambiguous interval, before watches had been placed and the precautions of a state of war commenced. They resolved to surprise the town of Platæa in the night, during a period of religious festival, in order that the population might be most completely off their guard. Accordingly, on a rainy night towards the close of March 431 B.C.¹, a body of rather more than 300 Theban

¹ Thukyd., ii. 2. ἀμα ἡμεῖς ἀρχομένη—seems to indicate a period rather before than after the first of April: we may consider the bisection of the

Thukydidean year into *θέρους* and *χειμῶν* as marked by the equinoxes. His summer and winter are each a half of the year (Thukyd., v. 20).

hoplites presented themselves at the gate of Platæa during the first sleep of the citizens. Their partisans opened the gate and conducted them to the agora, which they reached and occupied in military order without the least resistance. The best part of the Theban military force was intended to arrive at Platæa by break of day, in order to support them.

Believing themselves now masters of the town, and certain of a large reinforcement at daylight, the Thebans thought they could overawe the citizens into an apparently willing acquiescence in their terms, without any actual violence. They wished, moreover, rather to soften and justify, than to aggravate, the gross public wrong already committed. Accordingly their herald was directed to invite by public proclamation all Platæans who were willing to return to their ancient sympathies of race and to the Bœotian confederacy, that they should come forth and take station as brethren in the armed ranks of the Thebans. And the Platæans, suddenly roused from sleep by the astounding news that their great enemy was master of the town, supposed amidst the darkness that the number of assailants was far greater than the reality: so that in spite of their strong attachment to Athens, they thought their case hopeless, and began to open negotiations. But finding out soon that the real numbers of the Thebans were not greater than could be dealt with, they speedily took courage and determined to attack them, establishing communication with each other by breaking through the walls of their private houses¹, and forming barricades with waggons across such of these ways as were suitable.

A little before daybreak they sallied forth from their houses to the attack, and immediately came to close quarters with the Thebans. The latter now found themselves surprised in *their turn*, and enclosed in a town which they did not know, with narrow, crooked, and muddy ways, such as they would have had difficulty in tracking out even by daylight. Nevertheless they got as well as they could into close order, and repelled the Platæans two or three times. The attack was repeated until at length the Thebans became dismayed and broken. But flight was not less difficult than resistance; for they could not find their way out of the city, and even the gate by which they entered, the only one open, had been closed by a Platæan citizen. Dispersed about the city and pursued by men who knew every inch of the ground, the greater number ran into the open doors of a large building in conjunction with the wall, mistaking these doors for an approach to the town-gate. They were here blocked up without a chance of escape, and the Platæans at first thought of setting fire to the building. But at length a convention was concluded, whereby they, as well as the other Thebans in the city, agreed to surrender at discretion.

Had the reinforcements from Thebes arrived at the expected hour, this disaster would have been averted. But the heavy rain and dark night retarded their whole march, while the river Asôpus was so much swollen as to be with difficulty fordable: so that before they reached the gates of Platæa, their comrades within were either slain or captured. They immediately resolved to seize what they could find, persons as well as property, in the Platæan territory (no precautions having been taken

¹ A similar establishment of internal communication between adjoining houses in the street, was one of the most memorable features of the heroic

defence of Saragossa against the French, in the Peninsular War.

as yet to guard against the perils of war by keeping within the walls), in order that they might have something to exchange for such Thebans as were prisoners. Before this step could be executed, however, a herald came forth from the town to remonstrate with them upon their unholy proceeding in having so flagrantly violated the truce, and especially to warn them not to do any wrong without the walls. If they retired without inflicting farther mischief, their prisoners within should be given up to them; if otherwise, these prisoners would be slain immediately. A convention having been concluded and sworn to on this basis, the Thebans retired without any active measures.

Such at least was the Theban account of what preceded their retirement. But the Plataeans gave a different statement, denying that they had made any categorical promise or sworn any oath, and affirming that they had engaged for nothing except to suspend any decisive step with regard to the prisoners, until discussion had been entered into to see if a satisfactory agreement could be concluded.

As Thukydîdês records both of these statements, without intimating to which of the two he himself gave the preference, we may presume that both of them found credence with respectable persons. The Theban story is undoubtedly the most probable: but the Plataeans appear to have violated the understanding, even upon their own construction of it. For no sooner had the Thebans retired, than they (the Plataeans) hastily brought in their citizens and the best of their moveable property within the walls, and then slew all their prisoners forthwith, without even entering into the formalities of negotiation. The prisoners thus put to death were 180 in number¹.

On the first entrance of the Theban assailants at night, a messenger had started from Plataea to carry the news to Athens: a second messenger followed him to report the victory and capture of the prisoners. The Athenians sent back a herald without delay, enjoining the Plataeans to take no step respecting the prisoners until consultation should be had with Athens. Periklês doubtless feared what turned out to be the fact, for the prisoners had been slain before his messenger could arrive. Apart from the terms of the convention, and looking only to the received practice of ancient warfare, their destruction could not be denounced as unusually cruel. But impartial contemporaries would notice, and the Athenians in particular would deeply lament, the glaring impolicy of the act. In the hands of the Athenians and Plataeans, the captives would have been the means of obtaining from her much more valuable sacrifices than their lives, considered as a portion of Theban power, were worth: so strong was the feeling of sympathy for imprisoned citizens (several of them men of rank and importance), as may be seen by the past conduct of Athens after the battle of Korôneia, and by that of Sparta (hereafter to be recounted) after the taking of Sphaktêria.

The Athenians lost no time in sending forces to provision Plataea and placing it on the footing of a garrison town, removing to Athens the old men and sick, with the women and children. It was evident to both that the war was now actually begun—that nothing was to be thought of except the means of carrying it on—and that there could be no farther personal intercourse except under the protection of heralds. The inci-

¹ Thukyd., ii. 5, 6; Herodot., vii. 233.

dent at Plataea, striking in all its points, wound up all parties to the full pitch of warlike excitement. And the contagion of high-strung feeling spread from the leading combatants into every corner of Greece, manifesting itself partly in multiplied oracles, prophecies, and religious legends adapted to the moment. A recent earthquake at Delos, too, as well as various extraordinary physical phenomena, were construed as prognostic of the awful struggle impending—a period fatally marked not less by eclipses, earthquakes, drought, famine, and pestilence, than by the direct calamities of war.

Intelligence was sent round to forewarn and hearten up the numerous allies of Athens, tributary as well as free. The latter, with the exception of the Thessalians, Akarnanians, and Messenians at Naupaktus, were all insular—Chians, Lesbians, Korkyræans, and Zakynthians. With the Akarnanians their connection had only been commenced a short time before, seemingly during the preceding summer, arising out of the circumstances of the town of Argos in Amphilochia.

That town, situated on the southern coast of the Ambrakian Gulf, was originally occupied by a portion of the Amphilochi, a non-Hellenic tribe, whose lineage apparently was something intermediate between Akarnanians and Epirots. Some colonists from Ambrakia, having been admitted as co-residents with the Amphilochean inhabitants of this town, presently expelled them, and retained the town with its territory exclusively for themselves. The expelled inhabitants looked out for the means of restoration; and, in order to obtain it, invited the assistance of Athens. Accordingly the Athenians sent an expedition of thirty triremes under Phormio, who, joining the Amphilocheans and Akarnanians, attacked and carried Argos, reduced the Ambrakiots to slavery, and restored the town to the Amphilocheans and Akarnanians. It was on this occasion that the alliance of the Akarnanians with Athens was first concluded¹.

The numerous subjects of Athens, whose contributions stood embodied in the annual tribute, were distributed all over and around the Ægean, including all the islands north of Crete, with the exception of Melos and Thera. Moreover the elements of force collected in Athens itself were fully worthy of the metropolis of so great an empire. Periklês could make a report to his countrymen of 300 triremes fit for active service; 1,200 horsemen and horse-women; 1,600 bowmen; and the great force of all, not less than 29,000 hoplites—mostly citizens, but in part also metics. The chosen portion of these hoplites, both as to age and as to equipment, were 13,000 in number; while the remaining 16,000, including the elder and younger citizens and the metics, did garrison duty on the walls of Athens and Peiræus—on the long line of wall which connected Athens both with Peiræus and Phalærum—and in the various fortified posts both in and out of Attica². In addition to these large military and naval forces, the

¹ Thukyd., ii. 68. The time at which this expedition of Phormio and the capture of Argos happened, is not precisely marked by Thukydides. But his words seem to imply that it was before the commencement of the war, as Poppo observes. Phormio was sent to Chalkidikê about October or November, 432 B.C. (i. 64); and the expedition against Argos probably occurred between that event and the preceding spring.

² It seems likely that the Athenians kept two citizens' muster-rolls, one for the active field force, another for the garrison troops, with equal numbers in each: the total of either force in 431 was 13,000.

The field force at the outset of the war was mostly available for home service, 10,000 citizen hoplites taking part in the invasion of Megara, while 3,000 stood before Potidæa (Thukyd., ii. 31). The garrison troops could be increased to 16,000 (the total given in Thukyd., ii. 13) by the addition of the 3,000 hoplite metics (Thukyd., ii. 31). *Ath. Pol.* (c. 24) mentions 2,500 garrison troops oversea about this time: these would mostly be young men who had not yet entered the field force (*Ar. Vesp.*, 236).

For these figures, see E. Meyer's *Forschungen*, ii., pp. 149-168 (cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Arist.*

city possessed in the acropolis an accumulated treasure of coined silver amounting to not less than 6,000 talents, or about 1,400,000*l.*, derived from annual laying by of tribute from the allies and perhaps of other revenues besides. The treasure had at one time been as large as 9,700 talents, or about 2,230,000*l.*, but the cost of the recent religious and architectural decorations at Athens, as well as the siege of Potidæa, had reduced it to 6,000. Moreover, the acropolis and the temples throughout the city were rich in votive offerings, deposits, sacred plate, and silver implements for the processions and festivals, etc., to an amount estimated at more than 500 talents, while the great statue of the goddess recently set up by Pheidias in the Parthenon, composed of ivory and gold, included a quantity of the latter metal not less than 40 talents in weight—equal in value to more than 400 talents of silver. In alluding to these sacred valuables among the resources of the state, Periklês spoke of them only as open to be so applied in case of need, with the firm resolution of replacing them during the first season of prosperity, just as the Corinthians had proposed to borrow from Delphi and Olympia. Besides the hoard thus actually in hand, there came in a large annual revenue, amounting under the single head of tribute from the subject allies, to 600 talents, equal to about 138,000*l.*; besides all other items¹, making up a general total of at least 1,000 talents, or about 230,000*l.*

To this formidable catalogue of means for war, were to be added the unrivalled maritime skill and discipline of the seamen, and the superior development of directing intelligence. Periklês could depict Athens as holding Peloponnesus under siege by means of her navy and a chain of insular posts; and he could guarantee success as the sure reward of persevering, orderly, and well-considered exertion, combined with firm endurance under a period of temporary, but unavoidable suffering; and combined too with another condition hardly less difficult for Athenian temper to comply with—abstinence from seductive speculations of distant enterprise, while their force was required by the necessities of war near home. But such prospects were founded upon a long-sighted calculation, looking beyond immediate loss and therefore ill-calculated to take hold of the mind of an ordinary citizen—or at any rate likely to be overwhelmed for the moment by the pressure of actual hardship. Moreover, the best which Periklês could promise was a successful resistance—the unimpaired maintenance of that great empire to which Athens had become accustomed—a policy purely conservative, without any stimulus from the hope of positive acquisition.

und Ath., ii. 209). Meyer points out (1) that Thukydides equates the 13,000 garrison with the 13,000 field force; (2) that the garrison force is confessedly an estimate (ii. 31, 3), which would probably be correct; (3) that 5,000, or, in fact, anything less than 10,000, would be quite inadequate for fifteen miles of wall. Now, since the garrison force was made up of *πρεσβύτεροι* and *νεώτεροι*, and if the field force of 13,000 included all between the ages of twenty and sixty, the garrison force could not have exceeded a third of 13,000. Meyer suggests that all between these ages were *liable* to serve in the field, but that in practice only the most effective would be called out (E. M. Walker further suggests four-fifths of those between twenty and thirty-five, two-fifths between thirty-five and fifty, one-twentieth between fifty and sixty). This solution, though not certain, is in-

trinsically probable; at all events, the suggestion that for Thukydides' 16,000 (which would include the 3,000 metics) we should read 6,000 must be dismissed as impossible.—Ed.

¹ Thukyd., ii. 13; Xenophon, *Anab.*, vii. 4. [Thukydides' estimate does not agree with Diod., xii. 41 (460 talents), nor with the tribute-lists (*cf.* n. to p. 348). Perhaps Thukydides reckoned as *φόρος* (1) payments of which the one-sixtieth did not technically go to *Ἀθῆνα Παρθένος*, and so does not figure on the lists (*cf.* Methônê in C.I.A., i. 40; Hicks and Hill, 60; and Samos, n. to p. 170); (2) all payments *ἐκ τῆς ὑπεροπίας*—e.g., the Hellenic tithe on corn-ships (C.I.A., i. 32; i. 40 = Hicks and Hill, 49, 60; and Xen., *Hellen.*, i. 1, 22). For the provenance of the 400 talents of *ἐνδῆμα τέλη*, see pp. 335, 336.—Ed.]

On these latter points the position of the Peloponnesian alliance was far more encouraging. Not only the entire strength of Peloponnesus (except Argeians and Achæans, both of whom were neutral at first, though the Achæan town of Pellênê joined even at the beginning, and all the rest subsequently) was brought together, but also the Megarians, Bœotians, Phokians, Opuntian Lokrians, Ambrakiots, Leukadians and Anaktorians. Among these, Corinth, Megara, Sikyon, Pellênê, Elis, Ambrakia, and Leukas furnished maritime force, while the Bœotians, Phokians, and Lokrians supplied cavalry. It was upon the hoplite force, not omitting the powerful Bœotian cavalry, that the main reliance was placed, especially for the first and most important operation of the war—the devastation of Attica. Bound together by the strongest common feeling of active antipathy to Athens, the whole confederacy was full of hope and confidence for this immediate forward march—gratifying at once both to their hatred and to their love of plunder—and presenting a chance even of terminating the war at once, if the pride of the Athenians should be so intolerably stung as to provoke them to come out and fight. The general persuasion was, that Athens, even if not reduced to submission by the first invasion, could not possibly hold out more than two or three summers against the repetition of this destructive process.

But though the Peloponnesians entertained confident belief of carrying their point by simple land-campaign, they did not neglect auxiliary preparations for naval and prolonged war. The Lacedæmonians resolved to make up the naval force already existing among themselves and their allies to an aggregate of 500 triremes, chiefly by the aid of the friendly Dorian cities on the Italian and Sicilian coast¹. Besides this, the Lacedæmonians laid their schemes for sending envoys to the Persian king and to other barbaric powers—a remarkable evidence of melancholy revolution in Grecian affairs, when that potentate, whom the common arm of Greece had so hardly repulsed a few years before, was now invoked to bring the Phenician fleet again into the Ægean for the purpose of crushing Athens.

The invasion of Attica, however, without delay was the primary object to be accomplished, and for that the Lacedæmonians issued circular orders immediately after the attempted surprise of Platæa. Though the vote of the allies was requisite to sanction any war, yet when that vote had once been passed, the Lacedæmonians took upon themselves to direct all the measures of execution. Two-thirds of the hoplites of each confederate city—apparently two-thirds of a certain assumed rating for which the city was held liable in the books of the confederacy, so that the Bœotians and others who furnished cavalry were not constrained to send two-thirds of their entire force of hoplites—were summoned to be present on a certain day at the isthmus of Corinth, with provisions and equipment for an expedition of some length. The Spartan king Archidamus, on taking the command, addressed to the commanders and principal officers from each city a discourse of solemn warning as well as encouragement. His remarks were directed chiefly to abate the tone of sanguine over-confidence which reigned in the army. 'We are about to attack (he said) an enemy admirably equipped in every way, so that we may

¹ Thukyd., ii. 7. Didorous says that the Italian and Sicilian allies were required to furnish 200

triremes (xii. 41). Nothing of the kind seems to have been actually furnished.

expect certainly that they will come out and fight, even if they be not now actually on the march to meet us at the border, at least when they see us in their territory ravaging and destroying their property.'

Immediately on the army being assembled, Archidamus sent Meléssippus as envoy to Athens to announce the coming invasion, being still in hopes that the Athenians would yield. But a resolution had been already adopted, at the instance of Periklēs, to receive neither herald nor envoy from the Lacedæmonians when once their army was on its march: so that Meléssippus was sent back without even being permitted to enter the city.

Archidamus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known to him, continued his march from the isthmus into Attica—which territory he entered by the road of Cœnœ, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica towards Bœotia. His march was slow, and he thought it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of Cœnœ¹, which had been put into so good a state of defence, that after all the various modes of assault, in which the Lacedæmonians were not skilful, had been tried in vain—and after a delay of several days before the place—he was compelled to renounce the attempt.

The want of enthusiasm on the part of the Spartan king—his multiplied delays, first at the isthmus, next in the march, and lastly before Cœnœ—were all offensive to the fiery impatience of the army, who were loud in their murmurs against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta—that the highly cultivated soil of Attica was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be more likely to yield when devastation, though not yet inflicted, was nevertheless impending and at their doors. In this point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the partisans of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it would enable them to prevail.

Nor can we doubt that it was a moment full of difficulty to Periklēs at Athens. He had to proclaim to all the proprietors in Attica the painful truth, that they must prepare to see their lands and houses overrun and ruined; and that their persons, families, and moveable property must be brought in for safety either to Athens, or to one of the forts in the territory—or carried across to one of the neighbouring islands. To see their lands all ravaged, without raising an arm to defend them, and to desert and dismantle their country residences, as they had done during the Persian invasion, were recommendations which probably no one but Periklēs could have hoped to enforce. They were, moreover, the more painful to execute, inasmuch as the Athenian citizens had very generally retained the habits of residing permanently, not in Athens, but in the various demes of Attica, many of which still preserved their temples, their festivals, their local customs, and their limited municipal autonomy, handed down from the day when they had once been independent of Athens.

From all parts of Attica the residents flocked within the spacious walls of Athens, entire families with all their moveable property, and even

¹ The siege of Cœnœ was well worth undertaking, for (1) its capture would have placed the allies in direct command of the Thriasian plain; (2) it commanded the road between Athens and

Plataea; (3) the Peloponnesians needed practice in siege tactics, which might some day prove useful against Athens itself. Cf. Grundy, *Journal of Hellen. Studies*, vol. xviii. (1898), pp. 218-228.—Ed.

with the woodwork of their houses. The sheep and cattle were conveyed to Eubœa and the other adjoining islands. Though a few among the fugitives obtained dwellings or reception from friends, the greater number were compelled to encamp in the vacant spaces of the city and Peiræus, or in and around the numerous temples of the city—always excepting the acropolis and the Eleusinion, which were at all times strictly closed to profane occupants. But even the ground called *the Pelasgikon* immediately under the acropolis, which by an ancient and ominous tradition was interdicted to human abode¹, was made use of under the present necessity. In spite of so serious an accumulation of losses and hardships, the glorious endurance of their fathers in the time of Xerxês was faithfully copied, and copied too under more honourable circumstances, since at that time there had been no option possible; whereas the march of Archidamus might perhaps now have been arrested by submissions, ruinous indeed to Athenian dignity, yet not inconsistent with the security of Athens, divested of her rank and power.

After having spent several days before Cenoë without either taking the fort or receiving any message from the Athenians, Archidamus marched onward to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain—about the middle of June. His army was of irresistible force, not less than 60,000 hoplites, according to the statement of Plutarch², or of 100,000 according to others. But since Thukydidês, though comparatively full in his account of this march, has stated no general total, we may presume that he had heard none upon which he could rely.

As the Athenians had made no movement towards peace, Archidamus anticipated that they would come forth to meet him in the fertile plain of Eleusis and Thria, which was the first portion of territory that he sat down to ravage. Yet no Athenian force appeared to oppose him, except a detachment of cavalry. Having laid waste this plain without any serious opposition, Archidamus did not think fit to pursue the straight road which from Thria conducted directly to Athens across the ridge of Mount Ægaleos, but turned off to the eastward, leaving that mountain on his right-hand until he came to Krôpeia, where he crossed a portion of the line of Ægaleos over to Acharnæ. He was here about seven miles from Athens on a declivity sloping down into the plain which stretches westerly and north-westerly from Athens, and visible from the city walls. Here he encamped, keeping his army in perfect order for battle, but at the same time intending to damage and ruin the place and its neighbourhood. Acharnæ was the largest and most populous of all the demes in Attica, furnishing no less than 3,000 hoplites³ to the national line, and flourishing as well by its corn, vines, and olives, as by its peculiar abundance of charcoal-burning from the forests of ilex on the neigh-

¹ The *Pelasgikon* was a piece of fortification round the western slope of the Acropolis, where the approach is by nature comparatively easy, together with a glacis, for the protection of which the oracle in Thukyd., ii. 17, had no doubt been originally procured. Even when the Acropolis ceased to be a fortress the taboo on this spot remained. The name Πελασγικόν is probably due to a myth connecting these outworks, like the Acropolis walls, with the prehistoric 'Pelasgi' (Herodot., v. 64; vi. 137). The reading Πελασγικόν—i.e., 'stork's place'—(*Ath. Pol.*, 19) seems due to nothing more than a pun which Aristophanês

naturally introduced into his *Birds* (ii. 832, 869). Cf. E. Gardner, *Ancient Athens*, pp. 42-44; Wachsmuth, *Stadt Athen*, p. 299 ff.—Ed.

² Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 33.

³ There is no need to change Thukydidês' reading from ἀνδῶν to πολέων. The latter designation would be incorrect with regard to a δῆμος like Acharnæ. From an inscription we find that twenty-two councillors were returned by Acharnæ (C.I.A., ii. 868); moreover, the Acharnians, being mostly farmers, would chiefly come under the hoplite census.—Ed.

bouring hills. Archidamus calculated that when the Athenians actually saw his troops so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their wealthiest canton, their indignation would become uncontrollable, and they would march out forthwith to battle.

What Archidamus anticipated was on the point of happening, and nothing prevented it except the personal ascendancy of Periklēs, strained to its very utmost. The Acharnians first of all—next the youthful citizens generally—became madly clamorous for arming and going forth to fight. Groups of citizens were everywhere gathered together¹, angrily debating the critical question of the moment; while the usual concomitants of excited feeling—oracles and prophecies of diverse tenor, many of them doubtless promising success against the enemy at Acharnæ—were eagerly caught up and circulated.

In this inflamed temper of the Athenian mind, Periklēs was naturally the great object of complaint and wrath. He was denounced as the cause of all the existing suffering. He was reviled as a coward for not leading out the citizens to fight, in his capacity of general. This burst of spontaneous discontent was, of course, fomented by the numerous political enemies of Periklēs, and particularly by Kleon², whose talent for invective was thus first exercised under the auspices of the high aristocratical party, as well as of an excited public. But no manifestations, however violent, could disturb either the judgement or the firmness of Periklēs. He listened unmoved to all the declarations made against him, resolutely refusing to convene any public assembly, or any meeting invested with an authorized character, under the present irritated temper of the citizens. It appears that he as general, or rather the Board of ten Generals among whom he was one, must have been invested constitutionally with the power not only of calling the Ekklesia when they thought fit, but also of preventing it from meeting, and of postponing even those regular meetings which commonly took place at fixed times, four times in the prytany. No assembly accordingly took place, and the violent exasperation of the people was thus prevented from realizing itself in any rash public resolution. That Periklēs should have held firm against this raging force is but one among the many honourable points in his political character; but it is far less wonderful than the fact, that his refusal to call the Ekklesia was efficacious to prevent the Ekklesia from being held. The entire body of Athenians were now assembled within the walls, and if he refused to convoke the Ekklesia, they might easily have met in the Pnyx without him; for which it would not have been difficult at such a juncture to provide plausible justification. The inviolable respect which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion for the forms of their democratical constitution—assisted doubtless by their long-established esteem for Periklēs—is one of the most memorable incidents in their history.

While Periklēs thus decidedly forbade any general march out for battle, he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the compressed eagerness of the citizens. The cavalry were sent forth, together with the

¹ The drawback of having a population too keenly interested in matters of state is illustrated by the attitude of these Athenian street-politicians threatening to interfere with Periklēs' well-laid plans, just as their descendants during the Turkish war of 1897 exerted undue pressure on King George's ministry. The Athenian democracy here

compares ill with the burghers of the Dutch Republic, who willingly flooded their country in order to keep the Spaniards (1574) and French (1672) from attacking Leyden, Delft, and Amsterdam. Cf. Motley, *Rise of Dutch Republic*, iv. 2; and Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV.*, ch. 11.—Ed.

² Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 33.

Thessalian cavalry their allies, for the purpose of restraining the excursions of the enemy's light troops, and protecting the lands near the city from plunder. At the same time he fitted out a powerful expedition, which sailed forth to ravage Peloponnesus, even while the invaders were yet in Attica. Archidamus, after having remained engaged in the devastation of Acharnæ long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians would not hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a north-westerly direction towards the demes between Mount Brilëssus and Mount Parnês, on the road passing through Dekeleia. The army continued ravaging these districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted Attica by the north-western road near Orôpus, which brought them into Bœotia. It would seem that they quitted Attica towards the end of July, having remained in the country between thirty and forty days.

Meanwhile the Athenian expedition, joined by fifty Korkyræan ships and by some other allies, sailed round Peloponnesus, landing in various parts to inflict damage, and among other places at Methônê on the south-western peninsula of the Lacedæmonian territory¹. The place would have been carried with little difficulty, had not Brasidas the son of Tellis—a gallant Spartan now mentioned for the first time, but destined to great celebrity afterwards—who happened to be on guard at a neighbouring post, thrown himself into it with 100 men by a rapid movement, before the dispersed Athenian troops could be brought together to prevent him. Sailing northward along the western coast of Peloponnesus, the Athenians landed again on the coast of Elis and ravaged the territory for two days, defeating both the troops in the neighbourhood and 300 chosen men from the central Eleian territory. They then sailed northward, landing on various other spots to commit devastation, until they reached Sollium, a Corinthian settlement on the coast of Akarnania. They captured this place, which they handed over to the inhabitants of the neighbouring Akarnanian town of Palærus—as well as Astakus, and enrolled the town as a member of the Athenian alliance. From hence they passed over to Kephallênia, which they were fortunate enough also to acquire as an ally of Athens without any compulsion. These various operations took up near three months from about the beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens towards the close of September.

Thirty more triremes, under Kleopompus, were sent through the Euripus to the Lokrian coast opposite to the northern part of Eubœa. Some disembarkations were made, whereby the Lokrian towns of Thronium and Alopê were sacked, while a permanent garrison was planted in the uninhabited island of Atalanta opposite to the Lokrian coast, in order to restrain privateers from the Lokrian towns in their excursions against Eubœa. It was farther determined to expel the Æginetan inhabitants from Ægina, and to occupy the island with Athenian colonists. This step was partly rendered prudent by the important position of the island midway between Attica and Peloponnesus. But a concurrent motive, and probably the stronger motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy, and revenge against a people who had been among the foremost in provoking the war and in inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The Æginetans with their wives and children were all put on shipboard and landed in Peloponnesus—where the Spartans permitted them to

¹ Thukyd., ii. 25; Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 34; Justin, iii. 7, 5.

occupy the maritime district and town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards Argos. The island was made over to a detachment of Athenian *kleruchs*, or citizen proprietors sent thither by lot.

To the sufferings of the Æginetans, which we shall hereafter find still more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the Megarians. Towards the close of September, the full force of Athens, citizens and metics, marched into the Megarid, under Periklês, and laid waste the greater part of the territory: while they were in it, the hundred ships which had been circumnavigating Peloponnesus, having arrived at Ægina on their return, joined their fellow-citizens in the Megara. The junction of the two formed the largest Athenian force that had ever yet been seen together: there were 10,000 citizen hoplites (independent of 3,000 others who were engaged in the siege of Potidæa), and 3,000 metic hoplites—besides a large number of light troops. For several years of the war, the Athenians inflicted this destruction once, and often twice in the same year. A decree was proposed in the Athenian *Ekklesia* by Charinus, though perhaps not carried, to the effect that the *Stratēgi* every year should swear, as a portion of their oath of office¹, that they would twice invade and ravage the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same time kept the port of Nisæa blocked up, by means of their superior naval force and of the neighbouring coast of Salamis, the privations imposed on the Megarians became extreme and intolerable.

Expecting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for placing Attica in a permanent state of defence, both by sea and land. What these arrangements were, we are not told in detail, but one of them was sufficiently remarkable to be named particularly. They set apart one thousand talents out of the treasure in the acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except on the single contingency—of a hostile naval force about to assail the city, with no other means at hand to defend it. They further enacted that if any citizen should propose, or any magistrate put the question, in the public assembly, to make a different application of this reserve, he should be punishable with death. Moreover, they resolved every year to keep back one hundred of their best triremes, and trierarchs to command and equip them, for the same special necessity.

Such a stringent sanction expressed the deep and solemn conviction which the people entertained of the importance of their own resolution about the reserve—it forewarned all assemblies and all citizens to come of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose—it surrounded the reserve with an artificial sanctity, which forced every man who aimed at the reappropriation to begin with a preliminary proposition formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee which previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the door to a contingency which they had looked upon as treasonable. The proclamation of a lighter punishment, or a simple prohibition without any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the same emphatic conviction, nor produced the same deterring effect. The assembly of 431 B.C. could not in any way enact laws which subsequent assemblies could not reverse; but it could so frame its enactments, in cases of peculiar solemnity, as to make its authority strongly felt upon the judgement of its successors,

¹ Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 30.

and to prevent them from entertaining motions for repeal except under necessity at once urgent and obvious.

Far from thinking that the law now passed at Athens displayed barbarism, I consider it principally remarkable for its cautious and long-sighted view of the future, and worthy of the general character of Periklēs, who probably suggested it. Athens was just entering into a war which threatened to be of indefinite length, and was certain to be very costly. To prevent the people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and to place them under a necessity of reserving something against extreme casualties, was an object of immense importance. Now the particular casualty, which Periklēs (assuming him to be the proposer) named as the sole condition of touching this one thousand talents, might be considered as of all others the most improbable, in the year 431 B.C. Once tied up to this purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible emergency. We shall find the actual employment of it incalculably beneficial to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she could hardly have protected herself without some such special resource. The people would scarcely have sanctioned so rigorous an economy, had it not been proposed to them at a period so early in the war that their available reserve was still much larger. But it will be for ever to the credit of their foresight as well as constancy, that they should first have adopted such a precautionary measure, and afterwards adhered to it for nineteen years, under severe pressure for money, until at length a case arose which rendered farther abstinence really, and not constructively, impossible.

To display their force and take revenge by disembarking and ravaging parts of Peloponnesus, was doubtless of much importance to Athens during this first summer of the war, though it might seem that the force so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of Potidæa, which still remained under blockade—and of the neighbouring Chalkidians in Thrace, still in revolt. It was during the course of this summer that a prospect opened to Athens of subduing these towns, through the assistance of Sitalkēs king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince had married the sister of Nymphodōrus, a citizen of Abdēra, who engaged to render him and his son Sadokus, allies of Athens. Nymphodōrus farther established a good understanding between Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Athenians, who were persuaded to restore to him Therma, which they had before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise of powerful aid against the Chalkidians and Potidæans: yet the latter still held out, with little prospect of immediate surrender.

It was towards the close of autumn also that Periklēs, chosen by the people for the purpose, delivered the funeral oration at the public interment of those warriors who had fallen during the campaign.

The eleven chapters of Thukydides which comprise this funeral speech are among the most memorable relics of antiquity, considering that under the language and arrangement of the historian—always impressive, though sometimes harsh and peculiar, like the workmanship of a powerful mind misled by a bad or an unattainable model—we possess the substance and thoughts of the illustrious statesman. Much of it is peculiar, and every way worthy of Periklēs—comprehensive, rational, and full not less of sense and substance than of earnest patriotism. It thus forms a strong contrast with the jejune, though elegant, rhetoric of other harangues,

mostly not composed for actual delivery. And it deserves, in comparison with the funeral discourses remaining to us from Plato, and the pseudo-Demosthenês, and even Lysias, the honourable distinction which Thukydides claims for his own history—an ever-living possession, not a mere show-piece for the moment.

In the outset of his speech Periklês distinguishes himself from those who had preceded him in the same function of public orator, by dissenting from the encomiums which it had been customary to bestow on the law enjoining these funeral harangues.

One of the remarkable features in this discourse is its business-like, impersonal character. It is Athens herself who undertakes to commend and decorate her departed sons, as well as to hearten up and admonish the living.

After a few words on the magnitude of the empire and on the glorious efforts as well as endurance whereby their forefathers and they had acquired it, Periklês proceeds to sketch the plan of life, the constitution, and the manners, under which such achievements were brought about.

‘We live under a constitution such as no way to envy the laws of our neighbours—ourselves an example to others, rather than mere imitators. It is called a democracy, since its permanent aim tends towards the Many and not towards the Few. As to private matters and disputes, the laws deal equally with every man: while in regard to public affairs and to claims of individual influence, every man’s chance of advancement is determined not by party favour but by real worth, according as his reputation stands in his own particular department. Neither poverty, nor obscure station, keeps him back, if he really has the means of benefiting the city. Moreover, our social march is free, not merely in regard to public affairs, but also in regard to intolerance of each other’s diversity of daily pursuits. For we are not angry with our neighbour for what he may do to please himself, nor do we ever put on those sour looks, which, though they do no positive damage, are not less sure to offend. Thus conducting our private social intercourse with reciprocal indulgence, we are restrained from wrong on public matters by fear and reverence of our magistrates for the time being and of our laws—especially such laws as are instituted for the protection of wrongful sufferers, and even such others as, though not written, are enforced by a common sense of shame. Besides this, we have provided for our minds numerous recreations from toil, partly by our customary solemnities of sacrifice and festival throughout the year, partly by the elegance of our private establishments—the daily charm of which banishes the sense of discomfort. From the magnitude of our city, the products of the whole earth are brought to us, so that our enjoyment of foreign luxuries is as much our own and assured as those which we grow at home. In respect to training for war, we differ from our opponents (the Lacedæmonians) on several material points. First, we lay open our city as a common resort: we do not exclude even an enemy either from any lesson or any spectacle, the full view of which he may think advantageous to him. For military efficiency, we trust less to manœuvres and quackery than to our own native bravery. Next, in regard to education, while the Lacedæmonians even from their earliest youth subject themselves to an irksome exercise for the attainment of courage, we with our easy habits of life are not less prepared than they,

to encounter all perils within the measure of our strength. The proof of this is that the Peloponnesian confederates do not attack us one by one, but with their whole united force ; while we, when we attack them at home, overpower for the most part all of them who try to defend their own territory. None of our enemies has ever met and contended with our entire force. But when they chance to be engaged with any part of it, if victorious, they pretend to have vanquished us all—if defeated, they pretend to have been vanquished by all.

' Now, if we are willing to brave danger, just as much under an indulgent system as under constant toil, and by spontaneous courage as much as under force of law—we are gainers in the end by not vexing ourselves beforehand with sufferings to come, yet still appearing in the hour of trial not less daring than those who toil without ceasing.

' In other matters, too, as well as in these, our city deserves admiration. For we combine elegance of taste with simplicity of life, and we pursue knowledge without being enervated. The magistrates who discharge public trusts fulfil their domestic duties also—the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on public affairs : for we stand alone in regarding the man who keeps aloof from these latter not as harmless, but as useless. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders—or perhaps strike out for ourselves correct reasonings about them : far from accounting discussion an impediment to action, we complain only if we are not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it. For in truth we combine in the most remarkable manner these two qualities—extreme boldness in execution with full debate beforehand on that which we are going about : whereas with others, ignorance alone imparts boldness—debate introduces hesitation. Assuredly those men are properly to be regarded as the stoutest of heart, who, knowing most precisely both the terrors of war and the sweets of peace, are still not the less willing to encounter peril.

' In fine, I affirm that our city, considered as a whole, is the school-mistress of Greece ; while viewed individually, we enable the same man to furnish himself out and suffice to himself in the greatest variety of ways and with the most complete grace and refinement. Athens alone of all cities stands forth in actual trial greater than her reputation : her subjects will not think themselves degraded as if their obedience were paid to an unworthy superior. Having thus put forth our power, not uncertified, but backed by the most evident proofs, we shall be admired not less by posterity than by our contemporaries. Nor do we stand in need either of Homer or of any other panegyrist, whose words may for the moment please, though the truth if known would confute their intended meaning. We have compelled all land and sea to become accessible to our courage, and have planted everywhere imperishable monuments of our kindness as well as of our hostility.

' Such is the city on behalf of which these citizens, resolved that it should not be wrested from them, have nobly fought and died—and on behalf of which all of us here left behind must willingly toil.'

The effect of the democratical constitution, with its diffused and equal citizenship, in calling forth not merely strong attachment, but painful self-sacrifice, on the part of all Athenians—is nowhere more forcibly in-

sisted upon than in the words above cited of Periklês, as well as in others afterwards—'Contemplating as you do daily before you the actual power of the state, and becoming passionately attached to it, when you conceive its full greatness, reflect that it was all acquired by men daring, acquainted with their duty, and full of an honourable sense of shame in their actions'—such is the association which he presents between the greatness of the state as an object of common passion, and the courage, intelligence, and mutual esteem, of individual citizens, as its creating and preserving causes, poor as well as rich being alike interested in the partnership.

But the claims of patriotism, though put forward as essentially and deservedly paramount, are by no means understood to reign exclusively, or to absorb the whole of the democratical activity. Subject to these, and to those laws and sanctions which protect both the public and individuals against wrong, it is the pride of Athens to exhibit a rich and varied fund of human impulse—an unrestrained play of fancy and diversity of private pursuit, coupled with a reciprocity of cheerful indulgence between one individual and another—and an absence even of those 'black looks' which so much embitter life, even if they never pass into enmity of fact. This portion of the speech of Periklês deserves peculiar attention, because it serves to correct an assertion, often far too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern societies—an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been left free to the proper extent. This is pre-eminently true of Sparta—it is also true in a great degree of the ideal societies depicted by Plato and Aristotle: but it is pointedly untrue of the Athenian democracy, nor can we with any confidence predicate it of the major part of the Grecian cities.

The stress which he lays upon the liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from excessive restraint of law, but also from practical intolerance between man and man, and tyranny of the majority over individual dissenters in taste and pursuit—deserves serious notice, and brings out one of those points in the national character upon which the intellectual development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulse. The peculiar promptings in every individual bosom were allowed to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed by external opinion or trained into forced conformity with some assumed standard. Within the limits of the law, assuredly as faithfully observed at Athens as anywhere in Greece, individual impulse, taste, and even eccentricity, were accepted with indulgence, instead of being a mark as elsewhere for the intolerance of neighbours or of the public. This remarkable feature in Athenian life will help us in a future chapter to explain the striking career of Sokratês, and it farther presents to us, under another face, a great part of that which the censors of Athens denounced under the name of 'democratical licence'. The liberty and diversity of individual life in that city were offensive to Xenophon¹, Plato, and Aristotle—attached either to the monotonous drill of Sparta, or to some other ideal standard, which, though much better than the Spartan in itself,

¹ Compare the sentiment of Xenophon, the precise reverse of that which is here laid down by Periklês, extolling the rigid discipline of Sparta,

and denouncing the laxity of Athenian life (Xenophon, *Memorab.*, iii. 5, 15; iii. 12, 5).

they were disposed to impress upon society with a heavy-handed uniformity. That liberty of individual action, not merely from the over-restraints of law, but from the tyranny of jealous opinion, such as Periklēs depicts in Athens, belongs more naturally to a democracy, where there is no select One or Few to receive worship and set the fashion, than to any other form of government. But it is very rare even in democracies. None of the governments of modern times, democratical, aristocratical or monarchical, presents anything like the picture of generous tolerance towards social dissent, and spontaneity of individual taste, which we read in the speech of the Athenian statesman.

Connected with this reciprocal indulgence of individual diversity, was the many-sided activity, bodily and mental, so opposite to that narrow range of thought, exclusive discipline of the body, and never-ending preparation for war, which formed the system of Sparta. Periklēs' assertion that Athens was equal to Sparta even in her own solitary excellence—efficiency on the field of battle—is doubtless untenable. But not the less impressive is his sketch of that multitude of concurrent impulses which at this same time agitated and impelled the Athenian mind—the strength of one not implying the weakness of the remainder: the relish for all pleasures of art and elegance, and the appetite for intellectual expansion, coinciding in the same bosom with energetic promptitude as well as endurance: lastly an anxious interest, as well as a competence of judgement, in public discussion and public action, common to every citizen rich and poor, and combined with every man's own private industry. So comprehensive an ideal of many-sided social development, bringing out the capacities for action and endurance, as well as those for enjoyment, would be sufficiently remarkable, even if we supposed it only existing in the imagination of a philosopher: but it becomes still more so when we recollect that the main features of it at least were drawn from the fellow-citizens of the speaker. It must be taken, however, as belonging peculiarly to the Athens of Periklēs and his contemporaries¹. It would not have suited either the period of the Persian war fifty years before, or that of Demosthenēs seventy years afterwards. At the former period, the art, the letters, and the philosophy, adverted to with pride by Periklēs, were as yet backwards, while even the active energy and democratical stimulus, though very powerful, had not been worked up to the pitch which they afterwards reached: at the latter period, although the intellectual manifestations of Athens subsist in full or even increased vigour, we shall find the personal enterprise and energetic spirit of her citizens materially abated.

The season at which Periklēs delivered his discourse lends to it an additional and peculiar pathos. It was at a time when Athens was as yet erect and at her maximum. For though her real power was doubtless much diminished compared with the period before the Thirty years' truce, yet the great edifices and works of art, achieved since then, tended to compensate that loss, insofar as the sense of greatness was concerned: and no one, either citizen or enemy, considered Athens as having at all declined.

¹ It should always be remembered that Periklēs' funeral speech contains an ideal sketch of what he wished the Athenians should be, rather than an exact account of how he found them. This is specially noticeable in his assertions about the efficiency of the Athenian land-force, which throughout the war gave a poor display (cf. the

strictures of [Xenophon], *Resp. Ath.*, ii. 1), and the purely unselfish character of her foreign policy. Holm (*Gk. Hist.*, ii., p. 346, n. 2) aptly observes some features in Periklēs' speech which recall modern French peculiarities. Nevertheless, as an estimate of Periklēs' ideals and aspirations, this harangue is a most valuable document.—Ed.

APPENDIX

1. We are accustomed to regard the period 431-404 B.C. as forming in some sense a special section of Greek history, which may be conveniently comprehended under the general name 'Peloponnesian War'. This view implies that the period in question was separated by clear-cut lines of demarcation from the epoch before and after, and in itself was held together by some strong bond of internal coherence. That the close of hostilities in 404 marks an epoch in Greek history can scarcely be denied. Serious objections, however, may be advanced against the other assumptions of the traditional view.

In the first place the year 431 merely witnessed the resumption of an old conflict between Athens and Sparta which had been adjourned on several occasions; indeed, the introductory chapters of the first book of Thukydides amount to a confession that the events of the 'Peloponnesian War' cannot be understood without a knowledge of previous history from the Persian invasion downwards.

Secondly, the occurrences that fall within the period under consideration are by no means of a uniform character. The narrative is broken in the middle by an interlude which carries us away from the main seat of war to the west, and even the two periods of fighting in Greece proper are marked by about as many points of difference as of resemblance. Thus in the first period (431-421), (1) the war is carried on by two strong Hellenic coalitions; (2) their endeavours to harm each other vitally are mostly unsuccessful; (3) operations are largely conducted on land; (4) the most active enemy of Athens for a long time is Corinth. In the final period (1) both coalitions are weakened, and feel the need of invoking foreign aid (thus leading up to the conditions of the fourth century, under which a 'barbarian' became the recognized arbitrator in Greek disputes); (2) yet each power is able to inflict severe blows on the other; (3) the war is almost entirely maritime; (4) Sparta is the most dangerous opponent of Athens. Another difference lies in the general absence of political propaganda during the first period, whereas in the later years Sparta inaugurates her fourth-century policy of interference with existing constitutions.

That the contemporary Greeks felt this distinction is proved by the fact that they analyzed the events of 431-404 into several divisions. Thus in Andok. (*De Pace*, § 8) the campaigns of 431-421 constitute a separate war definitely concluded by Nikias's peace, while in Lysias (*Ed. Didot* ii. 256, fr. 18) we meet with the term 'Archidamian War'. The second period (413-404) is comprised in Isokrates (*De Pace*, § 37; *Plataicus*, § 31) under the title 'Dekeleian War'. The name 'Peloponnesian War' was probably not in use before the days of Ephorus. (It occurs in Diod., xiii. 38; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 29; Strabo, xiii., p. 600.)

Thirdly, it is important to notice that the 'War' was by no means a continuous whole. There are, after 421, nine years of official truce. Thukydides evidently realized this, and cautions his readers against regarding these years as years of peace. But his own narrative refutes him. Thus in 420 there is only campaigning in Thrace (of which practically nothing is known); in 419 and 417 there is almost nothing; in 416 the expedition to Melos. These were years of peace *de facto* as well as *de jure*. Finally, the Mantinea War was an episode merely, and was *not* followed by a general resumption of hostilities.

2. If, therefore, the term 'Peloponnesian War' is both late and arbitrary, it is natural to inquire whether there may not be a corresponding lack of unity in Thukydides' account of the war.

There are certain indications that the history in its present form is structurally imperfect. Thus (1) Book V. seems to contain some gaps (especially with regard to Sparta's campaigns against Argos and Athenian operations in Thrace); (2) Book VIII. is obscure in parts, and ends abruptly.

Hence it has been conjectured that Thukydides wrote an 'Archidamian War', followed by a 'Sicilian Expedition' and a 'Dekeleian War' in separate sections, and finally combined the three treatises into one, adding Book V. by way of connexion.

The positive evidence for this view consists in (1) the dual introduction (bks. i. and v., 26); (2) the use of *δὲ ὁ πόλεμος* in the sense of 'Archidamian

War' in at least two passages in the first section. (a) In iv. 48 we read that the civil wars in Korkyra ended in 425, *ὅσα ἐκ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε*—i.e., till 421, for in 410 there were fresh disturbances¹. (b) In i. 23, where the disasters occurring *μετὰ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου* are discussed, there is no allusion to any calamity that occurred after 421, save perhaps the destruction of Sikeliot cities by Carthage in 409-406. (3) Thukydides' distinction between a *πρῶτος* and a *ὕστερος πόλεμος*, with an *ἀναχωρή* (v. 26). Since Thukydides recorded the events of each year as the war went along, it is indeed unlikely that he started to compile his history as it now stands; his natural course would be to mark off the prominent sections of the war as it took its course into portions which could be worked up separately.

We can scarcely, however, believe that he elaborated and published the various divisions separately.

For (1) Book I. seems a formidable introduction to a work not extending beyond v. 25.

(2) The first section contains several indications of a late date of publication. (a) In i. 97 there is a reference to the *Atthis* of Hellanikus, published not earlier than the battle of Arginusæ—i.e., 406. (b) In i. 93 the ruined condition of the Long Walls is mentioned. (c) In ii. 65 the final downfall of Athens is commented on. (d) In ii. 100 the reign of King Archelaus of Macedonia is alluded to (the year of his accession not being earlier than 415 B.C.). (e) In iv. 74 the Megarian oligarchy installed in 424 is described as 'having persisted a very long time'.

3. Books VI. and VII. make frequent reference to events in Greece proper, and the whole Sicilian expedition is conceived as an incident *ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ* (vi. 17, vi. 36, vii. 18, vii. 27, 28).

As it is inadmissible to treat all these passages as later interpolations, the hypothesis of separate publication becomes untenable.

The most likely solution of the question would appear to be as follows: Thukydides composed rough drafts of the 'Archidamian War' (i.-v. 25) and of the Sicilian Expedition (bks. vi. and vii.) during the course of operations, but as hostilities dragged on he withheld publication until after the settlement of 404. Having at last decided on the range of his subject, he worked up his two previous drafts, and added Book V. (ch. 26 *ad fin.*) as a connecting link, with Book I. as an introduction to the war as a whole. Finally, he set himself to write the last nine years of the war, but probably died before he had finished Book VIII.

A fairly exact parallel to this hypothesis is supplied by the procedure of Polybius. This historian originally selected the period 220-167 B.C., marking the establishment of the Roman world-empire as his subject, and went to work on the books now numbered 3 to 30. Later on he came to the conclusion that this account required an introduction dealing with the great Punic wars which had made Roman supremacy possible (bks. 1 and 2). Finally, the events of the year 146 induced him to add an epilogue showing what use Rome made of her newly-acquired predominance (bks. 30-40). Having thus covered the whole period 264-146, he welded the various parts together, and published them as one continuous whole.—Ed.

CHAPTER XIX [XLIX]

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR DOWN TO THE END OF THE
THIRD YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

AT the close of one year after the attempted surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, the belligerent parties in Greece remained in an unaltered position as to relative strength. In spite of mutual damage inflicted—doubtless in the greatest measure upon Attica—no progress was yet made towards the fulfilment of those objects which had induced the Peloponnesians to go to war. Especially the most pressing among all their wishes—the relief of Potidæa—was noway advanced; for the Athenians had not found it necessary to relax the blockade of that city. The result of the

¹ This further shows that the passage was written *after* 410.

first year's operations had thus been to disappoint the hopes of the Corinthians and the other ardent instigators of war, while it justified the anticipations both of Periklēs and of Archidamus.

A second devastation of Attica was resolved upon for the commencement of spring. About the end of March, the entire Peloponnesian force (two-thirds from each confederate city as before) was assembled under the command of Archidamus and marched into Attica. This time they carried the work of systematic destruction not merely over the Thriasian plain and the plain immediately near to Athens, as before, but also to the more southerly portions of Attica, down even as far as the mines of Laurium. They found the territory deserted as before, all the population having retired within the walls.

In regard to this second invasion, Periklēs recommended the same defensive policy as he had applied to the first. But a new visitation had now occurred, diverting their attention from the invader, though enormously aggravating their sufferings. A few days after Archidamus entered Attica, a pestilence or epidemic sickness broke out unexpectedly at Athens.

It appears that this terrific disorder had been raging for some time throughout the regions round the Mediterranean, having begun, as was believed, in Ethiopia—thence passing into Egypt and Libya, and overrunning a considerable portion of Asia under the Persian government. About sixteen years before, too, there had been a similar calamity in Rome and in various parts of Italy¹. Recently, it had been felt in Lemnos and some other islands of the Ægean, yet seemingly not with such intensity as to excite much notice generally in the Grecian world: at length it passed to Athens, and first showed itself in the Peiræus. The progress of the disease was as rapid and destructive as its appearance had been sudden, whilst the extraordinary accumulation of people within the city and long walls, in consequence of the presence of the invaders in the country, was but too favourable to every form of contagion².

Of this plague—or (more properly) eruptive typhoid fever—a description no less clear than impressive has been left by the historian Thukydides, himself not only a spectator but a sufferer. The observations with which that notice is ushered in, deserve particular attention. 'In respect to this distemper (he says), let every man, physician or not, say what he thinks respecting the source from whence it may probably have arisen, and respecting the causes which he deems sufficiently powerful to have produced so great a revolution. But I, having myself had the distemper, and having seen others suffering under it, will state *what it actually was*, and will indicate in addition such other matters, as will furnish any man, who lays them to heart, with knowledge and the means of calculation

¹ Holm (*Gk. Hist.*, ii., p. 346, n. 3) quotes Livy, iv. 21, to show that there were epidemics in Rome between 436 and 432, and follows Holzapfel (*Römische Chronologie*) in suggesting Carthage as the common place of origin for the disease in Athens and Rome. Phenician traders may have brought it from Egypt to Carthage. On the other hand, Athens had a preponderant share of Greek trade with Egypt (see note to p. 337), and the rats on the corn-ships may have brought the plague directly.—Ed.

² Thukyd., ii. 52; Diodor., xii. 45; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 34. It is to be remarked, that the

Athenians, though their persons and moveable property were crowded within the walls, had not driven in their sheep and cattle also, but had transported them over to Eubœa and the neighbouring islands (Thukyd., ii. 14). Hence they escaped a serious aggravation of their epidemic: for in the accounts of the epidemics which desolated Rome under similar circumstances, we find the accumulation of great numbers of cattle, along with human beings, specified as a terrible addition to the calamity (see Livy, iii. 66; Dionys. Hal., *Ant. Rom.*, x. 53; compare Niebuhr, *Römisch. Gesch.*, vol. ii., p. 90).

beforehand, in case the same misfortune should ever again occur'. To record past facts, as a basis for rational prevision in regard to the future—the same sentiment which Thukydides mentions in his preface, as having animated him to the composition of his history—was at that time a duty so little understood, that we have reason to admire not less the manner in which he performs it in practice, than the distinctness with which he conceives it in theory. By resisting the itch of theorizing from one of those loose hypotheses which then appeared plausibly to explain everything, he probably renounced the point of view from which most credit and interest would be derivable at the time.

When it was found that neither the priest nor the physician could retard the spread, or mitigate the intensity, of the disorder, the Athenians abandoned themselves to despair, and the space within the walls became a scene of desolating misery. Every man attacked with the malady at once lost his courage—a state of depression, itself among the worst features of the case, which made him lie down and die, without any attempt to seek for preservatives. And though at first friends and relatives lent their aid to tend the sick with the usual family sympathies, yet so terrible was the number of these attendants who perished, 'like sheep', from such contact, that at length no man would thus expose himself; while the most generous spirits, who persisted longest in the discharge of their duty, were carried off in the greatest numbers¹. The patient was thus left to die alone and unheeded. There remained only those who, having had the disorder and recovered, were willing to tend the sufferers. These men formed the single exception to the all-pervading misery of the time—for the disorder seldom attacked anyone twice, and when it did, the second attack was never fatal. It was from them, too, that the principal attention to the bodies of deceased victims proceeded: for such was the state of dismay and sorrow, that even the nearest relatives neglected the sepulchral duties, sacred beyond all others in the eyes of a Greek. Nor is there any circumstance which conveys to us so vivid an idea of the prevalent agony and despair, as when we read in the words of an eyewitness, that the deaths took place among this close-packed crowd without the smallest decencies of attention—that the dead and the dying lay piled one upon another not merely in the public roads, but even in the temples, in spite of the understood defilement of the sacred building—that half-dead sufferers were seen lying round all the springs from insupportable thirst. In some cases, the bearers of a body, passing by a funeral pile on which another body was burning, would put their own there to be burnt also²; or perhaps, if the pile was prepared ready for a body not yet arrived, would deposit their own upon it, set fire to the pile, and then depart. Such indecent confusion would have been intolerable to the feelings of the Athenians, in any ordinary times.

To all these scenes of physical suffering, death, and reckless despair—was superadded another evil, which affected those who were fortunate enough to escape the rest. The bonds both of law and morality became relaxed, amidst such total uncertainty of every man both for his own life,

¹ Compare Diodor., xiv. 70, who mentions similar distresses in the Carthaginian army besieging Syracuse, during the terrible epidemic with which it was attacked in 395 B.C.; and Livy, xxv. 26, respecting the epidemic at Syracuse when it was besieged by Marcellus and the Romans.

² Thukyd., ii. 52. From the language of Thukydides, we see that this was regarded at Athens as highly unbecoming. Yet a passage of Plutarch seems to show that it was very common, in his time, to burn several bodies on the same funeral pile (Plutarch, *Symposiac.*, iii. 4, p. 651).

and that of others. Men cared not to abstain from wrong, under circumstances in which punishment was not likely to overtake them—nor to put a check upon their passions, and endure privations, in obedience even to their strongest conviction, when the chance was so small of their living to reap reward or enjoy any future esteem. An interval, short and sweet, before their doom was realized—before they became plunged in the wide-spread misery which they witnessed around, and which affected indiscriminately the virtuous and the profligate—was all that they looked to enjoy.

The picture of society under the pressure of a murderous epidemic, with its train of physical torments, wretchedness, and demoralization, has been drawn by more than one eminent author, but by none with more impressive fidelity and conciseness than by Thukydides¹, who had no predecessor, nor anything but the reality, to copy from. We may remark that amidst all the melancholy accompaniments of the time, there are no human sacrifices, such as those offered up at Carthage during pestilence to appease the anger of the gods—there are no cruel persecutions against imaginary authors of the disease, such as those against the Untori (anointers of doors) in the plague of Milan in 1630².

Three years altogether did this calamity desolate Athens, continuously during the entire second and third years of the war—after which followed a period of marked abatement for a year and a half: but it then revived again, and lasted for another year, with the same fury as at first. The public loss, over and above the private misery, which this unexpected enemy inflicted upon Athens, was incalculable. Out of 1,200 horsemen, all among the rich men of the state, 300 died of the epidemic, besides 4,400 hoplites out of the roll formally kept, and a number of the poorer population, so great as to defy computation³. No efforts of the Peloponnesians could have done so much to ruin Athens, or to bring the war to a termination such as they desired; and the distemper told the more in their favour, as it never spread at all into Peloponnesus, though it passed from Athens to some of the more populous islands. The Lacedæmonian army was withdrawn from Attica somewhat earlier than it would otherwise have been, for fear of taking the contagion.

But it was while the Lacedæmonians were yet in Attica, and during the first freshness of the terrible malady, that Periklēs equipped and conducted from Peiræus an armament of 100 triremes and 4,000 hoplites to attack the coasts of Peloponnesus: 300 horsemen were also carried in some horse-transport, prepared for the occasion out of old triremes. To diminish the crowd accumulated in the city was doubtless of beneficial tendency. But unhappily they carried the infection along with them, which desolated the fleet not less than the city, and crippled all its efforts. Reinforced by fifty ships of war from Chios and Lesbos, the Athenians first landed near Epidaurus in Peloponnesus, ravaging the territory and making

¹ The description in the sixth book of Lucretius, translated and expanded from Thukydides—that of the plague at Florence in 1348, with which the *Decameron* of Boccaccio opens—and that of Defoe in his *History of the Plague in London*—are all well-known.

² Carthaginienses, cum inter cetera mala etiam peste laborarent, cruentâ sacrorum religione, et scelere pro remedio, usi sunt: quippe homines ut victimas immolabant; pacem deorum sanguine

eorum exposcentes, pro quorum vitâ Dii rogari maximè solent' (Justin, xviii. 6).

For the facts respecting the plague of Milan and the Untori, see the interesting novel of Manzoni—*Promessi Sposi*—and the historical work of the same author—*Storia della Colonna Infame*.

³ Thukyd., iii. 87. Diodorus makes them above 10,000 (xii. 58) freemen and slaves together, which must be greatly beneath the reality.

an unavailing attempt upon the city : next they made like incursions on the more southerly portions of the Argolic peninsula—Trœzen, Halieis, and Hermione ; and lastly attacked and captured Prasiæ, on the eastern coast of Laconia. On returning to Athens, the same armament was immediately conducted under Hagnon and Kleopompus, to press the siege of Potidæa, the blockade of which still continued without any visible progress. On arriving there, an attack was made on the walls by battering engines and by the other aggressive methods then practised ; but nothing whatever was achieved. In fact, the armament became incompetent for all serious effort, from the aggravated character which the distemper here assumed, communicated by the soldiers fresh from Athens even to those who had before been free from it at Potidæa. So frightful was the mortality, that out of the 4,000 hoplites under Hagnon, no less than 1,050 died in the short space of forty days. The armament was brought back in this distressed condition to Athens, while the reduction of Potidæa was left as before to the slow course of blockade.

On returning from the expedition against Peloponnesus, Periklès found his countrymen almost distracted with their manifold sufferings. They vented their feelings against Periklès as the cause not merely of the war, but also of all that they were now enduring. Either with or without his consent, they sent envoys to Sparta to open negotiations for peace, but the Spartans turned a deaf ear to the proposition. This new disappointment rendered them still more furious against Periklès, whose long-standing political enemies now doubtless found strong sympathy in their denunciations of his character and policy. That unshaken and majestic firmness, which ranked first among his many eminent qualities, was never more imperiously required and never more effectively manifested.

In his capacity of Stratêgus or General, Periklès convoked a formal assembly of the people, for the purpose of vindicating himself publicly against the prevailing sentiment, and recommending perseverance in his line of policy. The speeches made by his opponents are not given by Thukydides ; but that of Periklès himself is set down at considerable length, and a memorable discourse it is. It strikingly brings into relief both the character of the man and the impress of actual circumstances—an impregnable mind conscious not only of right purposes but of just and reasonable anticipations, and bearing up with manliness, or even defiance, against the natural difficulty of the case, heightened by an extreme of incalculable misfortune. Far from humbling himself before the present sentiment, it is at this time that he sets forth his titles to their esteem in the most direct and unqualified manner, and claims the continuance of that which they had so long accorded, as something belonging to him by acquired right.

His main object, throughout this discourse, is to fill the minds of his audience with patriotic sympathy for the weal of the entire city, so as to counterbalance the absorbing sense of private woe. If the collective city flourishes (he argues), private misfortunes may at least be borne : but no amount of private prosperity will avail, if the collective city falls (a proposition literally true in ancient times and under the circumstances of ancient warfare—though less true at present). ‘Distracted by domestic calamity, ye are now angry both with me who advised you to go to war, and with yourselves who followed the advice. Ye listened to me, con-

sidering me superior to others in judgement, in speech, in patriotism, and in incorruptible probity—nor ought I now to be treated as culpable for giving such advice, when in point of fact the war was unavoidable and there would have been still greater danger in shrinking from it. I am the same man, still unchanged—but ye in your misfortunes cannot stand to the convictions which ye adopted when yet unhurt. Extreme and unforeseen, indeed, are the sorrows which have fallen upon you : yet inhabiting as ye do a great city, and brought up in dispositions suitable to it, ye must also resolve to bear up against the utmost pressure of adversity, and never to surrender your dignity. I have often explained to you that ye have no reason to doubt of eventual success in the war, but I will now remind you, more emphatically than before, and even with a degree of ostentation suitable as a stimulus to your present unnatural depression—that your naval force makes you masters not only of your allies, but of the entire sea—one half of the visible field for action and employment. Compared with so vast a power as this, the temporary use of your houses and territory is a mere trifle—an ornamental accessory not worth considering : and this too, if ye preserve your freedom, ye will quickly recover. It was your fathers who first gained this empire, without any of the advantages which ye now enjoy ; ye must not disgrace yourselves by losing what they acquired. Delighting as ye all do in the honour and empire enjoyed by the city, ye must not shrink from the toils whereby alone that honour is sustained : moreover, ye now fight, not merely for freedom instead of slavery, but for empire against loss of empire, with all the perils arising out of imperial unpopularity. It is not safe for you now to abdicate, even if ye chose to do so ; for ye hold your empire like a despotism—unjust perhaps in the original acquisition, but ruinous to part with when once acquired. Be not angry with me, whose advice ye followed in going to war, because the enemy have done such damage as might be expected from them : still less on account of this unforeseen distemper. Our city derives its particular glory from unshaken bearing up against misfortune : her power, her name, her empire of Greeks over Greeks, are such as have never before been seen : and if we choose to be great, we must take the consequence of that temporary envy and hatred which is the necessary price of permanent renown. Behave ye now in a manner worthy of that glory : display that courage which is essential to protect you against disgrace at present, as well as to guarantee your honour for the future. Send no farther embassy to Sparta, and bear your misfortunes without showing symptoms of distress.’

The irresistible reason, as well as the proud and resolute bearing of this discourse, set forth with an eloquence which it was not possible for Thukydides to reproduce, carried the assent of the assembled people. Accordingly, the assembly resolved that no farther propositions should be made for peace, and that the war should be prosecuted with vigour.

But though the public resolution thus adopted showed the ancient habit of deference to the authority of Periklēs, the sentiments of individuals taken separately were still those of anger against him as the author of that system which had brought them into so much distress. His political opponents—Kleon, Simmias, or Lakratidas, perhaps all three in conjunction—took care to provide an opportunity for this prevalent irritation to manifest itself in act, by bringing an accusation against him

before the dikastery. The accusation is said to have been preferred on the ground of pecuniary malversation, and ended by his being sentenced to pay a considerable fine, the amount of which is differently reported—fifteen, fifty, or eighty talents, by different authors¹. The event, however, disappointed their expectations. The imposition of the fine not only satiated all the irritation of the people against him, but even occasioned a serious reaction in his favour, and brought back as strongly as ever the ancient sentiment of esteem and admiration. It was quickly found that those who had succeeded Periklēs as generals neither possessed nor deserved in an equal degree the public confidence. He was accordingly soon re-elected, with as much power and influence as he had ever in his life enjoyed.

But that life, long, honourable, and useful, had already been prolonged considerably beyond the sixtieth year, and there were but too many circumstances, besides the recent fine, which tended to hasten as well as to embitter its close. At the very moment when Periklēs was preaching to his countrymen the necessity of manful and unabated devotion to the common country, in the midst of private suffering—he was himself among the greatest of sufferers. The epidemic carried off not merely his two sons (the only two legitimate, Xanthippus and Paralus), but also his sister, several other relatives, and his best and most useful political friends. Amidst this train of domestic calamities, and in the funeral obsequies of so many of his dearest friends, he remained master of his grief, and maintained his habitual self-command, until the last misfortune—the death of his favourite son Paralus, which left his house without any legitimate representative to maintain the family and the hereditary sacred rites. On this final blow, though he strove to command himself as before, yet at the obsequies of the young man, when it became his duty to place a wreath on the dead body, his grief became uncontrollable².

In the midst of these several personal trials he received the intimation, through Alkibiadēs and some other friends, of the restored confidence of the people towards him, and of his re-election to the office of Stratēgus³. But it was not without difficulty that he was persuaded to present himself again at the public assembly, and resume the direction of affairs. He had himself, some years before, been the author of that law, whereby the citizenship of Athens was restricted to persons born both of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers⁴. Without a legitimate heir, the house of

¹ Thukyd., ii. 65; Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 515, c. 71; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 35; Diodor., xii., c. 38-45.

Plutarch and Diodorus both state that Periklēs was not only fined, but also removed from his office of Stratēgus. [Though Grote was inclined to doubt this statement, it does not stand without support. (1) An ἀποχεριστορία in the assembly could in the fourth century be passed against any magistrate during any prytany (*Ath. Pol.*, 43), and the rule may well have been in force at this period. This formal deposition may have been preceded by a special εἴθυνα, and would naturally be followed by a trial (for κλοπή). (2) We know that the elections for the office of stratēgus occurred in spring (Beloch, *Altische Politik*, pp. 265-274; Gilbert, *Const. Antiquities*, p. 216); hence Periklēs did not lose office, as Grote suggests, by the mere expiry of his mandate. His re-election may have been in spring, 429, or on some special occasion.—Ed.]

² Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 36.

³ Thukydides' expression πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπείρυσαν αὐτῷ (ii. 65) seems to imply some special

power, such as the control over the whole board of stratēgi. A similar power lay in Periklēs' hands in 431 (*cf.* p. 391). Similarly in 440-439 we find him στρατηγὸς δέκατος αὐτὸς (Thukyd., i. 116), which probably indicates a similar presidency (*cf.* Plut., *Per.*, 13: Μένιππος ὑποστρατηγῶν τῷ Περικλεῖ—probably referring to 440). In Xen., *Hellen.*, i. 5, 20, we find Alkibiadēs proclaimed πάντων ἡγεμῶν αὐτοκράτωρ. In the fourth century the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὰ ὅπλα, or 'war-minister', had superior power—*e.g.*, Phokion in 322-318.

It seems clear that the Athenian constitution provided for the creation of a controlling general on special occasions. It is not to be inferred that such a president was normally chosen for the magisterial boards. The expression ὁ δέσιναι καὶ ἐνδράχοντες found in inscriptions seems merely to imply a casual priority: it is used of routine officials like the treasurers of Athēnē in C.I.A., iv. (1), p. 30; Hicks and Hill, 53). *cf.* Beloch, *Altische Politik*, pp. 274-288; Greenidge, *Handbook of Const. Hist.*, Appendix.—Ed.

⁴ *cf.* note to p. 332.—Ed.

Periklēs, one branch of the great Alkmæonid Gens by his mother's side, would be left deserted, and the continuity of the family sacred rites would be broken—a misfortune painfully felt by every Athenian family, as calculated to wrong all the deceased members, and provoke their posthumous displeasure towards the city. Accordingly, permission was granted to Periklēs to legitimize, and to inscribe in his own gens and phratry, his natural son by Aspasia, who bore his own name.

It was thus that Periklēs was reinstated in his post of Stratēgus, seemingly about August or September 430 B.C. He lived about one year longer, and seems to have maintained his influence as long as his health permitted. Yet we hear nothing of him after this moment, and he fell a victim, not to the violent symptoms of the epidemic, but to a slow and wearing fever, which undermined his strength as well as his capacity. According to an anecdote which we read, it was during his last moments, when he was lying apparently unconscious and insensible, that the friends around his bed were passing in review the acts of his life, and the nine trophies which he had erected at different times for so many victories. He heard what they said, and interrupted them by remarking—'What you praise in my life, belongs partly to good fortune, and is, at best, common to me with many other generals. But the peculiarity of which I am most proud, you have not noticed—no Athenian has ever put on mourning through any action of mine'¹.

Such a cause of self-gratulation illustrates that long-sighted calculation, aversion to distant or hazardous enterprise, and economy of the public force, which marked his entire political career. His character has been presented in very different lights by different authors both ancient and modern, and our materials for striking the balance are not so good as we could wish. But his immense and long-continued supremacy, as well as his unparalleled eloquence, are facts attested not less by his enemies than by his friends—nay, even more forcibly by the former than by the latter. The comic writers, who hated him, and whose trade it was to deride and hunt down every leading political character, exhaust their powers of illustration in setting forth both the one and the other²: Telekleidēs, Kratinus, Eupolis, Aristophanēs, all hearers and all enemies, speak of him like Olympian Zeus hurling thunder and lightning—like Heraklēs and Achilles, as the only speaker on whose lips persuasion sat and who left his sting in the minds of his audience: while Plato the philosopher³, who disapproved of his political working and of the moral effects which he produced upon Athens, nevertheless extols his intellectual and oratorical ascendancy—'his majestic intelligence'—in language not less decisive than Thukydidēs. There is another point of eulogy, not less valuable, on which the testimony appears uncontradicted: throughout his long career, amidst the hottest political animosities, the conduct of Periklēs towards opponents was always mild and liberal⁴. The conscious self-esteem and arrogance of manner, with which the contemporary poet Ion reproached him⁵, contrasting it with the unpretending simplicity of his own patron Kimon, though probably invidiously exaggerated, is doubtless in sub-

¹ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 38.

² Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 4, 8, 13, 16; Eupolis, *Δῆμος*, Fragm. vi., p. 459, ed. Meineke. Cicero (*De Orator.*, iii. 34; *Brutus*, 9-11) and Quintilian (ii. 16, 19; x. 1, 82) count only as witnesses at second-hand.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 71, p. 516; *Phædrus*, c. 54, p. 270: Περικλῆς, τὸν οὕτω μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἄνδρα. Plato, *Meno*, p. 94 B.

⁴ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 10-39.

⁵ *Ibid.*, c. 5.

stance well-founded, and those who read the last speech given above out of Thukydidês will at once recognise in it this attribute. His natural taste, his love of philosophical research, and his unwearied application to public affairs, all contributed to alienate him from ordinary familiarity, and to make him careless, perhaps improperly careless, of the lesser means of conciliating public favour.

But admitting this latter reproach to be well-founded, as it seems to be, it helps to negative that greater and graver political crime which has been imputed to him, of sacrificing the permanent well-being and morality of the state to the maintenance of his own political power—of corrupting the people by distributions of the public money. 'He gave the reins to the people (in Plutarch's words¹) and shaped his administration for their immediate favour, by always providing at home some public spectacle or festival or procession, thus nursing up the city in elegant pleasures—and by sending out every year sixty triremes manned by citizen-seamen on full pay, who were thus kept in practice and acquired nautical skill.'

Now the charge here made against Periklês—of a vicious appetite for immediate popularity, and of improper concessions to the immediate feelings of the people against their permanent interests—is precisely that which Thukydidês in the most pointed manner denies. The language of the contemporary historian² well deserves to be cited—'Periklês, powerful from dignity of character as well as from wisdom, and conspicuously above the least tinge of corruption, held back the people with a free hand, and was their real leader instead of being led by them. For not being a seeker of power from unworthy sources, he did not speak with any view to present favour, but had sufficient sense of dignity to contradict them on occasion, even braving their displeasure. Thus, whenever he perceived them insolently and unseasonably confident, he shaped his speeches in such manner as to alarm and beat them down: when again he saw them unduly frightened, he tried to counteract it and restore their confidence: so that the government was in name a democracy, but in reality an empire exercised by the first citizen in the state. But those who succeeded after his death, being more equal one with another, and each of them desiring pre-eminence over the rest, adopted the different course of courting the favour of the people and sacrificing to that object even important state-interests.'

It will be seen that the judgement here quoted from Thukydidês contradicts, in an unqualified manner, the reproaches commonly made against Periklês of having corrupted the Athenian people—by distributions of the public money, and by giving way to their unwise caprices—for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining his own political power. A distinction might, indeed, be possible, and Plutarch professes to note such distinction, between the earlier and the later part of his long political career. Periklês began (so that biographer says) by corrupting the people in order to acquire power; but having acquired it, he employed it in an independent and patriotic manner, so that the judgement of Thukydidês, true respect-

¹ Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 11.

Compare c. 9, where Plutarch says that Periklês, having no other means of contending against the abundant private largesses of his rival Kimon, resorted to the expedient of distributing the public

money among the citizens, in order to gain influence, acting in this matter upon the advice of his friend Demonidês, according to the statement of Aristotle.

² Thukyd., ii. 65.

ing the later part of his life, would not be applicable to the earlier¹. There is nothing to warrant us in restricting the encomium of Thukydides exclusively to the later life of Periklēs, or in representing the earlier life as something in pointed contrast with that encomium. Construing fairly what the historian says, he evidently did not so conceive the earlier life of Periklēs. Those political changes which are held by Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, to demonstrate the corrupting effect of Periklēs and his political ascendancy—such as the limitation of the functions of the Areopagus, as well as of the power of the magistrates, the establishment of the numerous and frequent popular dikasteries with regular pay, and perhaps also the assignment of pay to those who attended the Ekklesia, the expenditure for public works, religious edifices and ornaments, the Diobely² (or distribution of two oboli per head to the poorer citizens at various festivals, in order that they might be able to pay for their places in the theatre), taking it as it then stood, etc.—did not appear to Thukydides mischievous and corrupting.

Though Thukydides does not directly canvass the constitutional changes effected in Athens under Periklēs, yet everything which he does say leads us to believe that he accounted the working of that statesman, upon the whole, on Athenian power as well as on Athenian character, eminently valuable, and his death as an irreparable loss. And we may thus appeal to the judgement of an historian who is our best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the charge against Periklēs of having corrupted the Athenian habits, character, and government. If he spent a large amount of the public treasure upon religious edifices and ornaments, and upon stately works for the city—yet the sum which he left untouched, ready for use at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was such as to appear more than sufficient for all purposes of defence, or public safety, or military honour. It cannot be shown of Periklēs that he ever sacrificed the greater object to the less—the permanent and substantially valuable, to the transitory and showy—assured present possessions, to the lust of new, distant, or uncertain conquests. Periklēs is not to be treated as the author of the Athenian character: he found it with its very marked positive characteristics and susceptibilities, among which those which he chiefly brought out and improved were the best. The ambition of Athens he moderated rather than encouraged: the democratical movement of Athens he regularized, and worked out into judicial institutions which ranked among the prominent features of Athenian life, and worked,

¹ We cannot lay much stress on Plutarch's account of Periklēs' career, as it contains some obvious improbabilities. In his account we find Periklēs' career marked off into three periods: (1) Periklēs is haughty and retiring; (2) he courts the proletariat assiduously; (3) he turns haughty again. These statements do not agree with one another, and with Periklēs' alleged supremacy of forty years (c. xvi., appendix).

As *Ath. Pol.* has not given a new estimate of Periklēs' career, but simply follows the ordinary fourth-century version as found in Plato and the historians (Theopompus, Ephorus, etc.), on whom Plutarch also bases himself for the most part when not following the fifth-century comedians and anecdotists (Ion and Stesimbrotus), we are still compelled to place our main trust in Thukydides.—Ed.

² The *Ath. Pol.* has definitely solved the two problems here involved—the date when payment for the ekklesia began, and the authorship of the Diobely. (1) In c. xli., *ad fin.*, the former

measure is assigned to Agyrrius, whose career falls in the fourth century. From the picture of empty benches in *Ar., Ach.*, 20 ff., we might infer that the assembly was not paid in 425. (2) The *διωβελία* was introduced by Kleophon at the end of the war (c. xxviii. 3).

The other notices concerning this institution all refer to this period. Thus the amended text in *Xen., Hellen.*, i. 72, reads 'Ἀρχέδημος ὁ τῆς διωβελίας προστηκώς (in 406-405). C.I.G., ii. 147, 148 mention payments of *διωβελία*, amounting up to nine talents per prytany, and record the participation of Ægina in the grant (410-409 B.C.). This leads us to infer that the Diobely was a temporary measure of relief, which the widespread financial distress, at the close of the war called for. The identification of the *διωβελία* with the *θεωρικόν* rests on nothing more than the fact that two obols was the amount of *θεωρικόν* pay; moreover, some grammarians give the *θεωρικόν* rate of pay as one drachma.—Ed.

in my judgement, with a very large balance of benefit to the national mind as well as to individual security, in spite of the many defects in their direct character as tribunals. But that point in which there was the greatest difference between Athens, as Periklēs found it and as he left it, is unquestionably, the pacific and intellectual development—rhetoric, poetry, arts, philosophical research, and recreative variety. To which if we add, great improvement in the cultivation of the Attic soil—extension of Athenian trade—attainment and laborious maintenance of the maximum of maritime skill (attested by the battles of Phormio)—enlargement of the area of complete security by construction of the Long Walls—lastly, the clothing of Athens in her imperial mantle, by ornaments architectural and sculptural—we shall make out a case of genuine progress realized during the political life of Periklēs, such as the evils imputed to him, far more imaginary than real, will go but a little way to alloy.

It has been remarked by M. Boeckh¹, that Periklēs sacrificed the landed proprietors of Attica to the maritime interests and empire of Athens. This is, of course, founded on the destructive invasions of the country during the Peloponnesian war, for down to the commencement of that war the position of Attic cultivators and proprietors was particularly enviable: and the censure of M. Boeckh therefore depends upon the question, how far Periklēs contributed to produce, or had it in his power to avert, this melancholy war, in its results so fatal not merely to Athens, but to the entire Grecian race. Now here, again, if we follow attentively the narrative of Thukydidēs, we shall see that, in the judgement of that historian, not only Periklēs did not bring on the war, but he could not have averted it without such concessions as Athenian prudence as well as Athenian patriotism peremptorily forbade. The stories about Pheidias, Aspasia, and the Megarians, even if we should grant that there is some truth at the bottom of them, must, according to Thukydidēs, be looked upon at worst as concomitants and pretexts, rather than as real causes, of the war: though modern authors in speaking of Periklēs are but too apt to use expressions which tacitly assume these stories to be well-founded.

The relation of Athens to her allies, the weak point of her position, it was beyond the power of Periklēs seriously to amend, probably also beyond his will, since the idea of political incorporation, as well as that of providing a common and equal confederate bond sustained by effective federal authority, between different cities, was rarely entertained even by the best Greek minds². We hear that he tried to summon at Athens a congress of deputies from all cities of Greece, the allies of Athens included; but the scheme could not be brought to bear, in consequence of the reluctance, noway surprising, of the Peloponnesians. Practically, the allies were not badly treated during his administration: and if among the other bad consequences of the prolonged war, they as well as Athens and all other Greeks come to suffer more and more, this depends upon causes with which he is not chargeable, and upon proceedings which departed altogether from his wise and sober calculations. Taking him

¹ Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens*, b. iii., ch. xv., p. 399, Eng. trans.

² Herodotus (i. 170) mentions that previous to the conquest of the twelve Ionic cities in Asia by Croesus, Thales had advised them to consolidate themselves all into one single city-government at

Teos, and to reduce the existing cities to mere demes or constituent, fractional, municipalities—*τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πόλεις οἰκισμένης μὴδὲν ἕσσαν νομίζεσθαι κατὰ πρὸς εἰ δῆμοι εἴεν*. It is remarkable to observe that Herodotus himself bestows his unqualified commendation on this idea.

altogether, with his powers of thought, speech, and action—his competence civil and military, in the council as well as in the field—his vigorous and cultivated intellect, and his comprehensive ideas of a community in pacific and many-sided development—his incorruptible public morality, caution, and firmness, in a country where all those qualities were rare, and the union of them in the same individual of course much rarer—we shall find him without a parallel throughout the whole course of Grecian history.

Under the great mortality and pressure of sickness at Athens, operations of war naturally languished, while the enemies also, though more active, had but little success. A fleet of 100 triremes with 1,000 hoplites on board, was sent by the Lacedæmonians under Knêmus to attack Zakynthus, but accomplished nothing beyond devastation of the open parts of the island, and then returned home. And it was shortly after this, towards the month of September, that the Ambrakiots made an attack upon the Amphilochian town called Argos, situated on the southern coast of the Gulf of Ambrakia. Procuring aid from the Chaonians and some other Epirotic tribes, they marched against Argos, and after laying waste the territory, endeavoured to take the town by assault, but were repulsed and obliged to retire¹. This expedition appears to have impressed the Athenians with the necessity of a standing force to protect their interest in those parts; so that in the autumn Phormio was sent with a squadron of twenty triremes to occupy Naupaktus (now inhabited by the Messenians) as a permanent naval station, and to watch the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf.

Though the Peloponnesians were too inferior in maritime force to undertake formal war at sea against Athens, their single privateers, especially the Megarian privateers from the harbour of Nisæa, were active in injuring her commerce—and not merely the commerce of Athens, but also that of other neutral Greeks, without scruple or discrimination².

Some of these Peloponnesian privateers ranged as far as the southwestern coast of Asia Minor, where they found temporary shelter, and interrupted the trading-vessels from Phaselis and Phenicia to Athens; to protect which the Athenians despatched in the course of the autumn a squadron of six triremes, under Melêsander. He was farther directed to ensure the collection of the ordinary tribute from Athenian subject-allies, and probably to raise such contributions as he could elsewhere. In the prosecution of this latter duty, he undertook an expedition from the sea-coast against one of the Lykian towns in the interior, but his attack was repelled with loss, and he himself slain.

An opportunity soon afforded itself to the Athenians of retaliating on Sparta for their cruel treatment of the maritime prisoners. In execution of the idea projected at the commencement of the war, the Lacedæmonians sent Anêristus and two others as envoys to Persia, for the purpose of soliciting from the Great King aids of money and troops against Athens, the dissensions among the Greeks thus gradually paving the way for him to regain his ascendancy in the Ægean. Timagoras of Tegea, together with an Argeian named Pollis without any formal mission from his city, and the Corinthian Aristeus, accompanied them. As the sea

¹ See appendix on Periklês' strategy at the end of this chapter.—Ed.

² Thukyd., ii. 67-69; Herodot., vii. 137. Re-

specting the Lacedæmonian privateering during the Peloponnesian war, compare Thukyd., v. 115; compare also Xenophon, *Hellen.*, v. 1, 29.

was in the power of Athens, they travelled overland through Thrace to the Hellespont. Aristeus, eager to leave nothing untried for the relief of Potidæa, prevailed upon them to make application to Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince was then in alliance with Athens, and his son Sadokus had even received the grant of Athenian citizenship. Yet the envoys thought it possible not only to detach him from the Athenian alliance, but even to obtain from him an army to act against the Athenians and raise the blockade of Potidæa. But Athenian residents near the person of Sitalkês had influence enough not only to cause rejection of these requests, but also to induce Sadokus to assist them in seizing the persons of Aristeus and his companions in their journey through Thrace. Accordingly the whole party were seized and conducted as prisoners to Athens, where they were forthwith put to death, without trial or permission to speak.

Such revenge against Aristeus¹, the instigator of the revolt of Potidæa, relieved the Athenians from a dangerous enemy, and the blockaded city was now left to its fate. About midwinter it capitulated, after a blockade of two years, and after going through the extreme of suffering from famine to such a degree, that some of those who died were even eaten by the survivors. In spite of such intolerable distress, the Athenian generals, Xenophon son of Euripidês and his two colleagues, admitted them to favourable terms of capitulation—allowing the whole population and the Corinthian allies to retire freely, with a specified sum of money per head, so that they found shelter among the Chalkidic townships in the neighbourhood. These terms were singularly favourable, considering the desperate state of the city, which must very soon have surrendered at discretion. But the hardships, even of the army without, in the cold of winter, were very severe, and they had become thoroughly tired both of the duration and the expense of the siege. The cost to Athens had been not less than 2,000 talents, since the assailant force had never been lower than 3,000 hoplites, during the entire two years of the siege, and for a portion of the time considerably greater. The Athenians at home, when they learnt the terms of the capitulation, were displeased with the generals for the indulgence shown—since a little additional patience would have constrained the city to surrender at discretion, in which case the expense would have been partly made good by selling the prisoners as slaves. A body of 1,000 colonists were sent from Athens to occupy Potidæa and its vacant territory².

Two full years had now elapsed since the actual commencement of war by the attack of the Thebans on Plataea. Yet the Peloponnesians had accomplished no part of what they expected. They had not rescued Potidæa, nor had their twice-repeated invasion, although assisted by the unexpected disasters arising from the epidemic, as yet brought Athens to any sufficient humiliation. At the same time the Peloponnesian allies had on their side suffered little damage, since the ravages inflicted by the Athenian fleet on their coast may have been nearly compensated by the booty which their invading troops gained in Attica. In this third spring, the Peloponnesians did not repeat their annual march into Attica—deterred, partly, we may suppose, by fear of the epidemic yet raging there

¹ That Aristeus at this time was a specially hated personage at Athens is also proved by the slanders which Herodotus (viii. 94) repeats con-

cerning his father Adeimantus, the Corinthian admiral who distinguished himself at Salamis.—*Ed.*

² Diodor., xii. 46.

—but still more, by the strong desire of the Thebans to take their revenge on Plataea¹.

To this ill-fated city, Archidamus marched forthwith at the head of the confederate army. No sooner had he entered and begun to lay waste the territory, than the Plataean heralds came forth to arrest his hand, and accosted him in the following terms: 'Archidamus, and ye men of Lacedæmon, ye act wrong and in a manner neither worthy of yourselves nor of your fathers, in thus invading the territory of Plataea. For the Lacedæmonian Pausanias son of Kleombrotus, after he had liberated Greece from the Persians, in presence of all the allies, assigned to the Plataeans their own city and territory to hold in full autonomy, so that none should invade them wrongfully or with a view to enslave them. And we on our side now adjure you, calling to witness the gods who sanctioned that oath, as well as your paternal and our local gods, not to violate the oath by doing wrong to the Plataean territory, but to let us live on in that autonomy which Pausanias guaranteed.'

Whereunto Archidamus replied—'Ye speak fairly, men of Plataea, if your conduct shall be in harmony with your words. Remain autonomous yourselves, as Pausanias granted, and help us to liberate those other Greeks, who, after having shared in the same dangers and sworn the same oath along with you, have now been enslaved by the Athenians. It is for their liberation and that of the other Greeks that this formidable outfit of war has been brought forth. But if ye cannot act thus, at least remain quiet, conformably to the summons which we have already sent to you. Enjoy your own territory, and remain neutral—receiving both parties as friends, but neither party for warlike purposes. With this we shall be satisfied.'

The reply of Archidamus discloses by allusion a circumstance which the historian had not before directly mentioned, that the Lacedæmonians had sent a formal summons to the Plataeans to renounce their alliance with Athens and remain neutral. At what time this took place², we know not, but it marks the peculiar sentiment attaching to the town. But the Plataeans did not comply with the invitation thus repeated. The heralds, having returned for instructions into the city, brought back for answer, that compliance was impossible, without the consent of the Athenians, since their wives and families were now harboured at Athens: besides, if they should profess neutrality, and admit both parties as friends, the Thebans might again make an attempt to surprise their city. In reply to their scruples, Archidamus again addressed them—'Well then—hand over your city and houses to us Lacedæmonians: mark out the boundaries of your territory: specify the number of your fruit-trees, and all your other property which admits of being numbered; and then retire whithersoever ye choose, as long as the war continues. As soon as it is over, we will restore to you all that we have received—in the interim we will hold it in trust, and keep it in cultivation, and pay you such an allowance as shall suffice for your wants.'

The proposition now made was so fair and tempting, that the general

¹ The Peloponnesians had this further reason for attacking Plataea, that the town blocked the main road from the Isthmus to Boeotia. The only other available road, skirting the Corinthian Gulf near Ægosthena, was liable to become entirely impracticable in bad weather (Xen., *Hellen.*, v. 4, 18).

Cf. Grundy, *Journal of Hellen. Studies*, xviii. (1898), p. 225.—ED.

² This previous summons is again alluded to afterwards, on occasion of the slaughter of the Plataean prisoners (iii. 68); διότι τὸν τε ἄλλον χρόνον ἤγειον δῆθεν, etc.

body of the Platæans were at first inclined to accept it, provided the Athenians would acquiesce. They obtained from Archidamus a truce long enough to enable them to send envoys to Athens. After communication with the Athenian assembly, the envoys returned to Platæa bearing the following answer—'Men of Platæa, the Athenians say they have never yet permitted you to be wronged since the alliance first began—nor will they now betray you, but will help you to the best of their power. And they adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore to them, not to depart in any way from the alliance.'

This message awakened in the bosoms of the Platæans the full force of ancient sentiment. They resolved to maintain, at all cost, their union with Athens. It was indeed impossible that they could do otherwise (considering the position of their wives and families) without the consent of the Athenians. Though we cannot wonder that the latter refused consent, we may yet remark, that, in their situation, a perfectly generous ally might well have granted it. For the forces of Platæa counted for little as a portion of the aggregate strength of Athens; nor could the Athenians possibly protect it against the superior land-force of their enemies. In fact, so hopeless was the attempt, that they never even tried, throughout the whole course of the long subsequent blockade.

The whole of this preliminary debate, so strikingly and dramatically set forth by Thukydides, illustrates the respectful reluctance with which the Lacedæmonians first brought themselves to assail this scene of the glories of their fathers. What deserves remark is, that their direct sentiment attaches itself, not at all to the Platæan people, but only to the Platæan territory.

Archidamus now commenced the siege forthwith. The city was defended by a resolute garrison of 400 native citizens, with eighty Athenians. There was no one else in the town, except 110 female slaves for cooking. The fruit-trees, cut down in laying waste the cultivated land, sufficed to form a strong palisade all round the town, so as completely to enclose the inhabitants. Next, Archidamus, having abundance of timber near at hand in the forests of Kithæron, began to erect a mound against a portion of the town wall, so as to be able to scale it by an inclined plane. For seventy days and as many nights did the army labour at this work. But as it gradually mounted up, the Platæans constructed an additional wall of wood, which they planted on the top of their own town wall so as to heighten the part in contact with the enemy's mound, sustaining it by brickwork behind, for which the neighbouring houses furnished materials. And as the besiegers still continued heaping up materials, to raise their mound to the height even of this recent addition, the Platæans met them by breaking a hole in the lower part of their town wall, and pulling in the earth from the lower portion of the mound. Again, the Platæans dug a subterranean passage from the interior of their town to the ground immediately under the mound, and thus carried away unseen its earthy foundation. Nevertheless it was plain that these stratagems would be in the end ineffectual, and the Platæans accordingly built a new portion of town wall in the interior, in the shape of a crescent, taking its start from the old town wall on each side of the mound.

Archidamus farther brought up battering engines, one of which greatly shook and endangered the additional height of wall built by the Platæans

against the mound. The defenders on the walls let down ropes, got hold of the head of the approaching engine, and pulled it by main force out of the right line; or they let down heavy wooden beams with great violence directly upon the engine, breaking off its projecting beak. However rude these defensive processes may seem, they were found effective against the besiegers, who saw themselves, at the close of three months' unavailing efforts, obliged to renounce the idea of taking the town in any other way than by the process of blockade and famine¹.

Before they would incur so much inconvenience, however, they had recourse to one farther stratagem—that of trying to set the town on fire. From the height of their mound, they threw down large quantities of fagots: pitch and other combustibles were next added, and the whole mass set on fire. The conflagration was tremendous; nothing could have preserved the town, had the wind been rather more favourable. In spite of much partial damage, the town remained still defensible.

There now remained no other resource except to build a wall of circumvallation round Plataea, and trust to the slow process of famine. The task was distributed in suitable fractions among the various confederate cities, and completed about the middle of September. Two distinct walls were constructed, with sixteen feet of intermediate space all covered in, so as to look like one very thick wall. There were, moreover, two ditches, out of which the bricks for the wall had been taken—one on the inside towards Plataea, and the other on the outside against any foreign relieving force. The interior covered space between the walls was intended to serve as permanent quarters for the troops left on guard, consisting half of Bœotians and half of Peloponnesians.

At the same time that Archidamus began the siege of Plataea, the Athenians on their side despatched a force of 2,000 hoplites and 200 horsemen to the Chalkidic peninsula, under Xenophon, the same who had granted the capitulation of Potidæa. He first invaded the territory belonging to the Bottiæan town of Spartolus, not without hopes that the city itself would be betrayed to him by intelligences within. But this was prevented by the arrival of an additional force from Olynthus, partly hoplites, partly peltasts. Such peltasts, a species of troops between heavy-armed and light-armed, furnished with a pelta (or light shield) and short spear or javelin, appear to have taken their rise among these Chalkidic Greeks, being equipped in a manner half Greek and half Thracian: they were hereafter much improved and turned to account by some of the ablest Grecian generals. In the action which now took place under the walls of Spartolus, the Athenian hoplites defeated those of the enemy, but their cavalry and their light troops were completely worsted by the Chalkidic. These latter, still farther strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ventured even to attack the Athenian hoplites, who thought it prudent to fall back upon the two companies left in re-

¹ The minuteness with which Thukydides details these siege operations may be explained by the fact that such attempts to storm towns were at this time a novelty in Greek warfare. Grundy (*Journ. of Hellen. Stud.*, xviii., 1898, p. 222) ascribes this innovation to Archidamus, who had already tried his hand at Enœ (cf. note to p. 389). The successful defence was no doubt due to the Athenian engineers, whose experience of siege-works was comparatively wide (cf. Herodot.,

ix. 70; Thuk., i. 102; v. 75). But no really important development of siege tactics can be assigned to this period. The siege of Tyre by Alexander the Great (332 B.C.) and of Rhodes by Demetrius Poliorkētēs (305-304 B.C.) alone in recorded Greek history are remarkable for real siegecraft.

There is no need to treat the siege description as a product of Thukydidean fancy (Müller-Strübing in the *Jahrb. für klass. Philologie*, 131, pp. 289-348). —Ed.

serve to guard the baggage. During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidic horse and light-armed, who retired when the Athenians turned upon them, but attacked them on all sides when on their march, and employed missiles so effectively that the retreating hoplites could no longer maintain a steady order, but took to flight and sought refuge at Potidæa. Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force, together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, while the expedition returned in dishonour to Athens.

In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies were more successful. The Ambrakiots, exasperated by their repulse from the Amphilocheian Argos, during the preceding year, had been induced to conceive new and larger plans of aggression against both the Akarnanians and Athenians. In concert with their mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of Akarnania, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the Akarnanians from concentrating their forces in any one point.

The scheme of operations now projected was far more comprehensive than anything which the war had yet afforded. The land-force of the Ambrakiots, together with their neighbours and fellow-colonists the Leukadians and Anaktorians, assembled near their own city, while their maritime force was collected at Leukas, on the Akarnanian coast. The force at Ambrakia was joined, not only by Knêmus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, with 1,000 Peloponnesian hoplites, who found means to cross over from Peloponnesus, eluding the vigilance of Phormio—but also by a numerous body of Epirotic and Macedonian auxiliaries, collected even from the distant and northernmost tribes. Even king Perdikkas, though then nominally in alliance with Athens, sent 1,000 of his Macedonian subjects, who, however, arrived too late to be of any use.

It had been concerted that the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth should join that already assembled at Leukas, and act upon the coast of Akarnania at the same time that the land-force marched into that territory. But Knêmus, finding the land-force united and ready near Ambrakia, deemed it unnecessary to await the fleet from Corinth, and marched straight into Akarnania. He directed his march upon Stratus—an interior town, the chief place in Akarnania—the capture of which would be likely to carry with it the surrender of the rest, especially as the Akarnanians, distracted by the presence of the ships at Leukas, and alarmed by the large body of invaders on their frontier, did not dare to leave their own separate homes, so that Stratus was left altogether to its own citizens. Nor was Phormio, though they sent an urgent message to him, in any condition to help them, since he could not leave Naupaktus unguarded, when the large fleet from Corinth was known to be approaching. Under such circumstances, Knêmus and his army indulged confident hopes of overpowering Stratus without difficulty. They marched in three divisions: the Epirots in the centre—the Leukadians and Anaktorians on the right—the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots on the left. So little expectation was entertained of resistance, that these three divisions took no pains to keep near, or even in sight of each other. Both the Greek divisions, indeed, maintained a good order of march, and kept proper scouts on the look out; but the Epirots advanced without any care or order, and when

they approached near to Stratus, they would not halt to encamp and assail the place conjointly with the Greeks, but marched right forward to the town, intending to attack it single-handed. The Stratians watched and profited by this imprudence. Planting ambuscades in convenient places, and suffering the Epirots to approach without suspicion near to the gates, they then suddenly sallied out and attacked them, while the troops in ambuscade rose up and assailed them at the same time. The Chaonians who formed the van, thus completely surprised, were routed with great slaughter, while the other Epirots fled, after but little resistance. Knêmus did not choose to persist in his attack under such discouraging circumstances. His troops dispersed, and returned to their respective homes.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth had found difficulties in its passage alike unexpected and insuperable. Mustering forty-seven triremes of Corinth, Sikyon, and other places, with a body of soldiers on board and with accompanying store-vessels, it made its way along the northern coast of Achaia. Its commanders, not intending to meddle with Phormio and his twenty ships at Naupaktus, never imagined that he would venture to attack a number so greatly superior. The triremes were accordingly fitted out more as transports for numerous soldiers than with any view to naval combat, and with little attention to the choice of skilful rowers.

Except in the combat near Korkyra, and there only partially, the Peloponnesians had never yet made actual trial of Athenian maritime efficiency, at the point of excellence which it had now reached. Themselves retaining the old unimproved mode of fighting and of working ships at sea, they had no practical idea of the degree to which it had been superseded by Athenian training. Among the Athenians, on the contrary, not only the seamen generally had a confirmed feeling of their own superiority, but Phormio especially, the ablest of all their captains, always familiarized his men with the conviction, that no Peloponnesian fleet, be its number ever so great, could possibly contend against them with success¹. Accordingly the Corinthian admirals were surprised to observe that Phormio with his small Athenian squadron, instead of keeping safe in Naupaktus, was moving in parallel line with them and watching their progress until they should get out of the Corinthian Gulf into the more open sea. Having advanced along the northern coast of Peloponnesus as far as Patræ in Achaia, they then altered their course, and bore to the north-west in order to cross over towards the Ætolian coast, in their way to Akarnania. In doing this, however, they perceived that Phormio was bearing down upon them from Chalkis and the mouth of the river Euenus, and they now discovered for the first time that he was going to attack them. Disconcerted by the incident, and not inclined for a naval combat in the wide and open sea, they altered their plan of passage, returned to the coast of Peloponnesus, and brought to for the night at some point near to Rhium, the narrowest breadth of the strait. Their bringing to was a mere feint intended to deceive Phormio and induce him

¹ Thukyd. ii. 88. This passage is not only remarkable as it conveys the striking persuasion entertained by the Athenians of their own naval superiority, but also as it discloses the frank and intimate communication between the Athenian

captain and his seamen—so strongly pervading and determining the feelings of the latter. Compare what is told respecting the Syracusan Hermokrates, Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 1, 30.

to go back for the night to his own coast, for during the course of the night, they left their station, and tried to get across the breadth of the Gulf, where it was near the strait and comparatively narrow, before Phormio could come down upon them. But he watched their movements closely, kept the sea all night, and was thus enabled to attack them in mid-channel, even during the shorter passage near the strait, at the first dawn of morning. On seeing his approach, the Corinthian admirals ranged their triremes in a circle with the prows outward—like the spokes of a wheel. The circle was made as large as it could be without leaving opportunity to the Athenian assailing ships to practise the manœuvre of the *diekplus*¹.

In this position they were found and attacked shortly after daybreak by Phormio, who bore down upon them with his ships in single file, all admirable sailers, and his own ship leading; all being strictly forbidden to attack until he should give the signal. He rowed swiftly round the Peloponnesian circle, nearing the prows of their ships as closely as he could, and making constant semblance of being about to come to blows. Partly from the intimidating effect of this manœuvre, altogether novel to the Peloponnesians—partly from the natural difficulty, well-known to Phormio, of keeping every ship in its exact stationary position—the order of the circle, both within and without, presently became disturbed. It was not long before a new ally came to his aid, on which he calculated, postponing his actual attack until this favourable incident occurred. The strong land-breeze out of the Gulf of Corinth, always wont to begin shortly after daybreak, came down upon the Peloponnesian fleet with its usual vehemence, at a moment when the steadiness of their order was already somewhat giving way, and forced their ships more than ever out of proper relation one to the other. The triremes began to run foul of each other. Moreover, the fresh breeze had occasioned such a swell, that these rowers, unskilful under all circumstances, could not get their oars clear of the water, and the pilots thus lost command over their vessels². The critical moment was now come, and Phormio gave the

¹ Thukyd., ii. 86, *μη δίδοντες διέκπλουν*. The great object of the fast-sailing Athenian trireme was to drive its beak against some weak part of the adversary's ship, the stern, the side, or the oars—not against the beak, which was strongly constructed as well for defence as for offence. The Athenian therefore, rowing through the intervals of the adversary's line, and thus getting in their rear, turned rapidly, and got the opportunity, before the ship of the adversary could change its position, of striking it either in the stern or some weak part. Such a manœuvre was called the *diekplus*. The success of it of course depended upon the extreme rapidity and precision of the movements of the Athenian vessel, so superior in this respect to its adversary, not only in the better construction of the ship, but the excellence of rowers and steersmen.

[The manœuvre of the *diekplus* is strangely like that of 'breaking the line', which in the eighteenth century was considered the most effective operation in a sea-battle. This operation consisted in sailing up under the enemy's lee in line-ahead formation, passing to windward through a gap in the enemy's line, and then using the wind to concentrate on a portion of the hostile fleet. Thus Rodney effected a double *diekplus* at Dominica (Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, p. 485 ff.); other striking instances are afforded by St. Vincent and Collingwood's operations at Trafalgar. Herodotus mentions the use of this manœuvre at Lade (vi. 15) and Artemisium

(viii. 9): it was far more probably a later Athenian invention.—Ed.]

² The trireme had, in all, 170 rowers, distributed into three tiers. The upper tier, called *Thranitæ*, were sixty-two in number, or thirty-one on each side: the middle tier, or *Zugitæ*, as well as the lowest tier, or *Thalamitæ*, were each fifty-four in number, or twenty-seven on each side. Besides these, there were belonging to each trireme a certain number, seemingly about thirty, of supplementary oars (*κώπαι περινώες*), to be used by the epibata, or soldiers serving on board, in case of rowers being killed, or oars broken. Of course the oars of the *thranitæ*, or uppermost tier, were the longest: those of the *thalamitæ*, or lowest tier, the shortest: those of the *zugitæ*, of a length between the two. Each oar was rowed only by one man. The *thranitæ*, as having the longest oars, were most hardly worked and most highly paid.

What is here stated, appears to be pretty well ascertained, chiefly from the inscriptions discovered at Athens a few years ago, so full of information respecting the Athenian marine—and from the instructive commentary appended to these inscriptions by M. Boeckh, *Seawesen der Athener*, ch. ix., p. 94, 104, 115. But there is a great deal still respecting the equipment of an ancient trireme unascertained and disputed.

[A new hypothesis would place the *thranitæ* in the stern, the *zugitæ* in the middle, and the *thalamitæ* in the bows of the ship (W. W. Tarn, *Journ. of Hellen. Stud.*, xxv., 1905, pp. 137-157, 204-224).

signal for attack. He first drove against and disabled one of the admiral's ships—his comrades next assailed others with equal success—so that the Peloponnesians, confounded and terrified, attempted hardly any resistance, but broke their order and sought safety in flight. They fled partly to Patræ, partly to Dymê, in Achaia, pursued by the Athenians, who with scarcely the loss of a man, captured twelve triremes—carried away almost the entire crews—and returned to Naupaktus; while the Peloponnesian ships sailed along the shore from Patræ to Kyllênê, the principal port in the territory of Elis. They were here soon afterwards joined by Knêmus, who passed over with his squadron from Leukas.

These two incidents afford ground for some interesting remarks. The first of the two displays the great inferiority of the Epirots to the Greeks—and even to the less advanced portion of the Greeks—in the qualities of order, discipline, steadiness, and power of coöperation for a joint purpose. If, on land, we thus discover the inherent superiority of Greeks over Epirots involuntarily breaking out—so in the sea-fight we are no less impressed with the astonishing superiority of the Athenians over their opponents, a superiority, indeed, no way inherent, such as that of Greeks over Epirots, but depending in this case on previous toil, training, and inventive talent, on the one side, compared with neglect and old-fashioned routine on the other. Nowhere does the extraordinary value of that seamanship, which the Athenians had been gaining by years of improved practice, stand so clearly marked as in these first battles of Phormio. It gradually becomes less conspicuous as we advance in the war, since the Peloponnesians improve, learning seamanship as the Russians under Peter the Great learnt the art of war from the Swedes under Charles XII.

To none did the circumstances of this memorable sea-fight seem so incomprehensible as to the Lacedæmonians. They had heard indeed of the seamanship of Athens, but had never felt it, and could not understand what it meant; so that they imputed the defeat to nothing but disgraceful cowardice, and sent indignant orders to Knêmus at Kyllênê, to take the command, equip a larger and better fleet, and repair the dishonour. Three Spartan commissioners—Brasidas, Timokratês, and Lykophon—were sent down to assist him with their advice and exertions in calling together naval contingents from the different allied cities. By this means a large fleet of seventy-seven triremes was speedily mustered at Panormus—a harbour of Achaia near to the promontory of Rhium and immediately within the interior gulf.

Such preparations did not escape the vigilance of Phormio, who transmitted to Athens news of his victory, at the same time urgently soliciting reinforcements to contend with the increasing strength of the enemy.

This would hardly explain why the *θραυταί* were considered to have such a specially hard task. On the other hand, if they sat in the upper tier, they would have the longest oars and the greatest difficulty in clearing the blades. Perhaps the designations were changed by the time of Polybius and Mr. Tarn's other authorities.—Ed.]

There was nothing but the voice of the *keleustês* to keep these 170 rowers all in good time with their strokes. With oars of different length, and so many rowers, this must have been no easy matter; and apparently quite impossible, unless the rowers were trained to act together. The difference between those who were so trained and

those who were not, must have been immense (Compare Xenophon, (*Economic*., viii. 8.)

About 200 men, that is to say, 170 rowers and thirty supernumeraries, mostly epibatæ or hoplites serving on board, besides the pilot, the man at the ship's bow, the *keleustês*, etc., probably some half-dozen officers—formed the crew of a trireme: compare Herodot., viii. 17; vii. 184—where he calculates the thirty epibatæ over and above the 200.

The Venetian galleys in the thirteenth century were manned by about the same number of men.

The Athenians immediately sent twenty fresh ships to join him. Yet they were induced by the instances of a Kretan named Nikias, their proxenus at Gortyn, to allow him to take the ships first to Krete, on the faith of his promise to reduce the hostile town of Kydonia. This ill-advised diversion of the fleet from its straight course to join Phormio is a proof how much the counsels of Athens were beginning to suffer from the loss of Periklēs, who was just now in his last illness and died shortly afterwards. That liability to be seduced by novel enterprises and projects of acquisition, against which he so emphatically warned his countrymen, was even now beginning to manifest its disastrous consequences.

Through the loss of this precious interval, Phormio found himself, with no more than his original twenty triremes, opposed to seventy-seven triremes with a large force on land to back them, the latter no mean help in ancient warfare. He took up his station near the Cape Antirrhium, or the Molykric Rhium as it was called—the northern headland, opposite to the other headland also called Rhium, on the coast of Achaia. The line between these two capes, seemingly about an English mile in breadth, forms the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf. The Messenian force from Naupaktus attended him, and served on land. But he kept on the outside of the Gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian manœuvring, while his adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Achaic cape, from the corresponding reason. If we revert back to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of space was at that time accounted the best of all protection for a smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change of feeling, occasioned by the system of manœuvring introduced since that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea-room is now not less coveted by Phormio than dreaded by his enemies.

For six or seven days successively, the two fleets were drawn out against each other, Phormio trying to entice the Peloponnesians to the outside of the Gulf, while they on their side did what they could to bring him within it. To him, every day's postponement was gain, since it gave him a new chance of his reinforcements arriving: for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for forcing it on. But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such was the discouragement and reluctance prevailing among their seamen, that Knêmus and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations. Phormio reminded his men of their long practice and rational conviction of superiority at sea, such as no augmentation of numbers, especially with an enemy conscious of his own weakness, could overbalance. He called upon them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehension of orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect silence during the actual battle. The idea of entire silence on board the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was going on, is not only striking as a feature in the picture, but is also one of the most powerful evidences of the force of self-control and military habits among these citizen-seamen.

Knêmus and Brasidas now resolved to make a forward movement up the Gulf, as if against Naupaktus, which was the main Athenian station. Knowing that Phormio would be under the necessity of coming to the defence of the place, they hoped to pin him up and force him to action close

under the land, where Athenian manœuvring would be unavailing. Accordingly they commenced this movement early in the morning, sailing in line of four abreast towards the northern coast of the Inner Gulf. The right squadron was in the van, and care had been taken to place in it twenty of the best-sailing ships, since the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend upon their celerity. As they had foreseen, Phormio, the moment he saw their movement, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance. He ranged his ships in line of battle ahead, probably his own the leading ship, and sailed close along the land towards Naupaktus, while the Messenians marching ashore kept near to him.

Both fleets were thus moving in the same direction, and towards the same point—the Athenian close along shore—the Peloponnesians somewhat farther off¹. The latter had now got Phormio into the position which they wished, pinned up against the land, with no room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the whole Peloponnesian fleet, facing to the left, changed from column into line, and instead of continuing to move along the coast, rowed rapidly with their prows shoreward to come to close quarters with the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians, occupying the side towards Naupaktus, was especially charged with the duty of cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither, the best ships having been placed on the right for that important object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action completely succeeded: the Athenians were caught in a situation where resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in flight. But so superior were they in rapid movement even to the best Peloponnesians, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the twenty, just found means to run by, before the right wing of the enemy closed in upon the shore, and made the best of their way to Naupaktus. The remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore with serious damage—their crews being partly slain, partly escaping by swimming. But more than one of them was rescued by the bravery of the Messenian hoplites, who, in spite of their heavy panoply, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the decks and driving off the enemy even after the rope had been actually made fast, and the process of towing off had begun².

The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured. While their left and centre were thus occupied, the twenty ships of their right wing parted company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven fugitive Athenian ships which they had failed in cutting off. Ten of these got clear away into the harbour of Naupaktus, and there posted themselves in an attitude of defence, while the eleventh, somewhat less swift, was neared by the Lacedæmonian admiral, who, on board a Leukadian trireme, pushed greatly ahead of his comrades, in hopes of overtaking her. The Athenian captain, pulling swiftly round a trader-vessel, directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Leukadian, and drove his beak against her, amidships, with an impact so violent as to disable her at once. The pur-

¹ The movement which Grote here describes and discusses in a special appendix is just what the situation requires. The reading in Thuk., ii. 90, ἐπὶ τῇ εὐναιῶν γῇ, will not bear rendering into any satisfactory sense. The best emendation would seem to be *παρά* for *ἐν* (there being two

other *ἐν* quite close): thus the Peloponnesians would be coasting N.E. from Panormus to Cape Drepanum. Cf. Jowett, *Thucydides*, vol. ii, p. 138.—Ed.

² Compare the like bravery on the part of the Lacedæmonian hoplites at Pylus (Thukyd., iv. 14).

suing vessels coming up behind were so astounded and dismayed that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance, while some even found themselves half aground, from ignorance of the coast. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes in the harbour were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word from Phormio sufficed to put them in active forward motion, and to make them strenuously attack the embarrassed enemy. First, the Athenians broke the twenty pursuing ships on the right wing, next they pursued their advantage against the left and centre, who had probably neared to the right, so that after a short resistance, the whole were completely routed, and fled across the Gulf to their original station at Panormus¹. Not only did the eleven Athenian ships thus break, terrify, and drive away the entire fleet of the enemy, with the capture of six of the nearest Peloponnesian triremes, but they also rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and taken in the early part of the action. Moreover, the Peloponnesian crews sustained a considerable loss, both in killed and in prisoners.

Thus, in spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at first, Phormio ended by gaining a complete victory. The enemy were so completely discomfited—and farther so much in fear of the expected reinforcement from Athens—that they took advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the Gulf to Corinth, all except the Leukadians, who returned to their own home².

Presently the reinforcement arrived, after that untoward detention which had well nigh exposed Phormio and his whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of the Gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the autumn an expedition, landing at Astakus, and marching into the Akarnanian inland country with 400 Athenian hoplites and 400 Messenians.

After abandoning the naval contest at Rhium, and retiring to Corinth, Knêmus and Brasidas were prevailed upon by the Megarians, before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden inroad upon Peiræus. Such was the confessed superiority of the Athenians at sea, that while they guarded amply the coasts of Attica against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of an attack upon their own main harbour. Accordingly, Peiræus was not only unprotected by any chain across the entrance, but destitute even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The seamen of the retiring Peloponnesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next to Megara—each man carrying his seat-cloth, and his oar, together with the loop whereby the oar was fastened to the oar-hole in the side and thus prevented from slipping.

There lay forty triremes in Nisæa the harbour of Megara, which, though

¹ Thukyd., ii. 92. It is sufficiently evident that the Athenians defeated and drove off not only the twenty Peloponnesian ships of the right or pursuing wing—but also the left and centre. Otherwise they would not have been able to recapture those Athenian ships which had been lost at the beginning of the battle.

² This Athenian victory is attested by a bronze plate dedicated at Dodona, with the inscription, Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ Πελοποννησίων ναυμαχίᾳ νικήσαντες ἀνέθεσαν (Röhl, *Inscr. Gr. Ant.*, 5; Hicks and Hill, 57).—Ed.

old and out of condition, were sufficient for so short a trip; and the seamen, immediately on arriving, launched these and got aboard. Yet such was the awe entertained of Athens and her power, that when the scheme came really to be executed, the courage of the Peloponnesians failed, though there was nothing to hinder them from actually reaching Peiræus. Pretending that the wind was adverse, they contented themselves with passing across to the station of Budorum, in the opposite Athenian island of Salamis, where they surprised and seized the three guard-ships which habitually blockaded the harbour of Megara, and then landed upon the island. They spread themselves over a large part of Salamis, ravaged the properties, and seized men as well as goods. Fire-signals immediately made known this unforeseen aggression both at Peiræus and at Athens, occasioning in both the extreme of astonishment and alarm; for the citizens in Athens, not conceiving distinctly the meaning of the signals, fancied that Peiræus itself had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The whole population rushed down to the Peiræus at break of day, and put to sea with all the triremes that were ready. But the Peloponnesians, aware of the danger which menaced them, made haste to quit Salamis with their booty and the three captured guard-ships. The lesson was salutary to the Athenians: from henceforward Peiræus was furnished with a chain across the mouth, and a regular guard, down to the end of the war. Forty years afterwards, however, we shall find it just as negligently watched, and surprised with much more boldness and dexterity by the Lacedæmonian captain Teleutias¹.

As, during the summer of this year, the Ambrakiots had brought down a numerous host of Epirotic tribes to the invasion of Akarnania, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians—so during the autumn the Athenians obtained aid against the Chalkidians of Thrace from the powerful barbaric prince before mentioned, Sitalkês king of the Odrysian Thracians.

Amidst the numerous tribes, between the Danube and the Ægean sea—who all bore the generic name of Thracians, though each had a special name besides—the Odrysians were at this time the most warlike and powerful. The Odrysian king Têrês, father of Sitalkês, had made use of this power to subdue and render tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those whose residence was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His dominion, the largest existing between the Ionian sea and the Euxine, extended from Abdêra or the mouth of the Nestus in the Ægean sea, to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine; though it seems that this must be understood with deductions, since many intervening tribes, especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority. Sitalkês himself had invaded and conquered some of the Pæonian tribes who joined the Thracians on the west, between the Axius and the Strymon. Dominion, in the sense of the Odrysian king, meant tribute, presents, and military force when required. With the two former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since his nephew and successor Seuthes (under whom the revenue increased and attained its maximum) received 400 talents annually in gold and silver as tribute, and the like sum in various presents, over and above many other presents of manufactured articles and ornaments. These latter came from the Grecian colonies on the coast, which contributed, moreover, largely to the tribute,

¹ Xenophon, *Hellen.*, v. i, 19.

though in what proportions we are not informed¹. Even Grecian cities, not in Thrace, sent presents to forward their trading objects, as purchasers for the produce, the plunder, and the slaves, acquired by Thracian chiefs or tribes².

The natural state of the Thracian tribes was that of disunion and incapacity of political association. The Odrysian dominion had probably not reached, at the period when Herodotus made his inquiries, the same development which Thukydides describes in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, and which imparted to these tribes a union, partial indeed, and temporary, but such as they never reached either before or afterwards.

Perdikkas king of Macedonia had offended Sitalkês by refusing to perform a promise made of giving him his sister in marriage—a promise made as consideration for the interference of Sitalkês and Nymphodorus in procuring for Perdikkas peace with Athens, at a moment when he was much embarrassed by civil dissensions with his brother Philip. The latter prince, ruling in his own name (and seemingly independent of Perdikkas) over a portion of the Macedonians along the upper course of the Axios, had been expelled by his more powerful brother, and taken refuge with Sitalkês. He was now apparently dead, but his son Amyntas received from the Odrysian prince the promise of restoration.

But the forces of Sitalkês, collected from many different portions of Thrace, were tardy in coming together. Altogether his army amounted, or was supposed to amount, to 150,000 men—one-third of it cavalry, who were for the most part Getæ and Odrysians proper³. The whole host spread terror amidst all those who were within even the remote possibilities of its march⁴.

The Macedonians under Perdikkas, renouncing all idea of contending on foot against so overwhelming a host, either fled or shut themselves up in the small number of fortified places which the country presented.

Luckily for the enemies of the Odrysian king, his march was not made until the beginning of winter—seemingly about November or December. We may be sure that the Athenians, when they concerted with him the joint attack upon the Chalkidians, intended that it should be in a better time of the year. Having probably waited to hear that his army was in motion, and waited long in vain, they began to despair of his coming at all, and thought it not worth while to despatch any force of their own to the spot. Some envoys and presents only were sent as compliments, instead of the coöperating armament. And this disappointment, coupled with the severity of the weather, the nakedness of the country, and the privations of his army at that season, induced Sitalkês soon to enter into negotiations with Perdikkas, who, moreover, gained over Seuthes, nephew of the Odrysian prince, by promising his sister Stratonikê in marriage, together with a sum of money, on condition that the Thracian host should

¹ The disappearance of some Thracian towns from the tribute-lists in 440-435, and the large reductions in the assessment of others, may imply that Athens allowed some of her dependencies to pass under the control of Sitalkês, or at least to send him subsidies. (Cf. E. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, vol. iv., ch. ii.)—Ed.

² See Xenophon, *Anab.*, vii. 3, 16; 4, 2.

³ Thukydides, in his brief statements respecting this march of Sitalkês, speaks like one who had

good information about the inland region, as he was likely to have from his familiarity with the coasts, and resident proprietorship in Thrace (Thukyd., il. 100; Herodot., v. 16).

⁴ From the fact that Herodotus (iv. 80) mentions Sitalkês without breathing a word about the celebrated campaign of 429, we may infer that by this time he had left European Greece, or was no longer alive.—Ed.

be speedily withdrawn. This was accordingly done, after it had been distributed for thirty days over Macedonia, during eight of which days his detachment had ravaged the Chalkidic lands.

APPENDIX

As regards the plan of campaign adopted by Periklēs in the opening years of the war, Grote agrees with Thukydidēs that it was statesmanlike and, from the military point of view, the best possible. The following considerations may perhaps be held sufficient to modify this opinion:

His policy was threefold: (1) to treat Athens as an island and abandon Attica, (2) to maintain at all costs the command of the sea, and (3) to limit reprisals to descents on the Peloponnesian coasts. Such a policy can be based on two grounds only—that there is a prospect of exhausting the enemy, and that the defensive power is, by comparison, inexhaustible. Now, firstly, to treat Athens as an island was to overlook the essential fact that Athens had also a land empire and her citizens landed property. As a result, the fighting citizens (mainly Zeugites) lost their farms, and had to be supported by the state, while large landed proprietors were progressively less able to bear taxes; finally, the effect of the overcrowding in Athens and the sight of the enemy working their will on the surrounding land had a most pernicious effect on the general morale. Again, it was unsafe to regard the empire as impregnable in its loyalty. The recent example of Samos, coupled with the rebellion of Potidæa and the Thraceward cities, should have been enough to prevent this mistake, which the revolt of Lesbos so soon accentuated; the victories of Brasidas showed that the command of the sea was not everything. Finally, we know that financially Athens was hard pressed as early as 428. The reserve had gone; a special war-tax of 200 talents was imposed; the allies were irritated by squadrons sent to collect new resources; in 425 the tribute was doubled.

On the other side, the enemy could not be financially ruined—they had no resources at the outset; they cannot have lost at all heavily in their annual marches into Attica; and most surprising of all is the attempt to damage the Spartan confederacy by isolated descents on the Peloponnesian shores. Thus it would appear that in every fundamental point the strategy of Periklēs was open to criticism. To reply that the plague was the real cause of failure is only to emphasize the fact that Periklēs wholly failed to realize the extreme perils he ran in allowing the city to be overcrowded. The history of the war shows that the main object should rather have been to take immediate action in two ways—(1) by striking at the Peloponnesians effectively, say in their north-western possessions, and (2) by anticipating the later policy of Kleon and Alkibiadēs in supporting the democratic factions in such places as Megara, and thus sowing disunion. For a league based partly on force, partly on mutual interest, the policy of masterly inactivity and trivial reprisals was short-sighted and dangerous.—ED.

CHAPTER XX [L]

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMOTIONS AT KORKYRA

DURING the fourth year of the war the Peloponnesians, under Archidamus, again repeated their invasion and ravage of Attica, which had been intermitted during the year preceding. As before, they met with no serious resistance. Entering the country about the beginning of May, they continued the process of devastation until their provisions were exhausted. To this damage the Athenians had probably now accustomed themselves: but they speedily received, even while the in-

vaders were in their country, intelligence of an event far more embarrassing and formidable—the revolt of Mitylênê and of the greater part of Lesbos.

This revolt, indeed, did not come even upon the Athenians wholly unawares. Yet the idea of it was of longer standing than they suspected, for the Mitylenæan oligarchy had projected it before the war and had made secret application to Sparta for aid, but without success. Some time after hostilities broke out, they resumed the design, which was warmly promoted by the Bœotians, kinsmen of the Lesbians in Æolic lineage and dialect. The Mitylenæan leaders appear to have finally determined on revolt during the preceding autumn or winter. But they thought it prudent to make ample preparations before they declared themselves openly; and moreover they took measures for constraining three other towns in Lesbos—Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha—to share their fortunes, to merge their own separate governments, and to become incorporated with Mitylênê. Methymna, the second town in Lesbos, situated on the north of the island, was decidedly opposed to them and attached to Athens.

Though the oligarchical character of their government gave them much means of secrecy, still, measures of such importance could not be taken without provoking attention. Intimation was sent to the Athenians by various Mitylenæan citizens. Not less communicative were the islanders of Tenedos, animated by ancient neighbourly jealousy towards Mitylênê.

This news seems to have become certain about February or March, 428 B.C. But such was then the dispirited condition of the Athenians—arising from two years' suffering under the epidemic, and no longer counteracted by the wholesome remonstrances of Periklês—that they could not at first bring themselves to believe what they were so much afraid to find true. Lesbos, like Chios, was their ally upon an equal footing, still remaining under those conditions which had been at first common to all the members of the confederacy of Delos. Mitylênê paid no tribute to Athens: it retained its walls, its large naval force, and its extensive landed possessions on the opposite Asiatic continent: its government was oligarchical, administering all internal affairs without reference to Athens. The city was thus in practice all but independent, and so extremely powerful, that the Athenians, fearful of coping with it in their actual state of depression, were loath to believe the alarming intelligence which reached them. They sent envoys with a friendly message to persuade the Mitylenæans to suspend their proceedings, and it was only when these envoys returned without success, that they saw the necessity of stronger measures. Ten Mitylenæan triremes, serving as contingent in the Athenian fleet, were seized, and their crews placed under guard; while Kleïppidês, then on the point of starting (along with two colleagues) to conduct a fleet of forty triremes round Peloponnesus, was directed to alter his destination and to proceed forthwith to Mitylênê. It was expected that he would reach that town about the time of the approaching festival of Apollo Maloeis, celebrated in its neighbourhood—on which occasion the whole Mitylenæan population was in the habit of going forth to the temple: so that the town, while thus deserted, might easily be surprised and seized by the fleet. In case this calculation should be disappointed, Kleïppidês was instructed to require that the Mity-

lenæans should surrender their ships of war and raze their fortifications, and in the event of refusal to attack them immediately.

But the publicity of debate at Athens was far too great to allow such a scheme to succeed. The Mitylenæans had their spies in the city, and the moment the resolution was taken, one of them set off to communicate it at Mitylênê, so that when Kleïppidês arrived shortly afterwards, he found the festival adjourned and the government prepared for him. The requisition which he sent in was refused, and the Mitylenæan fleet even came forth from the harbour to assail him, but was beaten back with little difficulty. Upon this, the Mitylenæan leaders, finding themselves attacked before their preparations were completed, and desiring still to gain time, opened negotiations with Kleïppidês, and prevailed on him to suspend hostilities until ambassadors could be sent to Athens. This appears to have been about the middle of May, soon after the Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica.

Kleïppidês was induced, not very prudently, to admit this proposition, under the impression that his armament was not sufficient to cope with a city and island so powerful. He remained moored off the harbour at the north of Mitylênê until the envoys should return from Athens. Meanwhile the Mitylenæan government, unknown to Kleïppidês, and well aware that the embassy would prove fruitless, took advantage of the truce to send secret envoys to Sparta imploring immediate aid.

During the absence of the Mitylenæan envoys at Athens, reinforcements reached the Athenian admiral from Lemnos, Imbros, and some other allies, as well as from the Lesbian town of Methymna : so that when the envoys returned, as they presently did with an unfavourable reply, war was resumed with increased vigour. The Mitylenæans, having made a general sally with their full military force, gained some advantage in the battle : yet not feeling bold enough to maintain the field, they retreated back behind their walls. The news of their revolt, when first spread abroad, had created an impression unfavourable to the stability of the Athenian empire. But when it was seen that their conduct was irresolute and their achievements disproportionate to their supposed power, a reaction of feeling took place. Kleïppidês soon found his armament large enough to establish two separate camps. But he commanded little beyond the area of his camp, and was unable to invest the city by land, especially as the Mitylenæans had received reinforcements from Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, the other towns of Lesbos which acted with them. In this undecided condition, the island continued, until (somewhere about the month of August B.C. 428) the Athenians sent Pachês to take the command, with a reinforcement of 1,000 hoplites, who rowed themselves thither in triremes. The Athenians were now in force enough not only to keep the Mitylenæans within their walls, but also to surround the city with a single wall of circumvallation, strengthened by separate forts in suitable positions.

Meanwhile the Mitylenæan envoys, after a troublesome voyage, had reached Sparta a little before the Olympic festival, about the middle of June. The Spartans directed them to come to Olympia at the festival, where all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy would naturally be present, and there to set forth their requests, after the festival was concluded, in presence of all.

Thukydîdês has given us, at some length, his version of the speech wherein this was done—a speech not a little remarkable. Pronounced, as it was, by men who had just revolted from Athens, having the strongest interest to raise indignation against her as well as sympathy for themselves—and before an audience exclusively composed of the enemies of Athens, all willing to hear, and none present to refute, the bitterest calumnies against her—we should have expected a confident sense of righteous and well-grounded, though perilous effort, on the part of the Mitylenæans, and a plausible collection of wrongs and oppressions alleged against the common enemy. Instead of which the speech is apologetic and embarrassed. The speaker not only does not allege any extortion or severe dealing from Athens towards the Mitylenæans, but even admits the fact that they had been treated by her with marked honour; and that too, throughout a long period of peace, during which she stood less in awe of her allies generally, and would have had much more facility in realizing any harsh purposes towards them, than she could possibly enjoy now that the war had broken out, when their discontents would be likely to find powerful protectors. According to his own showing, the Mitylenæans, while they had been perfectly well treated by Athens during the past, had now acquired, by the mere fact of war, increased security for continuance of the like treatment during the future. It is upon the necessity of acquiring security for the future, nevertheless, that he rests the justification of the revolt, not pretending to have any subject of positive complaint. The Mitylenæans (he contends) could have no prospective security against Athens: for she had successively and systematically brought into slavery all her allies, except Lesbos and Chios, though all had originally been upon an equal footing: and there was every reason for fearing that she would take the first convenient opportunity of reducing the two last remaining to the same level—the rather as their position was now one of privilege and exception, offensive to her imperial pride and exaggerated ascendancy.

The reasons given for the revolt are mainly two. 1. The Mitylenæans had no security that Athens would not degrade them into the condition of subject-allies like the rest. 2. They did not choose to second the ambition of Athens, and to become parties to a war for the sake of maintaining an empire essentially offensive to Grecian political instincts.

In both these two reasons there is force; and both touch the sore point of the Athenian empire. That empire undoubtedly contradicted one of the fundamental instincts of the Greek mind—the right of every separate town to administer its own political affairs apart from external control. The Peloponnesian alliance recognised this autonomy in theory, by the general synod and equal voting of all the members at Sparta, on important occasions; though it was quite true (as Periklês urged at Athens) that in practice nothing more was enjoyed than an autonomy confined by Spartan leading-strings—and though Sparta held in permanent custody hostages¹ for the fidelity of her Arcadian allies, summoning their military contingents without acquainting them whither they were destined to march. But Athens proclaimed herself a despot, effacing the autonomy of her allies not less in theory than in practice. Far from being disposed to cultivate in them any sense of a real common interest with herself, she

¹ Thukyd., v. 54 61.

did not even cheat them with those forms and fictions which so often appease discontent in the absence of realities. The Mitylenæans might certainly affirm that they had no security against being one day reduced to the common condition of subject-allies like the rest. Yet an Athenian speaker, had he been here present, might have made no mean reply to this portion of their reasoning. He would have urged, that had Athens felt any dispositions towards such a scheme, she would have taken advantage of the Fourteen years' truce to execute it; and he would have shown that the degradation of the allies by Athens, and the change in her position from president to despot, had been far less intentional and systematic than the Mitylenæan orator affirmed.

To the Peloponnesian auditors, however, the speech of the latter proved completely satisfactory. The Lesbians were declared members of the Peloponnesian alliance, and a second attack upon Attica was decreed. The Lacedæmonians, foremost in the movement, summoned contingents from their various allies, and were early in arriving with their own at the Isthmus. They there began to prepare carriages or trucks, for dragging across the Isthmus the triremes which had fought against Phormio, from the harbour of Lechæum into the Saronic Gulf, in order to employ them against Athens. But the remaining allies did not answer to the summons, remaining at home occupied with their harvest, while the Lacedæmonians, sufficiently disappointed with this languor and disobedience, were still farther confounded by the unexpected presence of 100 Athenian triremes off the coast of the Isthmus.

The Athenians, perceiving the general belief entertained of their depressed and helpless condition, determined to contradict this by a great and instant effort. They accordingly manned forthwith 100 triremes, requiring the personal service of all men, citizens as well as metics, and excepting only the two richest classes of the Solonian census, *i.e.*, the Pentakosiomedimni, and the Hippeis or Horsemen. With this prodigious fleet they made a demonstration along the Isthmus in view of the Lacedæmonians, and landed in various parts of the Peloponnesian coast to inflict damage. At the same time thirty other Athenian triremes, despatched some time previously to Akarnania under Asôpius son of Phormio, landed at different openings in Laconia for the same purpose. This news reached the Lacedæmonians at the Isthmus, while the other great Athenian fleet was parading before their eyes. Amazed at so unexpected a demonstration of strength, they began to feel how much they had been misled respecting the exhaustion of Athens, and how incompetent they were, especially without the presence of their allies, to undertake any joint effective movement by sea and land against Attica. They therefore returned home, resolving to send an expedition of forty triremes under Alkidas to the relief of Mitylênê itself, at the same time transmitting requisitions to their various allies, in order that these triremes might be furnished.

Meanwhile Asôpius with his thirty triremes had arrived in Akarnania, from whence all the ships except twelve were sent home. He had been nominated commander as the son of Phormio, who appears either to have died, or to have become unfit for service, since his victories of the preceding year. The Akarnanians had preferred a special request that a son, or at least some relative, of Phormio, should be invested with the

command of the squadron ; so beloved was his name and character among them.

The sanguine announcement made by the Mitylenæans at Olympia, that Athens was rendered helpless by the epidemic, had indeed been strikingly contradicted by her recent display. For the maritime force which she had put forth this summer, manned as it was by a higher class of seamen, surpassed all former years, although, in point of number only, it was inferior to the 250 triremes which she had sent out during the first summer of the war. But the assertion that Athens was impoverished in finances was not so destitute of foundation : for the whole treasure in the acropolis, 6,000 talents at the commencement of the war, was now consumed, with the exception of that reserve of 1,000 talents which had been solemnly set aside against the last exigencies of defensive resistance¹. This is not surprising when we learn that every hoplite engaged for near two years and a half in the blockade of Potidæa received two drachmas per day, one for himself and a second for an attendant. There were during the whole time of the blockade 3,000 hoplites engaged there—and for a considerable portion of the time, 4,600—besides the fleet, all the seamen of which received one drachma per day per man. Accordingly, the Athenians were now for the first time obliged to raise a direct contribution among themselves, to the amount of 200 talents, for the purpose of prosecuting the siege of Mitylênê : and they at the same time despatched twelve triremes to collect money.

While the Athenians thus held Mitylênê under siege, their faithful friends the Platæans had remained closely blockaded by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians for more than a year, without any possibility of relief. At length provisions began to fail, and the general Eupompidês persuaded the garrison to adopt the daring, but seemingly desperate, resolution of breaking out over the blockading wall and in spite of its guards. So desperate, indeed, did the project seem, that at the moment of execution, one half of the garrison shrank from it as equivalent to certain death : the other half, about 212 in number, persisted and escaped.

The Platæans prepared ladders of a proper height to scale the blockading double wall, and on a cold and dark December night, amidst rain, sleet, and a roaring wind, marched forth from the gates, lightly armed. Taking care to sally out with the wind in their faces and at such a distance from each other as to prevent any clattering of arms, they crossed the inner ditch and reached the foot of the wall without being discovered. Many of the Platæans had already reached the top of the wall, when the noise of a tile accidentally knocked down by one of them betrayed what was passing. Immediately a general clamour was raised, alarm was given, and the awakened garrison rushed up from beneath to the top of the wall, yet not knowing where the enemy was to be found—a perplexity farther increased by the Platæans in the town, who took this opportunity of making a false attack on the opposite side. Amidst such confusion and darkness the blockading detachment could not tell where to direct their blows, and all remained at their posts, except a reserve of 300 men, kept constantly in readiness for special emergencies, who marched out

¹ The total amount drawn from the treasury of Athens between 433 and 427 is given by C.I.A., i. 273 (Hicks and Hill, 52) as 4,000 talents ; from the treasury of the other gods, 750 talents. From a

plausible restoration in C.I.A., iv. (1) 65, l. 6, 7 (Hicks and Hill, 58), we may infer that the state about this time borrowed money from the demotreasuries.—Ed.

and patrolled the outside of the ditch to intercept any fugitives from within. At the same time, fire-signals were raised to warn their allies at Thebes. But here again, the Plataeans in the town had foreseen and prepared fire-signals on their part, which they hoisted forthwith in order to deprive this telegraphic communication of all special meaning¹.

Meanwhile the escaping Plataeans prosecuted their flight without interruption over the space between, shoving down the battlements in order to make it more level and plant a greater number of ladders. In this manner they all successively got over and crossed the outer ditch. It was not, however, until nearly all had crossed, that the Peloponnesian reserve of 300 were seen approaching the spot with torches. These were held in check until the rearmost Plataeans had surmounted the difficulties of the passage: after which the whole body stole off as speedily as they could, taking at first the road towards Thebes, while their pursuers were seen with their torch-lights following the opposite direction on the road to Athens. After having marched about three-quarters of a mile on the road to Thebes, the fugitives quitted it, and striking to the eastward, soon found themselves in safety among the mountains which separate Bœotia from Attica at that point, from whence they passed into the glad harbour and refuge of Athens.

Meanwhile Pachês and the Athenians kept Mitylênê closely blocked up, the provisions were nearly exhausted, and the besieged were already beginning to think of capitulation—when their spirits were raised by the arrival of the Lacedæmonian envoy Salæthus, who had landed at Pyrrha on the west of Lesbos, and contrived to steal in (about February, 427 B.C.). He encouraged the Mitylenæans to hold out, assuring them that a Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas was on the point of setting out to assist them, and that Attica would be forthwith invaded by the general Peloponnesian army. The Lacedæmonian army had indeed invaded Attica, in order to keep the attention of Athens fully employed. Their ravages on this occasion were more diligent, searching, and destructive to the country than before, and were continued the longer because they awaited the arrival of news from Lesbos. But no news reached them, their stock of provisions was exhausted, and the army was obliged to break up.

Salæthus and the Mitylenæans held out until their provisions were completely exhausted, but neither relief nor encouragement reached them from Peloponnesus. At length even Salæthus became convinced that no relief would come; he projected, therefore, as a last hope, a desperate attack upon the Athenians and their wall of blockade. For this purpose he distributed full panoplies among the mass of the people or commons.

But he had not sufficiently calculated the consequences of this important step. The Mitylenæan multitude, living under an oligarchical government, had no interest in the present contest, which had been undertaken without any appeal to their opinion. They had no reason for aversion to Athens, seeing that they suffered no practical grievance from the Athenian alliance: and we find that even among the subject-allies the bulk of the citizens were never forward, sometimes positively reluctant,

¹ It would seem by this statement that the blockaders must have been often in the habit of transmitting intelligence to Thebes by means of fire-signals; each particular combination of lights having more or less of a special meaning.

[Well-known instances of signalling by beacons

occur in Herodot. vii. 182 (campaign of Artemisium) and Æschylus, *Agamemnon*, ll. 281-316. Cf. their use at Torônê in 423 (p. 505). The obstacle to their extensive use lay in the lack of suitable codes; though Polybius (x. 45-47) records a new system of his own application.—ED.]

to revolt. The Mitylenæan oligarchy had revolted, in spite of the absence of practical wrongs, because they desired an uncontrolled town-autonomy as well as security for its continuance. But this was a feeling to which the people were naturally strangers, having no share in the government of their own town, and being kept dead and passive, as it was the interest of the oligarchy that they should be, in respect to political sentiment. A Grecian oligarchy might obtain from its people quiet submission under ordinary circumstances; but if ever it required energetic effort, the genuine devotion under which alone such effort could be given, was found wanting. The Mitylenæan Demos, so soon as they found themselves strengthened and ennobled by the possession of heavy armour, refused obedience to the orders of Salæthus for marching out and imperilling their lives in a desperate struggle. They were under the belief—not unnatural under the secrecy of public affairs habitually practised by an oligarchy—that their governors were starving them, and had concealed stores of provisions for themselves. Accordingly, the first use which they made of their arms was, to demand that these concealed stores should be brought out and fairly apportioned to all, threatening, unless their demand was complied with at once, to enter into negotiations with the Athenians and surrender the city. The ruling Mitylenæans, unable to prevent this, preferred the chance of negotiating themselves for a capitulation. It was agreed with Pachês, that the Athenian armament should enter into possession of Mitylênê; that the fate of its people and city should be left to the Athenian assembly, and that the Mitylenæans should send envoys to Athens to plead their cause: until the return of these envoys, Pachês engaged that no one should be either killed, or put in chains, or sold into slavery. Nothing was said about Salæthus, who hid himself as well as he could in the city.

Having thus secured possession of Mitylênê, Pachês sent round some triremes to the other side of the island, and easily captured Antissa. But before he had time to reduce the two remaining towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, he received news which forced him to turn his attention elsewhere.

To the astonishment of everyone, the Peloponnesian fleet of Alkidas was seen on the coast of Ionia. It ought to have been there much earlier, and had Alkidas been a man of energy, it would have reached Mitylênê even before the surrender of the city. But the Peloponnesians, when about to advance into the Athenian waters and brave the Athenian fleet, were under the same impression of conscious weakness and timidity as that which beset land-troops when marching up to attack the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed. Alkidas, though unobstructed by the Athenians, though pressed to hasten forward by Lesbian and Ionian exiles on board, and aided by expert pilots from those Samian exiles who had established themselves at Anæa on the Asiatic continent, nevertheless instead of sailing straight to Lesbos, lingered first near Peloponnesus, next at the island of Delos, making capture of private vessels with their crews; until at length, on reaching the islands of Ikarus and Mykonos, he heard the unwelcome tidings that the besieged town had capitulated. Not at first crediting the report, he sailed onward to Embaton, in the Erythræan territory on the coast of Asia Minor, where he found the news confirmed. As only seven days had elapsed since the capitulation had been concluded,

Teutiaplus, an Eleian captain in the fleet, strenuously urged the daring project of sailing on forthwith, and surprising Mitylênê by night in its existing unsettled condition : no preparation would have been made for receiving them, and there was good chance that the Athenians might be suddenly overpowered, the Mitylenæans again armed, and the town recovered.

Such a proposition, which was indeed something more than daring, did not suit the temper of Alkidas. Nor could he be induced by the solicitation of the exiles to fix and fortify himself either in any port of Ionia, or in the Æolic town of Kymê, so as to afford support and countenance to such subjects of the Athenian empire as were disposed to revolt ; though he was confidently assured that many of them would revolt on his proclamation, and that the satrap Pissuthnês of Sardis would help him to defray the expense. He determined to return to Peloponnesus at once, dreading nothing so much as the pursuit of Pachês and the Athenian fleet. From Embaton accordingly he started on his return, coasting southward along Asia Minor as far as Ephesus. To get rid of his prisoners, Alkidas stopped at Myonnêsus near Teos, and there put to death the greater number of them. He then departed from Ephesus, taking his course across sea towards Crete and Peloponnesus.

On his return from Patmos to Mitylênê, Pachês was induced to stop at Notium by the solicitations of some exiles. Notium was the port of Kolophon, from which it was at some little distance, as Peiræus was from Athens.

It was now separated from Kolophon, and placed in possession of those Kolophonians who were opposed to the Persian supremacy in the upper town. But as it had been, down to this time, a mere appendage of Kolophon and not a separate town, the Athenians soon afterwards sent *Ekists* and performed for it the ceremonies of colonization according to their own laws and customs, inviting from every quarter the remaining exiles of Kolophon. Whether any new settlers went from Athens itself, does not appear. But the step was intended to confer a sort of Hellenic citizenship, and recognised collective personality, on the new-born town of Notium, without which, neither its Theôry or solemn deputation would have been admitted to offer public sacrifice, nor its private citizens to contend for the prize at Olympic and other great festivals.

Having cleared the Asiatic waters from the enemies of Athens, Pachês returned to Lesbos, reduced the towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, and soon found himself so completely master both of Mitylênê and the whole island as to be able to send home the larger part of his force, carrying with them as prisoners those prominently implicated in the late revolt, to the number altogether or rather more than a thousand¹. The Lacedæmonian Salæthus, being recently detected in his place of concealment, was included among the prisoners transmitted.

Upon the fate of these prisoners the Athenians had now to pronounce. They entered upon the discussion in a temper of extreme wrath and vengeance. As to Salæthus, their resolution to put him to death was unanimous and immediate. They turned a deaf ear to his promises, assuredly delusive, of terminating the blockade of Plataea, in case his life were spared. What to do with Mitylênê and its inhabitants was a point

¹ On this number, *cf.* note on p. 439.—ED.

more doubtful, and was submitted to formal debate in the public assembly.

It is in this debate that Thukydídēs first takes notice of Kleon, who is, however, mentioned by Plutarch as rising into importance some few years earlier, during the lifetime of Periklēs. Under the great increase of trade and population in Athens and Peiræus during the last forty years, a new class of politicians seems to have grown up, men engaged in various descriptions of trade and manufacture, who began to rival more or less in importance the ancient families of Attic proprietors. This change was substantially analogous to that which took place in the cities of Mediæval Europe, when the merchants and traders of the various guilds gradually came to compete with, and ultimately supplanted, the patrician families in whom the supremacy had originally resided. In Athens, persons of ancient family and station enjoyed at this time no political privilege—since through the reforms of Ephialtēs and Periklēs, the political constitution had become thoroughly democratical. But they still continued to form the two highest classes in the Solonian census founded on property—the Pentakosiomedimni, and the Hippeis or Knights. New men enriched by trade doubtless got into these classes, but probably only in minority, and imbibed the feeling of the class as they found it, instead of bringing into it any new spirit. Now an individual Athenian of this class, though without any legal title to preference, yet when he stood forward as candidate for political influence, continued to be decidedly preferred and welcomed by the social sentiment at Athens, which preserved in its spontaneous sympathies distinctions effaced from the political code¹. Besides this place ready prepared for him in the public sympathy, especially advantageous at the outset of political life—he found himself farther borne up by the family connections, associations, and political clubs, etc., which exercised very great influence both on the politics and the judicature of Athens, and of which he became a member as a matter of course. A person of low or middling station obtained no favourable presumptions or indulgence on the part of the public to meet him half-way; nor did he possess established connections to encourage first successes, or help him out of early scrapes. He found others already in possession of ascendancy, and well-disposed to keep down new competitors; so that he had to win his own way unaided, from the first step to the last, by qualities personal to himself, by assiduity of attendance—by acquaintance with business—by powers of striking speech—and withal by unflinching audacity, indispensable to enable him to bear up against that opposition and enmity which he would incur from the high-born politicians and organized party-clubs, as soon as he appeared to be rising into importance.

The free march of political and judicial affairs raised up several such men, during the years beginning and immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. Even during the life-time of Periklēs, they appear to have risen in greater or less numbers. But the personal ascendancy of that great man—who combined an aristocratical position with a strong and genuine democratical sentiment, and an enlarged intellect rarely found attached to either—impressed a peculiar character on Athenian politics.

¹ Thukyd., v. 43: 'Αλκιβιάδης—ἀνὴρ ἡλικία μὲν ὧν ἐστὶ τότε νέος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος. Compare Xenophon, *Memorabil.*, i. 2, 25; iii. 6. 1.

The Athenian world was divided into his partisans and his opponents, among each of whom there were individuals high-born and low-born. It is about two years after his death that we begin to hear of a new class of politicians—Eukratēs, the rope-seller—Kleon, the leather-seller—Lysiklēs, the sheep-seller—Hyperbolus, the lamp-maker¹; the two first of them must, however, have been already well-known as speakers in the Ekklesia even during the life-time of Periklēs.

Kleon acquired his first importance among the speakers against Periklēs, so that he would thus obtain for himself, during his early political career, the countenance of the numerous and aristocratical anti-Perikleans. He is described by Thukydidēs in general terms as a person of the most violent temper and character in Athens—as being dishonest in his calumnies, and virulent in his invective and accusation. Aristophanēs, in his comedy of the Knights, reproduces these features with others new and distinct, as well as with exaggerated details, comic, satirical, and contemptuous. His comedy depicts Kleon in the point of view in which he would appear to the knights of Athens—a leather-dresser, smelling of the tan-yard—a low-born brawler, terrifying opponents by the violence of his criminations, the loudness of his voice, the impudence of his gestures—moreover as venal in his politics²—threatening men with accusations and then receiving money to withdraw them—a robber of the public treasury—persecuting merit as well as rank—and courting the favour of the assembly by the basest and most guilty cajolery. The general attributes set forth by Thukydidēs (apart from Aristophanēs, who does not profess to write history), we may reasonably accept—the powerful and violent invective of Kleon, often dishonest—together with his self-confidence and audacity in the public assembly. Men of the middling class, like Kleon and Hyperbolus, who persevered in addressing the public assembly and trying to take a leading part in it, against persons of greater family pretension than themselves, were pretty sure to be men of more than usual audacity. It is probable enough that they had it to a displeasing excess—and even if they had not, the same measure of self-assumption which in Alkibiadēs would be tolerated from his rank and station, would in them pass for insupportable impudence. Unhappily we have no specimens to enable us to appreciate the invective of Kleon. We cannot determine whether it was more virulent than that of Demosthenēs and Æschinēs, seventy years afterwards, each of those eminent orators imputing to the other the grossest impudence, calumny, perjury, corruption, loud voice, and revolting audacity of manner, in language which Kleon can hardly have surpassed in intensity of vituperation, though he doubtless fell immeasurably short of it in classical finish. Nor can we even tell in what degree Kleon's denunciations of the veteran Periklēs³ were fiercer than those memorable invectives against the old age of Sir Robert Walpole, with which Lord Chatham's political career opened.

At the time when the question of Mitylênê came on for discussion, Thukydidēs says that Kleon was 'at that time by far the most persuasive speaker in the eyes of the people'. The fact of Kleon's great power of speech and his capacity of handling public business in a popular manner,

¹ Aristophan., *Equit.*, 130 *et seq.*, and Scholia; Eupolis, *Demi*, Fragm. xv., p. 466, ed. Meineke.

² See note on c. xxiv., p. 529.—Ed.

³ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 33: Ἐνεφύετο δὲ καὶ

Κλέων, ἥδη διὰ τῆς πρὸς ἐκείνουν ὁργῆς τῶν πολιτῶν πορευόμενος εἰς τὴν δημαγωγίαν.

Periklēs was δῖχθεις αἰθῶνι Κλέωνι—in the words of the comic author Hermippus.

is better attested than anything else respecting him, because it depends upon two witnesses both hostile to him—Thukydides and Aristophanes. The assembly and the dikastery were Kleon's theatre and holding-ground : for the Athenian people taken collectively in their place of meeting—and the Athenian people taken individually—were not always the same person and had not the same mode of judgement : Demos sitting in the Pnyx was a different man from Demos sitting at home¹. The lofty combination of qualities possessed by Periklès exercised influence over both one and the other ; but Kleon swayed considerably the former, without standing high in the esteem of the latter.

When the fate of Mitylênê and its inhabitants was submitted to the Athenian assembly, Kleon took the lead in the discussion. There never was a theme more perfectly suited to his violent temperament and power of fierce invective. Taken collectively, the case of Mitylênê presented a revolt as inexcusable and aggravated as any revolt could be. But there was yet another point which weighed as much as the rest, if not more. The revolters had been the first to invite a Peloponnesian fleet across the Ægean, and the first to proclaim both to Athens and her allies, the precarious tenure of her empire. Kleon proposed to apply to the captive city the penalties tolerated by the custom of war, in their harshest and fullest measure : to kill the whole Mitylenæan male population of military age, and to sell as slaves all the women and children. The proposition, though strongly opposed by Diodotus and others, was sanctioned and passed by the assembly, and a trireme was forthwith despatched to Mitylênê, enjoining Pachês to put it in execution.

Such a sentence was, in principle, nothing more than a very rigorous application of the received laws of war. Not merely the reconquered rebel, but even the prisoner of war (apart from any special convention) was at the mercy of his conqueror to be slain, sold, or admitted to ransom. We shall find the Lacedæmonians carrying out the maxim without the smallest abatement towards the Platæan prisoners in the course of a very short time.

But when the assembly broke up—when the citizen, no longer wound up by sympathizing companions and animated speakers in the Pnyx, subsided into the comparative quiescence of individual life, a sensible change became presently visible. We must also recollect—and it is a principle of no small moment in human affairs, especially among a democratical people like the Athenians, who stand charged with so many resolutions passed and afterwards unexecuted—that the sentiment of wrath against the Mitylenæans had been really in part discharged by the mere *passing* of the sentence, quite apart from its execution ; just as a furious man relieves himself from overboiling anger by imprecations against others, which he would himself shrink from afterwards realizing. The Athenians, on the whole the most humane people in Greece (though humanity, according to our ideas, cannot be predicated of any Greeks), became sensible that they had sanctioned a cruel and frightful decree. The Mitylenæan envoys present in Athens (who had probably been allowed to speak in the assembly and plead their own cause), together with those Athenians who had been proxeni and friends of Mitylênê, and the minority generally of the previous assembly—soon discerned, and did their best

¹ Aristophan., *Equit.*, 750.

to foster, this repentance, which became during the course of the same evening so powerful as well as so wide-spread, that the Stratêgi acceded to the prayer of the envoys, and convoked a fresh assembly for the morrow to reconsider the proceeding. By so doing, they committed an illegality, and exposed themselves to the chance of impeachment. But the change of feeling among the people was so manifest as to overbear any such scruples.

Though Thukydides had given us only a short summary without any speeches, of what passed in the first assembly—yet as to this second assembly, he gives us at length the speeches both of Kleon and Diodotus—the two principal orators of the first also.

Kleon, coming forward to defend his proposition passed on the preceding day, denounced the unwise tenderness and scruples of the people, who could not bear to treat their subject-allies, according to the plain reality, as men held only by naked fear. He dwelt upon the mischief and folly of reversing on one day what had been decided on the day preceding; also upon the guilty ambition of orators, who sacrificed the most valuable interests of the commonwealth, either to pecuniary gains, or to the personal credit of speaking with effect, triumphing over rivals, and setting up their own fancies in place of fact and reality. He deprecated the mistaken encouragement given to such delusions by a public 'wise beyond what was written', who came to the assembly, not to apply their good sense in judging of public matters, but merely for the delight of hearing speeches¹. He called for 'justice', nothing less, but nothing more; warning the assembly that the imperial necessities of Athens essentially required the constant maintenance of a sentiment of fear in the minds of unwilling subjects, and that they must prepare to see their empire pass away if they suffered themselves to be guided either by compassion for those who, if victors, would have no compassion on them, or by the mere impression of seductive discourses.

The harangue of Kleon is in many respects remarkable. If we are surprised to find a man, whose whole importance resided in his tongue, denouncing so severely the licence and the undue influence of speech in the public assembly, we must recollect that Kleon had the advantage of addressing himself to the intense prevalent sentiment of the moment, that he could therefore pass off the dictates of this sentiment as plain, downright, honest, sense and patriotism, while the opponents, speaking against the reigning sentiment and therefore driven to collateral argument, circumlocution, and more or less of manœuvre, might be represented as mere clever sophists, showing their talents in making the worse appear the better reason—if not actually bribed, at least unprincipled and without any sincere moral conviction. As this is a mode of dealing with questions, both of public concern and of private morality, not less common at present than it was in the time of the Peloponnesian war—to seize upon some strong and tolerably wide-spread sentiment among the public, to treat the dictates of that sentiment as plain common sense and obvious right, and then to shut out all rational estimate of coming good and evil as if it were unholy or immoral, or at best mere uncandid subtlety—we may well notice a case in which Kleon employs it to support a proposition now justly regarded as barbarous.

¹ Compare the language of Archidamus at Sparta in the congress, where he takes credit to the Spartans for being ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς

ὑπεροφίας παιδευόμενοι, etc. (Thukyd., i. 84)—very similar in spirit to the remarks of Kleon about the Athenians.

Applying our modern views to this proposition, indeed, the prevalent sentiment would not only not be in favour of Kleon, but would be irresistibly in favour of his opponents. To put to death in cold blood some six thousand persons would so revolt modern feelings, as to overbalance all considerations of past misconduct in the persons to be condemned. Nevertheless the speech of Diodotus, who followed and opposed Kleon, not only contains no appeal to any such merciful predispositions, but even positively disclaims appealing to them: the orator deprecates, not less than Kleon, the influence of compassionate sentiment, or of a spirit of mere compromise and moderation. He farther discards considerations of justice or the analogies of criminal judicature—and rests his opposition altogether upon reasons of public prudence, bearing upon the future welfare and security of Athens.

He begins by vindicating the necessity of reconsidering the resolution just passed, and insists on the mischief of deciding so important a question in haste or under strong passion. He enters a protest against the unwarrantable insinuations of corruption or self-conceit by which Kleon had sought to silence or discredit his opponents, and then, taking up the question on the ground of public wisdom and prudence, he proceeds to show that the rigorous sentence decreed on the preceding day was not to be defended. That sentence would not prevent any other among the subject-allies from revolting, if they saw, or fancied that they saw, a fair chance of success: but it might perhaps drive them, if once embarked in revolt, to persist even to desperation, and bury themselves under the ruins of their city. While every means ought to be employed to prevent them from revolting, by precautions beforehand—it was a mistaken reckoning to try to deter them by enormity of punishment, inflicted afterwards upon such as were reconquered. In developing this argument, the speaker gives some remarkable views on the theory of punishment generally, and on the small addition obtained in the way of preventive effect, even by the greatest aggravation of the suffering inflicted upon the condemned criminal—views which might have passed as rare and profound even down to the eighteenth century¹. And he farther supports his argument by emphatically setting forth the impolicy of confounding the Mitylenæan Demos in the same punishment with their oligarchy: the revolt had been the act exclusively of the latter, and the former had not only taken no part in it, but as soon as they obtained possession of arms, had surrendered the city spontaneously. In all the allied cities, it was the commons who were well-affected to Athens, and upon whom her hold chiefly depended against the doubtful fidelity of the oligarchies: but this feeling could not possibly continue, if it were now seen that all the Mitylenæans indiscriminately were confounded in one common destruction.

After several other discourses, both for and against—the assembly came to a vote, and the proposition of Diodotus was adopted; but adopted by so small a majority, that the decision seemed at first doubtful.

¹ Compare this speech of Diodotus with the views of punishment implied by Xenophon in his *Anabasis*, where he is describing the government of Cyrus the younger:

'Nor can any man contend, that Cyrus suffered criminals and wrong-doers to laugh at him: he punished them with the most unmeasured severity (*ἀπεχέσμενα πάντων ἐπιμειβεῖτο*). And you might often see along the frequented roads men

deprived of their eyes, their hands, and their feet: so that in his government, either Greek or barbarian, if he had no criminal purpose, might go fearlessly through and carry whatever he found convenient.' (*Anabasis*, i. 9, 13.)

The severity of the punishment is in Xenophon's mind the measure both of its effects in deterring criminals, and of the character of the ruler inflicting it.

The trireme carrying the first vote had started the day before, and was already twenty-four hours on its way to Mitylênê. A second trireme was immediately put to sea bearing the new decree; yet nothing short of superhuman exertions could enable it to reach the condemned city, before the sentence now on its way might be actually in course of execution. The Mitylenæan envoys stored the vessel well with provisions, promising large rewards to the crew if they arrived in time. An intensity of effort was manifested, without parallel in the history of Athenian seamanship. Luckily there was no unfavourable wind to retard them, but the object would have been defeated, if it had not happened that the crew of the first trireme were as slow and averse in the transmission of their mandate, as those of the second were eager for the delivery of the reprieve in time. And after all, it came only just in time. The first trireme had arrived, the order for execution was actually in the hands of Pachês, and his measures were already preparing. Had the execution been realized, the person who would have suffered most by it, and most deservedly, would have been the proposer Kleon. For if the reaction in Athenian sentiment was so immediate and sensible after the mere passing of the sentence, far more violent would it have been when they learnt that the deed had been irrevocably done, and when all its painful details were presented to their imaginations: and Kleon would have been held responsible as the author of that which had so disgraced them in their own eyes. As the case turned out, he was fortunate enough to escape this danger; and his proposition, to put to death those Mitylenæans whom Pachês had sent home as the active revolting party, was afterwards adopted and executed. It doubtless appeared so moderate, after the previous decree passed but rescinded, as to be adopted with little resistance, and to provoke no after-
repentance: yet the men so slain were rather more than one thousand in number¹.

Besides this sentence of execution, the Athenians razed the fortifications of Mitylênê, and took possession of all her ships of war. In lieu of tribute, they farther established a new permanent distribution of the land of the island, all except Methymna, which had remained faithful to them. They distributed it into 3,000 lots, of which 300 were reserved for consecration to the gods, and the remainder assigned to Athenian kleruchs, or proprietary settlers, chosen by lot among the citizens; the Lesbian proprietors still remaining on the land as cultivating tenants, and paying to the Athenian kleruch an annual rent of two minæ (about seven pounds sixteen shillings sterling) for each lot. We should have been glad to learn more about this new land-settlement than the few words of the historian suffice to explain. It would seem that 2,700 Athenian citizens with their families must have gone to reside, for the time at least, in Lesbos—as kleruchs; that is, without abnegating their rights as Athenian citizens, and without being exonerated either from Athenian taxation, or from personal military service. But it seems certain that these men did not continue long to reside in Lesbos. We may even suspect that the kleruchic

¹ Müller-Strübing (*Thuk. Forschungen*, p. 149 ff.) has thrown doubt on this total, which he regards as the work of an interpolator who wished to show up Athens in lurid colours. Certainly it is hard to conceive 1,000 men out of a total population estimated at 6,000 acting as 'chief_ringleaders' (*αἱρεῖται*, *Thuk.*, iii. 50).

Schütz (*Zeitschr. f. d. Gymn.* zu Wien, xxxv. (1881), p. 455) suggests Λ (30) should be read instead of Λ (1,000). But the preceding $\delta\lambda\iota\gamma\omega$ $\pi\lambda\epsilon\iota\upsilon\sigma$ suggests a somewhat larger total, say N (50).—Ed.

allotment of the island must have been subsequently abrogated. There was a strip on the opposite mainland of Asia, which had hitherto belonged to Mitylênê; this was now separated from that town, and henceforward enrolled among the tributary subjects of Athens¹.

The surrender of Platæa to the Lacedæmonians took place not long after that of Mitylênê to the Athenians—somewhat later in the same summer. Though the escape of one-half of the garrison had made the provisions last longer for the rest, still their whole stock had now come to be exhausted, so that the remaining defenders were enfeebled and on the point of perishing by starvation. The Lacedæmonian commander of the blockading force, knowing their defenceless condition, could easily have taken the town by storm, had he not been forbidden by express orders from Sparta. For the Spartan government, calculating that peace might one day be concluded with Athens on terms of mutual cession of places acquired by war, wished to acquire Platæa, not by force but by capitulation and voluntary surrender, which would serve as an excuse for not giving it up, though such a distinction, between capture by force and by capitulation, not admissible in modern diplomacy, was afterwards found to tell against the Lacedæmonians quite as much as in their favour². Acting upon these orders, the Lacedæmonian commander sent in a herald, summoning the Platæans to surrender voluntarily, and submit themselves to the Lacedæmonians as judges—with a stipulation 'that the wrongdoers should be punished, but that none should be punished unjustly'. To the besieged, in their state of hopeless starvation, all terms were nearly alike, and they accordingly surrendered the city. After a few days' interval five persons arrived from Sparta to sit in judgement upon their fate.

The five Spartans having taken their seat as judges, with the Thebans, the great enemies of Platæa, by their side—the prisoners taken, 200 Platæans and twenty-five Athenians, were brought up for trial or sentence. No accusation was preferred against them by anyone: but the simple question was put to them by the judges—'Have you during the present war rendered any service to the Lacedæmonians or to their allies?' The Platæans were confounded at a question alike unexpected and preposterous. It admitted but of one answer—but before returning any categorical answer at all, they entreated permission to plead their cause at length. In spite of the opposition of the Thebans, their request was granted.

¹ Thukyd., iii. 50; iv. 52. About the Lesbian kleruchs, see Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens*, B. iii. c. 18. These kleruchs must originally have gone thither as a garrison, as M. Boeckh remarks; and may probably have come back, either all or a part, when needed for military service at home. Still, however, there is much which is puzzling in this arrangement. It seems remarkable that the Athenians, at a time when their accumulated treasure had been exhausted and when they were beginning to pay direct contributions from their private property, should sacrifice 5,400 minæ (90 talents) annual revenue capable of being appropriated by the state, unless that sum were required to maintain the kleruchs as resident garrison for the maintenance of Lesbos. And as it turned out afterwards that their residence was not necessary, we may doubt whether the state did not convert the kleruchic grants into a public tribute, wholly or partially.

The oration of Antipho (*De Cede Herod.*, c. 13) makes no allusion to Athenian kleruchs either as

resident in the island, or even as absentees receiving the annual rent mentioned by Thukydides. The Mitylænæan citizen, father of the speaker of that oration, had continued possessor of his Lesbian property, and continued also to discharge his obligations as well (choregic obligations—χορηγίας) towards Mitylênê as (his obligations of pecuniary payment—τάλη) towards Athens. If the arrangement mentioned by Thukydides had been persisted in, this Mitylænæan proprietor would have paid nothing towards the city of Athens, but merely a rent of two minæ to some Athenian kleruch or citizen.

[From C.I.A., iv. (1) p. 22, No. 96 (Hicks and Hill, 61), wherein regulations are made for deciding suits between Athenian proprietors and Lesbian tenants, it is safe to conclude that an Athenian garrison was kept for some time on the island. The land-possession appears on the 425 tribute-list (C.I.A., i. 37; Hicks and Hill, 64), as Ἀτταῖαι πόλεις.—ED.]

² Thukyd., v. 17.

A more desperate position cannot be imagined. The interrogatory was expressly so framed as to exclude allusion to any facts preceding the Peloponnesian war. But the speakers disregarded the limits of the question itself, and neglected no topic which could touch the sympathies of their judges. After remonstrating against the mere mockery of trial and judgement to which they were submitted, they appealed to the Hellenic sympathies, and lofty reputation for commanding virtue, of the Lacedæmonians. They adverted to the first alliance of Platæa with Athens, concluded at the recommendation of the Lacedæmonians themselves, who had then declined, though formally solicited, to undertake the protection of the town against Theban oppression. They next turned to the Persian war, wherein Platæan patriotism towards Greece was not less conspicuous than Theban treason¹—to the victory gained over the Persians on their soil, whereby it had become hallowed under the promises of Pausanias and by solemn appeals to the local gods. From the Persian war they passed on to the flagitious attack made by the Thebans on Platæa, in the midst of the truce. They did not omit to remind the judges of an obligation personal to Sparta—the aid which they had rendered, along with the Athenians, to Sparta, when pressed by the revolt of the Helots at Ithôme.

The Theban speakers contended that the Platæans had deserved, and brought upon themselves by their own fault, the enmity of Thebes—that they had stood forward earnestly against the Persians, only because Athens had done so too—and that all the merit, whatever it might be, which they had thereby acquired, was counterbalanced and cancelled by their having allied themselves with Athens afterwards for the oppression and enslavement of the Æginetans, and of other Greeks equally conspicuous for zeal against Xerxès, and equally entitled to protection under the promises of Pausanias. The Thebans went on to vindicate their nocturnal surprise of Platæa, by maintaining that they had been invited by the most respectable citizens of the town, who were anxious only to bring back Platæa from its alliance with a stranger to its natural Boeotian home—and that they had abstained from anything like injurious treatment of the inhabitants, until constrained to use force in their own defence. They then reproached the Platæans, in their turn, with that breach of faith whereby ultimately the Theban prisoners in the town had been put to death. And while they excused their alliance with Xerxès, at the time of the Persian invasion, by affirming that Thebes was then under a dishonest party-oligarchy, who took this side for their own factious purposes, and carried the people with them by force, they at the same time charged the Platæans with permanent treason against the Boeotian customs and brotherhood. All this was farther enforced by setting forth the claims of Thebes to the gratitude of Lacedæmon, both for having brought Boeotia into the Lacedæmonian alliance at the time of the battle of Korôneia, and for having furnished so large a portion of the common force in the war then going on.

The discourse of the Thebans, inspired by bitter and as yet unsatisfied hatred against Platæa, proved effectual: or rather it was superfluous—the minds of the Lacedæmonians having before been made up. After the

¹ See this point emphatically set forth in Orat. xiv., called *Λόγος Πλαταικός*, of Isokratēs, p. 308 § 62.

The whole of that oration is interesting to be read in illustration of the renewed sufferings of the Platæans near fifty years after this capture.

proposition twice made by Archidamus to the Platæans, inviting them to remain neutral and even offering to guarantee their neutrality—after the solemn apologetic protest tendered by him upon their refusal, to the gods, before he began the siege—the Lacedæmonians conceived themselves exonerated from all obligation to respect the sanctity of the place, looking upon the inhabitants as having voluntarily renounced their inviolability and sealed their own ruin. Hence the importance attached to that protest, and the emphatic detail with which it is set forth in Thukydides. The five judges, as their only reply to the two harangues, again called the Platæans before them, and repeated to every one of them individually the same question which had before been put. Each of them, as he successively replied in the negative¹, was taken away and killed, together with the twenty-five Athenian prisoners. The women captured were sold as slaves, and the town and territory of Platæa were handed over to the Thebans, who at first established in them a few oligarchical Platæan exiles, together with some Megarian exiles—but after a few months, recalled this step, and blotted out Platæa, as a separate town and territory, from the muster-roll of Hellas. The Platæan territory was let out for ten years, as public property belonging to Thebes, and was hired by private Theban cultivators.

The conduct of Sparta was more rigorous, considering only the principle of the case and apart from the number of victims, than even the first unexecuted sentence of Athens against the Mitylenæans. For neither Sparta, nor even Thebes, had any fair pretence for considering Platæa as a revolted town, whereas Mitylênê was a city which had revolted under circumstances peculiarly offensive to Athens. Moreover Sparta promised trial and justice to the Platæans on their surrender: Pachês promised nothing to the Mitylenæans except that their fate should be reserved for the decision of the Athenian people. This little city—interesting from its Hellenic patriotism, its grateful and tenacious attachments, and its unmerited suffering—now existed only in the persons of its citizens harboured at Athens. We shall find it hereafter restored, destroyed again, and finally again restored: so chequered was the fate of a little Grecian state swept away by the contending politics of greater neighbours. The slaughter of the twenty-five Athenian prisoners, like that of Salæthus by the Athenians, was not beyond the rigour admitted and tolerated, though not always practised, on both sides—towards prisoners of war.

It has been already mentioned that in the naval combats between the Corinthians and Korkyræans during the year before the Peloponnesian war, the former had captured 250 Korkyræan prisoners, men of the first rank in the island. Instead of following the impulse of blind hatred in slaughtering their prisoners, the Corinthians displayed a more long-sighted calculation. They had treated the prisoners well, and made every effort to gain them over, with a view of employing them on the first opportunity to effect a revolution in the island—to bring it into alliance with Corinth, and disconnect it from Athens. Such an opportunity appears first to have occurred during the winter or spring of the present year, while both Mitylênê and Platæa were under blockade; probably about the time when Alkidas departed for Ionia, and when it was hoped that not only Mitylênê

¹ Diodorus (xii. 56) in his meagre abridgement of the siege and fate of Platæa, somewhat amplifies

the brevity and simplicity of the question as given by Thukydides.

would be relieved, but the neighbouring dependencies of Athens excited to revolt, and her whole attention thus occupied in that quarter. Accordingly the Korkyraean prisoners were then sent home from Corinth.

The new-comers, probably at first heartily welcomed after so long a detention, employed all their influence, combined with the most active personal canvass, to bring about a complete rupture of alliance with Athens. Intimation being sent to Athens of what was going on, an Athenian trireme arrived with envoys to try and defeat these manœuvres; while a Corinthian trireme also brought envoys from Corinth to aid the views of the opposite party. The mere presence of Corinthian envoys indicated a change in the political feeling of the island. But still more conspicuous did this change become, when a formal public assembly, after hearing both envoys, decided—that Korkyra would maintain her alliance with Athens according to the limited terms of simple mutual defence originally stipulated, but would at the same time be in relations of friendship with the Peloponnesians, as she had been before the Epidamnian quarrel.

Looking to the war then raging between Athens and the Peloponnesians, such a declaration was self-contradictory. It was intended by the oligarchical party only as a step to a more complete revolution, both foreign and domestic. They followed it up by a political prosecution against Peithias, the citizen of greatest personal influence among the people, who acted by his own choice as proxenus to the Athenians. What were the judicial institutions of the island, under which he was tried, we do not know: but he was acquitted of the charge. He then revenged himself by accusing in his turn five of the richest among his oligarchical prosecutors, of the crime of sacrilege.

Pressed by the ruinous fine upon the five persons condemned, as well as by the fear that Peithias might completely defeat their project of Corinthian alliance, the oligarchical party resolved to carry their point by violence and murder. They collected a party armed with daggers, burst suddenly into the senate-house during full sitting, and there slew Peithias with sixty other persons, partly senators, partly private individuals. These assassins, under the fresh terror arising from their recent act, convoked an assembly, and proposed a resolution of full neutrality both towards Athens and towards the Peloponnesians. And this resolution the assembly was constrained to pass—it probably was not very numerous, and the oligarchical partisans were at hand in arms. At the same time they sent envoys to Athens, to communicate the recent events with such colouring as suited their views, and to dissuade the fugitive partisans of Peithias from provoking any armed Athenian intervention, such as might occasion a counter-revolution in the island. With some of the fugitives, representations of this sort, or perhaps the fear of compromising their own families left behind, prevailed. But most of them, and the Athenians along with them, appreciated better both what had been done and what was likely to follow. The oligarchical envoys, together with such of the fugitives as had been induced to adopt their views, were seized by the Athenians as conspirators, and placed in detention at Ægina; while a fleet of sixty Athenian triremes under Eurymedon was immediately fitted out to sail for Korkyra—for which there was the greater necessity, as the Lacedæmonian fleet under Alkidas, lately mustered at Kyllênê after its return from Ionia, was understood to be on the point of sailing thither.

But the oligarchical leaders at Korkyra having little faith in the chances of this mission to Athens, proceeded in the execution of their conspiracy with that rapidity which was best calculated to ensure its success. On the arrival of a Corinthian trireme—which brought ambassadors from Sparta, and probably also news that the fleet of Alkidas would shortly appear—they organized their force, and attacked the people. The Korkyræan Demos were at first vanquished and dispersed. But during the night they collected together and fortified themselves in the upper parts of the town near the acropolis, and from thence down to one of the two harbours which the town possessed ; while the other harbour and the chief arsenal, facing the mainland of Epirus, was held by the oligarchical party, together with the market-place near to it. In this divided state the town remained throughout the ensuing day, during which the Demos sent emissaries round the territory soliciting aid from the working slaves, and promising to them emancipation as a reward ; while the oligarchy also hired and procured 800 Epirotic mercenaries from the mainland. Reinforced by the slaves, the Demos renewed the struggle on the morrow more furiously than before. Both in position and numbers they had the advantage over the oligarchy, and towards the afternoon were even on the point of carrying by assault the lower town, together with the neighbouring arsenal. The people being thus victorious, the Corinthian trireme, together with most of the Epirotic mercenaries, thought it safer to leave the island, while the victors were still farther strengthened on the ensuing morning by the arrival of the Athenian admiral Nikostratus, with twelve triremes from Naupaktus, and 500 Messenian hoplites.

Nikostratus did his best to allay the furious excitement prevailing, and to persuade the people to use their victory with moderation. Under his auspices a convention of amnesty and peace was concluded between the contending parties, save only ten proclaimed individuals, the most violent oligarchs, who were to be tried as ringleaders. At the same time an alliance offensive and defensive was established between Korkyra and Athens, and the Athenian admiral was then on the point of departing, when the Korkyræan leaders entreated him to leave with them, for greater safety, five ships out of his little fleet of twelve—offering him five of their own triremes instead. Notwithstanding the peril of this proposition to himself, Nikostratus acceded to it ; and the Korkyræans, preparing the five ships to be sent along with him, began to enroll among the crews the names of their principal enemies. To the latter this presented the appearance of sending them to Athens, which they accounted a sentence of death. The principal men of the defeated party, to the number of about 400, now took sanctuary in the temple and sacred ground of Hêrê ; upon which the leaders of the people, afraid that in this inviolable position they might still cause further insurrection in the city, opened a negotiation and prevailed upon them to be ferried across to the little island immediately opposite to the Heræum, where they were kept under watch, with provisions regularly transmitted across to them for four days.

At the end of these four days the Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas arrived at the road of Sybota on the opposite mainland—fifty-three triremes in number, since the forty triremes brought back from Ionia had been reinforced by thirteen more from Leukas and Ambrakia. Moreover the Lacedæmonians had sent down Brasidas as advising companion. The

Spartans were anxious to deal with Korkyra before reinforcements should arrive from Athens ; but the repairs necessary for the ships of Alkidas, after their disastrous voyage home, occasioned an unfortunate delay. When the Peloponnesian fleet was seen approaching from Sybota at break of day, the confusion in Korkyra was unspeakable. The Demos and the newly emancipated slaves were agitated alike by the late terrible combat and by fear of the invaders, and the town was half-burnt. Plenty of triremes were indeed at hand, and orders were given to man sixty of them forthwith—while Nikostratus, the only man who preserved the cool courage necessary for effective resistance, entreated the Korkyræan leaders to proceed with regularity, and to wait till all were manned, so as to sail forth from the harbour in a body. He went forth with his squadron, but the Korkyræans, instead of following his advice, sent their ships out one by one and without any selection of crews. Two of them deserted forthwith to the enemy, while others presented the spectacle of crews fighting among themselves : even those which actually joined battle came up by single ships, without the least order or concert.

The Peloponnesians soon seeing that they had little to fear from such enemies, thought it sufficient to set twenty of their ships against the Korkyræans, while with the remaining thirty-three they moved forward to contend with the twelve Athenians. Nikostratus, having plenty of sea-room, was not afraid of this numerical superiority. He took care to avoid entangling himself with the centre of the enemy, and to keep rowing about their flanks ; and as he presently contrived to disable one of their ships, by a fortunate blow with the beak of one of his vessels, the Peloponnesians, instead of attacking him with their superior numbers, formed themselves into a circle and stood on the defensive, as they had done in the first combat with Phormio in the middle of the Gulf at Rhium. Nikostratus (like Phormio) rowed round this circle, trying to cause confusion by feigned approach, and waiting to see some of the ships lose their places or run foul of each other, so as to afford him an opening for attack. And he might perhaps have succeeded, if the remaining twenty Peloponnesian ships, seeing the proceeding and recollecting with dismay the success of a similar manœuvre in the former battle, had not quitted the Korkyræan ships, whose disorderly condition they despised, and hastened to join their comrades. The whole fleet of fifty-three triremes now again took the aggressive, and advanced to attack Nikostratus, who retreated before them, but backing astern and keeping the head of his ships towards the enemy. In this manner he succeeded in drawing them away from the town, so as to leave to most of the Korkyræan ships opportunity for getting back to the harbour ; while such was the superior manœuvring of the Athenian triremes, that the Peloponnesians were never able to come up with him or force him to action. They returned back in the evening to Sybota, with no greater triumph than their success against the Korkyræans, thirteen of whose triremes they carried away as prizes.

It was the expectation in Korkyra, that they would on the morrow make a direct attack (which could hardly have failed of success) on the town and harbour. We may easily believe (what report afterwards stated) that Brasidas advised Alkidas to this decisive proceeding. The Korkyræan leaders, more terrified than ever, first removed their prisoners from the little island to the Heræum, and then tried to come to a com-

promise with the oligarchical party generally, for the purpose of organizing some effective and united defence. Thirty triremes were made ready and manned, wherein some even of the oligarchical Korkyræans were persuaded to form part of the crews.

But the slackness of Alkidas proved their best defence. Instead of coming straight to the town, he contented himself with landing in the island at some distance from it, on the promontory of Leukimnê: after ravaging the neighbouring lands for some hours, he returned to his station at Sybota. He had lost an opportunity which never again returned: for on the very same night the fire signals of Leukas telegraphed to him the approach of the fleet under Eurymedon from Athens—sixty triremes. His only thought was now for the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet, which was in fact saved by this telegraphic notice. Advantage was taken of the darkness to retire close along the land as far as the isthmus which separates Leukas from the mainland—across which isthmus the ships were dragged by hand or machinery, so that they might not fall in with, or be descried by, the Athenian fleet in sailing round the Leukadian promontory. From hence Alkidas made the best of his way home to Peloponnesus, leaving the Korkyræan oligarchs to their fate.

The arrival of Eurymedon opens a third unexpected transition in this chequered narrative—the Korkyræan Demos passing, abruptly and unexpectedly, from intense alarm and helplessness to elate and irresistible mastery. In the bosom of Greeks, and in a population seemingly amongst the least refined of all Greeks—including too a great many slaves just emancipated against the will of their masters, and of course the fiercest and most discontented of all the slaves in the island—such a change was but too sure to kindle a thirst for revenge almost ungovernable, as the only compensation for foregone terror and suffering.

As soon as the Peloponnesian fleet was known to have fled and that of Eurymedon was seen approaching, the Korkyræan leaders brought into the town the 500 Messenian hoplites who had hitherto been encamped without. Next, the thirty ships recently manned were ordered to sail round to the other or Hyllaic harbour. But when the ships arrived, and the crews were disembarked, a wholesale massacre was perpetrated, by putting to death those individuals of the oligarchical faction who had been persuaded on the day before to go aboard as part of the crews. Then came the fate of those suppliants, about 400 in number, who had been brought back from the islet opposite, and were still under sanctuary, in the sacred precinct of the Heræum. It was proposed to them to quit sanctuary and stand their trial. Fifty of them accepted the proposition, were put on their trial—all condemned, and all executed. Their execution took place, as it seems, on the spot, and within actual view of the unhappy men still remaining in the sacred ground; who, seeing that their lot was desperate, preferred dying by their own hands to starvation or the sword of their enemies.

Eurymedon remained with his fleet for seven days, during all which time the victorious Korkyræans carried on a sanguinary persecution against the party who had been concerned in the late oligarchical revolution. Five hundred of this party contrived to escape by flight to the mainland; while those who did not, or could not, flee, were slain wherever they could be found. It was not merely the oligarchical party who thus

suffered: the flood-gates of private feud were also opened, and various individuals, under false charges of having been concerned in the oligarchical movements, were slain by personal enemies or debtors. This deplorable suspension of legal, as well as moral restraints, continued during the week of Eurymedon's stay—a period long enough to satiate the fierce sentiment out of which it arose; yet without any apparent effort on his part to soften the victors or protect the vanquished. Had Nikostratus remained in command, we may fairly presume, judging by what he had done in the earlier part of the sedition with very inferior force, that he would have set much earlier limits to the Korkyræan butchery; unfortunately, Thukydides tells us nothing at all about Nikostratus, after the naval battle of the preceding day.

We should have been glad to hear something about the steps taken in the way of restoration or healing, after this burst of murderous fury, and after the departure of Eurymedon. But here again Thukydides disappoints our curiosity. We only hear from him, that the oligarchical exiles who had escaped to the mainland were strong enough to get possession of the forts and most part of the territory there belonging to Korkyra; just as the exiles from Samos and Mitylênê became more or less completely masters of the Peræa or mainland possessions belonging to those islands. They even sent envoys to Corinth and Sparta, in hopes of procuring aid to accomplish their restoration by force; but their request found no favour, and they were reduced to their own resources. After harassing for some time the Korkyræans in the island by predatory incursions, so as to produce considerable dearth and distress, they at length collected a band of Epirotic mercenaries, passed over to the island, and there established a fortified position on the mountain called Istônê, not far from the city. Having burnt their vessels in order to cut off all hopes of retreat, they maintained themselves for near two years by a system of ravage and plunder which inflicted great misery on the island. This was a frequent way whereby, of old, invaders wore out and mastered a city, the walls of which they found impregnable¹. The ultimate fate of these occupants of Istônê, which belongs to a future chapter, will be found to constitute a close suitable to the bloody drama yet unfinished in Korkyra.

Such a drama could not be acted in an important city belonging to the Greek name without producing a deep and extensive impression throughout all the other cities. And Thukydides has taken advantage of it to give a sort of general sketch of Grecian politics during the Peloponnesian war; violence of civil discord in each city, aggravated by foreign war, and by the contending efforts of Athens and Sparta—the former espousing the democratical party everywhere; the latter, the oligarchical².

¹ This interesting fact is due to the scantiness of the harvests in most parts of Greece, which did not allow an accumulation of stock. As a consequence, (1) regular siege tactics were rarely required to bring pressure on a town, and hence for a long time remained undeveloped; (2) the necessity of maintaining the open field against invaders gave rise to that heavy equipment of the Greek trooper, and the shock tactics, which at first sight appear so unsuitable to a rugged mountain country. Cf. Grundy, *Journ. of Hellen. Stud.*, p. 218 ff.—Ed.

² It is not accurate to say that Athens espoused the cause of democracy, Sparta that of oligarchy, throughout the Peloponnesian war. In the early stages we find oligarchies at Epidamnus, Mitylene, Chios, and perhaps Samos; democracies among

the Dorian cities of Sicily, in Elis, Megara, and perhaps Sikyon. There is no trace of oligarchic propaganda on Sparta's part till 418 (Thuk., v. 81). In the present passage Thukydides is careful to mark this political development as beginning *subsequently* to 427 B.C. (see also p. 368).

Nor is it exact to state that party feeling had never run so high before as at Korkyra. The early revolutions to which most Greek cities were subjected were frequently accompanied by even more atrocious excesses—e.g., at Milêtus (Ath., xii. 524) and Ægina (Herodot., vi. 90, 91). But taking Thukydides' lifetime as a period in itself, we do indeed find that the war was having a disastrous effect on Greek social life by undermining the growing sentiment of humanity and once more bringing the fatal spirit of *στάσις* into full play.—Ed.

The Korkyræan sedition was the first case in which these two causes of political antipathy and exasperation were seen acting with full united force, and where the malignity of sentiment and demoralization flowing from such a union was seen without disguise. The picture drawn by Thukydides of moral and political feeling under these influences, will ever remain memorable as the work of an analyst and a philosopher. He has conceived and described the perverting causes with a spirit of generalization which renders these two chapters hardly less applicable to other political societies far distant both in time and place (especially, under many points of view, to France between 1789 and 1799) than to Greece in the fifth century before the Christian æra. The deadly bitterness infused into intestine party contests by the accompanying dangers of foreign war and intervention of foreign enemies—the mutual fears between political rivals, where each thinks that the other will forestall him in striking a mortal blow, and where constitutional maxims have ceased to carry authority either as restraint or as protection—the superior popularity of the man who is most forward with the sword, or who runs down his enemies in the most unmeasured language, coupled with the disposition to treat both prudence in action and candour in speech as if it were nothing but treachery or cowardice—the exclusive regard to party ends, with the reckless adoption, and even admiring preference, of fraud or violence as the most effectual means—the loss of respect for legal authority as well as of confidence in private agreement, and the surrender even of blood and friendship to the overruling ascendancy of party-ties—the unnatural predominance of the ambitious and contentious passions, overpowering in men's minds all real public objects—all these gloomy social phenomena, here indicated by the historian, have their causes deeply seated in the human mind, and are likely, unless the bases of constitutional morality shall come to be laid more surely and firmly than they have hitherto been, to recur from time to time, under diverse modifications, 'so long as human nature shall be the same as it is now', to use the language of Thukydides himself¹. He has described, with fidelity not inferior to his sketch of the pestilence at Athens, the symptoms of a morbid political condition. In following the impressive description of the historian, we have to keep in mind the general state of manners in his time, especially the cruelties tolerated by the laws of war, as compared with that greater humanity and respect for life which has grown up during the last two centuries in modern Europe. And we have farther to recollect that if he had been describing the effects of political fury among Carthaginians and Jews, instead of among his contemporaries Greeks, he would have added, to his list of horrors, mutilation, crucifixion, and other refinements on simple murder.

The language of Thukydides is to be taken rather as a generalization and concentration of phenomena which he had observed among different communities, than as belonging altogether to any one of them. I do not believe—what a superficial reading of his opening words might at first suggest—that the bloodshed in Korkyra was only the earliest, but by no means the worst, of a series of similar horrors spread over the Grecian world. The facts stated in his own history suffice to show that though the same causes, which worked upon this unfortunate island, became dis-

¹ Thukyd., iii. 82.

seminated and produced analogous mischiefs throughout many other communities—yet the case of Korkyra, as it was the first, so it was also the worst and most aggravated in point of intensity.

In regard to the Korkyræan revolution, we can see that it is from the beginning the work of a selfish oligarchical party, playing the game of a foreign enemy, and the worst and most ancient enemy, of the island—aiming to subvert the existing democracy and acquire power for themselves—and ready to employ any measure of fraud or violence for the attainment of these objects. While the democracy which they attack is purely defensive and conservative, the oligarchical movers, having tried fair means in vain, are the first to employ foul means, which latter they find retorted with greater effect against themselves. Next, they pass to the use of the dagger in the senate-house against Peithias and his immediate fellow-leaders, and to the wholesale application of the sword against the democracy generally. The Korkyræan Demos are thus thrown upon the defensive. Their conduct as victors is such as we should expect under such maddening circumstances from coarse men mingled with liberated slaves. It is vindictive and murderous in the extreme, not without faithless breach of assurances given. But we must remember that they are driven to stand upon their defence, and that all their energies are indispensable to make that defence successful.

In the course of a few years from this time, we shall have occasion to recount two political movements in Athens similar in principle and general result to this Korkyræan revolution, exhibiting oligarchical conspirators against an existing and conservative democracy—with this conspiracy at first successful, but afterwards put down, and the Demos again restored. The contrast between Athens and Korkyra under such circumstances will be found highly instructive, especially in regard to the Demos both in the hours of defeat and in those of victory.

But the case of Korkyra, as well as that of Athens, different in so many respects, conspire to illustrate another truth, of much importance in Grecian history. Both of them show how false and impudent were the pretensions set up by the rich and great men of the various Grecian cities, to superior morality, superior intelligence, and greater fitness for using honourably and beneficially the powers of government, as compared with the mass of the citizens. Though the Grecian oligarchies, exercising powerful sway over fashion, and more especially over the meaning of words, bestowed upon themselves the appellation of 'the best men, the honourable and good, the elegant, the superior'. etc., and attached to those without their own circle epithets of a contrary tenor, implying low moral attributes—no such difference will be found borne out by the facts of Grecian history¹. Abundance of infirmity, with occasional bad passions, was doubtless liable to work upon the people generally, often corrupting and misguiding even the Athenian democracy, the best apparently of all the democracies in Greece. But after all, the rich and great men were only a part of the people, and taking them as a class (apart from honourable individual exceptions) by no means the best part. If exempted by their position from some of the vices which beset smaller and poorer men, they imbibed from that same position an unmeasured self-importance—and an excess of personal ambition as well as of personal appetite—

¹ See the valuable preliminary discourse, prefixed to Weicker's edition of Theognis, page xxi. § 9 et seq.

peculiar to themselves, not less anti-social in tendency, and operating upon a much grander scale. To the prejudices and superstitions belonging to the age, they were no way superior, considering them as a class; while their animosities among one another, virulent and unscrupulous, were among the foremost causes of misfortune in Grecian commonwealths. Indeed many of the most exceptionable acts committed by the democracies, consisted in their allowing themselves to be made the tools of one aristocrat for the ruin of another. Of the intense party-selfishness which characterized them as a body, sometimes exaggerated into the strongest anti-popular antipathy, as we see in the famous oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle¹—we shall find many illustrations as we advance in the history, but none more striking than this Korkyræan revolution.

CHAPTER XXI [LI]

FROM THE TROUBLES IN KORKYRA, IN THE FIFTH YEAR OF THE PELOPON-
NESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE END OF THE SIXTH YEAR

ABOUT the same time as the troubles of Korkyra occurred, Nikias the Athenian general conducted an armament against the rocky island of Minôa, which lay at the mouth of the harbour of Megara, and was occupied by a Megarian fort and garrison. It was fortified and made an Athenian possession, since it was eminently convenient to keep up an effective blockade against the Megarian harbour, which the Athenians had hitherto done only from the opposite shore of Salamis².

Though Nikias, son of Nikeratus, had been for some time conspicuous in public life, and is said to have been more than once Stratêgus along with Periklês, this is the first occasion on which Thukydîdês introduces him to our notice. He appears to have enjoyed, on the whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen of Athens, from the present time down to his death. In wealth and in family, he ranked among the first class of Athenians: in political character, Aristotle placed him, together with Thukydîdês, son of Melêsias, and Theramenês, above all other names in Athenian history—seemingly even above Periklês³.

Such a criticism, from Aristotle, deserves respectful attention, though the facts before us completely belie so lofty an estimate. It marks, however, the position occupied by Nikias in Athenian politics, as the principal person of what may be called the conservative party, succeeding Kimon and Thukydîdês, and preceding Theramenês. Nikias represents the party accommodating itself to a sovereign democracy, and existing in the form of common sentiment rather than of common purposes. And it is a remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people, that a man of this character, known as an aristocrat, but not feared as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in the city.

¹ Aristot., *Politic.*, v. 7, 19: Καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσονται, καὶ βουλευσώ ὁ, τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν. [Cf. also the utterly cynical spirit in which the oligarch who wrote the *Resp. Atheniensium* preserved among Xenophon's works expresses him-

self: μισεῖσθαι ἀναγκὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρχομένου (i. 14).—Ed.]

² Minôa has now ceased to be an island, and is a hill on the mainland near the shore.—Ed.

³ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 2, 3; [*Ath. Pol.*, c. 28.—Ed.]

Nikias was a man of even mediocrity, in intellect, in education, and in oratory: forward in his military duties, and not only personally courageous in the field, but hitherto found competent as a general under ordinary circumstances: assiduous, too, in the discharge of all political duties at home, especially in the post of Stratêgus or one of the ten generals of the state, to which he was frequently chosen and rechosen. Of the many valuable qualities combined in his predecessor Periklês, the recollection of whom was yet fresh in the Athenian mind, Nikias possessed two, on which, most of all, his influence rested—though, properly speaking, that influence belongs to the sum total of his character, and not to any special attributes in it. First, he was thoroughly incorruptible as to pecuniary gains—a quality so rare in Grecian public men of all the cities, that when a man once became notorious for possessing it, he acquired a greater degree of trust than any superiority of intellect could have bestowed upon him¹: next, he adopted the Periklean view as to the necessity of a conservative or stationary foreign policy for Athens, avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, adventurous risks, or provocation to fresh enemies. With this important point of analogy there were at the same time material differences between them even in regard to foreign policy. Periklês was a conservative, resolute against submitting to loss or abstraction of empire, but at the same time refraining from aggrandizement: Nikias was in policy faint-hearted, averse to energetic effort for any purpose whatever, and disposed not only to maintain peace, but even to purchase it by considerable sacrifices.

Besides these two main points, which Nikias had in common with Periklês, he was perfect in the use of minor and collateral modes of standing well with the people, which that great man had taken but little pains to practise. While Periklês attached himself to Aspasia, whose splendid qualities did not redeem in the eyes of the public either her foreign origin or her unchastity, the domestic habits of Nikias appear to have been strictly conformable to the rules of Athenian decorum. Periklês was surrounded by philosophers, Nikias by prophets². To a life thus rigidly decorous and ultra-religious—both eminently acceptable to the Athenians—Nikias added the judicious employment of a large fortune with a view to popularity. Those liturgies (or expensive public duties undertaken by rich men, each in his turn, throughout other cities of Greece as well as in Athens) which fell to his lot, were performed with such munificence and good taste, as to procure for him universal encomiums; and so much above his predecessors as to be long remembered and extolled. While his demeanour towards the poorer citizens generally was equal and conciliating, the presents which he made were numerous, both to gain friends and to silence assailants. We are not surprised to hear, that various bullies, whom the comic writers turn to scorn, made their profit out of this susceptibility. But most assuredly Nikias as a public man, though he might occasionally be cheated out of money, profited greatly by the reputation thus acquired.

The expenses unavoidable in such a career, combined with strict personal honesty, could not have been defrayed except by another quality, which ought not to count as discreditable to Nikias, though in this too he stood

¹ In the same way Phokion was elected Stratêgus forty-five times, and maintained a more permanent ascendancy than the other figures of

fourth-century Athenian politics.—Ed.

² Thukyd., vii. 50; Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 4, 5, 23.

distinguished from Periklēs. He was a careful and diligent money-getter, a speculator in the silver-mines of Laurium, and proprietor of one thousand slaves whom he let out for work in them, receiving a fixed sum per head for each¹. Judging by what remains to us of the comic authors, this must have been considered as a perfectly gentlemanlike way of making money: for while they abound with derision of the leather-dresser Kleon, the lamp-maker Hyperbolus, and the vegetable-selling mother to whom Euripidēs owes his birth, we hear nothing from them in disparagement of the slave-letter Nikias.

The hoplites, who despised Kleon—and did not much regard even the brave, hardy, and soldierlike Lamachus, because he happened to be poor²—respected in Nikias the union of wealth and family with honesty, courage, and carefulness in command. Before the fatal Sicilian expedition, he had never commanded any very serious or difficult enterprise; but what he had done had been accomplished successfully, so that he enjoyed the reputation of a fortunate as well as a prudent commander. He appears to have acted as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians at Athens, probably by his own choice, and among several others.

The first half of the political life of Nikias—after the time when he rose to enjoy full consideration in Athens, being already of mature age—was spent in opposition to Kleon, the last half in opposition to Alkibiadēs. To employ terms which are not at all suitable to the Athenian democracy, but which yet bring to view the difference intended to be noted better than any others, Nikias was a minister or ministerial man, often actually exercising, and always likely to exercise, official functions—Kleon was a man of the opposition, whose province it was to supervise and censure official men for their public conduct. We must divest these words of that accompaniment which they are understood to carry in English political life—a standing parliamentary majority in favour of one party: Kleon would often carry in the public assembly resolutions, which his opponents Nikias and others of like rank and position—who served in the posts of Stratēgus, ambassador, and other important offices designated by the general vote—were obliged against their will to execute.

While Nikias was thus in what may be called ministerial function, Kleon was not of sufficient importance to attain the same. We shall see in the coming chapter how he became as it were promoted, partly by his own superior penetration, partly by the dishonest artifice and misjudgement of Nikias and other opponents, in the affair of Sphakteria. But his vocation was now to find fault, to censure, to denounce; his theatre of action was the [council], the public assembly, the dikasteries; his principal talent was that of speech, in which he must unquestionably have surpassed all his contemporaries. The two gifts which had been united in Periklēs—superior capacity for speech, as well as for action—were now severed³, and had fallen, though both in greatly inferior degree, the one

¹ Xenophon, *Memorab.*, ii. 5, 2; [Xenophon], *De Vectigalibus*, iv. 14.

² Thukyd., v. 7; Plutarch, *Alkibiadēs*, c. 21: 'Ὁ γὰρ Λαμαχος ἦν μὲν πολεμικὸς καὶ ἀνδρώδης, ἀέλιμα δ' οὐ προσήν οὐδ' ὄγκος αὐτῷ διὰ πενίαν: compare Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 15.

³ This dissociation of the administrative and executive power, which has so frequently found its way into modern constitutional theory and practice, was nowhere explicitly contemplated, so far as we know, by the early Greek legislators.

The evils of a conscious breach between the 'ministers' and the 'opposition' was not long in showing its evil effects at Athens, where the result was that the stratēgi were committed to courses of action which they had done all in their power to oppose (notably Nikias to the Sicilian expedition), and lost touch with the feelings of the community.

An interesting attempt to correlate these bodies is to be found in the earlier proposals of the revolutionaries of 411 (*cf.* appendix to ch. 34).

to Nikias, the other to Kleon. As an opposition-man, fierce and violent in temper, Kleon was extremely formidable to all acting functionaries; and from his influence in the public assembly, he was doubtless the author of many important positive measures, thus going beyond the functions belonging to what is called opposition. But though the most effective speaker in the public assembly, he was not for that reason the most influential person in the democracy.

To understand the political condition of Athens at this time, it has been necessary to take this comparison between Nikias and Kleon, and to remark, that though the latter might be a more victorious speaker, the former was the more guiding and influential leader.

During the autumn of the fifth year of the war, the epidemic disorder, after having intermitted for some time, resumed its ravages at Athens, and continued for one whole year longer. And this autumn, as well as the ensuing summer, were distinguished by violent atmospheric and terrestrial disturbance. Numerous earthquakes were experienced at Athens, in Eubœa, in Bœotia, especially near Orchomenus. Sudden waves of the sea and unexampled tides were also felt on the coast of Eubœa and Lokris. The earthquakes produced one effect favourable to Athens. They deterred the Lacedæmonians from invading Attica. Agis king of Sparta had already reached the isthmus for that purpose; but repeated earthquakes were looked upon as an unfavourable portent, and the scheme was abandoned.

These earthquakes, however, were not considered sufficient to deter the Lacedæmonians from the foundation of Herakleia, a new colony near the strait of Thermopylæ. On this occasion, we hear of a branch of the Greek population not before mentioned during the war. The coast north-west of the strait of Thermopylæ was occupied by the Trachinians. These latter, immediately adjoining Mount Cæta on its north side—as well as the Dorians (the little tribe properly so called, which was accounted the primitive hearth of the Dorians generally) who joined the same mountain range on the south—were both of them harassed by the predatory mountaineers, probably Ætolians, on the high lands between them. At first the Trachinians were disposed to throw themselves on the protection of Athens. But not feeling sufficiently assured as to the way in which she would deal with them, they joined with the Dorians in claiming aid from Sparta: in fact, it does not appear that Athens, possessing naval superiority only and being inferior on land, could have given them effective aid.

The Lacedæmonians, eagerly embracing the opportunity, determined to plant a strong colony in this tempting situation. There was wood in the neighbouring regions for ship-building¹, so that they might hope to acquire a naval position for attacking the neighbouring island of Eubœa, while the passage of troops against the subject-allies of Athens in Thrace, would also be facilitated; the impracticability of such passage had forced them, three years before, to leave Potidæa to its fate. A considerable

More drastic schemes were suggested in plenty by the philosophers of the fourth century.

[While conceding the uses which Grote finds in the function of 'opposition', we must remember that in the Greek cities, with their chronic wars and threats of war, a strong executive was in-

dispensable. The final upshot of the growing paralysis of the magistracy was the replacement of the *πόλις* by the Hellenistic autocracy.—Ed.]

¹ Respecting this abundance of wood, as well as the site of Herakleia generally, consult Livy, xxxvi. 22.

body of colonists, Spartans and Lacedæmonian Pericæki, was assembled under the conduct of three Spartan Ækists. Proclamation was farther made to invite the junction of all other Greeks as colonists, excepting by name Ionians, Achæans, and some other tribes not here specified. A number of colonists, stated as not less than 10,000, flocked to the place, having confidence in the stability of the colony under the powerful protection of Sparta. The new town, of large circuit, was built and fortified under the name of Herakleia¹, not far from the site of Trachis, about two miles and a quarter from the nearest point of the Maliac Gulf, and about double that distance from the strait of Thermopylæ². Near to the latter, and for the purpose of keeping effective possession of it, a port with dock and accommodation for shipping was constructed.

A populous city, established under Lacedæmonian protection in this important post, alarmed the Athenians, and created much expectation in every part of Greece. But the Lacedæmonian Ækists were harsh and unskilful in their management, while the Thessalians, to whom the Trachinian territory was tributary, considered the colony as an encroachment upon their soil. Anxious to prevent its increase, they harassed it with hostilities from the first moment. The Ætæan assailants were also active enemies; so that Herakleia, thus pressed from without and misgoverned within, dwindled down from its original numbers and promise, barely maintaining its existence³.

The main Athenian armament of this summer, consisting of sixty triremes under Nikias, undertook an expedition against the island of Melos. Melos and Thera, both inhabited by ancient colonists from Lacedæmon, had never been from the beginning, and still refused to be, members of the Athenian alliance or subjects of the Athenian empire⁴. They thus stood out as exceptions to all the other islands in the Ægean, and the Athenians thought themselves authorized to resort to constraint and conquest, believing themselves entitled to command over all the islands. They might indeed urge, and with considerable plausibility, that the Melians now enjoyed their share of the protection of the Ægean from piracy, without contributing to the cost of it: but considering the obstinate reluctance and strong philo-Laconian prepossessions of the Melians, who had taken no part in the war and given no ground of offence to Athens, the attempt to conquer them by force could hardly be justified even as a calculation of gain and loss, and was a mere gratification to the pride of power in carrying out what, in modern days, we should call the principle of maritime empire. Nikias visited the island with his fleet, and after vainly summoning the inhabitants, ravaged the lands, but retired without undertaking a siege. He then sailed away, and came to Orôpus, on the north-east frontier of Attica bordering on Bœotia. The hoplites on board his ships, landing in the night, marched into the interior of Bœotia to the vicinity of Tanagra. They were here met, according to signal raised, by a military force from Athens which marched thither by land, and the joint Athenian army ravaged the Tanagræan territory, gaining an insignificant advantage over its defenders. On retiring, Nikias re-assembled

¹ Diodor., xii. 59.

² On the site of Herakleia, see Grundy, *Great Persian War*, p. 262 ff.—Ed.

³ Thukyd., iii. 92, 93; Diodor. xi. 49; xii. 59.

⁴ In the tribute-list of 425 (C.I.A., i. 37; Hicks and Hill, 64) we find both Melos and Thera

assessed. Thus in 425 the Athenians still anticipated the conquest of these islands. While Thera is rated at the reasonable sum of 5 talents, Melos, a much poorer island, stands at 15 talents: evidently Melos was already under a cloud.—Ed.

his armament, sailed northward along the coast of Lokris with the usual ravages, and returned home without effecting anything farther.

About the same time that he started, thirty other Athenian triremes, under Demosthenès and Proklès, had been sent round Peloponnesus to act upon the coast of Akarnania. In conjunction with the Akarnanian force—with fifteen triremes from Korkyra and some troops from Kephallenia and Zakynthus—they ravaged the whole territory of Leukas, both within and without the isthmus, and confined the inhabitants to their town, which was too strong to be taken by anything but a wall of circumvallation and a tedious blockade. And the Akarnanians, to whom the city was especially hostile, were urgent with Demosthenès to undertake this measure forthwith, since the opportunity might not again recur, and success was nearly certain.

But this enterprising officer committed the grave imprudence of offending them on a matter of great importance, in order to attack a country of all others the most impracticable—the interior of Ætolia. The Messenians of Naupaktus, who suffered from the depredations of the neighbouring Ætolian tribes, inflamed his imagination by suggesting to him a grand scheme of operations, more worthy of the large force which he commanded than the mere reduction of Leukas. The various tribes of Ætolians—rude, predatory, and unrivalled in the use of the javelin, which they rarely laid out of their hands—stretched across the country from between Parnassus and Æta to the eastern bank of the Achelôus. The scheme suggested by the Messenians was that Demosthenès should attack the great central Ætolian tribes:—if they were conquered, all the remaining continental tribes between the Ambrakian Gulf and Mount Parnassus might be invited or forced into the alliance of Athens. Having thus got the command of a large continental force, Demosthenès contemplated the ulterior scheme of marching at the head of it on the west of Parnassus through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians—inhabiting the north of the Corinthian Gulf, friendly to Athens, and enemies to the Ætolians, whom they resembled both in their habits and in their fighting—until he arrived at Kitynium in Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephisus. He would then easily descend that valley into the territory of the Phokians, who were likely to join the Athenians if a favourable opportunity occurred, but who might at any rate be constrained to do so. From Phokis, the scheme was to invade from the northward the conterminous territory of Bœotia, the great enemy of Athens, which might thus perhaps be completely subdued, if assailed at the same time from Attica. Any Athenian general who could have executed this comprehensive scheme would have acquired at home a high and well-merited celebrity. But Demosthenès had been ill-informed both as to the invincible barbarians, and the pathless country, comprehended under the name of Ætolia.

Demosthenès sailed with his Messenians, Kephallenians, and Zakynthians to Gæneon in the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, not far eastward of Naupaktus—where his army was disembarked, together with 300 epibatæ (or marines) from the triremes—including on this occasion, what was not commonly the case on shipboard¹, some of the choice hoplites,

¹ The Epibatæ, or soldiers serving on ship-board (marines), were more usually taken from the Thetes, or the poorest class of citizens, furnished by the state with a panoply for the occasion

—not from the regular hoplites on the muster-roll. So among the Romans, service in the legions was accounted higher and more honourable than that of the classarii milites (Tacit., *Histor.* i., 87).

selected all from young men of the same age, on the Athenian muster-roll. Early in the morning he marched into Ætolia. On the first days he took villages unfortified and undefended, for the inhabitants abandoned them and fled to the mountains above. He was inclined to halt and await the junction of the Ozolian Lokrians, who had engaged to invade Ætolia at the same time, and were almost indispensable to his success, from their familiarity with Ætolian warfare, and their similarity of weapons. But the Messenians again persuaded him to advance without delay into the interior, in order that the villages might be separately attacked and taken before any collective force could be gathered together: and Demosthenês was so encouraged by having as yet encountered no resistance, that he advanced to Ægítium, which also he found deserted, and captured without opposition.

Here, however, was the term of his good fortune. The mountains round Ægítium were occupied not only by the inhabitants of that village, but also by the entire force of Ætolia. The invasion of Demosthenês had become known beforehand to the Ætolians, who not only forewarned all their own tribes of the approaching enemy, but also sent ambassadors to Sparta and Corinth to ask for aid. However, they showed themselves fully capable of defending their own territory without foreign aid. Demosthenês found himself assailed in his position at Ægítium, on all sides at once by these active highlanders armed with javelins, pouring down from the neighbouring hills. Not engaging in any close combat, they retreated when the Athenians advanced forward to charge them—resuming their aggression the moment that the pursuers, who could never advance far in consequence of the ruggedness of the ground, began to return to the main body. The small number of bowmen along with Demosthenês for some time kept their unshielded assailants at bay. But the officer commanding the bowmen was presently slain; the stock of arrows became nearly exhausted; and what was still worse, the only man who knew the country and could serve as guide, was slain also. At length the force of Demosthenês was completely broken and compelled to take flight, without beaten roads, without guides, and in a country not only strange to them, but impervious, from continual mountain, rock, and forest¹. Many of them were slain in the flight by pursuers, superior not less in rapidity of movement than in knowledge of the country: some even lost themselves in the forest, and perished miserably in flames kindled around them by the Ætolians. The fugitives were at length reassembled at Ceneon near the sea, with the loss of Proklês the colleague of Demosthenês in command, as well as of 120 hoplites, among the best-armed and most vigorous in the Athenian muster-roll. The remaining force was soon transported back from Naupaktus to Athens, but Demosthenês remained behind, being too much afraid of the displeasure of his countrymen to return at such a moment.

The force of the new enemy, whom his unsuccessful attack had raised into activity, soon made itself felt. The Ætolian envoys, who had been

¹ Demosthenês' failure in Ætolia shows how fatal it was for Greek hoplites to leave the level ground and the beaten track. This is also illustrated by the battle of Idomenê (Thuk., iii. 112). Moreover, the successes of Demosthenês at Spakteria (Thuk., iv. 33, 34), and of Iphikratês at Lechaûm (Xen., *Hell.*, iv. 5, 13-17) confirm the

lesson that hoplites unsupported could not withstand a properly handled body of light troops. While admitting the necessity of a heavily equipped force (*cf. n. to p. 447*), we may wonder that in a country eminently suited to kleptic and 'sniping' tactics so little use was made of skirmishers.—Ep.

despatched to Sparta and Corinth, found it easy to obtain the promise of a considerable force to join them in an expedition against Naupaktus. About the month of September, a body of 3,000 Peloponnesian hoplites, including 500 from the newly-founded colony of Herakleia, was assembled at Delphi, under the command of Eurylochus. Their road of march to Naupaktus lay through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, whom they proposed either to gain over or to subdue. With Amphissa, the largest Lokrian township, they had little difficulty—for the Amphissians were in a state of feud with their neighbours on the other side of Parnassus, and were afraid that the new armament might become the instrument of Phokian antipathy against them. On the first application they joined the Spartan alliance, and gave hostages for their fidelity to it: moreover they persuaded many other Lokrian petty villages—among others the Myoneis, who were masters of the most difficult pass on the road—to do the same. Eurylochus, having arrived in the territory of Naupaktus, was there joined by the full force of the Ætolians. Their joint efforts captured the Corinthian colony of Molykreion, which had become subject to the Athenian empire.

Naupaktus, with a large circuit of wall and thinly defended, was in the greatest danger, and would certainly have been taken, had it not been saved by the efforts of the Athenian Demosthenēs. Apprised of the coming march of Eurylochus, he went personally to the Akarnanians, and persuaded them to send a force to aid in the defence of Naupaktus. At the head of 1,000 Akarnanian hoplites, Demosthenēs threw himself into Naupaktus, and Eurylochus, seeing that the town had been thus placed out of the reach of attack, abandoned all his designs upon it—marching farther westward to the borders of Akarnania.

The Ætolians, who had come down to join him for the common purpose of attacking Naupaktus, here abandoned him and retired to their respective homes. But the Ambrakiots prevailed upon him to assist them in attacking the Amphilocheian Argos as well as Akarnania, assuring him that there was now a fair prospect of bringing the whole of the population of the mainland, between the Ambrakian and Corinthian Gulfs, under the supremacy of Lacedæmon. Three thousand Ambrakiot hoplites invaded the territory of the Amphilocheian Argos, and captured the fortified hill of Olpæ immediately bordering on the Ambrakian Gulf, about three miles from Argos itself, a hill employed in former days by the Akarnanians as a place for public judicial congress of the whole nation.

This enterprise, communicated forthwith to Eurylochus, was the signal for movement on both sides. The Akarnanians, marching with their whole force to the protection of Argos, occupied a post called Krênæ in the Amphilocheian territory, to prevent Eurylochus from effecting his junction with the Ambrakiots at Olpæ. They at the same time sent urgent messages to Naupaktus, inviting Demosthenēs to act as their commander. Demosthenēs, not backward in seizing this golden opportunity, came speedily into the Ambrakian Gulf with twenty triremes, conducting 200 Messenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen.

He found also the whole of the enemy's force, both the 3,000 Ambrakiot hoplites and the Peloponnesian division under Eurylochus, already united and in position at Olpæ, about three miles off. For Eurylochus, as soon as he was apprised that the Ambrakiots had reached Olpæ, broke up

forthwith his camp at Proschium in Ætolia, knowing that his best chance of traversing the hostile territory of Akarnania consisted in celerity: the whole Akarnanian force, however, had already gone to Argos, so that his march was unopposed through that country. He crossed the Achelôus, marched westward of Stratus, then quitting both Akarnania and the direct road from Akarnania to Argos, he struck rather eastward into the mountains. From hence he descended at night into the territory of Argos, and passed unobserved, between Argos itself and the Akarnanian force at Krênæ, so as to join in safety the 3,000 Ambrakiots at Olpæ.

Demosthenês, thus finding a united and formidable enemy, superior in number to himself, at Olpæ, conducted his troops from Argos and Krênæ to attack them. The ground was rugged and mountainous, and between the two armies lay a steep ravine, which neither liked to be the first to pass; so that they lay for five days inactive. On the sixth day both armies put themselves in order of battle—both probably tired of waiting. The ground being favourable for ambuscade, Demosthenês hid in a bushy dell 400 hoplites and light-armed, so that they might spring up suddenly in the midst of the action upon the Peloponnesian left, which outflanked his right. He was himself on the right with the Messenians and some Athenians, opposed to Eurylochus on the left of the enemy: the Akarnanians with the Amphilochian darters occupied his left, opposed to the Ambrakiot hoplites: Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians were, however, intermixed in the line of Eurylochus, and it was only the Mantineans who maintained a separate station of their own towards the left centre. The battle accordingly began, and Eurylochus with his superior numbers was proceeding to surround Demosthenês, when on a sudden the men in ambush rose up and set upon his rear. A panic seized his men, who made no resistance worthy of their Peloponnesian reputation: they broke and fled, while Eurylochus himself was early slain. Demosthenês, having near him his best troops, pressed them vigorously, and their panic communicated itself to the troops in the centre, so that all were put to flight and pursued to Olpæ. On the right of the line of Eurylochus, the Ambrakiots completely defeated the Akarnanians opposed to them, and carried their pursuit even as far as Argos. So complete, however, was the victory gained by Demosthenês over the remaining troops, that these Ambrakiots had great difficulty in fighting their way back to Olpæ, which was not accomplished without severe loss. The loss in the army of Demosthenês was about 300; that of the opponents much greater, but the number is not specified.

Of the three Spartan commanders, two had been slain: the third, Menedæus, found himself beleaguered both by sea and land—the Athenian squadron being on guard along the coast. It would seem indeed that he might have fought his way to Ambrakia, especially as he would have met the Ambrakiot reinforcement coming from the city. But whether this were possible or not, the commander, too much dispirited to attempt it, took advantage of the customary truce granted for burying the dead, to open negotiations with Demosthenês for the purpose of obtaining an unmolested retreat. This was peremptorily refused: but Demosthenês secretly intimated to the Spartan commander and those immediately around him, together with the Mantineans and other Peloponnesian troops—that if they chose to make a separate and surreptitious retreat,

abandoning their comrades, no opposition would be offered. He designed by this means not merely to isolate the Ambrakiots, the great enemies of Argos and Akarnania, along with the body of miscellaneous mercenaries who had come under Eurylochus—but also to obtain the more permanent advantage of disgracing the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the eyes of the Epirotic Greeks. This disgraceful convention was accepted and carried into effect forthwith. It stands alone in Grecian history, as an example of separate treason in officers to purchase safety for themselves and their immediate comrades, by abandoning the general body under their command. Had the officers been Athenian, it would have been doubtless quoted as evidence of the pretended faithlessness of democracy. But as it was the act of a Spartan commander in conjunction with many leading Peloponnesians, we will only venture to remark upon it as a farther manifestation of that intra-Peloponnesian selfishness, and carelessness of obligation towards extra-Peloponnesian Greeks, which we found so lamentably prevalent during the invasion of Xerxēs.

Unfairly as this loss fell upon Ambrakia, a far more severe calamity was yet in store for her. The large reinforcement from the city, which had been urgently invoked by the detachment at Olpæ, started in due course as soon as they could be got ready, and entered the territory of Amphilochia about the time when the battle of Olpæ was fought. Their march was made known to Demosthenēs, on the day after the battle, by the Amphilochians, who at the same time indicated to him the best way of surprising them in the rugged and mountainous road along which they had to march, at the two conspicuous peaks called Idomenē, immediately above a narrow pass leading farther on to Olpæ. It was known beforehand, by the line of march of the Ambrakiots, that they would rest for the night at the lower of these two peaks, ready to march through the pass on the next morning. On that same night a detachment of Amphilochians, under direction from Demosthenēs, seized the higher of the two peaks, while that commander himself, dividing his forces into two divisions, started from his position at Olpæ in the evening after supper. After marching all night, they reached the camp of the Ambrakiots a little before daybreak—Demosthenēs himself with his Messenians in the van. The surprise was complete. The Ambrakiots were found still lying down and asleep, while even the sentinels, uninformed of the recent battle—hearing themselves accosted in the Doric dialect by the Messenians, whom Demosthenēs had placed in front for that express purpose—and not seeing very clearly in the morning twilight—mistook them for some of their own fellow-citizens coming back from the other camp. Large numbers of them were destroyed on the spot, and the remainder fled in all directions among the neighbouring mountains, none knowing the roads and the country. There were but a small proportion who survived to return to Ambrakia.

The complete victory of Idomenē, admirably prepared by Demosthenēs, was achieved with scarce any loss.

Thukydides considers this disaster to have been the greatest that afflicted any Grecian city during the whole war prior to the peace of Nikias¹;

¹ We may remark that the expression *κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τὸνδε*—when it occurs in the first, second, third, or first half of the fourth Book of Thukydides—seems to allude to the first ten years of the Pello-

ponnesian war, which ended with the peace of Nikias.

Compare *ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε* (iii. 98), which in like manner means the war prior to the peace of Nikias.

so incredibly great, indeed, that though he had learnt the number slain, he declines to set it down, from fear of not being believed—a scruple which we his readers have much reason to regret. It appears that nearly the whole adult military population of Ambrakia was destroyed, and Demosthenês was urgent with the Akarnanians to march thither at once. Had they consented, Thukydidês tells us positively that the city would have surrendered without a blow. But they refused to undertake the enterprise, fearing (according to the historian) that the Athenians at Ambrakia would be more troublesome neighbours to them than the Ambrakiots. That this reason was operative we need not doubt: but it can hardly have been either the single, or even the chief reason; for had it been so, they would have been equally afraid of Athenian coöperation in the blockade of Leukas, which they had strenuously solicited from Demosthenês, and had quarrelled with him for refusing. Ambrakia was less near to them than Leukas—and in its present exhausted state, inspired less fear: but the displeasure arising from the former refusal of Demosthenês had probably never been altogether appeased, nor were they sorry to find an opportunity of mortifying him in a similar manner.

How totally helpless Ambrakia had become, is still more conclusively proved by the fact that the Corinthians were obliged shortly afterwards to send by land a detachment of 300 hoplites for its defence.

The Athenian triremes soon returned to their station at Naupaktus, after which a convention was concluded between the Akarnanians and Amphilochians, on the one side, and the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians on the other—ensuring a safe and unmolested egress to both of the latter. With the Ambrakiots a more permanent pacification was effected¹: the Akarnanians and Amphilochians concluded with them a peace and alliance for 100 years, on condition that they should surrender all the Amphilochian territory and hostages in their possession, and should bind themselves to furnish no aid to Anaktorium, then in hostility to the Akarnanians. Each party, however, maintained its separate alliance—the Ambrakiots with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the Akarnanians with Athens.

It was in this same autumn that the Athenians were induced by an oracle to undertake the more complete purification of the sacred island of Delos. This step was probably taken to propitiate Apollo, since they were under the persuasion that the terrible visitation of the epidemic was owing to his wrath. And as it was about this period that the second attack of the epidemic, after having lasted a year, disappeared—many of them probably ascribed this relief to the effect of their pious cares at Delos. All the tombs in the island were opened; the dead bodies were then exhumed and re-interred in the neighbouring island of Rheneia; and orders were given that for the future neither deaths nor births should take place in the sacred island. Moreover the ancient Delian festival—once the common point of meeting and solemnity for the whole Ionic race, and celebrated for its musical contests, before the Lydian and Persian conquests had subverted the freedom and prosperity of Ionia—was now renewed. The religious zeal and munificence of Nikias were strikingly displayed at Delos².

¹ The chief significance of the prostration of Ambrakia lies in the consequent withdrawal of a fleet of about twenty triremes (Thuk., i. 46) from the allied navy. Apart from this, the Athenian successes in this quarter were a serious blow to

the Corinthians, who had hoped to draw the most profit from these campaigns in the north-west.—*Ep.*

² Thukyd., iii. 104; Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 3, 4; Diodor., xii. 58.

CHAPTER XXII [LII]

SEVENTH YEAR OF THE WAR—CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA

IN describing the operations round Pylus and Sphakteria, Grote has followed the traditional account, which, in supposed adherence to Thukydides' exposition, makes the Bay of Navarino and the land around it the scene of all the operations. Grote, indeed, notices one discrepancy between Thukydides' λιμὴν and the modern Navarino Bay—viz., that the entrances to the latter are much wider than Thukydides admits (the south entrance being really about 1,300 yards). But his explanation, that the physical features of the bay have greatly altered during the last 2,300 years, has been proved untenable: the changes have been shown by geologists to be very slight. The traditional account further omits to notice that Navarino Bay gives very poor shelter, especially before the frequent south-west gales. Dr. Arnold endeavoured to remove these difficulties by identifying the λιμὴν with the lagoon of Osmyn Aga, which is well protected from the wind; furthermore, he sought for Sphakteria in the Palæokastro promontory, which lies along the western side of the lagoon, and is connected with the land to the north by a low sand-bar, which he supposed non-existent in ancient times, thus making the headland an island; Pylus would then be the hill of Hagio Nikolo to the north-west of the lagoon.

Against this theory Grote urges that Thukydides' account will not allow two islands ('Sphagia' and 'Palæokastro') near the scene of battle. Besides (1) further research has shown that Palæokastro has been a peninsula for some thousands of years; (2) Palæokastro has all the features of the Pylus of Thukydides; (3) the ancient fort of Sphakteria has been clearly identified on Sphagia.

The most probable solution is given below; it may serve to correct at various points Grote's account as it has been retained in the text:

1. The Athenian fleet sailed for shelter into the lagoon, and fortified part of Palæokastro. (The positions where the Athenians anchored or beached their ships and raised their fortifications are still matters of dispute.)

2. The Peloponnesian fleet and army assailed Palæokastro both from the sea-side and from inside the lagoon (the exact points of attack being once again objects of controversy).

3. In order to prevent an Athenian relief squadron from finding a landing-place, the Peloponnesians occupied Sphagia and the entrances to the lagoon—i.e. (1) the outer strait between Sphagia and Palæokastro (ὁ ἑσπλος πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος, iv. 8); (2) the inner strait between Sphagia and the sand-spit stretching between the lagoon and Navarino Bay. The modern fairways at these points are about 130 and 200 yards (the inner strait probably having grown wider since ancient times). There is no need to suppose that the Peloponnesians also blocked the little inlet to the north of Palæokastro ('Voidio Kilia'), for the land-troops on the isthmus of Palæokastro would suffice to keep an Athenian force from disembarking here.

4. The Athenian relief squadron on the second day delivered a double attack—(1) on the barrier of ships in the outer strait between Palæokastro and Sphagia, (2) on the remaining Peloponnesian fleet, which it surprised at a distance from its station by rowing rapidly up Navarino Bay through the southern (unguarded) entrance.

5. As soon as the inner Peloponnesian line had been forced, the ships drawn up in the outer strait would have to retire, for fear of being taken in the rear, thus severing all communication between Sphagia and the mainland.

6. The Athenian fleet blockaded Sphakteria by cruising about Navarino Bay, where they severely felt the stress of weather.

7. The capture of Sphakteria took place exactly as described in Thukydides. This hypothesis presupposes no changes in the natural features of the district, save at the point where such alterations are even now supposed to be in process (on the sand-spit, which is being very slowly submerged by the occasional high seas in Navarino Bay).

This view does not conflict with Thukydides' text, though it involves the supposition that Thukydides used 'ὁ λιμὴν' in reference to two different pieces of water—(1) of the lagoon (up to the arrival of the Athenian relief squadron); (2) of Navarino Bay (from the sea-battle onwards). This mistake, which would also explain Thukydides' ambiguous language about the ἑσπλοι, may be due to his having compiled the story of the operations from two different sources: (1) an informant who took part in the early engagements off Palæokastro, and so meant 'the lagoon' when speaking of 'ὁ λιμὴν'; (2) a witness of the later campaign around Sphagia, to whom ὁ λιμὴν would naturally mean Navarino Bay. Since Thukydides certainly had no personal knowledge of the site, the confusion between the two pieces of water was natural enough.

This account mainly follows Grundy, *Journ. of Hellen. Stud.*, xvi. (1896), pp. 1-55, whose survey-maps and notes will be found invaluable. Cf. also Burrows, in the same volume, pp. 56-76, and in xviii. (1898), pp. 147-159 (with photographic illustrations).—Ed.

THE invasion of Attica by the Lacedæmonians had now become an ordinary enterprise, undertaken in every year of the war except the third and sixth, and then omitted only from accidental causes, though the same hopes were no longer entertained from it as at the commencement of the war. During the present spring, Agis king of Sparta conducted the Peloponnesian army into the territory, and repeated the usual ravages.

It seemed, however, as if Korkyra were about to become the principal scene of the year's military operations. For the exiles of the oligarchical party, having come back to the island and fortified themselves on Mount Istônê, carried on war with so much activity against the Korkyræans

in the city, that distress and even famine reigned there. Sixty Peloponnesian triremes were sent thither to assist the aggressors. As soon as it became known at Athens how hardly the Korkyræans in the city were pressed, orders were given to an Athenian fleet of forty triremes, about to sail for Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophoklēs, to halt in their voyage at Korkyra, and to lend whatever aid might be needed. But during the course of this voyage, an incident occurred elsewhere, neither foreseen nor imagined by anyone, which gave a new character and promise to the whole war—illustrating forcibly the observations of Periklēs and Archidamus before its commencement, on the impossibility of calculating what turn events might take.

So high did Demosthenēs stand in the favour of his countrymen after his brilliant successes in the Ambrakian Gulf, that they granted him permission at his own request to go aboard and to employ the fleet in any descent which he might think expedient on the coast of Peloponnesus. The attachment of this active officer to the Messenians at Naupaktus inspired him with the idea of planting a detachment of them on some well-chosen maritime post in the ancient Messenian territory, from whence they would be able permanently to harass the Lacedæmonians and provoke revolt among the Helots. The Messenians, active in privateering, and doubtless well-acquainted with the points of this coast, all of which had formerly belonged to their ancestors, had probably indicated to him Pylus on the south-western shore.

That was applied properly to denote the promontory which forms the northern termination of the modern bay of Navarino opposite to the island of Sphagia or Sphakteria. Accordingly, in circumnavigating Laconia, Demosthenēs requested that the fleet might be detained at this spot long enough to enable him to fortify it, engaging himself to stay afterwards and maintain it with a garrison. It was an uninhabited promontory—about forty-five miles from Sparta, that is, as far distant as any portion of her territory—presenting rugged cliffs, and easy of defence both by sea and land. But its great additional recommendation, with reference to the maritime power of Athens, consisted in its overhanging the spacious and secure basin now called the bay of Navarino. That basin was fronted and protected by the islet called Sphakteria or Sphagia, untrodden, untenanted and full of wood, which stretched along the coast for about a mile and three quarters¹, leaving only two narrow entrances—one at its northern end, opposite to the position fixed on by Demosthenēs, so confined as to admit only two triremes abreast, the other at the southern end about four times as broad; while the inner water approached by these two channels was both roomy and protected. It was on the coast of Peloponnesus, a little within the northern or narrowest of the two channels, that Demosthenēs proposed to plant his little fort—the ground being itself eminently favourable, with a spring of fresh water in the centre of the promontory.

But Eurymedon and Sophoklēs decidedly rejected all proposition of delay; and with much reason, since they had been informed (though seemingly without truth) that the Peloponnesian fleet had actually reached Korkyra. They might well have remembered the mischief

¹ The island is really 4,800 yards long. Probably the '15 stades' given by Thukydides (iv. 8)

apply to the length occupied by the Spartans during the subsequent operations.—ED.

which had ensued three years before, from the delay of the reinforcement sent to Phormio in some desultory operations on the coast of Crete. The fleet accordingly passed by Pylus without stopping: but a terrible storm drove them back and forced them to seek shelter in the very harbour which Demosthenès had fixed upon—the only harbour anywhere near. It happened, however, that the fleet was detained there for some days by stormy weather, so that the soldiers, having nothing to do, were seized with the spontaneous impulse of occupying themselves with the fortification. Having contemplated nothing of the kind on starting from Athens, they had neither tools for cutting stone, nor hods for carrying mortar. Accordingly they were compelled to build their wall by collecting such pieces of rock or stones as they found and putting them together as each happened to fit in: whenever mortar was needed, they brought it up on their bended backs, with hands joined behind them to prevent it from slipping away. Such deficiencies were made up, however, partly by the unbounded ardour of the soldiers, partly by the natural difficulties of the ground, which hardly required fortification except at particular points; the work was completed in a rough way in six days, and Demosthenès was left in garrison with five ships, while Eurymedon with the main fleet sailed away to Korkyra.

Intelligence of this attempt to plant upon the Lacedæmonian territory a hostile post was soon transmitted to Sparta. Yet no immediate measures were taken to march to the spot, as well from the natural slowness of the Spartan character, strengthened by a festival which happened to be then going on, as from the confidence entertained that, whenever attacked, the expulsion of the enemy was certain. A stronger impression, however, was made by the news upon the Lacedæmonian army invading Attica, who were at the same time suffering from want of provisions: accordingly Agis marched them back to Sparta, and the fortification of Pylus thus produced the effect of abridging the invasion to the unusually short period of fifteen days. It operated in like manner to the protection of Korkyra: for the Peloponnesian fleet, recently arrived thither or still on its way, received orders immediately to return for the attack of Pylus. Having avoided the Athenian fleet by transporting the ships across the isthmus at Leukas, it reached Pylus about the same time as the Lacedæmonian land-force from Sparta, composed of the Spartans themselves and the neighbouring Pericæi.

At the last moment before the Peloponnesian fleet came in and occupied the harbour, Demosthenès detached two out of his five triremes to warn Eurymedon: the remaining ships he hauled ashore under the fortification, protecting them by palisades planted in front. Having posted the larger portion of his force—some of them mere seamen without arms, and many only half-armed—round the assailable points of the fortification, to resist attacks from the land-force, he himself, with sixty chosen hoplites and a few bowmen, marched out of the fortification down to the sea-shore. It was on that side that the wall was weakest, for the Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had given themselves little trouble to provide against an assailant fleet. Accordingly, Demosthenès foresaw that the great stress of the attack would lie on the sea-side. His only safety consisted in preventing the enemy from landing, a purpose, seconded by the rocky and perilous shore, which left no possibility of

approach for ships except on a narrow space immediately under the fortification.

With a fleet of forty-three triremes and a powerful land-force, simultaneously attacking, the Lacedæmonians had good hopes of storming at once a rock so hastily converted into a military post. But as they foresaw that the first attack might possibly fail, and that the fleet of Eurymedon would probably return, they resolved to occupy forthwith the island of Sphakteria, the natural place where the Athenian fleet would take station for the purpose of assisting the garrison ashore. The neighbouring coast on the mainland of Peloponnesus was both harbourless and hostile, so that there was no other spot near, where they could take station. And the Lacedæmonian commanders reckoned upon being able to stop up, as it were mechanically, both the two entrances into the harbour, by triremes lashed together from the island to the mainland, with their prows pointing outwards: so that they would be able at any rate, occupying the island as well as the two channels, to keep off the Athenian fleet, and to hold Demosthenês closely blocked up on the rock of Pylus, where his provisions would quickly fail him. With these views they drafted off by lot some hoplites from each of the Spartan lochi, accompanied as usual by Helots, and sent them across to Sphakteria.

Of the assault on the land-side we hear little. The Lacedæmonians were proverbially unskilful in the attack of anything like a fortified place, and they appear now to have made little impression. But the chief stress and vigour of the attack came on the sea-side, as Demosthenês had foreseen. The assailing triremes rowed up, striving to get so placed as that the hoplites in the bow could effect a landing: but such were the difficulties arising partly from the rocks and partly from the defence, that squadron after squadron tried this in vain. Nor did even the gallant example of Brasidas procure for them any better success. Foremost in performance as well as in exhortation, Brasidas constrained his own pilot to drive his ship close in, and advanced in person even on to the landing-steps, for the purpose of leaping first ashore. But here he stood exposed to all the weapons of the Athenian defenders, who beat him back and pierced him with so many wounds, that he fainted away and fell back into the bows. His ship was obliged to retire, like the rest, without having effected any landing. To both sides it seemed a strange reversal of ordinary relations, that the Athenians, essentially maritime, should be fighting on land—against the Lacedæmonians, the select land-warriors of Greece, now on shipboard, and striving in vain to compass a landing on their own shore.

On the third day, the Lacedæmonians did not repeat their attack, but sent some of their vessels round to Asinê in the Messenian Gulf for timber to construct battering machines; which they intended to employ against the wall of Demosthenês on the side towards the harbour, where it was higher, and could not be assailed without machines, but where at the same time there was great facility in landing—for their previous attack had been made on the side fronting the sea, where the wall was lower, but the difficulties of landing insuperable.

But before these ships came back, the face of affairs was seriously changed by the return of the Athenian fleet from Zakynthos under Eurymedon, reinforced by four Chian ships and some of the guard-ships at

Naupaktus, so as now to muster fifty sail. The Athenian admiral, finding the enemy's fleet in possession of the harbour, and seeing both the island of Sphakteria occupied, and the opposite shore covered with Lacedæmonian hoplites—for the allies from all parts of Peloponnesus had now arrived—looked around in vain for a place to land. He could find no other night-station except the uninhabited island of Prôtê, not very far distant. From hence he sailed forth in the morning to Pylus, prepared for a naval engagement—hoping that perhaps the Lacedæmonians might come out to fight him in the open sea, but resolved, if this did not happen, to force his way in and attack the fleet in the harbour, the breadth of sea between Sphakteria and the mainland being sufficient to admit of nautical manœuvre. The Lacedæmonian admirals, seemingly confounded by the speed of the Athenian fleet in coming back, never thought of sailing out of the harbour to fight, nor did they even realize their scheme of blocking up the two entrances of the harbour with triremes closely lashed together. Leaving both entrances open, they determined to defend themselves within: but even here, so defective were their precautions, that several of their triremes were yet moored, and the rowers not fully aboard, when the Athenian admirals sailed in by both entrances at once, to attack them. Most of the Lacedæmonian triremes, afloat and in fighting trim, resisted the attack for a certain time, but were at length vanquished and driven back to the shore, many of them with serious injury. Five of them were captured and towed off, one with all her crew aboard. The Athenians, vigorously pursuing their success, drove against such as took refuge on the shore, as well as those which were not manned at the moment when the attack began, and had not been able to get afloat or into action. Some of the vanquished triremes being deserted by their crews, who jumped out upon the land, the Athenians were proceeding to tow them off, when the Lacedæmonian hoplites on the shore marched all armed into the water, seized the ships to prevent them from being dragged off, and engaged in a desperate conflict to baffle the assailants. At length the Lacedæmonians carried their point, and saved all the ships ashore, none being carried away except those at first captured.

But the great prize of the victory was neither in the five ships captured, nor in the relief afforded to the besieged at Pylus. It lay in the hoplites occupying the island of Sphakteria, who were now cut off from the mainland, as well as from all supplies. The Athenians, sailing round it in triumph, already looked upon them as their prisoners, while the Lacedæmonians on the opposite mainland, deeply distressed but not knowing what to do, sent to Sparta for advice. So grave was the emergency, that the Ephors came in person to the spot forthwith. Since they could still muster sixty triremes, a greater number than the Athenians—besides a large force on land, and the whole command of the resources of the country—while the Athenians had no footing on shore except the contracted promontory of Pylus, we might have imagined that a strenuous effort to carry off the imprisoned detachment across the narrow strait to the mainland would have had a fair chance of success. And probably, if either Demosthenês or Brasidas had been in command, such an effort would have been made. But Lacedæmonian courage was rather steadfast and unyielding than adventurous. Moreover the Athenian superiority at sea exercised a sort of fascination over men's minds analogous to that of

the Spartans themselves on land ; so that the Ephors, on reaching Pylus, took a desponding view of their position, and sent a herald to the Athenian generals to propose an armistice, in order to allow time for envoys to go to Athens and treat for peace.

To this Eurymedon and Demosthenês assented, and an armistice was concluded on the following terms. The Lacedæmonians agreed to surrender not only all their triremes now in the harbour, but also all the rest in their ports, altogether to the number of sixty ; also to abstain from all attack upon the fortress at Pylus either by land or sea, for such time as should be necessary for the mission of envoys to Athens as well as for their return, both to be effected in an Athenian trireme provided for the purpose. The Athenians on their side engaged to desist from all hostilities during the like interval ; but it was agreed that they should keep strict and unremitting watch over the island, yet without landing upon it. For the subsistence of the detachment in the island, the Lacedæmonians were permitted to send over every day a quantity of food ; but this was all to be done under the supervision of the Athenians, with peremptory obligations to send no secret additional supplies. It was moreover expressly stipulated that if any one provision of the armistice, small or great, were violated, the whole should be considered as null and void. Lastly, the Athenians engaged, on the return of the envoys from Athens, to restore the triremes in the same condition as they received them.

Such terms sufficiently attest the humiliation and anxiety of the Lacedæmonians ; while the surrender of their entire naval force, to the number of sixty triremes, which was forthwith carried into effect, demonstrates at the same time that they sincerely believed in the possibility of obtaining peace. Well aware that they were themselves the original beginners of the war, at a time when the Athenians desired peace—and that the latter had besides made fruitless overtures while under the pressure of the epidemic—they presumed that the same disposition still prevailed at Athens, and that their present pacific wishes would be so gladly welcomed as to procure without difficulty the relinquishment of the prisoners in Sphakteria.

The Lacedæmonian envoys, conveyed to Athens in an Athenian trireme, appeared before the public assembly to set forth their mission, according to custom. Their proposition was in substance a very simple one—'Give up to us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange for this favour, peace, with the alliance of Sparta.' They enforced their cause by appeals, well-turned and conciliatory, partly indeed to the generosity, but still more to the prudential calculation of Athens ; explicitly admitting the high and glorious vantage-ground on which she was now placed, as well as their own humbled dignity and inferior position. It became Athens to make use of her present good fortune while she had it—not to rely upon its permanence nor to abuse it by extravagant demands. By granting what was now asked, she might make a peace which would be far more durable than if it were founded on the extorted compliances of a weakened enemy, because it would rest on Spartan honour and gratitude. But if Athens should now refuse, and if, in the farther prosecution of the war, the men in Sphakteria should perish—a new and inextinguishable ground of quarrel, peculiar to Sparta herself, would be added to those already subsisting, which rather concerned Sparta as the chief

of the Peloponnesian confederacy. When once the two pre-eminent powers, Athens and Sparta, were established in cordial amity, the remaining Grecian states would be too weak to resist what they two might prescribe¹.

On this occasion, the Lacedæmonians acted entirely for themselves and from consideration of their own necessities, severing themselves from their allies, and soliciting a special peace for themselves, with as little scruple as the Spartan general Menedæus during the preceding year, when he abandoned his Ambrakiot confederates after the battle of Olpæ.

The course proper to be adopted by Athens in reference to the proposition, however, was by no means obvious. In all probability, the trime which brought the Lacedæmonian envoys also brought the first news of that unforeseen and instantaneous turn of events, which had rendered the Spartans in Sphakteria certain prisoners (so it was then conceived) and placed the whole Lacedæmonian fleet in their power, thus giving a totally new character to the war. It was difficult at first to measure the full bearings of the new situation, and even Periklēs himself might have hesitated what to recommend. But the immediate and dominant impression with the general public was, that Athens might now ask her own terms, as consideration for the prisoners in the island.

Of this reigning tendency Kleon² made himself the emphatic organ, as he had done three years before in the sentence passed on the Mitylenæans; a man who—like leading journals in modern times—often appeared to guide the public because he gave vehement utterance to that which they were already feeling, and carried it out in its collateral bearings and consequences. Reminding the Athenians of the dishonourable truce of Thirty years to which they had been compelled by the misfortunes of the time to accede, fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war—Kleon insisted that now was the time for Athens to recover what she had then lost—Nisæa, Pégæ, Trœzen, and Achaia. He proposed that Sparta

¹ Thukyd., iv. 20. [The language of the envoys need not be taken as mere cajolery. The policy of Sparta during the early years of the war confirms what an impartial review of the events of the previous decades would naturally suggest, that the Lacedæmonians were really quite willing to share the supremacy with Athens.]

Although war broke out several times between Sparta and Athens in the fifth century, the former generally showed reluctance, and on two occasions (457 and 445) deliberately abstained from following up her advantage (*cf.* notes to pp. 294, 302)—a generosity similar to that which Sparta constantly displayed towards Argos.

In the present war we have seen that the moving impulse, which in 459 came from the Saronic ports, and in 447 from Central Greece, proceeded from Megara, Ægina, and especially Corinth. At Sparta there was a considerable peace-party, which will be found asserting itself on this and on several other occasions. Moreover, in the actual conduct of operations the Spartans appear rather as executors of the Peloponnesian League's decree than as private enemies of Athens: their movements are of a half-hearted and spasmodic character, and the real initiative in the early campaigns seems to belong to Corinth.

Taking the war as a whole, we only find three periods in which Sparta displays any real energy: 424-422, 414-412, 407-404. These are the moments when her policy was dominated by an original genius, contending more or less for his own hand (Brasidas, Alkibiadēs, Lysander).

If we find Thukydides ascribing the whole war to Spartan animus against Athens (i. 23), we must take this as a reflection inspired by the ruthless energy of Lysander in the final campaigns. Jealousy as a motive seems out of place after the Athenian losses of 447-445.

Granting that the Spartans in 425 were genuinely anxious to resume their alliance with Athens, we may furthermore ask whether as president of the Peloponnesian League she was free to commit herself thus. In 421 a similar attempt failed altogether, but this may be largely due to later complications: (1) the renewed ambitions of Argos; (2) the aggravated enmity of Megara and Thebes against Athens; (3) the independent position of Athens' enemies in Chalkidike; (4) the vacillating policy of Athenian statesmen. In 425, therefore, Sparta might well have been able to force the hand of her allies and re-establish the old relations with the other great power of Hellas.—*Ed.*]

Aristophanēs, *Pac.*, 1048: 'Ἐξὼν σπείσασμένοις κοινῇ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀρχεῖν.

² Thukyd., iv. 21: μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεανέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὧν καὶ τῷ δῆμῳ πιθανώτατος· καὶ ἐπείσεν ἀποκρίνασθαι, etc.

This sentence reads like a first introduction of Kleon to the notice of the reader. It would appear that Thukydides had forgotten that he had before introduced Kleon on occasion of the Mitylenæan surrender, and that too in language very much the same—iii. 36.

should be required to restore these to Athens, in exchange for the soldiers now blocked up in Sphakteria ; after which a truce might be concluded for as long a time as might be deemed expedient.

On being informed of the resolution, the envoys made no comment on its substance, but invited the Athenians to name commissioners, who might discuss with them freely and deliberately suitable terms for a pacification. Here, however, Kleon burst upon them with an indignant rebuke. He had thought from the first (he said) that they came with dishonest purposes, but now the thing was clear—nothing else could be meant by this desire to treat with some few men apart from the general public. If they had really any fair proposition to make, he called upon them to proclaim it openly to all. But this the envoys could not bring themselves to do. They had probably come with authority to make certain concessions ; but to announce these concessions forthwith, would have rendered negotiation impossible, besides dishonouring them in the face of their allies. Moreover, they were totally unpractised in the talents for dealing with a public assembly, such discussions being so rare as to be practically unknown in the Lacedæmonian system. They remained silent—abashed by the speaker and intimidated by the temper of the assembly. Their mission was thus terminated, and they were re-conveyed in the trireme to Pylus.

We shall hereafter find other examples, in which the incapacity of Lacedæmonian envoys, to meet the open debate of Athenian political life, is productive of mischievous results. In this case, the proposition of the envoys to enter into treaty with select commissioners, was not only quite reasonable, but afforded the only possibility (though doubtless not a certainty) of some ultimate pacification : and the manœuvre whereby Kleon discredited it was a grave abuse of publicity—not unknown in modern, though more frequent in ancient, political life. Kleon probably thought that if commissioners were named, Nikias, Lachês, and other politicians of the same rank and colour, would be the persons selected ; persons whose anxiety for peace and alliance with Sparta would make them over-indulgent and careless in securing the interests of Athens. It will be seen, when we come to describe the conduct of Nikias four years afterwards, that this suspicion was not ill-grounded.

Unfortunately, Thukydidês, in describing the proceedings of this assembly, so important in its consequences because it intercepted a promising opening for peace, is brief as usual. But though nothing is positively stated respecting Nikias and his partisans, we learn from other sources that they vehemently opposed Kleon¹.

It has been common to treat the dismissal of the Lacedæmonian envoys on this occasion as a peculiar specimen of democratical folly. Yet over-estimation of the prospective chances arising out of success, to a degree more extravagant than that of which Athens was now guilty, is by no means peculiar to democracy. Other governments, opposed to democracy not less in temper than in form—an able despot like the Emperor Napoleon, and a powerful aristocracy like that of England²—have found success to the full as misleading. That Athens should desire to profit by this unexpected piece of good fortune, was perfectly reasonable : that

¹ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 7 ; Philochorus, *Fragm.*, 105, ed. Didot.

² Burke's *Speech to the Electors of Bristol pro-*

vious to the Election (Works, vol. iii., p. 365) ; and his *Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol*, p. 174 of the same volume.

she should make use of it to regain advantages which former misfortunes had compelled herself to surrender, was a feeling not unnatural.

We may, however, remark that Kleon gave an impolitic turn to Athenian feeling, by directing it towards the entire and literal reacquisition of what had been lost twenty years before. Unless we are to consider his quadruple demand as a flourish, to be modified by subsequent negotiation, it seems to present some plausibility, but little of long-sighted wisdom. For while on the one hand, it called upon Sparta to give up much which was not in her possession, and must have been extorted by force from allies—on the other hand, the situation of Athens was not the same as it had been when she concluded the Thirty years' truce; nor does it seem that the restoration of Achaia and Trœzen would have been of any material value to her. Nisæa and Pêgæ—which would have been tantamount to the entire Megarid, inasmuch as Megara itself could hardly have been held with both its ports in the possession of an enemy—would indeed have been highly valuable, since she could then have protected her territory against invasion from Peloponnesus, besides possessing a port in the Corinthian Gulf. And it would seem that if able commissioners had now been named for private discussion with the Lacedæmonian envoys, under the present urgent desire of Sparta coupled with her disposition to abandon her allies—this important point might possibly have been pressed and carried, in exchange for Sphakteria. Nay, even if such acquisition had been found impracticable, still the Athenians would have been able to effect some arrangement which would have widened the breach, and destroyed the confidence, between Sparta and her allies; a point of great moment for them to accomplish. There was therefore every reason for trying what could be done by negotiation, under the present temper of Sparta; and the step by which Kleon abruptly broke off such hopes was decidedly mischievous.

On the return of the envoys without success to Pylus, twenty days after their departure from that place, the armistice immediately terminated; and the Lacedæmonians redemanded the triremes which they had surrendered. But Eurymedon refused compliance with this demand, alleging that the Lacedæmonians had during the truce made a fraudulent attempt to surprise the rock of Pylus, and had violated the stipulations in other ways besides, while it stood expressly stipulated in the truce, that the violation by either side even of the least among its conditions should cancel all obligations on both sides. However the truth may be, Eurymedon persisted in his refusal, in spite of loud protests of the Lacedæmonians against his perfidy. Hostilities were energetically resumed: the Lacedæmonian army on land began again to attack the fortifications of Pylus, while the Athenian fleet became doubly watchful in the blockade of Sphakteria, in which they were reinforced by twenty fresh ships from Athens, making a fleet of seventy triremes in all. Two ships were perpetually rowing round the island, in opposite directions, throughout the whole day, while at night the whole fleet were kept on watch, except on the sea-side of the island in stormy weather.

The blockade, however, was soon found to be full of privation in reference to the besiegers themselves. The Athenians were much distressed for want of water. They had only one really good spring in the fortification of Pylus itself, quite insufficient for the supply of a large fleet; while

ships as well as men were perpetually afloat, since they could take rest and refreshment only by relays successively landing on the rock of Pylus, or even on the edge of Sphakteria itself, the ancient trireme affording no accommodation either for eating or sleeping¹.

In spite of all their vigilance, clandestine supplies of provisions continually reached the island, under the temptation of large rewards offered by the Spartan government. Able swimmers contrived to cross the strait, dragging after them by ropes skins full of linseed and poppy-seed mixed with honey; while merchant-vessels, chiefly manned by Helots, started from various parts of the Laconian coast, selecting by preference the stormy nights, and encountering every risk in order to run their vessel with its cargo ashore on the sea-side of the island, at a time when the Athenian guardships could not be on the look-out. They cared little about damage to their vessel in landing, provided they could get the cargo on shore, for ample compensation was ensured to them, together with emancipation to every Helot who succeeded in reaching the island with a supply. Week after week passed without any symptoms of surrender. The Athenians not only felt the present sufferings of their own position, but also became apprehensive for their own supplies, all brought by sea round Peloponnesus to this distant and naked shore. They began even to mistrust the possibility of thus indefinitely continuing the blockade, against the contingencies of such violent weather as would probably ensue at the close of summer. In this state of weariness and uncertainty, the active Demosthenês began to organize a descent upon the island, with the view of carrying it by force. He not only sent for forces from the neighbouring allies, Zakynthus and Naupaktus, but also transmitted an urgent request to Athens that reinforcements might be furnished to him for the purpose.

The arrival of these envoys caused infinite mortification to the Athenians at home. But the person most of all discomposed was Kleon, who observed that the people now regretted their insulting repudiation of the Lacedæmonian message, and were displeased with him as the author of it. At first, Kleon contended that the envoys had misrepresented the state of facts. To which the latter replied by entreating that, if their accuracy were mistrusted, commissioners of inspection might be sent to verify it; and Kleon himself was forthwith named for this function.

But it did not suit Kleon's purpose to go as commissioner to Pylus. His mistrust of the statement was a mere general suspicion, not resting on any positive evidence. Moreover he saw that the dispositions of the assembly tended to comply with the request of Demosthenês, and to despatch a reinforcing armament. He accordingly altered his tone at once: 'If ye really believe the story (he said), do not waste time in sending commissioners, but sail at once to capture the men. It would be easy with a proper force, if our generals were *men*, to sail and take the soldiers in the island. That is what *I* at least would do if *I* were general.' His words instantly provoked a hostile murmur from a portion of the assembly: 'Why do you not sail then at once, if you think the matter so easy?' Nikias, taking up this murmur, and delighted to have caught

¹ For the hardships of a continuous blockade off a coast without a suitable landing-place, cf. *Cæsar, Bell. Civ.*, lii. 13, 18, where we read that

the Pompeian admiral Bibulus actually died under his privations.—ED.

his political enemy in a trap, stood forward in person and pressed him to set about the enterprise without delay.

Kleon at first closed with this proposition, believing it to be a mere stratagem of debate and not seriously intended. But so soon as he saw that what was said was really meant, he tried to back out, and observed to Nikias—'It is your place to sail: *you* are general, not I.' Nikias only replied by repeating his exhortation, renouncing formally the command against Sphakteria, and calling upon the Athenians to recollect what Kleon had said, as well as to hold him to his engagement. The more Kleon tried to evade the duty, the louder and more unanimous did the cry of the assembly become that Nikias should surrender it to him, and that *he* should undertake it. At last, seeing that there was no possibility of receding, Kleon reluctantly accepted the charge, and came forward to announce his intention in a resolute address—'I am not at all afraid of the Lacedæmonians (he said): I shall sail without even taking with me any of the hoplites from the regular Athenian muster-roll, but only the Lemnian and Imbrian hoplites who are now here (that is, Athenian *kleruchs* or out-citizens who had properties in Lemnos and Imbros, and habitually resided there), together with some peltasts brought from Ænos in Thrace, and 400 bowmen. With this force, added to what is already at Pylus, I engage in the space of twenty days either to bring the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria hither as prisoners, or to kill them in the island.' The Athenians (observes Thukydides) laughed somewhat at Kleon's looseness of tongue; but prudent men had pleasure in reflecting that one or other of the two advantages was now certain: either they would get rid of Kleon, which they anticipated as the issue at once most probable and most desirable—or if mistaken on this point, the Lacedæmonians in the island would be killed or taken¹. The vote was accordingly passed for the immediate departure of Kleon, who caused Demosthenês to be named as his colleague in command, and sent intelligence to Pylus at once that he was about to start with the reinforcement solicited.

This curious scene, interesting as laying open the interior feeling of the Athenian assembly, suggests, when properly considered, reflections very different from those which have been usually connected with it. It seems to be conceived by most historians as a mere piece of levity or folly in the Athenian people, who are supposed to have enjoyed the excellent joke of putting an incompetent man against his own will at the head of this enterprise, in order that they might amuse themselves with his blunders. The truth is, that in regard to Kleon's alleged looseness of tongue, which excited more or less of laughter among the persons present, there was no one really ridiculous except the laughers themselves. For the announcement which he made was so far from being extravagant, that it was realized to the letter—and realized too, let us add, without any peculiar aid from unforeseen favourable accident.

If we intend fairly to compare the behaviour of Kleon with that of his political adversaries, we must distinguish between the two occasions: first, that in which he had frustrated the pacific mission of the Lacedæmonian envoys; next, the subsequent delay and dilemma which has been recently described. On the first occasion, his advice appears to have been mistaken in policy, as well as offensive in manner: his opponents,

¹ Thukyd., iv. 28.

proposing a discussion by special commissioners as a fair chance for honourable terms of peace, took a juster view of the public interests. But the case was entirely altered when the mission for peace (wisely or unwisely) had been broken up, and when the fate of Sphakteria had been committed to the chances of war. There were then imperative reasons for prosecuting the war vigorously, and for employing all the force requisite to ensure the capture of that island. And looking to this end, we shall find that there was nothing in the conduct of Kleon either to blame or to deride; while his political adversaries (Nikias among them) are deplorably reckless of the public interest, seeking only to turn the existing disappointment and dilemma into a party-opportunity for ruining him.

To grant the reinforcement asked for by Demosthenēs was obviously the proper measure, and Kleon saw that the people would go along with him in proposing it. But he had at the same time good grounds for reproaching Nikias and the other Stratēgi, whose duty it was to originate that proposition, with their backwardness in remaining silent, and in leaving the matter to go by default, as if it were Kleon's affair and not theirs. His taunt—'This is what *I* would have done, if *I* were general'—was a mere phrase of the heat of debate, such as must have been very often used without any idea on the part of the hearers of construing it as a pledge which the speaker was bound to realize. It was no disgrace to Kleon to decline a charge which he had never sought, and to confess his incompetence in command. The reason why he was forced into the post, in spite of his own unaffected reluctance, arose from two feelings, both perfectly serious, which divided the assembly—feelings opposite in their nature, but coinciding on this occasion to the same result. His enemies loudly urged him forward, anticipating that the enterprise under him would miscarry and that he would thus be ruined: his friends, perceiving this manœuvre, but not sharing in such anticipations, and ascribing his reluctance to modesty, pronounced themselves so much the more vehemently on behalf of their leader, and repaid the scornful cheer by cheers of sincere encouragement.

It is to be remarked that Nikias and his fellow Stratēgi were backward on this occasion, partly because they were really afraid of the duty. They anticipated a resistance to the death at Sphakteria such as that at Thermopylæ: in which case, though victory might perhaps be won by a superior assailing force, it would not be won without much bloodshed and peril, besides an inextinguishable quarrel with Sparta. If Kleon took a more correct measure of the chances, he ought to have credit for it as one '*bene ausus vana contemnere*'. And it seems probable, that if he had not been thus forward in supporting the request of Demosthenēs for reinforcement, Nikias and his friends would have laid aside the enterprise, and reopened negotiations for peace under circumstances neither honourable nor advantageous to Athens. Kleon was in this matter one main author of the most important success which Athens obtained throughout the whole war.

On joining Demosthenēs with his reinforcement, Kleon found every preparation for attack made by that general, and the soldiers at Pylus eager to commence such aggressive measures as would relieve them from the tedium of a blockade. Sphakteria had become recently more open to assault in consequence of an accidental conflagration of the wood. To

Demosthenês this was an accident especially welcome, for the painful experience of his defeat in the forest-covered hills of Ætolia had taught him how difficult it was for assailants to cope with an enemy whom they could not see, and who knew all the good points of defence in the country. The island being thus stripped of its wood, he was enabled to survey the garrison, to count their number, and to lay his plan of attack on certain data. The island was occupied altogether by 420 Lacedæmonian hoplites, out of whom more than 120 were native Spartans, belonging to the first families in the city. The commander Epitadas, with the main body, occupied the centre of the island, near the only spring of water which it afforded: an advanced guard of thirty hoplites was posted not far from the sea-shore in the end of the island farthest from Pylus; while the end immediately fronting Pylus, peculiarly steep and rugged, and containing even a rude circuit of stones, of unknown origin, which served as a sort of defence—was held as a post of reserve.

Leaving only one day for repose, the two generals took advantage of the night to put all their hoplites aboard a few triremes, making show as if they were merely commencing the ordinary nocturnal circumnavigation, so as to excite no suspicion in the occupants of the island. The entire body of Athenian hoplites, 800 in number, were thus disembarked in two divisions, one on each side of the island, a little before daybreak: the outposts, consisting of thirty Lacedæmonians, completely unprepared, were surprised even in their sleep, and all slain. At the point of day, the entire remaining force from the seventy-two triremes was also disembarked. Altogether there could not have been less than 10,000 troops employed in the attack of the island—men of all arms: 800 hoplites, 800 peltasts, 800 bowmen; the rest armed with javelins, slings, and stones. Demosthenês kept his hoplites in one compact body, but distributed the light-armed into separate companies of about 200 men each, with orders to occupy the rising grounds all round, and harass the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonians.

To resist this large force, the Lacedæmonian commander Epitadas had only about 360 hoplites around him. Of the Helots who were with him, Thukydidês says nothing during the whole course of the action. As soon as he saw the numbers and disposition of his enemies, Epitadas placed his men in battle array, and advanced to encounter the main body of hoplites whom he saw before him. No sooner had his march commenced, than he found himself assailed both in rear and flanks, especially in the right or unshielded flank, by the numerous companies of light-armed. Notwithstanding their extraordinary superiority of number, these men were at first awe-stricken at finding themselves in actual contest with Lacedæmonian hoplites. Still they began the fight, poured in their missile weapons, and so annoyed the march that the hoplites were obliged to halt, while Epitadas ordered the most active among them to spring out of their ranks and repel the assailants. But pursuers with spear and shield had little chance of overtaking men lightly clad and armed, who always retired, in whatever direction the pursuit was commenced—had the advantage of difficult ground—redoubled their annoyance against the rear of the pursuers, as soon as the latter retreated to resume their place in the ranks—and always took care to get ground to the rear of the hoplites.

After some experience of the inefficacy of Lacedæmonian pursuit, the light-armed, becoming far bolder than at first, closed upon them nearer and more universally, with arrows, javelins, and stones. Such method of fighting was one for which the Lykurgæan drill made no provision¹. Their only offensive arms consisted of the long spear and short sword usual to the Grecian hoplite, without any missile weapons whatever; nor could they even pick up and throw back the javelins of their enemies, since the points of these javelins commonly broke off. Moreover, the bows of the archers, doubtless carefully selected before starting from Athens, were powerfully drawn, so that their arrows may sometimes have pierced and inflicted wounds even through the shield or the helmet—but at any rate, the stuffed doublet, which formed the only defence of the hoplite on his unshielded side, was a very inadequate protection against them. At length the Lacedæmonian commander gave orders to close the ranks and retreat to the last redoubt in the rear.

A diminished remnant reached the last post in safety. Here they were in comparative protection, since the ground was so rocky and impracticable that their enemies could attack them neither in flank nor rear, though the position at any rate could not have been long tenable separately, inasmuch as the only spring of water in the island was in the centre, which they had just been compelled to abandon. Demosthenês and Kleon brought up their 800 Athenian hoplites, who had not before been engaged. But the Lacedæmonians were here at home with their weapons, and enabled to display their well-known superiority against opposing hoplites, especially as they had the vantage-ground against enemies charging from beneath. Although the Athenians were double in numbers, and withal yet unexhausted, they were repulsed in many successive attacks. The struggle lasted so long that heat and thirst began to tell even upon the assailants, when the commander of the Messenians came to Kleon and Demosthenês, and promised that if they would confide to him a detachment of light troops and bowmen, he would find his way round to the higher cliffs in the rear of the assailants. He accordingly stole away unobserved from the rear, scrambling round over pathless crags, and by an almost impracticable footing, on the brink of the sea, through approaches which the Lacedæmonians had left unguarded, never imagining that they could be molested in that direction. He suddenly appeared with his detachment on the higher peak above them, so that their position was thus commanded, and they found themselves, as at Thermopylæ, between two fires, without any hope of escape. Their enemies in front, encouraged by the success of the Messenians, pressed forward with increased ardour, until at length the courage of the Lacedæmonians gave way, and the position was carried.

A few moments more, and they would have been all overpowered and slain—when Kleon and Demosthenês, anxious to carry them as prisoners to Athens, constrained their men to halt, and proclaimed by herald an invitation to surrender, on condition of delivering up their arms, and being held at the disposal of the Athenians. Most of them, incapable of farther effort, closed with the proposition forthwith, signifying compliance by dropping their shields and waving their hands above their

¹ Thukyd., iv. 34: compare with this the narrative of the destruction of the Lacedæmonian

mora near Lechæum, by Iphikratês and the Peltastæ (Xenophon, *Hellen.*, iv. 5, 11).

heads. Finally they all surrendered themselves and delivered up their arms, 292 in number, the survivors of the original total of 420. And out of these no less than 120 were native Spartans, some of them belonging to the first families in the city. Seventy-two days had elapsed, from the first imprisonment in the island to the hour of their surrender.

The best troops in modern times would neither incur reproach, nor occasion surprise, by surrendering, under circumstances in all respects similar to this gallant remnant in Sphakteria. Yet in Greece the astonishment was prodigious and universal, when it was learnt that the Lacedæmonians had consented to become prisoners. For the terror inspired by their name, and the deep-struck impression of Thermopylæ had created a belief that they would endure any extremity of famine, and perish in the midst of any superiority of hostile force, rather than dream of giving up their arms and surviving as captives. The events of Sphakteria, shocking as they did this preconceived idea, discredited the military prowess of Sparta in the eyes of all Greece, and especially in those of her own allies. It is certain that the Spartans would have lost less by their death than by their surrender.

But the general judgement of the Greeks respecting the capture of Sphakteria, remarkable as it is to commemorate, is far less surprising than that pronounced by Thukydides himself. Kleon and Demosthenes returning with a part of the squadron and carrying all the prisoners, started from Sphakteria on the next day but one after the action, and reached Athens within twenty days after Kleon had left it. Thus 'the promise of Kleon, *insane as it was*, came true'—observes the historian.

If we carefully consider the promise, made by Kleon in the assembly, we shall find that so far from deserving the sentence pronounced upon it by Thukydides, of being a mad boast which came true by accident—it was a reasonable and even a modest anticipation of the future, reserving the only really doubtful point in the case—whether the garrison of the island would be ultimately slain or made prisoners¹.

I repeat with reluctance, though not without belief, the statement made by one of the biographers of Thukydides²—that Kleon was the cause of the banishment of the latter as a general, and has therefore received from him harder measure than was due in his capacity of historian. But though this sentiment is not probably without influence in dictating the unaccountable judgement which I have just been criticising—as well as other opinions relative to Kleon, on which I shall say more in a future chapter—I nevertheless look upon that judgement not as peculiar to Thukydides, but as common to him with Nikias and those whom we must call, for want of a better name, the oligarchical party of the time at Athens. And it gives us some measure of the prejudice and narrowness of vision which prevailed among that party at the present memorable crisis, so pointedly contrasting with the clear-sighted and resolute calculations, and the judicious conduct in action, of Kleon. Though the military attack of Sphakteria, one of the ablest specimens of generalship in the whole war, and distinguished not less by the dexterous employment of different descriptions of troops than by care to spare the lives of the assailants—belongs altogether to Demosthenes, yet if Kleon had not

¹ Holm (*Gk. Hist.*, ii., p. 393, n. 11) is inclined to see a preconceived plan between Kleon and Demosthenes in the Sphakteria debate. But

such a scheme would have been too far-fetched for practical politics.—Ed.

² *Vit. Thucydidis*, p. xv., ed. Bekker.

been competent to stand up in the Athenian assembly and defy those gloomy predictions which we see attested in Thukydidēs, Demosthenēs would never have been reinforced nor placed in condition to land on the island. The glory of the enterprise therefore belongs jointly to both. Kleon, far from stealing away the laurels of Demosthenēs (as Aristophanēs represents in his comedy of the *Knights*), was really the means of placing them on his head, though he at the same time deservedly shared them.

The return of Kleon and Demosthenēs to Athens, within the twenty days promised, bringing with them near 300 Lacedæmonian prisoners, must have been by far the most triumphant and exhilarating event which had occurred to the Athenians throughout the whole war. Such a number of Lacedæmonian prisoners, especially 120 Spartans, was a source of almost stupefaction to the general body of Greeks, and a prize of inestimable value to the captors.

The first impulse of the Athenians was to regard the prisoners as a guarantee to their territory against invasion. They resolved to keep them securely guarded until the peace, but, if at any time before that event the Lacedæmonian army should enter Attica, then to bring forth the prisoners, and put them to death in sight of the invaders. They were at the same time full of spirits in regard to the prosecution of the war, and became farther confirmed in the hope, not merely of preserving their power undiminished, but even of recovering much of what they had lost before the Thirty years' truce. Pylus was placed in an improved state of defence, with the adjoining island of Sphakteria doubtless as a subsidiary occupation. The Messenians, transferred thither from Nau-paktus, and overjoyed to find themselves once more masters even of an outlying rock of their ancestral territory, began with alacrity to overrun and ravage Laconia: while the Helots, shaken by the recent events, manifested inclination to desert to them. The Lacedæmonian authorities, experiencing evils before unfelt and unknown, became sensibly alarmed lest such desertions should spread through the country. Reluctant as they were to afford obvious evidence of their embarrassments, they nevertheless brought themselves to send to Athens several missions for peace; but all proved abortive¹. We are not told what they offered, but it did not come up to the expectations which the Athenians thought themselves entitled to indulge.

We, who now review these facts with a knowledge of the subsequent history, see that the Athenians could have concluded a better bargain with the Lacedæmonians during the six or eight months succeeding the capture of Sphakteria, than it was ever open to them to make afterwards: and they had reason to repent letting slip the opportunity². Perhaps indeed Periklēs, had he been still alive, might have taken a more prudent measure of the future, and might have had ascendancy enough over his countrymen to be able to arrest the tide of success at its highest point, before it began to ebb again.

¹ Thukyd., iv. 41; compare Aristophan., *Equit.*, 648, with Schol.

² Philochorus, quoted by Ar., *Pax*, 665 (F.H.G., I., No. 105) states that Kleon and the war-party secured the rejection of further peace embassies, the number of which is fixed by Ar., *Pax*, 667, at three. The 'higher demands' hinted at by Thuk., iv. 41, no doubt refer to Megara and Central Greece.

There can be little doubt that Periklēs would have been more compliant, for the Spartan terms carried with them the admission that the Athenian position was too strong for the Peloponnesians—the exact point which the war had been entered on to decide. In the new alliance Athens would no doubt have appeared as the predominant partner: and this was as high a position as Athenian ambition could reasonably demand.—Ed.

But if we put ourselves back into the situation of Athens during the autumn which succeeded the return of Kleon and Demosthenês from Sphakteria, we shall easily enter into the feelings under which the war was continued. The actual possession of the captives now placed Athens in a far better position than she had occupied when they were only blocked up in Sphakteria, and when the Lacedæmonian envoys first arrived to ask for peace. She was now certain of being able to command peace with Sparta on terms at least tolerable, whenever she chose to invite it—she had also a fair certainty of escaping the hardship of invasion. Next—and this was perhaps the most important feature of the case—the apprehension of Lacedæmonian prowess was now greatly lowered, and the prospects of success to Athens considered as prodigiously improved, even in the estimation of impartial Greeks, much more in the eyes of the Athenians themselves. Moreover the idea of a tide of good fortune—of future success as a corollary from past—was one which powerfully affected Grecian calculations generally. Why not push the present good fortune and try to regain the most important points lost before and by the Thirty years' truce, especially in Megara and Bœotia—points which Sparta could not concede by negotiation, since they were not in her possession? Probably the almost universal sentiment of Athens was at this moment warlike. That Demosthenês, now in full measure of esteem, would be eager to prosecute the war, with which his prospects of personal glory were essentially associated, can admit of no doubt. The comedy of Aristophanês called the *Acharnians* was acted about six months before the affair of Sphakteria, when no one could possibly look forward to such an event—the comedy of the *Knights* about six months after it¹. Now there is this remarkable difference between the two—that while the former breathes the greatest sickness of war, and presses in every possible way the importance of making peace, although at that time Athens had no opportunity of coming even to a decent accommodation—the latter talks in one or two places only of the hardships of war, and drops altogether that emphasis and repetition with which peace had been dwelt upon in the *Acharnians*—although coming out at a moment when peace was within the reach of the Athenians.

It was one of the earliest proceedings of Nikias, immediately after the inglorious exhibition which he had made in reference to Sphakteria, to conduct an expedition, in conjunction with two colleagues, against the Corinthian territory. He took with him 80 triremes, 2,000 Athenian hoplites, 200 horsemen aboard of some horse transports, and some additional hoplites from Milêtus, Andros, and Karystus². Starting from Peiræus in the evening, he arrived a little before day-break on a beach at the foot of the hill and village of Solymeia, about seven miles from Corinth,

¹ The *Acharneis* was performed at the festival of the Lenæa at Athens—January, 425 B.C.; the *Knights* at the same festival in the ensuing year, 424 B.C.

² It is hardly credible that the original provisions of the Delian League included compulsory land-service for the allies in purely Athenian interests. Yet we frequently find troops of the confederates on such expeditions—e.g., at Koroneia in 447 (Thuk., i. 113), at Solymeia, in Kythêra (iv. 53), while a large number of cities were represented in the Sicilian expedition (vii. 57). It is noticeable that in the treaty sworn by the people of Chalkis after the revolt of 446 (C.I.A., iv. (1),

p. 10; Hicks and Hill, 40, § 1, ll. 29-32) we find a clause stipulating military 'assistance' to Athens.

But it remains doubtful whether Athens imposed such service as a general obligation on all her tributaries, or whether she considered a special arrangement necessary with each city; at any rate we know that besides Chalkis, Milêtus, which is represented on most of these expeditions, was under a special treaty with Athens (C.I.A., iv., (1) 22a). Nor can we be sure that the allies disliked service paid at the rate of a drachma a day any more than the Argives and Mantineaans who volunteered on the Sicilian expedition because of the high remuneration offered.—Ed.

and two or three miles south of the Isthmus. The Corinthian troops were already assembled at the Isthmus itself to repel him ; for intelligence of the intended expedition had reached Corinth some time before from Argos, with which latter place the scheme of the expedition may have been in some way connected. The battle was first engaged on the Athenian right, almost immediately after its landing, on the point called Chersonesus. Here the Athenian hoplites, together with their Karystian allies, repelled the Corinthian attack. Nevertheless the Corinthians, retreating up to a higher point of ground, returned to the charge, and with the aid of a fresh lochus, drove the Athenians back to the shore and to their ships : from hence the latter again turned, and again recovered a partial advantage. The battle was no less severe on the left wing of the Athenians. But here, after a contest of some length, the latter gained a more decided victory, greatly by the aid of their cavalry—pursuing the Corinthians, who fled in some disorder to a neighbouring hill and there took up a position. The Athenians were thus victorious throughout the whole line, with the loss of about forty-seven men, while the Corinthians had lost 212, together with the general Lykophron. Reinforcements came both from Corinth and from Kenchreæ, and as it seems too, from the neighbouring Peloponnesian cities—so that Nikias thought it prudent to retire on board of his ships, and halt upon some neighbouring islands.

Nikias re-embarked, sailed along the coast of Epidaurus, upon which he inflicted some damage in passing, and stopped at last on the peninsula of Methana, between Epidaurus and Trœzen. On this peninsula he established a permanent garrison, drawing a fortification across the narrow neck of land which joined it to the Epidaurian peninsula. He then sailed home : but the post at Methana long remained as a centre for pillaging the neighbouring regions of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Halieis.

While Nikias was engaged in this expedition, Eurymedon and Sophoklès had sailed forward from Pylus with a considerable portion of that fleet which had been engaged in the capture of Sphakteria, to the island of Korkyra. Eurymedon and the Athenians, joining the Korkyræans in the city, attacked and stormed the post on Mount Istônê ; while the vanquished, retiring first to a lofty and inaccessible peak, were forced to surrender themselves on terms to the Athenians. Abandoning altogether their mercenary auxiliaries, they only stipulated that they should themselves be sent to Athens, and left to the discretion of the Athenian people. Eurymedon, assenting to these terms, deposited the disarmed prisoners in the neighbouring islet of Ptychia, under the distinct condition, that if a single man tried to escape, the whole capitulation should be null and void.

Unfortunately for these men, the orders given to Eurymedon carried him onward straight to Sicily. It was irksome therefore to him to send away a detachment of his squadron to convey prisoners to Athens, where the honours of delivering them would be reaped, not by himself, but by the officer to whom they might be confided. And the Korkyræans in the city, on their part, were equally anxious that the men should not be sent to Athens.

Their leaders, seemingly not without the privity of Eurymedon, sent across to Ptychia fraudulent emissaries under the guise of friends to the prisoners. These emissaries—assuring the prisoners that the Athenian commanders, in spite of the convention signed, were about to hand them

over to the Korkyraean people for destruction—induced some of them to attempt escape in a boat prepared for the purpose. By concert, the boat was seized in the act of escaping, so that the terms of the capitulation were really violated, upon which Eurymedon handed over the prisoners to their enemies in the island, who imprisoned them all together in one vast building, under guard of hoplites. From this building they were drawn out in companies of twenty men each, chained together in couples, and compelled to march between two lines of hoplites marshalled on each side of the road. Those who loitered in the march were hurried on by whips from behind: as they advanced, their private enemies on both sides singled them out, striking and piercing them until at length they miserably perished. Three successive companies were thus destroyed—ere the remaining prisoners in the interior, who thought merely that their place of detention was about to be changed, suspected what was passing. As soon as they found it out, one and all refused either to quit the building or to permit anyone else to enter. Their enemies, abstaining from attempts to force the door of the building, made an aperture in the roof, from whence they shot down arrows, and poured showers of tiles upon the prisoners within, who sought at first to protect themselves, but at length abandoned themselves to despair, and assisted with their own hands in the work of destruction. At daybreak the Korkyraeans entered the building, piled up the dead bodies on carts, and transported them out of the city: the exact number we are not told, but seemingly it cannot have been less than 300.

The complete prostration of Ambrakia during the campaign of the preceding year had left Anaktorium without any defence against the Akarnanians and Athenian squadron from Naupaktus. They besieged and took it during the course of the present summer, expelling the Corinthian proprietors, and re-peopling the town and its territory with Akarnanian settlers from all the townships in the country.

Throughout the maritime empire of Athens matters continued perfectly tranquil, except that the inhabitants of Chios, during the course of the autumn, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians from having recently built a new wall to their city, as if it were done with the intention of taking the first opportunity to revolt. They solemnly protested their innocence of any such designs, but the Athenians were not satisfied without exacting the destruction of the obnoxious wall. The presence on the opposite continent of an active band of Mitylenæan exiles, who captured both Rhœteium and Antandrus during the ensuing spring, probably made the Athenians more anxious and vigilant on the subject of Chios.

The Athenian tribute-gathering squadron, circulating among the maritime subjects, captured, during the course of the present autumn, a prisoner of some importance and singularity. It was a Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, seized at Eion on the Strymon, in his way to Sparta with despatches from the Great King. He was brought to Athens, where his despatches, which were at some length and written in the Assyrian character, were translated and made public. The Great King told the Lacedæmonians, in substance, that he could not comprehend what they meant; for that among the numerous envoys whom they had sent, no two told the same story. Accordingly he desired them, if they wished to make themselves understood, to send some envoys with fresh

and plain instructions to accompany Artaphernes. Such was the substance of the despatch, conveying a remarkable testimony as to the march of the Lacedæmonian government in its foreign policy. The extreme defects in the foreign management of Sparta, revealed by the despatch of Artaphernes, seem traceable partly to an habitual faithlessness often noted in the Lacedæmonian character—partly to the annual change of Ephors, so frequently bringing into power men who strove to undo what had been done by their predecessors—and still more to the absence of everything like discussion or canvass of public measures among the citizens. We shall find more than one example, in the history about to follow, of this disposition on the part of Ephors not merely to change the policy of their predecessors, but even to subvert treaties sworn and concluded by them¹. Such was the habitual secrecy of Spartan public business, that in doing this they had neither criticism nor discussion to fear. Brasidas, when he started from Sparta on the expedition which will be described in the coming chapter, could not trust the assurances of the Lacedæmonian executive without binding them by the most solemn oaths².

The Athenians sent back Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and availed themselves of this opportunity for procuring access to the Great King. They sent envoys along with him, with the intention that they should accompany him up to Susa, but on reaching Asia, the news met them that King Artaxerxes had recently died. Under such circumstances, it was not judged expedient to prosecute the mission, and the Athenians dropped their design³.

Respecting the great monarchy of Persia, during this long interval of fifty-four years since the repulse of Xerxēs from Greece, we have little information before us except the names of the successive kings. In the year 465 B.C., Xerxēs was assassinated by Artabanus and Mithradates, through one of those plots of great household officers, so frequent in Oriental palaces. He left two sons, or at least two sons present and conspicuous among a greater number, Darius and Artaxerxes. But Artabanus persuaded Artaxerxes that Darius had been the murderer of Xerxēs, and thus prevailed upon him to revenge his father's death by becoming an accomplice in killing his brother Darius: he next tried to assassinate Artaxerxes himself, and to appropriate the crown. Artaxerxes, however, being apprised beforehand of the scheme, either slew Artabanus with his own hand or procured him to be slain, and then reigned (known under the name of Artaxerxes Longimanus) for forty years, down to the period at which we are now arrived⁴.

Mention has already been made of the revolt of Egypt from the dominion of Artaxerxes, under the Libyan prince Inarus, actively aided by the Athenians. After a few years of success, this revolt was crushed and Egypt again subjugated, by the energy of the Persian general Megabyzus—with severe loss to the Athenian forces engaged.

¹ The contention that the repudiation of obligations is not peculiar to democracies is confirmed by the notorious perfidy of the Roman senate on several important occasions—e.g., after the disaster at the Caudine Forks (Livy, ix. 8, 9), and in the dealings with the Numantines who had negotiated with Q. Pompeius and Mancinus (Appian, iii. 79, 83).—Ed.

² Thukyd., iv. 86.

³ Thukyd., iv. 50; Diodor., xii. 64. The Athenians do not appear to have ever before sent

envoys or courted alliance with the Great King; though the idea of doing so must have been noway strange to them, as we may see by the humorous scene of Pseudartabas in the *Acharnais* of Aristophanes, acted in the year before this event.

⁴ Diodor., xl. 65; Aristotel., *Polit.*, v. 8, 3; Justin, iii. 1; Ktesias, *Persica*, c. 29, 30. It is evident that there were contradictory stories current respecting the plot to which Xerxēs fell a victim: but we have no means of determining what the details were.

At the death of Artaxerxes Longimanus, the family violences incident to a Persian succession were again exhibited. His son Xerxês succeeded him, but was assassinated, after a reign of a few weeks or months. Another son, Sogdianus, followed, who perished in like manner after a short interval¹. Lastly, a third son, Ochus (known under the name of Darius Nothus), either abler or more fortunate, kept his crown and life between nineteen and twenty years. By his queen Parysatis, he was father to Artaxerxes Mnemon and Cyrus the younger, both names of interest in reference to Grecian history.

APPENDIX

AN important event belonging to the year 425 is the raising of the allies' tribute throughout the Athenian empire. This change was originally known to us from the following sources: (1) Ar., *Vesp.*, 660, estimates the total revenue at nearly 2,000 talents (422 B.C.). (2) Andok., *De Pace*, § 9 (whom Æschinês, *Fals. Leg.*, p. 337, reproduces in a slightly altered form), says that after Nikias' peace over 1,200 talents were coming in every year from the League. (3) Plutarch, *Aristid.*, c. 24, mentions that after Periklês' death the demagogues gradually raised the tribute to 1,300 talents. (4) [Andok.], in *Alkib.*, § 11, accuses Alkibiadês of having doubled the tribute when he was *τακτής*.

On the other hand, Thukydidês passes over this measure in absolute silence. Hence Grote was induced to disbelieve in its existence altogether (see note 2 on p. 149, vol. iv., in the 1852 edition).

In support of such scepticism it may be pointed out that the accounts quoted above are partly contradictory, and contain some demonstrable errors of detail. Yet they agree in recording an increase of tribute about the time under consideration.

The question has been settled by the discovery of the assessment-list of 425-424 (C.I.A., i. 37; iv. (1), pp. 13, 54, 66, 140; Hicks and Hill, 64). The rates here given are much higher than on the quota-lists—e.g., the Island district is assessed at 150 talents instead of 80, the Hellespontine district at 295 talents instead of 98. Furthermore, the *κεφάλαιον* for the year has come to light again, and (according to the restoration of the left-hand symbol in the total) figures at 960 or 1,460 talents (Wilhelm, *Jahresheft des Æstr. Instituts*, i., Appendix p. 43). In either case, all the authors adduced above are substantially confirmed.

The author of this decree is, of course, not Alkibiadês (who was too young to be *τακτής* in 425), but a certain Thudippus, who may be looked upon as a lay-figure in the service of Kleon. At any rate, this latter politician is by far the most likely author of the measure.

It remains to observe that the tribute even at this increased rate could hardly be called exorbitant in time of war (*cf.* appendix to c. xvii, § 2).—ED.

¹ Diodor., xii. 64-71; Ktesias, *Persica*, c. 44-46.

CHAPTER XXIII [LIII]

EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR

THE eighth year of the war presents events of a more important and decisive character than any of the preceding. In reviewing the preceding years we observe that though there is much fighting, with hardship and privation inflicted on both sides, yet the operations are mostly of a desultory character, not calculated to determine the event of the war. But the capture of Sphakteria and its prisoners, coupled with the surrender of the whole Lacedæmonian fleet, was an event full of consequences and imposing in the eyes of all Greece. It stimulated the Athenians to a series of operations, larger and more ambitious than anything which they had yet conceived—directed, not merely against Sparta in her own country, but also to the reconquest of that ascendancy in Megara and Bœotia which they had lost on or before the Thirty years' truce. On the other hand, it intimidated so much both the Lacedæmonians, the revolted Chalkidic allies of Athens in Thrace, and Perdikkas king of Macedonia—that between them the expedition of Brasidas, which struck so serious a blow at the Athenian empire, was concerted. This year is thus the turning-point of the war. If the operations of Athens had succeeded, she would have regained nearly as great a power as she enjoyed before the Thirty years' truce. But it happened that Sparta, or rather the Spartan Brasidas, proved successful, gaining enough to neutralize all the advantages derived by Athens from the capture of Sphakteria.

The first enterprise undertaken by the Athenians in the course of the spring was against the island of Kythêra, on the southern coast of Laconia. It was inhabited by Lacedæmonian Periœki, and administered by a governor, and garrison of hoplites, annually sent thither. It was the usual point of landing for merchantmen from Libya and Egypt; and as it lay very near to Cape Malea, immediately over against the Gulf of Gythium—the only accessible portion of the generally inhospitable coast of Laconia—the chance that it might fall into the hands of an enemy was considered as so menacing to Sparta, that some politicians are said to have wished the island at the bottom of the sea¹. Nikias, in conjunction with Nikostratus and Autoklês, conducted thither a fleet of sixty triremes, with 2,000 Athenian hoplites, some few horsemen, and a body of allies mainly Milesians².

A certain party in the island among them had indeed secretly invited the coming of Nikias, through which intrigue easy terms were obtained for the inhabitants. Some few men, indicated by the Kytherians in intelligence with Nikias, were carried away as prisoners to Athens; but the remainder were left undisturbed and enrolled among the tributary allies under obligation to pay four talents per annum, an Athenian garrison being placed at Kythêra for the protection of the island. From

¹ Thukyd., iv. 54; Herodot., vii. 235. The manner in which Herodotus alludes to the dangers which would arise to Sparta from the occupation of Kythêra by an enemy, furnishes one additional probability tending to show that his history was composed before the actual occupation of the island by Nikias, in the eighth year of the Pelopon-

nesian war. Had he been cognizant of this latter event, he would naturally have made some allusion to it.

² Thukyd., iv. 54: *δισχιλίους Μιλησίων ὁπλίταις*. It seems impossible to believe that there could have been so many as 2,000 Milesian hoplites: but we cannot tell where the mistake lies.

hence Nikias employed seven days in descents and inroads upon the coast, near Helos, Asinê, Aphrodisia, Kotyrta, and elsewhere.

In returning home from Kythêra, Nikias first ravaged the small strip of cultivated land near Epidaurus Limêra, on the rocky eastern coast of Laconia, and then attacked the Æginetan settlement at Thyrea, the frontier strip between Laconia and Argolis. This town and district had been made over by Sparta to the Æginetans, at the time when they were expelled from their own island by Athens in the first year of the war. The new inhabitants, finding the town too distant from the sea¹ for their maritime habits, were now employed in constructing a fortification close on the shore, in which work a Lacedæmonian detachment, on guard in that neighbourhood, was assisting them. When the Athenians landed, both Æginetans and Lacedæmonians at once abandoned the new fortification. The Æginetans occupied the upper town of Thyrea; but the Lacedæmonian troops, not thinking it tenable, refused to take part in the defence, and retired to the neighbouring mountains, in spite of urgent entreaty from the Æginetans. Immediately after landing, the Athenians marched up to the town of Thyrea, and carried it by storm, burning or destroying everything within it. All the Æginetans were either killed or made prisoners. From hence the armament returned to Athens, where a vote was taken as to the disposal of the prisoners. The Kytherians brought home were distributed for safe custody among the dependent islands; but a harder fate was reserved for the Æginetans. They were all put to death, victims to the long-standing antipathy between Athens and Ægina. This cruel act was nothing more than a strict application of admitted customs of war in those days².

The occupation of Kythêra, in addition to Pylus, by an Athenian garrison, following so closely upon the capital disaster in Sphakteria, produced in the minds of the Spartans feelings of alarm and depression such as they had never before experienced. They anticipated nothing less than incessant foreign attacks on all their weak points, with every probability of internal defection, from the standing discontent of the Helots. It was not unknown to them probably that Kythêra itself had been lost partly through betrayal. The capture of Sphakteria had caused peculiar emotion among the Helots, to whom the Lacedæmonians had addressed both appeals and promises of emancipation, in order to procure succour for the hoplites while blockaded in the island. If the ultimate surrender of these hoplites had abated the terrors of Lacedæmonian prowess throughout all Greece, such effect had been produced to a still greater degree among the oppressed Helots. A refuge at Pylus, and a nucleus which presented some possibility of expanding into regenerated Messenia, were now before their eyes; while the establishment of an Athenian garrison at Kythêra opened a new channel of communication with the enemies of Sparta, so as to tempt all the Helots of daring temper to stand forward as liberators of their enslaved race. The Lacedæmonians, habitually cautious at all times, felt now as if the tide of fortune had turned decidedly against them, and acted with confirmed mistrust and dismay, confining themselves to measures strictly defensive, but organizing a force of

¹ Thukyd., iv. 56. He states that Thyrea was ten stadia, or about a mile and one-fifth, distant from the sea. But Colonel Leake (*Travels in the Morea*, vol. ii., ch. xxii., p. 492), who has dis-

covered quite sufficient ruins to identify the spot, affirms 'that it is at least three times that distance from the sea'.

² Thukyd., iv. 58; Diodor., xii. 65.

400 cavalry, together with a body of bowmen, beyond their ordinary establishment.

The precautions which they thought it necessary to take in regard to the Helots afford the best measure of their apprehensions at the moment, and exhibit moreover a refinement of fraud and cruelty rarely equalled in history. Wishing to single out from the general body such as were most high-couraged and valiant, the Ephors made proclamation, that those Helots, who conceived themselves to have earned their liberty by distinguished services in war, might stand forward to claim it. A considerable number obeyed the call—probably many who had undergone imminent hazards during the preceding summer in order to convey provisions to the blockaded soldiers in Sphakteria. After being examined by the government 2,000 of them were selected as fully worthy of emancipation, which was forthwith bestowed upon them in public ceremonial—with garlands, visits to the temples, and the full measure of religious solemnity. The government had now made the selection which it desired; presently every man among these newly-enfranchised Helots was made away with—no one knew how. A stratagem so perfidious stands without parallel in Grecian history—we might almost say, without a parallel in any history. It implies a depravity far greater than the rigorous execution of a barbarous customary law against prisoners of war or rebels, even in large numbers. The Ephors must have employed numerous instruments, apart from each other, for the performance of this bloody deed. Yet it appears that no certain knowledge could be obtained of the details—a striking proof of the mysterious efficiency of this Council of Five, surpassing even that of the Council of Ten at Venice—as well as of the utter absence of public inquiry or discussion.

It was while the Lacedæmonians were in this state of uneasiness at home that envoys reached them from Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Chalkidians of Thrace, entreating aid against Athens, who was considered likely, in her present tide of success, to resume aggressive measures against them. There were moreover other parties, in the neighbouring cities subject to Athens, who secretly favoured the application, engaging to stand forward in open revolt as soon as any auxiliary force should arrive to warrant their incurring the hazard. Perdikkas and the Chalkidians offered at the same time to provide the pay and maintenance, as well as to facilitate the transit, of the troops who might be sent to them. And—what was of still greater importance to the success of the enterprise—they specially requested that Brasidas might be invested with the command. He had now recovered from his wounds received at Pylus, and his reputation for adventurous valour, great as it was from positive desert, stood out still more conspicuously, because not a single other Spartan had as yet distinguished himself. His other great qualities, apart from personal valour, had not yet been shown, for he had never been in any supreme command. But he burned with impatience to undertake the operation destined for him by the envoys, although at this time it must have appeared so replete with difficulty and danger, that probably no other Spartan except himself would have entered upon it with hopes of success. To raise up embarrassments for Athens in Thrace was an object of great consequence to Sparta, while she also obtained an opportunity of sending away another large detachment of dangerous Helots. Seven

hundred of these latter were armed as hoplites and placed under the orders of Brasidas, but the Lacedæmonians would not assign to him any of their own proper forces. With the sanction of the Spartan name—with 700 Helot hoplites, and with such other hoplites as he could raise in Peloponnesus by means of the funds furnished from the Chalkidians—Brasidas prepared to undertake this expedition, alike adventurous and important.

Had the Athenians entertained any suspicion of his design, they could easily have prevented him from ever reaching Thrace. But they knew nothing of it until he had actually joined Perdikkas, nor did they anticipate any serious attack from Sparta, in this moment of her depression—much less, an enterprise far bolder than any which she had ever been known to undertake. They were now elate with hopes of conquests to come on their own part—their affairs being so prosperous and promising, that parties favourable to their interests began to revive, both in Megara and in Bœotia, while Hippokratês and Demosthenês, the two chief stratêgi for the year, were men of energy, well-qualified both to project and execute military achievements.

The first opportunity presented itself in regard to Megara. The inhabitants of that city had been greater sufferers by the war than any other persons in Greece. Twice in every year the Athenians laid waste the Megarid, which bordered upon their own territory; and that too with such destructive efficacy, that they intercepted all subsistence from the lands near the town—at the same time keeping the harbour of Nisæa closely blocked up. Under such hard conditions the Megarians found much difficulty in supplying even the primary wants of life¹. But their case had now, within the last few months, become still more intolerable by an intestine commotion in the city, ending in the expulsion of a powerful body of exiles, who seized and held possession of Pêgæ, the Megarian port in the Gulf of Corinth. Probably imports from Pêgæ had been their chief previous resource against the destruction which came on them from the side of Athens; so that it became scarcely possible to sustain themselves, while the exiles in Pêgæ not only deprived them of this resource, but took positive part in harassing them. These exiles were oligarchical, and the government in Megara had now become more or less democratical. But the privations in the city presently reached such a height, that several citizens began to labour for a compromise, whereby the exiles in Pêgæ might be readmitted. It was evident to the leaders in Megara that the bulk of the citizens could not long sustain the pressure of enemies from both sides—but it was also their feeling, that the exiles in Pêgæ, their bitter political rivals, were worse enemies than the Athenians, and that the return of these exiles would be a sentence of death to themselves. To prevent this counter-revolution, they opened a secret correspondence with Hippokratês and Demosthenês, engaging to betray both Megara and Nisæa to the Athenians, though Nisæa, the harbour of Megara, about one mile from the city, was a separate fortress, occupied by a Peloponnesian garrison, and by them exclusively, as well as the Long Walls, for the purpose of holding Megara fast to the Lacedæmonian confederacy.

The scheme for surprise was concerted, and what is more remarkable—in the extreme publicity of all Athenian affairs, and in a matter to which

¹ The picture drawn by Aristophanês (*Acharn.*, 760) is a caricature, but of suffering probably but too real.

many persons must have been privy—was kept secret until the instant of execution. A large Athenian force, 4,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry, was appointed to march at night by the high road through Eleusis to Megara : but Hippokratês and Demosthenês themselves went on shipboard from Peiræus to the island of Minoa, which was close against Nisæa, and had been for some time under occupation by an Athenian garrison. Hippokratês concealed himself with 600 hoplites on the mainland opposite to Minoa, and not far from a gate in the Long Wall ; while Demosthenês placed himself in ambush in the sacred precincts of Arês, still closer to the same gate.

On the night fixed for the surprise, but the moment that the gate in the Long Wall was opened, Demosthenês with his comrades sprang forward to force their way in. This active and determined band were successful in mastering the gate, and keeping it open, until the 600 hoplites under Hippokratês came up, and got in to the interior space between the Long Walls. They immediately mounted the walls on each side, every man as he came in, with little thought of order, to drive off or destroy the Peloponnesian guards, who, taken by surprise, and fancying that the Megarians generally were in concert with the enemy against them, were soon discouraged and fled into Nisæa. By a little after daybreak, the Athenians found themselves masters of all the line of the Long Walls, and under the very gates of Megara—as well as reinforced by the larger force, which having marched by land through Eleusis, arrived at the concerted moment.

Meanwhile the Megarians within the city were in the greatest tumult and consternation. But the conspirators, prepared with their plan, had resolved to propose that the gates should be thrown open and that the whole force of the city should be marched out to fight the Athenians. When once the gates should be open, they themselves intended to take part with the Athenians and facilitate their entrance—and they had rubbed their bodies over with oil in order to be visibly distinguished in the eyes of the latter. The plan was only frustrated the moment before it was about to be put in execution, by the divulcation of one of their own comrades. Without betraying any knowledge of the momentous secret which they had just learned, these opponents loudly protested against opening the gate and going out to fight an enemy for whom they had never conceived themselves, even in moments of greater strength, to be a match in the open field. For such resistance the conspirators were not prepared, so that they were forced to abandon their design and leave the gate closed.

The Athenian generals soon perceived by the delay that their friends within had been baffled, and immediately resolved to make sure of Nisæa which lay behind them, an acquisition important not less in itself, than as a probable means for the mastery of Megara. They set about the work with the characteristic rapidity of Athenians. Masons and tools in abundance being forthwith sent for from Athens, the army distributed among themselves the wall of circumvallation round Nisæa in distinct parts. First, the interior space between the Long Walls themselves was built across, so as to cut off the communication with Megara ; next, walls were carried out from the outside of both the Long Walls down to the sea, so as completely to enclose Nisæa with its fortifications and ditch. In a day

and a half the work of circumvallation was almost completed, so that the Peloponnesians in Nisæa saw before them nothing but a hopeless state of blockade. Despairing of speedy relief from Peloponnesus, they accepted easy terms of capitulation offered to them by the Athenian generals.

Megara in its present distracted state would certainly have fallen into their hands had it not been snatched from them by the accidental neighbourhood and energetic intervention of Brasidas. That officer, occupied in the levy of troops for his Thracian expedition, was near Corinth and Sikyon when he first learnt the surprise and capture of the Long Walls. Partly from the alarm which the news excited among these Peloponnesian towns, partly from his own personal influence, he got together a body of 2,700 Corinthian hoplites, 600 Sikyonian, and 400 Phliasian, besides his own small army, and marched with this united force to Tripodiskus in the Megarid, half-way between Megara and Pêgæ, on the road over Mount Geraneia, having first despatched a pressing summons to the Bœotians, to request that they would meet him at that point with reinforcements. Alarmed for the safety of Megara, he proceeded thither by a night-march without delay. Taking with him only a chosen band of 300 men, he presented himself, without being expected, at the gates of the city, entreating to be admitted, and offering to lend his immediate aid for the recovery of Nisæa. One of the two parties in Megara would have been glad to comply ; but the other, knowing well that in that case the exiles from Pêgæ would be brought back upon them, was prepared for a strenuous resistance, in which case the Athenian force, still only one mile off, would have been introduced as auxiliaries. Under these circumstances the two parties came to a compromise and mutually agreed to refuse admittance to Brasidas. They expected that a battle would take place between him and the Athenians, and each calculated that Megara would follow the fortunes of the victor.

Returning back without success to Tripodiskus, Brasidas was joined there early in the morning by 2,000 Bœotian hoplites and 600 cavalry ; for the Bœotians had been put in motion by the same news as himself, and had even commenced their march before his messenger arrived, with such celerity as to have already reached Platæa. The total force under Brasidas was thus increased to 6,000 hoplites and 600 cavalry, with whom he marched straight to the neighbourhood of Megara. After an indecisive cavalry skirmish, Brasidas advanced with his main force into the plain between Megara and the sea, taking up a position near to the Athenian hoplites, who were drawn up in battle array hard by Nisæa and the Long Walls. The Athenian generals reflected, that they had already secured a material acquisition in Nisæa, which cut off Megara from their sea ; that the army opposed to them was not only superior in number of hoplites, but composed of contingents from many different cities, so that no one city hazarded much in the action ; while their own force was all Athenian and composed of the best hoplites in Athens, which would render a defeat severely ruinous to the city. They did not think it worth while to encounter this risk, even for the purpose of gaining possession of Megara. With such views in the leaders on both sides, the two armies remained for some time in position, each waiting for the other to attack. At length the Athenians, seeing that no aggressive movement was con-

templated by their opponents, were the first to retire into Nisæa. Thus left master of the field, Brasidas retired in triumph to Megara, the gates of which were now opened without reserve to admit him.

The army of Brasidas, having gained the chief point for which it was collected, speedily dispersed, he himself resuming his preparations for Thrace, while the Athenians on their side also returned home, leaving an adequate garrison for the occupation both of Nisæa and of the Long Walls. But the interior of Megara underwent a complete and violent revolution. While the leaders friendly to Athens, not thinking it safe to remain, fled forthwith and sought shelter with the Athenians¹, the opposite party opened communication with the exiles at Pêgæ and readmitted them into the city, binding them, however, by the most solemn pledges to observe absolute amnesty of the past, and to study nothing but the welfare of the common city. The new-comers only kept their pledge during the interval which elapsed until they acquired power to violate it with effect. They seized many of their most obnoxious enemies—some of them suspected as accomplices in the recent conspiracy with Athens. The men thus seized were subjected to the forms of a public trial, before that which was called a public assembly, wherein each voter, acting under military terror, was constrained to give his suffrage openly. All were condemned to death and executed, to the number of 100. The constitution of Megara was then shaped into an oligarchy of the closest possible kind, a few of the most violent men taking complete possession of the government. But they must probably have conducted it with vigour and prudence for their own purposes, since Thukydides remarks that it was rare to see a revolution accomplished by so small a party, and yet so durable. A few months after these incidents, the Megarians regained possession of their Long Walls, by capture from the Athenians, and levelled the whole line of them to the ground: but the Athenians still retained Nisæa.

The scheme for surprising Megara had been both laid and executed with skill, and only miscarried through an accident to which such schemes are always liable, as well as by the unexpected celerity of Brasidas². It had moreover succeeded so far as to enable the Athenians to carry Nisæa—one of the posts which they had surrendered by the Thirty years' truce, and of considerable positive value to them: so that it counted on the whole as a victory, leaving the generals with increased encouragement to turn their activity elsewhere. Accordingly, very soon after the troops had been brought back from the Megarid, Hippokratês and Demosthenês concerted a still more extensive plan for the invasion of Bœotia, in conjunction with some malcontents in the Bœotian towns, who desired to

¹ We find some of them afterwards in the service of Athens, employed as light-armed troops in the Sicilian expedition (Thukyd., vi. 43).

² While admitting that on the whole the Athenian plan for the capture of Megara was well laid, we may observe one or two defects in their scheme of operations. It would have been well worth while by a still greater effort to raise a force sufficient (1) to beat the Megarians; (2) to hold the Kithæron defile from Bœotia to Megara, and the passes over Geraneia from the Isthmus. In fact, the possession of these positions was the chief prize which the subjugation of Megara could offer: communication between the Peloponnese

and Bœotia would thus have been broken, and the expedition of Brasidas impeded.

Failing the quick seizure of the passes, it is hard to see why the Athenians did not offer battle to Brasidas' hasty levies, in spite of their slightly inferior numbers, for the rewards of victory would have easily outweighed the loss of life. The reluctance of the hoplites to engage is a significant fact, since it illustrates the conscious inferiority of the Athenian land-troops. However, with such consciousness of their real weakness on land the Athenians should not have expected to recover and hold in permanence all the territory which had fallen to them in the days of their greatest power.—Ed.

break down and democratize the oligarchical governments. Demosthenês, with forty triremes, was sent round Peloponnesus to Naupaktus, with instructions to collect an Akarnanian force, and to occupy Siphæ, a maritime town belonging to the Bœotian Thespiæ¹, where intelligences had been already established. On the same day, determined beforehand, Hippokratês engaged to enter Bœotia, with the main force of Athens, at the south-eastern corner of the territory near Tanagra, and to fortify Delium, the temple of Apollo on the coast of the Eubœan strait; while at the same time it was concerted that some Bœotian and Phokian malcontents should make themselves masters of Chæroneia on the borders of Phokis. Bœotia would thus be assailed on three sides at the same moment, so that the forces of the country would be distracted and unable to co-operate. Internal movements were farther expected to take place in some of the cities, such as perhaps to establish democratical governments and place them at once in alliance with the Athenians.

Accordingly, about the month of August, Demosthenês sallied from Athens to Naupaktus, where he collected his Akarnanian allies—now stronger and more united than ever, since the refractory inhabitants of Œniadæ had been at length compelled to join their Akarnanian brethren. On the appointed day, seemingly about the beginning of October, he sailed with a strong force of these allies up to Siphæ, in full expectation that it would be betrayed to him. But the execution of this enterprise was less happy than that against Megara. In the first place, there was a mistake as to the day understood between Hippokratês and Demosthenês: in the next place, the entire plot was discovered and betrayed—communicated first to the Lacedæmonians, and through them to the bœotarchs. Siphæ and Chæroneia were immediately placed in so good a state of defence, that Demosthenês, on arriving at the former place, found not only no party within it favourable to him, but a formidable Bœotian force which rendered attack unavailing. Moreover Hippokratês had not yet begun his march, so that the defenders had nothing to distract their attention from Siphæ. Under these circumstances, while Demosthenês was obliged to withdraw without striking a blow, and to content himself with an unsuccessful descent upon the territory of Sikyon, all the expected internal movements in Bœotia were prevented from breaking out.

It was not till after the Bœotian troops, having repelled the attack by sea, had retired from Siphæ, that Hippokratês commenced his march from Athens to invade the Bœotian territory near Tanagra. He was probably encouraged by false promises from the Bœotian exiles, otherwise it seems remarkable that he should have persisted in executing his part of the scheme alone, after the known failure of the other part. The whole military population of Athens was marched to the neighbourhood of Delium, the eastern coast-extremity of the territory belonging to the Bœotian town of Tanagra, the expedition comprising all classes, not merely citizens, but also metics or resident non-freemen, and even non-resident strangers then by accident at Athens. Of course this statement must be understood with the reserve of ample guards being left behind for the city: but besides the really effective force of 7,000 hoplites, and several hundred horsemen, there appear to have been not less than 25,000

¹ Although the Thespians fought bravely at Delium, we have other evidence of their disaffection towards Thebes (Thuk., iv. 133). Similarly,

in the fourth century, they resolutely opposed the policy of centralization pursued by the latter city (Xen., *Hellen.*, v. 10, 38, etc.).—Ed.

light-armed, half-armed, or unarmed, attendants accompanying the march¹. The number of hoplites is here prodigiously great, brought together by general and indiscriminate proclamation, not selected by a special choice of the Stratēgi out of the names on the muster-roll, as was usually the case for any distant expedition². As to light-armed, there was at this time no trained force of that description at Athens, except a small body of archers. No pains had been taken to organize either darters or slingers: the hoplites, the horsemen, and the seamen, constituted the whole effective force of the city. To employ at one and the same time heavy-armed and light-armed was not natural to any Grecian community, but was a practice which grew up with experience and necessity. The Athenian feeling, as manifested in the *Persæ* of Æschylus a few years after the repulse of Xerxēs, proclaims exclusive pride in the spear and shield, with contempt for the bow. It was only during this very year, when alarmed by the Athenian occupation of Pylus and Kythēra, that the Lacedæmonians, contrary to their previous custom, had begun to organize a regiment of archers. The effective manner in which Demosthenēs had employed the light-armed in Sphakteria against the Lacedæmonian hoplites, was well calculated to teach an instructive lesson as to the value of the former description of troops.

The Bœotian Delium was a temple of Apollo, strongly situated, overhanging the sea about five miles from Tanagra, and somewhat more than a mile from the border territory of Orôpus. Hippokratēs reached Delium on the day after he had started from Athens. On the succeeding day he began his work of fortification, which was completed in two days and a half. By the middle of the fifth day after leaving Athens, the work was so nearly completed, that the army quitted Delium, and began its march homeward out of Bœotia, halting, after it had proceeded about a mile and a quarter, within the Athenian territory of Orôpus. It was here that the hoplites awaited the coming of Hippokratēs, who still remained at Delium stationing the garrison, and giving his final orders about future defence; while the greater number of the light-armed and unarmed, separating from the hoplites, continued their return-march to Athens. The position of the hoplites was probably about the western extremity of the plain of Orôpus, on the verge of the low heights between that plain and Delium³.

During these five days, however, the forces from all parts of Bœotia had time to muster at Tanagra. The contingents had arrived, not only from Thebes and its dependent townships around, but also from Haliartus, Korôneia, Orchomenus, Kôpæ, and Thespiæ: that of Tanagra joined on the spot. The government of the Bœotian confederacy at this time was vested in eleven bœotarchs—two chosen from Thebes, the rest in unknown proportion by the other cities, immediate members of the confederacy—and in four senates or councils, the constitution of which is not known.

¹ Thukyd., iv. 93, 94. He states that the Bœotian *ψιλοι* were above 10,000, and that the Athenian *ψιλοι* were *πολλαπλάσιοι τῶν ἐναντίων*. We can hardly take this number as less than 25,000, *ψιλῶν καὶ σκευοφόρων* (iv. 101).

The hoplites, as well as the horsemen, had their baggage and provision carried for them by attendants: see Thukyd., iii. 17; vii. 75.

² When a special selection took place, the names of the hoplites chosen by the generals to take

part in any particular service, were written on boards, according to their tribes: each of these boards was affixed publicly against the statue of the Heros Eponymus of the tribe to which it referred: Aristophanēs, *Equites*, 1369; *Pac.*, 1184, with Scholiast.

³ The plain of Oropus is separated from the more inland plain of Tanagra by rocky gorges, through which the Asopus flows. (Leake, *Athens and the Demi of Attica*, vol. ii., § iv., p. 112.)

Though all the *bœotarchs*, now assembled at Tanagra, formed a sort of council of war, yet the supreme command was vested in the *bœotarchs* from Thebes—either in Pagondas, as the senior of the two, or perhaps in both, alternating with each other day by day. As the Athenians were evidently in full retreat, and had already passed the border, all the other *bœotarchs*, except Pagondas, unwilling to hazard a battle on soil not *Bœotian*, were disposed to let them return home without obstruction. Such reluctance is not surprising, when we reflect that the chances of defeat were considerable, and that probably some of these *bœotarchs* were afraid of the increased power which a victory would lend to the oppressive tendencies of Thebes. But Pagondas carried the soldiers of the various cities along with him, even in opposition to the sentiments of their separate leaders, in favour of immediately fighting. He characterized the sentiment of the other *bœotarchs* as an unworthy manifestation of weakness, which, when properly considered, had not even the recommendation of superior prudence. For the Athenians were the most restless and encroaching of all enemies, so that the *Bœotians* who had the misfortune to be their neighbours, could only be secure against them by the most resolute promptitude in defending themselves as well as in returning the blows first given. If they wished to protect their autonomy and their property against the condition of slavery under which their neighbours in Eubœa had long suffered, as well as so many other portions of Greece, their only chance was to march onward and beat these invaders, following the glorious example of their fathers and predecessors in the field of Korôneia. The sacrifices were favourable to an advancing movement, while Apollo, whose temple the Athenians had desecrated by converting it into a fortified place, would lend his cordial aid to the *Bœotian* defence.

Finding his exhortations favourably received, Pagondas conducted the army by a rapid march to a position close to the Athenians. He was anxious to fight them before they should have retreated farther; moreover the day was nearly spent—it was already late in the afternoon.

Having reached a spot where he was only separated from the Athenians by a hill, which prevented either army from seeing the other, he marshalled his troops in the array proper for fighting. The Theban *hoplites*, with their dependent allies, ranged in a depth of not less than twenty-five shields, occupied the right wing: the *hoplites* of Haliartus, Korôneia, Kôpæ, and its neighbourhood, were in the centre: those of Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, on the left; for Orchomenus, being the second city in *Bœotia* next to Thebes, obtained the second post of honour at the opposite extremity of the line. Each contingent adopted its own mode of marshalling the *hoplites*, and its own depth of files: on this point there was no uniformity—a remarkable proof of the prevalence of dissentient custom in Greece, and how much each town, even among confederates, stood apart as a separate unit. There is a point which Thukydides does not specify—but which, though we learn it only on the inferior authority of Diodorus, appears both true and important. The front ranks of the Theban heavy-armed were filled by 300 select warriors, of distinguished bodily strength and discipline, who were accustomed to fight in pairs, each man being attached to his neighbour by a peculiar tie of intimate

friendship¹. This band was in after-days placed under peculiar training, detached from the front ranks of the phalanx, and organized into a separate regiment under the name of the Sacred Lochus or Band. Later history records how much it contributed to the shortlived military ascendancy of Thebes. On both flanks of this mass of Bœotian hoplites, about 7,000 in total number, were distributed 1,000 cavalry, 500 peltasts, and 10,000 light-armed or unarmed. The language of the historian seems to imply that the light-armed on the Bœotian side were something more effective than the mere multitude who followed the Athenians.

Hippokratēs, on his side, apprised while still at Delium that the Bœotians had moved from Tanagra, first sent orders to his army to place themselves in battle array, and presently arrived himself to command them, leaving 300 cavalry at Delium, partly as garrison, partly for the purpose of acting on the rear of the Bœotians during the battle. The Athenian hoplites were ranged eight deep along the whole line, with the cavalry, and such of the light-armed as yet remained, placed on each flank.

At the extremity of the line on each side, the interposition of ravines prevented the actual meeting of the two armies: but throughout all the rest of the line, the clash was formidable and the conduct of both sides resolute. Both armies, maintaining their ranks compact and unbroken, came to the closest quarters. On the left half of the Bœotian line, consisting of hoplites from Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, the Athenians were victorious. The Thespians, who resisted longest, even after their comrades had given way, were surrounded and sustained the most severe loss from the Athenians, who in the ardour of success, while wheeling round to encircle the enemy, became disordered and came into conflict even with their own citizens, not recognising them at the moment. Some loss of life was the consequence.

While the left of the Bœotian line was thus worsted and driven to seek protection from the right, the Thebans on that side gained decided advantage. Though the resolution and discipline of the Athenians was no way inferior, yet as soon as the action came to close quarters and to propulsion with shield and spear, the prodigious depth of the Theban column enabled them to bear down their enemies by mere superiority of weight. Moreover the Thebans appear to have been superior to the Athenians in gymnastic training² and acquired bodily force, as they were inferior both in speech and in intelligence. The chosen Theban warriors in the front rank were especially superior: but apart from such superiority, it is plain that when the two opposing columns came into conflict, shield against shield—the comparative force of forward pressure would decide the victory. This motive is sufficient to explain the extraordinary depth of the Theban column—which was increased by Epameinondas, half a century afterwards, at the battle of Leuktra, to the still more astonishing depth of fifty.

The Thebans on the right thus pushed back the troops on the left of the Athenian line, who retired at first slowly and for a short space, main-

¹ Diodor., xii. 70. [Similarly at the decisive battle of Leuktra the Thebans were drawn up fifty deep (Xen., *Hellen.*, vi. 4, 12). This formation and the valour of the Sacred Band were the cause of the great victory achieved there. The Sacred Band maintained a splendid record of bravery throughout the military career of Thebes,

and fell to the last man at Chæroneia (Plut., *Pelopidas*, 18).—ED.]

² Xenophon (*Memorab.*, iii. 5, 2, 15; iii. 12, 5: compare [Xenoph.] *De Athen. Republ.*, i. 13) maintains the natural bodily capacity of Athenians to be equal to that of Bœotians, but deprecates the want of *σωμαστικά* or bodily training.

taining their order unbroken—so that the victory of the Athenians on their right would have restored the battle, had not Pagondas detached from the rear two squadrons of cavalry, who, wheeling unseen round the hill behind, suddenly appeared to the relief of the Bœotian left, and produced upon the Athenians on that side, already deranged in their ranks by the ardour of pursuit, the intimidating effect of a fresh army arriving to reinforce the Bœotians. And thus, even on the right, the victorious portion of their line, the Athenians lost courage and gave way; while on the left, where they were worsted from the beginning, they found themselves pressed harder and harder by the pursuing Thebans: so that in the end, the whole Athenian army was broken and put to flight. The garrison of Delium, reinforced by 300 cavalry whom Hippokratês had left there to assail the rear of the Bœotians during the action, either made no vigorous movement, or were repelled by a Bœotian reserve stationed to watch them.

The pursuit of the Bœotians was vigorous and destructive. They had an efficient cavalry, strengthened by some Lokrian horse who had arrived even during the action: their peltasts also, and their light-armed would render valuable service against retreating hoplites. Fortunately for the vanquished, the battle had begun very late in the afternoon, leaving no long period of daylight. This important circumstance saved the Athenian army from almost total destruction¹. As it was, however, the general Hippokratês, together with nearly 1,000 hoplites, and a considerable number of light-armed and attendants, were slain, while the loss of the Bœotians, chiefly on their defeated left wing, was rather under 500 hoplites. Those who had fled to Delium and Orôpus were conveyed back by sea to Athens.

Pagondas resolved to lay siege to the newly-established fortress at Delium. But before commencing operations—which might perhaps prove tedious, since the Athenians could always reinforce the garrison by sea—he tried another means of attaining the same object. He despatched to the Athenians a herald to remonstrate against the violation of holy custom committed by the Athenians in seizing and fortifying the temple of Delium. The Bœotians therefore solemnly summoned them in the name of Apollo and the gods inmates along with them, to evacuate the place, carrying away all that belonged to them. Finally, the herald gave it to be understood, that unless this summons were complied with, no permission would be granted to bury their dead.

Answer was returned by the Athenian herald, who now went to the Bœotian commanders, to the following effect. Possession of the territory, according to the received maxims of Greece, always carried along with it possession of temples therein situated, under obligation to fulfil all customary observances to the resident god, as far as circumstances permitted. It was upon this maxim that the Bœotians had themselves acted when they took possession of their present territory, expelling the prior occupants and appropriating the temples: it was upon the same maxim that the Athenians would act in retaining so much of Bœotia as they had now conquered, and in conquering more of it, if they could. Necessity compelled them to use the consecrated water—a necessity not originating in the ambition of Athens, but in prior Bœotian aggressions

¹ Diodorus (xii. 70) dwells upon this circumstance.

upon Attica, a necessity which they trusted that the gods would pardon, since their altars were allowed as a protection to the involuntary offender, and none but he who sinned without constraint experienced their displeasure.

The Bœotian generals dismissed the herald with a reply short and decisive :—' If you are in Bœotia, you may take away all that belongs to you, but only on condition of going out of it. If, on the other hand, you are in your own territory, you can take your own resolution without asking us.'

In this debate, curious as an illustration of Grecian manners and feelings, there seems to have been special pleading and evasion on both sides. According to principles universally respected in Greece, the victor, if solicited, was held bound to grant to the vanquished a truce for burying his dead, to grant and permit it absolutely, without annexing any conditions. On this, the main point in debate, the Bœotians sinned against the sacred international law of Greece, when they exacted the evacuation of the temple at Delium as a condition for consenting to permit the burial of the Athenian dead. Ultimately, after they had taken Delium, they did grant it unconditionally.

To judge this curious debate with perfect impartiality, we ought to add, in reference to the conduct of the Athenians in occupying Delium, that for an enemy to make special choice of a temple, as a post to be fortified and occupied, was a proceeding certainly rare, perhaps hardly admissible, in Grecian warfare. On this ground, the Bœotians might reasonably complain of the seizure of Delium : though I apprehend that no impartial interpreter of Grecian international custom would have thought them warranted in requiring the restoration of the place, as a peremptory condition to their granting the burial-truce when solicited.

All negotiation being thus broken off, the Bœotian generals prepared to lay siege to Delium, aided by 2,000 Corinthian hoplites, together with some Megarians and the late Peloponnesian garrison of Nisæa—who joined after the news of the battle. Though they sent for darters and slingers, probably Cætæans and Ætolians, from the Maliac Gulf, yet their direct attacks were at first all repelled by the garrison, aided by an Athenian squadron off the coast, in spite of the hasty and awkward defences by which alone the fort was protected. At length they contrived a singular piece of fire-mechanism, which enabled them to master the place. The wooden portions of the wall, soon catching fire, became untenable for the defenders, who escaped in the best way they could, without attempting farther resistance. Two hundred of them were made prisoners, and a few slain ; but the greater number got safely on shipboard. This recapture of Delium took place on the seventeenth day after the battle.

Such was the memorable expedition and battle of Delium—a fatal discouragement to the feeling of confidence and hope which had previously reigned at Athens, besides the painful immediate loss which it inflicted on the city. Among the hoplites who took part in the vigorous charge and pushing of shields, the philosopher Sokratês is to be numbered¹. His bravery, both in the battle and the retreat, was much extolled by his

¹ In the year of Delium Sokratês had already attained the age of forty-five. His presence in the field may have been due to the exceptional toughness of his physique, or it may indicate that

after the losses incurred through the plague a force of 7,000 could not be raised in Athens without drawing upon the elderly men.—ED.

friends, and doubtless with good reason. He had before served with credit in the ranks of the hoplites at Potidæa, and he served also at Amphipolis, his patience under hardship, and endurance of heat and cold, being not less remarkable than his personal courage. He and his friend Lachês were among those hoplites who in the retreat from Delium, instead of flinging away their arms and taking to flight, kept their ranks, their arms, and their firmness of countenance. Alkibiadês also served at Delium in the cavalry, and stood by Sokratês in the retreat. The latter was thus exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Aristophanês was exposing him to derision in the comedy of the *Clouds*, as a dreamer alike morally worthless and physically incapable¹.

Severe as the blow was which the Athenians suffered at Delium, their disasters in Thrace about the same time, or towards the close of the same summer and autumn, were yet more calamitous. I have already mentioned the circumstances which led to the preparation of a Lacedæmonian force intended to act against the Athenians in Thrace, under Brasidas, in concert with the Chalkidians, revolted subjects of Athens, and with Perdikkas of Macedon. Having frustrated the Athenian designs against Megara, Brasidas completed the levy of his division—1,700 hoplites, partly Helots, partly Dorian Peloponnesians—and conducted them, towards the close of the summer, to Herakleia, in the Trachinian territory near the Maliac Gulf.

To reach Macedonia and Thrace, it was necessary for him to pass through Thessaly, which was no easy task; for the war had now lasted so long that every state in Greece had become mistrustful of the transit of armed foreigners. Moreover, the mass of the Thessalian population were decidedly friendly to Athens, and Brasidas had no sufficient means to force a passage; while, should he wait to apply for formal permission, there was much doubt whether it would be granted—and perfect certainty of such delay and publicity as would put the Athenians on their guard. But though such was the temper of the Thessalian people, yet the Thessalian governments, all oligarchical, sympathized with Lacedæmon. The federal authority or power of the tagus, which bound together the separate cities, was generally very weak². What was of still greater importance, the Macedonian Perdikkas, as well as the Chalkidians, had in every city powerful guests and partisans, whom they prevailed upon to exert themselves actively in forwarding the passage of the army.

By their countenance and support, combined with his own dexterity, he was enabled to accomplish the seemingly impossible enterprise of running through the country, not only without the consent, but against the feeling of its inhabitants, simply by such celerity as to forestall opposition. After traversing Achaia Phthiôtis, a territory dependent on the Thessalians, Brasidas began his march from Melitæa through Thessaly itself, along with his powerful native guides. Notwithstanding all possible secrecy and celerity, his march became so far divulged, that a body of volunteers from the neighbourhood assembled to oppose his progress

¹ See Plato (*Symposion*, c. 36, p. 221; *Lachês*, p. 181; *Charmidês*, p. 153; *Apolog. Sokratês*, p. 28), Strabo, ix., p. 403.

² Thuk., iv. 78, mentions a Thessalian *κοινόν* which stood opposed to the philo-Laonian *δυναστεία*. Had not the oligarchs with their separatist tendencies found strength enough till the fourth century to check the federalizing

ambitions of the democrats, and to prevent the efficient working of the *κοινόν* under its *ταγὴς*, there might have arisen a Thessalian League of that type which in the third and second centuries maintained the liberties of Greece. If welded together under a strong central administration, such a body might have proved a most effective bulwark against Macedonian encroachments.—Ed.

down the valley of the river Enipeus. His only chance of making progress lay in disarming their opposition by fair words. His guides excused themselves by saying that the suddenness of his arrival had imposed upon them as his guests the obligation of conducting him through, without waiting to ask for formal permission: to offend their countrymen, however, was the farthest thing from their thoughts, and they would renounce the enterprise if the persons now assembled persisted in their requisition. The same conciliatory tone was adopted by Brasidas himself. 'He protested his strong feeling of respect and friendship for Thessaly and its inhabitants: his arms were directed against the Athenians, not against them: nor was he aware of any unfriendly relation subsisting between the Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, such as to exclude either of them from the territory of the other. Against the prohibition of the parties now before them, he could not possibly march forward, nor would he think of attempting it; but he put it to their good feeling whether they ought to prohibit him.' Such conciliatory language was successful in softening the opponents and inducing them to disperse. Leaving Melitæa in the morning he reached Pharsalus on the same night, encamping on the river Apidanus: thence he proceeded on the next day to Phakium, and on the day afterwards into Perrhæbia¹, a territory adjoining to and dependent on Thessaly, under the mountain range of Olympus. Here he was in safety, so that his Thessalian guides left him; while the Perrhæbians conducted him over the pass of Olympus to Dium in Macedonia.

The Athenians were soon apprised of this stolen passage, so ably and rapidly executed, in a manner which few other Greeks, certainly no other Lacedæmonian, would have conceived to be possible. Aware of the new enemy thus brought within reach of their possessions in Thrace they transmitted orders thither for greater vigilance, and at the same time declared open war against Perdikkas; but unfortunately without sending any efficient force.

Perdikkas immediately invited Brasidas to join him in the attack of Arrhibæus, prince of the Macedonians called Lynkestæ, a summons which the Spartan could not decline, since Perdikkas provided half of the pay and maintenance of the army, but which he obeyed with reluctance, anxious as he was to commence operations against the allies of Athens. Such reluctance was still farther strengthened by envoys from the Chalkidians of Thrace—who, as zealous enemies of Athens, joined him forthwith, but discouraged any vigorous efforts to relieve Perdikkas from embarrassing enemies in the interior, in order that the latter might be under more pressing motives to conciliate and assist them. Accordingly Brasidas, though he joined Perdikkas and marched along with the Macedonian army towards the territory of the Lynkestæ, was not only averse to active military operations, but even entertained with favour propositions from Arrhibæus—wherein the latter offered to refer all his differences with Perdikkas to the arbitration of the Spartan general himself. Communicating these propositions to Perdikkas, Brasidas invited him to listen to an equitable compromise. But Perdikkas indignantly refused. Brasidas persisted in his intended conference with Arrhibæus, and was so far

¹ The geography of Thessaly is not sufficiently known to enable us to verify these positions with exactness. That which Thukydides calls the Apidanus, is the river formed by the junction of

the Apidanus and Enipeus. See Kiepert's map of ancient Thessaly—Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, ch. xlii., vol. iv., p. 470.

satisfied with the propositions made, that he withdrew his troops without marching over the pass into Lynkus. Too feeble to act alone, Perdikkas contracted his allowance for the future, so as to provide for only one-third of the army of Brasidas instead of one-half.

To this inconvenience, however, Brasidas submitted, in haste to begin his march into Chalkidikê. His first operation was against Akanthus, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Athos, the territory of which he invaded a little before the vintage, probably about the middle of September, when the grapes were ripe, but still out, and the whole crop of course exposed to ruin at the hands of an enemy superior in force. There was within the town of Akanthus a party in concert with the Chalkidians, anxious to admit him and to revolt openly from Athens. But the mass of the citizens were averse to this step. It was only by dwelling on the terrible loss from exposure of the crop without, that the anti-Athenian party could persuade them even to grant the request of Brasidas to be admitted singly, so as to explain his purposes formally before the public assembly, which would take its own decision afterwards. 'For a Lacedæmonian (says Thukydides) he was no mean speaker.' Doubtless the substance of the speech is genuine: and it is one of the most interesting in Grecian history—partly as a manifesto of professed Lacedæmonian policy—partly because it had a great practical effect in determining, on an occasion of paramount importance, a multitude which, though unfavourably inclined to him, was not beyond the reach of argument. I give the chief points of the speech, without binding myself to the words.

'Myself and my soldiers have been sent, Akanthians, to realize the purpose which we proclaimed on beginning the war—that we took arms to liberate Greece from the Athenians. Let no man blame us for having been long in coming, or for the mistake which we made at the outset in supposing that we should quickly put down the Athenians by operations against Attica, without exposing you to any risk. Enough, that we are now here on the first opportunity, resolved to put them down if you will lend us your aid. To find myself shut out of your town astonishes me. We Lacedæmonians undertook this long and perilous march, in the belief that we were coming to friends eagerly expecting us. It would indeed be monstrous if you should now disappoint us, and stand out against your own freedom as well as against that of other Greeks. Your example, standing high as you do both for prudence and power, will fatally keep back other Greeks. It will make them suspect that I am wanting either in power to protect them against Athens, or in honest purpose. Now, in regard to power, my own present army was one which the Athenians, though superior in number, were afraid to fight near Nisæa; nor are they at all likely to send an equal force hither against me by sea. And in regard to my purpose, it is not one of mischief, but of liberation, the Lacedæmonian authorities having pledged themselves to me by the most solemn oaths, that every city which joins me shall retain its autonomy. You have therefore the best assurance both as to my purposes and as to my power: you need not apprehend that I am come with factious designs, to serve the views of any particular men among you, and to remodel your established constitution to the disadvantage either of the Many or of the Few. That would be worse than foreign subjugation; and by such dealing we Lacedæmonians should be taking trouble to earn hatred instead

of gratitude. Perhaps you may say, that though you wish me well, you desire for your parts to be let alone, and to stand aloof from a dangerous struggle. If this should be your language, I shall first call your local gods and heroes to witness that I have come to you with a mission of good, and have employed persuasion in vain; I shall then proceed to ravage your territory and extort your consent, thinking myself justly entitled to do so, on two grounds. First, that the Lacedæmonians may not sustain actual damage in the shape of that tribute which you annually send to Athens. Next, that the Greeks generally may not be prevented by you from becoming free. It is only on the ground of common good that we Lacedæmonians can justify ourselves for liberating any city against its own will. But as we are conscious of desiring only extinction of the empire of others, not acquisition of empire for ourselves, we should fail in our duty if we suffered you to obstruct that liberation which we are now carrying to all. Consider well my words then: take to yourselves the glory of beginning the æra of emancipation for Greece—save your own properties from damage—and attach an ever-honourable name to the community of Akanthus.¹

Nothing could be more plausible or judicious than this language of Brasidas to the Akanthians—nor had they any means of detecting the falsity of the assertion (which he afterwards repeated in other places besides) that he had braved the forces of Athens at Nisæa with the same army as that now on the outside of the walls. As soon as he had retired, the subject was largely discussed in the assembly, with much difference of opinion among the speakers, and perfect freedom on both sides. The votes of the citizens present being taken secretly, a majority resolved to accede to the propositions of Brasidas and revolt from Athens. Exacting the renewal of his pledge and that of the Lacedæmonian authorities, for the preservation of full autonomy to every city which should join him, they received his army into the town. The neighbouring city of Stageirus (a colony of Andros, as Akanthus also was) soon followed the example¹.

There are few acts in history wherein Grecian political reason and morality appear to greater advantage than in this proceeding of the Akanthians. The habit of fair, free, and pacific discussion—the established respect to the vote of the majority—the deliberate estimate of reasons on both sides by each individual citizen—all these main laws and conditions of healthy political action appear as a part of the confirmed character of the Akanthians.

But there is another inference which the scene just described irresistibly suggests. It affords the clearest proof that the Akanthians had little to complain of as subject-allies of Athens, and that they would have continued in that capacity, if left to their own choice without the fear of having their crop destroyed. It is only the combined effect, of severe impending loss and of tempting assurances held out by the worthiest representative whom Sparta ever sent out, which induces them to revolt from Athens.

¹ Andros had a long-standing feud with Athens (Herodot., viii. 111; Xen., *Hellen.*, i. 4, 22), and may have influenced its colonies to revolt. Apart from the special case of these Andrian settlements, there were several reasons why her northern dependencies should be more coldly disposed towards Athens. For (1) they did not feel the tie of kinship so closely as the Ionians and Islanders; (2) the enthusiasm for Athens as

champion of Greece against Persia had somewhat dwindled by the time this district came into the League; (3) Athens had caused bad blood by her severity towards Thasos and Potidæa; (4) instead of having a formidable continental power at their back, these cities could find a ready ally in the Macedonian king. Under these circumstances it is indeed remarkable how slow they were to revolt.—ED.

Nor even then is the resolution taken without long opposition, and a large dissentient minority. Now it is impossible that the scene in Akanthus at this critical moment could have been of such a character, had the empire of Athens been practically odious and burdensome to the subject-allies, as it is commonly depicted.

As in Akanthus, so in most of the other Thracian subjects of Athens—the bulk of the citizens, though strongly solicited by the Chalkidians, manifest no spontaneous disposition to revolt from Athens. We shall find the party who introduce Brasidas to be a conspiring minority, who not only do not consult the majority beforehand, but act in such a manner as to leave no free option to the majority afterwards, whether they will ratify or reject, bringing in a foreign force to overawe them and compromise them without their own consent in hostility against Athens. Now that which makes the events of Akanthus so important as an evidence is, that the majority is not thus entrapped and compressed, but pronounces its judgement freely after ample discussion. The grounds of that judgement are clearly set forth to us, so as to show, that hatred of Athens, if even it exists at all, is in no way a strong or determining feeling. Had there existed any such strong feeling among the subject-allies of Athens in the Chalkidic peninsula, there was no Athenian force now present to hinder them all from opening their gates to the liberator Brasidas by spontaneous majorities.

That which I before remarked in recounting the revolt of Mitylênê, a privileged ally of Athens, is now confirmed in the revolt of Akanthus, a tributary, and subject-ally. The circumstances of both prove that imperial Athens neither inspired hatred nor occasional painful grievance, to the population of her subject-cities generally. It is indeed true that Athens managed her empire with reference to her own feelings and interests, and that her hold was rather upon the prudence than upon the affection of her allies, except in so far as those among them who were democratically governed, sympathized with her democracy. It is also true that restrictions in any form on the autonomy of each separate city were offensive to the political instincts of the Greeks: moreover Athens took less and less pains to disguise or soften the real character of her empire, as one resting simply on established fact and superior force. But this is a different thing from the endurance of practical hardship and oppression.

The acquisition of Akanthus and Stageirus enabled Brasidas in no very long time to extend his conquests, to enter Argilus, and from thence to make the capital acquisition of Amphipolis.

Argilus was situated between Stageirus and the river Strymon, along the western bank of which river its territory extended. Along the eastern bank of the same river—south of the lake which it forms under the name of Kerkinitis, and north of the town of Eion at its mouth—was situated the town and territory of Amphipolis, communicating with the lands of Argilus by the important bridge there situated. The Argilians were colonists from Andros, like Akanthus and Stageirus. The adhesion of those two cities to Brasidas gave him opportunity to cultivate intelligences in Argilus, wherein there had existed a standing discontent against Athens, ever since the foundation of the neighbouring city of Amphipolis. The resident settlers in this latter place were only in small proportion Athenian citizens, the rest of mixed origin, some of them Argilian

—a considerable number Chalkidians. The Athenian general Euklēs was governor in the town, though seemingly with no paid force under his command. His colleague Thukydidēs the historian was in command of a small fleet on the coast.

Among these mixed inhabitants a conspiracy was organized to betray the town to Brasidas. The inhabitants of Argilus as well as the Chalkidians each tampered with those of the same race who resided in Amphipolis, while the influence of Perdikkas, not inconsiderable in consequence of the commerce of the place with Macedonia, was also employed to increase the number of partisans.

Starting with his army from Arnē in the Chalkidic peninsula, Brasidas arrived in the afternoon near the channel whereby the lake Bolbē is connected with the sea. From hence he began his night-march to Amphipolis, on a cold and snowy night of November or the beginning of December. He reached Argilus in the middle of the night, where the leaders at once admitted him, proclaiming their revolt from Athens. With their aid and guidance, he then hastened forward without delay to the bridge across the Strymon, which he reached before break of day. It was guarded only by a feeble piquet—the town of Amphipolis itself being situated on the hill at some little distance higher up the river¹—so that Brasidas, preceded by the Argilian conspirators, surprised and overpowered the guard without difficulty. Thus master of this important communication, he crossed with his army forthwith into the territory of Amphipolis, where his arrival spread the utmost dismay and terror. The governor and the citizens were found wholly unprepared: the lands belonging to the city were occupied by residents with their families and property around them, as if there had been no enemy within reach. And so complete was the disorganization, that if Brasidas had marched up without delay to the gates and assaulted the town, many persons supposed that he would have carried it at once. Such a risk, however, was too great even for his boldness—the rather as repulse would have been probably his ruin.

But he waited in vain for the opening of the gates. The conspirators in the city, in spite of the complete success of their surprise and the universal dismay around them, found themselves unable to carry the majority along with them. As in Akanthus, so in Amphipolis, those who really hated Athens and wished to revolt were only a party-minority. The greater number of citizens, at this critical moment, stood by Euklēs and the few native Athenians around him in resolving upon defence, and in sending off an express to Thukydidēs at Thasos (the historian), as general in the region of Thrace, for immediate aid. Brasidas therefore sent in propositions for surrender on the most favourable terms, guaranteeing to every citizen who chose to remain, Amphipolitan or even Athenian, continued residence with undisturbed property and equal political rights, and granting to everyone who chose to depart, five days for the purpose of carrying away his effects.

Such easy conditions, when made known in the city, produced presently a sensible change of opinion among the citizens—proving acceptable both

¹ Thukyd., iv. 104: 'Ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πόλισμα πλείον τῆς διαβάσεως, καὶ οὐ καθεῖτο τείχη ὥσπερ νῦν, φύλακῃ δὲ τις βραχεία καθιστῆται, etc.

I think τῆς διαβάσεως is governed by ἀπέχει and not by πλείον—'the city is at some distance from the crossing': for Thukydides often uses

ἐκ πλείονος (iv. 103; viii. 88) as precisely identical with ἐκ πολλοῦ (i. 68; iv. 67; v. 69); also περὶ πλείονος.

In the following chapter, on occasion of the battle of Amphipolis, some farther remarks will be found on the locality.

to Athenians and Amphipolitans, though on different grounds. The properties of the citizens without, as well as many of their relatives, were all in the hands of Brasidas. No one counted upon the speedy arrival of reinforcement, and even if it did arrive, the city might be preserved, but the citizens without would still be either slain or made captive: a murderous battle would ensue, and perhaps after all, Brasidas, assisted by the party within, might prove victorious. The Athenian citizens in Amphipolis, knowing themselves to be exposed to peculiar danger, were perfectly well-pleased with his offer, as extricating them from a critical position, and procuring for them the means of escape with comparatively little loss; while the non-Athenian citizens, partakers in the same relief from peril, felt little reluctance in accepting a capitulation which preserved both their rights and their properties inviolate. Euklês could not prevent the acceptance of the terms, and the admission of the enemy into the city, on that same day.

No such resolution would have been adopted, had the citizens been aware how near at hand Thukydides and his forces were. The message despatched early in the morning from Amphipolis found him at Thasos with seven triremes, with which he instantly put to sea, so as to reach Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis, on the same evening. He hoped to be in time for saving Amphipolis: but the place had surrendered a few hours before. He arrived indeed only just in time to preserve Eion, for parties in that town were already beginning to concert the admission of Brasidas, who would probably have entered it at daybreak the next morning. Thukydides, putting the place in a condition of defence, successfully repelled an attack which Brasidas made both by land and by boats on the river. He at the same time received and provided for the Athenian citizens who were retiring from Amphipolis¹.

The capture of this city, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens—and the opening of the bridge over the Strymon, by which even all her eastern allies became approachable by land—occasioned prodigious emotion throughout all the Grecian world. The dismay felt at Athens² was greater than had been ever before experienced. The bloody defeat at Delium, and the unexpected conquests of Brasidas, now again lowered the *prestige* of Athenian success sixteen months after it had been so powerfully exalted by the capture of Sphakteria. The loss of reputation, which Sparta had then incurred, was now compensated by a reaction against the unfounded terrors since conceived about the probable career of her enemy. It was not merely the loss of Amphipolis, serious as that was, which distressed the Athenians; but also their insecurity respecting the maintenance of their whole empire. They knew not which of their subject-allies might next revolt in contemplation of aid from Brasidas, facilitated by the newly-acquired Strymonian bridge³. And as the proceedings of that general counted in part to the credit of

¹ Thukyd., iv. 105, 106; Diodor., xii. 68.

² The prodigious importance of the site of Amphipolis, with its adjoining bridge forming the communication between the regions east and west of Strymon, was felt not only by Philip of Macedon (as will hereafter appear), but also by the Romans after their conquest of Macedonia. Of the four regions into which the Romans distributed Macedonia, 'pars prima' (says Livy,

xliv. 30) habet opportunitatem Amphipoleos; quæ objecta claudit omnes ab oriente sole in Macedonian aditus'.

³ If Brasidas had been able to anticipate Philip of Macedon by carrying his eastward march as far as the Hellespont, he might have stopped the Athenian corn-supply from the Black Sea, and so brought severe pressure to bear on his enemies.—Ed.

his country, it was believed that Sparta, now for the first time shaking off her languor, had taken to herself the rapidity and enterprise once regarded as the exclusive characteristic of Athens.

But besides all these chances of evil to the Athenians, there was another yet more threatening—the personal ascendancy and position of Brasidas himself. It was not merely the fertility of aggressive resource, the quick movements, the power of stimulating the minds of soldiers, which lent efficiency to that general; but also his good faith, his moderation, his abstinence from party-cruelty, and from all intermeddling with the internal constitutions of the different cities in strict adherence to that manifesto whereby Sparta had proclaimed herself the liberator of Greece. Numerous solicitations were transmitted to him at Amphipolis from parties among the subject-allies of Athens. The anti-Athenian party in each was impatient to revolt, the rest of the population less restrained by fear.

Of those who indulged in these sanguine calculations, many had yet to learn by painful experience that Athens was still but little abated in power. Still her inaction during this important autumn had been such as may well explain their mistake. It might have been anticipated that on hearing the alarming news of the junction of Brasidas with the Chalkidians and Perdikkas so close upon their dependent allies, they would forthwith have sent a competent force to Thrace—which, if despatched at that time, would probably have obviated all the subsequent disasters. So they would have acted at any other time—and perhaps even then, if Periklēs had been alive. But the news arrived just at the period when Athens was engaged in the expedition against Bœotia, which ended very shortly in the ruinous defeat of Delium. Under the discouragement arising from the death of the Stratêgus Hippokratēs and 1,000 citizens, the idea of a fresh expedition to Thrace would probably have been intolerable to Athenian hoplites. The hardships of a winter service in Thrace, as experienced a few years before in the blockade of Potidæa, would probably also aggravate their reluctance. In Grecian history, we must steadfastly keep in mind that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers, and that the temper of the time, whether of confidence or dismay, modifies to an unspeakable degree all the calculations of military and political prudence. Even after the rapid successes of Brasidas, not merely at Akanthus and Stageirus, but even at Amphipolis, they sent only a few inadequate guards to the points most threatened. Without depreciating the merits of Brasidas, we may see that his extraordinary success was in great part owing to the no less extraordinary depression which at that time pervaded the Athenian public.

But while we thus notice the short-comings of Athens in not sending timely forces against Brasidas, we must at the same time admit, that the most serious and irreparable loss which she sustained—that of Amphipolis—was the fault of her officers more than her own. Euklēs and the historian Thukydidēs, to whom was confided the defence of that important town, had means amply sufficient to place it beyond all risk of capture, had they employed the most ordinary vigilance and precaution beforehand. That Thukydidēs became an exile immediately after this event, and remained so for twenty years, is certain from his own statement. And we hear, upon what in this case is quite sufficient authority, that

the Athenians condemned him to banishment, on the proposition of Kleon¹.

At the moment when Brasidas surprised Amphipolis, Thukydides was at Thasos; and the event is always discussed as if he was there by necessity or duty—as if Thasos was his special mission. Now we know from his own statement that he was sent as joint commander along with Euklês generally to Thrace, and especially to Amphipolis. Both of them were jointly and severally responsible for the proper defence of Amphipolis with the Athenian empire and interests in that quarter. Such nomination of two or more officers, co-ordinate and jointly responsible, was the usual habit of Athens, wherever the scale or the area of military operations was considerable, instead of one supreme responsible commander, with subordinate officers acting under him and responsible to him².

Nor can any plausible grounds for acquittal be pleaded. First, their position was of all others the most defensible. They had only to keep the bridge over the Strymon adequately watched and guarded—or to retain the Athenian squadron at Eion—and Amphipolis was safe. Next, the force under Brasidas was in no way superior—not even adequate to the capture of the inferior place Eion, when properly guarded—much less to that of Amphipolis. Lastly, there were no simultaneous revolts to distract attention, nor unknown enemies to confound a well-laid scheme of defence.

The presence of Thukydides on the station of Thrace was important to Athens, partly because he possessed valuable family-connections, mining-property, and commanding influence among the continental population round Amphipolis. This was one main reason why he was named. Of the two, perhaps, the conduct of Euklês admits of conceivable explanation more easily than that of Thukydides. For it seems that Euklês had no paid force in Amphipolis, no other force than the citizen hoplites, partly Athenian, partly of other lineage. Doubtless these men found it irksome to keep guard through the winter on the Strymonian bridge. Euklês might fancy, that by enforcing a large perpetual guard, he ran the risk of making Athens unpopular. Moreover, strict constancy of watch, night after night, when no actual danger comes, with an unpaid citizen force, is not easy to maintain. This is an insufficient excuse, but it is better than anything which can be offered on behalf of Thukydides, who had with him a paid Athenian force, and might just as well have kept it at Eion as at Thasos³. We may be sure that the absence of Thukydides with his fleet, at Thasos, was one essential condition in the plot laid by Brasidas with the Argilians.

¹ Thukyd., v. 26. See the biography of Thukydides by Marcellinus, prefixed to all the editions, p. 19, ed. Arnold.

² The system of divided command had been by no means universal at Athens in former days. The rule had been to give sole control to one general of conspicuous capacity (Aristeidês, Kimon, Myronidês); and we know that Periklês held a position of distinct superiority over his colleagues in the field (see n. to p. 406). The new apportionment seems only to become usual after that statesman's death. No doubt it was instituted by Kleon or one of his following, with a view to securing greater control over the executive officers. This close subjection of the military leaders to the central authority is also illustrated by the demagogues' new practice of

impeaching generals (Thuk., iv. 65). It need hardly be said that from a military point of view such divided control was disastrous: to this we may attribute in large measure the dilatory proceedings of the commanders in the Sicilian expedition, the half-measures that proved so fatal after the battle of Arginusæ, and the fiasco of Ægospotami. In the present case it may have led to some misunderstanding which paralyzed the movements of the Athenian detachments.—Ed.

³ That the recognised station of the Athenian fleet was at Eion—and that the maintenance of the passage of the Strymon was inestimable to the Athenians (even apart from Amphipolis), as guarantee for the inaccessibility of her eastern empire—we see by Thukyd., iv. 108.

In my judgement, not only the accusation against these two officers (I assume Euklēs to have been included) was called for on the fairest *presumptive* grounds—which would be sufficient as a justification of the leather-seller Kleon—but the positive verdict of guilty against them was fully merited. Whether the banishment inflicted was a greater penalty than the case warranted, I will not take upon me to pronounce. Every age has its own standard of feeling for measuring what is a proper intensity of punishment: penalties which our grandfathers thought right and meet, would in the present day appear intolerably rigorous. But when I consider the immense value of Amphipolis to Athens, combined with the conduct whereby it was lost, I cannot think that there was a single Athenian, or a single Greek, who would deem the penalty of banishment too severe.

It is painful to find such strong grounds of official censure against a man who as an historian has earned the lasting admiration of posterity—my own, among the first and warmest. But in criticising the conduct of Thukydidēs the officer, we are bound in justice to forget Thukydidēs the historian. He was not known in the latter character, at the time when this sentence was passed. Perhaps he never would have been so known (like the Neapolitan historian Colletta), if exile had not thrown him out of the active duties and hopes of a citizen.

It may be doubted whether he ever went home from Eion to encounter the grief, wrath, and alarm, so strongly felt at Athens after the loss of Amphipolis. Condemned, either with or without appearance, he remained in banishment for twenty years¹, not returning to Athens until after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. Of this long exile much is said to have been spent on his property in Thrace; yet he also visited most parts of Greece—enemies of Athens as well as neutral states. However much we may deplore such a misfortune on his account, mankind in general has, and ever will have, the strongest reason to rejoice at it. To this compulsory leisure we owe the completion, or rather the near approach to completion, of his history. And the opportunities which an exile enjoyed of personally consulting neutrals and enemies, contributed much to form that impartial, comprehensive, Pan-hellenic, spirit, which reigns generally throughout his immortal work.

Meanwhile Brasidas, installed in Amphipolis about the beginning of December 424 B.C., employed his increased power only the more vigorously against Athens. His first care was to reconstitute Amphipolis—a task wherein the Macedonian Perdikkas, whose intrigues had contributed to the capture, came and personally assisted. That city went through partial secession and renovation of inhabitants, being now moreover cut off from the port of Eion and the mouth of the river, which remained in the hands of the Athenians. Brasidas took measures for building ships of war, in the lake above the city, in order to force the lower part of the river: but his most important step was to construct a palisade work, connecting the walls of the city with the bridge. He thus made himself permanently master of the crossing of the Strymon, so as to shut the door by which he himself had entered, and at the same time to keep an easy communication with Argilus and the western bank of the Strymon. He also made some acquisitions on the eastern side of the river. The

¹ Thukyd., v. 26.

Thasian continental colonies of Galepsus and Œsymê also declared their adhesion to him.

While he sent to Lacedæmon, communicating his excellent position as well as his large hopes, he at the same time, without waiting for the answer, began acting for himself, with all the allies whom he could get together. He marched first against the peninsula called Aktê—the narrow tongue of land which stretches out from the neighbourhood of Akanthus to the mighty headland called Mount Athos—near thirty miles long, and between four and five miles for the most part in breadth. The long, rugged, woody ridge—covering this peninsula so as to leave but narrow spaces for dwelling, or cultivation, or feeding of cattle—was at this time occupied by many distinct petty communities, some of them divided in race and language. Some of these little communities spoke habitually two languages. Thyssus, Kleônê, Olophyxus, and others, all submitted on the arrival of Brasidas; but Sanê and Dion held out, nor could he bring them to terms even by ravaging their territory.

He next marched into the Sithonian peninsula, to attack Torônê, situated near the southern extremity of that peninsula—opposite to Cape Kanastræum, the extreme headland of the peninsula of Pallênê.

Torônê was inhabited by a Chalkidic population, but had not partaken in the revolt of the neighbouring Chalkidians against Athens. A small Athenian garrison had been sent there, probably since the recent dangers, and were now defending it as well as repairing the town-wall in various parts where it had been so neglected as to crumble down. They occupied as a sort of distinct citadel the outlying cape called Lêkythus, joining by a narrow isthmus the hill on which the city stood. A small party in Torônê, without privity or even suspicion of the rest, entered into correspondence with Brasidas, and engaged to provide for him the means of mastering the town. Accordingly he advanced by a night-march within about a quarter of a mile of the town-gates, which he reached a little before daybreak, sending forward 100 peltasts to be still nearer, and to rush upon the gate at the instant when signal was made from within. A small band, enabled to creep in through a small aperture in the wall towards the sea, were conducted silently up to the topmost watch-tower on the city hill, where they surprised and slew the guards, and set open a neighbouring postern gate. They then brought in the peltasts from without, while the fire-signal was forthwith lighted to invite Brasidas himself. He and his men hastened forward towards the city at their utmost speed.

So completely were the Torônæans surprised and thunderstruck, that hardly any attempt was made to resist. To the fugitives Brasidas addressed a proclamation inviting them to return, and promising them perfect security for person, property, and political rights.

In the meantime he convened a general assembly of the Torônæan population, whom he addressed in the same conciliating and equitable language as he had employed elsewhere. 'He had not come to harm either the city or any individual citizen. Those who had let him in, ought not to be regarded as bad men or traitors—for they had acted with a view to the benefit and the liberation of their city, not in order to enslave it, or to acquire profit for themselves. On the other hand, he did not think the worse of those who had gone over to Lêkythus, for their liking towards Athens: he wished them to come back freely, and he was sure

that the more they knew the Lacedæmonians, the better they would esteem them.'

On the expiration of a Two days' truce, Brasidas attacked the Athenian garrison in Lêkythus. On the second morning he brought up a machine, for the same purpose as that which the Bœotians had employed at Delium, to set fire to the wood-work. The Athenians put up, on a building in front of their position, a wooden platform, upon which many of them mounted, with casks of water and large stones to break it or to extinguish the flames. At last, the weight accumulated becoming greater than the supports could bear, it broke down with a prodigious noise; so that all the persons and things upon it rolled down in confusion. Many took to flight, while those who remained were insufficient to prolong the resistance successfully; so that Brasidas, perceiving the disorder and diminished number of the defenders, relinquished his fire-machine and again renewed his attempt to carry the place by assault, which now fully succeeded.

During the remainder of the winter Brasidas employed himself in setting in order the acquisitions already made, and in laying plans for farther conquests in the spring.

CHAPTER XXIV [LIV]

TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR—RENEWAL OF WAR AND BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS— PEACE OF NIKIAS

It was now that Athens felt the full value of those prisoners whom she had taken at Sphakteria. With those prisoners, as Kleon and his supporters had said truly, she might be sure of making peace whenever she desired it. Having such a certainty to fall back upon, she had played a bold game, and aimed at larger acquisitions during the past year. This speculation, though not in itself unreasonable, had failed: moreover a new phenomenon, alike unexpected by all, had occurred, when Brasidas broke open and cut up her empire in Thrace. Still, so great was the anxiety of the Spartans to regain their captives, who had powerful friends and relatives at home, that they considered the victories of Brasidas chiefly as a stepping-stone towards that object, and as a means of prevailing upon Athens to make peace. To his animated representations sent home from Amphipolis, setting forth the prospects of still farther success and entreating reinforcements—they had returned a discouraging reply, dictated in no small degree by the miserable jealousy of some of their chief men, who, feeling themselves cast into the shade, and looking upon his splendid career as an eccentric movement breaking loose from Spartan routine, were thus on personal as well as political grounds disposed to labour for peace. Such collateral motives, working upon the caution usual with Sparta, determined her to make use of the present fortune and realized conquests of Brasidas, as a basis for negotiation and recovery of the prisoners. The history of the Athenians during the past year might indeed serve as a warning to deter the Spartans from playing an adventurous game.

Ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the Lacedæmonians had been

attempting, directly or indirectly, negotiations for peace and the recovery of the prisoners. Their pacific dispositions were especially instigated by King Pleistoanax, whose peculiar circumstances gave him a strong motive to bring the war to a close. He had been banished from Sparta, fourteen years before the commencement of the war, under the charge of having taken bribes from the Athenians on occasion of invading Attica. For more than eighteen years, he lived in banishment close to the temple of Zeus Lykæus in Arcadia. But he never lost the hope of procuring restoration, through the medium of the Pythian priestess at Delphi, whom he and his brother Aristoklês kept in their pay. To every sacred legation which went from Sparta to Delphi, she repeated the same imperative injunction—‘They must bring back the seed of (Hêraklês) the demi-god son of Zeus from foreign land to their own; if they did not, it would be their fate to plough with a silver ploughshare’. The command of the god, thus incessantly repeated and backed by the influence of those friends who supported Pleistoanax at home, at length produced an entire change of sentiment at Sparta. In the fourth or fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, the exile was recalled.

As in the case of Kleomenês and Demaratus, however, it was not long before the previous intrigue came to be detected, or at least generally suspected and believed; to the great discredit of Pleistoanax, though he could not be again banished. Every successive public calamity which befel the state was imputed to the displeasure of the gods in consequence of the impious treachery of Pleistoanax. Suffering under such an imputation, this king was most eager to exchange the hazards of war for the secure march of peace, so that he was thus personally interested in opening every door for negotiation with Athens, and in restoring himself to credit by regaining the prisoners.

After the battle of Delium, the pacific dispositions of Nikias, Lachês, and the philo-Laconian party, began to find increasing favour at Athens; while the unforeseen losses in Thrace, coming thick upon each other—each successive triumph of Brasidas apparently increasing his means of achieving more—tended to convert the discouragement of the Athenians into positive alarm. Negotiations appear to have been in progress throughout great part of the winter. The continual hope that these might be brought to a close helps to explain the unwonted apathy of Athens, under the pressure of such disgraces. But so much did her courage flag, towards the close of the winter, that she came to look upon a truce as her only means of preservation against the victorious progress of Brasidas.

Attempts were made by the peace-party both at Athens and Sparta to negotiate at first for a definitive peace. But the conditions of such a peace were not easy to determine, so as to satisfy both parties—and became more and more difficult, with every success of Brasidas. At length the Athenians, eager above all things to arrest his progress, sent to Sparta to propose a truce for one year—desiring the Spartans to send to Athens envoys with full powers to settle the terms. The proposition of the truce for one year, together with the first two articles ready prepared, came from Athens, as indeed we might have presumed even without proof, since the interest of Sparta was rather against it, as allowing to the Athenians the fullest leisure for making preparations against farther losses in Thrace. But her main desire was, not so much to put herself

in condition to make the best possible peace, as to ensure some peace which would liberate her captives.

In the month of March 423 B.C., a truce for one year was concluded and sworn, between Athens on one side, and Sparta, Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, and Megara, on the other. The Spartans, instead of merely despatching plenipotentiaries to Athens as the Athenians had desired, went a step farther. In concurrence with the Athenian envoys, they drew up a form of truce, approved by themselves and their allies, in such manner that it only required to be adopted and ratified by the Athenians. The general principle of the truce was *uti possidetis*, and the conditions were in substance as follows :

1. Respecting the temple at Delphi, every Greek shall have the right to make use of it honestly and without fear, pursuant to the customs of his particular city.—The main purpose of this stipulation, prepared and sent verbatim from Athens, was to allow Athenian visitors to go thither, which had been impossible during the war, in consequence of the hostility of the Bœotians and Phokians. The liberty of sacrificing at Delphi was at this moment the more welcome to the Athenians, as they seem to have fancied themselves under the displeasure of Apollo.

2. All the contracting parties will inquire out and punish, each according to its own laws, such persons as may violate the property of the Delphian god.—This article also is prepared at Athens, for the purpose seemingly of conciliating the favour of Apollo and the Delphians. The Lacedæmonians accept the article literally.

3. The Athenian garrisons at Pylus, Kythêra, Nisæa and Minoa, and Methana in the neighbourhood of Trœzen, are to remain as at present. No communication to take place between Kythêra and any portion of the mainland belonging to the Lacedæmonian alliance. The soldiers occupying Pylus shall confine themselves within the space between Buphras and Tomeus ; those in Nisæa and Minoa, within the road which leads from the chapel of the hero Nisus to the temple of Poseidon—without any communication with the population beyond that limit. In like manner the Athenians in the peninsula of Methana near Trœzen, and the inhabitants of the latter city, shall observe the special convention concluded between them respecting boundaries.

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall make use of the sea for trading purposes, on their own coasts, but shall not have liberty to sail in any ship of war, nor in any rowed merchant-vessel of tonnage equal to 500 talents.

5. There shall be free communication by sea as well as by land, between Peloponnesus and Athens for herald or embassy, with suitable attendants, to treat for a definitive peace or for the adjustment of differences.

6. Neither side shall receive deserters from the other, whether free or slave.—This article was alike important to both parties. Athens had to fear the revolt of her subject-allies—Sparta the desertion of Helots.

7. Disputes shall be amicably settled, by both parties, according to their established laws and customs.

Such was the substance of the treaty prepared at Sparta—seemingly in concert with Athenian envoys—and sent by the Spartans to Athens for approval.

By the resolution which Lachês proposed in the Athenian public

assembly, ratifying the truce, the people farther decreed that negotiations should be opened for a definitive treaty, and directed the Stratêgi to propose to the next ensuing assembly, a scheme and principles for conducting the negotiations. But at the very moment when the envoys between Sparta and Athens were bringing the truce to final adoption, events happened in Thrace which threatened to cancel it altogether. Two days after the ratification, but before the truce could be made known in Thrace, Skiônê revolted from Athens to Brasidas.

Skiônê was situated in the peninsula of Pallênê (the westernmost of those three narrow tongues of land into which Chalkidikê branches out), conterminous with the Eretrian colony Mendê. The Skiônæans, not without considerable dissent among themselves, proclaimed their revolt from Athens, under concert with Brasidas. The revolt of Skiônê was, from the position of the town, a more striking defiance of Athens than any of the preceding events. For the isthmus connecting Pallênê with the mainland was occupied by the town of Potidæa—a town assigned at the period of its capture, seven years before, to Athenian settlers. Moreover the isthmus was so narrow, that the wall of Potidæa barred it across completely from sea to sea. Pallênê was therefore a quasi-island, not open to the aid of land-force from the continent, like the towns previously acquired by Brasidas. The Skiônæans thus put themselves, without any foreign aid, into conflict against the whole force of Athens, bringing into question her empire not merely over continental towns, but over islands.

Even to Brasidas himself, their revolt appeared a step of astonishing boldness. On being received into the city, he convened a public assembly, and addressed to them the same language which he had employed at Akanthus and Torônê; disavowing all party preferences as well as all interference with the internal politics of the town, and exhorting them only to unanimous efforts against the common enemy.

This speech produced a unanimous and exalted confidence which made them look forward cheerfully to all the desperate chances in which they had engaged themselves; and it produced at the same time, in still more unbounded manifestation, the same personal attachment and admiration as Brasidas inspired elsewhere. The Skiônæans not only voted to him publicly a golden crown, as the liberator of Greece, but when it was placed on his head, the burst of individual sentiment and sympathy was the strongest of which the Grecian bosom was capable. 'They crowded round him individually, and encircled his head with fillets, like a victorious athlete', says the historian. This remarkable incident illustrates what I observed before—that the achievements, the self-relying march, the straightforward politics, and probity of this illustrious man—who in character was more Athenian than Spartan, yet with the good qualities of Athens predominant—inspired a personal emotion towards him such as rarely found its way into Grecian political life.

The Lacedæmonian commander knew well how speedily their insular position would draw upon them the vigorous invasion of Athens. He accordingly brought across to Pallênê a considerable portion of his army, not merely with a view to the defence of Skiônê, but also with the intention of surprising both Mendê and Potidæa, in both which places there were small parties of conspirators prepared to open the gates.

It was in this position that he was found by the commissioners who came to announce formally the conclusion of the truce for one year, and to enforce its provisions. The face of affairs was materially altered by this communication, much to the satisfaction of the newly-acquired allies of Sparta in Thrace, who accepted the truce forthwith—but to the great chagrin of Brasidas, whose career was thus suddenly arrested. Yet he could not openly refuse obedience, and his army was accordingly transferred from the peninsula of Pallênê to Torônê.

The case of Skiônê, however, immediately raised an obstruction, doubtless very agreeable to him. The Athenian commissioner, while sanctioning the truce for all the other cities in Thrace, refused to comprehend Skiônê in it, sending immediate news home to Athens. Brasidas refused on his part to abandon Skiônê, which was peculiarly endeared to him by the recent scenes; and even obtained the countenance of the Lacedæmonian commissioners, by falsely asseverating that the city had revolted before the day named in the truce.

Violent was the burst of indignation when the news reached Athens. It was nowise softened, when the Lacedæmonians, acting upon the version of the case sent to them by Brasidas and Athenæus, despatched an embassy thither to claim protection for Skiônê—or at any rate to procure the adjustment of the dispute by arbitration or pacific decision. They resolved at once to undertake an expedition for the reconquest of Skiônê; and farther, on the proposition of Kleon, to put to death all the adult male inhabitants of that place as soon as it should have been reconquered. At the same time, they showed no disposition to throw up the truce generally. The state of feeling on both sides tended to this result—that while the war continued in Thrace, it was suspended everywhere else.

Fresh intelligence soon arrived of the revolt of Mendê, the adjoining town to Skiônê. Those Mendæans, who had laid their measures for secretly introducing Brasidas, were at first baffled by the arrival of the truce-commissioners. But they saw that he retained his hold on Skiônê, in spite of the provisions of the truce; and they ascertained that he was willing still to protect them if they revolted, though he could not be an accomplice, as originally projected, in the surprise of the town. Being moreover only a small party, with the sentiment of the population against them—they were afraid, if they now relinquished their scheme, of being detected and punished for the partial steps already taken, when the Athenians should come against Skiônê. They therefore thought it on the whole the least dangerous course to persevere. They proclaimed their revolt from Athens, constraining the reluctant citizens to obey them. The government seems before to have been democratical, but they now found means to bring about an oligarchical revolution along with the revolt. Brasidas immediately accepted their adhesion, and willingly undertook to protect them, professing to think that he had a right to do so, because they had revolted openly after the truce had been proclaimed. But the truce upon this point was clear—which he himself virtually admitted, by setting up as justification certain alleged matters in which the Athenians had themselves violated it. He immediately made preparation for the defence both of Mendê and Skiônê against the attack which was now rendered more certain than before; conveying the women and children of those two towns across to the Chalkidic Olynthus, and sending thither

as garrison 500 Peloponnesian hoplites with 300 Chalkidic peltasts; the commander of which force, Polydamidas, took possession of the acropolis with his own troops separately.

Brasidas then withdrew himself with the greater part of his army, to accompany Perdikkas on an expedition into the interior against Arrhibæus and the Lynkestæ. On what ground, after having before entered into terms with Arrhibæus, he now became his active enemy, we are left to conjecture. Probably his relations with Perdikkas, whose alliance was of essential importance, were such that this step was forced upon him against his will; or he may really have thought that the force under Polydamidas was adequate to the defence of Mendê and Skiônê—an idea which the unaccountable backwardness of Athens for the last six or eight months might well foster. Had he even remained, indeed, he could hardly have saved them, considering the situation of Pallênê and the superiority of Athens at sea: but his absence made their ruin certain.

While Brasidas was thus engaged far in the interior, the Athenian armament under Nikias and Nikostratus reached Potidæa: fifty triremes, ten of them Chian—1,000 hoplites and 600 bowmen from Athens—1,000 mercenary Thracians—with some peltasts from Methônê and other towns in the neighbourhood. From Potidæa they landed for the purpose of attacking Mendê. Polydamidas, the Peloponnesian commander in the town, took post with his force of 700 hoplites, including 300 Skiônæans, upon an eminence near the city, strong and difficult of approach: and such were the difficulties of the ground that the enemy were repulsed: Nikias was himself wounded, and the division of Nikostratus was thrown into great disorder, narrowly escaping a destructive defeat. The Mendæans, however, evacuated the position in the night and retired into the city; while the Athenians ravaged the neighbouring lands.

But dissensions so serious had already commenced within the walls, that the Skiônæan auxiliaries, becoming mistrustful of their situation, took advantage of the night to return home. The revolt of Mendê had been brought about against the will of the citizens, by the intrigues and for the benefit of an oligarchical faction. Nikostratus with half of the Athenian force was planted before the gate of Mendê which opened towards Potidæa. In the neighbourhood of that gate was the place of arms and the chief station both of the Peloponnesians and of the citizens. Polydamidas, intending to make a sally forth, was marshalling both of them in battle order, when one of the Mendæan Demos told him 'that he would not sally forth, and did not choose to take part in the contest'. Polydamidas seized hold of the man to punish him, when the mass of the armed Demos, taking part with their comrade, made a sudden rush upon the Peloponnesians. The latter, unprepared for such an onset, sustained at first some loss, and were soon forced to retreat into the acropolis—the rather as they saw some of the Mendæans open the gates to the besiegers without, which induced them to suspect a preconcerted betrayal. No such concert, however, existed; though the besieging generals, when they saw the gates thus suddenly opened, soon comprehended the real position of affairs. But they found it impossible to restrain their soldiers, who pushed in forthwith, from plundering the town: and they had even some difficulty in saving the lives of the citizens¹.

¹ Thukyd., iv. 130; Diodor., xii. 72.

Mendê being thus taken, the Athenian generals desired the body of the citizens to resume their former government, leaving it to them to single out and punish the authors of the late revolt. Having erected a wall of circumvallation, round the acropolis, joining the sea at both ends—and left a force to guard it—the Athenians moved away to begin the siege at Skiônê, where they found both the citizens and the Peloponnesian garrison posted on a strong hill, not far from the walls. As it was impossible to surround the town without being masters of this hill, the Athenians attacked it at once and they carried it by assault. Before the wall of circumvallation was finished, the garrison who had been shut up in the acropolis of Mendê got into Skiônê at night, having broken out by a sudden sally where the blockading wall around them joined the sea. But this did not hinder Nikias from prosecuting his operations, so that Skiônê was in no long time completely enclosed, and a division placed to guard the wall of circumvallation.

Such was the state of affairs which Brasidas found on returning from the inland Macedonia. Unable either to recover Mendê or to relieve Skiônê, he was forced to confine himself to the protection of Torônê. Nikias, however, without attacking Torônê, returned soon afterwards with his armament to Athens, leaving Skiônê under blockade.

The march of Brasidas into Macedonia had been unfortunate in every way. The joint force of himself and Perdikkas consisted of 3,000 Grecian hoplites—Peloponnesian, Akanthian, and Chalkidian—with 1,000 Macedonian and Chalkidian horse—and a considerable number of non-Hellenic auxiliaries. As soon as they had got beyond the mountain-pass into the territory of the Lynkestæ, they were met by Arrhibæus, and a battle ensued, in which that prince was completely worsted. They halted here for a few days, awaiting the arrival of a body of Illyrian mercenaries, with whom Perdikkas had concluded a bargain. At length Perdikkas became impatient to advance without them, while Brasidas, on the contrary, apprehensive of the fate of Mendê during his absence, was bent on returning back. The dissension between them becoming aggravated, they parted company and occupied separate encampments at some distance from each other—when both received unexpected intelligence which made Perdikkas as anxious to retreat as Brasidas. The Illyrians, having broken their compact, had joined Arrhibæus, and were now in full march to attack the invaders. The untold number of these barbarians was reported as overwhelming, while such was their reputation for ferocity as well as for valour, that the Macedonian army of Perdikkas, seized with a sudden panic, broke up in the night and fled without orders, hurrying Perdikkas himself along with them, and not even sending notice to Brasidas, with whom nothing had been concerted about the retreat. In the morning, the latter found Arrhibæus and the Illyrians close upon him, the Macedonians being already far advanced in their journey homeward.

The contrast between the man of Hellas and of Macedonia—general as well as soldiers—was never more strikingly exhibited than on this critical occasion. The soldiers of Brasidas, though surprised as well as deserted, lost neither their courage nor their discipline: the commander preserved not only his presence of mind, but his full authority. His hoplites were directed to form in a hollow square or oblong, with the light-armed and attendants in the centre, for the retreating march. Youth-

ful soldiers were posted either in the outer ranks, or in convenient stations, to run out swiftly and repel the assailing enemy ; while Brasidas himself, with 300 chosen men, formed the rear-guard.

The short harangue which (according to a custom universal with Grecian generals) he addressed to his troops immediately before the enemy approached, is in many respects remarkable. Though some were Akanthians, some Chalkidians, some Helots, he designates all by the honourable title of 'Peloponnesians'. 'Ye do not require the presence of allies to inspire you with bravery—nor do ye fear superior numbers of an enemy ; for ye belong not to those political communities in which the larger number governs the smaller, but to those in which a few men rule subjects more numerous than themselves, having acquired their power by no other means than by superiority in battle.'—'The Illyrians have no regular order (said he) such as to impress them with shame for deserting their post. Flight and attack are with them in equally honourable esteem, so that there is nothing to test the really courageous man : their battle, wherein every man fights as he chooses, is just the thing to furnish each with a decent pretence for running away.'—'Repel ye their onset whenever it comes, and so soon as opportunity offers, resume your retreat in rank and order. Ye will soon arrive in a place of safety : and ye will be convinced that such crowds, when their enemy has stood to defy the first onset, keep aloof with empty menace and a parade of courage which never strikes, while if their enemy gives way, they show themselves smart and bold in running after him where there is no danger'¹.

The superiority of disciplined and regimented force over disorderly numbers, even with equal individual courage, is now a truth so familiar, that we require an effort of imagination to put ourselves back into the fifth century before the Christian æra, when this truth was recognised only among the Hellenic communities ; when the practice of all their neighbours, Illyrians, Thracians, Asiatics, Epirots, and even Macedonians—implied ignorance or contradiction of it. In respect to the Epirots, the difference between their military habits and those of the Greeks has been already noticed—having been pointedly manifested in the memorable joint attack on the Akarnanian town of Stratus, in the second year of the war. Both Epirots and Macedonians, however, are a step nearer to the Greeks than either Thracians, or these Illyrian barbarians against whom Brasidas was now about to contend, and in whose case the contrast comes out yet more forcibly. It is not merely the contrast between two modes of fighting which the Lacedæmonian commander impresses upon his soldiers. He gives what may be called a moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded, a theory of large range and going to the basis of Grecian social life, in peace as well as in war. The sentiment in each individual man's bosom, of a certain place which he has to fill and duties which he has to perform, but at the same time essentially bound up with the feeling, that his neighbours are under corresponding obligations towards him—this sentiment, which Brasidas invokes as the settled military creed of his soldiers in their ranks, was not less the regulating

¹ Thukyd., iv. 126.

The speech of the Roman consul Manlius, in describing the Gauls, deserves to be compared—'Procerâ corpora, promissæ et rutilatæ comæ, vasta scuta, prælongi gladii : ad hoc cantus in-

euntium prælium, et ululatus et tripudia, et quantientium scuta in patrium quandam morem horrendus armorum crepitus : omnia de industriâ composita ad terrorem' (Livy, xxxviii. 17).

principle of their intercourse in peace as citizens of the same community. Simple as the principle may seem, it would have found no response in the army of Xerxès, or of the Thracian Sitalkès, or of the Gaul Brennus. The Persian soldier rushes to death by order of the Great King, perhaps under terror of a whip which the Great King commands to be administered to him. The Illyrian or the Gaul scorns such a stimulus, and obeys only the instigation of his own pugnacity, or vengeance, or love of blood, or love of booty, but recedes as soon as that individual sentiment is either satisfied, or overcome by fear. It is the Greek soldier alone who feels himself bound to his comrades by ties reciprocal and indissoluble¹—who obeys neither the will of a king, nor his own individual impulse, but a common and imperative sentiment of obligation. Such conceptions of military duty, established in the minds of these soldiers whom Brasidas addressed, are farther illustrated in the memorable Retreat of the Ten Thousand.

But there is another point in the speech of Brasidas which deserves notice: he tells his soldiers—'Courage is your homebred property: for ye belong to communities wherein the small number governs the larger, simply by reason of superior prowess in themselves and conquest by their ancestors'. First, it is remarkable that a large proportion of the Peloponnesian soldiers, whom Brasidas thus addresses, consisted of Helots—the conquered race, not the conquerors: yet so easily does the military or regimental pride supplant the sympathies of race, that these men would feel flattered by being addressed as if they were themselves sprung from the race which had enslaved their ancestors. Next, we here see the right of the strongest invoked as the legitimate source of power and as an honourable and ennobling recollection, by an officer of Dorian race, oligarchical politics, unperverted intellect, and estimable character. We shall accordingly be prepared, when we find a similar principle hereafter laid down by the Athenian envoys at Melos, to disallow the explanation of those who treat it merely as a theory invented by demagogues and sophists—upon one or other of whom it is common to throw the blame of all that is objectionable in Grecian politics or morality.

Having finished his harangue, Brasidas gave orders for retreat. As soon as his march began, the Illyrians rushed upon him, with all the confidence and shouts of pursuers against a flying enemy, believing that they should completely destroy his army. But wherever they approached near, the young soldiers specially stationed for the purpose turned upon and beat them back with severe loss; while Brasidas himself with his rear-guard of 300 was present everywhere rendering vigorous aid. When the Lynkèstæ and Illyrians attacked, the army halted and repelled them, after which it resumed its retreating march. The barbarians found themselves so rudely handled, and with such unwonted vigour—for they probably had had no previous experience of Grecian troops—that after a few trials they desisted from meddling with the army in its retreat along the plain. They ran forward rapidly, partly in order to overtake the Macedonians under Perdikkas, who had fled before—partly to occupy the narrow pass, with high hills on each side, which formed the entrance into Lyn-

¹ See the memorable remarks of Hippokratès and Aristotle on the difference in respect of courage between Europeans and Asiatics, as well as between Hellens and non-Hellens (Hippo-

kratès, *De Aïre, Locis, et Aquis*, c. 24, ed. Littré, § 116 *et seq.*, ed. Petersen; Aristotel., *Polit.*, vii. 6, 1-5), and the conversation between Xerxès and Demaratus (Herodot., vii. 103, 104).

kêstis, and which lay in the road of Brasidas. When the latter approached this narrow pass, he saw the barbarians masters of it. Brasidas immediately gave orders to his chosen 300, to charge up the most assailable of the two hills, with their best speed, before it became more numerously occupied—not staying to preserve compact ranks. This unexpected and vigorous movement disconcerted the barbarians, who fled, abandoning the eminence to the Greeks, and leaving their own men in the pass exposed on one of their flanks. The retreating army, thus master of one of the side hills, was enabled to force its way through the middle pass, and to drive away the Lynkêstian and Illyrian occupants. His enemies did not dare to attack him farther, so that he was enabled to reach, even in that day's march, the first town or village in the kingdom of Perdikkas, called Arnissa. So incensed were his soldiers with the Macedonian subjects of Perdikkas, that they seized and appropriated all the articles of baggage which happened to have been dropped in the disorder of a nocturnal flight. They even unharnessed and slew the oxen out of the baggage carts.

Perdikkas keenly resented this behaviour of the troops of Brasidas. From this moment he broke off his alliance with the Peloponnesians, and opened negotiations with Nikias, then engaged in constructing the wall of blockade round Skiônê. Such was the general faithlessness of this prince, however, that Nikias required as a condition of the alliance, some manifest proof of the sincerity of his intentions, and Perdikkas was soon enabled to afford a proof of considerable importance.

The relations between Athens and Peloponnesus, since the conclusion of the truce in the preceding March, had settled into a curious combination. The main purpose of the truce, that of giving time for discussions preliminary to a definitive peace, was completely frustrated. The decree of the Athenian people (which stands included in their vote sanctioning the truce), for sending and receiving envoys to negotiate such a peace, seems never to have been executed.

Instead of this, the Lacedæmonians despatched a considerable reinforcement by land to join Brasidas. But Ischagoras, the commander of the reinforcement, on reaching the borders of Thessaly, found all farther progress impracticable, and was compelled to send back his troops. For Perdikkas, by whose powerful influence alone Brasidas had been enabled to pass through Thessaly, now directed his Thessalian guests to keep the new-comers off.

Ischagoras, however—with a few companions but without his army—made his way to Brasidas, having been particularly directed by the Lacedæmonians to inspect and report upon the state of affairs. He numbered among his companions a few select Spartans of the military age, intended to be placed as harmosts or governors in the cities reduced by Brasidas. This was among the first violations, apparently often repeated afterwards, of the ancient Spartan custom—that none except elderly men, above the military age, should be named to such posts. Indeed Brasidas himself was an illustrious departure from the ancient rule. The mission of these officers was intended to guard against the appointment of any but Spartans to such posts—for there were no Spartans in the army of Brasidas. One of the new-comers, Klearidas, was made governor of Amphipolis. It is probable that these inspecting commis-

sioners may have contributed to fetter the activity of Brasidas. Moreover the newly-declared hostility of Perdikkas, together with disappointment in the non-arrival of the fresh troops intended to join him, much abridged his means. We hear of only one exploit performed by him at this time—and that too, more than six months after the retreat from Macedonia—about January or February 422 B.C. Having established intelligence with some parties in the town of Potidæa, in the view of surprising it, he contrived to bring up his army in the night to the foot of the walls, and even to plant his scaling-ladders, without being discovered. The sentinel carrying and ringing the bell had just passed by on the wall, leaving for a short interval an unguarded space (the practice apparently being, to pass this bell round along the walls from one sentinel to another throughout the night)—when some of the soldiers of Brasidas took advantage of the moment to try and mount. But before they could reach the top of the wall, the sentinel came back, alarm was given, and the assailants were compelled to retreat.

We hear farther of a war in Arcadia, between the two important cities of Mantinea and Tegea—each attended by its Arcadian allies, partly free, partly subject. In a battle fought between them at Laodikion, the victory was disputed.

The Bœotians had been no parties to the truce sworn between Sparta and Athens in the preceding month of March. But they seem to have followed the example of Sparta in abstaining from hostilities *de facto*: and we may conclude that they acceded to the request of Sparta so far as to allow the transit of Athenian visitors and sacred envoys through Bœotia to the Delphian temple. The only actual incident which we hear of in Bœotia during this interval, is one which illustrates forcibly the harsh and ungenerous ascendancy of the Thebans over some of the inferior Bœotian cities. The Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespiæ, and condemned the city to remain unfortified, on the charge of *atticizing* tendencies. How far this suspicion was well-founded, we have no means of judging. But the Thespians, far from being dangerous at this moment, were altogether helpless, having lost the flower of their military force at the battle of Delium, where their station was on the defeated wing. It was this very helplessness, brought upon them by their services to Thebes against Athens, which now both impelled and enabled the Thebans to enforce the rigorous sentence above-mentioned.

But the month of March 422 B.C.—the time prescribed for expiration of the One year's truce—had now arrived. It has already been mentioned that this truce had never been more than partially observed. Either of them had thus an excellent pretext for breaking the truce altogether; and as neither acted upon this pretext, we plainly see that the paramount feeling and ascendent parties, among both, tended to peace of their own accord, at that time. There was nothing except the interest of Brasidas, and of those revolted subjects of Athens to whom he had bound himself, which kept alive the war in Thrace. Under such a state of feeling, the oath taken to maintain the truce still seemed imperative on both parties—always excepting Thracian affairs.

The mere occurrence of the last day of the truce made no practical difference at first in this condition of things: either party might renew hostilities, but neither actually did renew them. To the Athenians there

was this additional motive for abstaining from hostilities for a few months longer: the great Pythian festival would be celebrated at Delphi in July or the beginning of August, and as they had been excluded from that holy spot during all the interval between the beginning of the war and the conclusion of the One year's truce, their pious feelings seem now to have taken a peculiar longing towards the visits, pilgrimages, and festivals connected with it. Though the truce therefore had really ceased, no actual warfare took place until the Pythian games were over.

But though the actions of Athens remained unaltered, the talk at Athens became very different.

'At this time (observes Thukydides) the great enemies of peace were, Brasidas on one side, and Kleon on the other: the former, because he was in full success and rendered illustrious by the war—the latter because he thought that, if peace were concluded, he should be detected in his dishonest politics, and be less easily credited in his criminations of others.' As to Brasidas, the remark of the historian is indisputable. It would be wonderful indeed, if he in whom so many splendid qualities were brought out by the war, and who had moreover contracted obligations with the Thracian towns which gave him hopes and fears of his own, entirely apart from Lacedæmon—it would be wonderful if the war and its continuance were not in his view the paramount object. In truth *his* position in Thrace constituted an insurmountable obstacle to any solid or steady peace, independently of the dispositions of Kleon.

But the colouring which Thukydides gives to Kleon's support of the war is open to much greater comment. First, we may well raise the question, whether Kleon had any real interest in war—whether his personal or party consequence in the city was at all enhanced by it. He had himself no talent or competence for warlike operations—which tended infallibly to place ascendancy in the hands of others, and to throw him into the shade. As to his power of carrying on dishonest intrigues with success, that must depend on the extent of his political ascendancy. Matter of crimination against others (assuming him to be careless of truth or falsehood) could hardly be wanting either in war or peace. And if the war brought forward unsuccessful generals open to his accusations, it would also throw up successful generals, who would certainly outshine him and would probably put him down. In the life which Plutarch has given us of Phokion, a plain and straightforward military man—we read that one of the frequent and criminative speakers of Athens (of character analogous to that which is ascribed to Kleon) expressed his surprise on hearing Phokion dissuade the Athenians from embarking in a new war: 'Yes (said Phokion), I think it right to dissuade them; though I know well, that if there be war, I shall have command over you—if there be peace, you will have command over me'¹. This is surely a more rational estimate of the way in which war affects the comparative importance of the orator and the military officer, than that which Thukydides pronounces in reference to the interests of Kleon. Moreover, when we come to follow the political history of Syracuse, we shall find the demagogue Athenagoras ultra-pacific, and the aristocrat Hermokratês far more warlike. The former is afraid, not without reason, that war will raise into consequence

¹ Plutarch, *Phokion*, c. 16. Compare also the conversation of Menekleides and Epaminondas—Cornel. Nepos, *Epamin.*, c. 5.

energetic military leaders dangerous to the popular constitution. We may add that Kleon himself had not been always warlike. He commenced his political career as an opponent of Periklēs, when the latter was strenuously maintaining the necessity and prudence of beginning the Peloponnesian war¹.

But farther—if we should even grant that Kleon had a separate party-interest in promoting the war—it will still remain to be considered whether, at this particular crisis, the employment of energetic warlike measures in Thrace was not really the sound and prudent policy for Athens. Taking Periklēs as the best judge of that policy, we shall find him at the outset of the war inculcating emphatically two important points—1. To stand vigorously upon the defensive, maintaining unimpaired their maritime empire, 'keeping their subject-allies well in hand', submitting patiently even to see Attica ravaged. 2. To abstain from trying to enlarge their empire or to make new conquests during the war. Consistently with this well-defined plan of action, Periklēs, had he lived, would have taken care to interfere vigorously and betimes to prevent Brasidas from making his conquests. Had such interference been either impossible or accidentally frustrated, he would have thought no efforts too great to recover them. To maintain undiminished the integrity of the empire, as well as that impression of Athenian force upon which the empire rested, was his cardinal principle. Now it is impossible to deny that in reference to Thrace, Kleon adhered more closely than his rival Nikias to the policy of Periklēs. It was to Nikias, more than to Kleon, that the fatal mistake made by Athens in not interfering speedily after Brasidas first broke into Thrace is to be imputed. It was Nikias and his partisans, desirous of peace at almost any price, and knowing that the Lacedæmonians also desired it, who encouraged the Athenians, at a moment of great public depression of spirit, to leave Brasidas unopposed in Thrace, and rely on the chance of negotiation with Sparta for arresting his progress. The peace-party at Athens carried their point of the truce for a year, with the promise, and for the express purpose, of checking the farther conquests of Brasidas; also with the farther promise of maturing that truce into a permanent peace, and obtaining under the peace even the restoration of Amphipolis.

Such was the policy of Nikias and his party, the friends of peace and opponents of Kleon. And the promises which they thus held out might perhaps appear plausible in March B.C. 423, at the moment when the truce for one year was concluded. But subsequent events had frustrated them in the most glaring manner, and had even shown the best reason for believing that no such expectations could possibly be realized, while Brasidas was in unbroken and unopposed action. For the Lacedæmonians, though seemingly sincere in concluding the truce on the basis of *uti possidetis*, and desiring to extend it to Thrace as well as elsewhere,

¹ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 33-35. [Against this view it may be urged: (1) that the new system of divided command was likely to keep the generals well under the control of the civil power (*cf. n. to p. 503*); (2) that Kleon could find a fair field for his activity by collusion with a capable commander who lacked the needed powers of rhetoric, or could not always be present in Athens to exercise them: the exploit which brought Kleon most fame (the capture of Sphakteria) was carried out jointly by himself and

Demosthenēs; (3) Kleon would naturally rely for support on the *ναυτικός ὄχλος* above all other classes. These men stood to lose little or nothing by the war, since they possessed no landed property; on the other hand, the sea-borne commerce went on undisturbed, and employment in the navy could be more readily obtained. It was the middle class which was most anxious to terminate the war, and this section had its spokesmen in Nikias, Theramenes, and Aristophanes—*i.e.*, among Kleon's opponents.—ED.]

had been unable to enforce the observance of it upon Brasidas, or to restrain him even from making new acquisitions—so that Athens never obtained the benefit of the truce, exactly in that region where she most stood in need of it. Only by the despatch of her armament to Skiônê and Mendê had she maintained herself in possession even of Pallênê.

Now what was the lesson to be derived from this experience, when the Athenians came to discuss their future policy, after the truce was at an end? The great object of all parties at Athens was, to recover the lost possessions in Thrace—especially Amphipolis. Nikias, still urging negotiations for peace, continued to hold out hopes that the Lacedæmonians would be willing to restore that place, as the price of their captives now at Athens. But to this Kleon might make, and doubtless did make, a complete reply, grounded upon the most recent experience:—‘If the Lacedæmonians consent to the restitution of Amphipolis (he would say), it will probably be only with the view of finding some means to escape performance, and yet to get back their prisoners. But granting that they are perfectly sincere, they will never be able to control Brasidas, and those parties in Thrace who are bound up with him by community of feeling and interest; so that after all, you will give them back their prisoners, on the faith of an equivalent beyond their power to realize. Look at what has happened during the truce! So different are the views and obligations of Brasidas in Thrace from those of the Lacedæmonians, that he would not even obey their order when they directed him to stand as he was, and to desist from farther conquest. Much less will he obey them when they direct him to surrender what he has already got: least of all, if they enjoin the surrender of Amphipolis, his grand acquisition and his central point for all future effort. Depend upon it, if you desire to regain Amphipolis, you will only regain it by energetic employment of force, as has happened with Skiônê and Mendê. And you ought to put forth your strength for this purpose immediately, while the Lacedæmonian prisoners are yet in your hands, instead of waiting until after you shall have been deluded into giving them up, thereby losing all your hold upon Lacedæmon.’

Such anticipations were fully verified by the result: for subsequent history will show that the Lacedæmonians, when they had bound themselves by treaty to give up Amphipolis, either would not, or could not, enforce performance of their stipulation, even after the death of Brasidas. Much less could they have done so during his life, when there was his great personal influence, strenuous will, and hopes of future conquest, to serve as increased obstruction to them. Such anticipations were also plainly suggested by the recent past: so that in putting them into the mouth of Kleon, we are only supposing him to read the lesson open before his eyes.

Now since the war-policy of Kleon, taken at this moment after the expiration of the One year’s truce, may be thus shown to be not only more conformable to the genius of Periklês, but also founded on a juster estimate of events both past and future, than the peace-policy of Nikias, what are we to say to the historian, who, without refuting such presumptions, every one of which is deduced from his own narrative—nay, without even indicating their existence—merely tells us that ‘Kleon opposed the peace in order that he might cloke dishonest intrigues and find matter for plausible crimination’? We cannot but say of this criticism, with profound regret that such words must be pronounced respecting any judgement

of Thukydídēs, that it is harsh and unfair towards Kleon, and careless in regard to truth and the instruction of his readers. It is conceived in the same tone as his unaccountable judgement in the matter of Sphakteria.

If Kleon, in proposing the expedition, originally proposed himself as the commander, a new ground of objection, and a very forcible ground, would thus be furnished. Since everything which Kleon does is understood to be a manifestation of some vicious or silly attribute, we are told that this was an instance of his absurd presumption, arising out of the success of Pylus, and persuading him that he was the only general who could put down Brasidas. But if the success at Pylus had really filled him with such overweening military conceit, it is most unaccountable that he should not have procured for himself some command during the year which immediately succeeded the affair at Sphakteria—the eighth year of the war—a season of most active warlike enterprise, when his presumption and influence arising out of the Sphakterian victory must have been fresh and glowing. As he obtained no command during this immediately succeeding period, we may fairly doubt whether he ever really conceived such excessive personal presumption of his own talents for war, and whether he did not retain after the affair of Sphakteria the same character which he had manifested in that affair—reluctance to engage in military expeditions himself, and a disposition to see them commanded as well as carried on by others. It is by no means certain that Kleon, in proposing the expedition against Amphipolis, originally proposed to take the command of it himself: I think it at least equally probable, that his original wish was to induce Nikias or the Stratēgi to take the command of it, as in the case of Sphakteria.

It is easy to see, however, that an expedition proposed under these circumstances by Kleon, though it might command a majority in the public assembly, would have a large proportion of the citizens unfavourable to it, and even wishing that it might fail. Moreover, Kleon had neither talents nor experience for commanding an army; so that the being engaged under his command in fighting against the ablest officer of the time, could inspire no confidence to any man in putting on his armour. From all these circumstances united, political as well as military, we are not surprised to hear that the hoplites whom he took out with him went with much reluctance¹. An ignorant general with unwilling soldiers, many of them politically disliking him, stood little chance of wresting Amphipolis from Brasidas. But had Nikias or the Stratēgi done their duty and carried the entire force of the city under competent command to the same object, the issue would probably have been different as to gain and loss—certainly very different as to dishonour.

Kleon started from Peiræus, apparently towards the beginning of August, with 1,200 Athenian, Lemnian, and Imbrian hoplites, and 300 horsemen, troops of excellent quality and condition, besides an auxiliary force of allies (number not exactly known) and thirty triremes. This armament was not of magnitude at all equal to the taking of Amphipolis, for Brasidas had equal numbers, besides all the advantages of the position. But it was a part of the scheme of Kleon, on arriving at Eion, to procure Macedonian and Thracian reinforcements before he commenced his attack. He first halted in his voyage near Skiōnē, from which place

¹ Thukyd., v. 7: καὶ οἰκοθεν ὡς ἄκοντες αὐτῷ ἐυνήθον.

he took away such of the hoplites as could be spared from the blockade. He next sailed across the Gulf from Pallênê to the Sithonian peninsula, to a place called the Harbour of the Kolophonians near Torônê. Having here learnt that neither Brasidas himself, nor any considerable Peloponnesian garrison, was present in Torônê, he landed his forces, and marched to attack the town.

It happened that Brasidas, desiring to enlarge the fortified circle of Torônê, had broken down a portion of the old wall, and employed the materials in building a new and larger wall enclosing the proasteion or suburb. This new wall appears to have been still incomplete and in an imperfect state of defence. Pasitêidas, the Peloponnesian commander, resisted the attack of the Athenians as long as he could; but when already beginning to give way, he saw ten Athenian triremes sailing into the harbour, which was hardly guarded at all. Abandoning the defence of the suburb, he hastened to repel these new assailants, but came too late, so that the town was entered from both sides at once. Pasitêidas the commander, with the Peloponnesian garrison and the Toronæan male population, were despatched as prisoners to Athens, while the Toronæan women and children, by a fate but too common in those days, were sold as slaves.

After this not unimportant success, Kleon sailed round the promontory of Athos to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis. From hence, in execution of his original scheme, he sent envoys to Perdikkas, urging him to lend effective aid as the ally of Athens in the attack of Amphipolis, with his whole forces, and to Pollês the king of the Thracian Odomantes, inviting him also to come with as many Thracian mercenaries as could be levied. The Edonians, the Thracian tribe nearest to Amphipolis, took part with Brasidas. Awaiting the expected reinforcements, Kleon employed himself, first in an attack upon Stageirus in the Strymonic Gulf, which was repulsed, next upon Galêpsus, on the coast opposite the island of Thasos, which was successful. But the reinforcements did not at once arrive, and being too weak to attack Amphipolis without them, he was obliged to remain inactive at Eion; while Brasidas on his side made no movement out of Amphipolis, but contented himself with keeping constant watch over the forces of Kleon, the view of which he commanded from his station on the hill of Kerdyllion, on the western bank of the river, communicating with Amphipolis by the bridge. Some days elapsed in such inaction on both sides. But the Athenian hoplites, becoming impatient of doing nothing, soon began to give vent to those feelings of dislike which they had brought out from Athens against their general. Athenian hoplites, if they felt such a sentiment, were not likely to refrain from manifesting it. And Kleon was presently made aware of the fact in a manner sufficiently painful to force him against his will into some movement, which, however, he did not intend to be anything else than a march for the purpose of surveying the ground all round the city¹.

To comprehend the important incidents which followed, it is necessary

¹ This episode shows that the 'intelligent interest' shown by the Greek citizen-soldier could have its drawbacks. Such free criticism is also recorded by Herodotus (vi. 12) in the case of the Ionians who fought at Lade. We may suspect that this *παρόρησις* was chiefly confined to the Ionian peoples, the Peloponnesian and Boeotian

soldiers having a good reputation for true soldierly bearing. But we should bear in mind that the Athenian hoplites, who were presumably drawn from the zeugite class, would largely be political opponents of Kleon, and treated him less respectfully than they would have behaved towards a commander of higher standing and experience.—Ed.

to say a few words on the topography of Amphipolis, as far as we can understand it on the imperfect evidence before us. That city was placed on the left bank of the Strymon, on a conspicuous hill around which the river makes a bend, first in a south-westerly direction, then, after a short course to the southward, back in a south-easterly direction. Amphipolis had for its only artificial fortification one long wall, which began near the point north-east of the town, where the river narrows again into a channel, after passing through the lake Kerkinitis, ascended along the eastern side of the hill, crossing the ridge which connects it with Mount Pangæus, and then descended so as to touch the river again at another point south of the town—thus being as it were a string to the highly-bent bow formed by the river. On three sides, north, west, and south, the city was defended only by the Strymon. At some little distance below the point where the wall touched the river south of the city, was the bridge, a communication of great importance for the whole country, which connected the territory of Amphipolis with that of Argilus. On the western or right bank of the river, bordering it and forming an outer bend corresponding to the bend of the river, was situated Mount Kerdylum. At the time when Brasidas first took the place, the bridge was totally unconnected with the long city wall. But during the intervening eighteen months, he had erected a palisade work connecting the two. By means of this palisade, the bridge was thus at the time of Kleon's expedition comprehended within the fortifications of the city, so that Brasidas, while keeping watch on Mount Kerdylum, could pass over whenever he chose into the city, without impediment.

In the march which Kleon now undertook, he went up to the top of the ridge (which runs nearly in an easterly direction from Amphipolis to Mount Pangæus) in order to survey the city and its adjoining ground on the northern and north-eastern side. The road which he was to take from Eion lay at a small distance eastward of the city long wall, and from the palisade which connected that wall with the bridge. But he had no expectation of being attacked in his march—the rather as Brasidas with the larger portion of his force was visible on Mount Kerdylum. Moreover the gates of Amphipolis were all shut—not a man was on the wall—nor were any symptoms of movement to be detected. As there was no evidence before him of intention to attack, he took no precautions, and marched in careless and disorderly array. Having reached the top of the ridge, he surveyed at leisure the lake before him, and the side of the city which lay towards Thrace. The perfect quiescence of the city imposed upon and even astonished him. It seemed altogether undefended, and he almost fancied, that if he had brought battering engines, he could have taken it forthwith. Impressed with the belief that there was no enemy prepared to fight, he took his time to survey the ground; while his soldiers became more and more relaxed and careless in their trim—some even advancing close up to the walls and gates.

But this state of affairs was soon materially changed. Brasidas, knowing that the Athenian hoplites would not long endure the tedium of absolute inaction, calculated that by affecting extreme backwardness he should seduce Kleon into some incautious movement. His station on Mount Kerdylum enabled him to watch the march of the Athenian army from Eion, and when he saw them pass up along the road outside of the

long wall of Amphipolis, he immediately crossed the river with his forces and entered the town. But it was not his intention to march out and offer them open battle. For his army, though equal in number to theirs, was extremely inferior in arms and equipment, in which points the Athenian force now present was so admirably provided, that his own men would not think themselves a match for it, if the two armies faced each other in open field. He relied altogether on the effect of sudden sally and well-timed surprise, when the Athenians should have been thrown into a feeling of contemptuous security by an exaggerated show of impotence in their enemy.

Brasidas called his men together to address to them the usual encouragements prior to an engagement. After appealing to the Dorian pride of his Peloponnesians, accustomed to triumph over Ionians, he explained to them his design of relying upon a bold and sudden movement with comparatively small numbers, against the Athenian army when not prepared for it¹.

These preparations, however, could not be completed in secrecy. Brasidas and his army were perfectly visible while descending the hill of Kerdylium, crossing the bridge and entering Amphipolis, to the Athenian scouts without. Moreover, so conspicuous was the interior of the city to spectators without, that the temple of Athênê, and Brasidas with its ministers around him performing the ceremony of sacrifice, was distinctly recognised. The fact was made known to Kleon as he stood on the high ridge taking his survey, while at the same time those who had gone near to the gates reported that the feet of many horses and men were beginning to be seen under them, as if preparing for a sally. He himself went close to the gate, and satisfied himself of this circumstance: we must recollect that there was no defender on the walls, nor any danger from missiles. Anxious to avoid coming to any real engagement before his reinforcements should arrive, he at once gave orders for retreat, which he thought might be accomplished before the attack from within could be fully organized. For he imagined that a considerable number of troops would be marched out, and ranged in battle order, before the attack was actually begun—not dreaming that the sally would be instantaneous, made with a mere handful of men. Orders having been proclaimed to wheel to the left, and retreat in column on the left flank towards Eion, Kleon, who was himself on the top of the hill with the right wing, waited only to see his left and centre actually in march on the road to Eion, and then directed his right also to wheel to the left and follow them.

The whole Athenian army were thus in full retreat, marching in a direction nearly parallel to the Long Wall of Amphipolis, with their right or unshielded side exposed to the enemy—when Brasidas, looking over the southernmost gates of the Long Wall with his small detachment ready marshalled near him, burst out into contemptuous exclamations on the disorder of their array. 'These men will not stand us: I see it by the quivering of their spears and of their heads. Men who reel about in that way never stand an assailing enemy.'

With that, both the gate of the Long Wall nearest to the palisade,

¹ Thukyd., v. 9. The words τὸ ἀνεμνόν τῆς γράμης are full of significance in regard to ancient military affairs. The Grecian hoplites, even the best of them, required to be peculiarly *wound up* for a battle: hence the necessity of the harangue from the general which always preceded. Com-

pare Xenophon's eulogy of the manœuvres of Epameinondas before the battle of Mantinea, whereby he made the enemy fancy that he was not going to fight, and took down the preparation in the minds of their soldiers for battle. (Xenoph. *Hellen.*, vii. 5, 22.)

and the adjoining gate of the palisade itself, were suddenly thrown open, and Brasidas with his 150 chosen soldiers issued out through them to attack the retreating Athenians. Running rapidly down the straight road which joined laterally the road towards Eion along which the Athenians were marching, he charged their central division on the right flank¹. Their left wing had already got beyond him on the road towards Eion. Taken completely unprepared, conscious of their own disorderly array, and astounded at the boldness of their enemy, the Athenians of the centre were seized with panic, made not the least resistance, and presently fled. Even the Athenian left, though not attacked at all, instead of halting to lend assistance, shared the panic and fled in disorder. Having thus disorganized this part of the army, Brasidas passed along the line to press his attack on the Athenian right: but in this movement he was mortally wounded and carried off the field unobserved by his enemies. Meanwhile Klearidas, sallying forth from the Thracian gate, had attacked the Athenian right on the ridge opposite to him, immediately after it began its retreat. But the soldiers on the Athenian right had probably seen the previous movement of Brasidas against the other division, and though astonished at the sudden danger, had thus a moment's warning, before they were themselves assailed, to halt and form on the hill. Klearidas here found a considerable resistance, in spite of the desertion of Kleon, who, more astounded than any man in his army by a catastrophe so unlooked for, lost his presence of mind and fled at once, but was overtaken by a Thracian peltast from Myrkinus, and slain. His soldiers on the right wing, however, repelled two or three attacks in front from Klearidas, and maintained their ground, until at length the Chalkidian cavalry and the peltasts from Myrkinus, having come forth out of the gates, assailed them with missiles in flank and rear so as to throw them into disorder. The whole Athenian army was thus put to flight, the left hurrying to Eion, the men of the right dispersing and seeking safety among the hilly grounds of Pangæus in their rear. Their sufferings and loss in the retreat, from the hands of the pursuing peltasts and cavalry, were most severe. When they at last again mustered at Eion, not only the commander Kleon, but 600 Athenian hoplites, half of the force sent out, were found missing.

So admirably had the attack been concerted, and so entire was its success, that only seven men perished on the side of the victors. But of those seven, one was the gallant Brasidas himself, who being carried into Amphipolis, lived just long enough to learn the complete victory of his troops and then expired. He received, by special decree, the distinguished honour of interment within their city—the universal habit being to inter even the most eminent deceased persons in a suburb without the walls. He was also proclaimed Ekist or Founder of Amphipolis, and as such, received heroic worship with annual games and sacrifices to his honour.

¹ Thukyd., v. 10. Brasidas and his men sallied forth by two different gates at the same time. One was the first gate in the Long Wall which would be the first gate in order to a person coming from the southward. The other was, the *gate upon the palisade* (*ai ἐν τῷ σταύρωμα πύλαι*)—that is, the gate in the Long Wall which opened from the town upon the palisade. The persons who sallied out by this gate would get out to

attack the enemy by the gate in the palisade itself.

Another gate would be that by which Brasidas himself with his army entered Amphipolis from Mount Kerdylum. It probably stood open at this moment when he directed the sally forth: that which had to be opened at the moment was, the gate in the palisade, together with the gate first in the Long Wall.

The Athenian Hagnon, the real founder and originally recognised Œkist of the city, was stripped of all his commemorative honours and expunged from the remembrance of the people, the buildings, which served as visible memento of his name, being destroyed. Klearidas, as governor of Amphipolis, superintended those numerous alterations in the city which this important change required, while the remaining armament of Athens, having obtained the usual truce and buried their dead, returned home without farther operations.

There are few battles recorded in history wherein the disparity and contrast of the two generals opposed has been so manifest—consummate skill and courage on the one side against ignorance and panic on the other. On the singular ability and courage of Brasidas there can be but one verdict of unqualified admiration. But the criticism passed by Thukydidēs on Kleon, here as elsewhere, cannot be adopted without reserves. He tells us that Kleon undertook his march, from Eion up to the hill in front of Amphipolis, in the same rash and confident spirit with which he had embarked on the enterprise against Pylus, in the blind confidence that no one would resist him. Now I have already, in a former chapter, shown grounds for concluding that the anticipations of Kleon respecting the capture of Sphakteria, far from being marked by any spirit of unmeasured presumption, were sober and judicious, realized to the letter without any unlooked-for aid from fortune. The remarks, here made by Thukydidēs on that affair, are not more reasonable than the judgement on it in his former chapter; for it is not true (as he here implies) that Kleon expected no resistance in Sphakteria—he calculated on resistance, but knew that he had force sufficient to overcome it. His fault even at Amphipolis, great as that fault was, did not consist in rashness and presumption. This charge at least is rebutted by the circumstance, that he himself wished to make no aggressive movement until his reinforcements should arrive—and that he was only constrained, against his own will, to abandon his intended temporary inactivity during that interval, by the angry murmurs of his soldiers, who reproached him with ignorance and backwardness—the latter quality being the reverse of that with which he is branded by Thukydidēs.

When Kleon was thus driven to do something, his march up to the top of the hill, for the purpose of reconnoitring the ground, was not in itself ill-judged. It might have been accomplished in perfect safety, if he had kept his army in orderly array, prepared for contingencies. But he suffered himself to be out-generalled and over-reached by that simulated consciousness of impotence and unwillingness to fight, which Brasidas took care to present to him. Among all military stratagems, this has perhaps been the most frequently practised with success against inexperienced generals, who are thrown off their guard and induced to neglect precaution, not because they are naturally more rash or presumptuous than ordinary men, but because nothing except either a high order of intellect, or special practice and training, will enable a man to keep steadily present to his mind liabilities even real and serious, when there is no discernible evidence to suggest their approach—much more when there *is* positive evidence, artfully laid out by a superior enemy, to create belief in their absence. A fault substantially the same had been committed by Thukydidēs himself and his colleague Euklēs a year and

a half before, when they suffered Brasidas to surprise the Strymonian bridge and Amphipolis, not even taking common precautions, nor thinking it necessary to keep the fleet at Eion.

This military incompetence, which made Kleon fall into the trap laid for him by Brasidas, also made him take wrong measures against the danger, when he unexpectedly discovered at last that the enemy within were preparing to attack him. His fatal error consisted in giving instant order for retreat, under the vain hope that he could get away before the enemy's attack could be brought to bear. An abler officer, before he commenced the retreating march so close to the hostile walls, would have taken care to marshal his men in proper array, to warn and address them with the usual harangue, and to wind up their courage to the fighting-point. Up to that moment they had no idea of being called upon to fight; and the courage of Grecian hoplites—taken thus unawares while hurrying to get away in disorder visible both to themselves and their enemies, without any of the usual preliminaries of battle—was but too apt to prove deficient. To turn the right or unshielded flank to the enemy, was unavoidable, from the direction of the retreating movement, nor is it reasonable to blame Kleon for this, as some historians have done—or for causing his right wing to move too soon in following the lead of the left, as Dr. Arnold seems to think. The grand fault seems to have consisted in not waiting to marshal his men and prepare them for standing fight during their retreat.

But the absence of military knowledge and precaution is not the worst of Kleon's faults on this occasion. His want of courage at the moment of conflict is yet more lamentable, and divests his end of that personal sympathy which would otherwise have accompanied it. A commander who has been out-generalled is under a double force of obligation to exert and expose himself to the uttermost in order to retrieve the consequences of his own mistakes. He will thus at least preserve his own personal honour, whatever censure he may deserve on the score of deficient knowledge and judgement¹.

What is said about the disgraceful flight of Kleon himself must be applied, with hardly less severity of criticism, to the Athenian hoplites under him. They behaved in a manner altogether unworthy of the reputation of their city, especially the left wing, which seems to have broken and run away without waiting to be attacked. And when we read in Thukydides, that the men who thus disgraced themselves were among the best and the best-armed hoplites in Athens—that they came out unwillingly under Kleon—that they began their scornful murmurs against him before he had committed any error—when we read this, we shall be led to compare the expedition against Amphipolis with former artifices respecting the attack of Sphakteria, and to discern other causes for its failure besides the military incompetence of the commander. These hoplites brought out with them from Athens the feelings prevalent among the political adversaries of Kleon. The expedition was proposed and carried by him, contrary to the wishes of these adversaries. They could not prevent it, but their opposition enfeebled it from the beginning, kept within too narrow limits the force assigned, and was one main reason which frustrated its success.

¹ Contrast the brave death of the Lacedæmonian general Anaxibias, when he found himself out-

generalled and surprised by the Athenian Iphikrâtes (Xenophon, *Hellen.*, iv. 8, 38).

Had Periklēs been alive, Amphipolis might perhaps still have been lost, since its capture was the fault of the officers employed to defend it. But if lost, it would probably have been attacked and recovered with the same energy as the revolted Samos had been, with the full force, and the best generals, that Athens could furnish. With such an armament under good officers, there was nothing at all impracticable in the reconquest of the place, especially as at that time it had no defence on three sides except the Strymon, and might thus be approached by Athenian ships on that navigable river¹. The armament of Kleon, even if his reinforcements had arrived, was hardly sufficient for the purpose. But Periklēs would have been able to concentrate upon it the whole strength of the city, without being paralysed by the contentions of political party.

It was thus that the Athenians, partly from political intrigue, partly from the incompetence of Kleon, underwent a disastrous defeat instead of carrying Amphipolis. But the death of Brasidas converted their defeat into a substantial victory. There remained no Spartan, like or second to that eminent man, either as a soldier or a conciliating politician, none who could replace him in the confidence and affection of the allies of Athens in Thrace. With him the fears of Athens, and the hopes of Sparta in respect to the future alike disappeared. The Athenian generals Phormio and Demosthenēs had both of them acquired among the Akarnanians an influence personal to themselves, apart from their post and from their country. But the career of Brasidas exhibited an extent of personal ascendancy and admiration, obtained as well as deserved, such as had never before been paralleled by any military chieftain in Greece: and Plato might well select him as the most suitable historical counterpart to the heroic Achilles². All the achievements of Brasidas were his own individually, with nothing more than bare encouragement, sometimes even without encouragement, from his country. And when we recollect the strict and narrow routine in which as a Spartan he had been educated, so fatal to the development of everything like original thought or impulse, and so completely estranged from all experience of party or political discussion—we are amazed at his power of adapting himself to new circumstances and new persons, and his dexterity in making himself the rallying-point of opposite political parties in each of the various cities which he acquired. At the time when Brasidas perished, in the flower of his age, he was unquestionably the first man in Greece. And though it is not given to us to predict what he would have become had he lived, we may be sure that the future course of the war would have been sensibly modified, perhaps even to the advantage of Athens, since she might have had sufficient occupation at home to keep her from undertaking her disastrous enterprise in Sicily.

Respecting the foreign policy of Kleon, the facts already narrated will enable the reader to form an idea of it as compared with that of his opponents. I have shown grounds for believing that Thukydides has forgotten his usual impartiality in criticising this personal enemy, that in regard to Sphakteria, Kleon was really one main and indispensable cause of procuring for his country the greatest advantage which she obtained throughout the whole war; and that in regard to his judgement, as

¹ Amphipolis was actually thus attacked by the Athenians, though without success, eight years

afterwards, by ships, on the Strymon—Thukyd., vii. 9. ² Plato, *Symposion*, c. 36, p. 221.

advocating the prosecution of war, three different times must be distinguished—1. After the first blockade of the hoplites in Sphakteria—2. After the capture of the island—3. After the expiration of the One-year truce. On the earliest of those three occasions, he was wrong, for he seems to have shut the door on all possibilities of negotiation, by his manner of dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys. On the second occasion, he had fair and plausible grounds to offer on behalf of his opinion, though it turned out unfortunate: moreover, at that time, all Athens was warlike, and Kleon is not to be treated as the peculiar adviser of that policy. On the third and last occasion, after the expiration of the truce, the political counsel of Kleon was right, judicious, and truly Periklæan—much surpassing in wisdom that of his opponents. We shall see in the coming chapters how these opponents managed the affairs of the state after his death—how Nikias threw away the interests of Athens in the enforcement of the conditions of peace—how Nikias and Alkibiadēs together shipwrecked the power of their country on the shores of Syracuse. And when we judge the demagogue Kleon in this comparison, we shall find ground for remarking that Thukydidēs is reserved and even indulgent towards the errors and vices of other statesmen—harsh only towards those of his accuser.

As to the internal policy of Kleon, and his conduct as a politician in Athenian constitutional life, we have but little trustworthy evidence. There exists indeed a portrait of him drawn in colours broad and glaring—most impressive to the imagination, and hardly effaceable from the memory—the portrait in the *Knights* of Aristophanēs. It is through this representation that Kleon has been transmitted to posterity, crucified by a poet who admits himself to have a personal grudge against him, just as he has been commemorated in the prose of an historian whose banishment he had proposed. The effect produced upon the Athenian audience when this piece was represented at the Lenæan festival (January, B.C. 424, about six months after the capture of Sphakteria), with Kleon himself and most of the real *Knights* present, must have been intense beyond what we can now easily imagine.

So ready are most writers to find Kleon guilty, that they are satisfied with Aristophanēs as a witness against him, though no other public man, of any age or nation, has ever been condemned upon such evidence. No man thinks of judging Sir Robert Walpole, or Mr. Fox, or Mirabeau, from the numerous lampoons put in circulation against them. No man will take measure of a political Englishman from *Punch*, or of a Frenchman from the *Charivari*. The unrivalled comic merit of the *Knights* of Aristophanēs is only one reason the more for distrusting the resemblance of its picture to the real Kleon. We have means too of testing the candour and accuracy of Aristophanēs by his delineation of Sokratēs, whom he introduced in the comedy of *Clouds* in the year after that of the *Knights*. As a comedy, the *Clouds* stands second only to the *Knights*: as a picture of Sokratēs, it is little better than pure fancy: it is not even a caricature, but a totally different person. With such an analogy before us, not to mention what we know generally of the portraits of Periklēs by these authors, we are not warranted in treating the portrait of Kleon as a likeness, except on points where there is corroborative evidence.¹

¹ Aristophan., *Equit.*, 55, 391, 740, etc. In one passage of the play, Kleon is reproached with pretending to be engaged at Argos in measures for

winning the alliance of that city, but in reality, under cover of this proceeding, carrying on clandestine negotiations with the Lacedæmonians

But when we put together the different heads of indictment accumulated by Aristophanês, it will be found that they are not easily reconcilable one with the other. For an Athenian, whose temper led him to violent crimination of others, at the inevitable price of multiplying and exasperating personal enemies, would find it peculiarly dangerous, if not impossible, to carry on peculation for his own account. If, on the other hand, he took the latter turn, he would be inclined to purchase connivance from others even by winking at real guilt on their part, far from making himself conspicuous as a calumniator of innocence. We must therefore discuss the side of the indictment which is indicated in Thukydidês; not Kleon as truckling to the people and cheating for his own pecuniary profit (which is certainly not the character implied in his speech about the Mitylenæans as given to us by the historian), but Kleon as a man of violent temper and fierce political antipathies—a bitter speaker—and sometimes dishonest in his calumnies against adversaries. These are the qualities which, in all countries of free debate, go to form what is called a great opposition speaker. It was thus that the elder Cato—‘the universal biter, whom Persephonê was afraid even to admit into Hades after his death’—was characterized at Rome, even by the admission of his admirers to some extent, and in a still stronger manner by those who were unfriendly to him, as Thukydidês was to Kleon. In Cato such a temper was not inconsistent with a high sense of public duty. And Plutarch recounts an anecdote respecting Kleon, that on first beginning his political career, he called his friends together, and dissolved his intimacy with them, conceiving that private friendships would distract him from his paramount duty to the commonwealth.

Moreover, the reputation of Kleon, as a frequent and unmeasured accuser of others, may be explained partly by a passage of his enemy Aristophanês, a passage the more deserving of confidence as a just representation of fact, since it appears in a comedy (the *Frogs*) represented (405 B.C.) fifteen years after the death of Kleon, and five years after that of Hyperbolus, when the poet had less motive for misrepresentations against either. In the *Frogs*, Xanthias is represented as acting with violence and insult towards two hostesses of eating-houses. Upon which, the women, having no other redress left, announce their resolution of calling, the one upon her protector Kleon, the other on Hyperbolus, for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice before the dikastery¹. This passage shows us (if inferences on comic evidence are to be held as admissible) that Kleon and Hyperbolus became involved in accusations partly by helping poor persons, who had been wronged, to obtain justice before the dikastery. A rich man who had suffered injury might purchase of Antipho or some other rhetor, advice and aid as to the conduct of his complaint. But a poor man or woman would think themselves happy to obtain the gratuitous suggestion, and sometimes the

(464). In two other passages, he is denounced as being the person who obstructs the conclusion of peace with the Lacedæmonians (790, 1390).

[These inconsistencies are not difficult to explain. It was a favourite device of Aristophanês to raise laughter by imputing to prominent men just those actions which they denounced most strenuously. Thus Sokratês, the sturdy lover of fresh air and common-sense, becomes a pale-

faced student; and if Kleon, the terror of corrupt administrators and the spokesman of the war-party, is made to take bribes from Mitylene (*Ach.*, l. 6, *Eq.*, 834), to shirk military duty, to intrigue with Sparta, and to advocate peace (*Eq.*, 443, 464, 869), it is probably only another example of the same kind of jesting. Cf. Whibley, *Political Parties*, *Introd.*, pp. 6, 7.—*Ed.*]

¹ Aristophan., *Ran.*, 566-576.

auxiliary speech, of Kleon or Hyperbolus ; who would thus extend their own popularity, by means very similar to those practised by the leading men in Rome¹.

But besides lending aid to others, doubtless Kleon was often also a prosecutor, in his own name, of official delinquents, real or alleged. That someone should undertake this duty, was indispensable for the protection of the city ; otherwise the responsibility to which official persons were subjected after their term of office would have been merely nominal : and we have proof enough that the general public morality of these official persons, acting individually, was by no means high. But the duty was at the same time one which most persons would and did shun. The prosecutor, while obnoxious to general dislike, gained nothing even by the most complete success ; and if he failed so much as not to procure a minority of votes among the dikasts, equal to one-fifth of the numbers present, he was condemned to pay a fine of 1,000 drachms. What was still more serious, he drew upon himself a formidable mass of private hatred, from the friends, partisans, and the political club, of the accused party—extremely menacing to his own future security and comfort, in a community like Athens. A prudent politician at Athens would undertake it occasionally, and against special rivals ; but he would carefully guard himself against the reputation of doing it frequently or by inclination—and the orators constantly do so guard themselves, in those speeches which yet remain.

It is this reputation which Thukydides fastens upon Kleon, and which, like Cato the censor at Rome, he probably merited from native acrimony of temper, from a powerful talent for invective, and from his position both inferior and hostile to the Athenian knights or aristocracy, who overshadowed him by their family importance. But in what proportion of cases his accusations were just or calumnious—the real question upon which a candid judgement turns—we have no means of deciding, either in his case or in that of Cato.

The quarrel of Kleon with Aristophanês is said to have arisen out of an accusation which he brought against that poet in the [council] of Five Hundred, on the subject of his second comedy, the *Babylonians*, exhibited B.C. 426, at the festival of the urban Dionysia in the month of March. At that season many strangers were present at Athens, especially many visitors and deputies from the subject-allies, who were bringing their annual tribute. And as the *Babylonians* (now lost), like so many other productions of Aristophanês, was full of slashing ridicule not only against individual citizens, but against the functionaries and institutions of the city², Kleon instituted a complaint against it in the [council], as an exposure dangerous to the public security before strangers and allies. We have to recollect that Athens was then in the midst of an embarrassing war—that the fidelity of her subject-allies was much doubted—that Lesbos, the greatest of her allies, had been reconquered only in the preceding year. Under such circumstances, Kleon might see plausible reason

¹ Here again we find Cato the elder represented as constantly in the forum at Rome, lending aid of this kind and espousing the cause of others who had grounds of complaint (Plutarch, *Cato*, c. 3), *πρῶτὸν μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν βαδίζει καὶ παρίστανται τοῖς δομένοις—τοὺς μὲν θαυμαστάς καὶ φίλους ἐκτὸς διὰ τῶν συγγενῶν*, etc. [Cf. also

the triumvir Crassus, who never refused his advocacy in the courts to any client, with the express purpose of commanding a wide influence (Plut., *Crassus*, c. 3).—Ed.]

² See *Acharn.*, 377, with the Scholia, and the anonymous biography of Aristophanês.

for thinking that a political comedy of the Aristophanic vein and talent tended to degrade the city in the eyes of strangers, even granting that it was innocuous when confined to the citizens themselves. The poet complains¹ that Kleon summoned him before the senate, with terrible threats and calumny: but it does not appear that any penalty was inflicted. Nor indeed had the senate competence to find him guilty or punish him, except to the extent of a small fine. They could only bring him to trial before the dikastery, which in this case plainly was not done. He himself however seems to have felt the justice of the warning: for we find that three out of his four next following plays, before the peace of Nikias (the *Acharnians*, the *Knights*, and the *Wasps*), were represented at the Lenæan festival², in the month of January, a season when no strangers nor allies were present.

The battle of Amphipolis removed at once the two most pronounced individual opponents of peace, Kleon and Brasidas. Athens too was more than ever discouraged and averse to prolonged fighting; for the number of hoplites slain at Amphipolis doubtless filled the city with mourning, besides the unparalleled disgrace now tarnishing Athenian soldiery. The peace-party under the auspices of Nikias and Lachês, relieved at once from the internal opposition of Kleon, as well as from the foreign enterprise of Brasidas, were enabled to resume their negotiations with Sparta in a spirit promising success. King Pleistoanax, and the Spartan ephors of the year, were on their side equally bent on terminating the war, and the deputies of all the allies were convoked at Sparta for discussion with the envoys of Athens. Such discussion was continued during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. At first the pretensions advanced were found very conflicting; but at length, after several debates, it was agreed to treat upon the basis of each party surrendering what had been acquired by war. The Athenians insisted at first on the restoration of Plataea; but the Thebans replied that Plataea was theirs neither by force nor by treason, but by voluntary capitulation and surrender of the inhabitants. This distinction seems to our ideas somewhat remarkable, since the capitulation of a besieged town is not less the result of force than capture by storm. But it was adopted in the present treaty; and under it the Athenians, while foregoing their demand of Plataea, were enabled to retain Nisæa, which they had acquired from the Megarians, and Anaktorium and Solium which they had taken from Corinth. To ensure accommodating temper on the part of Athens, the Spartans held out the threat of invading Attica in the spring, and of establishing a permanent fortification in the territory: and they even sent round proclamation to their allies, enjoining all the details requisite for this step. Since Attica had now been exempt from invasion for three years, the Athenians were probably not insensible to this threat of renewal under a permanent form.

At the beginning of spring—about the end of March, 421 B.C.—the important treaty was concluded for the term of fifty years. The following were its principal conditions:—

1. All shall have full liberty to visit all the public temples of Greece—

¹ Aristoph., *Acharn.*, 355-475.

² See the arguments prefixed to these three plays; and *Acharn.*, 475; *Equit.*, 881.

for purposes of private sacrifice, consultation of oracle, or visit to the festivals.—(The value of this article will be felt when we recollect that the Athenians and their allies had been unable to visit either the Olympic or the Pythian festival since the beginning of the war.)

2. The Delphians shall enjoy full autonomy and mastery of their temple and their territory.—(This article was intended to exclude the ancient claim of the Phokian confederacy to the management of the temple, a claim which the Athenians had once supported, before the Thirty years' truce: but they had now little interest in the matter, since the Phokians were in the ranks of their enemies.)

3. There shall be peace for fifty years between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, with abstinence from mischief either overt or fraudulent, by land as well as by sea.

4. Neither party shall invade for purposes of mischief the territory of the other—not by any artifice or under any pretence.

Should any subject of difference arise, it shall be settled by equitable means, and by oaths tendered and taken, in form to be hereafter agreed on.

5. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians.

They shall farther *relinquish* to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. But these cities shall remain autonomous, on condition of paying tribute to Athens according to the assessment of Aristeidês. Nor shall the cities be counted hereafter either as allies of Athens or of Sparta, unless Athens shall induce them by amicable persuasions to become her allies, which she is at liberty to do if she can.

The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Panaktum to the Athenians.

6. The Athenians shall restore to Sparta Koryphasium, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleum, Atalantê—with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies. They shall farther release all Spartans or allies of Sparta now blocked up in Skiônê.

7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall give back all the captives in their hands, from Athens or her allies.

8. Respecting Skiônê, Torônê, Sermylus, or any other town in the possession of Athens, the Athenians may take their own measures.

9. Oaths shall be exchanged between the contracting parties according to the solemnities held most binding in each city respectively, and in the following words—'I will adhere to this convention and truce sincerely and without fraud'. The oaths shall be annually renewed, and the terms of peace shall be inscribed on columns at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, as well as at Sparta and Athens.

10. Should any matter have been forgotten in the present convention, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians may alter it by mutual understanding and consent, without being held to violate their oaths.

These oaths were accordingly exchanged. They were taken by seventeen principal Athenians, and as many Spartans, on behalf of their respective countries. Among the Lacedæmonians swearing, are included the two kings, Agis and Pleistoanax—the Ephor Pleistolas (and perhaps other ephors, but this we do not know)—and Tellis, the father of Brasidas. Among the Athenians sworn are comprised Nikias, Lachês, Hagnon, Lamachus, and Demosthenês.

CHAPTER XXV [LV]

FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90

My last chapter terminated with the peace called the Peace of Nikias, concluded in March, 421 B.C.—between Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.

Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace—and ratified as it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates—still there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent, but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians were discontented because they did not receive back Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: the Eleians also, on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of them moreover took common offence at the article which provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent, and without consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought proper. Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.

So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, that having obtained the favourable vote of the majority, they resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it, through Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.

Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn, than the Spartans proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions required, the Athenians drew the favourable lot—an advantage so very great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing such alleged bribery, the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot conferred¹.

The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Ischagoras with two others to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, Ischagoras met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and so energetic were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government, pretending that he was not strong

¹ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 10.

enough to surrender the place against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled, the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found this impossible. He was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly be done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. The troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them to compliance were fruitless.

The Spartans were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should execute hers: and they were threatened with the double misfortune of forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos, if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the moment was now favourable for alliance with Athens, from the decided pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachês. The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing of the peace—awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions. Accordingly a treaty was concluded between the two, for fifty years—not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance. Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was the single provision of the alliance—with one addition, however, of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision at the present moment was of peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylus, planted there by themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.

An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the envoys from Amphipolis—probably not more than a month or two after the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be annually renewed—and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without violating the oath.

The most important result of this new alliance was something not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well assured, between the Spartan Ephors and Nikias at the time when it was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith restored.

Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquiescent

feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian inclinations of her leading men (at this moment Alkibiadēs was competing with Nikias for the favour of Sparta, as will be stated presently), than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to assist in keeping down the Helots—and the still more important after-proceeding of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her second best—without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided advantage in regard to her chief enemy—advantage, however, which had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses. This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the commencement of spring, whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized any one of their promised concessions: nay more—in trying to do so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as made it plain, that nothing short of the most stringent necessity would convert their promises into realities. Yet under these marked indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second treaty which practically annuls the first, and which ensures to the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for such alliance was at this moment (under the uncertain relations with Argos) not less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little doubt that if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence, she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives: for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we grant it to have been a real fact and not merely simulated, might have been removed by decisive co-operation on the part of Sparta with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years before, when the hoplites were first enclosed in Sphakteria, but before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but merely said, through their envoys, 'Give us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange, peace, together with our alliance'. At that moment there were some plausible reasons in favour of granting the proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled to make a better bargain. But *now*, there were no reasons in its favour, and a strong concurrence of reasons against it. The alliance in fact prevented the peace from being fulfilled: it became (as Thukydides himself admits) no peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities¹.

¹ The capital mistake which the Athenians committed during the negotiations lay in the original ratification of Nikias' peace: from this blunder most of the later complications followed as a natural consequence.

In the first place, the inexpediency of leaving Chalkidikē unsubdued was still greater after the defeat of Amphipolis than at the time of the armistice, and was sure to have a serious moral effect on the other tributary states. Again, the Athenians should have seen at once that Sparta

could not fulfil the conditions to which she had pledged herself, and hence might be driven to a change of policy. In 425 the prize of alliance with Athens might have outweighed the break-up of the Peloponnesian League; since then several allies had laid Sparta under a strong obligation, and the danger from Argos had to be reckoned with (cf. also note 1, p. 467). Hence the policy of coercion was out of the question.

Under these circumstances a serious attempt to bind down Sparta to the terms of peace must

Thukydides states on more than one occasion—and it was the sentiment of Nikias himself—that at the moment of concluding the peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of disadvantage and dishonour in reference to Athens¹. He alludes chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter—for as to other matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythêra, and Mèthônê. Yet so shortsighted were the philo-Laconian leanings of Nikias and the men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away this advantage—suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace—and nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which she desired. Most certainly, there was never any public recommendation of Kleon (as far as our information goes) so ruinously impolitic as this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives wherein both Nikias and Alkibiadês concurred. And now that the vehement leather-dresser, with his crimination eloquence, had passed away—replaced only by an inferior successor the lamp-maker² Hyperbolus—there remained no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances.

The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had forfeited the advantage of their position by giving up the captives. Yet it seems that under the present Ephors Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which could be called a breach of faith. Yet the Thracian towns were deaf to her persuasions, and obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So also were the Bœotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians: but the Bœotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice with Athens, terminable at ten days' notice on either side.

In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were established, the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians had sworn for themselves and their allies—yet the most powerful among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the Athenian prisoners in Bœotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which was (they said) all the intervention in their power,

simply have hastened the reaction against Athens which took place in 420—i.e., before Athens had found time to organize a new anti-Spartan coalition in the Peloponnese.

Having concluded the peace on an unsound basis, the Athenians had to face a dilemma: either they must bring on a new Peloponnesian war, or surrender their trump cards to Sparta in order at least to delay a fresh outbreak.

A similar excess of trustfulness involved the Athenians in an extremely difficult situation in 346. On this occasion Philip of Macedon offered peace and alliance to Athens, no doubt in perfectly good faith; but his promise to transfer his armed support from the Thebans to the Phokians was manifestly impracticable. Yet both the

Athenian embassy and the *ekklesia* overlooked this awkward fact, not even Demosthenês uttering a word of warning. The subsequent outburst of wrath, when the Athenians discovered the logic of the situation, availed them nothing (*Demosth., De Pace*); for once they had committed themselves to such unreal conditions of peace, they were bound to be the losers.—*Ed.*

¹ Thukyd., v. 28: *κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τούτον ἢ τε Λακεδαιμόνων μάλιστα δὴ κακὸς ἦκουε καὶ υπερῶφθη διὰ τὰς ἐνυμφίας.*—(Nikias) λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῶ (Athenian) ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπειρεσί (Lacedæmonians) τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, etc. (v. 46).—Ὅτε πρῶτον μὲν (to the Lacedæmonians) διὰ ἐνυμφῶν ἡ ἐνυμφία, etc.

² Aristophan., *Pac.*, 665-887.

since they were not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian cities against their will. As to the Boeotians and Corinthians, the Lacedæmonians went so far as to profess readiness to take arms along with Athens, for the purpose of constraining them to accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the surrender of Pylus—or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian garrison with the Helot deserters from that place—until farther progress should be made in the peace. Ultimately they suffered themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from Pylus to Kephallenia, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.

The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain, were Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders, who had first accepted from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next renounced all these advantages, and procured for Sparta almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The many critics on Grecian history who think no term too harsh for the demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens.

So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the number of states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendancy of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring: Argos therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fulness of wealth, power, and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both sides¹; while her military force was just now farther strengthened by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth and station, to receive constant military training at the public expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, apart from the other citizens². To a democratical government like Argos such an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present moment the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan confederacy

¹ Thukyd., v. 28. Aristophan., *Pac.*, 467, about the Argeians—*δὶχθεν μισθοφοροῦντες ἄλφια*.

He characterizes the Argeians as anxious for this reason to prolong the war between Athens and Sparta.

² Thukyd., v. 67.

Diodorus (xii. 75) represents the first formation of this Thousand-regiment at Argos as having taken place just about this time, and I think he is here worthy of credit, so that I do not regard

the expression of Thukydides *ἐκ πολλοῦ* as indicating a time more than two years prior to the battle of Mantinea. For Grecian military training, two years of constant practice would be a long time. It is not to be imagined that the Argeian democracy would have incurred the expense and danger of keeping up this select regiment, during all the period of their long peace, just now coming to an end.

opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something like headship in Peloponnesus.

The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. In the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens against the confederacy. And the alarm, once roused, was still farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.

Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring from the conferences at Sparta, the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to the common enemy—and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation, especially if a board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers to admit all suitable applicants, so that, in case of rejection, there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the Argeian democracy. This suggestion was eagerly adopted by both leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize their long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those two cities no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the public assembly.

Meanwhile the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantinea and Tegea, being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself, only a year and a half before, in a bloody, but indecisive, battle. Tegea, situated on the frontiers of Laconia and oligarchically governed, was tenaciously attached to Sparta; while for that very reason, as well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantinea was less so. She had recently conquered for herself a little empire in her own neighbourhood, composed of village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject-allies, and comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens—a period when the lesser states of

Peloponnesus generally, and even subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid service against the common enemy—so that she was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay moreover near to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have been invoked earlier, only that Sparta had been under pressing embarrassments—and farther, had assembled no general muster of the confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphakteria. But now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference. To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any of them from being mediatized or grouped into aggregations under the ascendancy of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta,—especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by ensuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of the confederacy¹.

Under such apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta (for so it was considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent, to follow the example.

In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of the congress at Corinth, whither the Lacedæmonians thought it necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians a remonstrance for the leading part which they had taken in organizing a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies—Bœotian, Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace, etc.—the Corinthians replied with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim their real ground for rejecting the peace—viz., that it had not procured for themselves the restoration of Solium and Anaktorium; since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had no interest—next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their resistance to the vote of the majority. 'It was a religious impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart from the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they revolted from Athens; and we should have infringed those separate oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after consultation with our friends here present.' With this unsatisfactory answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the purpose of urging the Corinthians to realize forthwith the hopes of alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their side to obtain a decided affirmative—being requested to come again at the next conference.

Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new

¹ Thukyd., i. 125.

Argeian confederacy and compromised Argos in an open proclamation, yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme. They were restrained by the discovery that their friends, who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states—left to their own impression and judgement by the Lacedæmonians, who did not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the Corinthians—spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from aversion towards the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the oligarchy at Sparta. They were linked together by communion of interest, not merely as being both neighbours and intense enemies of Attica, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse, the application of the Eleians, who, eagerly embracing the new project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians, and next to go on and enrol Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident so confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join the new confederacy.

The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantinea, in thus revolting from Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies. To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half their territory, but had been left in residence and occupation of it, under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the Olympian Zeus—in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When the Peloponnesian war began, the Lepreates were, by the standing agreement of the confederacy¹, exempted for the time from continuing to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war. Elis accordingly required that the payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly in their favour. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more disposed to carry out her general system of favouring the autonomy of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of the confederacy. Accordingly the Eleians, accusing her of unjust bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless the Spartans persisted in their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Eleians.

The new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea, had now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and Cor-

¹ Thukyd., v. 31: τὴν ἐνθὺν προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἰρητῇ, ἃ ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντο τινες, πάντα ἔχοντας καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἴσον ἔχοντας ἀφίστανται, etc.

Of the agreement here alluded to among the

members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage. It was extremely important to such of the confederates as were imperial cities—that is, which had subordinates or subject-allies.

inthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the junction of that city—seemingly the most powerful in Peloponnesus next to Sparta and Argos; but the Tegeans decidedly refused the proposal. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened by this repulse, which they had by no means expected—having been so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position insecure on the side of Athens, with whom they were not at peace, while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta and all her confederacy, including Bœotia and Megara. In this embarrassment they betook themselves to the Bœotians, whom they again entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance, a request already once refused, and not likely to be now granted, but intended to usher in a different request preferred at the same time. The Bœotians were entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, such as that which they had contracted for themselves. So far the Bœotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and back their application for an armistice—which the Athenians declined to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this answer, the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as a matter of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which they had sustained by the revolt of Mantinea and Elis. At the request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory, and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on the frontiers of Elis¹. These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose. But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished commander, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to plant them out.

Though the surrender of Sphakteria had been untarnished by any real cowardice or military incompetence, nevertheless, under the inexorable customs and tone of opinion at Sparta, these men were looked upon as more or less degraded. Some of them were already in the exercise of various functions, when the Ephors condemned them all to temporary disqualification for any official post, placing the whole of their property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors, from every act either of purchase or sale². The Ephors may have apprehended that

¹ Thukyd., v. 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots previously enfranchised, or the sons of such.

² Thukyd., v. 34. For the usual treatment of

Spartan soldiers who fled from battle, see Xenophon, *Rep. Laced.*, c. 9; Plutarch, *Agessilaus*, c. 30; Herodot., vii. 231.

they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and organizing revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable us to appreciate the situation ; but the ungenerous spirit of the regulation would not weigh much with the Ephors under any symptoms of public danger.

Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear nothing, except that the town of Skiônê at length surrendered to them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death the male population of military age—selling the women and children into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two years and a half before, belongs to Kleon ; that of executing it, nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, and to his countrymen generally. The reader will, however, now be sufficiently accustomed to the Greek laws of war, not to be surprised at such treatment against subjects revolted and reconquered. Skiônê and its territory was made over to the Plataean refugees. The native population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions, were now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat at Amphipolis had created a belief in Athens that this removal had offended the gods—under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle, the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian exiles. They farther lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian Gulf, which were captured by the Chalkidians of Thrace.

Hitherto the authorities of Sparta—king Pleistoanax as well as the Ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice, and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover, the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the summer (seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, B.C. 421) new Ephors were nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things this was an important revolution : for out of the five new Ephors, two (Kleobûlus and Xenarês) were decidedly hostile to peace with Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent. And we may here remark, that this fluctuation and instability of public policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional monarchy of Sparta—the least popular government in Greece, both in principle and in detail¹.

The new Ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the settlement of the pending differences, at which, among the rest, Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement ; so that the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobûlus and Xenarês, together with

¹ While admitting the frequent vacillation of Spartan foreign policy (*cf.* p. 480 with n. 1, *ib.*) we ought to hesitate before ascribing this feature to the extreme closeness of the Spartan 'oligarchy'. Had the administration lain in the hands of the gerusia, Sparta might perhaps have been called the 'least popular government in Greece'. But the

Ephors, in whom practically all power resided, were the direct nominees of the people. No doubt this board of officers created a tradition of their own which might often resist or even control popular sentiment, yet on questions of broad policy the Spartan commons could enforce their will whenever they chose to do so.—Ed.

many of their partisans, originated, in concert with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private underhand manœuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would grasp at it in preference (so these Ephors affirmed), even if it cost them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was farther essential that they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos—for Sparta could not easily go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.

Such were the plans which Kleobûlus and Xenarês laid with the Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favour the purpose at once: for on their road home, they were accosted by two Argeians, senators in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes as solicitors of the alliance, and communicated to the Bœotarchs, on their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan Ephors, and the wishes of these Argeians. The Bœotarchs also entered heartily into the entire scheme, receiving the Argeian envoys with marked favour, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance with Argos.

That sanction was to be obtained from 'the Four Councils of the Bœotians'—bodies of the constitution of which nothing is known¹. They proposed to these four Councils a resolution in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Bœotian federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial. Their particular object was (as they stated) to form alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace—for mutual defence, and for war as well as peace with others only by common consent. The manœuvre, skilfully contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control its proceedings. But the Bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found themselves defeated at the outset: for the Councils would not even hear of alliance with Corinth—so much did they fear to offend Sparta by any special connection with a city which had revolted from her. Nor did the Bœotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications with Kleobûlus and Xenarês, or to acquaint the Councils that the whole plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly, under this formal refusal on the part of the Councils, no farther proceedings could be taken.

But the anti-Athenian Ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their schemes for arriving at the Argeian alliance through the agency of the Bœotians,

¹ These 'four Councils' can have no resemblance to the institution devised by the moderate revolutionists at Athens in 411 (*Ath. Pol.*, c. 30). These latter 'four Councils' were intended to sit in succession, whereas the Bœotian bodies existed side by side, and were simultaneously in session (*Thuk.*, v. 38). Probably they were district assemblies, each representing one geographical

division of Bœotia like the local *verpades* of Thessaly (*Strabo*, ix., p. 430). The effect of such a partition would be to hamper local intercourse, and it was no doubt for this purpose that the Thebans made this arrangement—much as the Romans sought to weaken Macedonia in 167 by splitting it up into four sections.—ED.

did not the less persist in their views upon Panaktum. That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range between Attica and Bœotia, apparently on the Bœotian side of Phylê, and on or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led through Phylê¹—had been an Athenian possession, until six months before the peace, when it had been betrayed to the Bœotians. A special provision of the treaty between Athens and Sparta prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Bœotia, to request from the Bœotians the delivery of Panaktum as well as of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to Athens, she might be induced to surrender Pylus. The Bœotians refused compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the Athenians. Now the Spartans stood pledged by their covenant with the latter (either by its terms or by its recognised import) not to enter into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly bent upon getting possession of Panaktum—while the prospect of breach with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly that which Kleobûlus and Xenarês desired. Under these feelings, the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with Bœotia. But the Bœotians, instead of handing over Panaktum for surrender as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to the ground.

These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the destruction of Panaktum at the beginning of spring or about the middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian Ephors thus seemed to be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia, they were agreeably surprised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal of the peace just expiring. The Argeians found that they made no progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while their recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair of realizing their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian headship. But when they learnt that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate alliance with the Bœotians, and that Panaktum had been razed, their disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future. Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens—the destruction of Panaktum being conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession. Under such a persuasion—noway unreasonable in itself when the two contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished no collateral evidence to explain their real intent—the Argeians saw themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta, and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without a moment's delay, they despatched two Argeians to press for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spartans, and to obtain the best terms they could.

To the Lacedæmonian Ephors this application was eminently acceptable—the very event which they had been manœuvring underhand to bring

¹ See W. M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. ii., ch. xvii., p. 370.

about. Negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian envoys at first proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a peremptory negative—the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement. Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. About 120 years before this date, there had been a combat of this sort by 300 champions on each side, in which, after desperate valour on both sides, the victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined¹. The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now appeared a perfect absurdity—even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians, the most old-fashioned people in Greece. Yet since they hazarded nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, they at last agreed to the condition, drew up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted, the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at the festival of the Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths.

Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan Ephors seemed now to have carried all their points—friendship with Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means (through the possession of Panaktum) of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylus. But they were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedês and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of going on to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panaktum, they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, instead of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at Athens: nevertheless Andromedês proceeded thither, taking with him all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens, at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact: Panaktum as well as the prisoners were thus *restored* (he pretended)—for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and he claimed the cession of Pylus in exchange.

But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had been reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became discovered at Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for keeping such alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum and Pylus had

¹ Herodot., i. 82.

been brought to a close. Both the alliance, and the demolition of Panaktum, excited among the Athenians the strongest anger. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst frequent notes and protocols (to employ a modern phrase): nevertheless not one of the conditions favourable to Athens had yet been executed (except the restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number)—while she on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought to a head by this mission of Andromedês, discharged itself in the harshest dismissal of himself and his colleagues.

Even Nikias, Lachês, and the other leading Athenians, to whose misjudgement the embarrassment of the moment was owing, were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation against Spartan perfidy—if it were only to divert attention from their own mistake. But there was one of them—Alkibiadês son of Kleinias—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the Ekklesia, and giving to it a substantive aim.

The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was the splendour, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of Æakid lineage through the heroes Eurysakês and Ajax—and such the effect of that lineage upon the democratical public of Athens—that he stepped speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also through his mother Deinomachê to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he was related to Periklês, who became his guardian when he was left an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honour in a trireme of his own at the sea-fight of Artemisium against the Persians. Even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens was full of his freaks, to the unavailing regret of Periklês¹. Moreover, even before the age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training, procured for him assiduous caresses of every sort from the leading Athenians who frequented the public palæstræ.

A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so circumstanced. Violence of selfish passion, and reckless disregard of social obligation towards everyone, these form the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiadês. Nor does it appear that any injured person ever ventured to bring him to trial before the dikastery, though we read with amazement the tissue of lawlessness which marked his private life. But amidst the perfect legal, judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding the democracy—inequalities which the democratical institutions limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or discredited, and which were recognised as modifying elements in the current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom they injured as well as by those

¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 10, p. 320; Plutarch, *Alkibiad.*, c. 2, 3, 4; Isokratês, *De Bigis*, Orat. xvi., p. 353, §§ 33, 34; Cornel. Nepos, *Alkibiad.* c. 1.

whom they favoured. In the speech which Thukydides¹ ascribes to Alkibiadès before the Athenian public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts in Athenian society, show that if not approved, it was at least tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints of the democracy.

Amidst such unprincipled exorbitances of behaviour, Alkibiadès stood distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the army under Phormio at the siege of Potidæa in 432 B.C. Though then hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger, owing his life only to the exertions of Sokratès, who served in the ranks along with him. Eight years afterwards, Alkibiadès also served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokratès by protecting him against the Bœotian pursuers. As a rich young man, also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him—expensive duties, which (as we might expect) he discharged not merely with sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact expenditure of this sort, though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves off.

To a young man like Alkibiadès, thirsting for power and pre-eminence, a certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers—Prodikus, Protagoras, and others; but most of all, that of Sokratès. His intimacy with Sokratès has become celebrated on many grounds, and is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiadès (like the oligarchical Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter) was attracted to Sokratès by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation, his mastery of apposite and homely illustrations—his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete². But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokratès with the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes of discussion, in the society of all these sophists—Prodikus and Protagoras not less than Sokratès; for in the Athenian sense of the word, Sokratès was a sophist as well as the others, and to the rich

¹ Plutarch, *Alkibiad.*, c. 4; Cornel. Nepos, *Alkibiad.*, c. 2; Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 1.

I do not know how far the memorable narrative ascribed to Alkibiadès in the *Symposium* of Plato (c. 33, 34, pp. 216, 217) can be regarded as matter of actual fact and history, so far as Sokratès is concerned; but it is abundant proof in regard to the general relations of Alkibiadès with others:

compare Xenophon, *Memorab.*, i. 2, 29, 30; iv. 1-2.

² See Xenophon, *Memorab.*, i. 2, 12-24, 39-47.

Xenophon represents Alkibiadès and Kritias as frequenting the society of Sokratès, for the same reason and with the same objects as Plato affirms that young men generally went to the Sophists; see Plato, *Sophist.*, c. 20, p. 232 D.

youths of Athens, like Alkibiadês and Kritias, such society was highly useful¹.

Alkibiadês, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to be found in Athens, that of Sokratês most of all and most frequently. The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as could be done without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoilt youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life. But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life of Alkibiadês attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation, public or private, ever got footing in his mind—how much the ends which he pursued were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Sokratês was marked out to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of Alkibiadês and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.

From the beginning to the end of his eventful political life, Alkibiadês showed a combination of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigour in execution—not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Greeks: and what distinguished him from all, was his extraordinary flexibility of character, and consummate power of adapting himself to new habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances required. Like Themistoklês—whom he resembled as well in ability and vigour as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means—Alkibiadês was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a secondary quality subordinate to action; and though he possessed enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at least according to the high standard of Athens. But his career affords a memorable example of splendid qualities both for action and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by the utter want of morality, public and private. He never inspired confidence or esteem to anyone; and sooner or later, among a public like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting sentiments: 'the Athenians desired him, hated him, but still wished to have him'—was said in the latter years of his life by a contemporary poet—while we find also another pithy precept probably delivered in regard to him—'You ought not to keep a lion's whelp in your city at all; but if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to his behaviour'².

He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long before the peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in his family, as in that of his relation Periklês, were democratical: his grandfather Alkibiadês had been vehement in his opposition to the Peisis-

¹ See the representation given in the *Protagoras* of Plato, of the temper in which the young and wealthy Hippokratês goes to seek instruction from Protagoras—and of the objects which Protagoras proposes to himself in imparting the instruction (Plato; *Protagoras*, c. 2, p. 310 D; c. 8, p. 316 C; c. 9, p. 318, etc.; compare also

Plato, *Meno*, p. 91, and *Gorgias*, c. 4, p. 449 E—asserting the connection, in the mind of Gorgias, between teaching to speak and teaching to think—*λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν*, etc.).

² Aristophan., *Frogs*, 1445-1453. Plutarch, *Alkibiadês*, c. 16; Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 9.

tratids, and had even afterwards publicly renounced an established connection of hospitality with the Lacedæmonian government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But Alkibiadès himself, in commencing political life, departed from this family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical and philo-Laconian sentiment—doubtless far more consonant to his natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same general party with Nikias, and with Thessalus son of Kimôn, who afterwards became his bitter opponents. And it was in part probably to put himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his grandfather had broken off¹.

To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good treatment of the Spartan captives during their detention at Athens. He advocated both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration of her captives. Indeed he not only advocated these measures, but tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent of Sparta, for carrying them through at Athens. From such selfish hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of Proxenus of Sparta—Alkibiadès thus became a partisan of the philo-Laconian concessions of Nikias. But the captives on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his advances. They naturally preferred Nikias and Lachês, whose prudence would commend, if it did not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. But this contemptuous refusal from the Spartans stung him so to the quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course, he immediately threw himself into anti-Laconian politics with an energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.

The moment was favourable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new political leader to espouse this side, and was rendered still more favourable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Alkibiadès had therefore ample pretext for altering his tone respecting the Spartans—and for denouncing them as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful friends and family guests. The condition of that city, disengaged by the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of connection with Athens—a policy now strongly recommended by Alkibiadès, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had attacked and put down Argos separately.

It was not so much, however, the inclination towards Argos, but the growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argeian plans of Alkibiadès. And when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedès arrived at Athens from Bœotia, the unmeasured expression of displeasure in the Athenian Ekklesia showed Alkibiadès that the time was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent his own voice to strengthen the discontent against Sparta, he at the same time despatched a private intimation to his correspondents at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of his own strenuous aid, to send without

¹ Thukyd., v. 43; vi. 90: Isokratès. *De Bigis*, Or. xvi., p. 352, §§ 27-30.
Plutarch (*Alkibiad.*, c. 14) carelessly repre-

sents Alkibiadès as being actually proxenus of Sparta at Athens.

delay an embassy to Athens in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation at the very moment when their citizens were negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace. But no sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance with Athens—a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial state at sea, yet not interfering with their own primacy in Peloponnesus—than they despatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint embassy, Argeian, Eleian and Mantineian. The alliance between these three cities had already been rendered more intimate, by a second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a party—though Corinth had refused all concern in the second.

But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of their envoy Andromedês, and probably warned by reports from Nikias and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without a moment's delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens, with full powers to settle all matters of difference. And when the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an audience before the public assembly, the impression which they made, on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly favourable. It was indeed so favourable, that Alkibiadês became alarmed lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Laconian party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.

To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular manœuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his private guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their two families. This probably assisted in procuring for him a secret interview with the envoys on the day before the meeting of the public assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanour of the [council] so that if they proclaimed, themselves to have come with full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions. He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come, not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain, discuss, and report; the people would then find that they could gain nothing by intimidation—explanations would be heard, and disputed points be discussed with temper—while he (Alkibiadês) would speak emphatically in their favour. He gave them his solemn pledge—confirmed by an oath, according to Plutarch—that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his counsel. The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity of these suggestions¹. Accordingly, they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting, but without even warning, Nikias—which was exactly what Alkibiadês desired, and had probably required them to promise.

¹ Plutarch, *Alkibiad.*, c. 14: Ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ὀρκίους ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντάπασι πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ, καὶ

θαυμάζοντας ἅμα τὴν δεινότητά καὶ σύνεσιν, ὡς οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀνδρὸς οὐσαν. Again, Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 10.

Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced ; upon which Alkibiadès himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put the question to them, upon what footing they came ? They immediately declared that they had brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with which their declaration was heard. There was an unanimous burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity of Lacedæmonians in never saying the same thing two days together. To crown the whole, Alkibiadès himself affected to share all the surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in invectives against the envoys. Nor was this all¹ : he took advantage of the vehement acclamation which welcomed his invectives to propose that the Argeian envoys should be called in and the alliance with Argos concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a remarkable phenomenon—an earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it, causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a religious scruple then recognised as paramount.

This opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. But he at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honourable, must show it forthwith—1. by restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing ; 2. by restoring Amphipolis also ; 3. by renouncing their special alliance with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens.

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required, a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy—a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just—but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all further evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether : the influence of the anti-Athenian Ephors was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos—the menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a personal favour to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed, an empty concession, which covered but faintly

¹ Thukyd., v. 45. Compare Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 14 ; and Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 10.

the humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure against himself; while Alkibiadēs was permitted to introduce the envoys (already at hand in the city), from Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, and with whom a pact was at once concluded.

The words of this convention, which Thukydidēs gives us doubtless from the record on the public column, comprise two engagements—one for peace, another for alliance¹.

'The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire'. (The express terms in which these states announce themselves as imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon².)

'Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of damage.'

'The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim that city their enemy and attack it; neither of the four shall in that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.'

'Reciprocal obligations are imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantinea, or Elis, shall be attacked.'

'Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops through their own territory or the territory of allies over whom they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea, unless upon joint resolution.'

'In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli³ for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman, per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between all.'

'The four cities may by joint consent make any change they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths.'

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities than had

¹ An inscription has been found on the Athenian Acropolis, which after restoration turned out to be an authentic copy of the treaty with Argos (C.I.A., iv. (1), 466; Hicks and Hill, 69). A comparison of this document with the text of Thukydides (v. 47) shows that the latter has many small divergences in the wording (which prove on analysis to be modernizations by later scribes), but that the sense remains unimpaired. Cf. Reinach, *Traité d'Épigraphie Grecque*, pp. 330-335. Ar., *Equit.*, 466, 467, indicates that Kleon

had thought of an Argive alliance about 424, thus continuing the democratic tradition of Periklēs and his predecessors.—Ed.

² The expression *δοῖς Ἀθηναῖοι ἀρχουσιν* in the terms of the peace (Thuk., v. 18) might be construed as a recognition of the Athenian empire by Sparta.—Ed.

³ Three Æginæan obols at 1·6 grammes nearly = 4½ Attic obols at 1·1 gramme. The ordinary rate of pay for Athenian hoplites was 1 drachma = i.e., 6 obols.—Ed.

ever before been known¹. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire, still subsisted. A peace had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Boeotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis; which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta still retained the alliance concluded between themselves, without formal rupture on either side. No relations whatever subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Boeotia there was an armistice terminable at ten days' notice. Lastly, Corinth could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies towards Sparta.

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival of the 90th Olympiad or 420 B.C.; the festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in May. That festival was memorable on more than one ground. It was the first which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all Greeks free access to the great pan-hellenic temples, with liberty of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches. For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been excluded from sending their solemn legations or *Theories*, and from attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.

Alkibiadēs now felt himself standing forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders. The Athenian *Theōry*, of which he was a member, was set out with first-rate splendour, and with the amplest show of golden ewers, censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession. But when the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadēs himself appeared as competitor at his own cost—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four, which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another a second prize, so that Alki-

¹ Besides the common hatred of Sparta, the members of the Argive coalition all had a democratic constitution, thus standing in contrast with Corinth, Megara, and Thebes. In each case the democracy seems to have been of old standing. Mantinea had probably assumed such a form of government before 480, though after the campaign of Plataea a reaction set in, which lasted at least till 468 (Herodot., ix. 35, 77). Elis probably became democratic when the *συνοικισμός* of 471 introduced city-life (Diod., xl. 54). The old

Argive aristocracy was broken by the defeat at the hands of Kleomenēs (Herodot., vi. 76-84), and a democracy may have been installed in consequence of the Athenian alliance of 461, if not before.

The officers and assemblies mentioned in Thuk., v. 47, point to democratic constitutions (as witnessed in the *βουλή* and the *ἐκαστοί*), which have partially, though not wholly, superseded such old-fashioned bodies as the *δυοθήκοντα* and the *ἀρπύλαι*.—Ed.

biadēs was twice crowned with sprigs of the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald.

Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be hereafter described, Alkibiadēs maintained publicly before the Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens, dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power. He was doubtless right to a considerable extent, though not sufficiently to repel the charge from himself (which it was his purpose to do) both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation or violence at the public cost.

If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking—the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians. Such exclusion was the consequence of the new political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, Athens, and Mantinea. It has already been mentioned that since the peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians acting as arbitrators in the case of Lepreum, had declared it to be autonomous and had sent a body of troops to defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks upon the district, for the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of 1,000 hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The Eleians affirmed that the Lacedæmonians had sent the 1,000 hoplites into Lepreum after the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta the fine prescribed by the 'Olympian law', of two minæ for each man—2,000 minæ in all, a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians intimated that they would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the Olympic law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus.

The Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without any interruption¹. The boldness of the Eleians in putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by Alkibiadēs and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies.

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony the Trachinian Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ in the third year of the war. That colony had

¹ It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remembered and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve years

afterwards, during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph., *Hellen.*, iii. 2, 21; Diodor., xiv. 17).

never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by the neighbouring tribes, and administered with harshness by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbours, especially the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory : and in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, they had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenarês, the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies and waverers to be able to succour it ; and the Bœotians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Bœotian troops, dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrance.

CHAPTER XXVI [LVI]

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA

SHORTLY after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described in my last chapter, the Argeians and their allies sent a fresh embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. But Spartan envoys were present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new resolution was adopted.

In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under the inspirations of Alkibiadês, Athens was about to attempt the new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers and influence. At the beginning of the war she had been maritime, defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Periklês. After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage to aim at the recovery of Megara and Bœotia, which she had before been compelled to abandon by the Thirty Years' truce—at the recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year of the war, but with signal ill success ; while Brasidas during that period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became, to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis : Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against Amphipolis had failed—the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also : Athens had surrendered her capital advantage without regaining Amphipolis ; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done (as we shall find her projecting to do in the course of about four years forward), if it had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence

of the disgrace so recently undergone there; next, that Alkibiadēs was prompted by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athenian ardour into a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, especially in the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover, his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amidst the centre of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and barbarous region. It was under these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organizing a counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check and at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.

Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen, and reinforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiadēs exhibited the spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the peninsula. He first turned his attention to the Achæan towns in the north-west, where he persuaded the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens and even to undertake the labour of connecting their town with the sea by means of long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian Gulf, whereby the Athenians, who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, would have become masters of the commerce of the Gulf. But the Corinthians and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief, despatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme—and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ.

He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina now occupied by the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, dispensing with the labour of circumnavigating Cape Skyllæum whenever they sent forces to Argos. Moreover the territory of Epidaurus bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering state of the temple of Apollo Pythæus (situated within the walls of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over Epidaurus and other neighbouring cities—seemingly the remnant of that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in early times had been theirs. The Epidaurians owed to this temple certain ceremonial obligations—one of which was now due and unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default imposed upon them the duty of getting together a military force to attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.

Their invading march, however, was for a time suspended by the news that king Agis, with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies, had advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia on the

north-west, towards Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. What this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even explain the purpose to his own soldiers or officers, or allies¹. But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was found so unfavourable that he abandoned his march for the present and returned home². The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an outmarch as soon as that month had expired.

On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the Argeians prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day on which they set out was already the 26th of the month preceding the Karneian month, so that there remained only three days before the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But the Argeians made use of that very peculiarity of the season, which was accounted likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one of those arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which the Greeks occasionally employed to correct the ever-recurring confusion of their lunar system. Having begun their march on the 26th of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each succeeding day still the 26th, thus disallowing the lapse of time, and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. This proceeding was farther facilitated by the circumstance that their allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantinea, not being Dorians, were under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly the army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and spent seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in the field, invoked the aid of their allies, who, however, had already been summoned by Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose, any more than the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself. Some allies, however, perhaps the Corinthians, came as far as the Epidaurian border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend aid by entering the territory alone³.

¹ Thukyd., v. 54.

This incident shows that Sparta employed the military force of her allies without any regard to their feelings—quite as decidedly as Athens; though there were some among them too powerful to be thus treated.

² On this occasion Agis may have preferred not to advance any further on his own responsibility, and found a suitable pretext for retreat. It is noticeable how constantly the ostensible result of the sacrifices, and similar religious motives, were made to influence the operations of the Spartan armies—*cf.* the strategic delay of Pausanias before the final encounter at Platæa (Herodot., ix. 61), and the abandonment of Leonidas at Thermopylæ (Herodot., vii. 206). But these scruples occur most often on the Argive campaigns. Though on one occasion Agis postponed the exigencies of worship to meet a sudden crisis (Thuk., v. 82), we repeatedly find the Spartan commanders apparently throwing away all their strategic advantages for a religious reason (Herodot., vi. 76, 80-82; Thuk., v. 55, 75, 116). When we further bear in mind the extraordinarily lenient terms of Agis in 418 (Thuk., v. 60), we may

indeed suppose that Sparta had a superstitious respect for the 'eldest daughter of the Heraklid stock'.—Ed.

³ The meaning which I give may perhaps be called in question on the ground that such tampering with the calendar is too absurd and childish to have been really committed. Yet it is not more absurd than the two votes said to have been passed by the Athenian assembly (in 290 B.C.), who being in the month of Munychion, first passed a vote that that month should be the month Anthestêrion, next that it should be the month Boëdromion, in order that Demetrius Poliorêtês might be initiated both in the lesser and greater mysteries of Dêmêter, both nearly at the same time. Demetrius, being about to quit Athens in the month Munychion, went through both ceremonies with little or no delay (Plutarch, *Demetrius*, c. 26). Compare also the speech ascribed to Alexander at the Granikus, directing a second month Artemisius to be substituted for the month Daesius (Plutarch, *Alex.*, c. 16).

Besides, if we look to the conduct of the Argeians themselves at a subsequent period (B.C. 389, Xenophon, *Hellen.*, iv. 7, 2, 5; v. 1, 29), we shall

Meanwhile the Athenians had convoked another congress of deputies at Mantinea, for the purpose of discussing propositions of peace : perhaps this may have been a point carried by Nikias at Athens, in spite of Alkibiadēs. What other deputies attended, we are not told : but Euphamidas, coming as envoy from Corinth, animadverted, even at the opening of the debates, upon the inconsistency of assembling a peace congress while war was actually raging in the Epidaurian territory. So much were the Athenian deputies struck with this observation, that they departed, persuaded the Argeians to retire from Epidaurus, and then came back to resume negotiations. Still, however, the pretensions of both parties were found irreconcilable, and the congress broke up ; upon which the Argeians again returned to renew their devastations in Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians, immediately on the expiration of the Karneian month, marched out again, as far as their border town of Karyæ, but were again arrested and forced to return by unfavourable border-sacrifices. Intimation of their outmarch, however, was transmitted to Athens ; upon which Alkibiadēs, at the head of 1,000 Athenian hoplites, was sent to join the Argeians. But before he arrived, the Lacedæmonian army had been already disbanded : so that his services were no longer required, and the Argeians carried their ravages over one-third of the territory of Epidaurus before they at length evacuated it.

The Epidaurians were reinforced about the end of September by a detachment of 300 Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agesippidas, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this the Argeians preferred loud complaints at Athens. They had good reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not having kept better naval watch at their neighbouring station of Ægina, and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbour of Epidaurus. But they took another ground of complaint somewhat remarkable. In the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, it had been stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of troops through its territory without the joint consent of all. Now the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens : so that the Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argeians now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back the Messenians and Helots from Kephallenia to Pylus, and allow them to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion of Alkibiadēs, complied with their requisition, inscribing at the foot of the pillar on which their alliance with Sparta stood recorded that the Lacedæmonians had not observed their oaths.

see them playing an analogous trick with the calendar in order to get the benefit of the sacred truce. When the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, the Argeians despatched heralds with wreaths and the appropriate insignia, to warn them off on the ground of it being the period of the holy truce—though it *really was not so*—οὐχ ὅποτε καθήκοι ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ὅποτε ἐμβάλε λειν μῆλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέρφερον τοὺς μῆνας—Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι, ἐπεὶ ἐγνώσαν οὐ δυνήσμενοι κωλύειν, ἐπεμψαν, ὡς περ εἰώθεσαν, ἰστέφανωμένους δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέροντας σπονδὰς. On more than one occasion, this stratagem was successful : the Lacedæmonians did not dare to act in defiance of the summons of the heralds, who

affirmed that it *was* the time of the truce, though in reality it was not so. At last the Spartan king Agesipolis actually went both to Olympia and Delphi, to put the express question to those oracles, whether he was bound to accept the truce at any moment, right or wrong, when it might suit the convenience of the Argeians to bring it forward as a sham plea (*ὑποφέρειν*). The oracles both told him that he was under no obligation to submit to such a pretence : accordingly, he sent back the heralds, refusing to attend to their summons, and invaded the Argeian territory.

The tricks played with the calendar at Rome, by political authorities for party purposes, are well known to everyone.

The Argeians, after having prolonged their incursions on the Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even had the advantage—yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they now experienced throughout Peloponnesus—the Lacedæmonians determined, during the course of the ensuing summer, to put forth their strength vigorously, and win back their lost ground.

Towards the month of June (B.C. 418), they marched with their full force, freemen as well as Helots, under King Agis, against Argos. The Tegeans and other Arcadian allies joined them on the march, while their other allies near the Isthmus—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Phliasiens, etc.—were directed to assemble at Phlius. The number of these latter allies was very considerable—for we hear of 5,000 Bœotian hoplites, and 2,000 Corinthian: the Bœotians had with them also 5,000 light-armed, 500 horsemen, and 500 foot-soldiers, who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers of the rest, or of Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably did Thukydides himself know, for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, in reference to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantinea. Such muster of the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argeians, who, marching first to Mantinea and there taking up the force of that city as well as 3,000 Eleian hoplites who came to join them, met the Lacedæmonians in their march at Methydrium in Arcadia. The two armies being posted on opposite hills, the Argeians had resolved to attack Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from joining his allies at Phlius. But he eluded this separate encounter by decamping in the night, reached Phlius, and operated his junction in safety¹.

As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, the Argeians left their position also, and marched with their allies, first to Argos itself—next, to Nemea, on the ordinary road from Corinth and Phlius to Argos, by which they imagined that the invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing his force into three divisions, he himself with the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians, taking a short but very rugged and difficult road, crossed the ridge of the mountains and descended straight into the plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Peloponnesians, and Phliasiens were directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same plain upon a different point: while the Bœotians, Corinthians, and Sikyonians, followed the longer, more even, and more

¹ Agis on this occasion used the westernmost of the three routes that lead northward from Sparta, through Belmina, Methydrium, Kaphyæ, and Orchomenus down to Phlius and Sikyon. This was the line on which Pausanias marched against Mardonius in 479 (Herodot., ix. xi, x2). The possession of this road was of vital importance to Sparta, since the eastern route to the Isthmus was commanded by Argos, and the central one by Tegea and Mantinea, and hence did not always lie open to her armies. The attempts of Tegea or Mantinea, to secure control over this western track as well, frequently led to collisions with

Sparta. Thus, the obscure campaigns of 469-468 seem to have centred round the possession of Dipæa, which was a post on this route. In 420 Sparta sent a special expedition to dismantle the Mantinean fort of Kypsela, not far from Dipæa. The foundation of Megalopolis on a site commanding this highway (370) led to interminable wars with Sparta, while in the third century the fort of Belmina, which became a bone of contention between these two towns, caused several conflagrations between Sparta and the Achaean League.—Ed.

ordinary route, by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient, led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine called the Trêtus, bounded on each side by mountains. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his own division, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the Argeian position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argeians saw him devastating their properties near the city, they would forthwith quit the advantageous ground near Nemea to come and attack him in the plain: the Bœotian division would thus find the road by Nemea and the Trêtus open, and would be able to march without resistance into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with effect against the Argeians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with theirs, got across the mountains into the Argeian plain during the night; while the Argeians, hearing at daybreak that he was near their city, left their position at Nemea to come down to the plain and attack him.

On both sides the armies were marshalled, and order taken for battle. But the situation of the Argeians was in reality little less than desperate: for while they had Agis and his division in their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take them in flank, and the Bœotians marching along the undefended road through the Trêtus would attack them in the rear. The Bœotian cavalry too would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantinea, seem to have possessed any horsemen, a description of force which ought to have been sent from Athens, though from some cause which does not appear, the Athenian contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of a position so very critical, both the Argeians and their allies were elate with confidence and impatient for battle, thinking only of the division of Agis immediately in their front which appeared to be enclosed between them and their city. But the Argeian generals were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger, and just as the two armies were about to charge, Alkiphron, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of the Argeians, to a separate parley with Agis, without consultation or privity on the part of their own army. They exhorted Agis not to force on a battle, assuring him that the Argeians were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction, in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge against them—and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agis, at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four months to accomplish what they had promised. He on his part also took this step without consulting either his army or his allies, simply addressing a few words of confidential talk to one of the official Spartans near him. Immediately he gave the order for retreat, and the army, instead of being led to battle, was conducted out of the Argeian territory through the Nemean road whereby the Bœotians had just been entering. But it required all the habitual discipline of Lacedæmonian soldiers to make them obey this order of the Spartan king, alike unexpected and unwelcome. For the army were fully sensible both of the prodigious advantages of their position, and of the overwhelming strength of the invading force, so that all the three divisions were loud in their denunciations of Agis, and penetrated with shame at the thoughts of so disgraceful a retreat.

On returning home, Agis incurred not less blame from the Spartan authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away so admirable an opportunity of subduing Argos. This was assuredly no more than he deserved : but we read, with no small astonishment, that the Argeians and their allies on returning were even more exasperated against Thrasyllus, whom they accused of having traitorously thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good ground, in the received practice, to censure him for having concluded a truce without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom, on returning from a march, to hold a public court-martial before entering the city, for the purpose of adjudicating on offences and faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion against Thrasyllus, that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to seek personal safety at the altar ; upon which the soldiers tried him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated.

Very shortly afterwards the expected Athenian contingent arrived, which probably ought to have come earlier, 1,000 hoplites, with 300 horsemen, under Lachês and Nikostratus¹. Alkibiadês came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the horsemen. The Argeians, notwithstanding their displeasure against Thrasyllus, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce which he had concluded. Nor was Alkibiadês even permitted to address the public assembly, until the Mantineian and Eleian allies insisted that thus much at least should not be refused. An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, along with the Argeians. Alkibiadês contended that the recent truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void, since it had been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with the reinforcement now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded the assembly, that the Mantineians and Eleians consented at once to join him in an expedition against the Arcadian town of Orchomenus ; the Argeians also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely because its territory joined that of Mantinea on the northward, but because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee for fidelity. Its walls were, however, in bad condition, and its inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to become allies of Mantinea—to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion to such alliance—and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them by Sparta.

Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should next undertake. The Eleians contended strenuously for a march against Lepreum, while the Mantineians were anxious to attack their enemy and neighbour Tegea. The Argeians and Athenians preferred the latter—incomparably the more important enterprise of the two : but such was the disgust of the Eleians at the rejection of their proposition, that they

¹ It is astonishing that the Athenians should have sent so small a force to help their Peloponnesian allies. The appearance of their full force might have decided the day at Mantinea, thus anticipating the work of Epaminondas in the Peloponnese by fifty years. This remissness

was no doubt due to a political reaction at Athens ; for in 418 Alkibiadês was not re-elected general, while the contingent at Mantinea was led by Lachês, a partisan of peace. Alkibiadês might here have turned the scale against Sparta.—Ed.

abandoned the army altogether, and went home. Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies continued together at Mantinea organizing their attack upon Tegea, in which city they had a strong favourable party, who had actually laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt of the city from Sparta, when the philo-Laconian Tegeans just saved themselves by despatching an urgent message to Sparta and receiving the most rapid succour. The Lacedæmonians, filled with indignation at the news of the surrender of Orchomenus, vented anew all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fining him in the sum of 100,000 drachmæ or about $27\frac{2}{3}$ Attic talents. He urgently entreated, that an opportunity might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name which he had incurred. The penalty was accordingly withdrawn: but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been, before, a part of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his own authority; but a council of Ten was now named, without whose concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power¹.

To the great good fortune of Agis, the pressing message now arrived announcing the imminent revolt of Tegea. Such was the alarm occasioned by this news, that the whole military population instantly started off to relieve the place, Agis at their head—the most rapid movement ever known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers². The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They farther sent messages to the Corinthians and Bœotians, as well as to the Phokians and Lokrians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents in the territory of Mantinea. The arrival of such reinforcements, however, even with all possible zeal on the part of the cities contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time, the rather, as it appears that they could not get into the territory of Mantinea except by passing through that of Argos³—which could not be safely attempted until they had all formed a junction. Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once with the Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present into the territory of Mantinea. The Argeians and their allies presently came forth from Mantinea, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and impracticable ground, and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted by the difficulties of the position, he marshalled his army and led it up to attack them. His rashness on the present occasion might have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to Thrasyllus near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him that he was now merely proceeding to 'heal mischief by mischief'. So forcibly was Agis impressed either with this timely admonition, or by the closer view of the position which he had undertaken to assault, that he suddenly halted the army, and gave orders for retreat.

¹ We may infer from this context that the kings could possess considerable wealth, and that private property was not unknown at Sparta.

The power of the Spartan kings to mobilize the army on their own authority seems to be denied by Xen., *Resp. Lac.*, ix, 2, which represents them as emissaries of the city. From Herodot., v. 74, vi. 56, it would appear that the kings, as against other generals (Herodot., v. 62), had such full powers; and in 413 Agis certainly held an independent position (Thuk., viii. 5). Later on,

we find Pausanias and Agesilaus (Xen., *Hellen.*, ii. 2, 7; iv. 7, 1; v. 1, 34) apparently summoning armies on their own responsibility.—Ed.

² Thukyd., v. 64. The outmarch of the Spartans just before the battle of Platæa (described in Herodot., ix. 10) seems, however, to have been quite as rapid and instantaneous.

³ The central and western roads between Sparta and the Isthmus were blocked by Mantinea and Orchomenus, now in hostile hands.—Ed.

His march was now intended to draw the Argeians away from the difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between Mantinea and Tegea—both situated on a lofty, but enclosed plain, drained only by katabothra or natural subterranean channels in the mountains—was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for their mutual benefit. Thither Agis now conducted his army, for the purpose of turning the water towards the side of Mantinea, where it would occasion serious damage, calculating that the Mantineians and their allies would certainly descend from their position to hinder it. No stratagem, however, was necessary to induce the latter to adopt this resolution. For so soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt—next retreat—and lastly disappear—their surprise was very great; and this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and impatience to pursue the flying enemy. They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

Meanwhile it appears that Agis had found himself disappointed in his operations upon the water. He had either not done so much damage, or not spread so much terror, as he had expected: and he accordingly desisted, putting himself again in march to resume his position. But in the course of this march he came suddenly upon the Argeian and allied army where he was not in the least prepared to see them. They were not only in the plain, but already drawn up in perfect order of battle. The Mantineians occupied the right wing, the post of honour, because the ground was in their territory: next to them stood their dependent Arcadian allies: then the chosen Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and family trained in arms at the cost of the state: alongside of them, the remaining Argeian hoplites with their dependent allies of Kleônæ and Orneæ: last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their hoplites as well as their horsemen.

To any other Greeks than Lacedæmonians, the sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have occasioned a feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult to recover; and even the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent a momentary shock unparalleled in their previous experience. But they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training, as well as of that subordination of officers which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other Grecian armies orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice by a herald, who received them personally from the general: each *taxis* or company, indeed, had its own taxiarch, but the latter did not receive his orders separately from the general, and seems to have had no personal responsibility for the execution of them by his soldiers. Among the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a regular gradation of military and responsible authority. Every order emanated from the Spartan king when he was present, and was given to the Polemarchs (each commanding a Mora, the largest military division), who intimated it to the Lochagi, or colonels of the respective Lochi. These again gave command to each Pentekontêr, or captain of a Pentekosty; lastly, he to the Enômotarch, who commanded the lowest subdivision called an Enômoty. Accordingly, though thus taken by sur-

prise, they only manifested the greater promptitude and anxious haste in obeying the orders of Agis, transmitted through the regular series of officers. The battle array was attained, with regularity as well as with speed.

The extreme left of the Lacedæmonian line belonged by ancient privilege to the Skiritæ, mountaineers of the border district of Laconia skirting the Arcadian Parrhasii. Numbered among the bravest and most active men in Peloponnesus, they generally formed the vanguard in an advancing march; and the Spartans stand accused of having exposed them to danger as well as toil with unbecoming recklessness¹. Next to the Skiritæ, who were 600 in number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from serving with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamôdes, both probably summoned home from Lepreum. After them, in the centre of the entire line, came the Lacedæmonian lochi, seven in number, with the Arcadian dependent allies, Heræan and Mænalians, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, stood the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying the extreme right, as the post of honour. On each flank there were some Lacedæmonian horsemen.

Thukydides, with a frankness which enhances the value of his testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that this silence is not for want of having inquired—but none of the answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme secrecy of Lacedæmonian politics admitted of no certainty about *their* numbers, while the empty numerical boasts of other Greeks served only to mislead. From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr. Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, though in what capacity, we cannot determine, as he was an exile from his country. First he states that the Lacedæmonian army *appeared* more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us, that independent of the Skiritæ on the left, who were 600 in number—the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their right wing, consisted of 448 men. In respect to depth, the different enômoties were not all equal; but for the most part, the files were eight deep. Multiplying 448 by 8, and adding the 600 Skiritæ, this would make a total of 4,184 hoplites, besides a few horsemen on each flank². Respecting light-armed, nothing is said. I have no confidence in such an estimate—but the total is smaller than we should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians had marched out from Sparta with their entire force on a pressing emergency, and that they had only sent home one-sixth of their total, their oldest and youngest soldiers.

It does not appear that the generals on the Argeian side made any attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonian battle-array was yet incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice, to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation and encouragement; and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians may probably have attained their order.

¹ Xenophon, *Cyrop.* iv. 2, 1: see Diodor., xv. c. 32; Xenophon, *Rep. Laced.*, xiii. 6.

² Very little can be made out respecting the structure of the Lacedæmonian army.

That which was peculiar to the Lacedæmonian drill, was, the teaching a small number of men like an Enômoty (25, 32, 36 men, as we sometimes find it), to perform its evolutions under the

command of its Enômotarch. When this was once secured, it is probable that the combination of these elementary divisions was left to be determined in every case by circumstances. [The available evidence is put together and the whole constitution of the Spartan army-cadres at various dates set forth by Busolt in *Hermes*, xl. (1905), pp. 387-419.—ED.]

It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacedæmonian character that to them no words of encouragement were addressed either by Agis or any of the officers. 'They knew (says the historian) that long practice beforehand, in the business of war, was a better preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment.' At length the word was given to attack: the numerous pipers in attendance (an hereditary caste at Sparta) began to play, while the slow and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the time given by these instruments without any break or wavering in the line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented by the enemy, who having no pipers or other musical instruments, rushed forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious.

It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into conflict, to march not exactly straight forward, but somewhat aslant towards the right. The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid exposing their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right hand neighbour. Though the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right, and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the right wing, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and Brasidæans on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with the Lochi in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed, his left would be certainly taken in flank and perhaps even in the rear. Accordingly he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions even at this critical moment.

The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves on the extreme left, forbade such an order. Accordingly, Agis gave signal to the Brasidæans and Skiritæ to make a flank movement on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians; while in order to fill up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent orders to two polemarchs who had their Lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the right of the Brasidæans, so as again to close up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most victorious place in the line, chose to keep it: so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the centre, back into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute this second command before the hostile armies closed, and the Skiritæ and Brasidæans were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from their own centre. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them back; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasidæans and the Lacedæmonian centre, took them on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian baggage-waggons in the rear, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether dispersed.

But the victorious Mantineians and their comrades, thinking only of

what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very differently on the Lacedæmonian centre and right, where Agis found himself in front conflict with the Argeians—with the Kleonæans and Orneates, dependent allies of Argos—and with the Athenians. Over all these troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance. So formidable was the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops gave way without crossing spears, and even with a panic so headlong, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape. While thus defeated in front, they were taken in flank by the Tegeans and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis's army, and the Athenians here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand. Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back, was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand had little disposition to renew the combat against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to effect their retreat, which, however, could not be done without severe loss: Agis might have prevented it altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system enjoined abstinence from prolonged pursuit against a defeated enemy¹.

There fell in this battle 700 Argeians, Kleonæans, and Orneates; 200 Athenians, together with both the generals Lachês and Nikostratus; and 200 Mantineians. The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at about 300 men.

Such was the important battle of Mantinea, fought in the month of June 418 B.C. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the pre-existing stain upon the honour of Sparta. The disaster in Sphakteria had drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be stigmatized as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantinea silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military pre-eminence before the eyes of Greece. It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The consequences of the battle were thus immense in re-establishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesus.

Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we may remark, that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their 3,000 men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of Tegea. Shortly after the defeat, the 3,000 Eleians came back to the aid of Mantinea, together with

¹ Thukyd., v. 73; Diodor., xii. 69.

a reinforcement of 1,000 Athenians. Moreover, the Karneian month began—a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy, even despatching messengers to countermand their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late battle—and remaining themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial success, now found their own territory overrun by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to be accomplished: but the superior activity of the Athenians were here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work committed to them was speedily brought to completion—their allies, both Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them, in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian territory.

So far the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very centre of their enemy's force—at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party—philo-Laconian and anti-democratical: and the effect of the defeat at Mantinea had been to strengthen this party as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders now found their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantinea, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory¹, and doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now when the defeat of Mantinea reduced Argos to her own limits, they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.

As the first step towards the execution of this scheme, the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion and inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward an envoy with two alternative proposi-

¹ Aristotle (*Politic.*, v. 4, 9) expressly notices the credit gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle of Mantinea, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution—notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten—Οἱ γυνώριμοι εὐδοκίμησαντες ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, etc.

An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over defeated fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the Athenian army under Alkibiadēs and Thrasyllus, in one of the later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, *Hellen.*, i. 2, 15-17.

tions—one for peace, another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmon and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. But they had to contend against a strong resistance, since Alkibiadēs, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which, being already adopted by the Ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos—and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows:

‘The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as hostages from Orchomenus, and the men-hostages from the Mænalii. They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantinea, whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineians have carried away from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever place they may have been taken. Respecting the sacrifice alleged to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear themselves. Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus with mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send them home about their business.’

Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three confederates.

But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alkibiadēs at the same time retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea—and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following terms:

‘There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms—each giving amicable satisfaction, according to its established constitution, to all complaints

preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance—holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound to enter upon amicable adjustment¹. If any allied city shall quarrel with another allied city, the matter shall be referred to some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution.'

It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance, the disputed question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are to decide, without consulting the other allies, though binding themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty—that of ensuring autonomy to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the empire of Elis, Mantinea, or any other larger state which might have dependencies. And accordingly the Mantineians, finding themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies, renouncing all command over their Arcadian subjects, and delivering up the hostages of these latter—according to the stipulation in the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos². The Lacedæmonians do not seem to have meddled farther with Elis.

Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon (about November or December 418 B.C.) had still farther depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force. Joint Lacedæmonian and Argeian envoys were despatched to Thrace and Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects of Athens, the old alliance was renewed, and even new engagements concluded; while Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which constituted them brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty, insisting, however, with his habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be kept secret from Athens. In farther pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, to require that the

¹ Thukyd., v. 79.

The object of this clause I presume to be to provide that the joint forces of Lacedæmon and Argos should not be bound to interfere for every separate dispute of each single ally with a foreign state, not included in the alliance. Thus, there were at this time standing disputes between

Bœotia and Athens—and between Megara and Athens: the Argeians probably would not choose to pledge themselves to interfere for the maintenance of the alleged rights of Bœotia and Megara in these disputes.

² Thukyd., v. 81; Diodor., xii. 81.

Athenians should quit Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged it prudent to send Dêmosthenês to bring them away.

The Argeian oligarchical party now concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of 1,000 hoplites from each city against Sikyôn, for the purpose of introducing more thoroughpaced oligarchy into the already oligarchical Sikyônian government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyôn: yet that city seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably therefore the joint enterprise against Sikyôn was nothing more than a pretext to cover the introduction of 1,000 Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business at Sikyôn had been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the government.

This revolution (accomplished about February B.C. 417)—the result of the victory of Mantinea and the consummation of a train of policy laid by Sparta—raised her ascendancy in Peloponnesus to a higher and more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose—perhaps since the march of Alkibiadês thither two years before; accordingly she now remodelled their governments in conformity with her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither enemy, nor even neutral, to counterwork her or to favour Athens, throughout the whole peninsula.

But the Spartan ascendancy at Argos was not destined to last. Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional routine, and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to govern—yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived, and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them suspicious and probably cruel. Such cruelty, moreover, was not their only fault: they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. With the population of Argos—comparatively coarse and brutal in all ranks, and more like Korkyra than like Athens—such abuse was pretty sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment of the Thousand—men in the vigour of their age, and proud of their military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—construed the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a period of individual licence to themselves.

We are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the *Gymnopædiæ* was in course of being solemnized at Sparta. At this

critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection, and, after a sharp contest, gained a victory over the oligarchy. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessity of their friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march towards Argos. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless, various exiles who had escaped still promised them success, urgently entreating them to proceed; but the Lacedæmonians refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted festival.

Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown—after a continuance of about four months¹, from February to June 417 B.C.—and the chosen Thousand-regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities, who were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless the Argeian Demos, though victorious within the city, felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favourable treatment, a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. Still the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being very zealous in the cause—and least of all at this moment, when the period of harvest was at hand: so that about three months intervened before any actual force was brought together.

This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might always be open for supplies and reinforcement from Athens in case they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. The whole Argeian population—men and women, free and slave—set about the work with the utmost ardour: while Alkibiadēs brought assistance from Athens²—especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But the construction of walls adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half between Argos and the sea³, required a long time. Moreover the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the exiles without—a party defeated but not annihilated—strenuously urged the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew near

¹ Diodorus (xii. 80) says that it lasted eight months: but this, if correct at all, must be taken as beginning from the alliance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the first establishment of the oligarchy. The narrative of Thukydides

does not allow more than four months for the duration of the latter.

² Thukyd., v. 82. Plutarch, *Alkibiad.*, c. 15.

³ Pausanias, ii. 36, 3.

to assist—the same intrigue which had been entered into by the oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down to Peiræus were in course of erection¹. Accordingly about the end of September (417 B.C.), king Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and destroyed so much of the Long Walls as had been already raised. But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysiaë, where he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighbouring territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.

The close neighbourhood of such exiles kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter. To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiadês was despatched thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in ascendancy, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert with them, he selected 300 marked oligarchical persons, whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as hostages for the quiescence of the party (B.C. 416). Another ravaging march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of Phlius, wherein, however, they sustained nothing but loss. And again about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word for a second expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as the borders, they found the sacrifices (always offered previous to leaving their own territory) so unfavourable that they returned back and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least were suspected of doing so—to such a degree that some of them were seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their escape. Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians became more fortunate with their border sacrifices—entered the Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the Corinthians, who refused to take part)—and established the Argeian oligarchical exiles at Orneæ; from which town these latter were again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian reinforcement².

To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterwards be extended, of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a source of strength to Athens, very different from the splendid hopes which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantinea—hopes of supplanting Sparta in her ascendancy within the Isthmus. It is remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling between Athens and Sparta, and continued reciprocal hostilities, nevertheless neither the one nor the other would formally renounce the sworn alliance. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real truth, though each half-year brought them a step

¹ Thukyd., i. 107.

² *Ibid.*, vi. 7.

nearer to it in fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (416 B.C.) the Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylus became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities against the Athenians. Yet still Sparta and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation¹. Nor was the licence of free intercourse for individuals as yet suspended.

Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues, however, had made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who, having as an ally of Athens engaged to coöperate with an Athenian expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 B.C. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis, now withdrew his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an enemy.

Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon, without any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiadês, and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as Amphipolis, the centre of a great commercial and mining region—situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could readily command—and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman Periklês. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on the part of their generals; and when lost, we should have expected to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it; the more so, as if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it never can be recovered except by force. Next, Nikias, Lachês, and Alkibiadês, all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, under express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But after a series of diplomatic proceedings the result becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen: his inertness of character and incapacity of decided

¹ Thukyd., vi. 105. Andokidês affirms that the war was resumed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the Argeians (*Orat. de Pac.*, c. 1, 6, 3, 31, pp. 93-105). This assertion is indeed partially true: the alliance with Argos

was one of the causes of the resumption of war, but only one among others, some of them more powerful. Thukydidês tells us that the *persuasions* of Argos to induce Athens to throw up her alliance with Sparta, were repeated and unavailing.

or energetic effort. When he discovered that he had been out-manœuvred by the Lacedæmonian diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by repentance for this mistake, and putting forth his strongest efforts in order to recover those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiadês begins to display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous than those of Nikias—the passion for showy, precarious, boundless, and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after the defeat of Mantinea had put an end to the political speculations of Alkibiadês in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects an expedition against Amphipolis; and even then it is projected only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious perfidy¹. We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the peace of Nikias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed in the coming chapters—where she is brought near to ruin by the defects of Nikias and Alkibiadês combined: for by singular misfortune, she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.

It was in one of the three years between 420-416 B.C., though we do not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, arising out of the contention between Nikias and Alkibiadês². The political antipathy between the two having reached a point of great violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken, and this proposition was adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, a speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously supported it, hating Nikias not less than Alkibiadês. Hyperbolus is named by Aristophanes as having succeeded Kleon in the mastership of the rostrum in the Pnyx³: if this were true, his supposed demagogic pre-eminence would commence about September 422 B.C., the period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he had been among the chief butts of the comic authors, who ascribe to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in accusation, as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence

¹ We have very little information concerning the relations of Athens and the northern dependencies since the conclusion of the peace of Nikias. We may regard as more or less contemporary with that peace an exchange of oaths with the Bottiæi recorded in an inscription (C.I.A., iv. (1), p. 142; Hicks and Hill, 68). In Thuk., v. 39, the loss of a further township to Athens is mentioned (421).

In 418-417 Nikias seems to have taken up his Thracian policy as a counterblast to Alkibiadês' Peloponnesian designs. In 417 two serious attempts were made to recover Amphipolis. Thuk., v. 83, says the first, under Nikias, failed mainly through the treachery of Perdikkas, in return for which Athens again declared war against him. A second expedition is attested by an inscription which records a payment to a general (Chæremôn) in the Thraceward district (C.I.A., iv. (1), pp. 32, 70; Hicks and Hill, 70). In 416 some small harassing expeditions were undertaken against Perdikkas, from whom the Chalkidians withheld their aid (Thuk., vi. 7); while in 414 the Athenians, with the help of Perdikkas

and a Thracian force, made an ineffectual land attack on Amphipolis, and for awhile kept up a blockade by water (Thuk., vii. 9).—Ed.

² Dr. Thirlwall (*History of Greece*, vol. iii., ch. xxiv., p. 360) places this vote of ostracism in midwinter or early spring of 415 B.C., immediately before the Sicilian expedition.

His grounds for this opinion are derived from the Oration [Andokidês] *Against Alkibiadês*, the genuineness of which he seems to accept (see his Appendix II. on that subject, vol. iii., p. 494, seq.).

The more frequently I read over this Oration, the more do I feel persuaded that it is a spurious composition of one or two generations after the time to which it professes to refer. [The date can be more closely fixed with the help of Theopompus, fr. 103 (quoted by Schol. Ar., *Vesp.*, 1001), where the exile of Hyperbolus is reckoned at six years. This would place the ostracism early in 417, when Alkibiadês was recovering from his unpopularity in the previous year (cf. Beloch, *Alt. Pol.*, p. 339 ff.).—Ed.]

³ Aristophan., *Pac.*, 680.

as had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thukydidēs does not name him in any of the important debates which took place at and after the peace of Nikias. Thukydidēs only mentions him once—in 411 B.C., while he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and resident at Samos. He terms him, 'one Hyperbolus, a person of bad character, who had been ostracized, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a disgrace to the city'¹. We have no particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general character given by Thukydidēs.

At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take a vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between Nikias and Alkibiadēs, quite twenty-four years had elapsed since a similar vote had been resorted to, the last similar example having been that of Periklēs and Thukydidēs son of Melēsias, the latter of whom was ostracized about 443 B.C. The democratical constitution had become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially the necessity for ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers: moreover there was now full confidence in the numerous Dikasteries as competent to deal with the greatest of such criminals—thus abating the necessity as conceived in men's minds, not less than the real necessity, for such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things, altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised to find that the vote of ostracism now invoked, though we do not know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. The vote was decreed, but before it actually took place, the partisans of both changed their views, preferring to let the political dissension proceed without closing it by separating the combatants. But the ostracizing vote, having been formally pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place: it was always, however, perfectly general in its form, admitting of any citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly the two opposing parties, each doubtless including various clubs or Hetæries, united to turn the vote against someone else. They fixed upon a man whom all of them jointly disliked—Hyperbolus². By thus concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him to pass the sentence which sent him into temporary banishment. But such a result was in no one's contemplation when the vote was decreed to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently recognised by everyone, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, as a gross abuse of the ostracism. It was, even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens; and this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of it as employed afterwards. Yet if Alkibiadēs had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot³.

¹ Thukyd., viii. 73. According to Androtion (*Fragm.*, 48, ed. Didot)—ὀστρακισμένον διὰ φαν-λόγημα.

Compare about Hyperbolus, Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 11; Plutarch, *Alkibiadēs*, c. 13; *Ælian*, *V. H.*, xii. 43; Theopompus, *Fragm.*, 102, 103, ed. Didot.

² Plutarch, *Alkibiad.*, c. 13; Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 11.

³ This statement is hard to understand. Alkibiadēs could become despot either by popular choice or by a *coup d'état*. In the former case an appeal to ostracism would plainly have been useless; in the latter, such a procedure would have been far too cumbrous to deal with so bold an adventurer: nothing but an *εἰσαγγελία* before the *ekklesia* or the *boulē* could have had any effect.—Ed.

It was in the beginning of summer 416 B.C., that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Mēlos—one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thēra, which was not already included in their empire. Mēlos and Thēra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens; but at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint, until she landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomēdēs and Tisias: thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian, and two Lesbian—1,200 Athenian hoplites, and 1,500 hoplites from the allies—with 300 bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen¹. These officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject-all of Athens.

It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece—even in governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, admitting the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive council. Of the conversation which passed, Thukydidēs professes to give a detailed and elaborate account—at surprising length, considering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians, no one of them separately long, and some very short—but the dialogue carried on is dramatic and very impressive. There is indeed every reason for concluding that what we here read in Thukydidēs is in far larger proportion his own, and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three or four Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. Now as all the Melian prisoners of military age, and certainly all those leading citizens then in the town who had conducted this interview, were slain immediately after the capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose report Thukydidēs could possibly have heard what really passed. That he did hear either from or through them, the general character of what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.

The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to the mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances in which they now stand; in spite of the disposition of the Melians to enlarge the

¹ The fact that the Athenians made an attempt on Mēlos so far back as 426 shows that they had some other motive besides mere irritation and blind lust for conquest. A further reason may be found in the desire to secure for themselves one of the best harbours in the Ægean, protected alike from the prevailing north-east and south-west

winds, and to keep it out of the hands of hostile ships, such as Alkidas' squadron of 427, and the privateers commissioned by Sparta in 417. As a tribute-paying dependency Mēlos would be of far less value than Thēra, which, on the other hand, had no good harbour, and a less suitable strategic position.—Ed.

range of topics, by introducing considerations of justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians, or to set forth injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable under existing circumstances, since they know as well as he, that justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal compulsion on both sides, the strong doing what their power allows, and the weak submitting to it¹. To this the Melians reply, that (omitting all appeal to justice and speaking only of what was expedient) they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with some indulgence even towards those who may be unable to make out a case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be awful both as punishment to herself and as lesson to others. 'We are not afraid of *that* (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover our present contest is not undertaken against Sparta—it is a contest to determine whether subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This is a risk for us to judge of: in the meantime let us remind you that we come here for the advantage of our own empire, and that we are now speaking with a view to your safety—wishing to get you under our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the mutual benefit of both of us.'—'Cannot you leave us alone, and let us be your friends instead of enemies, but allies neither of you nor of Sparta?'—'No (is the reply)—your friendship does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of our weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies—your enmity will give a demonstration of our power.'—'But do your subjects really take such a measure of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of connection with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted from you and been reconquered?'—'They do: for they think that both one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power and from our fear to attack you.'—'But surely that very circumstance is in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert them into enemies.'—'We are in little fear of continental cities, who are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us—but only of islanders. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves into peril.'—'We know well (said the Melians) how terrible it is to con-

¹ In reference to this argumentation of the Athenian envoy, I call attention to the attack and bombardment of Copenhagen by the English Government in 1807, together with the language used by the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent on the subject. We read as follows in M. Thiers' *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*:

'Le prince continuant, et opposant à cette perfide intention la conduite loyale du Dane-

mark, qui n'avoit pris aucune précaution contre les Anglois, qui les avoit toutes prises contre les François, ce dont on abusoit pour le surprendre —M. Jackson répondit à cette juste indignation par une insolente familiarité, disant que la guerre étoit la guerre, qu'il falloit se résigner à ces nécessités, et céder au plus fort qu'ind on étoit le plus faible.' (Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, tome viii., livre xxviii., p. 190.)

tend against your superior power, and your good fortune ; nevertheless we trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from the Gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice—and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from very shame to aid us.’—‘We too (replied the Athenians) think that we shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favour. What we believe about the Gods is the same as that which we see to be the practice of men : the impulse of nature inclines them of necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This is the principle on which we now proceed, knowing well too that you or others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations from the Lacedæmonians, we congratulate you on your innocent simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness. For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most studious of excellence in regard to themselves and their own national customs. But looking at their behaviour towards others, we affirm roundly, and can prove by many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honourable, and what is expedient as if it were just.’

After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider the matter more cautiously among themselves, withdrew, and after a certain interval, were recalled by the Melian council to hear the following words : ‘We hold to the same opinion, as at first, men of Athens. We shall not surrender the independence of a city which has already stood for 700 years : we shall yet make an effort to save ourselves, relying on that favourable fortune which the Gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party ; and that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may be mutually acceptable.’—‘Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance through your own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes ; and with your all you will come to ruin.’

The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation, distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was constructed round the town, which was left under full blockade both by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of that time the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an additional detachment. At length the provisions within were exhausted ; plots for betrayal commenced among the Melians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of military age, and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the proposer of this barbarous resolution was, Thukydides does not say ; but Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiadēs¹ was strenuous in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently sent thither, to form a

¹ Plutarch, *Alkibiadēs*, c. 16.

new community ; apparently not as kleruchs, or out-citizens of Athens—but as new Melians¹.

Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Mēlos from the beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror, and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in Naupaktus, Nisæa, or elsewhere, might have undergone the same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigour of the laws of war ; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover the acquisition of the island was of no material value to Athens, not sufficient to pay the expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the whole proceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens. Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire, by sweeping in this small insular population who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in after times as among the first of her misdeeds.

To gratify her pride of empire, by a new conquest—easy to effect, though of small value—was doubtless her chief motive ; probably also strengthened by pique against Sparta, between whom and herself a thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted—and by a desire to humiliate Sparta through the Melians. This passion for new acquisition, superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with still more fatal predominance.

Both these points, it will be observed, are prominently marked in the dialogue set forth by Thukydides. I have already stated that this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except as to a few general points. The language put into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates and robbers, as Dionysius of Halikarnassus² long ago remarked, intimating his suspicion that Thukydides had so set out the case for the purpose of discrediting the country which had sent him into exile. Whatever may be thought of this suspicion, we may at least affirm that the arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are more open to the charge of equivocal wording, softening down the bad points of their case, putting an amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called *sophistry* where their purpose needs it³. Now the language of the envoy at Mēlos, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating the immorality of the class or profession named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for a sort of audacious frankness—a disdain not merely of sophistry in the modern sense of the word, but even of such plausible excuse as might have been offered.

¹ Thukyd., v. 106 : τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ ᾤκησαν, ἀποίκους ὕστερον πεντακισίους πέμψαντες. Lysander restored some Melians to the island after the battle of Ægospotami (Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii., 2, 9) : some therefore must have escaped or must have been spared, or some of the youths and women, sold as slaves at the time of the capture, must have been redeemed or emancipated from captivity.

² Dionys. Hal., *Judic. de Thucyd.*, c. 37-42, pp. 906-920 Reisk.

³ Plutarch, *Alkibiad.*, 16 : τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀεὶ τὰ πρᾶτα τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς ἀμαρτήμασι τιθεμένους, παιδίας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας.—To the same purpose Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 15.

As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states, in Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day, to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. We find Brasidas reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, which had established dominion over men far more numerous than themselves, as matter of pride and glory. Of right thus founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples to be quoted, as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Mēlos: but that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by the Athenian envoy of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification, looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece.

So at least he is made to do in the Thukydidean dramatic fragment—*Μήλου Ἀλωσις* (The Capture of Mēlos)—if we may parody the title of the lost tragedy of Phrynichus—*The Capture of Miletus*. And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thukydidēs will suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and tragical effect. The capture of Mēlos comes immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon three or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to recover. Though crippled, indeed, she struggled against its effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on declining, until her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thukydidēs, just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, makes a halt to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by his dramatic fragment of the envoys at Mēlos. It will be recollected that Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxēs into Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation, impresses his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch's insolence and superhuman pride by various conversations between him and the courtiers about him, as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such moral contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to the Greek mind. And Thukydidēs—having before him an act of great injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, committed exactly at this point of time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis¹.

¹ Thukydidēs may have felt on this occasion, like Aristotle in the *Poetics* (1451, b. 12), that history was not 'philosophical' enough. Hence he does not trouble to record the exact words

which the delegates actually used, but sets himself to present a type of the *ὑβριστικὸς ἄνθρωπος* on the verge of meeting with the *ἀτμή* that will bring him to his fall.—ED.

CHAPTER XXVII

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY

THE relations of Attica with the West began with the export trade in pottery which the Athenians set themselves to win from Corinth in the course of the sixth century. The numerous finds in Etruria and South Italy alike show that Athens must have had a considerable trade interest in those regions from this time onward.

This connexion is illustrated by Themistoklēs' well-known threat before the council of admirals at Salamis, that he would sail with his countrymen to found a new home on the site of Siris on the Gulf of Tarentum, on which Athens laid a special claim (Herodot., viii. 62). The reputed intrigues of this statesman with Hiero of Syracuse (Stesimbr. *ap.* Plut., *Them.*, c. 24), the names of his daughters ('Sybaris' and 'Italia'—Plut., *Them.*, c. 32), his relations with Korkyra and Epirus (Thuk., i. 136), all point to a policy of Western expansion, to which he may have hoped to win his countrymen.

The anti-Persian enthusiasm of Kimon diverted Athenian enterprise from this quarter, and we have no further evidence of interference till 454. In this year an Athenian general is said to have instituted a torch-race at Neapolis while engaged in war with the 'Sikels' (Timæus, fr. 99). A campaign against the 'Sikels' is inconceivable, but we may bring this event into connexion with a war, mentioned by Diod., xi. 86, between Segesta and Lilybæum: though here again there is an obvious error (Lilybæum did not exist before the fourth century). We may suppose Segesta was hard pressed, probably by Selinus, which dedicated thank-offerings for victory about this time (*Inscr. Gr. Sic. et Ital.*, i., p. 45, No. 268, Hicks and Hill, 34). Thus Athens was drawn into the same quarrel as committed her afterwards to her great expedition.

Other marks of Athenian influence in the West are their foundation of Thurii (444), and their settlement (probably in the earlier fifth century) at Neapolis (Strabo, 5, p. 246). The introduction of Athenian coin-types in this city, as well as Thurii, Herakleia, may be similarly interpreted, though perhaps this merely indicates a personal triumph of a pupil of the Attic sculptor Myron (Evans, *Horsemen of Tarentum*).

This forward policy of Athens may naturally be ascribed to Periklēs, who in his early career entered into a bitter conflict with the Corinthians (*cf.* note 5, p. 337). Though in later days he set his face against armed intervention in the West, he persevered in his tentative process of expansion (*cf.* note 2, p. 338). The Korkyrean alliance gave this movement a new impulse, for in 433 Athens entered into treaties with the Ionic cities of Rhegium and Leontini (C.I.A., iv. (1), p. 13; Hicks and Hill, 51 and 52).

These *πάλαια συμμαχία* may not have been entered on with any definite purpose of interference in Sicily, but they provided an excellent pretext for so doing, of which the Athenian democratic leaders availed themselves soon after Periklēs' death (Thuk., iii. 86).

The justification of the minor operations which followed in Sicily is given in this chapter. But there can be no excuse for the reckless schemes of Hyperbolus, whose demand for an expedition of 100 triremes against Carthage, probably in 425, was quite absurd (*Ar., Equit.*, 1302).

It will be noticed that the policy of Western expansion belonged altogether to the democratic party; Kimon and Nikias never held it in favour.

The following are the references to Sicilian affairs in the earlier books of Thukydides: i. 36; ii. 7; iii. 86, 88, 90, 99, 103, 115, 116; iv. 1, 2, 24, 25, 48, 58-65; v. 4, 5.—Eds.

In the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connection between the two has been merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect; so that I have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two streams entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in Sicily during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill up this blank, to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian events during the interval between 461-416 B.C.; and to assign the successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to stake the larger portion of their force upon that fatal hazard.

The extinction of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, followed by the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the island, left the various Grecian cities to reorganize themselves in free and self-constituted governments. After a period of severe commotion, an accommodation was concluded, whereby the adherents of the expelled dynasty were planted partly in the territory of Messênê, partly in the re-established city of Kamarina, in the eastern portion of the southern coast, bordering on Syracuse.

But though peace was thus re-established, these large mutations of inhabitants, first begun by the despots—and the incoherent mixture of races, religious institutions, dialects, etc., which was brought about unavoidably during the process—left throughout Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from the long traditional tenures in Peloponnesus and Attica, and numbered by foreign enemies among the elements of its weakness¹. The wonder indeed rather is, that such real and powerful causes of disorder were soon so efficaciously controlled by the popular governments, that the half-century now approaching was decidedly the most prosperous and undisturbed period in the history of the island.

Of the various Grecian cities Syracuse was the first in power, Agrigentum the second. The causes above noticed, disturbing the first commencement of popular governments in all of them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do not know the particulars of the democratical constitution which was there established, but its stability was threatened by more than one ambitious pretender, eager to seize the sceptre of Gelo and Hiero. The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyndarion, who employed a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and procuring partisans among the poor. His political designs were at length so openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put to death; yet not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried and failed in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a law similar to the Athenian ostracism, authorizing the infliction of temporary preventive banishment². Under this law several powerful citizens were actually and speedily banished; and such was the abuse of the new engine by the political parties in the city, that men of conspicuous position are said to have become afraid of meddling with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said to have given rise to new political contentions not less violent than those which it checked, insomuch that the Syracusans found themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction. We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this political experiment, beyond the meagre abstract given by Diodorus—and especially to know the precautionary securities by which the application of the ostracizing sentence was restrained at Syracuse. Perhaps no care was taken to copy the checks and formalities provided by Kleisthenês at Athens. Yet under all circumstances, the institution, though tutelary if reserved for its proper emergencies, was eminently open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and discord. The wonder rather is that it was so little abused at Athens.

Henceforward the republic increased in wealth and manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The Syracusan admiral Phaÿllus was despatched with a powerful fleet to repress the piracies of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the island of Elba, returned home, under the suspicion of having been bought off by bribes from the enemy; on which accusation he was tried and banished—a second fleet of sixty triremes under Apellês being sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried

¹ Thukyd., vi. 17.

² Diodor., xi. 86, 87. The institution at Syracuse was called the *petalism*, because in taking

the votes, the name of the citizen intended to be banished was written upon a leaf of olive, instead of a shell or potsherd.

his ravages into the island of Corsica (at that time a Tyrrhenian possession), and reduced the island of Elba completely. His return was signalized by a large number of captives and a rich booty¹.

Meanwhile the great antecedent revolutions, among the Grecian cities in Sicily, had raised a new spirit among the Sikels of the interior, and inspired the Sikel prince Duketius, a man of spirit and ability, with large ideas of aggrandizement. Many exiled Greeks having probably sought service with him, it was either by their suggestion, or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic improvement, that he commenced the plan of bringing the petty Sikel communities into something like city-life and collective co-operation. Having acquired glory by the capture of the Grecian town of Morgantina, he induced the Sikel communities to enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little town from the hilltop, called Menæ, down to a convenient spot of the neighbouring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called Palikî². As the veneration paid to these gods rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels generally, Duketius was enabled to establish a considerable new city of Palikê, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population.

The powerful position which Duketius had thus acquired is attested by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Greeks had appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The Sikel town of Ennesia had been seized by the Hieronian Greeks expelled from Ætna³: Duketius now found means to reconquer it, after ensnaring by stratagem the leading magistrate. He was next bold enough to invade the territory of the Agrigentines, and to besiege one of their country garrisons called Motyum. We are impressed with a high idea of his power when we learn that the Agrigentines, while marching to relieve the place, thought it necessary to invoke aid from the Syracusans. Over this united force Duketius gained a victory. In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the Sikel prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised the blockade of Motyum, completely defeated him in the field, and dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracusans. He rode off by night to the gates of Syracuse, and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the agora. A spectacle thus unexpected brought together a crowd of Syracuse citizens, exciting in them the strongest emotions: and when the magistrates convened the assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy was found paramount. Duketius, withdrawn from the altar, was sent off to Corinth under his engagement to live there quietly for the future, the Syracusans providing for his comfortable maintenance⁴.

If in some instances the assembled people, obeying the usual vehemence of multitudinous sentiment, carried severities to excess—so, in other cases, as well as in this, the appeal to their humane impulses will be found to have triumphed over prudential regard for future security. Such was the fruit which the Syracusans reaped for sparing Duketius, who, after

¹ Diodor., xi., 87, 88.

² *Ibid.*, xi. 78, 88, 90.

³ *Ibid.*, xi. 76.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xi. 91, 92.

residing a year or two at Corinth, violated his parole. Pretending to have received an order from the oracle, he assembled a number of colonists, whom he conducted into Sicily to found a city at Kalê Aktê on the northern coast belonging to the Sikels.

But the return of this energetic enemy was not the only mischief which the Syracusans suffered. Their resolution to spare Duketius had been adopted without the concurrence of the Agrigentines, who had helped to conquer him; and the latter, when they saw him again in the island, and again formidable, were so indignant that they declared war against Syracuse. War actually broke out between them, wherein other Greek cities took part. After lasting some time, with various acts of hostility, and especially a serious defeat of the Agrigentines at the river Himera, these latter solicited and obtained peace¹. The discord between the two cities, however, had left leisure to Duketius to found the city of Kalê Aktê, and to make some progress in re-establishing his ascendancy over the Sikels, in which operation he was overtaken by death. He probably left no successor to carry on his plans, so that the Syracusans, pressing their attacks vigorously, reduced many of the Sikel townships in the island².

By this large accession both of subjects and of tribute, combined with her recent victory over Agrigentum, Syracuse was elevated to the height of power, and began to indulge schemes for extending her ascendancy throughout the island: with which view her horsemen were doubled in number, and one hundred new triremes were constructed³. Whether any, or what steps were taken to realize her designs, our historian does not tell us. But the position of Sicily remains the same at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war: Syracuse, the first city as to power, indulging in ambitious dreams, if not in ambitious aggressions; Agrigentum, a jealous second, and almost a rival; the remaining Grecian states maintaining their independence, yet not without mistrust and apprehension.

Though the particular phænomena of this period, however, have not come to our knowledge, we see enough to prove that it was one of great prosperity for Sicily. The wealth, commerce, and public monuments of Agrigentum, especially, appear to have even surpassed those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the African coast was both extensive and profitable; for at this time neither the vine nor the olive was much cultivated in Libya, and the Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern territory of Sicily⁴, particularly that of Agrigentum. The temples of the city, among which that of Olympic Zeus stood foremost, were on the grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything of the kind in Sicily. The population of the city, free as well as slave, was very great: the number of rich men, keeping chariots, and competing for the prize at the Olympic games, was renowned—not less than the accumulation of works of art, statues and pictures⁵, with manifold insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly brought to our notice, because of the frightful catastrophe which desolated Agrigentum in 406 B.C. from the hands of the Carthaginians. It was in the interval which we are now describing, that such prosperity was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigentum alone, but more or less throughout all the Grecian cities of the island.

¹ Diodor., xii. 8.

² The influence of Greek culture on the towns of the interior is illustrated by the coinages now begun

by the natives. Head, *Hist. Num.*, p. 102.—Ed.

³ Diodor., xii. 30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xiii. 81.

⁵ *Ibid.*, xiii. 82, 83, 90.

Nor was it only in material prosperity that they were distinguished. At this time, the intellectual movement in some of the Italian and Sicilian towns was very considerable. The inconsiderable town of Elea in the Gulf of Poseidonia nourished two of the greatest speculative philosophers in Greece—Parmenidēs and Zeno. Empedoklēs of Agrigentum was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet combining with it a political and practical efficiency. The popular character of the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation of rhetorical studies, wherein not only Empedoklēs and Pōlus at Agrigentum, but Tisias and Korax at Syracuse, and still more, Gorgias at Leontini, acquired great reputation¹. It was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the judicatures, as in Athens, which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers Tisias and Korax at Syracuse.

In such state of material prosperity, popular politics, and intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition of Athens, who, though she had founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears to have never aimed at any political ascendancy even over that town. But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, were yet connected by sympathy, and on one side even by alliances, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of Sicily—Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, perhaps Himera and Messēnē—together with Lokri and Tarentum in Italy: among the allies of Athens, perhaps, the Chalkidic or Ionic Rhægium in Italy. Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini—were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty, is very doubtful.

It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, and the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 433-432), which brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to co-operation in the Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting the most violent anti-Athenian war-spirit in Corinth, with whom the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy—next, by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an established footing in Korkyra. The policy of Athens was purely conservative, and that of her enemies aggressive. At that moment Sparta and Corinth anticipated large assistance from the Sicilian Dorians, in ships of war, in money, and in provisions; while the value of Korkyra as an ally of Athens consisted in affording facilities for obstructing such reinforcements, far more than from any anticipated conquests.

In the spring of 431 B.C., the Spartans, then organizing their first invasion of Attica and full of hope that Athens would be crushed in one or two campaigns, contemplated the building of a vast fleet of 500 ships of war among the confederacy. A considerable portion of this charge was imposed upon the Italian and Sicilian Dorians, and a contribution in money besides, with instructions to refrain from any immediate declaration against Athens until their fleet should be ready. What were the causes

¹ See Aristotle as cited by Cicero, *Brut.*, c. 12; Plato, *Phædr.*, p. 267, c. 113, 114.

which prevented it from being realized, we are not distinctly told ; and we find Hermokratēs the Syracusan reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterwards (immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse) with their antecedent apathy¹. But it is easy to see, that as the Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest, nor any habit of obeying requisitions from Sparta, so they might naturally content themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case of need, without taxing themselves to the enormous extent which it pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both aggressive and purely Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment to Corinth, may have sought to act upon the order. But no similar motive would be found operative either at Agrigentum or at Gela or at Selinus.

Instead of despatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable hopes of conquering and appropriating—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. These cities doubtless sympathized with Athens in her struggle against Sparta ; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her or to threaten their Dorian neighbours, they were unable to defend themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian city of Kamarina, which was afraid of her powerful border city Syracuse—and by Rhegium in Italy ; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter enemy of Rhegium, sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth summer of the war, finding themselves blockaded by sea and confined to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succour as allies and Ionians, and to represent that if Syracuse succeeded in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith send over the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been invoking. The eminent rhetor Gorgias of Leontini, whose peculiar style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this embassy.

Now the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island, as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus : and they sent twenty triremes under Lachēs and Charœadēs, with instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests. Taking station at Rhegium, Lachēs did something towards rescuing the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which were in alliance with Syracuse². Throughout the ensuing year, he pressed the war in the neighbourhood of Rhegium and Messênē, his colleague Charœadēs being slain. Attacking Mylæ in the Messenian territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage over the troops of Messênē that that city itself capitulated to him, gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic cities³. He also contracted an alliance with the non-Hellenic city of Egēsta, in the north-west portion of Sicily, and he invaded the territory of Lokri : after which, in a second debarkation, he defeated a Lokrian detachment. But he was unsuccessful in an expedition into the interior

¹ Thukyd., vi. 34 : compare iii. 86.

² Thukyd., iii. 88 ; Diodor., xii. 54.

³ The possession of Messênē was of special value to Athens, since in conjunction with the

occupation of Rhegium it gave complete security to the trading-vessels that brought Athenian wares to the ports of the Tyrrhenian sea.—Ed.

of Sicily. Lachês concluded his operations in the autumn by an ineffective incursion on the territory of Himera and on the Lipari isles. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the ensuing year (B.C. 425), he found Pythodôrus already arrived from Athens to supersede him.

That officer had come as the forerunner of a more considerable expedition, intended to arrive in the spring under Eurymedon and Sophoklês. The Ionic cities in Sicily, finding the squadron under Lachês insufficient to render them a match for their enemies at sea, had been emboldened to send a second embassy to Athens, with request for farther reinforcements. It happened that at this moment the Athenians had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to send to Sicily forty additional triremes, in full hopes of bringing the contest to a speedy close.

Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophoklês started from Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, with instructions to afford relief at Korkyra in their way, and with Demosthenês on board to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. But the fleet was so long occupied, first off Sphakteria, next in operations at Korkyra, that it did not reach Sicily until about the month of September.

Such delay, eminently advantageous for Athens generally, was fatal to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For Pythodôrus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Lachês at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but experienced a more irreparable loss by the revolt of Messênê, which had surrendered to Lachês a few months before, and which, together with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait. Apprised of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to deprive them of this important base of operations against the island; and a fleet of twenty sail—half Syracusan, half Lokrian—was enabled by the concurrence of a party in Messênê to seize the town. Messênê now served as a harbour for the fleet hostile to Athens, which was speedily reinforced to more than thirty sail, and began maritime operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians and capturing Rhegium, before Eurymedon should arrive. But the Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes together with eight others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory.

The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-Syracusan party threatened revolt: and the Messenian forces, thus left free, invaded the territory of their neighbour the Chalkidic city of Naxos. They were preparing to storm the town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Sikels was seen descending the neighbouring hills to succour the Naxians: upon which, the latter, mistaking the new-comers for their Grecian brethren from Leontini, made a vigorous sally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. The Messenians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less than 1,000 men, and with a still greater loss sustained in their retreat home from the pursuit of the Sikels. So much was the city weakened by its recent defeat, that a Lokrian garrison was sent for its protection, while the Leontines and Naxians, together with the Athenian squadron on returning from Kamarina, attacked it by land and sea. A well-timed sally of the Messenians and Lokrians, however, dis-

persed the Leontine land-force, but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the assailants while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back within the walls. The scheme against Messênê, however, had now become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhegium.

Thus indecision was the result of operations in Sicily, during the first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war: nor does it appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the autumnal half, though the full fleet under Eurymedon had then joined Pythodôrus. In the spring of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylus and Kythêra, so that a rising among the Helots appeared noway improbable. She was in the full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of affairs so different from that in which they had begun the war three years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their island. The Dorian city of Kamarina, which had hitherto acted along with the Ionic or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a separate accommodation with its neighbouring city of Gela, at which latter place deputies were invited to attend from all the cities in the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.

This congress met in the spring of 424 B.C., when Syracuse, the most powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest which all had in the conclusion of peace. The Syracusan Hermokratês, chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to vindicate and enforce it in the congress. The speech which Thukydides places in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hermokratês impresses upon his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened all cities alike, Ionians not less than Dorians. If they enfeebled one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. If possible, they ought to maintain undisturbed peace; but if that were impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily, apart from any foreign intruders. Complaints should be exchanged, and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance, of which Syracuse—the first city in the island and best able to sustain the brunt of war—was prepared to set the example. Let them all feel that they were neighbours, inhabitants of the same island, and called by the common name of Sikeliots; and let them all with one accord repel the intrusion of aliens in their affairs, whether as open assailants or as treacherous mediators.

This harangue found general sympathy among the Sicilian cities, Ionic as well as Doric. Accordingly the peace was accepted by all the belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed¹. The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens should be included in the pacification. They next acquainted

¹ Thukyd., iv. 65. We learn from Polybius (*Fragm.*, xii. 22, 23, one of the *Excerpta* published by Mai from the Cod. Vatic.) that Timæus had in his 21st book described the Congress at Gela

at considerable length, and had composed an elaborate speech for Hermokratês: which speech Polybius condemns, as a piece of empty declamation.

Eurymedon and his colleagues with the terms, inviting them to accede to the pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet from Sicily. These generals had no choice but to close with the proposition. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.

On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his colleagues Sophoklés and Pythodôrus banished, on the charge of having been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet (so the Athenians believed) was strong enough to have made important conquests. This sentence was harsh and unmerited; for it does not seem that Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from concluding peace — while it is certain that without them he could have achieved nothing serious. But the Athenians (besides an undue depreciation of the Sicilian cities which we shall find fatally misleading them hereafter) were at this moment at the maximum of extravagant hopes, counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient of disappointment, and careless of proportion between the means entrusted to, and the objects expected from, their commanders.

The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had been premature in sending away the Athenians. Dispute between Leontini and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the invocation of Athens three years before, broke out afresh soon after the pacification of Gela. The democratical government of Leontini came to the resolution of strengthening their city by the enrolment of many new citizens; and a redivision of the territorial property of the state was projected in order to provide lots of land for these new-comers. But the aristocracy of the town, upon whom the necessity would thus be imposed of parting with a portion of their lands, forestalled the project by entering into a treasonable correspondence with Syracuse, bringing in a Syracusan army, and expelling the Demos. While these exiles found shelter as they could in other cities, the rich Leontines deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their residence to Syracuse, and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To them the operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became masters of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up a portion of it. Here, after being joined by a considerable number of the exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their fortifications.

The new enrolment of citizens, projected by the Leontine democracy, seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela, and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse—thus compensating for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The Leontine Demos sent envoys to Athens with renewed prayers for help.

But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call. Her defeat at Delium and her losses in Thrace had been followed by the truce for one year, and even during that truce, she had been called upon for strenuous efforts in Thrace to check the progress of Brasidas. After the expiration of the truce, she sent Phæax and two colleagues to Sicily (B.C. 422) with the modest force of two triremes. He was directed to try

and organize an anti-Syracusan party in the island, for the purpose of re-establishing the Leontine Demos. His representations of danger from Syracusan ambition were well received both at Kamarina and Agrigentum. But when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order to procure the adhesion of that city in addition to the other two, he found himself met by so resolute an opposition, that his whole scheme was frustrated.

A few months after the visit of Phæax to that island, came the peace of Nikias. The consequences of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while the ambition of Alkibiadês carried her on for three years in intra-Peloponnesian projects and co-operation with Argos against Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention elsewhere. During that year, Nikias had contemplated an expedition against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, whose desertion frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Mêlos was besieged and taken.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have continued at Athens pressing their entreaties for aid, which began to obtain some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. A quarrel broke out between the neighbouring cities of Selinus (Hellenic) and Egesta (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily. The Selinuntines, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained assistance from the Syracusans their allies, and thus reduced Egesta to considerable straits by land as well as by sea¹. Now the Egestæans had allied themselves with Lachês ten years before, during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her intervention for their defence, after having in vain applied both to Agrigentum and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage did not at this time readily embrace the pretext for interference—considering that ten years afterwards she interfered with such destructive effect against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at Carthage², thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most dangerous of their neighbours.

The Egestæan envoys reached Athens in the spring of 416 B.C., at a time when the Athenians had no immediate project to occupy their thoughts, except the enterprise against Mêlos, which could not be either long or doubtful. They rested their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard pressing upon a second (Egesta), and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to Peloponnesus both by race and descent, and sure to lend effective aid in putting down Athens herself. It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval expedition adequate to the rescue of Egesta, the Eges-

¹ Thukyd., vi. 6; Diodor., xii. 82. The statement of Diodorus—that the Egestæans applied

not merely to Agrigentum but also to Syracuse—is highly improbable.

² Thukyd., vi. 34.

tæans themselves engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war¹.

Such representations from the envoys, and fears of Syracusan aggrandizement as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked along with the prayers of the Leontines in rekindling the appetite of Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon the Athenian public, favourable from the first, was wound up to a still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The envoys were repeatedly heard in the public assembly together with those citizens who supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alkibiadēs, who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, tempting alike to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous, and that a considerable party sustained Nikias in a prudential opposition. Even at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but a mean turn such as perhaps Nikias himself could not resist. Special envoys were despatched to Egesta—partly to ascertain the means of the town to fulfil its assurance of defraying the costs of war—partly to make investigations on the spot, and report upon the general state of affairs.

Perhaps the commissioners despatched were men themselves not unfriendly to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may have been individually bribed by the Egestæans—at least such a supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian public morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could hardly be prepared for the deep-laid stratagems put in practice to delude them on their arrival at Egesta. They were conducted to the rich temple of Aphroditē on Mount Eryx, where the plate and donatives were exhibited before them, abundant in number, and striking to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt vessels, which, though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality of little pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egestæan citizens were profuse in their hospitalities and entertainments both to the commissioners and to the crews of the triremes.

A false appearance was thus created, of the large number of wealthy men in Egesta; and the Athenian seamen, while their hearts were won by the caresses, saw with amazement this prodigious display of gold and silver, and were thoroughly duped by the fraud. To complete the illusion sixty talents of uncoined silver were at once produced as ready for the operations of war. With this sum in hand, the Athenian commissioners and the Egestæan envoys also, returned to Athens, which they reached in the spring of 415 B.C.², about three months after the capture of Mēlos.

The Athenian assembly being presently convened to hear their report, the deluded commissioners drew a magnificent picture of the wealth, public and private, which they had actually seen and touched at Egesta, and presented the sixty talents (one month's pay for a fleet of sixty triremes) as a small instalment out of the vast stock remaining in Sicily.

¹ Thukyd., vi. 6; Diodor., xii. 83.

² To this winter or spring, perhaps, we may refer the representation of the lost comedy *Τριφάλης* of Aristophanēs. Iberians were alluded to in it, to be introduced by Aristarchus; seemingly Iberian mercenaries, who were among the auxili-

aries talked of at this time by Alkibiadēs and the other prominent advisers of the expedition, as a means of conquest in Sicily (Thukyd., vi. 90). See the few fragments remaining of the *Τριφάλης*, in Meineke, *Fragm. Comic. Gr.*, vol. ii., pp. 1162-1167.

Accordingly when the Egestæan envoys again renewed their petitions and representations, and when the distress of the suppliant Leontines was again depicted, the Athenian assembly no longer delayed coming to a final decision. They determined to send forthwith sixty triremes to Sicily, under three generals with full powers, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus, for the purpose, first, of relieving Egesta; next, as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of re-establishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of furthering the views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which they might find practicable. Such resolution being passed, a fresh assembly was appointed for the fifth day following, to settle the details.

We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from Egesta were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to Alkibiadês and those who had from the first advocated the expedition—as well as of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias who had opposed it. He resolved to avail himself of the next assembly four days afterwards, for the purpose of reopening the debate. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to hear him on this subject. Indeed the question which he raised could not be put without illegality; the principle of the measure had been already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable sample both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by Thukydides. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself to the exact expressions.

Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think we ought to take farther counsel whether it be well to send that expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the instance of aliens, into a dangerous war noway belonging to us. To myself personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honourable appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any man: yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before prevented me, nor shall now prevent me, from giving you my honest opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgments. I tell you then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your truce with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name indeed that truce may stand, so long as your power remains unimpaired; but on your first serious reverses, the enemy will eagerly take the opportunity of assailing you. Some of your most powerful enemies have never even accepted the truce; and if you divide your force as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along with the Sicilians, whom they would have been too happy to procure as coöperating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that your Chalkidian subjects in Thrace are still in revolt, and have never yet been conquered: other continental subjects, too, are not much to be trusted; and you are going to redress injuries offered to Egesta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained; but Sicily is so distant and the people so powerful, that you will never be able to maintain permanent ascendancy; and it is absurd to undertake an expedition wherein conquest

cannot be permanent, while failure will be destructive. The Egestæans alarm you by the prospect of Syracusan aggrandizement. But to me it seems, that the Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be less dangerous to you than they are at present : for as matters stand now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesus, from desire on the part of each to gain the favour of Lacedæmon, but imperial Syracuse would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust the Spartans : they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to repair their own dishonour. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this newly-acquired strength for our own purposes, instead of wasting it upon the treacherous assurances of desperate exiles from Sicily.'

Immediately after he sat down, while his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiadês rose to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary acquisition. Provoked as well as alarmed, Alkibiadês started up forthwith—his impatience breaking loose from the formalities of an exordium.

'Athenians, I both have better title than others to the post of commander, and I account myself fully worthy of it. Those very matters, with which he reproaches me, are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks, on witnessing my splendid Theôry at Olympia, were induced to rate the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded it as broken down by the war ; when I sent into the lists seven chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent before—winning the first prize, coming in also second and fourth, and performing all the accessories in a manner suitable to an Olympic victory. My exhibitions at Athens, too, choregic and others, are naturally viewed with jealousy by my rivals here ; but in the eyes of strangers they are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is by no means useless, when a man at his own cost serves the city as well as himself. It is this glory which I desire, and in pursuit of which I incur such reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians peril their all at Mantinea on the fortune of one day, a peril so great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their steady belief in their own strength.

'Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, find suitable words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness to give them confidence and obtain their co-operation. Be not now, therefore, afraid of this youth of mine : but so long as I possess it in full vigour, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune, turn us each to account in our own way.'

Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiadês went on to deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities (he said) were not so formidable as was represented. Their popula-

tion was numerous indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered himself as a permanent resident nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt ; nor were there arms or organization for such a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they had never yet been more without hope of damaging Athens, than they were now : they might invade Attica by land, whether the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not ; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies ? To be sure *they* could bring no help to Attica in return—*but* Athens did not want them on her own side of the water—she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited. She could not now set limits to the extent of her imperial sway ; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects. Let her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily ; at least she would humble Syracuse : in case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Nikias was not less at variance with the temper, than with the position, of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her energies would be wasted in internal rub and conflict, instead of that aspiring readiness of enterprise which, having become engrafted upon her laws and habits, could not be now renounced, even if bad in itself, without speedy destruction.

Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiadēs to Nikias. The debate was now completely reopened, so that several speakers addressed the assembly on both sides. The alarmed Egestæans and Leontines renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted faith of the city. By all these appeals, after considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved, that their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever ; and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was useless, altered his tactics. He now attempted a manœuvre, designed indirectly to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force as indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he without hopes that they might be sufficiently disheartened by such prospective hardships, to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with completeness and confidence.

Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat of the people, he reminded them that the cities which they were about to attack, especially Syracuse and Selinus, were powerful, populous, free—well-prepared in every way with hoplites, horsemen, light-armed troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to mount their cavalry, and abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no other allies in Sicily except Naxos and Katana, from their kindred with the Leontines. It was no

mere fleet, therefore, which could cope with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet indeed must be prodigiously great, for the purpose not merely of maritime combat, but of keeping open communication at sea, and ensuring the importation of subsistence. But there must besides be a large force of hoplites, bowmen, and slingers—a large stock of provisions in transports—and above all, an abundant amount of money : for the funds promised by the Egestæans would be found mere empty delusion. The army must be not simply a match for the enemy's regular hoplites and powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid from the first day of their landing. If not, in case of the least reverse, they would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single friend.

The effect of this second speech of Nikias on the assembly, coming as it did after a long and contentious debate, was much greater than that which had been produced by his first. But it was an effect totally opposite to that which he himself had anticipated and intended. Far from being discouraged from the expedition by those impediments which he had studiously magnified, the people only attached themselves to it with yet greater obstinacy. They were ready to grant without reserve everything which he asked, with an enthusiasm and unanimity such as was rarely seen to reign in an Athenian assembly. In fact, the second speech of Nikias had brought the two dissentient veins of the assembly into a confluence and harmony, all the more welcome because unexpected. While his partisans seconded it as the best way of neutralizing the popular madness, his opponents caught at it with acclamation, as realizing more than they had hoped for, and more than they could ever have ventured to propose.

It was thus that Nikias, quite contrary to his own purpose, not only imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which its projectors had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole soul of Athens, and roused a burst of ardour beyond all former example. Every man present, old as well as young, rich and poor, of all classes and professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service. Some were tempted by the love of gain, others by the curiosity of seeing so distant a region, others again by the pride and supposed safety of enlisting in so irresistible an armament. When the excitement had somewhat subsided, an orator, coming forward as spokesman of this sentiment, urged Nikias to declare at once, without farther evasion, what force he required from the people. Disappointed as Nikias was, yet being left without any alternative, he responded to the appeal, saying that he would take farther counsel with his colleagues, but that speaking on his first impression, he thought the triremes required must be not less than one hundred, nor the hoplites less than 5,000—Athenians and allies together. There must farther be a proportional equipment of other forces and accompaniments, especially Cretan bowmen and slingers. Enormous as this requisition was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but even went beyond it. They conferred upon the generals full power to fix both the numbers of the armament and every other matter relating to the expedition, just as they might think best for the interest of Athens.

Pursuant to this momentous resolution, the enrolment and preparation of the forces was immediately begun. Messages were sent to summon sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as well as to invite hoplites from Argos and Mantinea, and to hire bowmen and slingers elsewhere. For

three months the generals were busily engaged in this proceeding, while the city was in a state of alertness and bustle.

Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy, will not find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just considering. The supplications of Egestæans and Leontines, forwarded to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 B.C., undergo careful and repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. Still, however, no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct information from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Egesta for the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly certifying all that the Egestæans had promised.

Upon the result of that mission from Egesta, the two parties for and against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue; and when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so decisive in favour of the former, the party thus strengthened thought itself warranted in calling for a decision immediately, after all the previous debates. Nevertheless, the measure still had to surmount the renewed and hearty opposition of Nikias, before it became finally ratified. It was this long and frequent debate, with opposition often repeated but always outreasoned, which working gradually deeper and deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into hearty unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that tenacity which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the expedition was an error, it certainly was not error arising either from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in Grecian history was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or more deliberately and unanimously resolved.

Giving to Nikias full credit for the wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his scepticism about the reports from Egesta, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in Alkibiadês. His speech is not merely full of overweening insolence as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous instigations in regard to the foreign policy of his country. The arguments whereby he enforces the expedition against Syracuse are indeed more mischievous in their tendency than the expedition itself, for the failure of which Alkibiadês is not to be held responsible. It might have succeeded in its special object, had it been properly conducted; but even if it had succeeded, the remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was aiming at an unmeasured breadth of empire, which it would be altogether impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political wisdom with which Periklês had advised his countrymen to maintain strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus—we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending aggression inculcated by Alkibiadês, and the destructive principles which he lays down that Athens must for ever be engaged in new conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire and tearing herself to pieces by internal discord. Even granting the necessity for Athens to employ her

military and naval force (as Nikias had truly observed), Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thrace were still unsubdued; and the first employment of Athenian force ought to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant hazards and treacherous novelties. The parallel which Alkibiadês draws, between the enterprising spirit whereby the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the undefined speculations which he was himself recommending, is altogether fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian enterprise, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity on the part of all the Grecian cities in or round the Ægean Sea. Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in before: her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and had only passed by degrees into constraint; while the local situation of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of her controlling navy. Her new career of aggression in Sicily was in all these respects different. Nor is it less surprising to find Alkibiadês asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that distant island, employing a large portion of the Athenian naval force to watch them, would impart new stability to the pre-existing Athenian empire. How strange also to read the terms in which he makes light of enemies both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily—the Sicilian war being a new enterprise hardly less in magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian¹!—to notice the honour which he claims to himself for his operations in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantinea, which had ended in complete failure, and in restoring Sparta to the maximum of her credit as it had stood before the events of Sphakteria! There is in fact no speech in Thukydidês so replete with misguiding and fallacious counsels as this harangue of Alkibiadês.

As a man of action, Alkibiadês was always vigorous, and full of resource; as a politician and adviser, he was especially mischievous to his country, because he addressed himself exactly to their weak point, and exaggerated their sanguine and enterprising temper into a temerity which overlooked all permanent calculation. The Athenians had now contracted the belief that they, as lords of the sea, were entitled to dominion and receipt of tribute from all islands—a belief which they had not only acted upon, but openly professed, in their attack upon Mëlos during the preceding autumn. As Sicily was an island, it seemed to fall naturally under this category of subjects: for we ought not to wonder, amidst the inaccurate geographical data current in that day, that they were ignorant how much larger Sicily was than the largest island in the Ægean. But if the Athenian public were rash and ignorant, in contemplating the conquest of Sicily, much more extravagant were the views of Alkibiadês: though I cannot bring myself to believe that even he (as he afterwards asserted) really looked beyond Sicily to the conquest of Carthage and her empire. It was not merely ambition which he desired to gratify. He was not less eager for the immense private gains which would be consequent upon success, in order to supply those deficiencies which his profligate expenditure had occasioned².

¹ With regard to the difference between conquering Sicily and retaining the new conquest, Periklès or any other Athenian of the old generation could have pointed out that their countrymen, after practically expelling the Persians from Egypt, were again completely swept out of it. Just as Persia could never tolerate an established predominance in Egypt, so the Carthaginians must

have thrown their weight in the scale against the Athenians, if they had ever come near to subduing Sicily; and in the long run Athens could not have held such a distant possession against a power so close to the scene of operations.—Ed.

² Thukyd., vi. 15.

Compare vi. 90. Plutarch (*Alkib.*, c. 19; *Nikias*, c. 12). Plutarch sometimes speaks as if,

CHAPTER XXVIII [LVIII]

FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY

FOR the two or three months immediately succeeding the final resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily, the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited religious advisers, announced generally the favourable dispositions of the gods, and promised a triumphant result. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites, instead of being forced to employ constraint or incur ill-will, had only to choose the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided himself with his best arms and with bodily accoutrements for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a varied land and sea-service. Among the trierarchs (or rich citizens who undertook each in his turn the duty of commanding a ship of war) the competition was yet stronger. Each of them accounted it an honour to be named, and vied with his comrades to exhibit his ship in the most finished state of equipment. The state indeed furnished both the trireme with its essential tackle and oars, and the regular pay for the crew; but the trierarch, even in ordinary cases, usually incurred various expenses besides to make the equipment complete and to keep the crew together. Each trierarch tried to procure for his own ship the best crew, by offers of additional reward to all, but especially to the Thranitæ or rowers on the highest of the three tiers. Besides the best crews which Athens herself could furnish, picked seamen were also required from the subject-allies, and were bid for in the same way by the trierarchs.

Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact that five years had now elapsed since the peace of Nikias, without any considerable warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with fresh accumulations¹, and the triremes increased in number, the military population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had forgotten both the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic disease. Hence

not Alkibiadês alone (or at least in conjunction with a few partisans), but the Athenians generally, set out with an expectation of conquering Carthage as well as Sicily. In the speech which Alkibiadês made at Sparta after his banishment (Thukyd., vi. 90), he does indeed state this as the general purpose of the expedition. But it seems plain that he is here ascribing, to his countrymen generally, plans which were only fermenting in his own brain—as we may discern from a careful perusal of the first twenty chapters of the sixth book of Thukydides.

¹ Thukyd., vi. 26. I do not trust the statement given in Æschines, *De Fals. Legat.*, c. 54, p. 302, derived from Andokidês, *De Pace*, § 8, that 7,000 talents were laid by as an accumulated treasure in the acropolis during the peace of Nikias, and that 400 triremes, or 300 triremes, were newly built. The numerous historical inaccuracies in those orations, concerning the facts prior to 400 B.C., are such as to deprive them of all au-

thority, except where they are confirmed by other testimony.

[The 'psephism of Kallias,' which was formerly referred to a date between 421 and 415, almost certainly belongs to the year 435, and has been discussed in that connexion (see p. 359, n.).

C.I.A., i. 273 (Hicks and Hill, 62) records the repayment of loans from the temple treasuries made during the early years of the war. The total sum drawn between 433 and 427 amounts to 4,750 talents, between 426 and 423 to 750. E. Meyer (*Forschungen*, ii., p. 88 ff.) estimates the surplus in 421-420 (about the time of this inscription) at 1,700 talents. In the next five years the surplus must have been considerable, since in the busiest year (418) only 58 talents were drawn from the Athenæ treasury (C.I.A., iv. (1), pp. 32, 70; Hicks and Hill, 70). Nevertheless, Andokidês' total of 7,000 talents appears too high.—Ed.]

the fleet now got together, while it surpassed in number all previous armaments of Athens, except a single one in the second year of the previous war under Periklēs, was incomparably superior even to that, and still more superior to all the rest in the other ingredients of force, material as well as moral. Such was the confidence of success, that many Athenians went prepared for trade as well as for combat; so that the private stock thus added to the public outfit and to the sums placed in the hands of the generals, constituted an unparalleled aggregate of wealth.

After between two and three months of active preparations, the expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was, the mutilation of the Hermæ, one of the most extraordinary events in all Grecian history.

The Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermēs, were blocks of marble about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular pillar. They were distributed in great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous situations. The religious feeling of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or domiciliated where his statue stood¹, so that the companionship, sympathy, and guardianship of Hermēs, became associated with most of the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens, political, social, commercial, or gymnastic.

About the end of May, 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same night, all these Hermæ were mutilated by unknown hands².

It is of course impossible for anyone to sympathize fully with the feelings of a religion not his own: indeed the sentiment with which, in the case of persons of different creed, each regards the strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other, is usually one of surprise that such trifles and absurdities can occasion any serious distress or excitement. But if we take that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the history of Greece, to realize in our minds the religious and political associations of the Athenians³—noted in ancient times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling—we shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled terror and wrath which beset the public mind on the morning after this nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the

¹ Cicero, *Legg.*, ii. 11: 'Melius Græci atque nostri; qui, ut augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos urbes, quas nos, incolere voluerunt.'

How much the Grecian mind was penetrated with the idea of the god as an actual inhabitant of the town, may be seen illustrated in [Lysias] *Cont. Andokid.*, §§ 15-46: compare Herodotus, v. 67—a striking story, as illustrated in this History, ch. ix. (Full text)—Xen., *Hellen.*, vi. 4-7; Livy, xxxviii. 43.

In an inscription in Boeckh's *Corp. Insc.* (part ii., No. 190, p. 320) a list of the names of Prytaneis appears, at the head of which list figures the name of Athēnē Polias.

² Andokidēs (*De Myst.*, § 63) expressly states that only a single one was spared—καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὁ Ἐρμῆς ὃν ὄρατε πάντες, ὁ παρὰ τὴν παρθέναν

οἰκίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν, οὐ περιεκόπη, μόνος τῶν Ἑρμῶν τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.

Cornelius Nepos (*Alkibiad.*, c. 3) and Plutarch (*Alkib.*, c. 13) copy Andokidēs: in his *Nikias* (c. 18) the latter uses the expression of Thukydides—οἱ πλείστοι. This expression is no way at variance with Andokidēs, though it stops short of his affirmation. There is great mixture of truth and falsehood in the Oration of Andokidēs; but I think that he is to be trusted as to this point.

³ Pausanias, i. 17, 1; i. 24, 3; Harpokration, v. Ἐρμαί.

Especially the ἀγυιαῖδες θεσπεῖαι (Eurip., *Ion.*, 187) were noted at Athens: ceremonial attentions towards the divine persons who protected the public streets—a function performed by Apollo Agnæus, as well as by Hermēs.

statues and temples of the gods¹. If we could imagine the excitement of a Spanish or Italian town, on finding that all the images of the Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt at Athens—where religious associations and persons were far more intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings of every-day life—where, too, the god and his efficiency were more forcibly localized, as well as identified with the presence and keeping of the statue. It was on the protection of the gods that all their political constitution as well as the blessings of civil life depended, insomuch that the curses of the gods were habitually invoked as sanction and punishment for grave offences, political as well as others², an extension and generalization of the feeling still attached to the judicial oath. Accordingly they drew from the mutilation of the Hermæ the inference that heavy public misfortune was impending over the city, and that the political constitution to which they were attached was in imminent danger of being subverted³.

Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager and bustling movement of Athens, a few days before the Sicilian expedition was in condition for starting. In reference to that expedition, it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen. It would doubtless have been so interpreted, had it been a mere undesigned accident happening to any venerated religious object. The mutilation of the Hermæ, however, was something much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed itself as the deliberate act of organized conspirators, not inconsiderable in number, who had begun by committing sacrilege of a character flagrant and unheard of.

It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the other—to ruin Alkibiadês, to frustrate or delay the expedition. How they pursued the former purpose, will be presently seen: towards the latter, nothing was ostensibly done, but the position of Teukrus and other metics implicated, renders it more likely that they were influenced by sympathies with Corinth and Megara⁴, prompting them to intercept an expedition

¹ Herodot., viii. 144; Æschylus, *Pers.*, 820; Æschyl., *Agam.*, 339; Isokrates, *Panegy.*, § 182.

Timæus the Sicilian historian (writing about 320-290 B.C.) represented the subsequent defeat of the Athenians as a divine punishment for the desecration of the Hermæ, inflicted chiefly by the Syracusan Hermokratês, son of Hermon and descendant of the god Hermês (*Timæi Fragm.*, 103, 104, ed. Didot; [Longinus], *De Sublim.*, iv. 3).
² Thukyd., viii. 97; Plato, *Legg.*, ix., pp. 871 b, 881 d, ἡ τοῦ ἑρμοῦ ἀπά, etc. Demosthen., *Fals. Legat.*, p. 363, c. 24, p. 404, c. 60; Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 24.

³ Dr. Thirlwall observes in reference to the feeling at Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ—

⁴ We indeed see so little connection between acts of daring impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly understand how they could have been associated together, as they were in the minds of the Athenians. But perhaps the difficulty may not without reason have appeared much less to the contemporaries of Alcibiadês, who were rather disposed by their views of religion to regard them as inseparable (*Hist. Gr.*, ch. xxv., vol. iii., p. 394).

This remark might have been stated far more strongly, for an Athenian citizen would have had quite as much difficulty in comprehending our

disjunction of the two ideas, as we have in comprehending his association of the two.

⁴ Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 18; Pseudo-Plutarch, *Vit. X. Orator*, p. 834, who professes to quote from Kراتίππος, an author nearly contemporary. The Pseudo-Plutarch, however, asserts—what cannot be true—that the Corinthians employed Leontine and Eggestean agents to destroy the Hermæ. The Leontines and Eggesteans were exactly the parties who had greatest interest in getting the Sicilian expedition to start. The fact is, that no utter foreigners could well have done the deed: it required great familiarity with all the buildings, highways, and byways of Athens.

The Athenian Philochorus (writing about the date 310-280 B.C.) ascribed the mutilation of the Hermæ to the Corinthians; if we may believe the scholiast on Aristophanês—who, however, is not very careful, since he tells us that *Thukydídês* ascribed that act to Alkibiadês and his friends; which is not true (*Philochor. Fragm.*, 110, ed. Didot; Schol. Aristoph., *Lysistr.*, 1094).

[The mutilation is attributed by Isokr., *De Bigis* (§§ 3, 4) to the Athenian oligarchs.—It is true that no other class within Athens had any object in raising prejudice against the scheme, or was sufficiently organized for such a conspiracy. But the motive supplied in the above passage, the desire to ruin Alkibiadês, is open to dispute.

which was supposed to promise great triumphs to Athens. Indeed the two objects were intimately connected with each other ; for the prosecution of the enterprise, while full of prospective conquest to Athens, was yet more pregnant with future power and wealth to Alkibiadēs himself. Such chances would disappear if the expedition could be prevented ; nor was it at all impossible that the Athenians, under the intense impression of religious terror consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, might throw up the scheme altogether. Especially Nikias, exquisitely sensitive in his own religious conscience, and never hearty in his wish for going, would hasten to consult his prophets, and might reasonably be expected to renew his opposition on the fresh ground offered to him, or at least to claim delay until the offended gods should have been appeased.

But this calculation was not realized. Probably matters had already proceeded too far even for Nikias to recede. Notice had been sent round to all the allies ; forces were already on their way to the rendezvous at Korkyra ; the Argeian and Mantineian allies were arriving at Peiræus to embark. So much the more eagerly did the conspirators proceed in that which I have stated as the other part of their probable plan, to work that exaggerated religious terror, which they had themselves artificially brought about, for the ruin of Alkibiadēs.

Few men in Athens either had, or deserved to have, a greater number of enemies, political as well as private, than Alkibiadēs. His importance had been already so much increased, and threatened to be so much more increased, by the Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in compassing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the Hermæ seemed to have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to profit.

Amidst the mournful dismay spread by the discovery of so unparalleled a sacrilege, it appeared to the Athenian people—as it would have appeared to the Ephors at Sparta, or to the rulers in every oligarchical city of Greece—that it was their paramount and imperative duty to detect and punish the authors. So long as these latter were walking about unknown and unpunished, the temples were defiled by their presence, and the whole city was accounted under the displeasure of the gods, who would inflict upon it heavy public misfortunes¹. Under this displeasure every citizen felt himself comprehended, so that the sense of public security as well as of private comfort were alike unappeased, until the offenders should be discovered and atonement made by punishing or expelling them. Large

We may observe (1) that the commission of inquiry was instituted and presided over by demagogues, who proceeded to find their victims mainly among the aristocrats (Andok., *De Myst.*, §§ 27, 36). (2) The blame for the banishment of Alkibiadēs is explicitly thrown upon the democrats (Thuk., vi. 28-29, 89 ; viii. 47, 65). (3) The demagogues had a natural motive for vengeance against the leader who had thrown over Hyperbolus (Plut., *Nic.*, 11 ; *Alcib.*, 13), and was now outstripping them (Thuk., vi. 28). (4) The oligarchs had no serious quarrel with Alkibiadēs at this time.

As for the Corinthians, a sufficient number of their citizens must have resided in Athens for purposes of trade, and would know their way about quite well. A band of such metics could certainly have accomplished the outrage in question.—ED.]

¹ See the remarkable passage in the contempor-

ary pleading of Antiphon on a trial for homicide (Orat. ii., *Tetralog.*, 1, 10).

Λοῦμφορὸν θ' ὕμιν ἐστὶ τόνδε μάρτυρ καὶ ἀναγνὼν ὄντα εἰς τὰ τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσόντα μαινεῖν τὴν ἀργείαν αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας ἰδὼτα συγκαταπιμπλάγει τοὺς ἀναίτιους· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων αἱ τε ἀφορίαι γίνονται δυστυχεῖς θ' αἱ πράξεις καθίστανται. Οἰκείαν οὖν χρὴ τὴν τιμωρίαν ἡγήσαμένους, αὐτῶ τούτῳ τὰ τούτου ἀσεβήματα ἀναθέντας, ἰδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφορὰν καθαρὰν δὲ τὴν πόλιν καταστήσαι.

Compare Antiphon, *De Cæde Herodis*, § 33, and Sophoklēs, *Edip. Tyrann.*, 26, 96, 170—as to the miseries which befel a country, so long as the person guilty of homicide remained to pollute the soil, and until he was slain or expelled. See also Xenophon, *Hiero*, iv. 4, and Plato, *Legg.*, x., pp. 885-910.

rewards were accordingly proclaimed to any person who could give information, and even impunity to any accomplice whose confession might lay open the plot. Nor did the matter stop here. Once under this painful shock of religious and political terror, the Athenians became eager talkers and listeners on the subject of other recent acts of impiety. Hence an additional public vote was passed, promising rewards and inviting information from all witnesses—citizens, metics, or even slaves—respecting any previous acts of impiety which might have come within their cognizance, but at the same time providing that informers who gave false depositions should be punished capitally¹.

While the [Council] of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of action, Diognētus, Peisander, Chariklēs, and others, were named commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries; and public assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports². The first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave and recent mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of older date, above all to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated in various houses³, by parties of revellers caricaturing and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries. It was under this latter head that the first impeachment was preferred against Alkibiadēs.

So fully were the preparations of the armament now complete, that the trireme of Lamachus was already moored in the outer harbour, and the last public assembly was held for the departing officers, when Pythonikus rose to impeach Alkibiadēs. While Alkibiadēs strenuously denied the allegation, the Prytanes (councillors presiding over the assembly, according to the order determined by lot for that year among the ten tribes) at once made proclamation for all uninitiated citizens to depart from the assembly, and went to fetch the slave (Andromachus by name) whom Pythonikus had indicated. On being introduced, Andromachus deposed before the assembly that he had been with his master in the house of Polytion, when Alkibiadēs, Nikiadēs, and Melētus went through the sham celebration of the mysteries, many other persons being present, and especially three other slaves besides himself. We must presume that he verified this affirmation by describing what the mysteries were which he had seen—the test which Pythonikus had offered⁴.

Pythonikus, the demagogue Androklēs, and other speakers, having put in evidence this irreverent proceeding, enlarged upon it with the strongest invective, imputed to him many other acts of the like character, and even denounced him as cognizant of the recent mutilation of the Hermæ.

‘All had been done (they said) with a view to accomplish his purpose of

¹ Andokidēs, *De Mysteriis*, § 20.

² Andokidēs, *De Mysteriis*, §§ 14, 15, 26; Plutarch, *Alkibiad.*, c. 18.

³ Those who are disposed to imagine that the violent feelings and proceedings at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ were the consequence of her democratical government, may be reminded of an analogous event of modern times from which we are not yet separated by a century.

In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen of good family (the Chevalier d'Étallonde and Chevalier de la Barre) were tried, convicted and condemned for having injured a wooden crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in aggravation of this offence they were charged with having sung indecent songs. The evidence to prove these points was exceedingly doubtful: nevertheless both were condemned to

have their tongues cut out by the roots—to have their right hands cut off at the church gate—then to be tied to a post in the market-place with an iron chain, and burnt by a slow fire. This sentence, after being submitted by way of appeal to the Parliament of Paris and by them confirmed, was actually executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre (d'Étallonde having escaped) in July, 1766; with this mitigation, that he was allowed to be decapitated before he was burnt—but at the same time with this aggravation, that he was put to the torture, ordinary and extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accomplices (*Voltaire, Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre, Œuvres*, vol. xlii., pp. 361-379, ed. Beuchot; also *Voltaire, Le Cri du Sang Innocent*, vol. xii., p. 133).

⁴ Andokid., *De Myst.*, §§ 11-13.

subverting the democracy, when bereft of its divine protectors—a purpose manifested by the constant tenor of his lawless, overbearing, antipopular demeanour.' But in spite of all the disquietude arising from the recent sacrilege, their expectations were defeated. The strenuous denial of Alkibiadês—aided by his very peculiar position as commander of the armament, as well as by the reflection that the recent outrage tended rather to spoil his favourite projects in Sicily—found general credence. The citizens enrolled to serve manifested strong disposition to stand by him; the allies from Argos and Mantinea were known to have embraced the service chiefly at his instigation; the people generally had become familiar with him as the intended conqueror in Sicily, and were loath to be balked of this project. From all which circumstances, his enemies, finding little disposition to welcome the accusations which they preferred, were compelled to postpone them until a more suitable time¹.

But Alkibiadês saw full well the danger of having such charges hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived from his accidental position at the moment. He implored the people to investigate the charges at once, proclaiming his anxiety to stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty, and insisting above all things on the mischief to the city of sending him on such an expedition with the charge undecided. His enemies could only reply by the trick of putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility to Alkibiadês. These men deprecated the delay which would be occasioned in the departure of the expedition, if he were put upon his trial forthwith—and proposed deferring the trial until a certain number of days after his return².

The spectacle of the departure was indeed so imposing, and the moment so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the recollection of the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not mustered at Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied contingents to rendezvous at once at Korkyra. But the Athenian force alone was astounding to behold. There were one hundred triremes, sixty of which were in full trim for rapid nautical movement—while the remaining forty were employed as transports for the soldiers. There were fifteen hundred select citizen hoplites, chosen from the general muster-roll—and seven hundred Thêtes, or citizens too poor to be included in the muster-roll, who served as hoplites on shipboard, each with a panoply furnished by the state³. To these must be added, five hundred Argeian and two hundred and fifty Mantineian hoplites, paid by Athens and transported on board Athenian ships. The number of horsemen was so small, that all were conveyed in a single horse transport.

But the condition, the equipment, the pomp both of wealth and force, visible in the armament, was still more impressive than the number. At daybreak on the day appointed, when all the ships were ready in Peiræus for departure, the military force was marched down in a body from the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the whole popula-

¹ Thukyd., vi. 29. Isokratês (Orat. xvi., *De Bigis*, §§ 7, 8) represents these proceedings before the departure for Sicily, in a very inaccurate manner.

² The account which Andokidês gives of the first accusation against Alkibiadês by Pythonikus, in the assembly prior to the departure of the fleet, presents the appearance of being substantially correct, and I have followed it in the text. It is in harmony with the more brief indications of Thukydides.

³ The proportion of 700 Thêtes to 1,500 other hoplites is remarkably high: as a rule, this class was not drafted into the heavy infantry at all. We may infer that the zeugite class (consisting largely of small proprietors) showed some reluctance against serving overseas; or, more probably, that their numbers had greatly diminished through the stress of war, plague (Thuk., iii. 87), and loss of wealth.—Ed.

tion, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the appearance was that of a collective emigration like the flight to Salamis sixty-five years before.

The moment immediately succeeding this farewell—when all the soldiers were already on board and the Keleustês was on the point of beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion—was peculiarly solemn. Silence having been enjoined and obtained, by sound of trumpet, the crews in every ship, and the spectators on shore, followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods for success, and in singing the pæan. On every deck were seen bowls of wine prepared, out of which the officers and the Epibatæ made libations, with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final signal was given, and the whole fleet quitted Peiræus in single file—displaying the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race of speed as far as Ægina.

The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the contingents of the maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found to comprise 134 triremes with two Rhodian pentekonteres; 5,100 hoplites; 480 bowmen, 80 of them Cretan; 700 Rhodian slingers; and 120 Megarian exiles serving as light troops. Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments of war, bakers, masons, and carpenters, etc., the number was not less than 500; besides which, there was a considerable number of private trading ships, following voluntarily for purposes of profit.

In their progress southward along the coast of Italy to Rhegium, they met with a very cold reception from the various Grecian cities. The utmost which they would grant was the liberty of taking moorings and of watering; and even thus much was denied to them both at Tarentum and at the Epizephyrian Lokri. At Rhegium, immediately on the Sicilian strait, though the town gate was still kept shut, they were so far more hospitably treated, that a market of provisions was furnished to them and they were allowed to encamp not far from the walls. They here hauled their ships ashore and took repose until the return of three scout ships from Eggesta, while the generals entered into negotiation with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavouring to induce them to aid the armament in re-establishing the dispossessed Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But the Rhegines would promise nothing more than neutrality, and coöperation in any course of policy which it might suit the other Italian Greeks to adopt. Probably they, as well as the other Italian Greeks, were astonished and intimidated by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave to themselves open latitude of conduct for the future—not without mistrust of Athens and her affected forwardness for the restoration of the Leontines.

It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Korkyra (about July 415 B.C.) that the Syracusans became thoroughly convinced both of their approach, and of the extent of their designs against Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding March to assist Eggesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going on in consequence. There was, however, a prevailing indisposition to credit such tidings. Some derided the intelligence as mere idle rumour; others anticipated, at most, nothing more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years before. No one could

imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy with which she had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian conquest, nor the formidable armament presently about to start. Nevertheless, the Syracusan generals thought it their duty to strengthen the military condition of the state.

Hermokratês, however, whose information was more complete, judged these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public assembly—held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were starting from Peiræus—to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city should be put in immediate condition for repelling a most formidable invasion, he deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the firmest assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive them into hearty defensive co-operation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed did any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Greece, by which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations, however, both effective and immediate, were indispensable, not merely at home, but by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and Italian Greeks—to the Sikels—and to the Carthaginians, who had for some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of Athens, and whose immense wealth would now be especially serviceable—and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in Sicily, as well as renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he (Hermokratês) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organized, that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two months' provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbour of Tarentum, from whence they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic Gulf from Korkyra. The Syracusans would probably be able to deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition until winter approached: in which case, Nikias, the ablest of the three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme against his own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext to return.

Though these opinions of Hermokratês were espoused farther by various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of speakers placed little faith in his warnings. We have already noticed Hermokratês nine years before as envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela—then, as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in Sicily—then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and of sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution. Though there was nothing, in the words of Hermokratês himself, disparaging either to the democracy or to the existing magistrates, yet it would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have exaggerated that which he characterized as the 'habitual quiescence' of the Syracusans into contemptible remissness and disorganization under those administrators whom the democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers who, in replying to Hermokratês and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations, a citizen named Athenagoras was the most distinguished. He was at this

time the leading democratical politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.

'The tales which you have just heard are nothing better than fabrications, got up to alarm you. You will be too wise to take measure of the future from their reports: you will rather judge from what able men such as the Athenians are likely to do. Be assured that they will never leave behind them the Peloponnesians in menacing attitude, to come hither and court a fresh war not less formidable: indeed I think they account themselves lucky that we with our powerful cities have never come across to attack them. And if they *should* come, as it is pretended—they will find Sicily a more formidable foe than Peloponnesus: nay, our own city alone will be a match for twice the force which they can bring across. The Athenians, knowing all this well enough, will mind their own business; in spite of all the fictions which men on this side of the water conjure up in order to terrify you and get themselves nominated to the chief posts. One of these days, I fear they may even succeed, from our want of precautions. Such intrigues leave but short moments of tranquillity to our city: they condemn it to an intestine discord worse than foreign war, and have sometimes betrayed it even to despots and usurpers. Let me ask, indeed, what is it that you younger nobles covet? To get into command at your early age? The law forbids you, because you are yet incompetent. Or do you wish not to be under equal laws with the many? But how can you pretend that citizens of the same city should not have the same rights? Someone will tell me that democracy is neither intelligent nor just, and that the rich are the persons best fitted to command. But I affirm, first, that the people are the sum total, and the oligarchy merely a fraction; next, that rich men are the best trustees of the aggregate wealth existing in the community—intelligent men, the best counsellors—and the multitude, the best qualified for hearing and deciding after such advice. In a democracy, these functions, one and all, find their proper place. But oligarchy, though imposing on the multitude a full participation in all hazards, is not content even with an exorbitant share in the public advantages, but grasps and monopolizes the whole for itself.'

Immediately after this vehement speech from Athenagoras, one of the *Stratēgi* who presided in the assembly interposed, abruptly closing the assembly with these few words: 'We generals deprecate this interchange of personal vituperation, and trust that the hearers present will not suffer themselves to be biassed by it. Let us rather take care, in reference to the reports just communicated, that we be one and all in a condition to repel the invader. And even should the necessity not arise, there is no harm in strengthening our public force with horses, arms, and the other muniments of war. *We* generals shall take upon ourselves the care and supervision of these matters, as well as of the missions to neighbouring cities, for procuring information and for other objects. We have indeed already busied ourselves for the purpose, and we shall keep you informed of what we learn.'

The language of Athenagoras lets us somewhat into the real working of politics among the Syracusan democracy. Athenagoras at Syracuse was like Kleon at Athens—the popular orator of the city. But he was by no means the most influential person, nor had he the principal direction of

public affairs. Executive and magisterial functions belonged chiefly to Hermokratès and his partisans, the opponents of Athenagoras. Hermokratès has already appeared as taking the lead at the congress of Gela nine years before, and will be seen throughout the coming period almost constantly in the same position; while the political rank of Athenagoras is more analogous to that which we should call a leader of opposition—a function of course suspended under pressing danger, so that we hear of him no more. At Athens as at Syracuse, the men who got the real power, and handled the force and treasures of the state, were chiefly of the rich families—often of oligarchical sentiments, acquiescing in the democracy as an uncomfortable necessity, and continually open to be solicited by friends or kinsmen to conspire against it. Their proceedings were doubtless always liable to the scrutiny, and their persons to the animadversion, of the public assembly: hence arose the influence of the demagogue, such as Athenagoras and Kleon—the bad side of whose character is so constantly kept before the readers of Grecian history. By whatever disparaging epithets such character may be surrounded, it is in reality the distinguishing feature of a free government under all its forms—whether constitutional monarchy or democracy. By the side of the real political actors, who hold principal office and wield personal power, there are always abundant censors and critics—some better, others worse, in respect of honesty, candour, wisdom, or rhetoric—the most distinguished of whom acquires considerable importance, though holding a function essentially inferior to that of the authorized magistrate or general.

We observe here that Athenagoras, far from being inclined to push the city into war, is averse to it even beyond reasonable limit; and denounces it as the interested policy of the oligarchical party. This may show how little it was any constant interest or policy on the part of the so-called demagogues to involve their city in unnecessary war. The oligarchical party were the usual promoters of war, a fact which we should naturally expect, seeing that the rich and great, in most communities, have accounted the pursuit of military glory more conformable to their dignity than any other career¹. That the imputations advanced by Athenagoras against the oligarchical youth, of promoting military organization with a view to their own separate interest, were not visionary, may be seen by the analogous case of Argos, two or three years before.

Even before the debate here adverted to, the Syracusan generals had evidently acted upon views more nearly approaching to those of Hermokratès than to those of Athenagoras. Already alive to the danger, and apprised by their scouts when the Athenian armament was passing from Korkyra to Rhegium, they pushed their preparations with the utmost activity, distributing garrisons and sending envoys among their Sikeli dependencies, while the force within the city was mustered and placed under all the conditions of war.

The halt of the Athenians at Rhegium afforded increased leisure for such equipment. That halt was prolonged for more than one reason. In the first place, Nikias and his colleagues wished to negotiate with the Rhegines, as well as to haul ashore and clean their ships: next, they awaited the return

¹ On the other hand, we should remember that the burden of war-taxes fell mainly on the shoulders of the well-to-do. Provided the food-supply remained assured, the proletariat had

little or nothing to lose by a state of war: in fact, it had much to gain by the commissioning of large armaments. Cf. p. 518, note.—Ed.

of the three scout-ships from Egesta : lastly, they had as yet formed no plan of action in Sicily.

The ships from Egesta returned with disheartening news. Instead of the abundant wealth which had been held forth as existing in that town, and upon which the resolutions of the Athenians as to Sicilian operations had been mainly grounded, it turned out that no more than thirty talents in all could be produced. Disappointed in the source from whence they had calculated on obtaining money—for it appears that both Alkibiadês and Lamachus had sincerely relied on the pecuniary resources of Egesta, though Nikias was always mistrustful—the generals now discussed their plan of action.

Nikias wished to circumscribe his range of operations within the rigorous letter of the vote which the Athenian assembly had passed. He proposed to sail at once against Selinus ; then, formally to require the Egestæans to provide the means of maintaining the armament, or, at least, of maintaining those sixty triremes which they themselves had solicited. Since this requisition would not be realized, he would only tarry long enough to obtain from the Selinuntines some tolerable terms of accommodation with Egesta, and then return home, exhibiting, as they sailed along, to all the maritime cities, this great display of Athenian naval force. And while he would be ready to profit by any opportunity which accident might present for serving the Leontines or establishing new alliances, he strongly deprecated any prolonged stay in the island for speculative enterprises¹.

Against this scheme Alkibiadês protested, as narrow, timid, and disgraceful to the prodigious force with which they had been entrusted. He proposed to begin by opening negotiations with all the other Sicilian Greeks—especially Messênê, convenient both as harbour for their fleet and as base of their military operations—to prevail upon them to co-operate against Syracuse and Selinus. With the same view, he recommended establishing relations with the Sikels of the interior, in order to detach such of them as were subjects of Syracuse, as well as to ensure supplies of provisions. As soon as it had been thus ascertained what extent of foreign aid might be looked for, he would open direct attack forthwith against Syracuse and Selinus ; unless indeed the former should consent to re-establish Leontini, and the latter to come to terms with Egesta.

Lamachus, delivering his opinion last, advised that they should proceed at once to attack Syracuse, and fight their battle under its walls. The Syracusans (he urged) were now only half-prepared for defence. Many of their citizens, and much property, would be found still lingering throughout the neighbouring lands, and might thus be seized for the subsistence of their army² ; while the deserted town and harbour of Megara, very near to Syracuse both by land and by sea, might be occupied by the fleet as a naval station. The imposing and intimidating effect of the armament, not less than its real efficiency, was now at the maximum. If advantage were taken of this first impression to take an instant blow at their principal enemy, the Syracusans would be found destitute of the courage, not less than of the means, to resist. As for the other Sicilian cities, nothing would contribute so much to determine their immediate adhesion, as successful operations against Syracuse.

¹ Thukyd., vi. 47 ; Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 14.

² Compare Thukyd., iv. 104—describing the surprise of Amphipolis by Brasidas.

But Lamachus found no favour with either of the other two, and being thus compelled to choose between the plans of Alkibiadês and Nikias, gave his support to that of the former—which was the mean term of the three. There can be no doubt—as far as it is becoming to pronounce respecting that which never reached execution—that the plan of Lamachus was far the best and most judicious, at first sight indeed the most daring, but intrinsically the safest, easiest, and speediest, that could be suggested. For undoubtedly the siege and capture of Syracuse was the one enterprise indispensable towards the promotion of Athenian views in Sicily. The sooner that was commenced, the more easily it would be accomplished : and its difficulties were in many ways aggravated, in no way abated, by those preliminary precautions upon which Alkibiadês insisted. Anything like delay tended fearfully to impair the efficiency, real as well as reputed, of an ancient aggressive armament, and to animate as well as to strengthen those who stood on the defensive—a point on which we shall find painful evidence presently. Unfortunately, Lamachus, though the ablest soldier of the three, was a poor man, of no political position, and little influence among the hoplites. Had he possessed, along with his own straightforward military energy, the wealth and family ascendancy of either of his colleagues, the achievements as well as the fate of this splendid armament would have been entirely altered, and the Athenians would have entered Syracuse, not as prisoners, but as conquerors.

Alkibiadês, as soon as his plan had become adopted, sailed across the strait in his own trireme from Rhegium to Messênê. Though admitted personally into the city and allowed to address the public assembly, he could not induce them to conclude any alliance, or to admit the armament to anything beyond a market of provisions without the walls. He accordingly returned back to Rhegium, from whence he and one of his colleagues immediately departed with sixty triremes for Naxos. The Naxians cordially received the armament, which then steered southward along the coast of Sicily to Katana. In the latter place the leading men and the general sentiment were at this time favourable to Syracuse, so that the Athenians, finding admittance refused, were compelled to sail farther southward. On the ensuing day they made sail with their ships in single column immediately in front of Syracuse itself, while an advanced squadron of ten triremes were even despatched into the Great Harbour, south of the town, for the purpose of surveying on this side the city with its docks and fortifications, and for the farther purpose of proclaiming from shipboard by the voice of the herald—‘The Leontines now in Syracuse arê hereby invited to come forth without apprehension and join their friends and benefactors, the Athenians’. After this empty display, they returned back to Katana.

At Katana, Alkibiadês personally was admitted into the town, and allowed to open his case before the public assembly, as he had been at Messênê. Accident alone enabled him to carry his point—for some Athenian soldiers without, observing a postern-gate carelessly guarded, broke it open, and showed themselves in the market-place. The town was thus in the power of the Athenians, so that the leading men who were friends of Syracuse thought themselves lucky to escape in safety, while the general assembly came to a resolution accepting the alliance proposed by Alkibiadês. The whole Athenian armament was now con-

ducted from Rhegium to Katana, which was established as headquarters. Intimation was farther received from a party at Kamarina, that the city might be induced to join them, if the armament showed itself: accordingly the whole armament proceeded thither. But the Kamarinæans declined to admit the army, and declared that they would abide by the existing treaty, which bound them to receive at any time one single ship—but no more, unless they themselves should ask for it. The Athenians were therefore obliged to return to Katana. Passing by Syracuse, they landed near the city and ravaged some of the neighbouring lands. The Syracusan cavalry and light troops soon appeared, and a skirmish with trifling loss ensued, before the invaders retired to their ships.

Serious news awaited them on their return to Katana. They found the public ceremonial trireme, called the Salaminian, just arrived from Athens—the bearer of a formal resolution of the assembly, requiring Alkibiadês to come home and stand his trial for various alleged matters of irreligion combined with treasonable purposes.

This summons arose out of the mutilation of the Hermæ, and the inquiries instituted into the authorship of that deed, since the departure of the armament. The anxious sympathies connected with so large a body of departing citizens had for the moment suspended the alarm caused by that sacrilege. But it speedily revived, and the people could not rest without finding out by whom the deed had been done. Considerable rewards, 1,000 and even 10,000 drachms, were proclaimed to informers, of whom others soon appeared, in addition to the slave Andromachus before mentioned. A metic named Teukrus sent intimation to the [council] at Athens that he had himself been a party concerned in the recent sacrilege concerning the mysteries, as well as cognizant of the mutilation of the Hermæ—and that if impunity were guaranteed to him, he would come back and give full information. A vote of the [council] was immediately passed to invite him. He denounced by name eleven persons as having been concerned, jointly with himself, in the mock-celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and eighteen different persons, himself not being one, as the violators of the Hermæ. A woman named Agaristê, daughter of Alkmæonidês—these names bespeak her great rank and family in the city—deposed farther that Alkibiadês, Axiochus, and Adeimantus, had gone through a parody of the mysteries in a similar manner in the house of Charmidês¹.

Of the parties named in these different depositions, the greater number seem to have fled from the city at once; but all who remained were put into prison to stand future trial.

A large number of citizens, many of them of the first consideration in the city, were thus either lying in prison or had fled into exile. But the alarm went on increasing rather than diminishing. The people had heard only a succession of disclosures—all attesting a frequency of irreligious acts, calculated to insult and banish the local gods who protected their country and constitution—all indicating that there were many powerful citizens bent on prosecuting such designs, interpreted as treasonable—yet none communicating any full or satisfactory idea of the Hermokopid plot, of the real conspirators, or of their farther purposes. The enemy was among themselves, yet they knew not where to lay hands upon him.

¹ Andokides, *De Mysteriis*, §§ 14, 15, 35.

The public distraction was aggravated by Peisander and Chariklēs, who acted as commissioners of investigation, furious and unprincipled politicians¹, at that time professing exaggerated attachment to the democratical constitution, though we shall find both of them hereafter among the most unscrupulous agents in its subversion. These men loudly proclaimed that the facts disclosed indicated the band of Hermokopid conspirators to be numerous, with an ulterior design of speedily putting down the democracy. They insisted on pressing their investigations until full discovery should be attained.

It was amidst such eager thirst for discovery, that a new informer appeared, Diokleidēs—who professed to communicate some material facts connected with the mutilation of the Hermæ, affirming that the authors of it were three hundred in number.

Such (according to the report of Andokidēs²) was the story of this informer, which he concluded by designating forty-two individuals, out of the three hundred whom he had seen. The first names whom he specified were those of Mantitheus and Aphepsion, two [councillors] actually sitting among his audience. Next came the remaining forty, among whom were Andokidēs and many of his nearest relatives. But as there were a still greater number of names (assuming the total of three hundred to be correct) which Diokleidēs was unable to specify, the commissioner Peisander proposed that Mantitheus and Aphepsion should be at once seized and tortured, in order to force them to disclose their accomplices; the Psephism passed in the archonship of Skamandrius, whereby it was unlawful to apply the torture to any free Athenian, being first abrogated. Illegal, not less than cruel, as this proposition was, the [council] at first received it with favour. But Mantitheus and Aphepsion, casting themselves as suppliants upon the altar in the senate-house, pleaded so strenuously for their rights as citizens, to be allowed to put in bail and stand trial before the Dikastery, that this was at last granted³. No sooner had they provided their sureties, than they broke their covenant, mounted their horses, and deserted to the enemy. This sudden flight, together with the news that a Boëtian force was assembled on the borders of Attica, exasperated still farther the frantic terror of the public mind. The [council] at once took quiet measures for seizing and imprisoning all the remaining forty whose names had been denounced; while by concert with the Stratēgi, all the citizens were put under arms. The [council] itself remained all night in the acropolis, except the Prytanes (or fifty [councillors])

¹ Andokid., *De Myst.*, § 36. ² *Ibid.*, §§ 37-42.

³ We must recollect that the Athenians admitted the principle of the torture, as a good mode of eliciting truth as well as of testing depositions—for they applied it often to the testimony of slaves—sometimes apparently to that of metics. Their attachment to the established law, which forbade the application of it to citizens, must have been very great, to enable them to resist the great, special and immediate temptation to apply it in this case to Mantitheus and Aphepsion, if only by way of exception.

The application of torture to witnesses and suspected persons, handed down from the Roman law, was in like manner recognised, and pervaded nearly all the criminal jurisprudence of Europe until the last century. I could wish to induce the reader, after having gone through the painful narrative of the proceedings of the Athenians concerning the mutilation of the Hermæ, to peruse by way of

comparison the *Storia della Colonna Infame* by the eminent Alexander Manzoni, author of *I Promessi Sposi*. It lays open the judicial enormities committed at Milan in 1630, while the terrible pestilence was raging there, by the examining judges and the senate, in order to get evidence against certain suspected persons called *Untori*, that is, men who were firmly believed by the population to be causing and propagating the pestilence by means of certain ointment which they applied to the doors and walls of houses. The reader will understand, from Manzoni's narrative, the degree to which public excitement and alarm can operate to poison and barbarize the course of justice in a Christian city, without a taint of democracy, and with professional lawyers and judges to guide the whole procedure secretly—as compared with a pagan city, ultra-democratical, where judicial procedure as well as decision was all oral, public, and multitudinous.

of the presiding tribe) who passed the night in the public building called the Tholus. Every man in Athens felt the terrible sense of an internal conspiracy on the point of breaking out, perhaps along with an invasion of the foreigner—prevented only by the timely disclosure of Diokleidēs, who was hailed as the saviour of the city, and carried in procession to dinner at the Prytaneum¹.

Miserable as the condition of the city was generally, yet more miserable was that of the prisoners confined. At last Charmidēs, one of the parties confined, addressed himself to Andokidēs as his cousin and friend, imploring him to make a voluntary disclosure of all that he knew, in order to preserve the lives of so many innocent persons his immediate kinsmen, as well as to rescue the city out of a feverish alarm not to be endured. Such instances on the part of Charmidēs, aided by the supplications of the other prisoners present, overcame the reluctance of Andokidēs to become informer, and he next day made his disclosures to the senate. 'Euphilētus (he said) was the chief author of the mutilation of the Hermæ. He proposed the deed at a convivial party where I was present—but I denounced it in the strongest manner and refused all compliance. Presently I broke my collar-bone and injured my head, by a fall from a young horse, so badly as to be confined to my bed; when Euphilētus took the opportunity of my absence to assure the rest of the company falsely that I had consented, and that I had agreed to cut the Hermes near my paternal house, which the tribe Ægeïs have dedicated. Accordingly they executed the project while I was incapable of moving, without my knowledge: they presumed that I would undertake the mutilation of this particular Hermes—and you see that this is the only one in all Athens which has escaped injury.'

Having recounted this tale (in substance) to the senate, Andokidēs tendered his slaves, both male and female, to be tortured, in order that they might confirm his story. It appears that the torture was actually applied (according to the custom so cruelly frequent at Athens in the case of slaves), and that the [councillors] thus became satisfied of the truth of what Andokidēs affirmed. He mentioned twenty-two names of citizens as having been the mutilators of the Hermæ. Eighteen of these names, including Euphilētus and Melētus, had already been specified in the information of Teukrus; the remaining four were, Panætius, Diakritus, Lysistratus, and Chæredēmus—all of whom fled the instant that their names were mentioned, without waiting the chance of being arrested. As soon as the [council] heard the story of Andokidēs, they proceeded to question Diokleidēs over again; he confessed that he had given a false deposition, and begged for mercy. Diokleidēs was sent before the dikastery for trial, and put to death².

The foregoing is the story which Andokidēs, in the oration *De Mysteriis* delivered between fifteen and twenty years afterwards, represented himself to have communicated to the senate at this perilous crisis. But it probably is not the story which he really did tell—certainly not that which his enemies represented him as having told: least of all does it communicate the whole truth, or afford any satisfaction to such anxiety and alarm as are described to have been prevalent at the time. Nor does it accord

¹ Andokid., *De Myst.*, §§ 41-46.

² The narrative, which I have here given in sub-

stance, is to be found in Andokid., *De Myst.*, §§ 48-66.

with the brief intimation of Thukydides, who tells us that Andokides impeached himself along with others as participant in the mutilation¹. We may be sure, therefore, that the tale which Andokides really told was something very different from what now stands in his oration. But what it really was, we cannot make out. Nor should we gain much, even if it could be made out—since even at the time neither Thukydides nor other intelligent critics could determine how far it was true. The mutilation of the Hermæ remained to them always an unexplained mystery, though they accounted Andokides the principal organizer².

That which is at once most important and most incontestable, is the effect produced by the revelations of Andokides, true or false, on the public mind at Athens. He was a young man of rank and wealth in the city, belonging to the sacred family of the Kerykes—said to trace his pedigree to the hero Odysseus—and invested on a previous occasion with an important naval command; whereas the preceding informers had been metics and slaves. Moreover he was making confession of his own guilt. Hence the people received his communications with implicit confidence. They were so delighted to have got to the bottom of the terrible mystery, that the public mind subsided from its furious terrors into comparative tranquillity. All the prisoners in custody on suspicion, except those against whom Andokides informed, were forthwith released: those who had fled out of apprehension, were allowed to return; while those whom he named as guilty, were tried, convicted, and put to death. And though discerning men were not satisfied with the evidence upon which these sentences were pronounced, yet the general public fully believed themselves to have punished the real offenders. Andokides himself was pardoned, and was for the time an object, apparently, even of public gratitude. But the character of a statue-breaker and an informer could never be otherwise than odious at Athens. Andokides was either banished by the indirect effect of a general disqualifying decree; or at least found that he had made so many enemies, and incurred so much obloquy, by his conduct in this affair, as to make it necessary for him to quit the city. He remained in banishment for many years, and seems never to have got clear of the hatred which his conduct in this nefarious proceeding drew upon him³.

But the comfort arising out of these disclosures respecting the Hermæ was soon again disturbed. There still remained the various alleged profanations of the Eleusinian mysteries, which had not yet been investigated or brought to atonement, profanations the more sure to be pressed home, since the enemies of Alkibiades were bent upon turning them to his ruin. Among all the ceremonies of Attic religion, there was none more profoundly or universally revered than the mysteries of Eleusis.

¹ Thukyd., vi. 60.

To the same effect, see the hostile oration of [Lysias], *Contra Andokidem*, Or. vi., §§ 36, 37, 51; also Andokides himself, *De Mysteriis*, § 71; *De Reditu*, § 7.

If we may believe the Pseudo-Plutarch (*Vit. X. Orator.*, p. 834), Andokides had on a previous occasion been guilty of drunken irregularity and damaging a statue.

² Thukydides refuses even to mention the name of Andokides, and expresses himself with more than usual reserve about this dark transaction—as if he were afraid of giving offence to great Athenian families. The bitter feuds which it left

behind at Athens, for years afterwards, are shown in the two orations of Lysias and of Andokides. If the story of Didymus be true, that Thukydides after his return from exile to Athens died by a violent death (see *Biogr. Thucyd.*, p. xvii., ed. Arnold), it would seem probable that all his reserve did not protect him against private enmities arising out of his historical assertions.

³ See for evidence of these general positions respecting the circumstances of Andokides, the three Orations—Andokides, *De Mysteriis*—Andokides, *De Reditu Suo*—and [Lysias], *Contra Andokidem*.

Even the divulgation in words to the uninitiated, of that which was exhibited to the eye and ear of the assembly in the interior of the Eleusinian temple, was accounted highly criminal: much more the actual mimicry of these ceremonies for the amusement of a convivial party.

When we recollect how highly the Eleusinian mysteries were venerated by Greeks not born in Athens, and even by foreigners, we shall not wonder at the violent indignation excited in the Athenian mind by persons who profaned or divulged them, especially at a moment when their religious sensibilities had been so keenly wounded¹. It was about this same time² that a prosecution was instituted against the Melian philosopher Diagoras for irreligious doctrines. Having left Athens before trial, he was found guilty in his absence, and a reward was offered for his life.

Probably the privileged sacred families, connected with the mysteries, were foremost in calling for expiation from the state to the majesty of the two offended goddesses, and for punishment on the delinquents³. And the enemies of Alkibiadês, personal as well as political, found the opportunity favourable for reviving that charge against him which they had artfully suffered to drop before his departure to Sicily. The matter of fact alleged against him—the mock-celebration of these holy ceremonies—was not only in itself probable, but proved by reasonably good testimony against him and some of his intimate companions. Moreover, the overbearing insolence of demeanour habitual with Alkibiadês, so glaringly at variance with the equal restraints of democracy, enabled his enemies to impute to him not only irreligious acts, but anti-constitutional purposes, an association of ideas which was at this moment the more easily accredited, since his divulgation and parody of the mysteries did not stand alone, but was interpreted, in conjunction with the recent mutilation of the Hermæ, as a manifestation of the same anti-patriotic and irreligious feeling, if not part and parcel of the same treasonable scheme. And the alarm on this subject was now renewed by the appearance of a Lacedæmonian army at the isthmus, professing to contemplate some enterprise in conjunction with the Bœotians—a purpose not easy to understand, and presenting every appearance of being a cloak for hostile designs against Athens. So fully was this believed among the Athenians, that they took arms, and remained under arms one whole night. Moreover the party in Argos connected with Alkibiadês were just at this time suspected of a plot for the subversion of their own democracy; which still farther aggravated the presumptions against him, while it induced the Athenians to give up to the Argeian democratical government the oligarchical hostages taken from that town a few months before, in order that it might put those hostages to death, whenever it thought fit.

Such incidents materially aided the enemies of Alkibiadês in their unremitting efforts to procure his recall and condemnation. Among them were men very different in station and temper: Thessalus son of

¹ (Lysias), *Cont. Andokid.*, §§ 50, 51; Cornel. Nepos, *Alcib.*, c. 4. The expressions of Pindar (*Fragm.* 96) and of Sophoklès (*Fragm.* 58, Bruncè — (*Edip. Kolon.*, 1038) respecting the value of the Eleusinian mysteries are very striking: also Cicero, *Legg.*, ii. 14.

Horace will not allow himself to be under the same roof, or in the same boat, with anyone who has been guilty of divulging these mysteries (*Od.*, iii. 2, 26), much more than of deriding them.

The reader will find the fullest information about these ceremonies in the *Eleusinia*, forming the first treatise in the work of Lobeck called *Aglaophamus*. [See also Foucart, *Les Associations Religieuses chez les Grecs*, esp. pt. ii., ch. ix., pp. 55-66.—Ed.]

² Diodor., xiii. 6.

³ We shall find these sacred families hereafter to be the most obstinate in opposing the return of Alkibiadês from banishment (Thukyd., viii. 53).

Kimón, a man of the highest lineage and of hereditary oligarchical politics—as well as Androklês, a leading demagogue or popular orator. It was the former who preferred against him in the senate the formal impeachment.

Similar impeachments being at the same time presented against other citizens now serving in Sicily along with Alkibiadês, the accusers moved that he and the rest might be sent for to come home and take their trial. Great care, however, was taken, in sending this summons, to avoid all appearance of harshness, or menace. The trierarch was forbidden to seize his person, and had instructions to invite him simply to accompany the Salaminian home in his own trireme, and thus avoid the hazard of offending the Argeian and Mantineian allies serving in Sicily, or the army itself¹.

We may be sure that Alkibiadês received private intimation from his friends at Athens, by the same trireme, communicating to him the temper of the people; so that his resolution was speedily taken. Professing to obey, he departed in his own trireme on the voyage homeward, along with the other persons accused, the Salaminian trireme being in company. But as soon as they arrived at Thurii in coasting along Italy, he and his companions quitted the vessel and disappeared. Both Alkibiadês and the rest of the accused were condemned to death on non-appearance, and their property confiscated.

Probably his disappearance and exile were acceptable to his enemies at Athens: at any rate, they thus made sure of getting rid of him, while had he come back, his condemnation to death, though probable, could not be regarded as certain. In considering the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, we have to remark, that the people were guilty of no act of injustice. He had committed—at least there was fair reason for believing that he had committed—an act criminal in the estimation of every Greek—the divulcation and profanation of the mysteries. The same demand for legal punishment would have been supposed to exist in a Christian Catholic country, down to a very recent period of history—if instead of the Eleusinian mysteries we suppose the Sacrifice of the Mass to have been the ceremony ridiculed; though such a proceeding would involve no breach of obligation to secrecy. Nor ought we to judge what would have been the measure of penalty formerly awarded to a person convicted of such an offence, by consulting the tendency of penal legislation during the last sixty years. Even down to the last century it would have been visited with something sharper than the draught of hemlock, which is the worst that could possibly have befallen Alkibiadês at Athens—as we may see by the condemnation and execution of the Chevalier de la Barre at Abbeville in 1766. The uniform tendency of Christian legislation²,

¹ Plutarch (*Alkib.*, c. 22-33) says that it would have been easy for Alkibiadês to raise a mutiny in the army at Katana, had he chosen to resist the order for coming home. But this is highly improbable. Considering what his conduct became immediately afterwards, we shall see good reason to believe that he *would* have taken this step, had it been practicable.

² I transcribe the following extract from a work of authority on French criminal jurisprudence—Jousse, *Traité de la Justice Criminelle*, Paris, 1771, part iv., tit. 46, n. 5, 8, 10, 11, vol. iv., pp. 97-99: '... La peine du Sacrilege, par l'Ancien Testament, étoit celle du feu, et d'être lapidé.—Par les Loix Romaines, les coupables, étoient condamnés au fer, au feu, et aux bêtes farouches, suivant les circonstances.—En France, la peine du sacrilège

est arbitraire, et dépend de la qualité et des circonstances du crime, du lieu, du temps, et de la qualité de l'accusé.—Dans le sacrilège au premier chef, qui attaque la Divinité, la Sainte Vierge, et les Saints, v. g. à l'égard de ceux qui foulent aux pieds les saintes Hosties, ou qui les jettent à terre, ou en abusent, et qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes, la peine est le feu, l'amende honorable, et le poing coupé. Il en est de même de ceux qui profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux; ceux qui, en dérision de nos Mystères, s'en moquent et les contrefont dans leurs débauches: ils doivent être punis de peine capitale, parceque ces crimes attaquent immédiatement la Divinité.'

M. Jousse proceeds to cite several examples of persons condemned to death for acts of sacrilege, of the nature above described.

down to a recent period, leaves no room for reproaching the Athenians with excessive cruelty in their penal visitation of offences against the religious sentiment. On the contrary, the Athenians are distinguished for comparative mildness and tolerance, as we shall find various opportunities for remarking.

It is among the darkest chapters of Athenian political history, indicating, on the part of the people, strong religious excitability, without any injustice towards Alkibiadês: but indicating, on the part of his enemies, as well as of the Hermokopids generally, a depth of wicked contrivance rarely paralleled in political warfare. It is to these men, not to the people, that Alkibiadês owes his expulsion, aided indeed by the effect of his own previous character. In regard to the Hermæ, the Athenians condemned to death a small number of men who may perhaps have been innocent victims, but whom they sincerely believed to be guilty. In regard to Alkibiadês, they came to no collective resolution, except that of recalling him to take his trial, a resolution implying no wrong in those who voted for it, whatever may be the guilt of those who proposed and prepared it by perfidious means¹.

In order to appreciate the desperate hatred with which the exile Alkibiadês afterwards revenged himself on his countrymen, it has been necessary to explain to what extent he had just ground of complaint against them. On being informed that they had condemned him to death in his absence, he is said to have exclaimed, 'I shall show them that I am alive'. He fully redeemed his word².

The recall and consequent banishment of Alkibiadês was mischievous to Athens in several ways. It transferred to the enemy's camp an angry exile, to make known her weak points, and to rouse the sluggishness of Sparta. It offended a portion of the Sicilian armament—most of all probably the Argeians and Mantineians—and slackened their zeal in the cause. And what was worst of all, it left the armament altogether under the paralysing command of Nikias. For Lamachus, though still equal in nominal authority, and now invested with the command of one-half instead of one-third of the army, appears to have had no real influence

¹ The proceedings in England in 1678 and 1679, in consequence of the pretended Popish Plot, have been alluded to by various authors and recently by Dr. Thirlwall, as affording an analogy to that which occurred at Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ. But there are many material differences, and all, so far as I can perceive, to the advantage of Athens.

The plot of the Popish Recusants started from no real fact: the whole of it was a tissue of falsehoods and fabrications proceeding from Oates, Bedloe, and a few other informers of the worst character.

At Athens, there was unquestionably a plot: the Hermokopids were real conspirators, not few in number. No one could doubt that they conspired for other objects besides the mutilation of the Hermæ. At the same time, no one knew what these objects were, nor who the conspirators themselves were.

If before the mutilation of the Hermæ, a man like Oates had pretended to reveal to the Athenian people a fabricated plot implicating Alkibiadês and others, he would have found no credence. It was not until after and by reason of that terror-striking incident, that the Athenians began to give credence to informers. And we are to recollect that they did not put anyone to death on the

evidence of these informers. They contented themselves with imprisoning on suspicion, until they got the confession and deposition of Andokidês. Now Andokidês, as a witness, deserves but very qualified confidence: yet it is impossible to degrade him to the same level even as Teukrus or Diokleidês—much less to that of Oates and Bedloe.

As for the condemnation of Alkibiadês and others for profaning and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries, these are not for a moment to be put upon a level with the condemnations in the Popish Plot. These were true charges: at least there is strong presumptive reason for believing that they were true. The enormity of the Popish Plot consisted in punishing persons for acts which they had not done, and upon depositions of the most lying and worthless witnesses.

The state of mind into which the Athenians were driven after the cutting of the Hermæ, was indeed very analogous to that of the English people during the circulation of the Popish Plot. The suffering, terror, and distraction, I apprehend to have been even greater at Athens: but while the cause of it was graver and more real, nevertheless the active injustice which it produced was far less than in England.

² Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 22.

except in the field, or in the actual execution of that which his colleague had already resolved.

The armament now proceeded—as Nikias had first suggested—to sail round from Katana to Selinus and Egesta. Passing through the strait and along the north coast of the island, he first touched at Himera, where admittance was refused to him; he next captured a Sikanian maritime town named Hykkara, together with many prisoners. Having handed over this place to the Egestæans, Nikias went in person to inspect their condition, but could obtain no more money than the thirty talents which had been before announced on the second visit of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners from Hykkara to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of 120 talents, and conducted the Athenian land-force across the centre of the island, through the territory of the friendly Sikels to Katana, making an attack in his way upon the hostile Sikel town of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by his naval force.

It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at Rhegium; during which period they had achieved nothing beyond the acquisition of Naxos and Katana as allies, except the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxos and Katana, as Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias, together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant. What is still worse in reference to the character of the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but nothing serious had been attempted. The mass of Syracusan citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus and other cities, called upon their generals to lead them to the attack of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare to approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of restoring the Leontines. Nikias, compelled to strike a blow for the maintenance of his own reputation, devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry—informing himself as to the ground near the city through some exiles serving along with him¹.

He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen in his heart attached to Athens, as bearer of a pretended proposition from the friends of Syracuse at Katana. Many of the Athenian soldiers (so the message ran) were in the habit of passing the night within the walls apart from their camp and arms. It would be easy for the Syracusans by a vigorous attack at daybreak, to surprise them thus unprepared and dispersed; while the philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised to aid, by closing the gates, assailing the Athenians within and setting fire to the ships.

Accordingly the entire Syracusan force was marched out, and encamped within about eight miles of Katana. But Nikias, choosing this same day to put on shipboard his army, together with his Sikel allies present, sailed by night southward along the coast, rounding the island of Ortygia, into the Great Harbour of Syracuse². Arrived thither by break of day, he

¹ Thukyd., vi. 63; Diodor., xiii. 6.

² Thukyd., vi. 65, 66; Diodor., xiii. 6; Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 13.

To understand the position of Nikias, as well as

it can be made out from the description of Thukydides, the reader will consult the plan of Syracuse and its neighbourhood contained, *e.g.*, in J. B. Bury's *History of Greece*.—Ed.

disembarked his troops unopposed south of the mouth of the Anâpus, in the interior of the Great Harbour. Having broken down the neighbouring bridge, he took up a position protected by various obstacles, so that he could choose his own time for fighting, and was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of his ships on the shore, he provided a palisade work by cutting down the neighbouring trees. He had full leisure for such defensive works, since the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb him, while the Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre on arriving before the lines at Katana. Such was the confidence of the Syracusans, however, that even after so long a march, they offered battle forthwith: but as Nikias did not quit his position, they retreated to take up their night-station on the other side of the Helôrine road.

On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his position and formed his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each eight deep. His front division was intended to attack; his rear division (in hollow square with the baggage in the middle) was held in reserve near the camp to lend aid where aid might be wanted: cavalry there was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more numerous than his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without any selection; they were ranged in the deeper order of sixteen, alongside of their Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were posted their horsemen, the best part of their force, not less than 1,200 in number, together with 200 horsemen from Gela, 20 from Kamarina, about 50 bowmen, and a company of darters. The hoplites had little training, and their array, never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther disturbed by the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to see their families—others, hurrying out to join, found the battle already begun, and took rank wherever they could.

Presently the trumpets sounded, and Nikias ordered his first division of hoplites to charge at once rapidly, before the Syracusans expected it. The shock was bravely encountered on both sides, and for some time the battle continued hand to hand with undecided result. There happened to supervene a violent storm of rain with thunder and lightning, which alarmed the Syracusans, while to the more practised Athenian hoplites, it seemed a mere phenomenon of the season. At length the Syracusan army dispersed, and fled, first, before the Argeians on the right, next, before the Athenians in the centre. The victors pursued as far as was safe and practicable, without disordering their ranks, for the Syracusan cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, checked all who pressed forward, and enabled their own infantry to retire in safety behind the Helôrine road. The Syracusans and their allies lost 250 men, the Athenians 50.

On the morrow Nikias re-embarked his troops, and sailed back to his former station at Katana. He conceived it impossible, without cavalry and a farther stock of money, to maintain his position near Syracuse or to prosecute immediate operations of siege or blockade. And as the winter was now approaching, he determined to take up winter quarters at Katana—though considering the mild winter at Syracuse, and the danger of marsh fever near the Great Harbour in summer, the change of season might well be regarded as a questionable gain. But he proposed to employ the interval in sending to Athens for cavalry and money, as well as in procuring the like reinforcements from his Sicilian allies, whose

numbers he calculated now on increasing by the accession of new cities after his recent victory—and to get together magazines of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the spring. Despatching a trireme to Athens with these requisitions, he sailed with his forces to Messênê, within which there was a favourable party who gave hopes of opening the gates to him. Such a correspondence had already been commenced before the departure of Alkibiadês : but it was the first act of revenge which the departing general took on his country, to betray the proceedings to the philo-Syracusan party in Messênê. Accordingly these latter, watching their opportunity, rose in arms before the arrival of Nikias, put to death their chief antagonists, and held the town by force against the Athenians, who after a fruitless delay of thirteen days were forced to return to Naxos, where they established a palisaded camp and station, and went into winter quarters.

The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement into the harbour of Syracuse and the battle, had been ably planned and executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army, as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers themselves and to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. But as to other results, the victory was barren ; we may even say, positively mischievous, since it neither weakened nor humiliated the Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. All the difficulties and dangers to be surmounted in Sicily had been foreseen by himself and impressed upon the Athenians. He had thus been allowed to bring with him a force calculated upon his own ideas, together with supplies and implements for besieging ; yet when arrived, he seems only anxious to avoid exposing that force in any serious enterprise, and to find an excuse for conducting it back to Athens. Upon the formidable cavalry of the Syracusans, Nikias had himself insisted, in the preliminary debates. Yet the existence of this cavalry is made an excuse for a farther postponement of four months until reinforcements can be obtained from Athens. To all the intrinsic dangers of the case, predicted by Nikias himself with proper discernment, was thus superadded the aggravated danger of his own delay ; he frittered away the first impression of his armament—giving the Syracusans leisure to enlarge their fortifications—and allowing the Peloponnesians time to interfere against Attica as well as to succour Sicily.

Great indeed must have been the disappointment of the Athenians, when, after having sent forth in the month of June an expedition of unparalleled efficiency, they receive in the month of November a despatch to acquaint them that the general has accomplished little except one indecisive victory ; and that he has not even attempted anything serious—nor can do so unless they send him farther cavalry and money. Yet the only answer which they made was, to grant and provide for this demand without any public expression of discontent or disappointment against him. And this is the more to be noted, since the removal of Alkibiadês afforded an inviting and even valuable opportunity for proposing to send out a fresh colleague in his room. If there were no complaints raised against Nikias at Athens, so neither are we informed of any such, even among his own soldiers in Sicily. We may remember that the delay of a few days at Eion, under perfectly justifiable circumstances, and while

awaiting the arrival of reinforcements actually sent for, raised the loudest murmurs against Kleon in his expedition against Amphipolis, from the hoplites in his own army. The contrast is instructive, and will appear yet more instructive as we advance forward.

Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of their recent defeat. At the next public assembly Hermokratês deprecated their want of tactics and discipline. He pressed them to diminish the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto been accustomed to nominate to the command—to reduce the number to three, conferring upon them at the same time fuller powers than had been before enjoyed, and swearing a solemn oath to leave them unfettered in the exercise of such powers—lastly, to enjoin upon these generals the most strenuous efforts, during the coming winter, for training and arming the whole population. Accordingly Hermokratês himself, with Herakleidês and Sikanus, were named to the command. Ambassadors were sent both to Sparta and to Corinth, for the purpose of entreating assistance in Sicily, as well as of prevailing on the Peloponnesians to recommence a direct attack against Attica.

But by far the most important measure which marked the nomination of the new generals was the enlargement of the line of fortifications at Syracuse. They constructed a new wall, enclosing an additional space and covering both their Inner and their Outer City to the westward—reaching from the Outer sea to the Great Harbour, across the whole space fronting the rising slope of the hill of Epipolæ—and stretching far enough westward to enclose the sacred precinct of Apollo Temenites. This was intended as a precaution, in order that if Nikias, resuming operations in the spring, should beat them in the field and confine them to their walls—he might nevertheless be prevented from carrying a wall of circumvallation from sea to sea without covering a great additional extent of ground. Besides this, the Syracusans fitted up and garrisoned the deserted town of Megara, on the coast to the north of Syracuse; they established a regular fortification in the temple of Zeus Olympius, which they had already garrisoned after the recent battle with Nikias; and they planted stakes in the sea to obstruct the convenient landing-places. But there was one farther precaution which the Syracusans omitted at this moment, when it was open to them without any hindrance—to occupy and fortify the Euryalus, or the summit of the hill of Epipolæ. Had they done this now, probably the Athenians could never have made progress with their lines of circumvallation.

Kamarina maintained an equivocal policy which made both parties hope to gain it; and in the course of this winter the Athenian envoy Euphêmus with others was sent thither to propose a renewal of that alliance, between the city and Athens, which had been concluded ten years before. Hermokratês the Syracusan went to counteract his object; and both of them, according to Grecian custom, were admitted to address the public assembly.

Hermokratês began by denouncing the views and past history of Athens. He did not (he said) fear her power, provided the Sicilian cities were united and true to each other: even against Syracuse alone, the hasty retreat of the Athenians after the recent battle had shown how little they confided in their own strength. What he did fear was the delusive

promises and insinuations of Athens, tending to disunite the island, and to paralyse all joint resistance. Every one knew that her purpose in this expedition was to subjugate all Sicily—that Leontini and Egesta served merely as convenient pretences to put forward—and that she could have no sincere sympathy for Chalkidians in Sicily, when she herself held in slavery the Chalkidians in Eubœa. The Sicilians could not too speedily show her that they were no Ionians, made to be transferred from one master to another, but autonomous Dorians from the centre of autonomy, Peloponnesus. Let not the Kamarinæans imagine that Athens was striking her blow at Syracuse alone: they were themselves next neighbours of Syracuse, and would be the first victims if she were conquered. The Dorians of Syracuse were assailed by their eternal enemies the Ionians, and ought not to be now betrayed by their own brother Dorians of Kamarina.

Euphêmus, in reply, explained the proceedings of Athens in reference to her empire. Though addressing a Dorian assembly, he did not fear to take his start from the position laid down by Hermokratês, that Ionians were the natural enemies of Dorians. Under this feeling, Athens, as an Ionian city, had looked about to strengthen herself against the supremacy of her powerful Dorian neighbours in Peloponnesus. Finding herself after the repulse of the Persian king at the head of those Ionians and other Greeks who had just revolted from him, she had made use of her position as well as of her superior navy to shake off the illegitimate ascendancy of Sparta. Her empire was justified by regard for her own safety against Sparta, as well as by the immense superiority of her maritime efforts in the rescue of Greece from the Persians. Even in reference to her allies, she had good ground for reducing them to subjection, because they had made themselves the instruments and auxiliaries of the Persian king in his attempt to conquer her. Prudential views for assured safety to herself had thus led her to the acquisition of her present empire, and the same views now brought her to Sicily. He was prepared to show that the interests of Kamarina were in full accordance with those of Athens. The main purpose of Athens in Sicily was to prevent her Sicilian enemies from sending aid to her Peloponnesian enemies—to accomplish which, powerful Sicilian allies were indispensable to her. To enfeeble or subjugate her Sicilian allies, would be folly: if she did this, they would not serve her purpose of keeping the Syracusans employed in their own island. Hence her desire to re-establish the expatriated Leontines, powerful and free, though she retained the Chalkidians in Eubœa as subjects. Near home she wanted nothing but subjects, disarmed and tribute-paying—while in Sicily, she required independent and efficient allies; so that the double conduct, which Hermokratês reproached as inconsistent, proceeded from one and the same root of public prudence. Pursuant to that motive, Athens dealt differently with her different allies according to the circumstances of each. Thus, she respected the autonomy of Chios and Methymna, and maintained equal relations with other islanders near Peloponnesus; and such were the relations which she now wished to establish in Sicily.

Syracuse was aiming at the acquisition of imperial sway over the island; and that which she had already done towards the Leontines showed what she was prepared to do, when the time came, against

Kamarina and others. It was under this apprehension that the Kamarinæans had formerly invited Athens into Sicily: it would be alike unjust and impolitic were they now to repudiate her aid, for she could accomplish nothing without them; if they did so on the present occasion, they would repent it hereafter when exposed to the hostility of a constant encroaching neighbour, and when Athenian auxiliaries could not again be had.

In these two speeches, we find Hermokratès renewing substantially the same line of counsel as he had taken up ten years before at the congress of Gela—to settle all Sicilian differences at home, and above all things to keep out the intervention of Athens, who if she once got footing in Sicily would never rest until she reduced all the cities successively. This was the natural point of view for a Syracusan politician; but by no means equally natural, nor equally conclusive, for an inhabitant of one of the secondary Sicilian cities—especially of the conterminous Kamarina. And the oration of Euphémus is an able pleading to demonstrate that the Kamarinæans had far more to fear from Syracuse than from Athens. His arguments to this point are at least highly plausible, if not convincing: but he seems to lay himself open to attack from the opposite quarter. If Athens cannot hope to gain any subjects in Sicily, what motive has she for interfering? This Euphémus meets by contending that if she does not interfere, the Syracusans and their allies will come across and render assistance to the enemies of Athens in Peloponnesus. It is manifest, however, that under the actual circumstances of the time, Athens could have no real fears of this nature, and that her real motives for meddling in Sicily were those of hope and encroachment, not of self-defence. But it shows how little likely such hopes were to be realized—and therefore how ill-advised the whole plan of interference in Sicily was—that the Athenian envoy could say to the Kamarinæans, in the same strain as Nikias had spoken at Athens when combating the wisdom of the expedition—‘Such is the distance of Sicily from Athens, and such the difficulty of guarding cities of great force and ample territory combined, that if we wished to hold you Sicilians as subjects, we should be unable to do it: we can only retain you as free and powerful allies’.

The Kamarinæans thought it safest to give an evasive answer, of friendly sentiment towards both parties, but refusal of aid to either.

For a city comparatively weak and situated like Kamarina, such was perhaps the least hazardous policy. In December 415 B.C., no human being could venture to predict how the struggle between Nikias and the Syracusans in the coming year would turn out; nor were the Kamarinæans prompted by any hearty feeling to take the extreme chances with either party. Matters had borne a different aspect indeed in the preceding month of July 415 B.C., when the Athenians first arrived. Had the vigorous policy urged by Lamachus been then followed up, the Athenians would always have appeared likely to succeed—if indeed they had not already become conquerors of Syracuse: so that waverers like the Kamarinæans would have remained attached to them from policy. The best way to obtain allies (Lamachus had contended) was to be prompt and decisive in action, and to strike at the capital point at once, while the intimidating effect of their arrival was fresh. Of the value of his advice, an emphatic illustration is afforded by the conduct of Kamarina.

Throughout the rest of the winter, Nikias did little or nothing. He

merely despatched envoys for the purpose of conciliating the interior, where the autonomous Sikels for the most part declared in his favour. Against some refractory tribes, Nikias sent detachments for purposes of compulsion; while the Syracusans on their part did the like to counteract him. As the spring approached, Nikias transferred his position from Naxos to Katana.

He farther sent a trireme to Carthage to invite coöperation from that city, and a second to the Tyrrhenian maritime cities on the southern coast of Italy, some of whom had proffered to him their services, as ancient enemies of Syracuse, and now realized their promises. From Carthage nothing was obtained. To the Sikels, Eggestæans, and all the other allies of Athens, Nikias also sent orders for bricks, iron bars, clamps, and everything suitable for the wall of circumvallation, which was to be commenced with the first burst of spring.

While such preparations were going on in Sicily, debates of portentous promise took place at Sparta. Immediately after the retreat of Nikias into winter quarters, the Syracusans had despatched envoys to Peloponnesus to solicit reinforcements. Here again, we are compelled to notice the lamentable consequences arising out of the inaction of Nikias. Had he commenced the siege of Syracuse on his first arrival, it may be doubted whether any such envoys would have been sent to Peloponnesus at all; at any rate, they would not have arrived in time to produce decisive effects. After exerting what influence they could upon the Italian Greeks, in their voyage, the Syracusan envoys reached Corinth, where they found the warmest reception and obtained promises of speedy succour. The Corinthians furnished envoys of their own to accompany them to Sparta, and to back their request for Lacedæmonian aid.

They found at the congress at Sparta another advocate upon whom they could not reasonably have counted—Alkibiadês. That exile had crossed over from Thurii to the Eleian port of Kyllênê in Peloponnesus in a merchant-vessel, and now appeared at Sparta on special invitation and safe-conduct from the Lacedæmonians, of whom he was at first vehemently afraid, in consequence of having raised against them that Peloponnesian combination which had given them so much trouble before the battle of Mantinea. He now appeared too, burning with hostility against his country, and eager to inflict upon her all the mischief in his power. Having been the chief evil genius to plunge her, mainly for selfish ends of his own, into this ill-starred venture, he was now about to do his best to turn it into her irreparable ruin. His fiery stimulus, and unmeasured exaggerations, supplied what was wanting in Corinthian and Syracusan eloquence, and inflamed the tardy goodwill of the Spartan Ephors into comparative decision and activity. His harangue in the Spartan congress is given to us by Thukydidês—who may possibly have heard it, as he was then himself in exile. I give here the substance, without professing to translate the words.

‘First, I must address you, Lacedæmonians, respecting the prejudices current against me personally, before I can hope to find a fair hearing on public matters. You know it was I, who renewed my public connection with Sparta, after my ancestors before me had quarrelled with you and renounced it. Moreover, I assiduously cultivated your favour on all points, especially by attentions to your prisoners at Athens: but while I

was showing all this zeal towards you, you took the opportunity of the peace which you made with Athens to employ my enemies as your agents. It was this conduct of yours which drove me to unite with the Argeians and Mantineians ; nor ought you to be angry with me for mischief which you thus drew upon yourselves. Probably some of you hate me too, without any good reason, as a forward partisan of democracy. My family were always opposed to the Peisistratid despots ; and as all opposition, to a ruling One or Few, takes the name of The People, so from that time forward we continued to act as leaders of the people. Moreover our established constitution was a democracy, so that I had no choice but to obey : though I did my best to maintain a moderate line of political conduct in the midst of the reigning licence. It was not my family, but others, who in former times as well as now, led the people into the worst courses—those same men who sent me into exile. For as to democracy, all we Athenians of common sense well knew its real character. Personally, I have better reason than anyone else to rail against it—if one *could* say anything new about such confessed folly ; but I did not think it safe to change the government, while you were standing by as enemies.

‘ So much as to myself personally : I shall now talk to you about the business of the meeting, and tell you something more than you yet know. Our purpose in sailing from Athens, was, first to conquer the Sicilian Greeks—next, the Italian Greeks—afterwards, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage herself. If all or most of this succeeded, we were then to attack Peloponnesus. We intended to bring to this enterprise the entire power of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, besides large numbers of Iberian and other warlike barbaric mercenaries, together with many new triremes built from the abundant forests of Italy, and large supplies both of treasure and provision. We could thus blockade Peloponnesus all round with our fleet, and at the same time assail it with our land-force ; and we calculated, by taking some towns by storm and occupying others as permanent fortified positions, that we should easily conquer the whole peninsula, and then become undisputed masters of Greece. You thus hear the whole scheme of our expedition from the man who knows it best ; and you may depend on it that the remaining generals will execute all this, if they can. Nothing but your intervention can hinder them. If Syracuse falls into the hands of the Athenians, all Sicily and all Italy will share the same fate ; and the danger which I have described will be soon upon you.

‘ It is not therefore simply for the safety of Sicily—it is for the safety of Peloponnesus—that I now urge you to send across, forthwith, a fleet with an army of hoplites as rowers ; and what I consider still more important than an army—a Spartan general to take the supreme command. Moreover, you must also carry on declared and vigorous war against Athens here, that the Syracusans may be encouraged to hold out, and that Athens may be in no condition to send additional reinforcements thither. You must farther fortify and permanently garrison Dekeleia in Attica¹ : that is the contingency of which the Athenians have always been most afraid.

¹ The establishment and permanent occupation of a fortified post in Attica had been contemplated by the Corinthians even before the beginning of the war (Thukyd., i. 122).

'None of you ought to think the worse of me because I make this vigorous onset upon my country in conjunction with her enemies. Nor ought you to mistrust my assurances as coming from the reckless passion of an exile. The worst enemies of Athens are not those who make open war like you, but those who drive her best friends into hostility. I loved my country while I was secure as a citizen—I love her no more, now that I am wronged. In fact, I do not conceive myself to be assailing a country still mine: I am rather trying to win back a country now lost to me. The real patriot is not he, who having unjustly lost his country, acquiesces in patience—but he whose ardour makes him try every means to regain her.'

Enormous consequences turned upon this speech—no less masterly in reference to the purpose and the audience, than infamous as an indication of the character of the speaker. He takes credit in his speech for moderation as opposed to the standing licence of democracy. But this is a pretence absurd even to extravagance, which Athenians of all parties would have listened to with astonishment. Such licence as that of Alkibiadēs himself had never been seen at Athens. As against himself, he had reason for accusing his political enemies of unworthy manœuvres, and even of gross political wickedness, if they were authors or accomplices in the mutilation of the Hermæ. But most certainly, their public advice to the commonwealth was far less mischievous than his.

If then that portion of the speech of Alkibiadēs, wherein he touches upon Athenian politics and his own past conduct, is not to be taken as historical evidence, just as little can we trust the following portion in which he professes to describe the real purposes of Athens in her Sicilian expedition. That any such vast designs as those which he announces were ever really contemplated even by himself and his immediate friends, is very improbable; that they were contemplated by the Athenian public, by the armament, or by Nikias, is utterly incredible. If Alkibiadēs had himself conceived at Athens the designs which he professed to reveal in his speech at Sparta, there can be little doubt that he would have espoused the scheme of Lamachus—or rather would have originated it himself. We find him indeed, in his speech delivered at Athens before the determination to sail, holding out hopes, that by means of conquests in Sicily, Athens might become mistress of all Greece. But this is there put as an alternative and as a favourable possibility. Alkibiadēs could not have ventured to promise, in his discourse at Athens, the results which he afterwards talked of at Sparta as having been actually contemplated. Had he put forth such promises, the charge of juvenile folly which Nikias urged against him would probably have been believed by everyone. His speech at Sparta, though it has passed with some as a fragment of true Grecian history, seems in truth little better than a gigantic romance, dressed up to alarm his audience¹.

Intended for this purpose, it was eminently suitable and effective. The Lacedæmonians had already been partly moved by the representations from Corinth and Syracuse, and were even prepared to send envoys to the latter place with encouragement to hold out against Athens. But the peace of Nikias, and the alliance succeeding it, still subsisted between Athens and Sparta. For this reason—as well as from the distance of

¹ Plutarch, *Alkibi.*, c. 17.

Sicily, great even in the estimation of the more nautical Athenians—the Ephors could not yet make up their minds to despatch thither any positive aid. It was exactly in this point of hesitation between the will and the deed, that the energetic and vindictive exile from Athens found them. His flaming picture of the danger impending—brought home to their own doors, and appearing to proceed from the best informed of all witnesses—overcame their reluctance at once; while he at the same time pointed out the precise steps whereby their interference would be rendered of most avail. The transfer of Alkibiadēs to Sparta thus reverses the superiority of force between the two contending chiefs of Greece—‘Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum’¹.

The Lacedæmonians forthwith resolved to send an auxiliary force to Syracuse. But as this could not be done before the spring, they nominated Gylippus commander, directing him to proceed thither without delay, and to take counsel with the Corinthians for operations as speedy as the case admitted². We do not know that Gylippus had as yet given any positive evidence of that consummate skill and activity which we shall presently be called upon to describe. He was probably chosen on account of his superior acquaintance with the circumstances of the Italian and Sicilian Greeks, since his father Kleandridas, after having been banished from Sparta fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war, for taking Athenian bribes, had been domiciliated as a citizen at Thurii. Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send immediately two triremes for him, to Asinē in the Messenian Gulf, and to prepare as many others as their docks could furnish.

CHAPTER XXIX [LIX]

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS—DOWN
TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES AND
THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENERAL WAR

THE Athenian troops at Katana were put in motion in the early spring, even before the arrival of the reinforcements from Athens, and sailed to Megara. Having in vain attacked the Syracusan garrison, they re-embarked, landed again for similar purposes at the mouth of the river Terias, and then, after an insignificant skirmish, returned to Katana. An expedition into the interior of the island procured for them the alliance of the Sikel town of Kentoripa; and the cavalry being now arrived from Athens, they prepared for operations against Syracuse. Nikias had received from Athens 250 horsemen fully equipped, for whom horses were to be procured in Sicily³—30 horse-bowmen and 300 talents in money. He was not long in furnishing them with horses from Egesta and Katana,

¹ Lucan, *Pharsal.*, iv. 819.

² Thukyd., vi. 93; Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 23; Diodor., xiii. 7.

³ Horses were so largely bred in Sicily, that they

even found their way into Attica and Central Greece—Sophoklēs, *Œd. Kolon.*, 312—

γυναιχ' ὁρῶ
Στείχουσιν ἡμῖν, ἄσπον, Αἰτναίας ἐνι
Πάλου βεβῶσαν.

from which cities he also received some farther cavalry—so that he was presently able to muster 650 cavalry in all.

Syracuse consisted at this time of two parts, an inner and an outer city. The former was comprised in the island of Ortygia, the original settlement founded by Archias, within which the modern city is at this moment included: the latter or outer city, afterwards known by the name of Achradina, occupied the high ground of the peninsula north of Ortygia, but does not seem to have joined the inner city, or to have been comprised in the same fortification. This outer city was defended, on the north and east, by the sea, with rocks presenting great difficulties of landing—and by a sea-wall; so that on these sides it was out of the reach of attack. Its wall on the land-side, beginning from the sea somewhat eastward of the entrance of the cleft now called Santa Bonagia or Panagia, ran in a direction westward of south as far as the termination of the high ground of Achradina, and then turned eastward along the stone quarries now known as those of the Capucins and Novanteris, where the ground is in part so steep, that probably little fortification was needed. This fortified high land of Achradina thus constituted the outer city; while the lower ground, situated between it and the inner city or Ortygia, seems at this time not to have been included in the fortifications of either, but was employed partly for religious processions, games, and other multitudinous ceremonies—partly for the burial of the dead, which, according to invariable Grecian custom, was performed without the walls of the city. Extensive catacombs yet remain to mark the length of time during which this ancient Nekropolis served its purpose.

Epipolæ was a triangle upon an inclined plane, of which Achradina was the base: to the north as well as to the south, it was suddenly broken off by lines of limestone cliff (forming the sides of the triangle), about fifteen or twenty feet high, and quite precipitous, except in some few openings made for convenient ascent. From the western point or apex of the triangle, the descent was easy and gradual towards the city, the interior of which was visible from this outer slope¹.

According to the warfare of that time, Nikias could only take Syracuse by building a wall of circumvallation so as to cut off its supplies by land and at the same time blockading it by sea. But during the many months of inaction which he had allowed, the Syracusans had greatly augmented the difficulties of his enterprise. They had constructed a new wall, covering both their inner and their outer city—stretching across the whole front which faced the slope of Epipolæ, from the Great Harbour to the opposite sea near Santa Bonagia. After it was finished, Nikias could not begin his blockade from the side of the Great Harbour, since he would have been obstructed by the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ. He was under the necessity of beginning his wall from a portion of the higher ground of Epipolæ, and of carrying it both along a greater space and higher up on the slope, until he touched the Great Harbour at a point farther removed from Ortygia.

Syracuse having thus become assailable only from the side of Epipolæ, the necessity so created for carrying on operations much higher up on the slope gave to the summit of that eminence a greater importance

¹ For the topography and the siege-works see map in J. B. Bury's *History of Greece* based on that in Freeman's *History of Sicily*. For the

contours see Italian staff maps and the plan in Baedeker's *Southern Italy* (9th ed., 1893); also the maps in Lupus's account of Syracuse.—ED.

than it had before possessed. Nikias, doubtless furnished with good local information by the exiles, seems to have made this discovery earlier than the Syracusan generals, who (having been occupied in augmenting their defences on another point where they were yet more vulnerable) did not make it until immediately before the opening of the spring campaign. It was at that critical moment that a chosen regiment of 600 hoplites was placed as garrison of Epipolæ. These men were intended to occupy the strong ground on the summit of the hill, and thus obstruct all the various approaches to it, seemingly not many in number, and all narrow.

But before they had yet left their muster, to march to the summit, intelligence reached them that the Athenians were already in possession of it. Nikias and Lamachus, putting their troops on board at Katana, had sailed during the preceding night to a landing-place not far from a place called Leon, which was only six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, and seems to have lain between Megara and the peninsula of Thapsus. Their hoplites immediately moved forward with rapid step to ascend Epipolæ, mounting seemingly from the north-east, so that they first reached the summit called Euryâlus, near the apex of the triangle above described. From hence they commanded the slope of Epipolæ beneath them and the town of Syracuse to the eastward. They were presently attacked by the Syracusans, who broke up their muster in the mead as soon as they heard the news. But when they hastened up to retake it, the rapid pace had so disordered their ranks, that the Athenians attacked them at great advantage, besides having the higher ground. The Syracusans were driven back to their city with loss, while the Athenians remained masters of the high ground of Euryâlus, as well as of the upper portion of the slope of Epipolæ.

This was a most important advantage—indeed seemingly essential to the successful prosecution of the siege.

On the next morning, Nikias and Lamachus marched their army down the slope of Epipolæ near to the Syracusan walls, and offered battle, which the enemy did not accept. They then withdrew the Athenian troops; after which their first operation was to construct a fort on the high ground called Labdalum, near the western end of the upper northern cliffs bordering Epipolæ, on the brink of the cliff, and looking northward towards Megara. This was intended as a place of security wherein both treasures and stores might be deposited, so as to leave the army unencumbered in its motions. The Athenian cavalry being now completed by the new arrivals from Egesta, Nikias descended from Labdalum to a new position lower down on Epipolæ, seemingly about midway between the northern and southern cliffs. He here constructed, with as much rapidity as possible, a walled enclosure, called the Circle, intended as a centre from whence the projected wall of circumvallation was to start northward towards the sea at Trogilus, southward towards the Great Harbour. Astounded at the rapidity with which the Athenians executed this construction¹, the Syracusans marched their forces out, and prepared to give battle in order to interrupt it. But when the Athenians, relinquishing the work, drew up on their side in battle order—the Syracusan generals were so struck with their manifest superiority in soldierlike array, as com-

¹ The Athenians seem to have surpassed all other Greeks in the diligence and skill with which

they executed fortifications: see some examples, Thukyd., v. 75-82; Xenoph., *Hellen.*, iv. 4, 18.

pared with the disorderly trim of their own ranks, that they withdrew their soldiers back into the city without venturing to engage, merely leaving a body of horse to harass the operations of the besiegers, and constrain them to keep in masses. The newly-acquired Athenian cavalry, however, were here brought for the first time into effective combat. With the aid of one tribe of their own hoplites, they charged the Syracusan horse, drove them off with some loss, and erected their trophy. This is the only occasion on which we read of the Athenian cavalry being brought into conflict, though Nikias had made the absence of cavalry the great reason for his prolonged inaction¹.

Interruption being thus checked, Nikias continued his blockading operations, first completing the Circle, then beginning his wall of circumvallation in a northerly direction from the Circle towards Trogilius. So strongly did Hermokratês feel the inferiority of the Syracusan hoplites in the field, that he discouraged any fresh general action, and proposed to construct a counter-wall or cross-wall, traversing the space along which the Athenian circumvallation must necessarily be continued, so as to impede its farther progress.

Accordingly they took their start from the postern-gate near the grove of Apollo Temenitês. From this point, which was lower down on the slope of Epipolæ than the Athenian Circle, they carried their palisade and counter-wall up the slope, in a direction calculated to intersect the intended line of hostile circumvallation southward of the Circle. It seems to have terminated at the brink of the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ, which prevented the Athenians from turning it and attacking it in flank, while it was defended in front by a stockade and topped with wooden towers for discharge of missiles.

During all this process, Nikias had not thought it prudent to interrupt them. Employed as he seems to have been on the Circle, and on the wall branching out from the Circle northward, he was unwilling to march across the slope of Epipolæ to attack them with half his forces, leaving his own rear exposed to attack from the numerous Syracusans in the city, and his own Circle only partially guarded. Moreover, by such delay he was enabled to watch for an opportunity of assaulting the new counter-wall with advantage. Such an opportunity soon occurred, just at the time when he had accomplished the farther important object of destroying the aqueducts which supplied the city, partially at least, with water for drinking. The Syracusans appear to have been filled with confidence both by the completion of their counter-wall, which seemed an effective bar to the besiegers—and by his inaction. The tribe left on guard presently began to relax in their vigilance: some even permitted themselves to take repose during that hour within the city walls. Such negligence did not escape the Athenian generals, who silently prepared an assault

¹ Throughout the siege operations the value of cavalry was made apparent, and we may wonder that so little is heard of it during the warfare of the period.

Though common enough in the early historical days, this arm gradually fell into disuse, partly owing to the lack of suitable cavalry-ground in Greece proper, partly owing to the insubordination of the young aristocrats who usually composed this troop (*cf.* the Roman burgess-equites, whose misconduct in the second century B.C. led to their disappearance as a fighting corps). Another cause is to be found in the democratic

feeling which was engendered in part by the hoplite service, and in turn gave a preference to this arm (*E. Meyer, Gesch. des Alt.*, vol. ii., ch. iii., § 1). Lastly, we may refer to the failure of the picked Persian squadrons at Plataea and elsewhere.

Yet occasionally a well-trained cavalry corps could still prove its value—*e.g.*, Hippias' Thesalians in 511 (*Hdt.*, v. 63); the Chalkidians at Spartolus in 429 (*Thuk.*, ii. 79); and the Athenians before Mantinea in 362 (*Xen., Hell.*, vii. 5, 15-17). But it was left to Alexander the Great to prove the decisive value of a heavy corps in pitched battles.—*Ed.*

for midday. Three hundred chosen hoplites were instructed to sally out suddenly and run across straight to attack the stockade and counter-wall, while the main Athenian force marched in two divisions under Nikias and Lamachus, half towards the city walls to prevent any succour from coming out of the gates, half towards the Temenite postern-gate from whence the stockade and cross-wall commenced. The rapid forward movement of the chosen three hundred was crowned with full success. They captured both the stockade and the counter-wall, feebly defended by its guards. They pulled down the counter-wall, plucked up the palisade, and carried the materials away for the use of their own circumvallation.

As the recent Syracusan counter-work had been carried to the brink of the southern cliff, which rendered it unassailable in flank—Nikias was warned of the necessity of becoming master of this cliff, so as to deprive them of the same resource in future. Accordingly, without staying to finish his blockading wall regularly and continuously from the Circle southward, across the slope of Epipolæ—he left the Circle under guard and marched across at once to take possession of the southern cliff, at the point where the blockading wall was intended to reach it. This point of the southern cliff he immediately fortified as a defensive position, whereby he accomplished two objects. First, he prevented the Syracusans from again employing the cliff as a flank defence for a second counter-wall. Next, he acquired the means of providing a safe and easy road of communication between the high ground of Epipolæ and the low marshy ground beneath, which divided Epipolæ from the Great Harbour. As his troops would have to carry on simultaneous operations, partly on the high ground above, partly on the low ground beneath, he could not allow them to be separated from each other by a precipitous cliff which would prevent ready mutual assistance. The Circle, though isolated, was strong enough for the time to maintain itself against attack, and was adequately garrisoned.

By this new movement, the Syracusans were debarred from carrying a second counter-wall on the same side of Epipolæ, since the enemy were masters of the terminating cliff on the southern side of the slope. They now turned their operations to the lower ground or marsh between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour, being as yet free on that side, since the Athenian fleet was still at Thapsus. Across that marsh—and seemingly as far as the river Anapus, to serve as a flank barrier—they resolved to carry a palisade work with a ditch, so as to intersect the line which the Athenians must next pursue in completing the southernmost portion of their circumvallation. They so pressed the prosecution of this new cross palisade, that by the time the new Athenian fortification of the cliff was completed, the new Syracusan obstacle was completed also.

Lamachus overcame the difficulty before him with ability and bravery. Descending unexpectedly, one morning before daybreak, from his fort on the cliff at Epipolæ into the low ground beneath, he contrived to surprise the palisade with the first dawn of morning. Orders were at the same time given for the Athenian fleet to sail round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, so as to divert the attention of the enemy, and get on the rear of the new palisade work. A large Syracusan force came out from the city to retake it, bringing on a general action in the low ground

between the Cliff of Epipolæ, the Harbour, and the river Anapus. The superior discipline of the Athenians proved successful : the Syracusans were defeated and driven back on all sides, so that their right wing fled into the city, and their left (including the larger portion of their best force, the horsemen), along the banks of the river Anapus, to reach the bridge. Flushed with victory, the Athenians hoped to cut them off from this retreat, and a chosen body of 300 hoplites ran fast in hopes of getting to the bridge first. In this hasty movement they fell into such disorder, that the Syracusan cavalry turned upon them, and threw them back upon the Athenian right wing, to which the fugitives communicated their own panic and disorder. The fate of the battle appeared to be turning against the Athenians, when Lamachus, who was on the left wing, hastened to their aid with the Argeian hoplites and as many bowmen as he could collect. His ardour carried him incautiously forward, so that he crossed a ditch, with very few followers, before the remaining troops could follow him. He was here attacked and slain in single combat : but the Syracusans were driven back when his soldiers came up. The rapid movement of this gallant officer was thus crowned with complete success, restoring the victory to his own right wing, a victory dearly purchased by the forfeit of his own life.

Meanwhile the temporary flight of the Athenian right wing, and the withdrawal of Lamachus from the left to reinforce it, imparted fresh courage to the Syracusan right, which had fled into the town. They came forth to renew the contest ; while their generals attempted a diversion by sending out a detachment from the north-western gates of the city to attack the Athenian Circle on the mid-slope of Epipolæ. As this Circle lay completely apart and at considerable distance from the battle, they hoped to find the garrison unprepared for attack, and thus to carry it by surprise. Their manœuvre, bold and well-timed, was on the point of succeeding. They carried with little difficulty the covering outwork in front, and the Circle itself was only saved by the presence of mind of Nikias, who was lying ill within it. He directed the attendants to set fire to a quantity of wood which lay in front of the Circle-wall, so that the flames prevented all farther advance on the part of the assailants, and also served as a signal to the Athenians engaged in the battle beneath, who immediately sent reinforcements to the relief of their general ; while at the same time the Athenian fleet, just arrived from Thapsus, was seen sailing into the Great Harbour. This last event, threatening the Syracusans on a new side, drew off their whole attention to the defence of their city.

Both army and fleet now began to occupy themselves seriously with the construction of the southernmost part of the wall of circumvallation, beginning immediately below the Athenian fortified point of descent from the southern cliff of Epipolæ and stretching across the lower marshy ground to the Great Harbour. The distance between these two extreme points was about eight stadia or nearly an English mile : the wall was double, with gates, and probably towers, at suitable intervals—including a space of considerable breadth, doubtless roofed over in part, since it served afterwards, with the help of the adjoining citadel on the cliff, as shelter and defence of the whole Athenian army. The Syracusans could not interrupt this process, nor could they undertake a new counter-wall up the mid-slope of Epipolæ, without coming out to fight a general battle, which they did not feel competent to do.

But not only were they thus compelled to look on without hindering the blockading wall towards the Harbour.—It was now, for the first time, that they began to taste the real restraints and privations of a siege. Down to this moment, their communication with the Anapus and the country beyond, as well as with all sides of the Great Harbour, had been unimpeded; whereas now, the arrival of the Athenian fleet and the change of position of the Athenian army, had cut them off from both¹, so that little or no fresh supplies of provision could reach them except at the hazard of capture from the hostile ships. Nothing now remained open, except a portion, especially the northern portion, of the slope of Epipolæ. Of this outlet the besieged, especially their numerous cavalry, doubtless availed themselves, for the purpose of excursions and of bringing in supplies. But it was both longer and more circuitous for such purposes than the plain near the Great Harbour and the Helôrine road: moreover, it had to pass by the high and narrow pass of Euryâlus, and might thus be rendered unavailable to the besieged, whenever Nikias thought fit to occupy and fortify that position. Unfortunately for himself and his army, he omitted this easy, but capital precaution, even at the moment when he must have known Gylippus to be approaching.

In regard to the works actually undertaken, the order followed by Nikias and Lamachus can be satisfactorily explained. Having established their fortified post on the centre of the slope of Epipolæ, they were in condition to combat opposition and attack any counter-wall on whichever side the enemy might erect it. Commencing in the first place the execution of the northern portion of the blockading line, they soon desist from this, and turn their attention to the southern portion, because it was here that the Syracusans constructed their two first counter-works. In attacking the second counter-work of the Syracusans, across the marsh to the Anapus, they chose a suitable moment for bringing the main fleet round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, with a view to its coöperation. After clearing the lower ground, they probably deemed it advisable, in order to establish a safe and easy communication with their fleet, that the double wall across the marsh, from Epipolæ to the Harbour, should stand next for execution; for which there was this farther reason—that they thereby blocked up the most convenient exit and channel of supply for Syracuse. There are thus plausible reasons assignable why the northern portion of the line of blockade, from the Athenian camp on Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus, was left to the last, and was found open—at least the greater part of it—by Gylippus.

While the Syracusans thus began to despair of their situation, the prospects of the Athenians were better than ever. The reports circulating through the neighbouring cities represented them as in the full tide of success, so that many Sikel tribes, hitherto wavering, came in to tender their alliance, while three armed pentekonters also arrived from the Tyrrhenian coast. Moreover abundant supplies were furnished from the Italian Greeks generally. Nikias, now sole commander since the death of Lamachus, had even the glory of receiving and discussing proposals from Syracuse for capitulation—a necessity which was openly and abundantly canvassed within the city itself. The ill-success of Hermokratês

¹ Diodorus, however, is wrong in stating (xiii. 7) that the Athenians occupied the temple of Zeus Olympius and the Polichné or hamlet surrounding

it, on the right bank of the Anapus. These posts remained always occupied by the Syracusans, throughout the whole war (Thukyd., vii. 4. 37)

and his colleagues had recently caused them to be displaced from their functions as generals. Though several propositions for surrender, perhaps unofficial, yet seemingly sincere, were made to Nikias, nothing definitive could be agreed upon as to the terms. Had the Syracusan government been oligarchical, the present distress would have exhibited a large body of malcontents upon whom he could have worked with advantage; but the democratical character of the government maintained union at home in this trying emergency.

We must take particular note of these propositions in order to understand the conduct of Nikias during the present critical interval. He had been from the beginning in secret correspondence with a party in Syracuse, who, though neither numerous nor powerful in themselves, were now doubtless both more active and more influential than ever they had been before. From them he received constant and not unreasonable assurances that the city was on the point of surrendering and could not possibly hold out. And as the tone of opinion without, as well as within, conspired to raise such an impression in his mind, so he suffered himself to be betrayed into a fatal languor and security as to the farther prosecution of the besieging operations. The injurious consequences of the death of Lamachus now became evident. From the time of the departure from Katana down to the battle in which that gallant officer perished (a period seemingly of about three months, from about March to June 414 B.C.), the operations of the siege had been conducted with great vigour as well as unremitting perseverance; while the building-work, especially, had been so rapidly executed as to fill the Syracusans with amazement. But so soon as Nikias is left sole commander, this vigorous march disappears and is exchanged for slackness and apathy.

Though such was the present temper of the Athenian troops, Nikias could doubtless have spurred them on and accelerated the operations, had he himself been convinced of the necessity of doing so. Hitherto, we have seen him always overrating the gloomy contingencies of the future, and disposed to calculate as if the worst was to happen which possibly could happen. But a great part, of what passes for caution in his character, was in fact backwardness and inertia of temperament, aggravated by the melancholy addition of a painful internal complaint.

Gylippus meanwhile had employed himself in getting together forces for the purpose of the expedition. But the Lacedæmonians, though so far stimulated by the representations of the Athenian exile as to promise aid, were not forward to perform the promise. Even the Corinthians, decidedly the most hearty of all in behalf of Syracuse, were yet so tardy, that in the month of June, Gylippus was still at Leukas, with his armament not quite ready to sail. To embark in a squadron for Sicily against the numerous and excellent Athenian fleet, now acting there, was a service not tempting to anyone. Moreover every vessel from Sicily, between March and June 414 B.C., brought intelligence of progressive success on the part of Nikias and Lamachus—thus rendering the prospects of Corinthian auxiliaries still more discouraging.

At length, in the month of June, arrived the news of that defeat of the Syracusans wherein Lamachus was slain, and of its important consequences in forwarding the operations of the besiegers. Gylippus and the Corinthians despaired, in consequence, of being able to render any effective

aid against the Athenians in Sicily. But as there still remained hopes of being able to preserve the Greek cities in Italy, Gylippus thought it important to pass over thither at once with his own little squadron of four sail—two Lacedæmonians and two Corinthians. He first sailed to Tarentum. From hence he undertook a visit to Thurii, where his father Kleandridas, exiled from Sparta, had formerly resided as citizen. After trying to profit by this opening for the purpose of gaining the Thurians, and finding nothing but refusal, he passed on farther southward, until he came opposite to the Terinæan Gulf, near the south-eastern cape of Italy. Here a violent gust of wind off the land drove him out to sea, until at length, standing in a northerly direction, he was fortunate enough to find shelter again at Tarentum. But such was the damage which his ships had sustained, that he was forced to remain here while they were hauled ashore and refitted.

So untoward a delay threatened to intercept altogether his farther progress. For the Thurians had sent intimation of his visit, as well as of the number of his vessels, to Nikias at Syracuse. In the present sanguine phase of his character, Nikias overlooked the gravity of the fact announced. He despised Gylippus as a mere privateer, nor would he even take the precaution of sending ships from his numerous fleet to watch and intercept the new-comer. Accordingly Gylippus, after having refitted his ships at Tarentum, advanced southward along the coast without opposition to the Epizephyrian Lokri. Here he first learnt, to his great satisfaction, that Syracuse was not yet so completely blockaded, but that an army might still reach and relieve it from the interior, entering it by the Euryâlus and the heights of Epipolæ, so he passed forthwith through the strait, which he found altogether unguarded. After touching both at Rhegium and at Messênê, he arrived safely at Himera. Even at Rhegium, there was no Athenian naval force, though Nikias had indeed sent thither four Athenian triremes, after he had been apprised that Gylippus had reached Lokri. But this Athenian squadron reached Rhegium too late.

To appreciate Nikias's misjudgment fully—and to be sensible that we are not making him responsible for results which could not have been foreseen—we have only to turn back to what had been said six months before by the exile Alkibiadês at Sparta. 'Send forthwith an army to Sicily—but *send at the same time, what will be yet more valuable than an army—a Spartan to take the supreme command.*' It was in fulfilment of such recommendation, the wisdom of which will abundantly appear, that Gylippus had been appointed. And had he even reached Syracuse alone in a fishing-boat, the effect of his presence, carrying the great name of Sparta with full assurance of Spartan intervention to come, would have sufficed to give new life to the besieged. Yet Nikias—having, through a lucky accident, timely notice of his approach, when a squadron of four ships would have prevented his reaching the island—neglects him as a freebooter of no significance.

Gylippus, on announcing himself as forerunner of Peloponnesian reinforcements, met with a hearty welcome. The Himæræans agreed to aid him with a body of hoplites, and to furnish panoplies for the seamen in his vessels. On sending to Selinus, Gela, and some of the Sikel tribes in the interior, he received equally favourable assurances; so that he was enabled in no very long time to get together a respectable force. The interest of

Athens among the Sikels had been recently weakened by the death of one of her most active partisans, the Sikel prince Archonidēs—a circumstance which both enabled Gylippus to obtain more of their aid and facilitated his march across the island. He was enabled to undertake this inland march from Himera to Syracuse, at the head of 700 hoplites from his own vessels—1,000 hoplites and light troops, with 100 horse, from Himera—some horse and light troops from Selinus and Gela—and 1,000 Sikels. With these forces, some of whom joined him on the march, he reached Euryálus and the heights of Epipolæ above Syracuse.

His arrival was all but too late—and might have been actually too late, had not the Corinthian admiral Gongylus got to Syracuse a little before him. The Corinthian fleet of twelve triremes, having started from Leukas later than Gylippus, was now on its way to Syracuse. But Gongylus had been detained at Leukas by some accident, so that he did not depart until after all the rest. Yet he reached Syracuse the soonest, probably striking a straighter course across the sea. He got safely into the harbour of Syracuse, escaping the Athenian guardships, whose watch doubtless partook of the general negligence of the besieging operations.

The arrival of Gongylus at that moment was an accident of unspeakable moment—and was in fact nothing less than the salvation of the city. Among all the causes of despair in the Syracusan mind, there was none more powerful than the circumstance, that they had not as yet heard of any relief approaching. Their discouragement increasing from day to day, and the interchange of propositions with Nikias becoming more frequent, matters had at last so ripened that a public assembly was just about to be held to sanction a definitive capitulation¹. It was at this critical juncture that Gongylus arrived, apparently a little before Gylippus reached Himera. They instantly threw aside all idea of capitulation, and resolved to hold out to the last.

It was not long before they received intimation that Gylippus had reached Himera, and was raising an army to march across for their relief. He was presently seen coming, having ascended Epipolæ by Euryálus, the same way by which the Athenians had come from Katana in the spring, when they commenced the siege. As he descended the slope of Epipolæ, the whole Syracusan force went out in a body to hail his arrival and accompany him into the city.

Few incidents throughout the whole siege of Syracuse appear so unaccountable as the fact, that the proceedings and march of Gylippus, from his landing at Himera to the moment of his entering the town, were accomplished without the smallest resistance on the part of Nikias. After having despised Gylippus in his voyage along the coast of Italy as a freebooter with four ships, he now despises him not less at the head of an army marching from Himera. If he was taken unawares, as he really appears to have been, the fault was altogether his own, and the ignorance such as we must almost call voluntary. For the approach of Gylippus must have been well-known to him beforehand. He must have learnt from the four ships which he sent to Rhegium, that Gylippus had already touched thither in passing through the strait, on his way to Himera. He must therefore have been well-aware, that the purpose was to attempt the relief of Syracuse by an army from the interior; and his correspondence

¹ Thukyd., vi. 103; vii. 2. Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 19.

among the Sikel tribes must have placed him in cognizance of the equipment going on at Himera. Moreover, when we recollect that Gylippus reached that place without either troops or arms—that he had to obtain forces not merely from Himera, but also from Selinus and Gela—that he had to march all across the island, partly through hostile territory—it is impossible to allow less interval than a fortnight, or three weeks, between his landing at Himera and his arrival at Epipolæ. Farther, Nikias must have learnt, through his intelligence in the interior of Syracuse, the important revolution which had taken place in Syracusan opinion through the arrival of Gongylus, even before the landing of Gylippus in Sicily was known. Lastly, that enemy had first to march all across Sicily, during which march he might have been embarrassed and perhaps defeated¹; and could then approach Syracuse only by one road, over the high ground of Euryâlus in the Athenian rear—through passes few in number, easy to defend, by which Nikias had himself first approached, and through which he had only got by a well-laid plan of surprise.

At the moment when the Spartan auxiliary was thus allowed to march quietly into Syracuse, the Athenian double wall of circumvallation between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour, eight stadia long, was all but completed. But Gylippus cared not to interrupt its completion. He aimed at higher objects, and he knew (what Nikias unhappily never felt and never lived to learn) the immense advantage of turning to active account that first impression, and full tide of confidence, which his arrival had just infused into the Syracusans. Hardly had he accomplished his junction with them, when he marshalled the united force in order of battle, and marched up to the lines of the Athenians. His first proceeding marked how much the odds of the game were changed. He sent a herald to tender to them a five days' armistice, on condition that they should collect their effects and withdraw from the island. Nikias disdained to return any reply to this insulting proposal; but his conduct showed how much *he* felt, as well as Gylippus, that the tide was now turned. For when the Spartan commander, perceiving now for the first time the disorderly trim of his Syracusan hoplites, thought fit to retreat into more open ground farther removed from the walls, probably in order that he might have a better field for his cavalry, Nikias declined to follow him, and remained in position close to his own fortifications. This was tantamount to a confession of inferiority in the field, a virtual abandonment of the capture of Syracuse.

After drawing off his troops, Gylippus brought them out again the next morning, and marshalled them in front of the Athenian lines, as if about to attack. But while the attention of the Athenians was thus engaged, he sent a detachment to surprise Labdalum, which was not within view of their lines. The fort was taken, and the garrison put to the sword. Gylippus pursued his successes actively, by immediately beginning the construction of a fresh counter-wall, from the outer city-wall in a north-westerly direction aslant up the slope of Epipolæ, so as to traverse the intended line of the Athenian circumvallation on the north side of their Circle, and render blockade impossible. He availed himself, for this pur-

¹ Compare an incident in the ensuing year, Thukyd., vii. 32. The Athenians, at a moment when they had become much weaker than they were now, had influence enough among the Sikel

tribes to raise opposition to the march of a corps coming from the interior to the help of Syracuse. This auxiliary corps was defeated and nearly destroyed in its march.

pose, of stones laid by the Athenians for their own circumvallation, at the same time alarming them by threatening attack upon their lower wall (between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour)—which was now just finished. Against one part of the wall, which seemed weaker than the rest, he attempted a nocturnal surprise, but finding the Athenians in vigilant guard without, he was forced to retire.

These attacks, however, appear to have been chiefly intended as diversions, in order to hinder the enemy from obstructing the completion of the counter-wall. Now was the time for Nikias to adopt vigorous aggressive measures both against this wall and against the Syracusans in the field—unless he chose to relinquish all hope of ever being able to beleaguer Syracuse. And indeed he now undertook a measure altogether new. He resolved to fortify Cape Plemmyrium—the rocky promontory which forms one extremity of the narrow entrance of the Great Harbour, immediately south of the point of Ortygia—and to make it a secure main station for the fleet and stores. The fleet had been hitherto stationed in close neighbourhood of the land-force, in a fortified position at the extremity of the double blockading wall between the southern cliff of Epipolæ and the Great Harbour. From such a station in the interior of the harbour, it was difficult for the Athenian triremes to perform the duties incumbent on them—of watching the two ports of Syracuse (one on each side of the isthmus which joins Ortygia to the mainland) so as to prevent any exit of ships from within, or ingress of ships from without—and of ensuring the unobstructed admission by sea of supplies for their own army. For both these purposes, the station of Plemmyrium was far more convenient; and Nikias now saw that henceforward his operations would be for the most part maritime. Without confessing it openly, he thus practically acknowledged that the superiority of land-force had passed to the side of his opponents, and that a successful prosecution of the blockade had become impossible.

Three forts were erected on the sea-board of Cape Plemmyrium, which became the station for triremes as well as for ships of burthen. Though the situation was found convenient for all naval operations, it entailed also serious disadvantages, being destitute of any spring of water, so that for supplies of water, and of wood also, the crews of the ships had to range a considerable distance, exposed to surprise from the numerous Syracusan cavalry placed in garrison at the temple of Zeus Olympius. Day after day, losses were sustained in this manner, besides the increased facilities given for desertion, which soon fatally diminished the efficiency of each ship's crew. As the Athenian hopes of success now declined, both the slaves, and the numerous foreigners who served in their navy, became disposed to steal away. And though the ships of war, down to this time, had been scarcely at all engaged in actual warfare, yet they had been for many months continually at sea and on the watch, without any opportunity of hauling ashore to refit. Hence the naval force, now about to be called into action as the chief hope of the Athenians, was found lamentably degenerated.

Day after day Gylippus brought out his Syracusans in battle-array, but the Athenians showed no disposition to attack. At length he took advantage of what he thought a favourable opportunity to make the attack himself; but the ground was so hemmed in by various walls—the

Athenian fortified lines on one side, the Syracusan front or Temenitic fortification on another, and the counter-wall now in course of construction on a third—that his cavalry and darters had no space to act. Accordingly, the Syracusan hoplites, having to fight without these auxiliaries, were beaten and driven back with loss, the Corinthian Gongylus being among the slain¹. On the next day, Gylippus had the prudence to take the blame of this defeat upon himself. After no long time, he again brought them up in order of battle, taking care, however, to keep in the open space beyond the extremity of the walls and fortifications.

On this occasion, Nikias marched out into the open space to meet him. He probably felt encouraged by the result of the recent action; but there was a farther and more pressing motive. The counter-wall of intersection, which the Syracusans were constructing, was on the point of cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation—so that it was essential for Nikias to attack without delay, unless he formally abnegated all farther hope of successful siege. Both armies were therefore ranged in battle order on the open space beyond the walls, higher up the slope of Epipolæ, Gylippus placing his cavalry and darters to the right of his line, on the highest and most open ground. In the midst of the action between the hoplites on both sides, these troops on the right charged the left flank of the Athenians with such vigour, that they completely broke it. The whole Athenian army underwent a thorough defeat, and only found shelter within its fortified lines. And in the course of the very next night, the Syracusan counter-wall was pushed so far as to traverse the projected line of Athenian blockade, reaching presently as far as the edge of the northern cliff: so that Syracuse was now safe, unless the enemy should not only recover their superiority in the field, but also become strong enough to storm and carry the new-built wall.

Farther defence was also obtained by the safe arrival of the Corinthian, Ambrakiotic, and Leukadian fleet of twelve triremes, which Nikias had vainly endeavoured to intercept. He had sent twenty sail to the southern coast of Italy; but the new-comers were fortunate enough to escape them.

Gylippus now took the precaution of constructing a redoubt on the high ground of Epipolæ, so as to command the approach to Syracuse from the high ground of Euryálus, a step which Hermokratês had not thought of until too late, and which Nikias had never thought of at all. He erected a new fort on a suitable point of the high ground, backed by three encampments at proper distances in the rear of it. A continuous wall was then carried from this advanced post down the slope of Epipolæ, so as to reach and join the counter-wall recently constructed; whereby this counter-wall, already traversing and cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation, became in fact prolonged up the whole slope of Epipolæ, and barred all direct access from the Athenians in their existing lines up to the summit of that eminence, as well as up to the northern cliff. The Syracusans had now one continuous and uninterrupted line of defence, a long single wall, resting at one extremity on the new-built fort upon the high ground of Epipolæ—at the other extremity, upon the city-wall. This wall was only single; but it was defended along its whole length by the permanent detachments occupying the three several fortified positions or encampments just mentioned.

¹ Thukyd., vii. 5; Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 19.

Not content with having placed the Syracusans out of the reach of danger, Gylippus took advantage of their renewed confidence to infuse into them projects of retaliation. They began to equip their ships in the harbour, and to put their seamen under training, in hopes of qualifying themselves to contend with the Athenians even on their own element, while Gylippus himself quitted the city to visit the various cities of the island, and to get together farther reinforcements; naval as well as military. And as it was foreseen that Nikias on his part would probably demand aid from Athens—envoys, Syracusan as well as Corinthian, were despatched to Peloponnesus, to urge the necessity of forwarding additional troops—even in merchant-vessels, if no triremes could be spared to convey them.

As all possibility of prosecuting the siege of Syracuse successfully was now at an end, a sound judgment would have dictated that the position in the harbour had become useless as well as dangerous, and that the sooner it was evacuated the better. Probably Demosthenês would have acted thus, under similar circumstances; but such foresight and resolution were not in the character of Nikias. Not venturing to quit his position without orders from Athens, he determined to send home thither an undisguised account of his critical position, and to solicit either reinforcements or instructions to return.

It was now indeed the end of September (B.C. 414), so that he could not hope even for an answer before midwinter, nor for reinforcements until the ensuing spring was far advanced. Nevertheless he determined to encounter this risk, and to trust to vigilant precautions for safety during the interval. But as it was of the last importance to him to make his countrymen at home fully sensible of the grave danger of his position—he resolved to transmit a written despatch. Accordingly he sent home a letter, which seems to have reached Athens about the end of November, and was read formally in the public assembly by the secretary of the city.

‘Our previous proceedings have been already made known to you, Athenians, in many other despatches; but the present crisis is such as to require your deliberation more than ever. After we had overcome in many engagements the Syracusans, and had built the fortified lines which we now occupy—there came upon us the Lacedæmonian Gylippus, with an army partly Peloponnesian, partly Sicilian. Him too we defeated, in the first action; but in a second we were overwhelmed by a crowd of cavalry and darters, and forced to retire within our lines. And thus the superior number of our enemies has compelled us to suspend our circumvallation, and remain inactive: indeed we cannot employ in the field even the full force which we possess, since a portion of our hoplites are necessarily required for the protection of our walls. Meanwhile the enemy have carried out a single intersecting counter-wall beyond our line of circumvallation, so that we can no longer continue the latter to completion, unless we had force enough to attack and storm their counter-wall. And things have come to such a pass, that we, who profess to besiege others, are ourselves rather the party besieged—by land at least, since the cavalry leave us scarce any liberty of motion. Farther, the enemy have sent envoys to Peloponnesus to obtain reinforcements, while Gylippus in person is going round the Sicilian cities. For it is the determination not merely to assail our lines on shore with their land-force, but also to attack us by sea.

'They know well, that now our ships have rotted from remaining too long at sea, and the crews are ruined. Nor have we the means of hauling our ships ashore to refit, since the enemy's fleet, equal or superior in numbers, always appears on the point of attacking us. We see them in constant practice, and they can choose their own moment for attack. Moreover, they can keep their ships high and dry more than we can, for they are not engaged in maintaining watch upon others. And were we to relax ever so little in our vigilance, we should no longer be sure of our supplies, which we bring in even now with difficulty close under their walls.

'Our crews, too, have been and are still wasting away from various causes. Among the seamen who are our own citizens, many, in going to a distance for wood, for water, or for pillage, are cut off by the Syracusan cavalry. Such of them as are slaves desert, now that our superiority is gone, while the foreigners make off straight to some of the neighbouring cities. And you know as well as I, that no crew ever continues long in perfect condition, and that the first class of seamen, who set the ship in motion and maintain the uniformity of the oar-stroke, is but a small fraction of the whole number.

'Among all these embarrassments, the worst of all is, that I as general can neither prevent the mischief, from the difficulty of your tempers to govern—nor can I provide supplementary recruits elsewhere, as the enemy can easily do from many places open to him. We have nothing but the original stock which we brought out with us, both to make good losses and to do present duty; for Naxos and Katana, our only present allies, are of insignificant strength. And if our enemy gain but one farther point—if the Italian cities, from whence we now draw our supplies, should turn against us—we shall be starved out.

'I thought it the safer policy to tell you the truth without disguise, understanding as I do your real dispositions, that you never listen willingly to any but the most favourable assurances, yet are angry in the end, if they turn to unfavourable results. Be thoroughly satisfied, that in regard to the force against which you originally sent us, both your generals and your soldiers have done themselves no discredit. But now that all Sicily is united against us, and that farther reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, you must take your resolution with full knowledge that we here have not even strength to contend against our present difficulties. You must either send for us home—or you must send us a second army, land-force as well as naval, not inferior to that which is now here, together with a considerable supply of money. You must farther send a successor to supersede me, as I am incapable of work from a disease in the kidneys. I think myself entitled to ask this indulgence at your hands: for while my health lasted, I did you much good service in various military commands. But whatever you intend, do it at the first opening of spring, without any delay: for the new succours which the enemy is getting together in Sicily, will soon be here—and those which are to come from Peloponnesus will either elude or forestall you as they have already once done.'

The Athenians resolved to comply with the second portion of the alternative put by Nikias; not to send for the present armament home, but to reinforce it by a second powerful armament both of land and naval force,

in prosecution of the same objects. But they declined his other personal request, and insisted on continuing him in command; passing a vote, however, to name Menander and Euthydemus, officers already in the army before Syracuse, joint commanders along with him, in order to assist him in his laborious duties. They sent Eurymedon speedily, about the winter solstice, in command of ten triremes to Syracuse, carrying one hundred and twenty talents of silver, together with assurances of coming aid to the suffering army. And they resolved to equip a new and formidable force, under Demosthenes and Eurymedon, to go thither as reinforcement in the earliest months of the spring.

This letter of Nikias suggests several serious reflections, in reference both to himself and to the Athenian people. As to himself, there is nothing so remarkable as the sentence of condemnation which it pronounces on his own past proceedings in Sicily. When we find him lamenting the wear and tear of the armament, and treating the fact as notorious, that even the best naval force could only maintain itself in good condition for a short time—what graver condemnation could be passed upon those eight months which he wasted in trifling measures, after his arrival in Sicily, before commencing the siege of Syracuse? When he announces that the arrival of Gylippus with his auxiliary force before Syracuse, made the difference to the Athenian army between triumph and something bordering on ruin—the inquiry naturally suggests itself, what precautions he had himself taken to prevent the coming of the Spartan general. The desertion and demoralization of his naval force was, as he himself points out, mainly the consequence of this turn of fortune, and was also the first commencement of that unmanageable temper of the Athenian soldiery. For it would be injustice to this unfortunate army not to recognise that they first acquiesced patiently in prolonged inaction, because their general directed it, and next, did their duty most gallantly in the operations of the siege, down to the death of Lamachus.

When we look at the despatch, not merely as it stands singly, but as falling in series with its antecedents—the natural effect which we should suppose it likely to produce upon the Athenians would be, a vehement burst of wrath and displeasure against Nikias. Upon the most candid and impartial scrutiny, he deserved nothing less. And when we consider, farther, the character generally ascribed by historians of Greece to the Athenian people, that they are represented as fickle, ungrateful, and irritable, by standing habit—as abandoning upon the most trifling grounds those whom they had once esteemed, forgetting all prior services, visiting upon innocent generals the unavoidable misfortunes of war, and impelled by nothing better than demagogic excitements—we naturally expect that the blame really deserved by Nikias would be exaggerated beyond all due measure, and break forth in a storm of violence and fury. Yet not a word of blame or displeasure is proclaimed. The general vote was one not simply imputing no blame, but even pronouncing continued and unabated confidence. So great is the value which they set upon his services, and the esteem which they entertain for his character, that they will not avail themselves of the easy opportunity which he himself provides to get rid of him.

It is not by way of compliment to the Athenians that I make these remarks on their present proceeding. Quite the contrary. The mis-

placed confidence of the Athenians in Nikias—on more than one previous occasion, but especially on this—betrays an incapacity of appreciating facts immediately before their eyes, and a blindness to decisive and multiplied evidences of incompetence, which is one of the least creditable manifestations of their political history. But we do learn from it a clear lesson, that the defects of the Athenian character were very different from what historians commonly impute to them. Instead of being fickle, we find them tenacious in the extreme of confidence once bestowed, and of schemes once embarked upon : instead of ingratitude for services actually rendered, we find credit given for services which an officer ought to have rendered, but has not : instead of angry captiousness, we discover an indulgence not merely generous but even culpable, in the midst of disappointment and humiliation : instead of a public assembly, wherein, as it is commonly depicted, the criminative orators were omnipotent, and could bring to condemnation any unsuccessful general however meritorious—we see that even grave and well-founded accusations make no impression upon the people in opposition to pre-established personal esteem. If Kleon had committed but a small part of those capital blunders which discredit the military career of Nikias, he would have been irretrievably ruined.

The incident now before us is instructive as a refutation of that exaggerated mischief which it is common to impute to the person called a Demagogue. Happy would it have been for Athens had she now had Kleon present, or any other demagogue of equal power, at that public assembly which took the melancholy resolution of sending fresh forces to Sicily and continuing Nikias in the command ! The case was one in which the accusatory eloquence of the demagogue was especially called for to expose the real past mismanagement of Nikias—to prove how much mischief he had already done, and how much more he would do if continued.

What makes the resolution so peculiarly discreditable, is, that it was adopted in defiance of clear and present evidence. To persist in the siege of Syracuse, under present circumstances, was sad misjudgement ; to persist in it with Nikias as commander was hardly less than insanity. The first expedition, though even *that* was rash and ill-conceived, nevertheless presented tempting hopes which explain, if they do not excuse, the too light estimate of impossibility of lasting possession. Moreover there was at that time a confusion—between the narrow objects connected with Leontini and Egesta, and the larger acquisitions to be realized through the siege of Syracuse—which prevented any clear and unanimous estimate of the undertaking in the Athenian mind. But now, the circumstances of Sicily were fully known : the mendacious promises of Egesta had been exposed ; the hopes of allies for Athens in the island were seen to be futile ; while Syracuse, armed with a Spartan general and Peloponnesian aid, had not only become inexpugnable, but had assumed the aggressive : lastly, the chance of a renewal of Peloponnesian hostility against Attica had been now raised into certainty. While perseverance in the siege of Syracuse, therefore, under circumstances so unpromising and under such necessity for increased exertions at home, was a melancholy imprudence in itself—perseverance in employing Nikias converted that imprudence into ruin, which even the addition of an energetic colleague in the person of Demosthenês was not sufficient to avert.

Meanwhile, war with Sparta, though not yet actually proclaimed, had become inevitable. Even in the preceding winter, the Lacedæmonians had listened favourably to the recommendation of Alkibiadês that they should establish a fortified post at Dekeleia in Attica. They had not yet indeed brought themselves to execution of this resolve; for the peace between them and Athens still subsisted in name—and they hesitated to break it openly, partly because they knew that the breach of peace had been on their side at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, attributing to this fault their capital misfortune at Sphakteria. Athens on her side had also scrupulously avoided direct violation of the Lacedæmonian territory, in spite of much solicitation from her allies at Argos. But her reserve on this point gave way during the present summer, probably at the time when her prospect of taking Syracuse appeared certain. The Lacedæmonians having invaded and plundered the Argeian territory, thirty Athenian triremes were sent to aid in its defence. This armament disembarked on the eastern coast of Laconia and committed devastations: which direct act of hostility—coming in addition to the marauding excursions of the garrison of Pylus, and to the refusal of pacific redress at Athens—satisfied the Lacedæmonians that the peace had been now first and undeniably broken by their enemy, so that they might with a safe conscience recommence the war.

The Corinthians and Syracusans vehemently pressed their claim at Sparta; Alkibiadês also renewed his instances for the occupation of Dekeleia. It was in the face of such impending liability to renewed Peloponnesian invasion that the Athenians took their resolution to send a second army to Syracuse and prosecute the siege with vigour. If there were any hesitation yet remaining on the part of the Lacedæmonians, it disappeared so soon as they were made aware of the imprudent resolution of Athens, which not only created an imperative necessity for sustaining Syracuse, but also rendered Athens so much more vulnerable at home, by removing part of her force. Accordingly, very soon after the vote passed at Athens, an equally decisive resolution for direct hostilities was adopted at Sparta. It was determined that a Peloponnesian allied force should be immediately prepared, to be sent at the first opening of spring to Syracuse, and that at the same time Attica should be invaded, and the post of Dekeleia fortified. Orders to this effect were immediately transmitted to the whole body of Peloponnesian allies, especially requisitions for implements, materials, and workmen, towards the construction of the projected fort at Dekeleia.

CHAPTER XXX [LX]

FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY

THE Syracusan war now no longer stands apart, as an event by itself, but becomes absorbed in the general war rekindling throughout Greece. While Eurymedon went with his ten triremes to Syracuse even in mid-

winter, Demosthenês exerted himself to get together the second armament for early spring. Twenty other Athenian triremes were farther sent round Peloponnesus to the station of Naupaktus—to prevent any Corinthian reinforcements from sailing out of the Corinthian Gulf. Against these latter, the Corinthians on their side prepared twenty-five fresh triremes, to serve as a convoy to the transports carrying their hoplites. In Corinth, Sikyon, and Bœotia, as well as at Lacedæmon, levies of hoplites were going on for the armament to Syracuse—at the same time that everything was getting ready for the occupation of Dekeleia. Lastly, Gylippus was engaged with not less activity in stirring up all Sicily to take a more decisive part in the coming year's struggle.

From Cape Tænarus in Laconia, at the earliest moment of spring, embarked a force of 600 Lacedæmonian hoplites (Helots and Neodamodes), and 300 Bœotian hoplites, with the Thespian Hegesandrus. They were directed to cross the sea southward to Kyrênê, and from thence to make their way along the African coast to Sicily. At the same time a body of 700 hoplites—partly Corinthians, partly hired Arcadians, partly Sikyonians, under constraint from their powerful neighbours—departed from the north-west of Peloponnesus and the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf of Sicily, the Corinthian triremes watching them until they were past the Athenian squadron at Naupaktus.

These were proceedings of importance : but the most important of all was the reinvasion of Attica at the same time by the great force of the Peloponnesian alliance, under the Spartan king Agis, son of Archidamus. Twelve years had elapsed since Attica last felt the hand of the destroyer, a little before the siege of Sphakteria. The plain in the neighbourhood of Athens was now first laid waste, after which the invaders proceeded to their special purpose of erecting a fortified post for occupation at Dekeleia. The work, apportioned among the allies present, was completed during the present summer, and a garrison was established there composed of contingents relieving each other at intervals, under the command of king Agis himself. Dekeleia was situated on an outlying eminence belonging to the range called Parnês, about fourteen miles to the north of Athens—near the termination of the plain of Athens, and commanding an extensive view of that plain as well as of the plain of Eleusis. The hill on which it stood, if not the fort itself, was visible even from the walls of Athens. It was admirably situated both as a central point for excursions over Attica, and for communication with Bœotia ; while the road from Athens to Orôpus, the main communication with Eubœa, passed through the gorge immediately under it.

We read with amazement that while the whole Peloponnesian confederacy was renewing its pressure with redoubled force upon Athens—at that very moment, the Athenians sent out, not only a fleet of thirty triremes under Chariklês to annoy the coasts of Peloponnesus, but also the great armament which they had resolved upon under Demosthenês, to push offensive operations against Syracuse. The force under the latter general consisted of 60 Athenian and 5 Chian triremes ; of 1,200 Athenian hoplites of the best class, chosen from the citizen muster-roll ; with a considerable number of hoplites besides, from the subject-allies and elsewhere. There had been also engaged on hire 1,500 peltasts from Thrace ; but these men did not arrive in time, so that Demosthenês set sail without

them. Chariklēs having gone forward to take aboard a body of allies from Argos, the two fleets joined at Ægina, inflicted some devastations on the coasts of Laconia, and established a strong post on the island of Kythēra to encourage desertion among the Helots. From hence Chariklēs returned with the Argeians, while Demosthenēs conducted his armament round Peloponnesus to Korkyra. He proceeded to Zakynthus and Kephallenia, from whence he engaged some additional hoplites—and to Anaktorium, in order to procure darters and slingers from Akarnania. It was here that he was met by Eurymedon with his ten triremes, who had gone forward to Syracuse in the winter with the pecuniary remittance urgently required, and was now returning to act as colleague of Demosthenēs in the command. The news brought by Eurymedon from Sicily was in every way discouraging. Yet the two admirals were under the necessity of sparing ten triremes from their fleet to reinforce Konon at Naupaktus, who was not strong enough alone to contend against the Corinthian fleet which watched him from the opposite coast. To make good this diminution, Eurymedon went forward to Korkyra, with the view of obtaining from the Korkyræans fifteen fresh triremes and a contingent of hoplites—while Demosthenēs was getting together the Akarnanian darters and slingers.

Gylippus returned to Syracuse early in the spring, nearly about the time when Agis invaded Attica and when Demosthenēs quitted Peiræus, with fresh reinforcements from the interior. It was his first care, in conjunction with Hermokratēs, to inspire the Syracusans with courage for fighting the Athenians on shipboard. Such was the acknowledged superiority of the latter at sea, that this was a task of some difficulty, calling for all the eloquence and ascendancy of the two leaders.

The town of Syracuse had two ports, one on each side of the island of Ortygia. The lesser port lay northward of Ortygia, between that island and the low ground or Nekropolis near the outer city: the other lay on the opposite side of the Isthmus of Ortygia, within the Great Harbour. Both of them (it appears) were protected against attack from without, by piles and stakes planted in the bottom in front of them. But the lesser port was the more secure of the two, and the principal docks of the Syracusans were situated within it, the Syracusan fleet, eighty triremes strong, being distributed between them. The entire Athenian fleet was stationed under the fort of Plemmyrium, immediately opposite to the southern point of Ortygia.

Gylippus laid his plan with great ability, so as to take the Athenians completely by surprise. Having trained and prepared the naval force as thoroughly as he could, he marched out his land-force secretly by night, over Epipolæ and round by the right bank of the Anapus, to the neighbourhood of the fort of Plemmyrium. With the first dawn of morning, the Syracusan fleet sailed out. The Athenians, though unprepared and confused, hastened to man 60 ships; with 25 of which they met the 35 Syracusans sailing forth from the Great Harbour—while with the other 35 they encountered the 45 from the lesser port, immediately outside of the mouth of the Great Harbour. In the former of these two actions the Syracusans were at first victors; in the second also, the Syracusans from the outside forced their way into the mouth of the Great Harbour, and joined their comrades. But being little accustomed to

naval warfare, they presently fell into complete confusion ; so that the Athenians, recovering from the first shock, attacked them anew, and completely defeated them, sinking or disabling eleven ships¹.

But this victory was more than counterbalanced by the irreparable loss of Plemmyrium. During the first excitement at the Athenian naval station, when the ships were in course of being manned to meet the unexpected onset from both ports at once, the garrison of Plemmyrium went to the water's edge to watch and encourage their countrymen, leaving their own walls thinly guarded. This was just what Gylippus had anticipated. He attacked the forts at daybreak, taking the garrison completely by surprise, and captured them after a feeble resistance ; first the greatest and most important fort, next the two smaller.

This well-concerted surprise was no less productive to the captors than fatal as a blow to the Athenians. Not only were many men slain, and many made prisoners, in the assault—but there were vast stores of every kind, and even a large stock of money found within the fort, partly belonging to the military chest, partly the property of the trierarchs and of private merchants, who had deposited it there as in the place of greatest security.* The sails of not less than forty triremes were also found there, and three triremes which had been dragged up ashore. Gylippus caused one of the three forts to be pulled down, and carefully garrisoned the other two.

Great as the positive loss was here to the Athenians—the collateral damage and peril growing out of the capture of Plemmyrium was yet more serious. The Syracusans were now masters of the mouth of the harbour on both sides, so that not a single storeship could enter without a convoy and a battle. What was of not less detriment—the Athenian fleet was now forced to take station under the fortified lines of its own land-force, and was thus cramped up on a small space in the innermost portion of the Great Harbour, between the city-wall and the river Anapus ; the Syracusans being masters everywhere else, with full communication between their posts all round, hemming in the Athenian position both by sea and by land.

To the Syracusans, on the contrary, the result of the recent battle proved every way encouraging. They detached a squadron of twelve triremes to the coast of Italy, for the purpose of intercepting some merchant-vessels coming with a supply of money to the Athenians. So little fear was there of an enemy at sea, that these vessels seem to have been coming without convoy, and were for the most part destroyed by the Syracusans, together with a stock of ship-timber which the Athenians had collected near Kaulonia. They were fortunate enough to escape the squadron of twenty triremes which Nikias detached to lie in wait for them near Megara.

One of this Syracusan squadron had gone forward from Italy with envoys to Peloponnesus, to communicate the favourable news of the capture of Plemmyrium, and to accelerate as much as possible the operations against Attica, in order that no reinforcements might be sent from thence. At the same time, other envoys went from Syracuse to visit the cities in the interior of Sicily. They strenuously pleaded for farther aid to Syracuse without delay, since there were now good hopes of being

¹ Thukyd., vii. 23 ; Diodor., xiii. 9 ; Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 20.

able to crush the Athenians in the harbour completely, before the reinforcements about to be despatched could reach them.

While these envoys were absent on their mission, the Great Harbour was the scene of much desultory conflict, though not of any comprehensive single battle. And this state of affairs in the Great Harbour stood substantially unaltered, during all the time that the envoys were absent on their Sicilian tour—probably three weeks or a month.

These envoys had found themselves almost everywhere well received. The prospects of Syracuse were now so triumphant, and those of Nikias with his present force so utterly hopeless, that the waverers thought it time to declare themselves; and all the Greek cities in Sicily, except Agrigentum, which still remained neutral (and of course except Naxos and Katana), resolved on aiding the winning cause. From Kamarina came 500 hoplites, 400 darters, and 300 bowmen; from Gela, 5 triremes, 400 darters, and 200 horsemen. Besides these, an additional force from the other cities was collected, to march to Syracuse in a body across the interior of the island, under the conduct of the envoys themselves. But this part of the scheme was frustrated by Nikias. At his instance, the Sikel tribes Kentoripes and Halikyæi, allies of Athens, were prevailed upon to attack the approaching enemy. They planned a skilful ambuscade, set upon them unawares, and dispersed them with the loss of 800 men. All the envoys were also slain, except the Corinthian, who conducted the remaining force (about 1,500 in number) to Syracuse.

This reverse—which seems to have happened about the time when Demosthenês with his armament were at Korkyra on the way to Syracuse—so greatly mortified the Syracusans, that Gylippus thought it advisable to postpone awhile the attack which he intended to have made immediately on the reinforcement arriving. The delay of these few days proved nothing less than the salvation of the Athenian army.

It was not until Demosthenês was approaching Rhegium, within two or three days' sail of Syracuse, that the attack was determined on without farther delay. The captains and ship-masters of Syracuse and Corinth had now become fully aware of the superiority of Athenian nautical manœuvre, and of the causes upon which that superiority depended. The Athenian trireme was of a build comparatively light, fit for rapid motion through the water, and for easy change of direction: its prow was narrow, armed with a sharp projecting beak at the end, but hollow and thin, not calculated to force its way through very strong resistance. It was never intended to meet, in direct impact and collision, the prow of an enemy. In advancing against an enemy's vessel, they evaded the direct shock, steered so as to pass by it—then by the excellence and exactness of their rowing, turned swiftly round, altered their direction, and came back before the enemy could alter his: or perhaps rowed rapidly round him—or backed their ship stern foremost—until the opportunity was found for driving the beak of their ship against some weak part of his—against the midships, the quarter, the stern, or the oar-blades without. In such manœuvres the Athenians were unrivalled: but none such could be performed unless there were ample sea-room—which rendered their present naval station the most disadvantageous that could be imagined. They were cooped up in the inmost part of a harbour of small dimensions, close on the station of their enemies, and with all the shore, except their

own lines, in possession of those enemies; so that they could not pull round from want of space, nor could they back water because they durst not come near shore. In this contracted area, the only mode of fighting possible was by straightforward collision, prow against prow, a process, which not only shut out all their superior manœuvring, but was unsuited to the build of their triremes. On the other hand, the Syracusans, under the advice of the able Corinthian steersman Aristo, altered the construction of their triremes to meet the special exigency of the case. Instead of the thin and sharp advancing beak, striking the enemy considerably above the water-level, they shortened the prow, but made it excessively heavy and solid—and lowered the elevation of the projecting beak: so that it became not so much calculated to pierce, as to break in and crush by main force all the opposing part of the enemy's ship, not far above the water. What were called the *epôtids*, 'ear-caps' or nozzles projecting forwards to the right and left of the beak, were made peculiarly thick and sustained by under-beams let into the hull of the ship¹. The Syracusans relied on the narrowness of the space, for shutting out the Athenian evolutions, and bringing the contest to nothing more than a straightforward collision, in which the weaker vessel would be broken and stove in at the prow, and thus rendered unmanageable.

The Athenians were putting themselves in position to defend their walls from what seemed to be a land-attack, when they saw the Syracusan fleet, 80 triremes strong, sailing out prepared for action: upon which they, too, though at first confused by this unexpected appearance, put their crews on shipboard, and went out of their palisaded station, 75 triremes in number. The whole day passed off, however, in desultory and indecisive skirmish.

It was competent to the Athenians to avoid altogether a naval action (at least until the necessity arose for escorting fresh supplies into the harbour) by keeping within their station; and as Demosthenês was now at hand, prudence counselled such reserve. Nikias himself, too, is said to have deprecated immediate fighting, but to have been out-voted by his two newly-appointed colleagues Menander and Euthydêmus, who, anxious to show what they could do without Demosthenês, took their stand upon Athenian maritime honour, which peremptorily forbade them to shrink from the battle when offered².

Though on the next day the Syracusans made no movement, Nikias caused every trierarch to repair what damage his ship had sustained; and even took the precaution of farther securing his naval station by mooring merchant-vessels just alongside of the openings in the palisade. The prows of these vessels were provided with dolphins—or beams lifted up on high and armed at the end with massive heads of iron, which could be so let fall as to crush any ship entering. At the earliest dawn of next day, the Syracusans reappeared, with the same demonstrations both of land-force and naval force as before. The Athenian fleet having gone

¹ Compare Thukyd., vii. 34-36; Diodor., xiii. 10; Eurip., *Iph. Taur.*, 1335.

It is Diodorus who specifies that the Corinthians lowered the level of their prows, so as to strike nearer to the water.

[For details concerning the bows of a Greek war-ship, cf. Torr, *Ancient Ships*, pp. 62 ff.

The *ραφεσπεριαί* which were to be torn by the Corinthian *ενωρίδες* (Thuk., vii. 34) are usually

explained as the extremities of the ship (Torr, *loc. cit.*); another theory represents them as outriggers (W. W. Tarn, in *Journ. Hellen. Stud.*, xxv. (1905), pp. 204-224).—Ed.]

² Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 20. Diodorus (xiii. 10) represents the battle as having been brought on against the wish and intention of the Athenians generally, not alluding to any difference of opinion among the commanders.

forth to meet them, several hours were spent in the like indecisive and partial skirmishes, until at length the Syracusan fleet sailed back to the city—again without bringing on any general or close combat. The Athenians, construing such retirement of the enemy as evidence of backwardness and unwillingness to fight, and supposing the day's duty at an end, retired on their side within their own station, and separated to get their dinners at leisure.

But ere they had been long ashore, they were astonished to see the Syracusan fleet sailing back to renew the attack, in full battle order. This was a manœuvre suggested by the Corinthian Aristo, the ablest steersman in the fleet. Confounded at the sight, the Athenian crews forced themselves again on board, most of them yet without refreshment, and in the midst of disorder. The indecisive skirmishing again commenced, and continued for some time—until at length the Athenian captains became so impatient of prolonged fatigue, that they resolved to begin of themselves, and make the action close as well as general. Accordingly the word of command was given, and they rowed forward to make the attack, which was cheerfully received by the Syracusans. By receiving the attack instead of making it, the latter were better enabled to ensure a straightforward collision of prow against prow, excluding all circuit, backing, or evolutions, on the part of the enemy: at any rate, their steersmen contrived to realize this plan, and to crush, stave in, or damage, the forepart of many of the Athenian triremes, simply by superior weight of material and solidity on their own side. The Syracusan darters on the deck, moreover, as soon as the combat became close, were both numerous and destructive; while their little boats rowed immediately under the sides of the Athenian triremes, broke the blades of their oars, and shot darts in through the oar-holes, against the rowers within. At length the Athenians, after sustaining the combat bravely for some time, found themselves at such disadvantage, that they were compelled to give way and to seek shelter within their own station. The armed merchant-vessels which Nikias had planted before the openings in the palisade were now found of great use in checking the pursuing Syracusans. The general victory of the Syracusans, however, was complete: seven Athenian triremes were sunk or disabled, many others were seriously damaged, and numbers of seamen either slain or made prisoners.

The generals were already concerting measures for renewed attack both by land and by sea, and a week or two more would probably have seen the ruin of this once triumphant besieging armament, now full of nothing but discouragement. The mere stoppage of supplies, in fact, as the Syracusans were masters of the mouth of the harbour, would be sure to starve it out in no long time, if they maintained their superiority at sea. All their calculations were suspended, however, and the hopes of the Athenians for the time revived, by the entry of Demosthenès and Eurymedon with the second armament into the Great Harbour; which seems to have taken place on the very day, or on the second day, after the recent battle.

Demosthenès, after obtaining the required reinforcements at Korkyra, had crossed the Ionian sea to the islands called Choerades on the coast of Iapygia, where he took aboard a band of 150 Messapian darters, through the friendly aid of the native prince Artas, with whom an ancient alliance

was renewed. Passing on farther to Metapontum, already in alliance with Athens, he was there reinforced with two triremes and three hundred darters, with which addition he sailed on to Thurii. Here he found himself cordially welcomed ; for the philo-Athenian party was in full ascendancy, having recently got the better in a vehement dissension, and passed a sentence of banishment against their opponents. They equipped a regiment of 700 hoplites and 300 darters to accompany Demosthenês, who marched his troops by land through the Thurian territory to the banks of the river Hylias which divided it from Kroton. He was here met by Krotoniate envoys, who forbade the access to their territory : upon which he marched down the river to the sea-shore, got on shipboard, and pursued his voyage southward along the coast of Italy—touching at the various towns, except the hostile Lokri.

Taking Athenians, allies, and mercenary forces, together—he conducted 73 triremes, 5,000 hoplites, and a large number of light troops of every description, archers, slingers, darters, etc., with other requisites for effective operation. At the sight of such an armament, not inferior to the first which had arrived under Nikias, the Syracusans lost for a moment the confidence of their recent triumph. That Athens could be rash enough to spare such an armament, at a moment when the full burst of Peloponnesian hostility was reopening upon her, and when Dekeleia was in course of being fortified, was a fact not to be credited unless actually seen. And probably, the Syracusans, though they knew that Demosthenês was on his way, had no idea beforehand of the magnitude of his armament.

On the other hand, the hearts of the discomfited and beleaguered Athenians again revived as they welcomed their new comrades. They saw themselves again masters by land as well as by sea ; and they displayed their renewed superiority by marching out of their lines forthwith and ravaging the lands near the Anapus, the Syracusans not venturing to engage in a general action, and merely watching the movement with some cavalry from the Olympieion.

But Demosthenês was not imposed upon by this delusive show of power, so soon as he had made himself master of the full state of affairs, and had compared his own means with those of the enemy. He found the army of Nikias not merely worn down with long-continued toil, but also weakened in a terrible degree by the marsh fever general towards the close of summer, in the low ground where they were encamped.

But above all, he came penetrated with the deplorable effects which had resulted from the mistake of Nikias, in wasting irreparably so much precious time. All these considerations determined Demosthenês to act without a moment's delay, while the impression produced by his arrival was yet unimpaired—and to aim one great and decisive blow, such as might, if successful, make the conquest of Syracuse again probable. If this should fail, he resolved to abandon the whole enterprise, and return home with his armament forthwith.

By means of the Athenian lines, he had possession of the southernmost portion of the slope of Epipolæ. But all along that slope from east to west, immediately in front or to the north of his position, stretched the counter-wall built by the Syracusans, beginning at the city-wall on the lowest ground, and reaching up first in a north-westerly, next in a westerly

direction, until it joined the fort on the upper ground near the cliff, where the road from Euryálus down to Syracuse passed. It was a complete bar to his progress, and he could not stir a step without making himself master of it, towards which end there were only two possible means—either to storm it in front, or to turn it from its western extremity by marching round up to the Euryálus. He began by trying the first method. But the wall was abundantly manned and vigorously defended; his battering machines were all burnt or disqualified, and every attempt which he made was completely repulsed. There remained only the second method—to turn the wall, ascending by circuitous roads to the heights of Euryálus behind it, and then attacking the fort in which it terminated.

But the march necessary for this purpose—first, up the valley of the Anapus, visible from the Syracusan posts above; next, ascending to the Euryálus by a narrow and winding path—was so difficult, that even Demosthenês despaired of being able to force his way up in the daylight. He was therefore constrained to attempt a night-surprise, for which he made preparations on the largest scale. He took the command himself, along with Menander and Eurymedon (Nikias being left to command within the lines¹)—conducting hoplites and light troops, together with masons and carpenters, and all other matters necessary for establishing a fortified post—lastly, giving orders that every man should carry with him provisions for five days.

Fortune so far favoured him, that not only all these preliminary arrangements, but even his march itself, was accomplished without any suspicion of the enemy. At the beginning of a moonlight night, he quitted the lines, moved along the low ground on the left bank of the Anapus and parallel to that river for a considerable distance—then following various roads to the right, arrived at the Euryálus or highest pitch of Epipolæ, where he found himself in the same track by which the Athenians in coming from Katana a year and a half before—and Gylippus in coming from the interior of the island about ten months before—had passed, in order to get to the slope of Epipolæ above Syracuse. He reached, without being discovered, the extreme Syracusan fort on the high ground—assailed it completely by surprise—and captured it after a feeble resistance. A regiment hastened up to the rescue, but the Athenian vanguard, charging impetuously forward, drove them back in disorder upon the fortified positions in their rear. Even Gylippus, and the Syracusan troops advancing upwards out of these positions, were at first carried back by the same retreating movement.

So far the enterprise of Demosthenês had been successful beyond all reasonable hope. He was master not only of the outer fort of the Syracusan position, but also of the extremity of their counter-wall which rested upon that fort. Some of the Athenians even began to tear down the parapets, and demolish this part of the counter-wall; an operation of extreme importance, since it would have opened to Demosthenês a communication with the southern side of the counter-wall, leading directly towards the Athenian lines on Epipolæ. At any rate, his plan of turning the counter-wall was already carried—if he could only have maintained himself in his actual position, even without advancing farther—and if he

¹ Thukyd., vii. 43. Diodorus tells us that Demosthenês took with him 10,000 hoplites, and

10,000 light troops—numbers which are not at all to be trusted (xiii. 11).

could have demolished two or three hundred yards of the upper extremity of the wall now in his power. But both he and his men, too much flushed with success to think of halting, hastened forward to complete their victory, and to prevent the disordered Syracusans from again recovering a firm array. Unfortunately, however, their ardour of pursuit (as it constantly happened with Grecian hoplites) disturbed the regularity of their own ranks, so that they were not in condition to stand the shock of the Bœotian hoplites, just emerged from their position, and marching up in steady and excellent order to the scene of action. The Bœotians charged, and after a short resistance, broke them completely. The fugitives of the van were thus driven back upon their own comrades advancing from behind—still under the impression of success, and themselves urged on by the fresh troops closing up in their rear.

In this manner the whole army presently became one scene of clamour and confusion. The Syracusans and Bœotians, shouting aloud and pursuing their advantage, became intermingled with the foremost Athenians, and both armies thus grouped into knots which only distinguished each other by mutual demand of the watchword. The Dorians in the Athenian army (from Argos, Korkyra, and other places) raised a pæan not distinguishable from that of the Syracusans: accordingly their shout struck terror into the Athenians themselves, who fancied that they had enemies in their own rear and centre. Such disorder and panic presently ended in a general flight. The Athenians hurried back by the same roads which they had ascended: but these roads were found too narrow for terrified fugitives, and many of them threw away their arms in order to scramble or jump down the cliffs, in which most of them perished. Even of those who safely effected their descent into the plain below, many (especially the new-comers belonging to the armament of Demosthenês) lost their way through ignorance, and were cut off the next day by the Syracusan horse. With terrible loss of numbers, and broken spirit, the Athenians at length found shelter within their own lines.

The Syracusans now again indulged the hope of storming the Athenian lines and destroying the armament; to which end, however, it was thought necessary to obtain additional reinforcements, and Gylippus went in person with this commission to the various cities of Sicily¹.

Demosthenês had done his best to strike one decisive blow: the chances of war had turned out against him; he now therefore insisted on relinquishing the whole enterprise and returning home forthwith. The season was yet favourable for the voyage (it seems to have been the beginning of August), whilst the triremes recently brought, as yet unused, rendered them masters at sea for the present. It was idle (he added) to waste more time and money in staying to carry on war against Syracuse, which they could not now hope to subdue; especially when Athens had so much need of them all at home, against the garrison of Dekeleia.

This proposition, though espoused and seconded by Eurymedon, was peremptorily opposed by Nikias; who contended, first, that their present distress and the unpromising chances for the future, ought not to be publicly proclaimed. A formal resolution to retire, passed in the presence of

¹ Thukyd., vii. 46. Plutarch (*Nikias*, c. 21) states that the number of slain was 2,000. Diodorus gives it at 2,500 (xiii. 11). Thukydides does not state it at all.

These two authors probably both copied from some common authority, not Thukydides; perhaps Philistus [quoted by Timæus].

so many persons, would inevitably become known to the enemy, and therefore could never be executed with silence and secrecy. But farthermore, he took a decided objection to the resolution itself. He would never consent to carry back the armament, without specific authority from home to do so. Sure he was, that the Athenian people would never tolerate such a proceeding. When submitted to the public assembly at home, the conduct of the generals would be judged, not by persons who had been at Syracuse and cognizant of the actual facts, but by hearers who would learn all that they knew from the artful speeches of criminative orators. Even the citizens actually serving would alter their tone when they were safe in the public assembly, and would turn round to denounce their generals as having been bribed to bring away the army. Sooner would he incur any extremity of risk from the enemy. It must be recollected too that if *their* affairs were now bad, those of Syracuse were as bad, and even worse. For more than a year, the war had been imposing upon the Syracusans a ruinous cost, in subsistence for foreign allies as well as in keeping up outlying posts—so that they had already spent 2,000 talents, besides heavy debts contracted and not paid. They could not continue in this course longer; yet the suspension of their payments would at once alienate their allies, and leave them helpless. The cost of the war (to which Demosthenês had alluded as a reason for returning home) could be much better borne by Athens; while a little farther pressure would utterly break down the Syracusans. He (Nikias) therefore advised to remain where they were and continue the siege; the more so as their fleet had now become unquestionably the superior.

Both Demosthenês and Eurymedon treated the plan of remaining in the Great Harbour as fraught with ruin, and insisted, at the very least, on quitting this position without a moment's delay. Even admitting the scruples of Nikias against abandoning the Syracusan war without formal authority from home, they still urged an immediate transfer of their camp from the Great Harbour to Thapsus or Katana. At either of these stations they could prosecute operations against Syracuse, with all the advantage of a wider range of country for supplies, a healthier spot, and above all of an open sea, which was absolutely indispensable to the naval tactics of Athenians.

But even to the modified motion of transferring the actual position to Thapsus or Katana, Nikias refused to consent. He insisted on remaining as they were; and it appears that Menander and Euthydemus (colleagues named by the assembly at home before the departure of the second armament) must have voted under the influence of his authority; whereby the majority became on his side. Nothing less than being in a minority, probably, would have induced Demosthenês and Eurymedon to submit—on a point of such transcendent importance.

It was thus that the Athenian armament remained without quitting the Harbour, yet apparently quite inactive, during a period which cannot have been less than between three weeks and a month, until Gylippus returned to Syracuse with fresh reinforcements.

So unaccountable did such obstinacy appear, that many persons gave Nikias credit for knowing more than he chose to reveal. Even Thukydidês thinks that he was misled by that party in Syracuse, with whom he had always kept up a secret correspondence (seemingly apart from his col-

leagues), and who still urged him, by special messages, not to go away ; assuring him that Syracuse could not possibly go on longer.

Nothing throughout the whole career of Nikias is so inexplicable as his guilty fatuity—for we can call it by no lighter name, seeing that it involved all the brave men around him in one common ruin with himself—at the present critical juncture. How can we suppose him to have really believed that the Syracusans, now in the flood-tide of success, and when Gylippus was gone forth to procure additional forces, would break down and be unable to carry on the war ?

But we discern on the present occasion another motive, which counts for much in dictating his hesitation. Nikias knew too well the reception which he had deserved. But in the first place, we may remark that Demosthenēs and Eurymedon, though as much responsible as he was for this decision, had no such fear of popular injustice ; or if they had, saw clearly that the obligation of braving it was here imperative. And in the next place, no man ever had so little reason to complain of the popular judgment as Nikias. To Nikias—a perfectly brave man, and suffering withal under an incurable disease—life at Athens had neither charm nor honour left. Hence, as much as from any other reason, he was induced to withhold the order for departure, clinging to the hope that some unforeseen boon of fortune might yet turn up.

Nearly a month after the night-battle on Epipolæ¹, Gylippus returned to Syracuse, and brought with him a considerable force of Sicilian Greeks, together with those Peloponnesian hoplites who had started from Cape Tænarus in the early spring, and had made their way from Kyrênê first along the coast of Africa, and then across to Selinus. Such increase of strength immediately determined the Syracusans to resume the aggressive, both by land and by sea. Demosthenēs now again pressed the resolution for immediate departure. Whatever fancies Nikias may have indulged about Syracusan embarrassments, were dissipated by the arrival of Gylippus ; nor did he venture to persist in his former peremptory opposition. He, however, insisted with good reason, that no formal or public vote should be taken on the occasion—but that the order should be circulated through the camp, as privately as possible, to be ready for departure at a given signal. Intimation was sent to Katana that the armament was on the point of coming away—with orders to forward no farther supplies.

This plan was proceeding successfully : the ships were made ready—the signal would have been hoisted on the ensuing morning—and within a few hours, this armament would have found itself clear of the harbour, with comparatively small loss²—when the Gods themselves (I speak in the language and feelings of the Athenian camp) interfered to forbid its departure. On the very night before (the 27th August, 413 B.C.)—which was full moon—the moon was eclipsed. Such a portent, impressive to the Athenians at all times, was doubly so under their present despondency, and many of them construed it as a divine prohibition against departure until a certain time should have elapsed, with expiatory ceremonies to take off the effect. They made known their wish for postponement to

¹ This interval may be inferred (see Dodwell, *Ann. Thucyd.*, vii. 50) from the state of the moon at the time of the battle of Epipolæ, compared with the subsequent eclipse.

² Diodor., xiii. 12 : Οἱ στρατιῶται τὰ σκεύη ἐνερθεύοντο, &c. Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 23.

Nikias and his colleagues; but their interference was superfluous, for Nikias himself was more deeply affected than anyone else. He consulted the prophets, who declared that the army ought not to decamp until thrice nine days, a full circle of the moon, should have passed over¹. And Nikias took upon himself to announce, that until after the interval indicated by them, he would not permit even any discussion or proposition on the subject.

The decision of the prophets was obeyed without hesitation. Even Demosthenês found himself compelled to yield. Yet according to Philochorus (himself a professional diviner, skilful in construing the religious meaning of events), it was a decision decidedly wrong, that is, wrong according to the canonical principles of divination. To men planning escape or any other operation requiring silence and secrecy, an eclipse of the moon, as hiding light and producing darkness, was an encouraging sign, and ought to have made the Athenians even more willing and forward in quitting the harbour².

Such a resolution, amounting to an unequivocal confession of helplessness, emboldened the Syracusans yet farther, to crush them as they were in the harbour, and never to permit them to occupy even any other post in Sicily. Accordingly Gylippus brought out all his forces, both land and naval, with the former of which he beset the Athenian lines, while the fleet, 76 triremes in number, was directed to sail up to the Athenian naval station. The Athenian fleet, 86 triremes strong, sailed out to meet it, and a close and desperate action took place. The Syracusans first beat the centre division of the Athenians; next, the right division under Eurymedon, who in attempting an evolution to outflank the enemy's left, forgot those narrow limits of the harbour which were at every turn the ruin of the Athenian mariner—neared the land too much—and was pinned up against it. He was here slain, and his division destroyed: successively, the entire Athenian fleet was beaten and driven ashore.

Few of the defeated ships could get into their own station. Most of them were forced ashore or grounded on points without those limits; upon which Gylippus marched down his land-force to the water's edge, in order to prevent the retreat of the crews. His march, however, was so hurried and disorderly, that the Tyrrhenian troops, on guard at the flank of the Athenian station, sallied out against them as they approached, and drove them away from the shore³. More Syracusan troops came to their aid; but the Athenians also, anxious above all things for the protection of their ships, came forth in greater numbers; and a general battle

¹ The moon was totally eclipsed on this night, August 27, 413 B.C., from 27 minutes past 9 to 34 minutes past 10 p.m. (Wurm, *De Ponderib. Græcor.*, § xciv., p. 184)—speaking with reference to an observer in Sicily.

Thukydides states that Nikias adopted the injunction of the prophets, to tarry *thrice nine days* (vii. 50). Diodorus says *three days*. Plutarch intimates that Nikias went beyond the injunction of the prophets, who only insisted on *three days*, while he resolved on remaining for an entire lunar period (Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 23).

I follow the statement of Thukydides: there is no reason to believe that Nikias would lengthen the time beyond what the prophets prescribed.

The erroneous statement respecting this memorable event, in so respectable an author as Polybius, is not a little surprising (Polyb., ix. 19).

² Compare the description of the effect produced by the eclipse of the sun at Thebes, immediately prior to the last expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly (Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, c. 31).

³ E. Meyer (*Gesch. d. Alt.*, vol. iv., § 658) conjectures that this feat was performed, not by Tyrrhenians, but by some Campanian mercenaries whom Diodorus (xiii. 44) mentions as hired by the Athenians at the suggestion of their allies. But it is improbable that Thukydides blundered on this point, especially since he mentions a Tyrrhenian naval contingent in vi. 103. Moreover, it is not surprising to find the Tyrrhenians helping Athens, a city with which they were bound by a brisk commercial intercourse, against the Syracusans, who had vigorously repressed their privateers (Diod., xi. 87, 88).—ED.

ensued in which the latter were victorious. Except for this success on land, the entire Athenian fleet would have been destroyed: as it was, the defeat was still complete, and eighteen triremes were lost, all their crews being slain. As the Athenians were hauling in their disabled triremes, the Syracusans made a last effort to destroy them by means of a fireship, for which the wind happened to be favourable. But the Athenians found means to prevent her approach, and to extinguish the flames¹.

The Syracusans, fully alive to the importance of their victory, already looked on the enemy within it as their prisoners. They determined to close up and guard the mouth of it, from Plemmyrium to Ortygia, so as to leave no farther liberty of exit. It was not merely to rescue their own city from siege, nor even to repel and destroy the besieging army, that they were now contending. It was to extinguish the entire power of Athens, and liberate the half of Greece from dependence. Their pride swelled when they reflected on the Pan-Hellenic importance which the siege of Syracuse had now acquired, and when they counted up the number and variety of Greek warriors who were now fighting, on one side or the other, between Euryâlus and Plemmyrium. With the exception of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy, never before had combatants so many and so miscellaneous been engaged under the same banners. Greeks continental and insular—Ionic, Doric, and Æolic—autonomous and dependent—volunteers and mercenaries—from Miletus and Chios in the east to Selinus in the west—were all here to be found; and not merely Greeks, but also the barbaric Sikels, Egestæans, Tyrrhenians, and Iapygians. If the Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, and Bœotians, were fighting on the side of Syracuse—the Argeians and Mantineians, not to mention the great insular cities, stood in arms against her.

It was their first operation, occupying three days, to close up the mouth of the Great Harbour, which was nearly one mile broad, with vessels of every description—triremes, traders, boats, etc.—anchored in an oblique direction, and chained together². They at the same time prepared their naval force with redoubled zeal for the desperate struggle which they knew to be coming.

Nikias and his colleagues called together the principal officers to deliberate what was to be done. As they had few provisions remaining, and had counter-ordered their farther supplies, some instant and desperate effort was indispensable; and the only point in debate was, whether they should burn their fleet and retire by land, or make a fresh maritime exertion to break out of the harbour. Such had been the impression left by the recent sea-fight, that many in the camp leaned to the former scheme³. But the generals resolved upon first trying the latter, and exhausted all their combinations to give to it the greatest possible effect. They now evacuated the upper portion of their lines, both on the higher ground of Epipolæ, and even on the lower ground, such portion as was nearest to the southern cliff, in order to leave nearly their whole force disposable for sea-service. They then made ready every trireme in the station which could be rendered ever so imperfectly seaworthy, constraining every fit man to serve aboard them, without distinction of age, rank, or country.

¹ Thukyd., vii. 52, 53; Diodor., xiii. 13.

² Thukyd., vii. 59; Diodor., xiii. 14.

³ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 24.

The triremes were manned with double crews of soldiers, hoplites as well as bowmen and darters—the latter mostly Akarnanians; while the hoplites, stationed at the prow with orders to board the enemy as quickly as possible, were furnished with grappling-irons to detain the enemy's ship immediately after the moment of collision, in order that it might not be withdrawn and the collision repeated, with all its injurious effects arising from the strength and massiveness of the Syracusan epôtids.

Nikias did his best to revive their energy, by exhortations unusually emphatic and impressive. 'Recollect (he said) that you, too, not less than the Syracusans, are now fighting for your own safety and for your country; for it is only by victory in the coming struggle that any of you can ever hope to see his country again. We generals have now made effective provision against our two great disadvantages—the narrow circuit of the harbour, and the thickness of the enemy's prows. Sad as the necessity is, we have thrown aside all our Athenian skill and tactics, and have prepared to fight under the conditions forced upon us by the enemy—a land battle on shipboard. It will be for you to conquer in this last desperate struggle, where there is no friendly shore to receive you if you give way. You, hoplites on the deck, as soon as you have the enemy's trireme in contact, keep him fast, and relax not until you have swept away his hoplites and mastered his deck. You, seamen and rowers, must yet keep up your courage. You are better defended on deck above, and you have more triremes to help you, than in the recent defeat. Such of you as are not Athenian citizens, I entreat to recollect the valuable privileges which you have hitherto enjoyed from serving in the navy of Athens¹. For such of you as *are* Athenians, I again remind you that Athens has neither fresh triremes, nor fresh hoplites, to replace those now here. Unless you are now victorious, her enemies near home will find her defenceless; and our countrymen there will become slaves to Sparta, as you will to Syracuse. Recollect, every man of you, that you now going aboard here are the *all* of Athens—her hoplites, her ships, her entire remaining city, and her splendid name'.

Immediately on the conclusion of his address, the order was given to go aboard, and the seamen took their places. But when the triremes were fully manned, and the trierarchs, after superintending the embarkation, were themselves about to enter and push off—the agony of Nikias was too great to be repressed. Feeling more keenly than any man the intensity of this last death struggle, he still thought that he had not said enough for the occasion. He now renewed his appeal personally to the trierarchs—all of them citizens of rank and wealth at Athens. He cared not for being suspected of trenching upon the commonplaces of rhetoric: he caught at every topic which could touch the inmost affections, awaken the in-bred patriotism, and rekindle the abated courage of the officers, whom he was sending forth to this desperate venture. He at length constrained himself to leave off, still fancying in his anxiety that

¹ Dr. Arnold, following the Scholiast, explains these words as having particular reference to the metics in the Athenian naval service. But I cannot think this correct. All persons in that service—who were freemen, but not yet citizens of Athens—are here designated; partly metics, doubtless, but partly also citizens of the islands and dependent allies—the *ἐξένοι ναυδάται* alluded

to by the Corinthians and by Periklēs at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thukyd., i. 121-143) as the *ὠνητὴ δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία* of Athens. Without doubt there were numerous foreign seamen in the warlike navy of Athens, who derived great consideration as well as profit from the service, and often passed themselves off for Athenian citizens when they really were not so.

he ought to say more—and proceeded to marshal the land-force for the defence of the lines, as well as along the shore, where they might render as much service as possible to the combatants on shipboard¹.

Very different was the spirit prevalent on the sea-board of the Syracusan station. They had been apprised of the grappling-irons now about to be employed by the Athenians, and had guarded against them in part by stretching hides along their bows, so that the 'iron-hand' might slip off without acquiring any hold. The preparatory movements even within the Athenian station being perfectly visible, Gylippus sent the fleet out with the usual prefatory harangue. He complimented them on the great achievements which they had already performed in breaking down the naval power of Athens, so long held irresistible. He reminded them that the sally of their enemies was only a last effort of despair, undertaken without confidence in themselves, and under the necessity of throwing aside all their own tactics in order to copy feebly those of the Syracusans. He called upon them to recollect the destructive purposes which the invaders had brought with them against Syracuse, to inflict with resentful hand the finishing stroke upon this half-ruined armament, and to taste the delight of satiating a legitimate revenge.

The Syracusan fleet—76 triremes strong, as in the last battle—was the first to put off from shore. A certain proportion of them were placed near the mouth of the harbour, in order to guard the barrier; while the rest were distributed around the harbour, in order to attack the Athenians from different sides as soon as they should approach. Moreover, the surface of the harbour swarmed with the light craft of the Syracusans², boats of no mean service during the battle, saving or destroying the seamen cast overboard from disabled ships. From the Athenian station presently came forth 110 triremes, under Demosthenês, Menander, and Euthydêmus, and steered across direct to the mouth of the harbour. Inside of this narrow basin, rather more than five English miles in circuit, 194 ships of war, each manned with more than 200 men, were about to join battle—in the presence of countless masses around, near enough both to see and hear; the most picturesque battle probably in history, without smoke or other impediments to vision, and in the clear atmosphere of Sicily—a serious realization of those *Naumachiæ* which the Roman emperors used to exhibit with gladiators on the Italian lakes, for the recreation of the people.

The Athenian fleet made directly for that portion of the barrier where a narrow opening had been left for merchant-vessels. Their first impetuous attack broke through the Syracusan squadron defending it, and they were already attempting to sever its connecting bonds, when the enemy from all sides crowded in upon them and forced them to desist. Presently the battle became general, and the combatants were distributed in various parts of the harbour. At the first onset, the skill and tactics of the steersmen shone conspicuous. As the vessels neared, the bowmen, slingers, and throwers on the deck hurled clouds of missiles against the enemy—next was heard the loud crash of the two impinging metallic

¹ See the striking chapter of Thukyd., vii. 69. Even the tame style of Diodorus (xiii. 15) becomes animated in describing this scene.

² Diodorus, xiii. 14.

It is to be recollected that both Plutarch and Diodorus had probably read, through the medium

of Timæus, the description of the battles in the Great Harbour of Syracuse, contained in Philistus; a better witness, if we had his account before us, even than Thukydides, since he was probably at this time in Syracuse, and was perhaps actually engaged.

fronts, resounding all along the shore. When the vessels were thus once in contact, they were rarely allowed to separate: a strenuous hand-fight then commenced by the hoplites in each, trying respectively to board and master their enemy's deck.

For a long time victory was altogether doubtful, and the whole harbour was a scene of partial encounters, wherein sometimes Syracusans, sometimes Athenians, prevailed. According as success thus fluctuated, so followed the cheers or wailings of the spectators ashore. But at length the moment came, after a long-protracted struggle, when victory began to declare in favour of the Syracusans, who, perceiving that their enemies were slackening, redoubled their efforts, and pushed them back towards the land. All the Athenian triremes were thrust ashore like shipwrecked vessels in or near their own station, a few being even captured before they could arrive there. Some of the land-force rushed to rescue the ships and their crews from pursuit, others to man their walls in case of attack from land: many were even paralysed at the sight, and absorbed with the thoughts of their own irretrievable ruin.

Such was the close of this decisive combat. The modern historian strives in vain to convey the impression of it which appears in the condensed and burning phrases of Thukydides. The Greeks who fight, like the Greeks who look on, are not soldiers withdrawn from the community, and specialized as well as hardened by long professional training—but citizens with all their passions, instincts, sympathies, joys, and sorrows, of domestic as well as political life. Moreover, the non-military population in ancient times had an interest of the most intense kind in the result of the struggle, which made the difference to them, if not of life and death, at least of the extremity of happiness and misery. When we read the few but most vehement words which he employs to depict the Athenian camp under this fearful trial, we must recollect that these were not only men whose all was at stake, but that they were moreover citizens full of impressibility—sensitive and demonstrative Greeks, and indeed the most sensitive and demonstrative of all Greeks. To repress all manifestations of strong emotion was not considered, in ancient times, essential to the dignity of the human character.

Amidst all the deep pathos, however, which the great historian has imparted to the final battle at Syracuse, he has not explained the causes upon which its ultimate issue turned. Considering that the Athenians were superior to their enemies in number, as 110 to 76 triremes—that they fought with courage not less heroic—and that the action was on their own element; we might have anticipated for them, if not a victory, at least a drawn battle, with equal loss on both sides. But we may observe—1. The number of 110 triremes was formed by including some hardly seaworthy. 2. The crews were composed partly of men not used to sea-service; and the Akarnanian darters, especially, were for this reason unhandy with their missiles. 3. Though the water had been hitherto the element favourable to Athens, yet her superiority in this respect was declining, and her enemies approaching nearer to her, even in the open sea. But the narrow dimensions of the harbour would have nullified her superiority at all times, and placed her even at great disadvantage—like a nimble pugilist of light weight contending, in a very confined ring, against superior weight and muscle. 4. The Syracusans enjoyed great

advantage from having nearly the whole harbour lined round with their soldiers and friends, not simply from the force of encouraging sympathy—no mean auxiliary, but because any of their triremes, if compelled to fall back before an Athenian, found protection on the shore, and could return to the fight at leisure, while an Athenian in the same predicament had no escape. 5. The numerous light craft of the Syracusans doubtless rendered great service in this battle, as they had done in the preceding¹. 6. Lastly, both in the Athenian and Syracusan characters—the pressure of necessity was less potent, as a stimulus to action, than hopeful confidence, with the idea of a flood-tide yet mounting. In the character of some other races, the Jews for instance, the comparative force of these motives appears to be reversed.

About 60 Athenian triremes, little more than half of the fleet which came forth, were saved as the wreck from this terrible conflict. The Syracusans on their part had also suffered severely, only 50 triremes remaining out of 76. So utterly did the pressure of suffering benumb the Athenians, that no man among them, not even the ultra-religious Nikias, thought of picking up the floating bodies or asking for a truce to bury the dead.

Such despair, however, was not shared by the generals; to their honour be it spoken. On the afternoon of this terrible defeat, Demosthenês proposed to Nikias that at daybreak the ensuing morning they should man all the remaining ships—even now more in number than the Syracusan—and make a fresh attempt to break out of the harbour. To this Nikias agreed, and both proceeded to try their influence in getting the resolution executed. But so irreparably was the spirit of the seamen broken, that nothing could prevail upon them to go again on shipboard. Preparations were therefore made for commencing their march in the darkness of that very night. The roads were still open, and had they so marched, a portion of them, at least, might even yet have been saved². But there occurred one farther postponement—which cut off the last hopes of this remnant.

The Syracusan Hermokratês, fully anticipating that the Athenians would decamp that very night, was eager to prevent their retreat, because of the mischief which they might do if established in any other part of Sicily. He pressed Gylippus to send out forthwith, and block up the principal roads, passes, and fords, by which the fugitives would get off. Though sensible of the wisdom of his advice, the generals thought it wholly unexecutable. Such was the universal and unbounded joy which now pervaded the city, that an order to arm and march out would have been as little heeded as the order to go on shipboard was by the desponding Athenians. Perceiving that he could get nothing done until the next morning, Hermokratês resorted to a stratagem in order to delay the departure of the Athenians for that night. At the moment when darkness was beginning, he sent down some confidential friends on horseback to the Athenian wall. These men, riding up near enough to make themselves heard, and calling for the sentries, addressed them as messengers

¹ From the sixth century onwards the build of Greek men-of-war seems to have tended towards uniformity, and since the Persian wars all actions of importance were fought out with triremes. The Syracusans first began that differentiation into heavy and light vessels which became prevalent

in the naval warfare of the Hellenistic and Roman age, when we find Egypt and Carthage sending out fleets of quinqueremes, the Illyrians and pirates relying on their light craft.—Ed.

² Diodor., xiii. 18.

from the private correspondents of Nikias in Syracuse, who had sent to warn him (they affirmed) not to decamp during the night, inasmuch as the Syracusans had already beset and occupied the roads; but to begin his march quietly the next morning after adequate preparation.

This fraud was perfectly successful: the sincerity of the information was believed, and the advice adopted. Had Demosthenès been in command alone, we may doubt whether he would have been so easily duped; for granting the accuracy of the fact asserted, it was not the less obvious that the difficulties, instead of being diminished, would be increased tenfold on the following day. We have seen, however, on more than one previous occasion, how fatally Nikias was misled by his treacherous advices from the philo-Athenians at Syracuse. Having remained over that night, the generals determined also to stay the next day—in order that the army might carry away with them as much of their baggage as possible—sending forward a messenger to the Sikels in the interior to request that they would meet the army, and bring with them a supply of provisions. Gylippus and Hermokratès had thus ample time, on the following day, to occupy all the positions convenient for obstructing the Athenian march. They at the same time towed into Syracuse as prizes all the Athenian triremes which had been driven ashore in the recent battle, and which now lay like worthless hulks, unguarded and unheeded.

It was on the next day but one after the maritime defeat that Nikias and Demosthenès put their army in motion to attempt retreat. The camp had long been a scene of sickness and death from the prevalence of marsh fever; but since the recent battle, the number of wounded men and the unburied bodies of the slain, had rendered it yet more pitiable. Forty thousand¹ miserable men now set forth to quit it. Many had little or no provisions to carry; but of those who had, every man carried his own—even the horsemen and hoplites, now for the first time either already left without slaves by desertion, or knowing that no slave could now be trusted.

But it was not until the army had actually begun its march that the full measure of wretchedness was felt and manifested. It was then that the necessity first became proclaimed of leaving behind not merely the unburied bodies, but also the sick and the wounded.

The generals did their best to keep up some sense of order as well as courage; and Nikias, particularly, in this closing hour of his career, displayed a degree of energy and heroism which he had never before seemed to possess. Though himself among the greatest personal sufferers of all, from his incurable complaint, he was seen everywhere in the ranks, marshalling the troops, heartening up their dejection, and addressing them with a voice more commanding than was his wont.

'Keep up your hope still, Athenians (he said), even as we are now: others have been saved out of circumstances worse than ours. I, too, having no advantage over any of you in strength (nay, you see the condition to which I have been brought by my disease), and accustomed even to superior splendour and good fortune in private as well as public life—

¹ Thukydides' estimate (vii. 75) seems somewhat exaggerated. It is difficult to understand how such a large force could have survived so many months of war and disease. Besides, in c. 82 the number of men who surrendered with Demosthenès is given as 6,000, and as this body repre-

sented more than half the army (c. 80), we should be compelled to suppose the first four days of the retreat reduced the army from 40,000 to 10,000 or 12,000 (*cf.* E. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.* vol. iv., § 678).—Ed.

I too am plunged in the same peril with the humblest soldier among you. Nevertheless, my conduct has been constantly pious towards the gods, as well as just and blameless towards men; in recompense for which, my hope for the future is yet sanguine. Perhaps, indeed, our misfortunes may from this time forward abate; for our enemies have had their full swing of good fortune, and if at the moment of our starting we were under the jealous wrath of any of the gods, we have already undergone chastisement amply sufficient. We may reasonably hope henceforward to have the offended god dealing with us more mildly—for we are now objects fitter for his compassion than for his jealousy¹. Look, moreover, at your own ranks, hoplites so numerous and so excellent: let that guard you against excessive despair, and recollect that wherever you may sit down, you are yourselves at once a city; there is no city in Sicily that can either repulse your attack or expel you if you choose to stay. As our provisions are very scanty, we shall hasten on night and day alike; and so soon as you reach any friendly village of the Sikels, who still remain constant to us from hatred to Syracuse, then consider yourselves in security. Once more, soldiers, recollect that to act like brave men is now a matter of necessity to you—and that if you falter, there is no refuge for you anywhere. Whereas if you now get clear of your enemies, such of you as are not Athenians will again enjoy the sight of home, while such of you as *are* Athenians will live to renovate the great power of our city, fallen though it now be. *It is men that make a city—not walls, nor ships without men.*'

The army was distributed into two divisions; the hoplites marching in a hollow oblong, with the baggage and unarmed in the interior. The front division was commanded by Nikias, the rear by Demosthenēs. Directing their course towards the Sikel territory, in the interior of the island, they first marched along the left bank of the Anapus until they came to the ford of that river, which they found guarded by a Syracusan detachment. They forced the passage, however, without much resistance, and accomplished on that day a march of about five miles. Encamping for that night on an eminence, they recommenced their march with the earliest dawn, and halted, after about two miles and a half, in a deserted village on a plain. As their intended line of march had now become evident, the Syracusans profited by this halt to get on before them, and to occupy in force a position on the road, called the Akraean cliff. Here the road, ascending a high hill, formed a sort of ravine bordered on each side by steep cliffs. The Syracusans erected a wall or barricade across the whole breadth of the road, and occupied the high ground on each side. But even to reach this pass was beyond the competence of the Athenians; so impracticable was it to get over the ground in the face of overwhelming attacks from the enemy's cavalry and light troops. They were compelled, after a short march, to retreat to their camp of the night before.

Every hour added to the distress of their position; for their food was

¹ This is a remarkable illustration of the doctrine, so frequently set forth in Herodotus, that the gods were jealous of any man or any nation who was pre-eminently powerful, fortunate, or prosperous. Nikias, recollecting the immense manifestation and promise with which his armament had started from Peiræus, now believed

that this had provoked the jealousy of some of the gods, and brought about the misfortunes in Sicily.

Compare the story of Amasis and Polykratēs in Herodotus (iii. 39), and the striking remarks put into the mouth of Paulus Æmilius by Plutarch (*Vit. Paul. Æmil.*, c. 36).

all but exhausted, nor could any man straggle from the main body without encountering certain destruction from the cavalry. Accordingly, on the next morning, they tried one more desperate effort to get over the hilly ground into the interior. Starting very early, they arrived at the foot of the hill called the Akraean cliff, where they found the barricades placed across the road, with deep files of Syracusan hoplites behind them, and crowds of light troops lining the cliffs on each border. They made the most strenuous efforts to force this position, but all their struggles were vain.

Exhausted by their fruitless efforts, the Athenians fell back a short space to repose, when Gylippus tried to surround them by sending a detachment to block up the narrow road in their rear. This, however, they prevented, effecting their retreat into the open plain, where they passed the night, and on the ensuing day, attempted once more the hopeless march over the Akraean cliff. But they were not allowed even to advance so far as the pass and the barricade. They were so assailed and harassed by the cavalry and darters, in flank and rear, that in spite of heroic effort and endurance, they could not accomplish a progress of so much as one single mile. Extenuated by fatigue, half-starved, and with numbers of wounded men, they were compelled to spend a third night in the same plain.

As soon as the Syracusans had retired for the night to their camp, Nikias and Demosthenês took counsel. They saw plainly that the route which they had originally projected, over the Akraean cliff into the Sikel regions of the interior and from thence to Katana, had become impracticable. Accordingly they resolved to make off during the night, leaving numerous fires burning to mislead the enemy; but completely to alter the direction, and to turn down towards the southern coast on which lay Kamarina and Gela. Their guides informed them that if they could cross the river Kakyparis, which fell into the sea south of Syracuse, on the south-eastern coast of Sicily—or a river still farther on called the Erineus—they might march up the right bank of either into the regions of the interior. Accordingly they broke up in the night, when the front division of the army under Nikias got into full march, and made considerable advance. By daybreak this division reached the south-eastern coast of the island not far south of Syracuse and fell into the track of the Helôrîne road, which they pursued until they arrived at the Kakyparis. Even here, however, they found a Syracusan detachment beforehand with them, raising a redoubt, and blocking up the ford; nor could Nikias pass it without forcing his way through them. He marched straight forward to the Erineus, which he crossed on the same day, and encamped his troops on some high ground on the other side.

Except at the ford of the Kakyparis, his march had been all day unobstructed by the enemy. He thought it wiser to push his troops as fast as possible in order to arrive at some place both of safety and subsistence, without concerning himself about the rear division under Demosthenês. That division, the larger half of the army, started both later and in greater disorder. Unaccountable panics and darkness made them part company or miss their way, so that Demosthenês, with all his efforts to keep them together, fell much behind Nikias. He was overtaken by the Syracusans during the forenoon, seemingly before he reached the Kaky-

paris—and at a moment when the foremost division was nearly six miles ahead.

When the Syracusans discovered at dawn that their enemy had made off in the night, their first impulse was to accuse Gylippus of treachery in having permitted the escape. Such ungrateful surmises, however, were soon dissipated, and the cavalry set forth in rapid pursuit, until they overtook the rear division, which they immediately began to attack and impede. The advance of Demosthenês had been tardy before, and his division disorganized; but he was now compelled to turn and defend himself against an indefatigable enemy, who presently got before him, and thus stopped him altogether. Their numerous light troops and cavalry assailed him on all sides and without intermission, employing nothing but missiles, however, and taking care to avoid any close encounter. While this unfortunate division were exerting their best efforts both to defend themselves, and if possible to get forward, they found themselves enclosed in a walled olive-ground, through the middle of which the road passed. Entangled and huddled up in this enclosure, from whence exit at the farther end in the face of an enemy was found impossible, they were now overwhelmed with hostile missiles from the walls on all sides. Though unable to get at the enemy, they endured incessant harassing for the greater part of the day, until at length the remaining spirit of the unhappy sufferers was thoroughly broken. Perceiving their condition, Gylippus sent to them a herald with a proclamation, inviting all the islanders among them to come forth from the rest, and promising them freedom if they did so. The inhabitants of some cities, yet not many—a fact much to their honour—availed themselves of this offer, and surrendered. Presently, however, a larger negotiation was opened, which ended by the entire division capitulating upon terms, and giving up their arms. Gylippus and the Syracusans engaged that the lives of all should be spared, that is, that none should be put to death either by violence, or by intolerable bonds, or by starvation. Having all been disarmed, they were forthwith conveyed away as prisoners to Syracuse—6,000 in number. Disdaining either to surrender or to make any stipulation for himself personally, Demosthenês was on the point of killing himself with his own sword the moment that the capitulation was concluded; but his intention was prevented, and he was carried off a disarmed prisoner, by the Syracusans¹.

On the next day, Gylippus and the victorious Syracusans overtook Nikias on the right bank of the Erineus, apprised him of the capitulation of Demosthenês, and summoned him to capitulate also. He demanded leave to send a horseman, for the purpose of verifying the statement; and on the return of the horseman, he made a proposition to Gylippus—that his army should be permitted to return home, on condition of Athens reimbursing to Syracuse the whole expense of the war, and furnishing hostages until payment should be made, one citizen against each talent of silver. These conditions were rejected; but Nikias could not yet bring himself to submit to the same terms for his division as Demosthenês. Accordingly the Syracusans recommenced their attacks, which the Athenians, in spite of hunger and fatigue, sustained as they best could

¹ This statement depends upon the very good authority of the contemporary Syracusan Philis-

tus: see Pausanias, i. 29, 9; *Philisti Fragm.*, 46, ed. Didot.

until night. It was the intention of Nikias again to take advantage of the night for the purpose of getting away. But on this occasion, the Syracusans were on the watch, and as soon as they heard movement in the camp, they raised the war-shout, thus showing that they were on the look-out, and inducing the Athenians again to lay down the arms which they had taken up for departure. A detachment of 300 Athenians, nevertheless, still persisting in marching off, apart from the rest, forced their way through the posts of the Syracusans. These men got safely away, and nothing but the want of guides prevented them from escaping altogether.

During all this painful retreat, the personal resolution displayed by Nikias was exemplary. It was now the sixth day of the retreat, yet Nikias early in the morning attempted a fresh march, in order to get to the river Asinarus, which falls into the same sea, south of the Erineus, but is a more considerable stream, flowing deeply imbedded between lofty banks. This was a last effort of despair, with little hope of final escape, even if they did reach it. Yet the march was accomplished, in spite of renewed and incessant attacks all the way, from the Syracusan cavalry, who even got to the river before the Athenians, occupying the ford, and lining the high banks near it. Here the resolution of the fugitives at length gave way: when they reached the river, their strength, their patience, and their hopes for the future, were all extinct. Tormented with raging thirst, and compelled by the attacks of the cavalry to march in one compact mass, they rushed into the ford all at once, treading down and tumbling over each other in the universal avidity for drink. Meanwhile the Syracusans from above poured upon the huddled mass showers of missiles, while the Peloponnesian hoplites even descended into the river, came to close quarters with them, and slew considerable numbers.

Helpless and demoralized as the army now was, Nikias could think no farther of resistance. He accordingly surrendered himself to Gylippus, to be dealt with at the discretion of that general and of the Lacedæmonians¹: Gylippus gave orders that no more should be killed, but that the rest should be secured as captives.

The number of prisoners thus made is not positively specified by Thukydides, as in the case of the division of Demosthenês. Of the captives from the division of Nikias, the larger proportion were seized by private individuals, and fraudulently secreted for their own profit; the number obtained for the state being comparatively small, seemingly not more than 1,000². The various Sicilian towns became soon full of these prisoners, sold as slaves for private account.

Perhaps not less than 40,000 persons in the aggregate had started from the Athenian camp to commence the retreat, six days before. The number was successively thinned, by wounds, privations, and straggling; so that the 6,000 taken with Demosthenês, and perhaps 3,000 or 4,000 captured with Nikias, formed the remnant. Of the stragglers during the march, however, we are glad to learn that many contrived to escape the Syracusan cavalry and get to Katana—where also those who afterwards ran away from their slavery under private masters, found a refuge. These fugitive

¹ Thukyd., vii. 83, 86; Philistus, *Fragm.*, 46, ed. Didot; Pausanias, i. 29, 9.

² Thukydides states, roughly and without pretending to exact means of knowledge, that the total number of captives brought to Syracuse

under public supervision, was not less than 7,000 (vii. 87). As the number taken with Demosthenês was 6,000 (vii. 82), this leaves 1,000 as having been obtained from the division of Nikias.

Athenians served as auxiliaries to repel the attacks of the Syracusans upon Katana¹.

It was in this manner, chiefly, that Athens came to receive again within her bosom a few of those ill-fated sons whom she had drafted forth in two such splendid divisions to Sicily. For of those who were carried as prisoners to Syracuse, fewer yet could ever have got home. They were placed, for safe custody, along with the other prisoners, in the stone-quarries of Syracuse. Into these quarries—deep hollows, of confined space, with precipitous sides, and open at the top to the sky—the prisoners were plunged, without the smallest protection or convenience. For subsistence they received each day a ration of one pint of wheaten bread (half the daily ration of a slave) with no more than half a pint of water, so that they were not preserved from the pangs either of hunger or of thirst. Sick and wounded even at the moment of arrival, many of them speedily died. Under this condition and treatment they remained for seventy days. After that time, the novelty of the spectacle had worn off; while the place must have become a den of abomination and a nuisance intolerable even to the citizens themselves. Accordingly they now removed all the surviving prisoners, except the native Athenians and the few Italian or Sicilian Greeks among them. All those so removed were sold for slaves². What became of the remaining prisoners, we are not told. Perhaps some of them may have obtained their release—as was the case (we are told) with several of those who had been sold to private masters—by the elegance of their accomplishments and the dignity of their demeanour. The dramas of Euripidês were so peculiarly popular throughout all Sicily, that those Athenian prisoners who knew by heart considerable portions of them, won the affections of their masters. Some even of the stragglers from the army are affirmed to have procured for themselves, by the same attraction, shelter and hospitality during their flight. Euripidês, we are informed, lived to receive the thanks of several among these unhappy sufferers, after their return to Athens³.

Upon the treatment of Nikias and Demosthenês, not merely the Syracusans, but also the allies present, were consulted, and much difference of opinion was found. To keep them in confinement simply, without putting them to death, was apparently the opinion advocated by Hermokratês⁴. But Gylippus, then in full ascendancy and an object of deep gratitude for his invaluable services, solicited as a reward to himself to be allowed to conduct them back as prisoners to Sparta.

In spite of all his influence, however, Gylippus could not carry this point. First, the Corinthians both strenuously opposed him themselves, and prevailed on the other allies to do the same. Afraid that the wealth of Nikias would always procure for him the means of escaping from

¹ [Lysias], *Pro Polystrato*, Orat. xx., §§ 26-28, c. 6, p. 686 R.

² Thukyd., vii. 87. Diodorus (xiii. 20-32) gives two long orations purporting to have been held in the Syracusan assembly, in discussing how the prisoners were to be dealt with. An old citizen, named Nikolaus, who has lost his two sons in the war, is made to advocate the side of humane treatment; while Gylippus is introduced as the orator recommending harshness and revenge.

From whom Diodorus borrowed this, I do not

know; but his whole account of the matter appears to me untrustworthy.

One may judge of his accuracy when one finds him stating that the prisoners received each two *chœnikes* of barley-meal—instead of two *kotylæ*; the *chœnix* being four times as much as the *kotylê* (Diodor., xiii. 19).

³ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 29; Diodor., xiii. 33. The reader will see how the Carthaginians treated the Grecian prisoners whom they took in Sicily—in Diodor., xiii. 111.

⁴ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 28; Diodor., xiii. 19.

imprisonment, so as to do them farther injury—they insisted on his being put to death. Next, those Syracusans, who had been in secret correspondence with Nikias during the siege, were yet more anxious to get him put out of the way; being apprehensive that, if tortured by their political opponents, he might disclose their names and intrigues. Such various influences prevailed, so that Nikias, as well as Demosthenēs, was ordered to be put to death by a decree of the public assembly, much to the discontent of Gylippus. Hermokratēs vainly opposed the resolution, but perceiving that it was certain to be carried, he sent to them a private intimation before the discussion closed, and procured for them, through one of the sentinels, the means of dying by their own hands. Their bodies were publicly exposed before the city gates to the view of the Syracusan citizens¹; while the day on which the final capture of Nikias and his army was accomplished, came to be celebrated as an annual festival, under the title of the *Asinaria*, on the twenty-sixth day of the Dorian month *Karneius*².

The esteem and admiration felt at Athens towards Nikias had been throughout lofty and unshaken: after his death it was exchanged for disgrace. His name was omitted, while that of his colleague Demosthenēs was engraved, on the funeral pillar erected to commemorate the fallen warriors. This difference Pausanias explains by saying that Nikias was conceived to have disgraced himself as a military man by his voluntary surrender, which Demosthenēs had disdained³.

The opinion of Thukydidēs deserves special notice, in the face of this judgment of his countrymen. While he says not a word about Demosthenēs, beyond the fact of his being put to death, he adds in reference to Nikias a few words of marked sympathy and commendation. 'Such were the reasons why Nikias was put to death; though *he* assuredly, among all Greeks of my time, least deserved to come to so extreme a pitch of ill-fortune, considering his exact performance of established duties to the divinity⁴.'

If we were judging Nikias merely as a private man, and setting his personal conduct in one scale, against his personal suffering on the other, the remark of Thukydidēs would be natural and intelligible. But the general of a great expedition, upon whose conduct the lives of thousands of brave men as well as the most momentous interests of his country, depend, cannot be tried by any such standard. His private merit becomes a secondary point in the case, as compared with the discharge of his responsible public duties, by which he must stand or fall.

¹ Thukyd., vii. 86; Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 28. The statement which Plutarch here cites from Timæus respecting the intervention of Hermokratēs, is not in any substantial contradiction with Philistus and Thukydidēs.

² Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 28.

³ The surrender of Nikias must have taken place, I think, not less than twenty-four or twenty-five days after the eclipse (which occurred on the 27th of August)—that is, about Sept. 21.

⁴ Pausan., i. 29, 9; Philist., *Fragm.*, 46, ed. Didot.

Philistus, whom Pausanias announces himself as following, is an excellent witness for the actual facts in Sicily; though not so good a witness for the impression at Athens respecting those facts.

It seems certain, even from Thukydidēs, that Nikias, in surrendering himself to Gylippus, thought that he had considerable chance of saving his life—Plutarch too so interprets the proceeding,

and condemns it as disgraceful (see his comparison of Nikias and Crassus, near the end). Demosthenēs could not have thought the same for himself: the fact of his attempted suicide appears to me certain, on the authority of Philistus, though Thukydidēs does not notice it.

⁴ Thukyd., vii. 86.

A man's good or bad fortune, depending on the favourable or unfavourable disposition of the gods towards him, was understood to be determined more directly by his piety and religious observances, rather than by his virtue (see passages in Isokratēs, *De Permutatione*, Orat. xv., § 301; Lysias, *Cont. Nikomach.*, c. 5, p. 854)—though undoubtedly the two ideas went to a certain extent together. The contrast between the remarkable piety of Nikias, and that extremity of ill-fortune which marked the close of his life—was very likely to shock Grecian ideas generally, and was a natural circumstance for the historian to note.

Tried by this more appropriate standard, what are we to say of Nikias? I shall not here repeat the separate points in his conduct which justify this view, and which have been set forth as they occurred, in the preceding pages. Admitting fully both the good intentions of Nikias, and his personal bravery, rising even into heroism during the last few days in Sicily—it is not the less incontestable, that first, the failure of the enterprise—next, the destruction of the armament—is to be traced distinctly to his lamentable misjudgment. His improvidence and incapacity stand proclaimed, not merely in the narrative of the historian, but even in his own letter to the Athenians, and in his own speeches both before the expedition and during its closing misfortunes, when contrasted with the reality of his proceedings.

And yet our great historian—after devoting two immortal books to this expedition—after setting forth emphatically both the glory of its dawn and the wretchedness of its close, with a dramatic genius parallel to the *Cædipus Tyrannus* of Sophoklēs—when he comes to recount the melancholy end of the two commanders, has no words to spare for Demosthenēs (far the abler officer of the two, who perished by no fault of his own), but reserves his flowers to strew on the grave of Nikias, the author of the whole calamity—‘What a pity! Such a respectable and religious man!’

Thukydidēs is here the more instructive, because he exactly represents the sentiment of the general Athenian public towards Nikias during his lifetime. They could not bear to condemn so respectable and religious a citizen. When we find Thukydidēs, after narrating so much improvidence and mismanagement on the grand scale, still keeping attention fixed on the private morality and decorum of Nikias, as if it constituted the main feature of his character—we can understand how the Athenian people originally came both to over-estimate this unfortunate leader, and continued over-estimating him with tenacious fidelity even after glaring proof of his incapacity.

In reviewing the causes of popular misjudgment, historians are apt to enlarge prominently, if not exclusively, on demagogues and the demagogic influences. Mankind being usually considered in the light of governable material, or as instruments for exalting, arming, and decorating their rulers—whatever renders them more difficult to handle in this capacity, ranks first in the category of vices. Nor can it be denied that this was a real and serious cause. Clever crimination speakers often passed themselves off for something above their real worth: though useful and indispensable as a protection against worse, they sometimes deluded the people into measures impolitic or unjust. But, even if we grant, to the cause of misjudgment here indicated, a greater practical efficiency than history will fairly sanction—still it is only one among others more mischievous. Never did any man at Athens, by mere force of demagogic qualities, acquire a measure of esteem at once so exaggerated and so durable, combined with so much power of injuring his fellow-citizens, as the anti-demagogic Nikias. No demagogic arts or eloquence would ever have created in the people so deep-seated an illusion as the imposing respectability of Nikias¹. Now it was against the overweening ascendancy

¹ A good many of the features depicted by Tacitus (*Hist.*, l. 49) in Galba, suit the character of Nikias—much more than those of the rapacious and unprincipled Crassus, with whom Plutarch compares the latter:

‘Vetus in familiâ nobilitas, magnæ opes: ipsi

medium ingenium, magis extra vitia, quam cum virtutibus. Sed claritas natalium, et metus temporum, obtentui fuit, ut quod segnitia fuit sapientia vocaretur. Major privato visus, dum privatus fuit, et omnium consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset.’

of such decorous and pious incompetence, when aided by wealth and family advantages, that the demagogic accusatory eloquence ought to have served as a natural bar and corrective. Performing the functions of a constitutional opposition, it afforded the only chance of that tutelary exposure whereby blunders and short-comings might be arrested in time. How insufficient was the check which it provided—even at Athens, where everyone denounces it as having prevailed in devouring excess—the history of Nikias is an ever-living testimony.

CHAPTER XXXI [LXI]

FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY, DOWN
TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT
ATHENS

I HAVE already mentioned, that even at the moment when Demosthenês with his powerful armament left Peiræus to go to Sicily, the hostilities of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens herself had been already recommenced. Not only was the Spartan king Agis ravaging Attica, but the far more important step of fortifying Dekeleia, for the abode of a permanent garrison, was in course of completion. That fortress, having been begun about the middle of March, was probably by the month of June in a situation to shelter its garrison.

And now began that incessant marauding of domiciliated enemies, partially contemplated even at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war—and recently enforced by the advice of the exile Alkibiadês¹. The earlier invasions of Attica had been all temporary, continuing for five or six weeks at the farthest, and leaving the country in repose for the remainder of the year. But the Athenians now underwent from henceforward the experience of a hostile garrison within fifteen miles of their city, an experience peculiarly painful this summer, as well as from its novelty, as from the extraordinary vigour which Agis displayed in his operations. His excursions were so widely extended, that no part of Attica was secure or could be rendered productive. Not only were all the sheep and cattle destroyed, but the slaves too, especially the most valuable slaves or artisans, began to desert to Dekeleia in great numbers: more than 20,000 of them soon disappeared in this way. So terrible a loss of income both to proprietors of land and to employers in the city, was farther aggravated by the increased cost and difficulty of import from Eubœa. Provisions and cattle from that island had previously come over land from Orôpus, but as that road was completely stopped by the garrison of Dekeleia, they were now of necessity sent round Cape Sunium by sea; a transit more circuitous and expensive, besides being open to attack from the enemy's privateers. In the midst of such heavy privations, the demands on citizens and metics for military duty were multiplied beyond measure. The presence of the enemy at Dekeleia forced them to keep watch day and night throughout their long extent of wall, comprising both Athens and Peiræus: in the daytime the hoplites of the city relieved each other on guard, but at night, nearly all of them were either on the battlements or

¹ Thukyd., i. 122-142; vi. 90.

at the various military stations in the city. Instead of a city, in fact, Athens was reduced to the condition of something like a military post.

Besides the personal efforts of the citizens, such exigences pressed heavily on the financial resources of the state. Already the immense expense incurred, in fitting out the two large armaments for Sicily, had exhausted all the accumulations laid by in the treasury during the interval since the peace of Nikias; so that the attacks from Dekeleia, not only imposing heavy additional cost, but at the same time abridging the means of paying, brought the finances of Athens into positive embarrassment. With a view of increasing her revenues, she altered the principle on which her subject-allies had hitherto been assessed. Instead of a fixed sum of annual tribute, she now required from them payment of a duty of 5 per cent. on all imports and exports by sea. How this new principle of assessment worked, we have unfortunately no information. To collect the duty, and take precautions against evasion, an Athenian custom-house officer must have been required in each allied city. Yet it is difficult to understand how Athens could have enforced a system at once novel, extensive, and more burdensome to the payers, when we come to see how much her hold over those payers, as well as her naval force, became enfeebled.¹

Her impoverished finances also compelled her to dismiss a body of Thracian mercenaries, whose aid would have been very useful against the enemy at Dekeleia. These Thracian peltasts, 1,300 in number, had been hired at a drachma per day each man, to go with Demosthenés to Syracuse, but had not reached Athens in time. As soon as they came thither, the Athenians placed them under the command of Diitrephês, to conduct them back to their native country, with instructions to do damage to the Bœotians, as opportunity might occur, in his way through the Euripus. Diitrephês passed to Chalkis in Eubœa, from whence he crossed in the night to the Bœotian coast opposite, and marched up some distance from the sea to the neighbourhood of the Bœotian town Mykalêssus. He arrived here unseen, and fell upon the town unexpectedly at break of day. Not only were all the houses, and even the temples, plundered—but the Thracians farther manifested that raging thirst of blood which seemed inherent in their race. They slew every living thing that came in their way; men, women, children, horses, cattle, etc. They burst into a school, wherein many boys had just been assembled, and massacred them all.

The succour brought from Thebes, by Mykalessian fugitives, arrived unhappily only in time to avenge, not to save, the inhabitants. When the force arrived at the sea-shore, the Athenian ships did not think it safe to approach very close, so that not less than 250 Thracians were slain

¹ Besides the statement in Thuk., vii. 28, this tax is attested by Ar., *Ran.*, 363; and a similar tax is mentioned in two inscriptions (C.I.A., ii. 116, 146; Hicks and Hill, 76), where we find Thasos and Clazomenæ agreeing to pay the *εἰκοστή* levied ἐν Ἑρασιβοῦλον—i.e., in 389.

Against Grote's view that this duty would be specially vexatious we may urge: (1) The tax would come in gradually, and the odious ἀργυρολόγοι *vîtes* would no longer be needed; (2) the burden, no doubt, was levied on the Athenian traders in allied ports as well, thus tending to efface the distinction between Athens and her 'tributaries'. The idea of a closer federation with the allies seems to have revived about this time; at any rate, we find Ar., *Lysistr.*, 582 ff. (411 B.C.), putting forward a thorough-going

reform in this direction. Cf. also Lysias, Or. 34, § 3: Εὐβοέσων ἐπιγαμίαν ἐποιοῦμεθα—which may refer to this period.

Probably this change took some time to carry everywhere into effect. While the new tax was administered by the Πορισταί (Beloch, *Rhein. Mus.*, 1884, p. 249), the Ἑλληνοταμίαι survived for some years (C.I.A., iv. (1), p. 34): In 408 Chalkêdon agreed to resume payment of φόρος, if we may trust the account of Xenophon (*Hellen.*, i. 3, 9), though the terms of this convention are not altogether easy to understand. On the other hand, no mention is made of φόρος in the treaty with Selymbria, which surrendered about the same time (C.I.A., iv. (1), 61a; Hicks and Hill, 77). Cf. throughout Beloch, *loc. cit.*—Ed.]

before they could get aboard; and the Athenian commander Diitrephês was so severely wounded that he died shortly afterwards. The rest pursued their voyage homeward.

Meanwhile the important station of Naupaktus and the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf again became the theatre of naval encounter. Seventeen years before, Phormio with eighteen Athenian triremes would have thought himself a full match for twenty-five Corinthian. But the Athenian admiral of this year, Konon, now judged so differently, that he constrained Demosthenês and Eurymedon to reinforce his eighteen triremes with ten others, on the ground that the Corinthian fleet opposite of 25 sail was about to assume the offensive against him.

Soon afterwards Diphilus came to supersede Konon with some fresh ships from Athens, which made the total number of triremes 33. The Corinthian fleet, reinforced so as to be nearly of the same number, took up a station on the coast of Achaia opposite Naupaktus. They ranged themselves across the mouth of a bay in the shape of a crescent, with two projecting promontories as horns: each of these promontories was occupied by a friendly land-force, thus supporting the line of triremes at both flanks. This was a position which did not permit the Athenians to sail through the line, or manœuvre round it and in the rear of it. Accordingly, when the fleet of Diphilus came across from Naupaktus, it remained for some time close in front of the Corinthians, neither party venturing to attack; for the straightforward collision was destructive to the Athenian ships with their sharp, but light and feeble beaks. After considerable delay, the Corinthians at length began the attack on their side. The battle lasted some time, terminating with no decisive advantage to either party.

This battle seems to have taken place, so far as we can make out, a short time before the arrival of Demosthenês at Syracuse, about the close of the month of May. We cannot doubt that the Athenians most anxiously expected news from that officer. Their disappointment would be all the more bitter when they came to receive, towards the end of June or beginning of July, despatches announcing the capital defeat of Demosthenês in his attempt upon Epipolæ, and the consequent extinction of all hope that Syracuse could ever be taken. After these despatches, we may perhaps doubt whether any others subsequently reached Athens.

According to the tale of Plutarch, the news was first made known at Athens through a stranger, who, arriving at Peiræus, went into a barber's shop, and began to converse about it as upon a theme which must of course be uppermost in everyone's mind. The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons as well as to the public in the market-place. The public assembly being forthwith convoked, he was brought before it, and called upon to produce his authority, which he was unable to do, as the stranger had disappeared. He was consequently treated as a fabricator of uncertified rumours for the disturbance of the public tranquillity, and even put to the torture.¹ How much of this improbable tale may be true, we cannot determine; but we may easily believe that neutrals, passing from Corinth or Megara to Peiræus, were the earliest communicants of the misfortunes of Nikias and Demosthenês in Sicily during the months of

¹ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 30. He gives the story without much confidence—'Ἀθηναίους δὲ φασί, etc.

July and August. Presently came individual soldiers of the armament, who had got away from the defeat and found a passage home; so that the bad news was fully confirmed.

As soon as the full extent of their loss was at length forced upon their convictions, the city presented a scene of the deepest affliction. Over and above the extent of private mourning, there prevailed utter despair as to the public safety. Not merely was the empire of Athens apparently lost, but Athens herself seemed utterly defenceless. Her treasury was empty, her docks nearly destitute of triremes, the flower of her hoplites as well as of her seamen had perished in Sicily without leaving their like behind, and her maritime reputation was irretrievably damaged; while her enemies were farther strengthened by the accession of their new Sicilian allies. In these melancholy months (October, November, 413 B.C.) the Athenians expected nothing less than a vigorous attack, both by land and sea, from the Peloponnesian and Sicilian forces united, with the aid of their own revolted allies—an attack which they knew themselves to be in no condition to repel.

Amidst so gloomy a prospect it was but poor satisfaction to vent their displeasure on the chief speakers who had recommended their recent disastrous expedition, or on those prophets and reporters of oracles who had promised them the divine blessing upon it¹. After this first burst of anger, however, they began gradually to look their actual situation in the face; they resolved to get together, as speedily as they could, both ships and money—to keep watch over their allies, especially Eubœa—and to defend themselves to the last. A Board of ten elderly men, under the title of Probûli, was named to review the expenditure, to suggest all practicable economies, and propose for the future such measures as occasion might seem to require². The propositions of these Probûli were for the most part adopted, with a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen in an Athenian assembly. Among other economies, the Athenians

¹ Thukyd., viii. 1.

It would seem that Thukydides considered the Athenians, after having adopted the expedition by their votes, to have debarred themselves from the right of complaining of those speakers who had stood forward prominently to advise the step. I do not at all concur in his opinion. The adviser of any important measure always makes himself morally responsible for its justice, usefulness, and practicability; and he very properly incurs disgrace, more or less according to the case, if it turns out to present results totally contrary to those which he had predicted. We know that the Athenian law often imposed upon the mover of a proposition not merely *moral*, but even *legal*, responsibility; a regulation of doubtful propriety under other circumstances, but which I believe to have been useful at Athens. [Hyperidês, *Pro Euxen.*: εἰσαγγελτικός νόμος περὶ τοῦ λέγειν μὴ τὰ ἀριστα τῷ δήμῳ.—Ed.]

[On the other hand, if the Athenian assembly was really competent to decide important political questions, as undoubtedly it claimed to be, it ought not logically to have shrunk from taking full responsibility upon itself. Clearly the individual speakers, however well qualified to give advice on some special point, could not judge the whole question so well as the corporate assembly after hearing the debaters on every side. The speakers are properly to be regarded as advocates, whose purpose is to state the case as incisively as possible from their particular point of view, the *ekklesia* as the judge, which gives a respon-

sible decision on the strength of all the evidence tendered. No doubt the system of *ὑπεύθυνος παραινέσις* and *ἀνεύθυνος ἀκρόασις* (Thuk., iii. 43) was convenient at times—e.g., after the fiasco of the embassy to Artaphernês (Herodot., v. 73; cf. [Xenophon], *Resp. Ath.*, ii., § 17). But it would have been more just and more expedient to give the speakers the fullest benefit of the boasted Athenian *παρήγοια*. Provided that the assembly was really competent to weigh evidence, it should have encouraged a free expression of opinion on all sides. We may admire the institution of *εὐθυνα* for executive magistrates; to apply it to debates on difficult questions of policy was a course of doubtful advantage.—Ed.]

Demosthenês (*De Corona*, c. 73) gives an emphatic statement of the responsibility which he cheerfully accepts for himself as a political speaker and adviser.

² Thukydides' expression, *εἰς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι* (viii. 1), deserves attention, *σωφροσύνη* being one of the complimentary descriptions which the anti-democrats used for a more narrow constitution. Cf. viii. 53: *εἰ μὴ πολιτεύσομεν σωφρονέστερον καὶ ἐς ὅλους μάλλον τὰς ἀρχὰς ποιήσομεν*; vi. 89, where democracy is dubbed *ἀκολασία*; viii. 64: *σωφροσύνην λαβοῦσαι* (i.e., an oligarchy).

It will thus be seen that the establishment of the Probûli marks the beginning of a political reaction sanctioned by the general body of voters in 413. For the further activity of this board, see appendix to c. xxxii.—Ed.

abridged the costly splendour of their choric and liturgic ceremonies at home, and brought back the recent garrison which they had established on the Laconian coast. They at the same time collected timber, commenced the construction of new ships, and fortified Cape Sunium in order to protect their numerous transport ships in the passage from Eubœa to Peiræus.

While Athens was thus struggling to make head against her misfortunes, all the rest of Greece was full of aggressive scheming against her. So grave an event as the destruction of this great armament had never happened since the expedition of Xerxes against Greece. It not only roused the most distant cities of the Grecian world, but also the Persian satraps and the court of Susa. All of them, enemies, subjects, and neutrals, alike believed that the doom of Athens was sealed, and that the coming spring would see her captured. Earlier than the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians did not feel disposed to act; but they sent round their instructions to the allies for operations both by land and sea to be then commenced. A fleet of 100 triremes was directed to be prepared against the spring; 50 of these being imposed in equal proportion on the Lacedæmonians themselves and the Bœotians—15 on Corinth—15 on the Phocians and Lokrians—10 on the Arcadians, with Pellênê and Sikyon—10 on Megara, Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Hermionê. It seems to have been considered that these ships might be built and launched during the interval between September and March. The same large hopes, which had worked upon men's minds at the beginning of the war, were now again rife among the Peloponnesians, the rather as that powerful force from Sicily, which they had then been disappointed in obtaining, might now be anticipated with tolerable assurance as really forthcoming.

From the smaller allies, contributions in money were exacted for the intended fleet by Agis, who moved about during this autumn with a portion of the garrison of Dekeleia.

It was during the march of Agis through Bœotia that the inhabitants of Eubœa applied to him, entreating his aid to enable them to revolt from Athens; which he readily promised, sending for Alkamenês at the head of 300 Neodamode hoplites from Sparta, to be despatched across to the island as harmost. Having a force permanently at his disposal, with full liberty of military action, the Spartan king at Dekeleia was more influential even than the authorities at home, so that the disaffected allies of Athens addressed themselves in preference to him. It was not long before envoys from Lesbos visited him for this purpose. So powerfully was their claim enforced by the Bœotians (their kinsmen of the Æolic race), who engaged to furnish ten triremes for their aid, provided Agis would send ten others, that he was induced to postpone his promise to the Eubœans, and to direct Alkamenês as harmost to Lesbos instead of Eubœa, without at all consulting the authorities at Sparta.

At the same time that these two islands were negotiating with Agis, envoys from Chios, the first and most powerful of all Athenian allies, had gone to Sparta for the same purpose. The government of Chios, considering Athens to be now on the verge of ruin, thought itself safe, together with the opposite city of Erythræ, in taking measures for achieving independence.

Besides these three great allies, whose example in revolting was sure

to be followed by others, Athens was now on the point of being assailed by other enemies yet more unexpected—the two Persian satraps of the Asiatic seaboard, Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus. No sooner was the Athenian catastrophe in Sicily known at the court of Susa, than the Great King claimed from these two satraps the tribute due from the Asiatic Greeks on the coast; for which they had always stood enrolled in the tribute records, though it had never been actually levied since the complete establishment of the Athenian empire. The only way to realize this tribute, for which the satraps were thus made debtors, was to detach the towns from Athens, and break up her empire; for which purpose Tissaphernês sent an envoy to Sparta, in conjunction with those of the Chians and Erythræans. He invited the Lacedæmonians to conclude an alliance with the Great King, for joint operations against the Athenian empire in Asia, promising to furnish pay and maintenance for any forces which they might send, at the rate of one drachma per day for each man of the ships' crews. He farther hoped by means of this aid to reduce Amorgês, the revolted son of the late satrap Pissuthnês, who was established in the strong maritime town of Iasus, with a Grecian mercenary force and a considerable treasure, and was in alliance with Athens. The Great King had sent down a peremptory mandate, that Amorgês should either be brought prisoner to Susa or slain.

At the same moment, though without any concert, there arrived at Sparta two Grecian exiles in the service of Pharnabazus, bringing propositions of a similar character from that satrap, whose government comprehended Phrygia and the coast lands north of Æolis, from the Propontis to the north-east corner of the Elæatic Gulf. Eager to have the assistance of a Lacedæmonian fleet in order to detach the Hellespontine Greeks from Athens, and realize the tribute required by the court of Susa, Pharnabazus was at the same time desirous of forestalling Tissaphernês as the medium of alliance between Sparta and the Great King.

It so happened that Alkibiadês' family friend Endius was at this moment one of the Board of Ephors, while his personal enemy King Agis, with whose wife he carried on an intrigue, was absent in command at Dekeleia. Knowing well the great power and importance of Chios, Alkibiadês strenuously exhorted the Spartan authorities to devote their first attention to that island.¹ A Periœkus named Phrynīs, being sent thither to examine whether the resources alleged by the envoys were really forthcoming, brought back a satisfactory report, that the Chian fleet was not less than sixty triremes strong; upon which the Lacedæmonians concluded an alliance with Chios and Erythræ, engaging to send a fleet of forty sail to their aid. Ten of these triremes, now ready in the Lacedæmonian ports, were directed immediately to sail to Chios. It seems to have been now midwinter—but Alkibiadês, and still more the Chian envoys, insisted on the necessity of prompt action, for fear that the Athenians should detect the intrigue. However, an earthquake just then intervening, was construed by the Spartans as a mark of divine displeasure, so that they would

¹ If Alkibiadês really wanted to ruin Athens completely, he would have done better to direct an expedition to the Hellespont. Whereas the stoppage of the corn-supplies would almost certainly have brought Athens to her knees, the loss of Chios could not cause immediate ruin. The

other projects which Alkibiadês initiated—the despatch of Gylippus and the occupation of Dekeleia—likewise suggest that he did not wish to crush Athens completely, but to deal such a blow as would prove his power to do her harm. Cf. Holm, *Gk. Hist.*, ii., p. 509.—ED.

not persist in sending either the same commander or the same ships. Chalkideus was named to supersede Melanchridas, while five new ships were directed to be equipped, so as to be ready to sail in the early spring along with the larger fleet from Corinth.

As soon as spring arrived, three Spartan commissioners were sent to Corinth to transport across the isthmus from the Corinthian to the Saronic Gulf, the thirty-nine triremes now in the Corinthian port of Lechæum. It was at first proposed to send off all, at one and the same time, to Chios—even those which Agis had been equipping for the assistance of Lesbos. A general synod of deputies from the allies was held at Corinth, wherein it was determined, with the concurrence of Agis, to despatch the fleet first to Chios under Chalkideus—next, to Lesbos under Alkamenês—lastly, to the Hellespont, under Klearchus. But it was judged expedient to divide the fleet, and bring across twenty-one triremes out of the thirty-nine, so as to distract the attention of Athens, and divide her means of resistance.

Hardly had the twenty-one triremes, however, been brought across to Kenchreæ, when a fresh obstacle arose to delay their departure. The Isthmian festival, celebrated every alternate year, and kept especially holy by the Corinthians, was just approaching. They would not consent to begin any military operations until it was concluded, though Agis tried to clude their scruples by offering to adopt the intended expedition as his own. It was during the delay which thus ensued that the Athenians were first led to conceive suspicions about Chios, whither they despatched Aristokratês, one of the generals of the year. The Chian authorities strenuously denied all projects of revolt, and being required by Aristokratês to furnish some evidence of their good faith, sent back along with him seven triremes to the aid of Athens. Being aware that the Chian people were in general averse to the idea of revolting from Athens, they did not feel confidence enough to proclaim their secret designs without some manifestation of support from Peloponnesus.

Shortly after the Isthmian festival, the squadron actually started from Kenchreæ to Chios, under Alkamenês; but an equal number of Athenian ships watched them as they sailed along the shore, and tried to tempt them farther out to sea, with a view to fight them. Alkamenês, however, desirous of avoiding a battle, thought it best to return back; upon which the Athenians also returned to Peiræus. Reappearing presently with a larger squadron of 37 triremes, they pursued Alkamenês (who had again begun his voyage along the shore southward) and attacked him near the uninhabited harbour called Peiræum, on the frontiers of Corinth and Epidaurus. They here gained a victory, captured one of his ships, and damaged or disabled most of the remainder. Alkamenês himself was slain, and the ships were run ashore, where on the morrow the Peloponnesian land-force arrived in sufficient numbers to defend them.

Besides the discouragement arising from such a check at the outset of their plans against Ionia, the Ephors thought it impossible to begin operations with so small a squadron as five triremes, so that the departure of Chalkideus was for the present countermanded. This resolution was only reversed at the strenuous instance of the Athenian exile Alkibiadês, who urged them to permit Chalkideus and himself to start forthwith. Small as the squadron was, yet as it would reach Chios before the defeat

at Peiræum became public, it might be passed off as the precursor of the main fleet ; while he (Alkibiadês) pledged himself to procure the revolt of Chios and the other Ionic cities, through his personal connection with the leading men.

By these arguments Alkibiadês obtained the consent of the Spartan Ephors, and sailed along with Chalkideus in the five triremes to Chios.

There was indeed little danger in crossing the Ægean to Ionia, with ever so small a squadron ; for Athens in her present destitute condition had no fleet there, and although Strombichidês was detached with eight triremes from the blockading fleet off Peiræum, to pursue Chalkideus and Alkibiadês as soon as their departure was known, he was far behind them, and returned without success. To keep their voyage secret, they detained the boats and vessels which they met, and did not liberate them until they reached Korykus in Asia Minor, the mountainous land southward of Erythræ. They were here visited by their leading partisans from Chios, who urged them to sail thither at once before their arrival could be proclaimed. Accordingly they reached the town of Chios (on the eastern coast of the island), immediately opposite to Erythræ on the continent to the astonishment and dismay of every one, except the oligarchical plotters who had invited them. By the contrivance of these latter, the Council was found just assembling, so that Alkibiadês was admitted without delay, and invited to state his case. He represented his squadron as the foremost of a large Lacedæmonian fleet actually at sea and approaching. Under these impressions, and while the population were yet under their first impulse of surprise and alarm, the oligarchical Council took the resolution of revolting. The example was followed by Erythræ, and soon afterwards by Klazomenæ, determined by three triremes from Chios. Both the Chians and Erythræans actively employed themselves in fortifying their towns and preparing for war.

In reviewing this account of the revolt of Chios, we find occasion to repeat remarks already suggested by previous revolts of other allies of Athens — Lesbos, Akanthus, Torônê, Mendê, Amphipolis, etc. Contrary to what is commonly intimated by historians, we may observe that the empire of Athens, though upheld mainly by an established belief in her superior force, was nevertheless by no means odious, nor the proposition of revolting from her acceptable, to the general population of her allies. She had at this moment no force in Ionia ; and the oligarchical government of Chios, wishing to revolt, was only prevented from openly declaring its intention by the reluctance of its own population. The envoys of Tissaphernês had accompanied those of Chios to Sparta, so that the Chian government saw plainly that the misfortunes of Athens had only the effect of reviving the aggressions and pretensions of their former foreign master, against whom Athens had protected them for the last fifty years. We may well doubt therefore whether this prudent government looked upon the change as on the whole advantageous. But they had no motive to stand by Athens in her misfortunes, and good policy seemed now to advise a timely union with Sparta as the preponderant force. The sentiment entertained towards Athens by her allies (as I have before observed) was more negative than positive. It was favourable rather than otherwise, in the minds of the general population, to whom she caused little actual hardship or oppression ; but averse, to a certain extent, in the minds of

their leading men—since she wounded their dignity, and offended that love of town autonomy which was instinctive in the Grecian political mind.

The revolt of Chios, speedily proclaimed, filled every man at Athens with dismay. The Athenians had no fleet or force even to attempt its reconquest: but they now felt the full importance of that reserve of 1,000 talents, which Periklês had set aside in the first year of the war against the special emergency of a hostile fleet approaching Peiræus. The penalty of death had been decreed against any one who should propose to devote this fund to any other purpose; and in spite of severe financial pressure, it had remained untouched for twenty years. Now, however, though the special contingency foreseen had not yet arisen, matters were come to such an extremity, that the only chance of saving the remaining empire was by the appropriation of this money. An unanimous vote was accordingly passed to abrogate the penal enactment against proposing any other mode of appropriation; after which the resolution was taken to devote this money to present necessities.

By means of this new fund, they were enabled to find pay and equipment for all the triremes ready in their harbour, and thus to spare a portion from their blockading fleet off Peiræum; out of which Strombichidês with his squadron of eight triremes was despatched immediately to Ionia—followed, after a short interval, by Thrasyklês with twelve others. At the same time, the seven Chian triremes which also formed part of this fleet, were cleared of their crews, among whom such as were slaves were liberated, while the freemen were put in custody. Besides fitting out an equal number of fresh ships to keep up the numbers of the blockading fleet, the Athenians worked with the utmost ardour to get ready thirty additional triremes. Strombichidês, arriving at Samos, and finding Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ already in revolt, sailed to Teos, in hopes of preserving that place. But he had not been long there when Chalkideus arrived from Chios with twenty-three triremes, all or mostly Chian; while the forces of Erythræ and Klazomenæ approached by land. Strombichidês was obliged to make a hasty flight back to Samos. Upon this evidence of Athenian weakness, and the superiority of the enemy, the Teians admitted into their town the land-force without, by the help of which, they now demolished the wall formerly built by Athens to protect the city against attack from the interior. Some of the troops of Tissaphernês lending their aid in the demolition, the town was laid altogether open to the satrap, who moreover came himself shortly afterwards to complete the work.

Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian government were prompted by considerations of their own safety to instigate revolt in all other Athenian dependencies; and Alkibiadês now took advantage of their forwardness in the cause to make an attempt on Milêtus. Accordingly he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of twenty-five triremes, twenty of them Chian, together with the five which they themselves had brought from Laconia. Conducting his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate enough to pass unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos. Arriving at Milêtus, where he possessed established connections among the leading men, and had already laid his train, as at Chios, for revolt—Alkibiadês prevailed on them to break with Athens forthwith:

so that when Strombichidēs and Thrasyklēs, who came in pursuit the moment they learnt his movements, approached, they found the port shut against them, and were forced to take up a station on the neighbouring island of Ladē.

It was at Milētus, immediately after the revolt, that the first treaty was concluded between Tissaphernēs, on behalf of himself and the Great King—and Chalkideus, for Sparta and her allies. Probably the aid of Tissaphernēs was considered necessary to maintain the town, when the Athenian fleet was watching it so closely on the neighbouring island: at least it is difficult to explain otherwise an agreement so eminently dishonourable as well as disadvantageous to the Greeks:—

'The Lacedæmonians and their allies have concluded alliance with the Great King and Tissaphernēs, on the following conditions. The king shall possess whatever territory and cities he himself had, or his predecessors had before him. The king, and the Lacedæmonians with their allies, shall jointly hinder the Athenians from deriving either money or other advantages from all those cities which have hitherto furnished to them any such. They shall jointly carry on war against the Athenians, and shall not renounce the war against them, except by joint consent. Whoever shall revolt from the king, shall be treated as an enemy by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; whoever shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians, shall in like manner be treated as an enemy by the king.'

As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Milētus was handed over to Tissaphernēs, who immediately caused a citadel to be erected and placed a garrison within it. If fully carried out, indeed, the terms of the treaty would have made the Great King master not only of all the Asiatic Greeks and all the islanders in the Ægean, but also of all Thessaly and Bœotia and the full ground which had once been covered by Xerxēs. We shall find the Lacedæmonian authorities themselves hereafter refusing to ratify the treaty, on the ground of its exorbitant concessions. But it stands as a melancholy evidence of the new source of mischief now opening upon the Asiatic and insular Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens was broken up—the revived pretensions of their ancient lord and master, whom nothing had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty years, except Athens, first as representative and executive agent, next as successor and mistress of the confederacy of Delos.

The Athenian station, from the present time to the end of the war, was Samos; and a revolution which now happened, ensuring the fidelity of that island to her alliance, was a condition indispensable to her power of maintaining the struggle in Ionia¹.

We have heard nothing about Samos throughout the whole war, since its reconquest by the Athenians after the revolt of 440 B.C.: but we now find it under the government of an oligarchy called the Geōmori (the proprietors of land). It cannot be doubted that these Geōmori were disposed to follow the example of the Chian oligarchy, and revolt from Athens, while the people at Samos, as at Chios, were averse to such a change. These latter profited by the recent warning, forestalled the designs of

¹ Thuk., iv. 75, mentions a party of Samian exiles established on the opposite mainland, an incident which points to a democratic revolution some time previous to 424. The word ἐναγλαῖος, used in viii. 21, may mean a 'rise after a fall'

(cf. Diod., xviii. 31), or a 'counter-revolution': in this case we may suppose the oligarchs regained control about this time (perhaps in conjunction with the revolt of Ephesus, which is nowhere explicitly mentioned).—Ed.

their oligarchy, and rose in insurrection, with the help of three Athenian triremes which then chanced to be in the port. The oligarchy were completely defeated, but not without a violent struggle, two hundred of them being slain, and four hundred banished. This revolution secured the adherence of Samos to the Athenians, who immediately recognised the new democracy, and granted to it the privilege of an equal and autonomous ally.

On the other hand, the Athenian blockading fleet was surprised and defeated by the Peloponnesian fleet at Peiræum, which was thus enabled to get to Kenchreæ, and to refit in order that it might be sent to Ionia. The sixteen Peloponnesian ships which had fought at Syracuse had already come back to Lechæum, in spite of the obstructions thrown in their way by the Athenian squadron under Hippoklès at Naupaktus. The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus was sent to Kenchreæ to take the command and proceed to Ionia as admiral in chief: but it was some time before he could depart for Chios, whither he arrived with only four triremes, followed by six more afterwards.

Before he reached that island, however, the Chians, interested for their own safety in multiplying defections from Athens, had themselves undertaken the prosecution of the plans concerted by Agis and the Lacedæmonians at Corinth. They originated an expedition of their own to procure the revolt of Lesbos, with the view, if successful, of proceeding afterwards to do the same among the Hellespontine dependencies of Athens. A land-force, partly Peloponnesian, partly Asiatic, marched northward towards Kymê, to coöperate in both these objects. Lesbos was at this time divided into at least five separate city-governments—Methymna at the north of the island, Mitylênê towards the south-east, Antissa, Eresus and Pyrrha on the west. Whether these governments were oligarchical or democratical, we do not know; but the Athenian kleruchs who had been sent to Mitylênê after its revolt sixteen years before, must have long ago disappeared. The Chian fleet first went to Methymna and procured the revolt of that place, where four triremes were left in guard, while the remaining nine sailed forward to Mitylênê and succeeded in obtaining that important town also.

Their proceedings, however, were not unwatched by the Athenian fleet at Samos. Unable to recover possession of Teos, Diomedon had been obliged to content himself with procuring neutrality from that town, and admission for the vessels of Athens as well as of her enemies. But he had since been strengthened partly by the democratical revolution at Samos, partly by the arrival of Leon with ten additional triremes from Athens: so that these two commanders were now enabled to sail, with twenty-five triremes, to the relief of Lesbos. Reaching Mitylênê (the largest town in that island) very shortly after its revolt, they sailed straight into the harbour when no one expected them, seized the nine Chian ships with little resistance, and after a successful battle on shore, regained possession of the city. The Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus—who had only been three days arrived at Chios from Kenchreæ with his four triremes—saw the Athenian fleet pass through the channel between Chios and the mainland, on its way to Lesbos; and immediately on the same evening followed it to that island, to lend what aid he could. Astyochus prevailed on Eresus to revolt from Athens, and having armed the popula-

tion, sent them by land together with his own hoplites under Eteonikus to Methymna, in hopes of preserving that place. But in spite of all his endeavours, Methymna as well as Eresus and all Lesbos was recovered by the Athenians, while he himself was obliged to return with his force to Chios. The land troops which had marched along the mainland, with a view to farther operations at the Hellespont, were carried back to Chios and to their respective homes.

The recovery of Lesbos, which the Athenians now placed in a better posture of defence, was of great importance in itself, and arrested for the moment all operations against them at the Hellespont. Their fleet from Lesbos was first employed in the recovery of Klazomenæ. Animated by such additional success—as well as by a victory which the Athenians who were blockading Milêtus, gained over Chalkideus, wherein that officer was slain—Leon and Diomedon thought themselves in a condition to begin aggressive measures against Chios. Their fleet of twenty-five sail was well-equipped with Epibatæ, who, though under ordinary circumstances they were Thêtes armed at the public cost, yet in the present stress of affairs were impressed from the superior hoplites in the city muster-roll. They occupied the little islets called Cénussæ, near Chios on the north-east, and disembarking on the island, not only ravaged the neighbourhood, but inflicted upon the Chian forces a bloody defeat. After two farther defeats, at Phanæ and at Leukonium, the Chians no longer dared to quit their fortifications.

The Athenians now retaliated upon Chios the hardships under which Attica itself was suffering. The territory of Chios was highly cultivated¹, its commerce extensive, and its wealth among the greatest in all Greece. In fact, under the Athenian empire, its prosperity had been so marked and so uninterrupted, that Thukydidês expresses his astonishment at the undeviating prudence and circumspection of the government. 'Except Sparta (he says), Chios is the only state that I know, which maintained its sober judgement throughout a career of prosperity, and became even more watchful in regard to security, in proportion as it advanced in power.' He adds, that the step of revolting from Athens, though the Chian government now discovered it to have been an error, was at any rate a pardonable error; for it was undertaken under the impression, universal throughout Greece after the disaster at Syracuse, that Athenian power was at an end—and undertaken in conjunction with allies seemingly more than sufficient to sustain it. This remarkable observation of Thukydidês doubtless includes an indirect censure upon his own city, as abusing her prosperity for purposes of unmeasured aggrandisement, a censure not undeserved in reference to the enterprise against Sicily. But it counts at the same time as a valuable testimony to the condition of the allies of Athens under the Athenian empire.

The operations now carrying on in Chios indicated such an unexpected renovation in Athenian affairs, that a party in the island began to declare in favour of re-union with Athens. The Chian government were forced to summon Astyochus, with his four Peloponnesian ships from Erythræ, to strengthen their hands. While the Chians were thus endangered at home, the Athenian interest in Ionia was still farther fortified by the arrival of a fresh armament of forty-eight triremes from Athens at Samos.

¹ Aristotel., *Politik*, iv. 4, 1; Athenæus, vi., p. 265.

The newly-arrived armament immediately sailed from Samos to Milêtus, where it effected a disembarkation, in conjunction with those Athenians who had been before watching the place from the island of Ladê. The Milesians marched forth to give them battle, mustering 800 of their own hoplites, together with the Peloponnesian seamen of the five triremes brought across by Chalkideus, and a body of troops, chiefly cavalry, under the satrap Tissaphernês. Alkibiadês also was present and engaged. The Argeian allies of Athens were so full of contempt for the Ionians of Milêtus who stood opposite to them, that they rushed forward to the charge with great neglect of rank or order, a presumption which they expiated by an entire defeat, with the loss of 300 men. But the Athenians on their wing were so completely victorious over the Peloponnesians and others opposed to them, that all the army of the latter, and even the Milêsians themselves on returning from their pursuit of the Argeians, were forced to shelter themselves within the walls of the town. The issue of this combat excited much astonishment, inasmuch as on each side, Ionian hoplites were victorious over Dorian.

For a moment, the Athenian army, masters of the field under the walls of Milêtus, indulged the hope of putting that city under blockade, by a wall across the isthmus which connected it with the continent. But these hopes soon vanished when they were apprised, on the very evening of the battle, that the main Peloponnesian and Sicilian fleet, 55 triremes in number, was actually in sight. Of these 55, 22 were Sicilian (20 from Syracuse and two from Selinus) sent at the pressing instance of Hermokratês. Alkibiadês strenuously urged the admiral to lend immediate aid to the Milesians, so as to prevent the construction of the intended wall of blockade, representing that if that city were captured, all the hopes of the Peloponnesians in Ionia would be extinguished. Accordingly he prepared to sail thither the next morning; but during the night, the Athenians thought it wise to abandon their position near Milêtus and return to Samos, from which place the Argeian hoplites, sulky with their recent defeat, demanded to be conveyed home.

On the ensuing morning, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed from the Gulf of Iasus to Milêtus. Finding it already relieved of the enemy, they stayed there only one day in order to reinforce themselves with the 25 triremes which Chalkideus had originally brought thither, and which had been since blocked up by the Athenian fleet at Ladê. Being now not far from Iasus, the residence of Amorgês, Tissaphernês persuaded them to attack it by sea, in coöperation with his forces by land. No one at Iasus was aware of the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet: the triremes approaching were supposed to be Athenians and friends, so that the place was entered and taken by surprise. It was handed over to Tissaphernês, along with all the prisoners, for each head of whom he paid down a Daric stater, or twenty Attic drachmæ—and along with Amorgês himself, whom the satrap was thus enabled to send up to Susa.

The arrival of the recent reinforcements to both the opposing fleets, and the capture of Iasus, took place about the autumnal equinox or the end of September; at which period, the Peloponnesian fleet being assembled at Milêtus, Tissaphernês paid to them the wages of the crews, at the rate of one Attic drachma per head per diem, as he had promised by his envoy at Sparta. But he at the same time gave notice for the future that he

could not continue so high a rate of pay, unless he should receive express instructions from Susa ; and that until such instructions came, he should give only half a drachma per day. Theramenês, being only commander for the interim, until the junction with Astyochus, was indifferent to the rate at which the men were paid (a miserable jealousy which marks the low character of many of these Spartan officers) : but the Syracusan Hermokratês remonstrated so loudly against the reduction, that he obtained from Tissaphernês the promise of a slight increase above the half drachma, though he could not succeed in getting the entire drachma continued. The Athenians on their side were reinforced by 35 fresh triremes ; their fleet from Chios was now recalled to Samos, where the commanders mustered their whole naval force, with a view of redividing it for ulterior operations.

Considering that in the autumn of the preceding year, immediately after the Syracusan disaster, the navy of Athens had been no less scanty in number of ships than defective in equipment—we read with amazement that she had now at Samos no less than 104 triremes in full condition and disposable for service, besides some others specially destined for the transport of troops. Indeed the total number which she had sent out, putting together the separate squadrons, had been 128. So energetic an effort no Grecian state except Athens could have accomplished ; nor even Athens herself, had she not been aided by that reserve fund, consecrated twenty years before through the long-sighted calculation of Periklês.

The Athenians resolved to employ 30 triremes in making a landing, and establishing a fortified post, in Chios ; and Strombichidês was assigned to the command. The other 74 triremes, remaining masters of the sea, made descents near Milêtus, trying in vain to provoke the Peloponnesian fleet out of that harbour. It was some time before Astyochus actually went thither to assume his new command. Going forth with twenty triremes—ten Peloponnesian and ten Chian—he made a fruitless attack upon the Athenian fortified post in the Erythræan territory, after which he sailed to Klazomenæ, recently re-transferred from the continent to the neighbouring islet. He here (in conjunction with Tamôs, the Pe sian general of the district) enjoined the Klazomenians again to break with Athens, and to take up their residence inland at Daphnûs. This demand being rejected, he attacked Klazomenæ, but was repulsed, although the town was unfortified, and was presently driven off by a severe storm. Astyochus was now anxious to make an attempt on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising revolt from Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet were so averse to the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish it and sail back to Chios, his fleet, before it arrived there, being again dispersed by the storms, frequent in the month of November.

Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Milêtus (at the head of the mercenary force made prisoners at Iasus), had reached Erythræ, and from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him and to the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to undertake the expedition to Lesbos ; but he experienced from them the same reluctance as from the Corinthians—a proof that the tone of feeling in Lesbos had been found to be decidedly philo-Athenian on the former expedition. Pedaritus even peremptorily refused to let him have the Chian triremes for any such purpose—an act

of direct insubordination in a Lacedæmonian officer towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus resented so strongly, that he immediately left Chios for Milêtus, carrying away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling the Chians that they might look in vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it. Instead of pursuing his voyage to Milêtus, he turned to Erythræ.

The fact of his thus going back proved, by accident, the salvation of his fleet. For it so happened that on that same night the Athenian fleet under Strombichidês—30 triremes accompanied by some triremes carrying hoplites—had its station on the southern side of the same headland. Neither knew of the position of the other, and Astyochus, had he gone forward the next day towards Milêtus, would have fallen in with the superior numbers of his enemy.

The Athenians now occupied a strong maritime site called Delphinium, seemingly a projecting cape having a sheltered harbour on each side, not far from the city of Chios. A strong philo-Athenian party had pronounced itself; and though its leader was seized by Pedaritus and put to death, still his remaining partisans were so numerous, that the government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than ever. In spite of numerous messages sent to Milêtus, entreating succour and representing the urgent peril to which this greatest among all the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed—Astyochus adhered to his parting menaces, and refused compliance. The indignant Pedaritus sent to prefer complaint against him at Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile the fortress at Delphinium advanced so near towards completion, that Chios began to suffer from it as much as Athens suffered from Dekeleia, with the farther misfortune of being blocked up by the sea. The slaves in this wealthy island—chiefly foreigners acquired by purchase, but more numerous than in any other Grecian state except Laconia—were emboldened by the manifest superiority of the invaders to desert in crowds; and the loss arising, not merely from their flight, but from the valuable information and aid which they gave to the enemy, was immense¹.

Astyochus, on reaching Milêtus, found the Peloponnesian force just reinforced by a squadron of twelve triremes under Dorieus, chiefly from Thurii, which had undergone a political revolution since the Athenian disaster at Syracuse. Orders were sent from Milêtus that half of this newly-arrived squadron should remain on guard at Knidus, while the other half should cruise near the Triopian Cape to intercept the trading-vessels from Egypt. But the Athenians, who had also learned the arrival of Dorieus, sent a powerful squadron from Samos, which captured all these six triremes off Cape Triopium. They farther made an attempt to recover Knidus, which was very nearly successful, as the town was unfortified on the sea-side. On the morrow the attack was renewed; but the Athenians were forced to return to Samos without any farther advantage. Astyochus took no step to intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough to keep the sea against the 74 Athenian triremes at Samos, though his fleet at Milêtus was at this moment in high condition.

Though the Peloponnesians had hitherto no ground of complaint

¹ Thukyd., viii. 38-40. About the slaves in Chios, see the extracts from Theopompus and Nymphodorus in, Athenæus, vi., p. 265.

against the satrap for irregularity of payment, still the powerful fleet now at Milêtus inspired the commanders with a new tone of confidence, so that they became ashamed of the stipulations of that treaty to which Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, when first landing at Milêtus with their scanty armament, had submitted. Accordingly Astyochus, shortly after his arrival at Milêtus, insisted on a fresh treaty with Tissaphernês, which was agreed on, to the following effect :—

‘Convention and alliance is concluded, on the following conditions, between the Lacedæmonians with their allies—and King Darius, his sons, and Tissaphernês. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not attack or injure any territory or any city which belongs to Darius or has belonged to his father or ancestors ; nor shall they raise any tribute from any of the said cities. Neither Darius nor any of his subjects shall attack or injure the Lacedæmonians or their allies. Should the Lacedæmonians or their allies have any occasion for the king—or should the king have any occasion for the Lacedæmonians or their allies—let each meet as much as may be the wishes expressed by the other. Both will carry on jointly the war against Athens and her allies : neither party shall bring the war to a close, without mutual consent. The king shall pay and keep any army which he may have sent for and which may be employed in his territory. If any of the cities parties to this convention shall attack the king’s territory, the rest engage to hinder them, and to defend the king with their best power. And if anyone within the king’s territory, or within the territory subject to him¹, shall attack the Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall hinder them and lend his best defensive aid.’

Looked at with the eyes of Pan-hellenic patriotism, this second treaty of Astyochus and Theramenês was less disgraceful than the first treaty of Chalkideus. It did not formally proclaim that all those Grecian cities which had ever belonged to the king or to his ancestors, should still be considered as his subjects ; nor did it pledge the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in hindering any of them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however, by implication, undiminished extent of the king’s dominion, the same as at the maximum under his predecessors—the like undefined rights of the king to meddle with Grecian affairs—the like unqualified abandonment of all the Greeks on the continent of Asia.

A Peloponnesian squadron of 27 triremes under the command of Antisthenês, having started from Cape Malea about the close of 412 B.C., had first crossed the sea to Melos, where it dispersed ten Athenian triremes and captured three of them—then afterwards, from apprehension that these fugitive Athenians would make known its approach at Samos, had made a long circuit round by Krete, and thus ultimately reached Kaunos at the south-eastern extremity of Asia Minor. This was the squadron which Kalligeitus and Timagoras had caused to be equipped, having come over for that purpose a year before as envoys from the satrap Pharnabazus. Antisthenês was instructed first to get to Milêtus ; next, to forward these triremes, under Klearchus, to the Hellespont, for the purpose of coöper-

¹ The distinction here drawn between the king’s territory, and the territory over which the king holds empire—deserves notice. By the former phrase is understood (I presume) the continent of Asia, which the court of Susa looked upon, together with all its inhabitants, as a freehold exceedingly

sacred and peculiar (Herodot., i. 4) : by the latter, as much as the satrap should find it convenient to lay hands upon, of that which had once belonged to Darius son of Hystaspes or to Xerxês, in the plenitude of their power.

ating with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies in that region. Eleven Spartans, the chief of whom was Lichas, accompanied Antisthenês, to be attached to Astyochus as advisers, according to a practice not unusual with the Lacedæmonians. These men were not only directed to exercise control coördinate with Astyochus—but even empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss that admiral himself, upon whom the complaints of Pedaritus from Chios had cast suspicion, and to appoint Antisthenês in his place.

No sooner had Astyochus learnt at Milêtus the arrival of Antisthenês at Kaunus, than he sailed immediately to secure his junction with the 27 new triremes. In his voyage southward he captured the city of Kôs, unfortified and half ruined by a recent earthquake, and then passed on to Knidus, where the inhabitants urged him to go forward at once, in order that he might surprise an Athenian squadron of 20 triremes under Charminus, which had been despatched from Samos, after the news received from Melos, in order to attack and repel the squadron under Antisthenês. Charminus was cruising near Rhodes and the Lykian coast, to watch the Peloponnesian fleet just arrived at Kaunus. In this position he was found by the far more numerous fleet of Astyochus, and forced to make the best speed in escaping, not without the loss of six ships. The Athenians in Samos had kept no watch on the movements of the main Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, and seem to have been ignorant of its departure until they were apprised of the defeat of Charminus.

Though the Peloponnesian fleet now assembled at Knidus consisted of 94 triremes, much superior in number to the Athenian, it did not try to provoke any general action. The time of Lichas and his brother commissioners was at first spent in negotiations with Tissaphernês, against whom they found a strong feeling of discontent prevalent in the fleet. That satrap had of late become irregular in furnishing pay to the seamen. He was at the same time full of promises, paralysing all their operations by assurances that he was bringing up the vast fleet of Phenicia to their aid : but in reality his object was, under fair appearances, to prolong the contest and waste the strength of both parties. Lichas protested against the two conventions concluded by Chalkideus and by Theramenês, as being, both the one and the other, a disgrace to the Hellenic name. By the express terms of the former, and by the implications of the latter, not merely all the islands of the Ægean, but even Thessaly and Bœotia, were acknowledged as subject to Persia ; so that Sparta, if she sanctioned such conditions, would be merely imposing upon the Greeks a Persian sceptre, instead of general freedom, for which she professed to be struggling. Lichas, declaring that he would rather renounce all prospect of Persian pay than submit to such conditions, proposed to negotiate for a fresh treaty upon other and better terms—a proposition, which Tissaphernês rejected with so much indignation, as to depart without settling anything.

His desertion did not discourage the Peloponnesian counsellors. Possessing a fleet larger than they had ever before had united in Asia, they calculated on being able to get money to pay their men without Persian aid ; and an invitation, which they just now received from various powerful men at Rhodes, tended to strengthen such confidence. The island of Rhodes, inhabited by a Dorian population considerable in number as well as distinguished for nautical skill, was at this time divided between three

separate city-governments, as it had been at the epoch of the Homeric Catalogue—Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus; for the city called Rhodes, formed by a coalescence of all these three, dates only from two or three years after the period which we have now reached. All the three Rhodian towns, destitute of fortifications, were partly persuaded, partly frightened, into allying themselves with the Peloponnesians. The Athenian fleet, whose commanders were just now too busy with political intrigue to keep due military watch, arrived from Samos too late to save Rhodes, and presently returned to the former island.

The Peloponnesians now levied from the Rhodians a contribution of 32 talents, and adopted the island as the main station for their fleet, instead of Milêtus. But they remained on the island without any movement, and actually hauled their triremes ashore, for the space of no less than eighty days, that is, from about the middle of January to the end of March 411 B.C. While their powerful fleet of 94 triremes, superior to that of Athens at Samos, was thus lying idle, their allies in Chios were known to be suffering severe distress: moreover the promise of sending to coöperate with Pharnabazus against the Athenian dependencies on the Hellespont remained unperformed. We may impute such extreme military slackness mainly to the insidious policy of Tissaphernês, now playing a double game between Sparta and Athens. He still kept up intelligence with the Peloponnesians at Rhodes—paralysed their energies by assurances that the Phenician fleet was actually on its way to aid them—and ensured the success of these intrigues by bribes distributed personally among the generals and the trierarchs. Even Astyochus the general-in-chief took his share in this corrupt bargain, against which not one stood out except the Syracusan Hermokratês.

I have noticed, on more than one previous occasion, the many evidences which exist of the prevalence of personal corruption—even in its coarsest form, that of direct bribery—among the leading Greeks of all the cities, when acting individually. Nor ought this general fact ever to be forgotten by those who discuss the question between oligarchy and democracy, as it stood in the Grecian world. The confident pretensions put forth by the oligarchical Greeks to superior virtue, public as well as private—and the quiet repetition, by various writers modern and ancient, of the laudatory epithets implying such assumed virtue—are so far from being borne out by history, that these individuals were perpetually ready as statesmen to betray their countrymen, or as generals even to betray the interests of their soldiers, for the purpose of acquiring money themselves. And if the community were to have any chance of guarantee against such abuses, it could only be by full license of accusation against delinquents, and certainty of trial before judges identified in interest with the people themselves. Such were the securities which the Grecian democracies, especially that of Athens, tried to provide, in a manner, not always wise, still less always effectual—but assuredly justified, in the amplest manner, by the urgency and prevalence of the evil. Yet in the common representations given of Athenian affairs, this evil is overlooked or evaded; the precautions taken against it are denounced as so many evidences of democratical ill-temper and injustice; and the class of men, through whose initiatory action alone such precautions were enforced, are held up to scorn as demagogues and *sycophants*. Had these

Peloponnesian generals and trierarchs, who under the influence of bribes wasted two important months in inaction, been Athenians, there might have been some chance of their being tried and punished, though even at Athens the chance of impunity to offenders, through powerful political clubs and other sinister artifices, was much greater than it ought to have been. When the judicial precautions provided at Athens are looked at, as they ought to be, side by side with the evil, they will be found imperfect indeed both in the scheme and in the working, but certainly neither uncalled-for nor over-severe.

CHAPTER XXXII [LXII]

TWENTY-FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR—OLIGARCHY OF FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS

THERE is no reason to doubt that the foreign affairs of Athens might have gone on improving, had they not been endangered by the treason of a fraction of her own citizens. That treason took its first rise from the exile Alkibiadês.

In the course of a few months he had greatly lost the confidence of the Spartans. The revolt of the Asiatic dependencies of Athens had not been accomplished so easily and rapidly as he had predicted: Chalkideus, the Spartan commander with whom he had acted, was defeated and slain near Milêtus: the Ephor Endius, by whom he was chiefly protected, retained his office only for one year, and was succeeded by other Ephors about the end of September, when the Athenians gained their second victory near Milêtus, and were on the point of blocking up the town; lastly, King Agis, the personal enemy of Alkibiadês, still remained to persecute him.

It was thus that, after the defeat of Milêtus, Agis was enabled to discredit Alkibiadês as a traitor to Sparta; upon which the new Ephors sent out at once an order to the general Astyochus, to put him to death. Alkibiadês had now an opportunity of tasting the difference between Spartan and Athenian procedure. Though his enemies at Athens were numerous and virulent—with all the advantage, so unspeakable in political warfare, of being able to raise the cry of irreligion against him; yet the utmost which they could obtain was, that he should be summoned home to take his trial before the Dikastery. At Sparta, without any positive ground of crimination, his enemies procure an order that he shall be put to death.

Alkibiadês, however, got intimation of the order in time to retire to Tissaphernês. Probably he was forewarned by Astyochus himself, not ignorant that so monstrous a deed would greatly alienate the Chians and Milêsiens. With that flexibility of character which enabled him at once to master and take up a new position, Alkibiadês soon found means to insinuate himself into the confidence of the satrap. He began now to play a game neither Spartan, nor Athenian, but Persian and anti-Hellenic, a game of duplicity to which Tissaphernês himself was spontaneously disposed, but to which the intervention of a dexterous Grecian negotiator was indispensable. It was by no means the interest of the Great King

(Alkibiadês urged) to lend such effective aid to either of the contending parties as would enable it to crush the other : he ought neither to bring up the Phenician fleet to the aid of the Lacedæmonians, nor to furnish that abundant pay which would procure for them indefinite levies of new Grecian force. He ought so to feed and prolong the war, as to make each party an instrument of exhaustion and impoverishment against the other, and thus himself to rise on the ruins of both : first to break down the Athenian empire by means of the Peloponnesians, and afterwards to expel the Peloponnesians themselves—which might be effected with little trouble if they were weakened by a protracted previous struggle.

Thus far Alkibiadês gave advice, as a Persian counsellor, not unsuitable to the policy of the court of Susa. But he seldom gave advice without some view to his own profit, ambition, or antipathies. Cast off unceremoniously by the Lacedæmonians, he was now driven to seek restoration in his own country. To accomplish this object, it was necessary not only that he should preserve her from being altogether ruined, but that he should present himself to the Athenians as one who could, if restored, divert the aid of Tissaphernês from Lacedæmon to Athens. Accordingly, he farther suggested to the satrap, that while it was essential to his interest not to permit land power and maritime power to be united in the same hands, whether Lacedæmonian or Athenian—it would nevertheless be found easier to arrange matters with the empire and pretensions of Athens, than with those of Lacedæmon. Athens (he argued) neither sought nor professed any other object than the subjection of her own maritime dependencies, in return for which she would willingly leave all the Asiatic Greeks in the hands of the Great King ; while Sparta, forswearing all idea of empire, and professing ostentatiously to aim at the universal enfranchisement of every Grecian city, could not with the smallest consistency conspire to deprive the Asiatic Greeks of the same privilege.

All these latter arguments, whereby Alkibiadês professed to create in the mind of the satrap a preference for Athens, were either futile or founded on false assumptions. For on the one hand, even Lichas never refused to concur in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks to Persia—while on the other hand, the empire of Athens, so long as she retained any empire, was pretty sure to be more formidable to Persia than any efforts undertaken by Sparta, under the disinterested pretence of liberating generally the Grecian cities. Nor did Tissaphernês at all lend himself to any such positive impression, though he felt strongly the force of the negative recommendations of Alkibiadês—that he should do no more for the Peloponnesians than was sufficient to feed the war, without ensuring to them either a speedy or a decisive success. The real use of the Athenian exile, was to assist the satrap in carrying it into execution ; and to provide for him those plausible pretences and justifications, which he was to issue as a substitute for effective supplies of men and money.

The first payment made by Tissaphernês, immediately after the capture of Iasus and of the revolted Amorgês, to the Peloponnesians at Milêtus, was at the rate of one drachma per head. But notice was given that for the future it would be reduced one half, a reduction for which Alkibiadês undertook to furnish a reason. The Athenians (he urged) gave no more than half a drachma, not because they could not afford more, but because,

from their long experience of nautical affairs, they had found that higher pay spoiled the discipline of the seamen by leading them into excesses and over-indulgence, as well as by inducing too ready leave of absence to be granted, in confidence that the high pay would bring back the men when called for. As he probably never expected that such subterfuges (employed at a moment when Athens was so poor that she could not even pay the half drachma per head) would carry conviction to anyone—he induced Tissaphernês to strengthen their effect by individual bribes to the generals and trierarchs. In regard to other Grecian cities who sent to ask pecuniary aid, and especially Chios, Alkibiadês spoke out with less reserve. They had been hitherto compelled to contribute to Athens (he said), and now that they had shaken off this payment, they must not shrink from imposing upon themselves equal or even greater burthens in their own defence. At the same time, however, he intimated—by way of keeping up hopes for the future—that Tissaphernês was at present carrying on the war at his own cost; but if hereafter remittances should arrive from Susa, the full rate of pay would be resumed. To this promise was added an assurance that the Phenician fleet was now under equipment, and would shortly be brought up to their aid, so as to give them a superiority which would render resistance hopeless.

Alkibiadês was at the same time opening correspondence with the Athenian officers at Samos. His breach with the Peloponnesians, as well as his ostensible position in the service of Tissaphernês, were facts well-known among the Athenian armament; and his scheme was to procure both restoration and renewed power in his native city, by representing himself as competent to bring over to her the aid and alliance of Persia, through his ascendancy over the mind of the satrap. His hostility to the democracy, however, was so generally known, that he despaired of accomplishing his return unless he could connect it with an oligarchical revolution. Accordingly he sent over a private message to the officers at Samos, several of them doubtless his personal friends, desiring to be remembered to the 'best men' in the armament—such was one of the standing phrases by which oligarchical men knew and described each other—and intimating his wish to come again as a citizen among them, bringing with him Tissaphernês as their ally. But he would come only on condition of the formation of an oligarchical government.

As yet, no man in Samos had thought of a revolution; but the moment that the idea was thus started, the trierarchs and wealthy men in the armament caught at it with avidity. Amidst the exhaustion of the public treasure at Athens, and the loss of tribute from her dependencies, it was now the private proprietors, and most of all, the wealthy proprietors, upon whom the cost of military operations fell; from which burthen they here saw the prospect of relief, coupled with increased chance of victory. A deputation of them crossed over from Samos to the mainland to converse personally with Alkibiadês, who again renewed his assurances in person, that he would bring not only Tissaphernês, but the Great King himself, into active coöperation with Athens provided they would put down the Athenian democracy, which he affirmed that the king could not possibly trust.

On the return of the deputation with these fresh assurances, the oligarchical men in Samos came together to take their measures for subverting

the democracy. They even ventured to speak of the project openly among the mass of the armament, who listened to it with nothing but aversion, were silenced at least, though not satisfied, by being told that the Persian treasury would be thrown open to them only on condition that they would relinquish their democracy. The oligarchical conspirators, however, knew well that the best which they could expect was a reluctant acquiescence—and that they must accomplish the revolution by their own hands. It was resolved to send a deputation to Athens, with Peisander¹ at the head, to make known the new prospects and to put the standing oligarchical clubs (*Hetæries*) into active coöperation for the purpose of violently breaking up the democracy; and farther, to establish oligarchical governments in all the remaining dependencies of Athens. They imagined that these dependencies would be thus induced to remain faithful to her, perhaps even that some of those which had already revolted might come back to their allegiance—when once she should be relieved from her democracy and placed under the rule of her 'best and most virtuous citizens'.

Hitherto, the bargain tendered for acceptance had been—subversion of the Athenian democracy and restoration of Alkibiadês, on one hand—against hearty coöperation, and a free supply of gold, from Persia, on the other. But what security was there that such bargain would be realized? There was absolutely no security except the word of Alkibiadês. For what reasonable motive could be imagined to make the Great King shape his foreign policy according to the interests of Alkibiadês—or to inspire him with such lively interest in the substitution of oligarchy for democracy at Athens? This was a question which the oligarchical conspirators at Samos not only never troubled themselves to raise, but which they had every motive to suppress. The suggestion of Alkibiadês coincided fully with their political interest and ambition. Their object was to put down the democracy, and get possession of the government for themselves—a purpose, towards which the promise of Persian gold, if they could get it accredited, was inestimable as a stepping-stone, whether it afterwards turned out to be a delusion or not. The probability is, that having a strong interest in believing it themselves, and a still stronger interest in making others believe it, they talked each other into persuasion.

There was one man, and one man alone so far as we know, who ventured openly to call it in question. This was Phrynichus, one of the generals of the fleet, who had recently given valuable counsel after the victory of Milêtus, a clear-sighted and sagacious man, but personally hostile to Alkibiadês. Alkibiadês (he said) had no attachment to oligarchical government rather than to democratical; nor could he be relied on for standing by it after it should have been set up. His only purpose was, to make use of the oligarchical conspiracy now forming, for his own restoration; which, if brought to pass, could not fail to introduce political discord into the camp—the greatest misfortune that could at present

¹ It has been supposed that Peisander was really an oligarch all along, who pretended at first to be a democrat, in order to deal his opponents a blow from within.

This theory is to some extent supported by Isokr., *De Bigis*, §§ 3, 4, which represents the oligarchs as exploiting the democracy. But (1) Isokrates' assertions in this speech are mostly untrustworthy; (2) Thukydides, who was connected

with the aristocratic families of Athens, nowhere hints at such a fact; (3) the comic writers deal with Peisander so harshly that they must have taken him for a political enemy; (4) the whole story sounds too ingenious to be true. Probably Peisander was a mere adventurer who tried to rise on the tide of each wave of political feeling, and so joined the reaction which had already manifested itself in 413 (see n. 2, p. 672).—Ed.

happen. As to the Persian king, it was unreasonable to expect that he would put himself out of his way to aid the Athenians, his old enemies, in whom he had no confidence—while he had the Peloponnesians present as allies, with a good naval force and powerful cities in his own territory, from whom he had never experienced either insult or annoyance. Moreover the dependencies of Athens—upon whom it was now proposed to confer, simultaneously with Athens herself, the blessing of oligarchical government—would receive that boon with indifference. Their object would be to obtain autonomy, either under oligarchy or democracy, as the case might be. From an Athenian oligarchy, the citizens of these dependencies had nothing to expect but violent executions without any judicial trial; but under the democracy, they could obtain shelter and the means of appeal, while their persecutors were liable to restraint and chastisement, from the people and the popular *Dikasteries*¹.

But in this protest he stood nearly alone. The tide of opinion, among the oligarchical conspirators, ran so furiously the other way, that it was resolved to despatch Peisander and others immediately to Athens to consummate the oligarchical revolution as well as the recall of Alkibiadês.

Phrynichus knew well what would be the consequence to himself—if this consummation were brought about—from the vengeance of his enemy Alkibiadês. Satisfied that the latter would destroy him, he took measures for destroying Alkibiadês beforehand, by a treasonable communication to the Lacedæmonian admiral Astyochus at Milêtus, to whom he sent a secret account of the intrigues which the Athenian exile was carrying on at Samos to the prejudice of the Peloponnesians, prefaced with an awkward apology for this sacrifice of the interests of his country to the necessity of protecting himself against a personal enemy. But Phrynichus was imperfectly informed of the real character of the Spartan commander, or of his relations with Tissaphernês and Alkibiadês. Not merely was the latter now at Magnesia, under the protection of the satrap, and out of the power of the Lacedæmonians—but Astyochus, a traitor to his duty through the gold of Tissaphernês, went up thither to show the letter of Phrynichus to the very person whom it was intended to expose. Alkibiadês forthwith sent intelligence to the generals and officers at Samos of the step taken by Phrynichus, and pressed them to put him to death.

The life of Phrynichus now hung by a thread, and was probably preserved only by that respect for judicial formalities so deeply rooted in the Athenian character. In the extremity of danger, he resorted to a still more subtle artifice to save himself. He despatched a second letter to Astyochus, intimating that he was now willing to betray to the Lacedæmonians the camp and armament at Samos. He invited Astyochus to attack the place, which was as yet unfortified—explaining minutely in what manner the attack could be best conducted. Foreseeing that Astyochus would betray this letter as he had betrayed the former, Phrynichus revealed to the camp the intention of the enemy to make an attack, as if it had reached him by private information. Presently arrived a letter from Alkibiadês, communicating to the army that Phrynichus had betrayed them, and that the Peloponnesians were on the point of making

¹ In taking the comparison between oligarchy and democracy in Greece, there is hardly any evidence more important than this passage: a testimony to the comparative merit of democracy,

pronounced by an oligarchical conspirator, and sanctioned by an historian himself unfriendly to the democracy.

an attack. But this letter, arriving after the precautions taken by order of Phrynichus himself had been already completed, was construed into a mere trick on the part of Alkibiadēs himself, to raise a charge of treasonable correspondence against his personal enemy. The impression thus made effaced the taint which had been left upon Phrynichus, inasmuch that the latter stood exculpated on both charges.

But Phrynichus, though thus successful in extricating himself, failed thoroughly in his manœuvre against the influence of Alkibiadēs, in whose favour the oligarchical movement not only went on, but was transferred from Samos to Athens. On arriving at the latter place, Peisander and his companions laid before the public assembly the projects conceived by the oligarchs at Samos. The people were invited to restore Alkibiadēs and renounce their democratical constitution, in return for which, they were assured of obtaining the Persian king as an ally, and of overcoming the Peloponnesians¹. Many speakers rose in animated defence of the democracy. The opponents of Alkibiadēs indignantly denounced the mischief of restoring him. Against all these opponents Peisander had but one simple reply. He called them forward successively by name, and put to each the question—‘What hope have you of salvation for the city, when the Peloponnesians have a naval force against us fully equal to ours, together with a greater number of allied cities—and when the king as well as Tissaphernēs are supplying them with money, while we have no money left? What hope have you of salvation, unless we can persuade the king to come over to our side? That object cannot possibly be attained, unless we put the powers of government into the hands of a few—and unless we recall Alkibiadēs, the only man now living who is competent to do the business.’

The general vote of the assembly sanctioned his recommendation. He and ten other envoys, invested with full powers of negotiating with Alkibiadēs and Tissaphernēs, were despatched to Ionia immediately. Peisander at the same time obtained from the assembly a vote deposing Phrynichus from his command.

Before his departure for Asia, he took a step yet more important. He was well aware that the recent vote would never pass into a reality by the spontaneous act of the people themselves. It was indeed indispensable as a first step, partly as an authority to himself, partly also as a confession of the temporary weakness of the democracy, and as a sanction and encouragement for the oligarchical forces to show themselves. But the second step yet remained to be performed, that of calling these forces into energetic action. Peisander visited all the various political clubs, or *Hetæries*, associations, bound together by oath, among the wealthy citizens, partly for purposes of amusement, but chiefly pledging the members to stand by each other in objects of political ambition, in judicial trials, in accusation or defence of official men after the period of office had expired, in carrying points through the public assembly, etc. Among these clubs were distributed most of ‘the best citizens, the good and

¹ In the speech made by Theramenes (the Athenian) during the oligarchy of Thirty, seven years afterwards, it is affirmed that the Athenian people voted the adoption of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, from being told that the *Lacedæmonians* would hardly trust a democracy (Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 45).

This is probably not correct—a specimen of the

loose assertion of speakers in regard to facts even not very long past. At the moment when Theramenes said this, the question, what political constitution at Athens the *Lacedæmonians* would please to tolerate, was all-important to the Athenians. Theramenes transfers the feelings of the present to the incidents of the past.

honourable men, the elegant men, the men of note, the temperate, the honest and moderate men', etc., to employ that complimentary phraseology by which wealthy and anti-popular politicians have chosen to designate each other, in ancient as well as in modern times. In the details of political life, they had different partialities as well as different antipathies, and were oftener in opposition than in coöperation with each other. But they furnished, when taken together, a formidable anti-popular force, generally either in abeyance, or disseminated in the accomplishment of smaller political measures and separate personal successes, but capable, at a special crisis, of being organized, and put in conjoint attack, for the subversion of the democracy. Such was the important movement now initiated by Peisander. He visited separately each of these clubs, put them into communication with each other, and exhorted them all to joint aggressive action against their common enemy the democracy¹.

Having taken other necessary measures towards the same purpose, Peisander left Athens with his colleagues to enter upon his negotiation with Tissaphernês. But the coöperation of the clubs which he had originated, was prosecuted with increased ardour during his absence, and even fell into hands more organizing and effective than his own. The rhetorical teacher Antiphon took it in hand especially, acquired the confidence of the clubs, and drew the plan of campaign against the democracy. He was a man estimable in private life and not open to pecuniary corruption, in other respects, of pre-eminent ability, in contrivance, judgement, speech, and action. The profession to which he belonged, generally unpopular among the democracy, excluded him from taking rank as a speaker either in the public assembly or the dikastery: for a rhetorical teacher, contending in either of them against a private speaker, was considered to stand at the same unfair advantage as a fencing-master fighting a duel with a gentleman would be held to stand in modern times. Himself thus debarred from the showy celebrity of Athenian political life, Antiphon became only the more consummate, as a master of advice and rhetorical composition², to assist the celebrity of others; insomuch that his silent assistance in political and judicial debates, as a sort of chamber-counsel, was highly appreciated and largely paid. Now such were precisely the talents required for the present occasion; while Antiphon, who hated the democracy for having hitherto kept him in the shade, gladly bent his full talents towards its subversion.

His chief auxiliary was Theramenês, another Athenian, now first named, of eminent ability and cunning. His father, Hagnon, was one of the Probûli.

¹ There seem to have been similar political clubs or associations at Carthage, exercising much influence, and holding perpetual banquets as a means of largess to the poor—Aristotel., *Polit.*, ii. 8, 2; Livy, xxxiii. 46; xxxiv. 61.

The like political associations were both of long duration among the nobility of Rome, and of much influence for political objects as well as judicial success—'coitiones' (compare Cicero, *Pro Cluentio*, c. 54, § 148) honorum adipiscendorum causa factæ—'factiones'—'sodalitates'. Compare Dio Cass., xxxvii. 57, about the *ἐταίρικὰ* of the Triumphvirs at Rome.

See Th. Mommsen, *De Collegiis et Sodalitiis Romanorum*, Kiel, 1843, ch. iii., §§ 5, 6, 7.

The Guilds in the European cities during the middle ages, usually sworn to by every member

and called *Conjuraciones Amicitia*, bear in many respects a resemblance to these *ἐνωμοσίαι*; though the judicial proceedings in the mediæval cities, being so much less popular than at Athens, narrowed their range of interference in this direction: their political importance, however, was quite equal. (See Wilda, *Das Gilden Wesen des Mittelalters*, Abschn., ii., p. 167, etc.)

² The person described by Krito in the *Euthydêmos* of Plato (c. 31, p. 305 C.) as having censured Sokratês for conversing with Euthydêmos and Dionysodôros, is presented exactly like Antiphon in Thukydides—ἥκιστα γὰρ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ· οὐδὲ οἷμαι πῶποτε αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίῳ ἀναβηκέναι· ἀλλ' ἐπαίειν αὐτὸν φασὶ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, γὰρ τὸν Δία, καὶ δεῖνόν εἶναι καὶ δεῖνους λόγους ξυτιθέναι.

Even Phrynichus became zealous in forwarding the movement at Athens, after his dismissal from the command. He brought to the side of Antiphon and Theramenês a contriving head not inferior to theirs, coupled with daring and audacity even superior.

At the time when Peisander and the other envoys reached Ionia (seemingly about the end of January or beginning of February, 411 B.C.), the Peloponnesian fleet had already gone to Rhodes. At the same time, the Athenian armament at Chios was making progress in the siege of that place and the construction of the neighbouring fort at Delphinium. Pedaritus, the Lacedæmonian governor of the island, had sent pressing messages to solicit aid from the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, but no aid arrived; and he therefore resolved to attempt a general sally and attack upon the Athenians, with his whole force foreign as well as Chian. Though at first he obtained some success, the battle ended in his complete defeat and death.

It was while Chios seemed thus likely to be recovered by Athens that Peisander arrived in Ionia to open his negotiations with Alkibiadês and Tissaphernês. He was enabled to announce that the subversion of the democracy at Athens was already begun and would soon be consummated: and he now required the price which had been promised in exchange—Persian alliance and aid to Athens against the Peloponnesians. But Alkibiadês knew well that he had promised what he had not the least chance of being able to perform.

Receiving the envoys himself in conjunction with Tissaphernês, he pushed his demands to an extent which he knew that the Athenians would never concede, in order that the rupture might seem to be on their side, and not on his. First, he required the whole of Ionia to be conceded to the Great King; next, all the neighbouring islands, with some other items besides. Large as these requisitions were, comprehending the cession of Lesbos and Samos as well as Chios, and replacing the Persian monarchy in the condition in which it had stood in 496 B.C. before the Ionic revolt—Peisander and his colleagues granted them all: so that Alkibiadês was on the point of seeing his deception exposed and frustrated. At last he bethought himself of a fresh demand, which touched Athenian pride as well as Athenian safety, in the tenderest place. He required that the Persian king should be held free to build ships of war in unlimited number, and to keep them sailing along the coast as he might think fit, through all these new portions of territory¹. Not merely did it cancel the boasted treaty (called the peace of Kallias) concluded about forty years before between Athens and Persia, but it extinguished the maritime empire of Athens, and compromised the security of all the coasts and islands of the Ægean. If there came to be a powerful Persian fleets on the islands, it would be the certain precursor and means of farther conquests to the westward, and would revive the aggressive dispositions of the Great King as they had stood at the beginning of the reign of Xerxês. Peisander and his comrades, abruptly breaking off the debate,

¹ Thukyd., viii. 56: ναὺς ἡγεῖον εἶναι βασιλεῖα ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ παραπλεῖν τὴν αὐτοῦ γῆν, ὅπη ἂν καὶ ὅσαι αὐτὸν βούληται.

In my judgement *αὐτοῦ* is decidedly the proper reading here.

[The reading *αὐτοῦ γῆν* has also the best MSS. support. The demand that the Persian King

might move his fleet anywhere along the coast of Asia Minor, instead of being confined to the waters 'east of Phaselis and the Kyanean rocks', was in itself sufficient to ruin the negotiations. To ask that the Persians might send any number of ships to cruise off Attica would have been a gratuitous act of impudence.—Ed.]

returned to Samos. They suspected Alkibiadès of playing false with the oligarchical movement which he had himself instigated, and affirmed that he was, after all, unsuitable for a place in oligarchical society. Such declarations, when circulated at Samos, to account for their unexpected failure in realizing the hopes which they had raised, created among the armament an impression that Alkibiadès was really favourable to the democracy.

Immediately after the rupture of the negotiations the satrap took a step well calculated to destroy the hopes of the Athenians altogether, so far as Persian aid was concerned. Though persisting in his policy of lending no decisive assistance to either party, he yet began to fear that he was pushing matters too far against the Peloponnesians. He had no treaty with them actually in force, since Lichas had disallowed the two previous conventions; nor had he furnished them with pay or maintenance. He was now, however, apprised that they could find subsistence no longer, and that they would probably desert, or commit depredations on the coast of his satrapy, or perhaps be driven to hasten on a general action with the Athenians. Under such apprehensions he felt compelled to furnish them with pay, and to conclude with them a third convention. He therefore invited the Peloponnesian leaders to Milétus, and concluded with them a treaty to the following effect:—

‘In this 13th year of the reign of Darius, and in the ephorship of Alexippidas at Lacedæmon, a convention is hereby concluded by the Lacedæmonians and their allies, with Tissaphernès and Hieramenès and the sons of Pharnakès, respecting the affairs of the king and of the Lacedæmonians and their allies. The territory of the king, as much of it as is in Asia, shall belong to the king. Let the king determine as he chooses respecting his own territory. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not approach the king’s territory with any mischievous purpose—nor shall the king approach that of the Lacedæmonians and their allies with any like purpose. If any one among the Lacedæmonians or their allies shall approach the king’s territory with mischievous purpose, the Lacedæmonians and their allies shall hinder him: if anyone from the king’s territory shall approach the Lacedæmonians or their allies with mischievous purpose, the king shall hinder him. Tissaphernès shall provide pay and maintenance, for the fleet now present at the rate already stipulated, until the king’s fleet shall arrive; after that it shall be at the option of the Lacedæmonians to maintain their own fleet if they think fit—or if they prefer, Tissaphernès shall furnish maintenance, and at the close of the war the Lacedæmonians shall repay to him what they have received. After the king’s fleet shall have arrived, the two fleets shall carry on war conjointly, in such manner as shall seem good to Tissaphernès and the Lacedæmonians and their allies. If they choose to close the war with the Athenians, they shall close it only by joint consent.’

In comparing this third convention with the two preceding, we find that nothing is now stipulated as to any territory except the continent of Asia, which is ensured unreservedly to the king, of course with all the Greek residents planted upon it. But by a diplomatic finesse, the terms of the treaty imply that this is not *all* the territory which the king is entitled to claim—though nothing is covenanted as to any remainder. Next, this third treaty includes Pharnabazus with his satrapy of Dasky-

lium; while in the former treaties no other satrap except Tissaphernês had been concerned. Thirdly, we here find, for the first time, formal announcement of a Persian fleet about to be brought up as auxiliary to the Peloponnesians.

The Peloponnesian fleet was now ordered to move from Rhodes. Before it quitted that island, however, envoys came thither from Eretria and from Orôpus; which latter place, though protected by an Athenian garrison, had recently been surprised and captured by the Boeotians. The loss of Orôpus much increased the facilities for the revolt of Eubœa; and these envoys came to entreat aid from the Peloponnesian fleet, to second the island in that design. The Peloponnesian commanders, however, felt themselves under prior obligation to relieve the sufferers at Chios, towards which island they first bent their course. But when they saw the Athenian squadron dogging their motions, they again concentrated their force at Milêtus; while the Athenian fleet was also again united at Samos. It was about the end of March 411 B.C., that the two fleets were thus replaced in the stations which they had occupied four months previously.

After the breach with Alkibiadês, and still more after this manifest reconciliation of Tissaphernês with the Peloponnesians, Peisander and the oligarchical conspirators at Samos had to reconsider their plan of action. The first step had been achieved, before the delusive expectation of Persian gold was dissipated. The Athenian people had been familiarized with the idea of a subversion of their constitution, in consideration of a certain price: it remained to extort from them at the point of the sword, without paying the price, what they had thus consented to sell¹. Moreover the leaders of the scheme felt themselves already compromised, so that they could not recede with safety. The conspirators resolved to persevere, at all hazards, both in breaking down the constitution and in carrying on the foreign war. Most of them being rich men, they were content to defray the cost out of their own purses, now that they were contending, not for their country, but for their own power and profit.

They lost no time in proceeding to execution. While they despatched Peisander with five of the envoys back to Athens, to consummate what was already in progress there—and the remaining five to oligarchize the dependent allies—they organized all their partisan force in the armament and began to take measures for putting down the democracy in Samos itself. The partisans of Peisander, finding it an invincible obstacle to their views, contrived to gain over a party of the leading Samians now in authority under it. Three hundred of these latter, a portion of those who ten months before had risen in arms to put down the pre-existing oligarchy, now enlisted as conspirators along with the Athenian oligarchs. The new alliance was cemented, according to genuine oligarchical practice, by an assassination—for which a suitable victim was at hand. The Athenian Hyperbolus, who had been ostracized some years before by the coalition of Nikias and Alkibiadês, was now resident at Samos. Some of the Athenian partisans, headed by Charminus, one of the generals, in concert with the Samian conspirators, seized him and put him to death, seemingly with some other victims.

¹ See Aristotel., *Polit.*, v. 3, 8. He cites this revolution as an instance of one begun by deceit, and afterwards consummated by force.

But these assassinations gave warning to opponents. Those leading men at Samos who remained attached to the democracy, looking abroad for defence against the coming attack, made earnest appeal to Leon and Diomedon, the two generals recently arrived from Athens in substitution for Phrynichus and Skironidês, as well as to the trierarch Thrasyllus, to Thrasybulus (son of Lykus), then serving as an hoplite, and to many others of the pronounced democrats and patriots in the Athenian armament. They made appeal, not simply in behalf of their personal safety and of their own democracy, but also on grounds of public interest to Athens; since, if Samos became oligarchized, its sympathy with the Athenian democracy and its fidelity to the alliance would be at an end.

To stand by the assailed democracy of Samos, and to preserve the island itself, now the mainstay of the shattered Athenian empire, were motives more than sufficient to awaken the Athenian leaders thus solicited. Commencing a personal canvass among the soldiers and seamen, and invoking their interference to avert the overthrow of the Samian democracy, they found the general sentiment decidedly in their favour, most of all among the Parali, or crew of the consecrated public trireme called the *Paralus*. Presently the conspirators made a violent attack to overthrow the government; but though they chose their own moment, they still found themselves thoroughly worsted in the struggle. Thirty of their number were slain in the contest, and three of the most guilty afterwards condemned to banishment. The victorious party took no farther revenge, even upon the remainder of the three hundred conspirators—granted a general amnesty—and did their best to re-establish constitutional and harmonious working of the democracy.

Chæreas, an Athenian trierarch, who had been forward in the contest, was sent in the *Paralus* to Athens, to make communication of what had occurred. But this democratical crew, on reaching their native city, instead of being received with that welcome which they doubtless expected, found the democracy of Athens subverted: instead of the *Boulê* of Five Hundred, and the assembled people, an oligarchy of Four Hundred self-installed persons were enthroned with sovereign authority in the Council House. The first order of the Four Hundred, on hearing that the *Paralus* had entered *Peiræus*, was to remove the crew aboard a common trireme, with orders to depart forthwith and to cruise near *Eubœa*. The commander Chæreas found means to escape, and returned back to Samos to tell the unwelcome news.

The steps, whereby this oligarchy of Four Hundred had been gradually raised up to their new power, must be taken up from the time when *Peisander* quitted Athens. All the members of that board of Elders called *Probûli*, who had been named after the defeat in Sicily—with *Hagnon*, father of *Theramênês*, at their head¹—together with many other leading citizens, some of whom had been counted among the firmest friends of the democracy, joined the movement; while the oligarchic and the neutral rich came into it with ardour; so that a body of partisans was formed both numerous and well provided with money. They permitted the [council] and the public assembly to go on meeting and debating as

¹ Thukyd., viii. 1. About the countenance which all these *Probûli* lent to the reactionaries, see Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, iii. 18, 2.

usual ; but his partisans, neither the names nor the numbers of whom were publicly known, received from him instructions both when to speak and what language to hold. The great topic upon which they descanted, was the costliness of democratical institutions in the present distressed state of the finances, when tribute from the allies could no longer be reckoned upon—the heavy tax imposed upon the state by paying the Councillors, the *Dikasts*, the *Ekklesiasts* or citizens who attended the public assembly, etc. The state could now afford to pay none but those soldiers who fought in its defence, nor ought anyone else to touch the public money. It was essential (they insisted) to exclude from the political franchise all except a select body of Five Thousand, composed of those who were best able to do service to the city by person and by purse¹.

Even thus indirectly advocated, the project of cutting down the franchise to Five Thousand, and of suppressing all the paid civil functions, was a change sufficiently violent to call forth abundant opponents. Of the men who thus stood forward in opposition, the most prominent were successively taken off by private assassination. The first of them who thus perished was *Androklês*, distinguished as a demagogue or popular speaker, and marked out to vengeance not only by that circumstance, but by the farther fact that he had been among the most vehement accusers of *Alkibiadês* before his exile. A band of Grecian youths got together, from different cities, was organized for the business : the victims were all chosen on the same special ground, and the deed was so skilfully perpetrated that neither director nor instrument ever became known. After these assassinations—emanating from an unknown Directory like a *Vehmic tribunal*—had continued for some time, the terror which they inspired became universal. So finished an organization, and such well-aimed blows, raised a general belief that the conspirators were much more numerous than they were in reality. And as it turned out that there were persons among them who had before been accounted hearty democrats, so at last dismay and mistrust became universally prevalent. In the midst of this terrorism, all opposition ceased in the [council] and public assembly, so that the speakers of the conspiring oligarchy appeared to carry an unanimous assent.

Such was the condition to which things had been brought in Athens at the time when *Peisander* and the five envoys arrived thither returning from *Samos*. It is probable that they had previously transmitted home from *Samos* news of the rupture with *Alkibiadês*. Such news would probably be acceptable both to *Antiphon* and *Phrynichus*, both of them personal enemies of *Alkibiadês*. At any rate, the plans of *Antiphon* had been independent of all view to Persian aid. *Peisander* had not come direct from *Samos* to Athens, but had halted in his voyage at various allied dependencies—while the other five envoys had been sent to *Thasos* and elsewhere, all for the same purpose, of putting down democracies in those allied cities where they existed, and establishing oligarchies in their room. *Peisander* made this change at *Tênos*, *Andros*, *Karystus*, *Ægina*, and elsewhere, collecting from these several places a regiment of 300 hoplites, which he brought with him to Athens as a sort of body-guard to his new

¹ *Thukydides* (viii. 64) only knows of certain informal proposals made by the plotters as a stepping-stone towards securing complete control for themselves (*λόγος ἐκ τοῦ φάρδρου προσιργαστο*

αὐτοῖς). From *Ath. Pol.* (c. 29) we now know that recommendations were put forward in all due order by a public commission, and ratified by the assembly (see Appendix to this chapter).—ED.

oligarchy. His arrival was the signal for consummating the revolution; first, by suspension of the tutelary constitutional sanction—next, by the more direct employment of armed force.

In a public assembly a decree was passed, naming ten commissioners with full powers, to prepare propositions for such political reform as they should think advisable—and to be ready by a given day¹. According to the usual practice, this decree must previously have been approved in the Boulê of Five Hundred, before it was submitted to the people. Such was doubtless the case in the present instance, so that the decree passed without any opposition. On the day fixed, a fresh assembly met, which Peisander and his partisans caused to be held, not in the usual place (called the Pnyx) within the city walls, but at a place called Kolônus, ten stadia (rather more than a mile) without the walls, north of the city. Kolônus was a temple of Poseidon, within the precinct of which the assembly was enclosed for the occasion. Such an assembly was not likely to be numerous, wherever held², since there could be little motive to attend when freedom of debate was extinguished; but the oligarchical conspirators now transferred it without the walls, selecting a narrow area for the meeting—in order that they might lessen still farther the chance of numerous attendance. They were thus also more out of the reach of an armed movement in the city, as well as enabled to post their own armed partisans around, under colour of protecting the meeting against disturbance by the Lacedæmonians from Dekeleia.

The proposition of the newly-appointed Decemvirs was exceedingly short and simple. They merely moved the abolition of the celebrated Graphê Paranomôn; that is, they proposed that every Athenian citizen should have full liberty of making any anti-constitutional proposition that he chose. This proposition was adopted without a single dissident. It was thought more formal to sever this proposition pointedly from the rest, and to put it, singly and apart, into the mouth of the special commissioners, since it was the legalizing condition of every other positive change which they were about to move afterwards. Full liberty being thus granted to make any motion, however anti-constitutional, and to dispense with all the established formalities, such as preliminary authorization by the senate—the revolutionaries now came forward with substantive propositions to the following effect³ :—

1. All the existing democratical magistracies were suppressed at once, and made to cease for the future. 2. No civil functions whatever were hereafter to be salaried. 3. To constitute a new government, a committee of five persons were named forthwith, who were to choose a larger body of one hundred (that is, one hundred including the five choosers themselves). Each individual, out of this body of one hundred, was to choose three persons. 4. A body of Four Hundred was thus constituted, who were to take their seat in the Council-house, and to carry on the government with unlimited powers, according to their own discretion.

¹ Thukyd., viii. 67. [On the order in which these measures were brought forward, and on the constitution of the Commission, see Appendix.—Ed.]

² Compare the statement in Lysias (Orat. xii., *Cont. Erastosth.*, § 76, p. 127) respecting the small numbers who attended and voted at the assembly by which the subsequent oligarchy of Thirty was named.

³ Thukydides does not ascribe this batch of proposals to any definite person, but says somewhat obscurely: ἐνταῦθα δὲ λαμπρώς ἐλέγχετο μήτε ἀρχεῖν, κ. τ. λ. (viii. 67)—an expression which suggests that he was not acquainted with the constitutional details of the revolution. This deficiency is remedied in *Ath. Pol.* (chs. 29, 30). See Appendix to this chapter.—Ed.

5. They were to convene the Five Thousand, whenever they might think fit. All was passed without a dissentient voice.

The invention and employment of this imaginary aggregate of Five Thousand was not the least dexterous among the combinations of Antiphon. No one knew who these Five Thousand were: yet the resolution, just adopted, purported—not that such a number of citizens should be singled out and constituted, either by choice, or by lot, or in some determinate manner which should exhibit them to the view and knowledge of others—but that the Four Hundred should convene *The Five Thousand*, whenever they thought proper: thus assuming the latter to be a list already made up and notorious, at least to the Four Hundred themselves. The Four Hundred now installed formed the entire and exclusive rulers of the state. But the mere name of the Five Thousand, though it was nothing more than a name, served two important purposes for Antiphon and his conspiracy. First, it admitted of being falsely produced (especially to the armament at Samos) as proof of a tolerably numerous and popular body of qualified citizens—all intended to take their turn by rotation in exercising the powers of government. Next, it immensely augmented the means of intimidation possessed by the Four Hundred at home, by exaggerating the impression of their supposed strength. For the citizens generally were made to believe that there were five thousand real and living partners in the conspiracy; while the fact that these partners were not known and could not be individually identified, rather aggravated the reigning terror and mistrust, since every man, suspecting that his neighbour might possibly be among them, was afraid to communicate his discontent or propose means for joint resistance.

As soon as the public assembly at Kolônus had with such seeming unanimity accepted all the propositions of Peisander, they were dismissed, and the new regiment of Four Hundred were constituted in the form prescribed. It now only remained to install them in the Council-house. They selected that hour of the day when the greater number of citizens habitually went home. While the general body of hoplites left the station at this hour according to the usual practice, the hoplites (Andrian, Tenian and others) in the immediate confidence of the Four Hundred were directed to hold themselves prepared at a little distance off; so that if any symptoms should appear of resistance being contemplated, they might at once interfere and forestall it. Having taken this precaution, the Four Hundred marched in a body to the Boulê, each man with a dagger concealed under his garment, and followed by their special body-guard of 120 young men from various Grecian cities. The councillors were noway prepared to resist the decree just passed under the forms of legality, with an armed body now arrived to enforce its execution. They obeyed and departed, each man as he passed the door receiving the salary tendered to him.

Thus perished, or seemed to perish, the democracy of Athens, after an uninterrupted existence of nearly one hundred years since the revolution of Kleisthenês. So incredible did it appear that the numerous, intelligent, and constitutional citizens of Athens should suffer their liberties to be overthrown by a band of four hundred conspirators, while the great mass of them not only loved their democracy, but had arms in their hands to defend it, that even their enemy and neighbour Agis at Dekeleia could hardly imagine the revolution to be a fact accomplished.

As Grecian history has been usually written, we are instructed to believe that the misfortunes, and the corruption, and the degradation, of the democratical states, were brought upon them by the class of demagogues, of whom Kleon, Hyperbolus, Androklês, etc., stand forth as specimens. These men are represented as mischief-makers and revilers, accusing without just cause, and converting innocence into treason.

Now the history of this conspiracy of the Four Hundred presents to us the other side of the picture. It reveals the continued existence of powerful anti-popular combinations, ready to come together for treasonable purposes when the moment appeared safe and tempting. It manifests the character and morality of the leaders, to whom the direction of the anti-popular force naturally fell. It proves that these leaders, men of uncommon ability, required little more than the extinction or silence of the demagogues, to be enabled to subvert the popular securities, and get possession of the government. We need no better proof to teach us what was the real function and intrinsic necessity of these demagogues in the Athenian system, taking them as a class, and apart from the manner in which individuals among them may have performed their duty. Aggressive in respect to official delinquents, they were defensive in respect to the public and the constitution. If that anti-popular force, which Antiphon found ready-made, had not been efficient, at a much earlier moment, in stifling the democracy—it was because there were demagogues to cry aloud, as well as assemblies to hear and sustain them. If Antiphon's conspiracy was successful, it was because he knew where to aim his blows, so as to strike down the real enemies of the oligarchy and the real defenders of the people.

As soon as the Four Hundred found themselves formally installed, they divided themselves by lot into separate Prytanies, and then solemnized their installation by prayer and sacrifice. They put to death some political enemies, though not many: they farther imprisoned and banished others, and made large changes in the administration of affairs, carrying everything with a rigour unknown under the old constitution¹. It seems to have been proposed among them to pass a vote of restoration to all persons under sentence of exile. But this was rejected by the majority, in order that Alkibiadês might not be among the number: nor did they think it expedient to pass the law, reserving him as a special exception.

They farther despatched a messenger to Agis at Dekeleia, intimating their wish to treat for peace. Agis, however, not believing that the Athenian people would thus submit to be deprived of their liberty, anticipated that intestine dissension would certainly break out, or at least that some portion of the Long Walls would be found unguarded. While therefore he declined the overtures for peace, he at the same time sent for reinforcements out of Peloponnesus, and marched with a considerable army, in addition to his own garrison, up to the very walls of Athens. But he found the ramparts carefully manned: no commotion took place within: even a sally was made, in which some advantage was gained over

¹ Thukyd., viii. 70. I imagine that this must be the meaning of the words—τὰ δὲ ἅλλα ἐνεμον κατὰ κράτος τὴν πόλιν.

[Thukydides merely says, regarding the further innovations: ὕστερον δὲ πολλὰ μεταλλάξαντες τῆς τοῦ δήμου διοικήσεως. But all these changes from the time-honoured democracy must have been

well worth mentioning on his part, and his brevity indicates that he had no definite information on this point, save, perhaps, a vague report of the measures carried by the extremists after the installation of the Four Hundred (*Ath. Pol.*, c. 31). According to *Ath. Pol.* (c. 33), their rule lasted four months.—Ed.]

him. He therefore speedily retired, sending back his newly-arrived reinforcements to Peloponnesus; while the Four Hundred, on renewing their advances to him for peace, now found themselves much better received, and were even encouraged to despatch envoys to Sparta itself.

As soon as they had thus got over the first difficulties, they despatched ten envoys to Samos. Aware beforehand of the danger impending over them in that quarter from the known aversion of the soldiers and seamen to anything in the nature of oligarchy, they had moreover just heard, by the arrival of Chæreas and the Paralus, of the joint attack made by the Athenian and Samian oligarchs, and of its complete failure. Their ten envoys were instructed to represent at Samos that the recent oligarchy had been established with no views injurious to the city, but on the contrary for the general benefit; that though the Council now installed consisted of Four Hundred only, yet the total number of partisans who had made the revolution and were qualified citizens under it, was Five Thousand, a number greater (they added) than had ever been actually assembled in the Pnyx under the democracy, even for the most important debates¹, in consequence of the unavoidable absences of numerous individuals on military service and foreign travel.

They were forestalled by Chæreas, who, though the Four Hundred tried to detain him, made his escape and hastened to Samos to communicate the change which had occurred at Athens. Instead of hearing that change described under the extenuations prescribed by Antiphon and Phrynichus, the armament first learnt it from the lips of Chæreas, who told them at once the extreme truth—and even more than the truth. He recounted with indignation that every Athenian, who ventured to say a word against the Four Hundred rulers of the city, was punished with the scourge—that even the wives and children of persons hostile to them were outraged—that there was a design of seizing and imprisoning the relatives of the democrats at Samos, and putting them to death if the latter refused to obey orders from Athens. These additional details of Chæreas filled them with uncontrollable wrath, which they manifested by open menace against the known partisans of the Four Hundred at Samos. It was not without difficulty that their hands were arrested by the more reflecting citizens present, who remonstrated against the madness of such disorderly proceedings when the enemy was close upon them.

A great democratical manifestation, of the most earnest and imposing character, was proclaimed, chiefly at the instance of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The Athenian armament, brought together in one grand assembly, took an oath by the most stringent sanctions—To maintain their democracy—To keep up friendship and harmony with each other—To carry on the war against the Peloponnesians with energy—To be at enmity with the Four Hundred at Athens, and to enter into no amicable communication with them whatever. The whole armament swore to this compact with enthusiasm, and even those who had before taken part in

¹ That no assembly had ever been attended by so many as 5,000 (*ovδενώμενε*) I certainly am far from believing. It is not improbable, however, that 5,000 was an unusually large number of citizens to attend. Dr. Arnold, in his note, opposes the allegation, in part, by remarking that 'the law required not only the presence but the sanction of at least 6,000 citizens to some particular decrees of the assembly'. It seems to me, however, quite

possible, that in cases where this large number of votes was required, as in the ostracism, and where there was no discussion carried on immediately before the voting—the process of voting may have lasted some hours, like our keeping open of a poll. So that though more than 6,000 citizens must have *voted* altogether—it was not necessary that all should have been present in the same assembly.

the oligarchical movements were forced to be forward in the ceremony. What lent double force to this scene, was, that the entire Samian population, every male of the military age, took the oath along with the friendly armament.

Pursuant to this resolution, the soldiers of the armament now took a step unparalleled in Athenian history. Feeling that they could no longer receive orders from Athens under her present oligarchical rulers, they constituted themselves into a sort of community apart, and held an assembly as citizens to choose anew their generals and trierarchs. Of those already in command, several were deposed as unworthy of trust, others being elected in their places, especially Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. '*The city has revolted from us*' (exclaimed Thrasybulus). 'But let not this abate our courage: for they are only the lesser force—we are the greater and the self-sufficing. We have here the whole navy of the state, whereby we can ensure to ourselves the contributions from our dependencies just as well as if we started from Athens. We have the hearty attachment of Samos, second in power only to Athens herself, and serving us as a military station against the enemy, now as in the past. We are better able to obtain supplies for ourselves, than those in the city for themselves; for it is only through our presence at Samos that they have hitherto kept the mouth of Peiræus open. If they refuse to restore to us our democratical constitution, we shall be better able to exclude them from the sea than they to exclude us. They send us no pay—they leave us to provide maintenance for ourselves. As counsellors, we here are better than they; for they have just committed the wrong of subverting the constitution of our common country—while we are striving to maintain it, and will do our best to force them into the same track. Alkibiadēs, if we ensure to him a safe restoration, will cheerfully bring the alliance of Persia to sustain us; and even if the worst comes to the worst, our powerful naval force will always enable us to find places of refuge in abundance, with city and territory adequate to our wants.'

Meanwhile Alkibiadēs, finding his return by means of the oligarchy impossible, naturally became its enemy, and this new antipathy superseded his feeling of revenge against the democracy for having banished him. In fact he was disposed (as Phrynichus had truly said about him¹) to avail himself indifferently of either, according as the one or the other presented itself as a serviceable agency for his ambitious views. Accordingly, as soon as the turn of affairs at Samos had made itself manifest, he opened communication with Thrasybulus and the democratical leaders², renewing to them the same promises of Persian alliance, on condition of his own restoration, as he had before made to Peisander and the oligarchical party. Thrasybulus and his colleagues either sincerely believed him, or at least thought that his restoration afforded a possibility of obtaining Persian aid, without which they despaired of the war.

It was not, however, until after more than one assembly and discussion, that Thrasybulus prevailed on the armament to pass a vote of security and restoration to Alkibiadēs. As Athenian citizens, the soldiers probably were unwilling to take upon them the reversal of a sentence solemnly passed by the democratical tribunal, on the ground of irreligion with

¹ Thukyd., viii. 48.

² Thukydides does not expressly mention this

communication—but it is implied in the words 'Ἀλκιβιάδην—ἄσμενον παρέξειν, etc. (viii. 76).

suspicion of treason. They were, however, induced to pass the vote, after which Thrasybulus sailed over to the Asiatic coast, brought across Alkibiadēs to the island, and introduced him to the armament. The supple exile, who had denounced the democracy so bitterly both at Sparta, and in his correspondence with the oligarchical conspirators, knew well how to adapt himself to the sympathies of the democratical assembly now before him. He began by deploring the sentence of banishment passed against him, and throwing the blame of it, not upon the injustice of his countrymen, but upon his own unhappy destiny¹. He then entered upon the public prospects of the moment, pledging himself with entire confidence to realize the hopes of Persian alliance, and boasting in terms not merely ostentatious but even extravagant, of the ascendant influence which he possessed over Tissaphernēs. The satrap had promised him (so the speech went on) never to let the Athenians want for pay, as soon as he once came to trust them, not even if it were necessary to issue out his last daric or to coin his own silver couch into money. Nor would he require any farther condition to induce him to trust them, except that Alkibiadēs should be restored and should become their guarantee. Not only would he furnish the Athenians with pay, but he would, besides, bring up to their aid the Phœnician fleet, which was already at Aspendus—instead of placing it at the disposal of the Peloponnesians.

Though Alkibiadēs thus presented himself with a new falsehood, as well as with a new vein of political sentiment, his discourse was eminently successful. In the fulness of confidence and enthusiasm, they elected him general along with Thrasybulus and the rest. So completely indeed were their imaginations filled with the prospect of Persian aid, against their enemies in Ionia, that alarm for the danger of Athens under the government of the Four Hundred became the predominant feeling; and many voices were even raised in favour of sailing to Peiræus for the rescue of the city. But Alkibiadēs, knowing well (what the armament did not know) that his own promises of Persian pay and fleet were a mere delusion, strenuously dissuaded such a movement, which would have left the dependencies in Ionia defenceless against the Peloponnesians. As soon as the assembly broke up, he crossed over again to the mainland, under pretence of concerting measures with Tissaphernēs to realize his recent engagements.

Relieved, substantially though not in strict form, from the penalties of exile, Alkibiadēs was thus launched in a new career. He was at this time eager to make a show of intimate and confidential communication with Tissaphernēs, in order that he might thereby impose upon the Athenians at Samos; to communicate to the satrap his recent election as general of the Athenian force, that his importance with the Persians might be enhanced; and lastly, by passing backwards and forwards from Tissaphernēs to the Athenian camp, to exhibit an appearance of friendly concert between the two, which might sow mistrust and alarm in the minds of the Peloponnesians. In this tripartite manœuvring, so suitable to his habitual character, he was more or less successful; especially in regard to the latter purpose. For though he never had any serious chance of inducing Tissaphernēs to assist the Athenians, he did nevertheless

¹ Thukyd., viii. 82. Nothing can be more false and perverted than the manner in which the pro-

ceedings of Alkibiadēs, during this period, are presented in the Oration of Isokratēs, *De Bigis*, §§ 18-23.

contribute to alienate him from the enemy, as well as the enemy from him.

Without any longer delay in the camp of Tissaphernês than was necessary to keep up the faith of the Athenians in his promise of Persian aid, Alkibiadês returned to Samos, where he was found by the ten envoys sent by the Four Hundred from Athens, on their first arrival. These envoys were invited by the generals to make their communication to the assembled armament. They had the utmost difficulty in procuring a hearing, so loud were the cries that the subverters of the democracy ought to be put to death. Silence being at length obtained, they proceeded to state that the late revolution had been brought to pass for the salvation of the city, and especially for the economy of the public treasure, by suppressing the salaried civil functions of the democracy, and thus leaving more pay for the soldiers: that there was no purpose of mischief in the change, still less of betrayal to the enemy, which might already have been effected, had such been the intention of the Four Hundred, when Agis advanced from Dekeleia up to the walls: that the citizens, now possessing the political franchise, were, not Four Hundred only, but Five Thousand in number, all of whom would take their turn in rotation for the places now occupied by the Four Hundred.

The general resentment against the Four Hundred was now expressed by the assembly so passionately, that the proposition of sailing immediately to the Peiræus was revived with greater ardour than before. Alkibiadês, who had already once discountenanced this design, now stood forward to repel it again. Nevertheless all the plenitude of his influence, then greater than that of any other officer in the armament, and seconded by the esteemed character as well as the loud voice of Thrasybulus¹, was required to avert it. He took upon himself to give to the envoys a public answer in the name of the collective armament. 'We make no objection to the power of the Five Thousand: but the Four Hundred must go about their business, and reinstate the Boulê of Five Hundred as it was before. We are much obliged for what you have done in the way of economy, so as to increase the pay available for the soldiers. Above all, maintain the war strenuously, without any flinching before the enemy. For if the city be now safely held, there is good hope that we may make up the mutual differences between us by amicable settlement; but if once either of us perish, either we here or you at home, there will be nothing left for the other to make up with.'

Thukydides insists much on the capital service which Alkibiadês then rendered to his country, by arresting a project which would have had the effect of leaving all Ionia and the Hellespont defenceless against the Peloponnesians. His advice doubtless turned out well in the result; yet if we contemplate the state of affairs at the moment when he gave it, we shall be inclined to doubt whether prudential calculation was not rather against him, and in favour of the impulse of the armament. For what was to hinder the Four Hundred from patching up a peace with Sparta, and getting a Lacedæmonian garrison into Athens to help them in maintaining their dominion? Alkibiadês could not really imagine that the Four Hundred would obey his mandate delivered to the envoys, and resign their power voluntarily. But if they remained masters of

¹ Plutarch, *Alkibiadês*, c. 26.

Athens, who could calculate what they would do, not merely in regard to the foreign enemy, but even in regard to the relatives of the absent soldiers? Whether we look to the legitimate apprehensions of the soldiers, inevitable while their relatives were thus exposed, or to the chance of irreparable public calamity, greater even than the loss of Ionia, by the betrayal of Athens to the enemy—we shall be disposed to conclude that the impulse of the armament was natural, and that Alkibiadēs was nothing more than fortunate in a sanguine venture. And if, instead of the actual chances, we look to the chances as Alkibiadēs represented, and as the armament conceived them upon his authority—viz., that the Phœnician fleet was close at hand to act against the Lacedæmonians in Ionia—we shall sympathize yet more with the defensive movement homeward. Alkibiadēs had an advantage over everyone else, simply by knowing his own falsehoods¹.

At the same assembly were introduced envoys from Argos, bearing a mission of recognition and an offer of aid to the Athenian Demos in Samos.

Meanwhile the envoys returned from Samos to Athens, carrying back to the Four Hundred the unwelcome news of their total failure with the armament. A little before, it appears, some of the trierarchs on service at the Hellespont had returned to Athens also, and had tried to turn their squadron to the purposes of the oligarchical conspirators, but had been baffled by the inflexible democracy of their own seamen². At the time when Peisander quitted Samos for Athens to consummate the oligarchical conspiracy even without Alkibiadēs, he and others had gone round many of the dependencies and had effected a similar revolution in their internal government, in hopes that they would thus become attached to the new oligarchy at Athens. But this anticipation (as Phrynichus had predicted) was nowhere realized. The newly-created oligarchies only became more anxious for complete autonomy than the democracies had been before. At Thasos especially, a body of exiles who had for some time dwelt in Peloponnesus were recalled, and active preparations were made for revolt, by new fortifications as well as by new triremes.

From the moment when the coadjutors of Antiphon first learnt, through the arrival of Chæreas at Athens, the proclamation of the democracy at Samos, discord, mistrust, and alarm began to spread even among their own members, together with a conviction that the oligarchy could never stand except through the presence of a Peloponnesian garrison in Athens. Antiphon and Phrynichus, the leading minds who directed the majority of the Four Hundred, despatched envoys to Sparta for concluding peace (these envoys never reached Sparta, being seized by the Parali and sent

¹ Against this view it may be urged: (1) That, as Thukydides observes, the departure of the Athenian fleet from Asiatic waters would have meant the certain loss of the remaining dependencies (viii. 86). If, furthermore, the allied fleet had sailed to the Hellespont, the restored democracy could have been starved into surrender, much as in 404 B.C., and might have received an even worse government of refugees. (2) The success of an attack upon Athens was exceedingly problematic; the Peiræus was securely held by the Four Hundred, and the rest of the coast by Agis; and, failing to find a landing-place, the fleet might have been left without a base of operations. (3) If the fleet had made any serious headway against the oligarchs, these latter would no doubt have followed the example of the Megarian demo-

crats in 424, and played into the hands of Agis. Such a surrender certainly could have happened in any case, but so long as there was a democratic fleet in being, its mere existence must have modified the terms of settlement. Moreover, the success of Alkibiadēs' policy may not have been due to mere luck. He must have been aware of the influence of the Moderates at Athens, who had given the first impetus to the revolution, and formed its real backbone. Thus he could realize that time was in his favour, for by their reckless violence the extremists were simply undermining their own position. This waiting policy may have been based on the calculation, 'Give the oligarchs rope enough, and they will hang themselves'.—Ed.

² Lysias, *Cont. Eratosthen.* § 43, c. 9, p. 411, Reisk.

prisoners to Argos). They farther commenced the erection of a special fort at Eetioneia, the projecting mole which contracted and commanded, on the northern side, the narrow entrance of Peiræus. Against their proceedings, however, there began to arise, even in the bosom of the Four Hundred, an opposition minority affecting popular sentiment, among whom the most conspicuous persons were Theramenês and Aristokratês.

Now began the workings of jealousy and strife among the successful conspirators, each of whom had entered into the scheme with unbounded expectations of personal ambition for himself—each had counted on stepping at once into the first place among the new oligarchical body. In a democracy (observes Thukydîdês) contentions for pre-eminence provoke in the unsuccessful competitors less sense of injustice, than in an oligarchy; for the losing candidates acquiesce with comparatively little repugnance in the unfavourable vote of a large miscellaneous body of unknown citizens; but they are angry at being put aside by a few known comrades, their rivals as well as their equals: moreover at the moment when an oligarchy of ambitious men has just raised itself on the ruins of a democracy, every man of the conspirators is in exaggerated expectation—everyone thinks himself entitled to become at once the first man of the body, and is dissatisfied if he be merely put upon a level with the rest.

Such were the feelings of disappointed ambition which sprung up among a minority of the Four Hundred. Theramenês, the leader of this minority, began to disconnect himself from this precarious enterprise. Taking advantage of the delusion which the Four Hundred had themselves held out about the fictitious Five Thousand, he insisted that it was necessary to popularize the party by enrolling and producing these Five Thousand as a real instead of a fictitious body.

Such an opposition became still more developed when the envoys returned from Samos, with an account of their reception by the armament, as well as of the answer, delivered in the name of the armament, whereby Alkibiadês directed the Four Hundred to dissolve themselves forthwith, but at the same time approved of the constitution of the Five Thousand, coupled with the restoration of the old senate. To enroll the Five Thousand at once, would be meeting the army half-way; and there were hopes that at that price a compromise and reconciliation might be effected, of which Alkibiadês had himself spoken as practicable¹. Hence arose an increased conviction that the dominion of the latter could not last; and an ambition, on the part of others as well as Theramenês, to stand forward as leaders of a popular opposition against it, in the name of the Five Thousand.

Against this popular opposition, Antiphon and Phrynichus exerted themselves to uphold their power without abridgement. They knew well that the enrolment of so many partners² would be tantamount to a

¹ Thukyd., viii. 86-89. It is alleged by Andokidês (in an Oration delivered many years afterwards before the people of Athens—*De Reditu suo*, §§ 10-15)—that during this spring he furnished the armament at Samos with wood proper for the construction of oars—only obtained by the special favour of Archelaus, King of Macedonia, and of which the armament then stood in great need. He farther alleges, that he afterwards visited Athens, while the Four Hundred were in full dominion; and that Peisander, at the head of this oligarchical body, threatened his life for having furnished such valuable aid to the armament, then at enmity

with Athens. Though he saved his life by clinging to the altar, yet he had to endure bonds and manifold hard treatment.

Of these claims which Andokidês prefers to the favour of the subsequent democracy, I do not know how much is true.

² Thucyd., viii. 92: τὸ μὲν καταστήσθαι μετόχους τοσούτους, ἀντίκρυς ἂν διήμην ἡγούμενοι, etc.

Aristotle (*Polit.*, v. 5, 4) calls Phrynichus the demagogue of the Four Hundred; that is, the person who most strenuously served *their* interests and struggled for *their* favour.

democracy, and would be in substance at least, if not in form, an annihilation of their own power. They had now gone too far to recede with safety; while the menacing attitude of Samos, as well as the opposition growing up against them at home both within and without their own body, served only as instigation to them to accelerate their measures for peace with Sparta and to secure the introduction of a Spartan garrison.

With this view, immediately after the return of their envoys from Samos, the two most eminent leaders, Antiphon and Phrynichus, went themselves with ten other colleagues in all haste to Sparta, prepared to purchase peace and the promise of Spartan aid almost at any price. At the same time the construction of the fortress at Eetioneia was prosecuted with redoubled zeal; under pretence of defending the entrance of Peiræus against the armament from Samos, but with the real purpose of bringing into it a Lacedæmonian fleet and army. A separate citadel was enclosed, defensible against any attack from Peiræus—furnished besides with distinct broad gates and posterns of its own, as well as with facilities for admitting an enemy within it, and orders were issued that all the corn, both actually warehoused and hereafter to be imported into Peiræus, should be deposited therein and sold out from thence for consumption. As Athens was sustained almost exclusively on corn brought from Eubœa and elsewhere, since the permanent occupation of Dekeleia, the Four Hundred rendered themselves masters by this arrangement of all the subsistence of the citizens, as well as of the entrance into the harbour.

Though Theramenès, himself one of the generals named under the Four Hundred, denounced the treasonable purpose of this new citadel—yet the majority of the Four Hundred stood to their resolution, so that the building made rapid progress. Such was the habit of obedience at Athens to an established authority, when once constituted—and so great the fear and mistrust arising out of the general belief in the reality of the Five Thousand, unknown auxiliaries supposed to be prepared to enforce the orders of the Four Hundred—that the people, and even armed citizen hoplites, went on working at the building, in spite of their suspicions as to its design. Though not completed, it was so far advanced as to be defensible, when Antiphon and Phrynichus returned from Sparta. They had gone thither prepared to surrender everything—not merely their naval force, but their city itself—and to purchase their own personal safety by making the Lacedæmonians masters of Peiræus. Yet we read with astonishment that the latter could not be prevailed on to contract any treaty. Had Alkibiadès been now playing their game, had they been under any energetic leaders to impel them into hearty coöperation with the treason of the Four Hundred, they might now have overpowered their great enemy at home, before the armament at Samos could have been brought to the rescue.

Why the Lacedæmonians remained idle, both in Peloponnesus and at Dekeleia, while Athens was thus betrayed and in the very throes of dissolution, we can render no account: possibly the caution of the Ephors may have distrusted Antiphon and Phrynichus, from the mere immensity of their concessions. All that they would promise was, that a Lacedæmonian fleet of 42 triremes (partly from Tarentum and Lokri)—now about to sail to Eubœa on the invitation of a disaffected party in that island—

should so far depart from its straight course as to hover near Ægina and Peiræus.

Of this squadron, however, even before it rounded Cape Malea, Theramenês obtained intelligence, and denounced it as intended to operate in concert with the Four Hundred for the occupation of Eetioneia. Meanwhile Athens became daily a scene of greater discontent and disorder. Phrynichus, as he left the [Council]-house, was assassinated by two confederates, one of them a peripolus, or youthful hoplite, in the midst of the crowded market-place and in full daylight. The man who struck the blow made his escape, but his comrade was seized and put to the torture by order of the Four Hundred¹: he was, however, a stranger, from Argos, and either could not or would not reveal the name of any directing accomplice. Nothing was obtained from him except general indications of meetings and wide-spread disaffection. Nor did the Four Hundred, being thus left without special evidence, dare to lay hands upon Theramenês, the pronounced leader of the opposition. The assassins of Phrynichus remaining unpunished, Theramenês and his associates became bolder in their opposition than before. And the approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet under Agesandridas—which, having now taken station at Epidaurus, had made a descent on Ægina, and was hovering not far off Peiræus, altogether out of the straight course for Eubœa—lent double force to all their previous assertions about the imminent dangers connected with the citadel at Eetioneia.

At length the hoplites of the tribe in which Aristokratês (the warmest partisan of Theramenês) was taxiarch, broke out into absolute mutiny, seized the person of Alexiklês, the general in command, and put him under arrest in a neighbouring house. News of this violence was speedily conveyed to the Four Hundred, who were at that moment holding session in the [Council]-house, Theramenês himself being present. Their wrath and menace were at first vented against him as the instigator of the revolt, a charge against which he could only vindicate himself by volunteering to go among the foremost for the liberation of the prisoner. He forthwith started in haste for the Peiræus. A third among the generals, Aristarchus, one of the fiercest of the oligarchs, followed him, probably from mistrust, together with some of the younger Knights (Horsemen or richest class in the state) identified with the cause of the Four Hundred.

The perilous excitement of this temporary crisis, which brought into full daylight every man's real political sentiments, proved the oligarchical faction, hitherto exaggerated in number, to be far less powerful than had been imagined by their opponents. And the Four Hundred had found themselves too much embarrassed how to keep up the semblance of their authority even in Athens itself, to be able to send down any considerable force for the protection of their citadel at Eetioneia. Theramenês, on reaching Peiræus, began to address the mutinous hoplites in a tone of simulated displeasure, while Aristarchus threatened them with the force which they imagined to be presently coming down from the city. But these menaces were met by equal firmness on the part of the hoplites, who even appealed to Theramenês himself, and called upon him to say whether he thought the construction of this citadel was for the good of Athens, or

¹ Thukyd., viii. 91. The statement of Plutarch is in many respects different (*Alkibiadês*, c. 25). [See also note 1 on p. 715.—Ed.]

whether it would not be better demolished. His opinion had been fully pronounced beforehand; and he replied, that if they thought proper to demolish it, he cordially concurred. Without farther delay, hoplites and unarmed people mounted pell-mell upon the walls, and commenced the demolition with alacrity, under the general shout—'Whoever is for the Five Thousand in place of the Four Hundred, let him lend a hand in this work'. The work of demolition seems to have been prosecuted all that day, and not to have been completed until the next day; after which the hoplites released Alexiklēs from arrest, without doing him any injury.

Two things deserve notice, among these details, as illustrating the Athenian character. Though Alexiklēs was vehemently oligarchical as well as unpopular, these mutineers do no harm to his person, but content themselves with putting him under arrest. Next, they do not venture to commence the actual demolition of the citadel, until they have the formal sanction of Theramenēs, one of the constituted generals. The strong habit of legality, implanted in all Athenian citizens by their democracy—and the care, even in departing from it, to depart as little as possible—stand plainly evidenced in these proceedings.

The events of this day gave a fatal shock to the ascendancy of the Four Hundred. Yet they assembled on the morrow as usual in the [Council]-house; and they appear, now when it was too late, to have directed one of their members to draw up a real list, giving body to the fiction of the Five Thousand¹. Meanwhile the hoplites in Peiræus, having finished the levelling of the new fortifications, took the still more important step of entering, armed as they were, into the theatre of Dionysus hard by and there holding a formal assembly, probably under the convocation of the general Theramenēs, pursuant to the forms of the antecedent democracy. They here took the resolution of adjourning their assembly to the Anakeion, (or temple of Castor and Pollux, the Dioskuri,) in the city itself and close under the acropolis, whither they immediately marched and established themselves, still retaining their arms. So much was the position of the Four Hundred changed, that they, who had on the preceding day been on the aggressive against a spontaneous outburst of mutineers in Peiræus, were now thrown upon the defensive against a formal assembly, all armed, in the city and close by their own [Council]-house. Feeling themselves too weak to attempt any force, they sent deputies to the Anakeion to negotiate and offer concessions. They engaged to publish the list of *The Five Thousand*, and to convene them for the purpose of providing for the periodical cessation and renewal of the Four Hundred, by rotation from the Five Thousand, in such order as the latter themselves should determine. But they entreated that time might be allowed for effecting this. Many of the hoplites in the city itself joined the assembly in the Anakeion, and took part in the debates. The assembly at length dispersed, after naming an early future time for a second assembly, to bring about the re-establishment of harmony, in the theatre of Dionysus.

On the day when this assembly in the theatre of Dionysus was on the point of coming together, the news ran through Peiræus and Athens, that the forty-two triremes under the Lacedæmonian Agesandridas, having

¹ [Lysias], *Orat. xx.*, *Pro Polystrato*, c. 4, p. 675 Reisk.

This task was confided to Polystratus, a very recent member of the Four Hundred, and therefore probably less unpopular than the rest. In his

defence after the restoration of the democracy, he pretended to have undertaken the task much against his will, and to have drawn up a list containing 9,000 names instead of 5,000.

recently quitted the harbour of Megara, were sailing along the coast of Salamis in the direction towards Peiræus. Such an event, confirmed all the previous warnings of Theramenês as to the treasonable destination of the citadel recently demolished. Foregoing their intended assembly, the citizens rushed with one accord down to Peiræus, where some of them took post to garrison the walls and the mouth of the harbour—others got aboard the triremes lying in the harbour—others, again, launched some fresh triremes from the boat-houses into the water. Agesandridas rowed along the shore, near the mouth of Peiræus, but found nothing to promise concert within, or tempt him to the intended attack. Accordingly, he passed by and moved onward to Sunium in a southerly direction. Having doubled the cape, he then turned his course along the coast of Attica northward, and presently took station at Orôpus.

Though relieved when they found that he passed by Peiræus without making any attack, the Athenians knew that his destination must now be against Eubœa, which to them was hardly less important than Peiræus, since their main supplies were derived from that island. Accordingly they put to sea at once with all the triremes which could be manned and got ready in the harbour. But from the hurry of the occasion, coupled with the mistrust and dissension now reigning, and the absence of their great naval force at Samos—the crews mustered were raw and ill-selected, and the armament inefficient. Thymocharês the admiral conducted them round Cape Sunium to Eretria in Eubœa, where he found a few other triremes, which made up his whole fleet to 36 sail¹.

He had scarcely reached the harbour and disembarked, when, without allowing time for his men to procure refreshment, he found himself compelled to fight a battle with the forty-two ships of Agesandridas, who had just sailed across from Orôpus. This surprise had been brought about by the anti-Athenian party in Eretria. Thymocharês, on seeing the approach of the enemy, ordered his men aboard; but to his disappointment, many of them were found to be so far off that they could not be brought back in time—so that he was compelled to sail out and meet the Peloponnesians with ships very inadequately manned. In a battle immediately outside of the Eretrian harbour, he was, after a short contest, completely defeated. Some of his ships escaped to Chalkis, others to a fortified post garrisoned by the Athenians themselves not far from Eretria: yet not less than 22 triremes, out of the whole 36, fell into the hands of Agesandridas. Of those seamen who escaped, many found their death from the hands of the Eretrians, into whose city they fled for shelter. On the news of this battle, not merely Eretria, but also all Eubœa (except Oreus in the north of the island, which was settled by Athenian Kleruchs) declared its revolt from Athens, which had been intended more than a year before—and took measures for defending itself in concert with Agesandridas and the Bœotians.

Ill could Athens endure a disaster, in itself so immense and aggravated, under the present distressed condition of the city. Her last fleet was destroyed; her nearest and most precious island torn from her side, an island which of late had yielded more to her wants than Attica itself, but which was now about to become a hostile and aggressive neighbour.

¹ Diodorus (xiii. 34) mentions the discord among the crews on board these ships under Thymocharês

almost the only point which we learn from his meagre notice of this interesting period.

The dismay and terror excited by the news at Athens was unbounded, even exceeding what had been felt after the Sicilian catastrophe, or the revolt of Chios. There was no second reserve now in the treasury, such as the thousand talents which had rendered such essential service on the last-mentioned occasion. In addition to their foreign dangers, the Athenians were farther weighed down by two intestine calamities in themselves hardly supportable—alienation of their own fleet at Samos, and the discord, yet unappeased, within their own walls, wherein the Four Hundred still held provisionally the reins of government, with the ablest and most unscrupulous leaders at their head. In the depth of their despair, the Athenians expected nothing less than to see the victorious fleet of Agesandridas (more than sixty triremes strong, including the recent captures) off the Peiræus, forbidding all importation, and threatening them with approaching famine, in combination with Agis at Dekeleia. The enterprise would have been easy, for there were neither ships nor seamen to repel him; and his arrival at this critical moment would most probably have enabled the Four Hundred to resume their ascendancy, with the means as well as the disposition to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the city. Nothing could have saved Athens, if the Lacedæmonians at this juncture had acted with reasonable vigour, instead of confining their efforts to Eubœa, now an easy and certain conquest.

Fortunately for the Athenians, no Agesandridas appeared off Peiræus; so that the twenty triremes, which they contrived to man as a remnant for defence, had no enemy to repel. It was their first proceeding, when the hostile fleet did not appear, to convene a public assembly, and that too in the Pnyx itself, the habitual scene of the democratical assemblies. In this assembly the tide of opinion ran vehemently against the Four Hundred. Even those, who (like the Board of Elders entitled Probûli) had originally counselled their appointment, now denounced them along with the rest, though severely taunted by the oligarchical leader Peisander for their inconsistency. Votes were finally passed—1. To depose the Four Hundred—2. To place the whole government in the hands of *The Five Thousand*—3. Every citizen, who furnished a panoply either for himself, or for anyone else, was to be of right a member of this body of *The Five Thousand*—4. No citizen was to receive pay for any political function, on pain of becoming solemnly accursed, or excommunicated. Such were the points determined by the first assembly held in the Pnyx. The Archons, the [Council] of Five Hundred, etc., were renewed: after which many other assemblies were also held, in which *Nomothetæ*¹, *Dikasts*, and other institutions essential to the working of the democracy, were constituted. Various other votes were also passed; especially one, on the

¹ Our first evidence of the existence of this board occurs in this context (Thuk., viii. 97), from which we may suspect that they were not instituted till this occasion. The confusion concerning the laws of Kleisthenes and of the *πατριος πολιτεία*, of which the extremists availed themselves during the revolution, could not have existed had the archives been in good order. It was no doubt as a measure of precaution against a similar abuse in the future that the 'revision of statutes' was now instituted (*cf.* note 2, p. 321).

From the decree quoted in Andok., *De Myst.*, §§ 83 ff., we gather some closer information concerning the *νομοθέται*. After the suppression of

the Thirty Tyrants in 403, a resolution was passed to collect all the remaining fragments of Solon's and Draco's code, with a view to cancelling obsolete statutes and modernizing those which were still of value. Thus, this second board of *νομοθέται* was appointed, like the first, for the special purpose of reducing the archives to order.

The institution of drafting-clerks to make copies of the debateable statutes is recorded in C.I.A., iv. (1), p. 18; Hicks and Hill, 78.

Since *Lysias* (*c. Nicom.*) frequently used *νομοθέται* in the ancient sense of 'law-giver', we may infer that in his time the word had not yet received its special technical sense.—Ep.

proposition of Kritias, seconded by Theraménês¹, to restore Alkibiadês and some of his friends from exile; while messages were farther despatched, both to him and to the armament at Samos, apprising them of what had recently occurred at Athens.

Thukydídês bestows marked eulogy upon the general spirit of moderation and patriotic harmony which now reigned at Athens. Putting an end to the oligarchy, and to the rule of the Four Hundred, they restored the old democracy, seemingly with only two modifications—first, the partial limitation of the right of suffrage—next, the discontinuance of all payment for political functions. The impeachment against Antiphon, tried immediately afterwards, went before the [Council] and the Dikastery, exactly according to the old democratical forms of procedure. But we must presume that the [Council], the Dikasts, the Nomothetæ, the Ekklesiasts (or citizens who attended the assembly), the public orators who prosecuted state-criminals or defended any law when it was impugned—must have worked for the time without pay.

Moreover the two modifications above-mentioned were of little practical effect. The exclusive body of Five Thousand citizens, professedly constituted at this juncture, was neither exactly realized, nor long retained. It was constituted, even now, more as a nominal than as a real limit. The mere fact, that everyone who furnished a panoply was entitled to be of the Five Thousand—and not they alone, but others besides—shows that no care was taken to adhere either to that or to any other precise number. If we may credit a speech assigned to Lysias², the Four Hundred had themselves (after the demolition of their intended fortress at Eetioneia, and when power was passing out of their hands) appointed a committee of their number to draw up for the first time a real list of *The Five Thousand*: and Polystratus, a member of that committee, takes credit with the succeeding democracy for having made the list comprise nine thousand names instead of five thousand.

But exclusive suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand, though prudent as a step of momentary transition, could not stand, nor was any attempt made to preserve it in permanence—amidst a community so long accustomed to universal citizenship, where the necessities of defence against the enemy called for energetic efforts from all the citizens.

How far, or under what restriction, any re-establishment of civil pay obtained footing during the seven years between the Four Hundred and the Thirty, we cannot say. But leaving this point undecided, we can show, that within a year after the deposition of the Four Hundred, the suffrage of the so-called Five Thousand expanded into the suffrage of all Athenians without exception, or into the full antecedent democracy. A memorable decree, passed about eleven months after that event—at the commencement of the archonship of Glaukippus (June or July 410 B.C.) exhibits to us the full democracy not merely in action, but in all the glow of feeling called forth by a recent restoration. Demophantus on this occasion proposed and carried a decree³, prescribing the form of an

¹ Plutarch, *Alkibiadês*, c. 33. Cornelius Nepos (*Alkibiad.*, c. 5, and Diodorus, xiii. 38-42) mentions Theraménês as the principal author of the decree for restoring Alkibiadês from exile. But the precise words of the elegy composed by Kritias, wherein the latter vindicates this proceeding to himself, are cited by Plutarch, and are very good

evidence. Doubtless many of the leading men supported, and none opposed, the proposition.

² [Lysias]. *Orat.* xx., *Pro Polystrato*, c. 4, p. 675 Reisk.

³ About the date of this psephism or decree, see Boeckh, *Staatshaushaltung der Athener*, vol. ii., p. 168.

oath to be taken by all Athenians to stand by the democratical constitution¹.

The constitution which *all* the Athenians thus swore to maintain by the most strenuous measures of defence, must have been a constitution in which *all* Athenians had political rights—not one of Five Thousand privileged persons excluding the rest².

The mere deposition of the Four Hundred was sufficient to induce most of the violent leaders forthwith to leave Athens. Peisander, Alexiklēs and others, went off secretly to Dekeleia³. Aristarchus availed himself of his authority to march—with some of the rudest among those Scythian archers, who did the police duty of the city—to Cenoë on the Boeotian frontier, which was at that moment under siege by a body of Corinthians and Boeotians united. In concert with the besiegers, he presented himself to the garrison, and acquainted them that Athens and Sparta had just concluded peace, one of the conditions of which was that Cenoë should be surrendered to the Boeotians. The garrison, having been closely blocked up, and kept wholly ignorant of the actual condition of politics, obeyed the order without reserve; so that the Boeotians acquired possession of this very important frontier position—a new thorn in the side of Athens, besides Dekeleia.

Thus was the Athenian democracy again restored, and the divorce between the city and the armament at Samos terminated, after an interruption of about four months by the successful conspiracy of the Four Hundred. That the victorious democracy should punish the principal actors concerned in it, was nothing more than rigorous justice. But the circumstances of the case were peculiar: for the counter-revolution had been accomplished partly by the aid of a minority among the Four Hundred themselves—Theramenēs, Aristokratēs, and others, together with the Board of Elders called Probūli. The earlier operations of the conspiracy could not be exposed to inquiry and trial, without compromising these parties as fellow-criminals. Theramenēs evaded the difficulty, by selecting for animadversion a recent act of the majority of the Four Hundred, which he and his partisans had opposed. He stood forward to impeach the last embassy sent by the Four Hundred to Sparta—sent with instructions to purchase peace and alliance at almost any price—and connected with the construction of the fort at Eetioneia for the reception of an enemy's garrison. The fact that it was Theramenēs who thus denounced his old friends, was long remembered as a treacherous betrayal, and employed in after-days as an excuse for atrocious injustice against himself⁴.

Of the twelve envoys who went on this mission, all except Phrynichus

¹ Andokidēs, *De Mysteriis*, §§ 95-99.

² Further evidence as to the complete restoration of the democracy is to be found in (1) a passage in the decree of Demophantus, mentioning a Council of Five Hundred elected by lot (Andok., *De Myst.*, § 96); (2) Xen., *Hellen.*, i. 7, which shows that the ekklesia before which the generals appeared after Arginusæ (406) contained all the proletariat; (3) Ar., *Ran.*, 1466 (ὡς μέγα δύνασθον τῷ δού' ὀβολῷ) with schol. (πρὸς τὸν δικαστικὸν μίσθον), proving that the jurors received pay in 405.

If these measures were carried all at once, a suitable occasion seems to suggest itself in 407, when Kleophon rose to the height of his influence.

—ED.

³ Thukyd., viii. 98. Most of these fugitives returned six years afterwards, after the battle of Ægospotami, when the Athenian people again became subject to an oligarchy in the persons of the Thirty. Several of them became members of the senate which worked under the Thirty (Lysias, *Cont. Agorai.*, § 80, c. 18, p. 495).

⁴ Lysias, *Cont. Eratosthen.*, c. 11, p. 427, §§ 66-68. Βουλόμενος δὲ (Theramenēs) τῷ μετετέρῳ πλῆθει πιστὸς δεῖν εἶναι, Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Ἀρχεπτόλεμον, φιλάτους ὄντας αὐτῷ, κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν· εἰς τοσοῦτον δὲ κακίας ἦλθεν, ὥστε ἅμα μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἐκείνους πίστιν ἑμὰς καταδουλώσατο, διὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς ἑμὰς τοὺς φίλους ἀπώλεσεν.

Compare Xenophon, *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 30-33.

Antiphon, Archeptolemus, and Onomaklēs seem to have already escaped to Dekeleia or elsewhere. Phrynichus had been assassinated several days before. Respecting his memory, a condemnatory vote had already been just passed by the restored [Council] of Five Hundred, decreeing that his property should be confiscated and his house razed to the ground; and conferring the gift of citizenship, together with a pecuniary recompense, on two foreigners who claimed to have assassinated him¹. The other three were presented in name to the [Council] by the generals (of whom probably Theramēnēs was one) as having gone on a mission to Sparta for purposes of mischief to Athens. Upon this presentation a [councillor] named Andron² moved—That the generals, aided by any ten [councillors] whom they may choose, do seize the three persons accused, and hold them in custody for trial:—That the Thesmothetæ do send to each of the three a formal summons to prepare themselves for trial on a future day before the Dikastery, on the charge of high treason—and do bring them to trial on the day named; assisted by the generals, the ten [councillors] chosen as auxiliaries, and any other citizen who may please to take part, as their accusers. Each of the three was to be tried separately, and if condemned, was to be dealt with according to the penal law of the city against traitors³.

Though all the three persons thus indicated were in Athens, yet before it was executed, Onomaklēs had fled, so that Antiphon and Archeptolemus only were imprisoned for trial. They too must have had ample opportunity for leaving the city, and we might have presumed that Antiphon would have thought it quite as necessary to retire as Peisander and Alexiklēs. However, he chose voluntarily to stay: and this man, who had given orders for taking off so many of the democratical speakers by private assassination, received from the democracy, when triumphant, full notice and fair trial, on a distinct and specific charge. The speech which he made in his defence, though it did not procure acquittal, was listened to, not merely with patience, but with admiration, as we may judge from the powerful and lasting effect which it produced. Thukydides describes it as the most magnificent defence against a capital charge which had ever come before him⁴. Both he and Archeptolemus were found guilty by the Dikastery and condemned to the penalties of treason.

How many of the Four Hundred oligarchs actually came to trial or were punished, we have no means of knowing; but there is ground for believing that none were put to death except Antiphon and Archeptolemus—perhaps also Aristarchus, the betrayer of Cēnoē to the Bœotians. The

¹ Both Lysias and Lykurgus contain statements about the death of Phrynichus which are not in harmony with Thukydides. These orators agree in reporting the names of the two foreigners who claimed to have slain Phrynichus, and whose claim was allowed by the people afterwards, in a formal reward and vote of citizenship—Thrasylbulus of Kalydon—Apollodorus of Megara (Lysias, *Cont. Agorat.*, c. 18, p. 492; Lykurg., *Cont. Leokrat.*, c. 29, p. 217).

Lykurgus says that Phrynichus was assassinated by night 'near the fountain hard by the willow-trees': which is quite contradictory to Thukydides, who states that the deed was done in daylight, and in the market-place. Agoratus, against whom the speech of Lysias is directed, pretended to have been one of the assassins, and claimed reward on that score.

[The decrees of honour are recorded in C.I.A., i. 59; Hicks and Hill, 74. They confirm the version of Lysias. Thukydides was most probably misinformed.—Ed.]

² This Andron was the father of the Attidographer Androtion, whom *Ath. Pol.* uses frequently. It is not unlikely that it was from this source that *Ath. Pol.* derives its valuable information as to the programme of the Moderates, among whom Androtion's father is to be counted.—Ed.

³ [Plutarch], *Vit. X. Oratt.*, p. 834: compare Xenophon, *Hellenic.*, i. 7, 22.

⁴ Thukyd., viii. 68; [Aristotel.], *Ethic. Eudem.*, iii. 5. [This oration of Antiphon was perhaps one of the chief documents which Thukydides found available for the treatment of the revolution (see Appendix).—Ed.]

latter is said to have been formally tried and condemned¹: though by what accident he afterwards came into the power of the Athenians, after having once effected his escape, we are not informed. It seems that each of the Four Hundred was called on to go through an audit and a trial of accountability (according to the practice general at Athens with magistrates going out of office). Such of them as did not appear to this trial were condemned to fine, to exile, or to have their names recorded as traitors. But most of those who did appear seem to have been acquitted, partly, we are told, by bribes to the Logistæ or auditing officers—though some were condemned either to fine or to partial political disability, along with those hoplites who had been the most marked partisans of the Four Hundred².

Indistinctly as we make out the particular proceedings of the Athenian people at this restoration of the democracy, we know from Thukydidēs that their prudence and moderation were exemplary. The eulogy, which he bestows in such emphatic terms upon their behaviour at this juncture, is indeed doubly remarkable: first, because it comes from an exile, not friendly to the democracy, and a strong admirer of Antiphon; next, because the juncture itself was one eminently trying to the popular morality. The democracy was now one hundred years old, dating from Kleisthenēs—and fifty years old, dating from the final reforms of Ephialtēs and Periklēs; so that self-government and political equality were a part of the habitual sentiment of every man—heightened in this case by the fact that Athens was not merely a democracy, but an imperial democracy, having dependencies abroad. Considering the immense peril, the narrow escape, and the impaired condition in which Athens was left notwithstanding her escape, we might well have expected in the people a violence of reactionary hostility, analogous to that exasperation which, under very similar circumstances, had caused the bloody massacres at Korkyra. And when we find that this is exactly the occasion which Thukydidēs selects to eulogize their good conduct and moderation, we are made deeply sensible of the good habits which their previous democracy must have implanted in them, and which now served as a corrective to the impulse of the actual moment. They had become familiar with the cementing force of a common sentiment; they had learnt to hold sacred the inviolability of law and justice, even in respect to their worst enemy; and what was of not less moment, the frequency and freedom of political discussion had taught them not only to substitute the contentions of the tongue for those of the sword, but also to conceive their situation with its present and prospective liabilities, instead of being hurried away by blind retrospective vengeance against the past.

Moreover we recognise at Samos the same absence of reactionary

¹ Xenoph., *Hellenic*, i. 7, 28. This is the natural meaning of the passage; though it may also mean that a day for trial was named, but that Aristarchus did not appear. Aristarchus may possibly have been made prisoner in one of the engagements which took place between the garrison of Dekeleia and the Athenians. The Athenian exiles in a body established themselves at Dekeleia and carried on constant war with the citizens at Athens: see Lysias, *De Bonis Nicia Fratris*, Or. xviii., ch. 4, p. 604; *Pro Polystrato*, Orat. xx., c. 7, p. 688; Andokidēs, *De Mysteriis*, c. 17, p. 50.

² Andokidēs, *De Mysteriis*, §§ 75-78.

The oration of [Lysias], *Pro Polystrato* is on

several points obscure: but we make out that Polystratus was one of the Four Hundred who did not come to stand his trial of accountability, and was therefore condemned in his absence. The defence explains his non-appearance by saying that he had been wounded at the battle of Eretria, and that the trial took place immediately after the deposition of the Four Hundred (§ 14, 24). He was heavily fined, and deprived of his citizenship (§§ 15, 33, 38). The speech was delivered at a time later than the battle of Kynossema, in the autumn of this year (§ 31), but not very long after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, and certainly (I think) long before the Thirty.

vengeance as at Athens, after the attack of the oligarchs, Athenian as well as Samian, has been repelled; although those oligarchs had begun by assassinating Hyperbolus and others. There is throughout this whole democratical movement at Samos a generous exaltation of common sentiment over personal, and at the same time an absence of ferocity against opponents, such as nothing except democracy ever inspired in the Grecian bosom.

It is indeed true that this was a special movement of generous enthusiasm, and that the details of a democratical government correspond to it but imperfectly. Neither in the life of an individual, nor in that of a people, does the ordinary and every-day movement appear at all worthy of those particular seasons in which a man is lifted above his own level, and becomes capable of extreme devotion and heroism. Yet such emotions, though their complete predominance is never otherwise than transitory, have their foundation in veins of sentiment which are not even at other times wholly extinct, but count among the manifold forces tending to modify and improve, if they cannot govern, human action. It is one of the merits of Grecian democracy that it *did* raise this feeling of equal and patriotic communion. To those who regard different forms of government as distinguished from each other mainly by the feelings which each tends to inspire, in magistrates as well as citizens, the contemporaneous scenes of Athens and Samos will suggest instructive comparisons between Grecian oligarchy and Grecian democracy.

APPENDIX

THE discovery of the *Ath. Pol.* has supplied new and important evidence as regards the Four Hundred, in addition to the somewhat meagre account of Thukydides. As this new exposition in some respects conflicts with the historian's versions, an endeavour has been made to sustain the statements he makes by an attack on the authenticity of the *Ath. Pol.* passages bearing upon this subject.

Among the various theories which seek to discredit the *Ath. Pol.* we may mention one or two of the leading ones.

(1) The documents of c. 29 properly apply to the year 410, when the modified democracy was instituted. But documents relating to the ἀναθήσεις τῶν πατρῶν νόμων οὗς Κλεισθένης ἔθηκε, as recorded in c. 29, cannot be arbitrarily isolated from the documents of cc. 30 and 31, some of which are of a markedly oligarchic character: the measures of c. 29 clearly lead up to these.

(2) The documents of c. 29 refer to the early measures of the Thirty in 404. But the clauses (a) μετὰ τῶν προὑπαρχόντων προβούλων, and (b) ἔως ἂν ὁ πόλεμος ᾗ ἤνιχ the date at a much earlier period.

(3) The documents are forgeries of the Four Hundred (e.g., of Theramenes) or of the Isokratean school of writers (Wilamowitz, *Arist. u. Athen.*, i. 165; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, ii. 2, p. 71).

That the *Ath. Pol.* is not free from forgeries is probable enough (see Appendix to Chapter I. on Early Attica). But whereas the early constitutions may easily have been falsified by unscrupulous politicians of the fifth or ingenious professors of the fourth century, because practically all knowledge of these ancient codes had disappeared, the same theory cannot be applied with equal confidence to documents of the later democratic period. In fact, the thorough revision of the statutes which was carried out by the successive boards of νομοθέται would make it impossible for an almost contemporaneous piece of forgery to escape detection. The *Ath. Pol.* almost certainly derived these documents from an Athidographer, who would have had easy access to the archives, in order to consult the genuine enactments, but would have been hard put to it to discover discarded forgeries, still more to impose them upon the belief of people who could readily verify or expose the compiler's statements.

Now, if *Ath. Pol.*, as can scarcely be doubted, is quoting authentic official documents of 411, it not merely affords us a valuable supplement to Thukydídēs' account, but in some cases allows us to correct that author with some measure of confidence.

The historian must have based his account mainly on verbal accounts of refugees from aristocratic families with which he was connected by blood and intercourse; certainly he shows little trace of having used any written documents dealing with the revolution. Hence his account is (1) not altogether uncoloured by prejudice, (2) not uniformly complete and well-attested. Least of all does he do justice to the constitutional aspects of the revolution, which form the most valuable part of the *Ath. Pol.* account.

A. *Ath. Pol.* (c. 29) and Thukydídēs (viii. 53, 54) agree that the strong revulsion of feeling at Athens, which first brought a revolution within the bounds of possibility, was due to the prospects of an agreement with Persia. Though we may doubt *Ath. Pol.*'s statement that the majority of the people were conspicuously in favour of such innovations as would secure Persian aid, it is important to note that some such current of feeling did exist, and that the machinations of Peisander and Alkibiadēs (Thuk., viii. 47-49) by no means gave the first impulse in this direction. This is indeed no more than Thukydídēs himself hints, when he says (viii. 1) that the people on hearing of the Sicilian disaster were incensed at the *phoroi*—i.e., the demagogues—who had promoted the expedition, and that as far back as 413 Probólí were appointed (1) to devise economies, and also (2) political reforms (see n. to p. 672). Though Thukydídēs subsequently lets this board drop out of sight, we hear from Arist., *Rhet.*, iii. 18, 2, that they showed favour towards a reactionary movement, while the inclusion of Theramenēs' father Hagnon, the former enemy of Periklēs (Plut., *Per.*, 32), indicates that it contained an anti-democratic element. Furthermore, the first decree of *Ath. Pol.*, c. 29, moved by Pythodorus (which Thuk., viii. 67, only mentions vaguely, as if he had never consulted official sources on the subject), shows that the Probólí formed the nucleus of the Committee of Public Safety which ushered in the revolution.

B. Still more important is Kleitophon's amendment, which empowered the Committee to report on Kleisthenēs' *πάτριος νόμος*. Here we are introduced to a party-cry of the moderate section under Theramenēs, of which we shall hear again in connexion with that same leader (*Ath. Pol.*, cc. 31, 34).

Clearly, then, the revolution was not altogether an artificial movement engineered by a conspiring minority: it mainly represented a genuine popular reaction, which the Probólí and Theramenēs supplied with a systematic programme.

C. Coming to the next step in the proceedings, we find the Committee issuing a report under two heads. (1) It recommends the abolition of all restrictions upon free legislation (cf. Thuk., viii. 67); (2) it suggests an administrative reform—the abolition of pay, during the war, for all magistrates except Archons and Prytanes, and a constitutional alteration—the confinement of the franchise to those 'able to serve with purse and person', with 5,000 as a minimum total number.

Thukydídēs knows of these measures only as informal suggestions (with an ulterior purpose) published abroad by the conspirators. *Ath. Pol.* proves that they were brought before the *ekklēsia*, and there approved. There is no need to consider these two versions as irreconcilable. It is quite credible that the *éraspelai* under Antiphon were working to secure these innovations; but at this time the revolutionary movement still remained as a whole open and undisguised, and was carried out by constitutional means.

D. It now became necessary to appoint a Constituent Committee. The last decree in *Ath. Pol.*, c. 29, and the first in c. 30, provide that (1) 100 elderly men (ten from each tribe) be elected to choose the new body of citizens (known briefly as 'the Five Thousand'); (2) the 'Five Thousand' are to choose 100 legislators to draw up the new code.

It is clear that the author of *Ath. Pol.* speaks loosely here, for the subsequent events show that the new citizen-body did not yet come into being.¹ Yet we

¹ Perhaps the 100 'electors' of clause 1 are to be identified with the 100 'legislators' whom *Ath. Pol.* calls nominees of the 5,000. In this case we must suppose them to have been an elected

legislative committee. *Ath. Pol.* may here have gone beyond the documents in the endeavour not to disagree with Thukydídēs.

may suppose that at this time a quorum was enrolled, sufficient to nominate the 100 legislators.

E. We now come to consider the work of the new Constituent Assembly. *Ath. Pol.*, c. 30, tells us that a constitution was drawn up, based on the following chief points:

1. The main power to reside in a *βουλή* (council).
2. This *βουλή* to be selected by lot, under supervision of the Archon, from all propertied citizens of more than thirty years of age.
3. This *βουλή* to meet at least every four days, to discuss all public business, especially matters of finance.
4. The members to be unpaid, and to be liable to a fine for abstention.
5. One-fourth of the citizens to serve each year.
6. All important officers to be chosen out of a select list of existing councillors.

This constitution, coupled with the previous enactments of the Committee of Public Safety, seem to embody fairly completely the ideal of the moderate party under Theramenes. In many ways it may be regarded as an improvement upon the existing democracy, at least as a temporary device to meet a dangerous crisis in a time of war. Among the defects of the traditional system we may notice (1) the excessive expenditure; (2) the undue influence which mere number gave to the proletariat, with its lack of parliamentary capacity and its special class interests; (3) the investment of supreme power in an unwieldy assembly, which met at too rare intervals, and ensured no regular attendance of voters; (4) the lack of touch between the assembly and the executive, and the consequent paralysis of the latter (*cf.* n. 3, p. 452).

The new constitution was calculated to remedy all these evils. Moreover, it did not unduly restrict the franchise, though limiting its actual exercise to a section of the population at a time. Though not really like any *πάτριος πολιτεία*, it appears to have been a fairly judicious compromise for the purpose of coping with the existing situation.

F. So far we may trace Theramenes' ascendancy in the events of the revolution. But before this new constitution could be put into effect, the Moderate party found itself outpaced by the extremists. These latter contrived, not to repeal the above-mentioned reforms altogether, but to defer them pending the settlement of the crisis. To meet the needs of the moment, they carried a new scheme (*Ath. Pol.*, c. 31), in which (1) the *βουλή* was made accessible to all citizens over thirty, but in point of fact restricted to the Solonian number of 400, to be selected (probably by lot) out of a preliminary list of candidates chosen by the tribes (*cf.* [Lysias], *Pro Polystir.*, § 2)¹.

(2) This *βουλή* was to choose the important magistrates, with ten plenipotentiary generals at the head, and was to share with these an absolutely unlimited power.

(3) The inferior magistracies were to be tenable only once.

By this arrangement all power practically fell into the hands of a corporation of 400. Such an innovation could hardly be conceived as proceeding from the free will of the Athenian people, and we are not surprised to find from Thuk., viii. 67, that the assembly which passed these measures was quite an irregular one. In fact, we have now reached the point where the partisans of the *εἰραπελαί* under Peisander, Antiphon, Aristarchus, and Phrynichus have determined to play a game of their own, and to establish themselves as masters of Athens by force and fraud. After the *ekklesiá* at Kolonus had ratified their programme they could afford to treat the 'Five Thousand' in the way which Thuk., viii. 86, 92, etc., and *Ath. Pol.*, c. 32 (which is mainly based on Thukydides), describes—as a name with which to cow the opposition at Athens, and to amuse the armament at Samos.

G. But such a rule could not possibly be prolonged against the will of the majority, except with the help of a foreign army; so that the proceedings of the extremists led quite logically to acts of high treason. Had Sparta interfered, the opposition might have been crushed; but in the natural course of events the democrats and moderates ultimately took heart to combine against the terrorists. This coalition, which found an able spokesman in Theramenes, was strong enough in itself to break the ascendancy of the oligarchs. The

¹ Thuk. (viii. 67) gives a different account of the selection of the 400, which perhaps refers to the mode of choice in the first year, before the ar-

rangements for the more regular method could be completed. Otherwise his account agrees well with *Ath. Pol.*, c. 31.

enrolment of the 'Five Thousand' had now to be conceded (Thuk., viii. 93; [Lysias], *Pro Polyst.*, § 10); and the naval disaster at Eretria merely hastened a disintegration which had already set in, thus restricting the rule of the oligarchy to four months.

On this showing the opposition of Theraménès is such as he himself described it in his apologia before the Thirty Tyrants (Xen., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 45, 46), and of precisely the same character as his resistance to the intransigents of 404. The motive of jealousy and selfish ambition, which Thuk., viii. 89, ascribes to him, is again insisted on by Kritias (Xen., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 30); and no doubt Theraménès' constitutional policy was branded as mere trimming by all the more violent partisans, while Antiphon in his apology (from which Thukydidēs probably drew much information, as Wilamowitz, *Arist. u. Athen.*, i., p. 106, suggests) must have sought to represent his accuser in the worst possible light.

H. The constitution as fixed after the fall of the Four Hundred was very much like that which the Committee of Public Safety had recommended (Thuk., viii. 97; *Ath. Pol.*, c. 33): in fact, it represents a compromise between the two sections of the victorious opposition, the moderates and the democrats.

From the *Ath. Pol.*, therefore, we are enabled to infer that the revolution of 411, besides that character of conspiracy which Thukydidēs emphasizes, had also a constitutional side. Incidentally it sheds new light on the character and ideals of that middle party which had formerly rallied round the cautious and conservative Nikias, but now found an enterprising advocate in Theraménès. The real part which this statesman played as leader of the moderates is also revealed by the account in *Ath. Pol.*, which serves to correct those fierce accusations which are levelled against him by most of our authorities.—Ed.

CHAPTER XXXIII [LXIII]

THE RESTORED ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY, AFTER THE DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED, DOWN TO THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR

It has already been stated that the Peloponnesian fleet of 94 triremes, having remained not less than 80 days idle at Rhodes, had come back to Milētus towards the end of March, with the intention of proceeding to the rescue of Chios, which a portion of the Athenian armament under Strombichidēs had been for some time besieging. The main Athenian fleet at Samos, however, prevented Astyochus from effecting this object, since he did not think it advisable to hazard a general battle. He was influenced partly by the bribes, partly by the delusions of Tissaphernēs, who sought only to wear out both parties by protracted war, and who now professed to be on the point of bringing up the Phœnician fleet to his aid. Astyochus had in his fleet the ships which had been brought over for coöperation with Pharnabazus at the Hellespont, and which were thus equally unable to reach their destination. To meet this difficulty, the Spartan Derkyllidas was sent with a body of troops by land to the Hellespont, there to join Pharnabazus, in acting against Abydos and the neighbouring dependencies of Athens. Abydos, connected with Milētus by colonial ties, set the example of revolting from Athens to Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus, an example followed, two days afterwards, by the neighbouring town of Lampsakus.

It does not appear that there was at this time any Athenian force in the Hellespont; and the news of this danger to the empire in a fresh quarter, when conveyed to Chios, alarmed Strombichidēs, the commander

of the Athenian besieging armament. The Chians, having recently increased their fleet to 36 triremes, against the Athenian 32 by the arrival of 12 ships (obtained from Milêtus during the absence of Astyochus at Rhodes), had sallied out and fought an obstinate naval battle against the Athenians, with some advantage. Nevertheless Strombichidês felt compelled immediately to carry away 24 triremes and a body of hoplites for the relief of the Hellespont. Hence the Chians became sufficiently masters of the sea, to provision themselves afresh, though the Athenian armament and fortified post still remained on the island. Astyochus also was enabled to recall Leon with the twelve triremes to Milêtus, and thus to strengthen his main fleet.

The present appears to have been the time, when the oligarchical party both in the town and in the camp at Samos, were laying their plan of conspiracy. Apprised of the reigning dissension, Astyochus thought it a favourable opportunity for sailing with his whole fleet up to the harbour of Samos, and offering battle; but the Athenians were in no condition to leave the harbour. He accordingly returned to Milêtus, where he again remained inactive, in expectation of the arrival of the Phœnician ships. But the discontent of his own troops, especially the Syracusan contingent, presently became uncontrollable. To appease their clamours, Astyochus was compelled to call together a general assembly, the resolution of which was pronounced in favour of immediate battle. He accordingly sailed from Milêtus with his whole fleet of 112 triremes round to the promontory of Mykalê immediately opposite Samos—ordering the Milesian hoplites to cross the promontory by land to the same point. The Athenian fleet, now consisting of only 82 sail, in the absence of Strombichidês, was then moored near Mykalê: but the public decision just taken by the Peloponnesians to fight becoming known to them, they retired to Samos, not being willing to engage with such inferior numbers.

It seems to have been during this last interval of inaction on the part of Astyochus, that the oligarchical party in Samos made their attempt and miscarried. Strombichidês was now sent for immediately, that the fleet might be united against the main enemy at Milêtus. That officer had recovered Lampsakus, but had failed in his attempt on Abydos. Having established a central fortified station at Sestos, he now rejoined the fleet at Samos, which by his arrival was increased to 108 sail. Having now learnt both the arrival of Strombichidês, and the renewed spirit as well as unanimity of the Athenians, the Peloponnesian commanders did not venture to persist in their resolution of fighting. They returned back to Milêtus, to the mouth of which harbour the Athenians sailed, and had the satisfaction of offering battle to an unwilling enemy.

At this time, earnest invitations arrived from Pharnabazus, soliciting the coöperation of the fleet at the Hellespont, with liberal promises of pay and maintenance. Klearchus, who had been sent out with the last squadron from Sparta for the express purpose of going to aid Pharnabazus, claimed to be allowed to execute his orders; while Astyochus also, having renounced the idea of any united action, thought it now expedient to divide the fleet, which he was at a loss how to support. Accordingly Klearchus was sent with forty triremes from Milêtus to the Hellespont. Byzantium, a Doric city and Megarian colony, from whence secret invitations had already reached him, was now induced to revolt from Athens.

This untoward news admonished the Athenian generals at Samos, whose vigilance the circuitous route of Klearchus had eluded, of the necessity of guarding the Hellespont, whither they sent a detachment, and even attempted in vain to recapture Byzantium. Sixteen fresh triremes afterwards proceeded from Milêtus to the Hellespont and Abydos, thus enabling the Peloponnesians to watch that strait as well as the Bosphorus and Byzantium, and even to ravage the Thracian Chersonese.

Meanwhile the discontents of the fleet at Milêtus broke out into open mutiny against Astyochus and Tissaphernês. Above all, the incorruptible Hermokratês of Syracuse, and Dorieus the Thurian commander, zealously espoused the claims of their seamen, who being mostly freemen (in greater proportion than the crews of the Peloponnesian ships), went in a body to Astyochus, with loud complaints and demand of their arrears of pay. But the Peloponnesian general received them with haughtiness and even with menace, lifting up his stick to strike the commander Dorieus. Such was the resentment of the seamen that they rushed forward to pelt Astyochus with missiles : he took refuge, however, on a neighbouring altar, so that no actual mischief was done.

Nor was the discontent confined to the seamen of the fleet. The Milesians also, displeased and alarmed at the fort which Tissaphernês had built in their town, watched an opportunity of attacking it by surprise, and expelled his garrison. Though the armament in general, now full of antipathy against the satrap, sympathized in this proceeding, yet the Spartan commissioner Lichas censured it severely ; intimating to the Milesians that they, as well as the other Greeks in the king's territory, were bound to be subservient to Tissaphernês within all reasonable limits—and even to court him by extreme subservience, until the war should be prosperously terminated. Though Lichas in these enforcements only carried out the stipulations of his treaty with Persia, yet it is certain that the Milesians instead of acquiring autonomy according to the general promises of Sparta, were now farther from it than ever, and that imperial Athens had protected them against Persia much better than Sparta.

The subordination of the armament was now almost at an end, when Mindarus arrived from Sparta as admiral to supersede Astyochus. Both Hermokratês and some Milesian deputies availed themselves of this opportunity to go to Sparta for the purpose of preferring complaints against Tissaphernês ; while the latter on his part sent thither an envoy (a Karian brought up in equal familiarity with the Greek and Karian languages) to defend himself. At the same time, he thought it necessary to put forward a new pretence, for the purpose of strengthening the negotiations of his envoy at Sparta. He announced that the Phenician fleet was on the point of arriving at Aspendus in Pamphylia, and that he was going thither to meet it, for the purpose of bringing it up to the seat of war to coöperate with the Peloponnesians. He invited Lichas to accompany him, and engaged to leave Tamos at Milêtus, as deputy during his absence, with orders to furnish pay and maintenance to the fleet.

Mindarus was imposed upon by his plausible assurance, and despatched an officer named Philippus with two triremes to Aspendus, while the satrap went thither by land.

Some time elapsed before Mindarus was undeceived, for Philippus found the Phenician fleet at Aspendus, and was therefore at first full of

hope that it was really coming onward. The Phenician ships were 147 in number, a fleet more than sufficient for concluding the maritime war, if brought up to act zealously. But Tissaphernês affected to think that this was a small force, unworthy of the majesty of the Great King, who had commanded a fleet of 300 sail to be fitted out for the service¹.

Presently arrived the Athenian Alkibiadês, with thirteen Athenian triremes, exhibiting himself as on the best terms with the satrap. He too had made use of the approaching Phenician fleet to delude his countrymen at Samos, by promising to go and meet Tissaphernês at Aspendus, so as to determine him, if possible, to employ the fleet in aid of Athens—but at the very least, *not* to employ it in aid of Sparta.

Having at length lost his hope of the Phenician ships, Mindarus resolved to break off all dealing with the perfidious Tissaphernês—the more so as Tamos, the deputy of the latter, though left ostensibly to pay and keep the fleet, performed that duty with greater irregularity than ever—and to conduct his fleet to the Hellespont into coöperation with Pharnabazus, who still continued his promises and invitations. The Peloponnesian fleet² (73 triremes strong, after deducting 13 which had been sent under Dorieus to suppress some disturbances in Rhodes) having been carefully prepared beforehand, was put in motion by sudden order, so that no previous intimation might reach the Athenians at Samos. Mindarus reached Chios in safety, but from here he was pursued by Thrasyllus, who passed, with 55 triremes, to the northward, and was thus between the Lacedæmonian admiral and the Hellespont. Believing that Mindarus would remain some time at Chios, Thrasyllus placed scouts both on the high lands of Lesbos and on the continent opposite Chios, in order that he might receive instant notice of any movement on the part of the enemy's fleet. Meanwhile he employed his Athenian force in reducing the Lesbian town of Eresus, which had been lately prevailed on to revolt.

The course which Thrasyllus expected the Peloponnesian fleet to take, was to sail from Chios northward through the strait which separates the north-eastern portion of that island from Mount Mimas on the Asiatic mainland: after which it would probably sail past Eresus on the western side of Lesbos, as being the shortest track to the Hellespont—though it might also go round on the eastern side between Lesbos and the continent, by a somewhat longer route. The Athenian scouts were planted so as to descry the Peloponnesian fleet if it either passed through this strait or neared the island of Lesbos. But Mindarus passed the northern latitude of Chios and took an eastward course, with Lesbos at some distance to his left-hand, direct to the mainland, which he touched at a harbour called Karterii in the Phokæan territory. Here he stopped to give the crew their morning meal: he then crossed the arc of the Gulf of Kymê to the little islets called Arginusæ (close on the Asiatic continent opposite Mitylênê), where he again halted for supper. Continuing his voyage onward during most part of the night, he was at Harmatûs (on the continent, directly northward and opposite to Methymna) by the next day's morning meal:

¹ Thukyd., viii. 87. This greater total, which Tissaphernês pretended that the Great King purposed to send, is specified by Diodorus at 300 sail. Thukydides does not assign any precise number (Diodor., xiii. 38, 42, 46).

On a subsequent occasion, too, we hear of the Phenician fleet as intended to be augmented to a

total of 300 sail (Xenoph., *Hellen.*, iii. 4, 1). It seems to have been the sort of standing number for a fleet worthy of the Persian king. [Multiples of this number constantly occur during the Persian wars—e.g., at Ladê (Hdt., vi. 9); at Marathon (vi. 95); under Xerxes (vii. 89).—Ed.]

² Diodor., xiii. 38.

then still hastening forward after a short halt, he doubled Cape Lektum, sailed along the Troad and past Tenedos, and reached the entrance of the Hellespont before midnight, where his ships were distributed at Sigeium, Rhœteium, and other neighbouring places¹.

By this accelerated voyage, the Peloponnesian fleet eluded the lookers-out of Thrasyllus, and reached the opening of the Hellespont when that admiral was barely apprised of its departure from Chios. But as it advanced still farther along the Troad, the momentous news was promulgated through numerous fire-signals on the hill.

These signals were perfectly visible to the two hostile squadrons now on guard on each side of the Hellespont, 18 Athenian triremes at Sestos in Europe, 16 Peloponnesian triremes at Abydos in Asia. To the former, it was destruction to be caught by this powerful enemy in the narrow channel of the Hellespont. They quitted Sestos in the middle of the night, passing opposite to Abydos, and keeping a southerly course close along the shore of the Chersonese, in the direction towards Elæûs at the southern extremity of that peninsula, so as to have the chance of escape in the open sea and of joining Thrasyllus. But they would not have been allowed to pass even the hostile station at Abydos, had not the Peloponnesian guardships received the strictest orders from Mindarus, transmitted before he left Chios, that if he should attempt the start, they were to keep a special look-out for his coming, and reserve themselves to lend him such assistance as might be needed, in case he were attacked by Thrasyllus.

On arriving about daylight near the southern point of the Chersonese, these Athenians were descried by the fleet of Mindarus. The latter immediately gave chase : but the Athenians, now in the wide sea, contrived to escape most of them to Imbros. Mindarus was now joined by the squadron from Abydos, and their united force (86 triremes strong) was employed for one day in trying to storm Elæûs. Failing in this enterprise, the fleet retired to Abydos. Thrasyllus meanwhile arrived at Elæûs, and began to prepare his triremes, 76 in number, for a general action.

After five days his fleet was brought to battle, sailing northward towards Sestus up the Hellespont, along the coast of the Chersonese, or on the European side. Mindarus on his side brought into action eighty-six triremes (ten more than Thrasyllus in total number), extending from Abydos to Dardanus on the Asiatic shore ; the Syracusans under Hermokratês being on the right, opposed to Thrasyllus, while Mindarus with the Peloponnesian ships was on the left opposed to Thrasybulus. The epibataë or maritime hoplites on board the ships of Mindarus are said to have been superior to the Athenians, but the latter had the advantage in skilful pilots and nautical manœuvring : nevertheless the description of the battle tells us how much Athenian manœuvring had fallen off since the glories of Phormio at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war ; nor

¹ The reading of Thukydidiðs (viii. 101), αἱ τῶν Πελοποννησίων νῆες ἀπαίρουν ἐκ τῆς Χίου πελάγαι, seems unsatisfactory. Grote would explain it by making Mindarus sail out southward from the harbour of Chios, and then double right round the island before shaping his course for Phokæa and Kymê. But this journey, amounting to about 100 miles, could not possibly have been completed before the morning meal.

Many editors have suspected a case of haplography in this passage, and emend to Χίου οὐ

πελάγαι, which will mean that Mindarus did not head straight for the Hellespont, but kept close to the mainland shore (past Phokæa, Kymê, Harmatîs, etc.). This reading also makes the grammar of the sentence in question a little less strained.

By starting very early, Mindarus might have got close in under the mainland before sunrise, and by hugging the shore might for some time conceal his presence from the Athenian scouts.—Ed.

would that eminent seaman have selected for the scene of a naval battle the narrow waters of the Hellespont. Mindarus took the aggressive, advancing to attack near the European shore, and trying to outflank his opponents on both sides, as well as to drive them up against the land. Thrasyllus on one wing, and Thrasybulus on the other, by rapid movements, extended themselves so as to frustrate this attempt to outflank them; but in so doing, they stripped and weakened the centre, which was even deprived of the sight of the left wing by means of the projecting headland of Kynossema. Thus unsupported, the centre was vigorously attacked and roughly handled by the middle division of Mindarus. But this partial success threw the central Peloponnesian division itself into disorder, while Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus carried on a conflict at first equal, and presently victorious, against the ships on the right and left of the enemy. Having driven back both these two divisions, they easily chased away the disordered ships of the centre, so that the whole Peloponnesian fleet was put to flight. The narrow breadth of the Hellespont forbade either long pursuit or numerous captures. Nevertheless eight Chian ships, five Corinthians, two Ambrakian and as many Boeotian, and from Sparta, Syracuse, Pellene and Leukas, one each—fell into the hands of the Athenian admirals, who, however, on their own side lost fifteen ships¹.

A victory so indecisive would have been little valued by the Athenians, in the times preceding the Sicilian expedition. But since that overwhelming disaster, followed by so many other misfortunes, and last of all, by the defeat of Thymocharis with the revolt of Euboea—their spirit had been so sadly lowered, that the trireme which brought the news of the battle of Kynossema, seemingly towards the end of August 411 B.C., was welcomed with the utmost delight. They began to feel as if the ebb-tide had reached its lowest point, and had begun to turn in their favour, holding out some hopes of ultimate success in the war. Another piece of good fortune soon happened to strengthen this belief. Mindarus was compelled to reinforce himself at the Hellespont by sending for the fleet of fifty triremes now acting at Euboea². This was in itself an important relief to Athens, by withdrawing an annoying enemy near home. But it was still farther enhanced by the subsequent misfortunes of the fleet, which in passing round the headland of Mount Athos to get to Asia, was overtaken by a terrific storm and nearly destroyed, with great loss of life among the crews; so that a remnant only survived to join Mindarus³.

The inhabitants of Chalkis and the other cities, now left without foreign defence against her, employed themselves jointly with the Boeotians in divesting Euboea of its insular character, by constructing a mole across the Euripus, the narrowest portion of the Euboean strait, where Chalkis was divided from Boeotia. It was in vain that the Athenian Theramenês,

¹ Thukyd., viii. 105, 106; Diodor., xiii. 39, 40.

The general account which Diodorus gives of this battle, is, even in its most essential features, not reconcilable with Thukydides. It is vain to try to blend them. I have been able to borrow from Diodorus hardly anything except his statement of the superiority of the Athenian pilots, and the Peloponnesian epibatai. He states that twenty-five fresh ships arrived to join the Athenians in the middle of the battle, and determined the vic-

tory in their favour: this circumstance is evidently borrowed from the subsequent conflict a few months afterwards.

² Thukyd., viii. 107; Diodor., xiii. 41.

³ Diodor., xiii. 41. It is probable that this fleet was in great part Boeotian; and twelve seamen who escaped from the wreck commemorated their rescue by an inscription in the temple of Athene at Koroneia; which inscription was read and copied by Ephorus.

with thirty triremes, presented himself to obstruct the progress of the undertaking¹.

The battle of Kynossêma produced no very important consequences, except that of encouragement to the Athenians. Even just after the action, Kyzikus revolted from them, and on the fourth day after, the Athenian fleet, hastily refitted at Sestos, sailed to that place to retake it. It was unfortified, so that they succeeded with little difficulty, and imposed upon it a contribution: moreover in the voyage thither, they gained an additional advantage by capturing, off the southern coast of the Propontis, those eight Peloponnesian triremes which had accomplished, a little while before, the revolt of Byzantium. But on the other hand, as soon as the Athenian fleet had left Sestos, Mindarus sailed from his station at Abydos to Elæûs, and recovered all the triremes captured from him at Kynossêma, which the Athenians had there deposited.

But that which now began to constitute a far more important element of the war, was, the difference of character between Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus, and the transfer of the Peloponnesian fleet from the satrapy of the former to that of the latter. Pharnabazus was a brave and earnest man, who set himself to assist them strenuously, by men as well as by money. From this time forward, Persian aid becomes a reality in the Grecian war. For we shall find that while the Peloponnesians are for the most part well-paid, out of the Persian treasury—the Athenians, destitute of any such resource, are compelled to rely on the contributions which they can levy here and there, without established or accepted right; and to interrupt for this purpose even the most promising career of success.

The good pay and hearty coöperation which the Peloponnesians now enjoyed from Pharnabazus, only made them the more indignant at the previous deceit of Tissaphernês. Under the influence of this sentiment, they readily lent aid to the inhabitants of Antandrus in expelling his general Arsakes with the Persian garrison.

In Milêtus as well as in Knidus, Tissaphernês had already experienced the like humiliation: Lichas was no longer alive to back his pretensions: nor do we hear that he obtained any result from the complaints of his envoy Gaulites at Sparta. The delusion respecting the Phenician fleet, now that Mindarus had openly broken with him and quitted Milêtus, was no longer available to any useful purpose. Accordingly he dismissed the Phenician fleet to their own homes, pretending to have received tidings that the Phenician towns were endangered by sudden attacks from Arabia and Egypt²; while he himself quitted Aspendus to revisit Ionia, as well as to go forward to the Hellespont for the purpose of renewing personal intercourse with the dissatisfied Peloponnesians³.

¹ Diodor., xiii. 47.

See Colonel Leake's *Travels in Northern Greece*, for a description of the Euripus, and the adjoining ground, with a plan, vol. ii., ch. xiv., pp. 259-265.

² Diodor., xiii. 46. This is the statement of Diodorus, and seems probable enough; though he makes a strange confusion in the Persian affairs of this year, leaving out the name of Tissaphernês, and jumbling the acts of Tissaphernês with the name of Pharnabazus.

³ Thukyd., viii. 100. It is at this point that we have to supply company with the historian Thukydides, whose work not only closes without reaching any definite epoch or limit, but even breaks off (as we possess it) in the middle of a sentence.

The full extent of this irreparable loss can hardly

be conceived, except by those who have been called upon to study his work with the profound and minute attention required from an historian of Greece. To pass from Thukydides to the *Hellenica* of Xenophon, is a descent truly mournful; and yet, when we look at Grecian history as a whole, we have great reason to rejoice that even so inferior a work as the latter has reached us. The historical purposes and conceptions of Thukydides, as set forth by himself in his preface, are exalted and philosophical to a degree altogether wonderful, when we consider that he had no pre-existing models before him from which to derive them. And the eight books of his work (in spite of the unfinished condition of the last) are not unworthy of these large promises, either in spirit or in execution.

As soon as the Phenician fleet had disappeared, Alkibiadês returned with his thirteen triremes from Phasêlis to Samos. At this time Dorieus was at Rhodes with thirteen triremes, having been despatched by Mindarus (before his departure from Milêtus) in order to stifle the growth of a philo-Athenian party in the island. Perhaps the presence of this force may have threatened the Athenian interest in Kos and Halikarnassus; for we now find Alkibiadês going to these places from Samos, with nine fresh triremes in addition to his own thirteen. Having erected fortifications at the town of Kos, he planted in it an Athenian garrison. From Halikarnassus he levied large contributions, upon what pretence, or whether from simple want of money, we do not know. It was towards the middle of September that he returned to Samos.

At the Hellespont the two fleets came to a second action, wherein the Peloponnesians, under Agesandridas, had the advantage; yet with little fruit. It was about the month of October, seemingly, that Dorieus with his fourteen triremes came from Rhodes to rejoin Mindarus. Twenty Athenian triremes were despatched to attack him: upon which Dorieus fled, and sought safety by hauling his vessels ashore in the receding bay near Dardanus. Mindarus immediately hastened to Abydos, where he fitted out his whole fleet of 84 triremes, Pharnabazus coöperating on the shore with his land-force. Having rescued the ships of Dorieus, his next care was, to resist the entire Athenian fleet, which presently came to attack him under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. An obstinate naval combat took place between the two fleets, which lasted nearly the whole day with doubtful issue: at length, towards the evening, 20 fresh triremes were seen approaching. They proved to be the squadron of Alkibiadês sailing from Samos: having probably heard of the re-union of the squadron of Dorieus with the main Peloponnesian fleet, he had come with his own counterbalancing reinforcement¹. The Peloponnesian fleet was driven back to Abydos, and there run ashore. Here the Athenians still followed up their success, and endeavoured to tow them all off. But the Persian land-force protected them, and Pharnabazus himself was seen foremost in the combat. The main Peloponnesian fleet was thus preserved: yet the Athenians retired with an important victory, carrying off thirty triremes as prizes, and retaking those which they had themselves lost in the two preceding actions.

Mindarus kept his defeated fleet unemployed at Abydos during the winter, sending to Peloponnesus as well as among his allies to solicit reinforcements: in the mean time, he engaged jointly with Pharnabazus in operations by land against various Athenian allies on the continent. The Athenian admirals, on their side, instead of keeping their fleet united to prosecute the victory, were compelled to disperse a large portion of it in flying squadrons for collecting money, retaining only forty sail at Sestos; while Thrasyllus in person went to Athens to proclaim the victory and ask for reinforcements. Pursuant to this request, thirty triremes were sent out under Theramenês, who first endeavoured without success to impede the construction of the bridge between Eubœa and Bœotia, and next sailed on a voyage among the islands for the purpose of collecting money. He acquired considerable plunder by descents upon hostile

¹ Diodorus (xiii. 46) and Plutarch (*Alkib.*, c. 27) speak of his coming to the Hellespont by accident

—κατὰ τύχην—which is certainly very improbable.

territory, and also extorted money from various parties, either contemplating or supposed to contemplate revolt, among the dependencies of Athens. At Paros, where the oligarchy established by Peisander in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred still subsisted, Theramenês deposed and fined the men who had exercised it—establishing a democracy in their room. From hence he passed to Macedonia, to the assistance and probably into the temporary pay, of Archelaus king of Macedonia, whom he aided for some time in the siege of Pydna. The blockade having lasted the whole winter, Theramenês was summoned away, before its capture, to join the main Athenian fleet in Thrace¹. We trace in all these proceedings the evidence of that terrible want of money which now drove the Athenians to extortion, and interference with their allies, such as they had never committed during the earlier years of the war.

It is at this period that we find mention made of a fresh intestine commotion in Korkyra. It appears that the oligarchical party in the island, which had been for the moment nearly destroyed at that period, had since gained strength, and was encouraged by the misfortunes of Athens to lay plans for putting the island into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. The democratical leaders, apprised of this conspiracy, sent to Naupaktus for the Athenian admiral Konon. He came with a detachment of 600 Messenians, by the aid of whom they seized the oligarchical conspirators in the market-place, putting a few to death, and banishing more than a thousand. The exiles, having retired to the opposite continent, came back shortly afterwards, and were admitted, by the connivance of a party within, into the market-place. A serious combat took place within the walls, which was at last made up by a compromise and by the restoration of the exiles².

Meanwhile Tissaphernês arrived at the Hellespont—seemingly about November 411 B.C. He was anxious to retain some credit with the Peloponnesians, for which an opportunity soon presented itself. Alkibiadês, then in command of the Athenian fleet at Sestos, came to visit him in all the pride of victory; but the satrap seized and sent him away to Sardis as a prisoner in custody, affirming that he had the Great King's express orders for carrying on war with the Athenians. Here was an end of all the delusions of Alkibiadês, respecting pretended power of influencing the Persian counsels.

Towards the middle of this winter the superiority of the fleet of Mindarus at Abydos, over the Athenian fleet at Sestos, had become so great, that the Athenians no longer dared to maintain their position in the Hellespont. They sailed round the southern point of the Chersonese, and took station at Kardia on the western side of the isthmus of that peninsula. Here, about the commencement of spring, they were rejoined by Alkibiadês, who had found means to escape from Sardis. The dispersed squadrons of the Athenian fleet being now all summoned to concentrate, Theramenês came to Kardia from Macedonia, and Thrasybulus from Thasos; whereby the Athenian fleet was rendered superior in number to that of Mindarus. News was brought that the latter had moved with his fleet from the Hellespont to Kyzikus, and was now engaged in the siege of that place, jointly with Pharnabazus and the Persian land-force.

¹ Diodor., xiii. 47, 49.

² *Ibid.*, xiii. 48.

His vigorous attacks had in fact already carried the place, when the Athenian admirals resolved to attack him there, and contrived to do it by surprise, sailing up the Hellespont to Prokonnesus by night, so that their passage escaped the notice of the Peloponnesian guard-ships at Abydos¹.

Resting at Prokonnesus, and seizing every boat on the island, in order that their movements might be kept secret, Alkibiadês warned the assembled seamen that they must prepare for a sea-fight, a land-fight, and a wall-fight, all at once. A body of hoplites were landed on the mainland in the territory of Kyzikus, for the purpose of operating a diversion; after which the fleet was distributed into three divisions under Alkibiadês, Theramenês, and Thrasybulus. The former, advancing near to Kyzikus with his single division, challenged the fleet of Mindarus, and contrived to inveigle him by pretended flight to a distance from the harbour; while the other Athenian divisions, assisted by hazy and rainy weather, came up unexpectedly, cut off his retreat, and forced him to run his ships ashore on the neighbouring mainland. After a hard-fought battle, partly on ship-board, partly ashore, both the Peloponnesian fleet by sea and the forces of Pharnabazus on land were completely defeated. Mindarus himself was slain, and the entire fleet, every single trireme, was captured, except the triremes of Syracuse, which were burnt by their own crews; while Kyzikus itself surrendered to the Athenians, and submitted to a large contribution, being spared from all other harm. The number of the triremes thus captured or destroyed is differently given; the lowest estimate states it at 60, the highest at 80².

This capital action, ably planned and bravely executed by Alkibiadês and his two colleagues (about April 410, B.C.), changed sensibly the relative position of the belligerents. The Peloponnesians had now no fleet of importance in Asia, though they probably still retained a small squadron at the station of Milêtus; while the Athenian fleet was more powerful and menacing than ever. The dismay of the defeated army is forcibly portrayed in the laconic despatch sent by Hippokratês (secretary of the late admiral Mindarus) to the Ephors at Sparta: — 'All honour and advantage are gone from us: Mindarus is slain: the men are starving: we are in straits what to do'³. So discouraging was the view entertained of the future, that a Lacedæmonian embassy with Endius at their head, came to Athens to propose peace; or rather perhaps Endius (ancient friend and guest of Alkibiadês, who had already been at Athens as envoy before) was allowed to come thither now again to sound the temper of the city, in a sort of informal manner which admitted of being easily disavowed if nothing came of it. For it is remarkable that Xenophon makes no mention of this embassy⁴: and his silence, though not sufficient to warrant us in questioning the reality of the event—which is stated by Diodorus,

¹ Diodor., xiii. 49. Diodorus specially notices this fact, which must obviously be correct. Without it, the surprise of Mindarus could not have been accomplished.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 1, 14-20; Diodor., xiii. 50, 51. The numerous discrepancies between Diodorus and Xenophon, in the events of these few years, are collected by Sievers, *Commentat. in Xenoph. Hellen.*, not. 62, pp. 65, 66 *et seq.*

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 1, 23: 'Ἐρρεῖ τὰ καλὰ Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσοῦα πεινῶντι τῶνδεσσι ἀπορόμεσι τί χρὴ δρᾶν.

Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 28.

⁴ Among the important events which Xenophon fails to record in the *Hellenica* may be mentioned: (1) The restoration of the full democracy; (2) the capture of Pylos from the Athenians; (3) the loss of Nisæa; (4) the destruction of Agesandridas's fleet; (5) Lysander's congress at Ephesus; (6) the services of Epaminondas and Pelopidas at Leuktra; (7) the foundation of Messên and Megalopolis. One omission more need hardly cause misgivings.—Ed.

perhaps on the authority of Theopompus, and is noway improbable in itself—nevertheless leads me to doubt whether the Ephors themselves admitted that they had made or sanctioned the proposition. It is to be remembered, that Sparta, not to mention her obligation to her confederates generally, was at this moment bound by special convention to Persia to conclude no separate peace with Athens.

According to Diodorus, Endius, having been admitted to speak in the Athenian assembly, invited the Athenians to make peace with Sparta on the following terms:—That each party should stand just as they were: That the garrisons on both sides should be withdrawn: That prisoners should be exchanged, one Lacedæmonian against one Athenian.

If we may believe Diodorus, all the most intelligent citizens in Athens recommended that this proposition should be accepted. Only the demagogues, the disturbers, those who were accustomed to blow up the flames of war in order to obtain profit for themselves, opposed it. Especially the demagogue Kleophon, now enjoying great influence, enlarged upon the new chances of success now opening to them; insomuch that the assembly ultimately rejected the proposition of Endius¹.

It was easy for those who wrote after the battle of Ægospotamos and the capture of Athens, to be wise after the fact, and to repeat the stock denunciations against an insane people misled by a corrupt demagogue. But if, abstracting from our knowledge of the final close of the war, we look to the tenor of this proposition as well as the time at which it was made—we shall hesitate before we pronounce Kleophon to have been foolish for recommending its rejection.

The question whether his advice was judicious is not so easy to dispose of. We cannot doubt that Alkibiadēs and his colleagues promised a large career of coming success, perhaps the recovery of most part of the lost maritime empire. In this temper of the Athenian people and of their generals, justified as it was to a great degree by the reality, what is the proposition which comes from Endius? What he proposes is, in reality, no concession at all. Both parties to stand in their actual position—to withdraw garrisons—to restore prisoners. There was only one way in which Athens would have been a gainer by accepting these propositions. She would have withdrawn her garrison from Pylus—she would have been relieved from the garrison of Dekeleia: such an exchange would have been a considerable advantage to her. To this we must add the relief arising from simple cessation of war—doubtless real and important.

Now the question is, whether a statesman like Periklēs would have advised his countrymen to be satisfied with such a measure of concession, immediately after the great victory at Kyzikus, and the two smaller victories preceding it? I incline to believe that he would not. It would rather have appeared to him in the light of a diplomatic artifice calculated to paralyse Athens during the interval while her enemies were defenceless, and to gain time for them to build a new fleet². Sparta could not pledge herself either for Persia, or for her Peloponnesian confederates: indeed past experience had shown that she could not do so with effect. By accepting the propositions, therefore, Athens would not really have

¹ Diodor., xiii. 53.

² Philochorus (*ap. Schol. ad Eurip., Orest.*, 371) appears to have said that the Athenians rejected the proposition as insincerely meant—*λακε-*

*δαμονίων πρεσβευσαμένων περὶ εἰρήνης ἀπιστή-
σαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ προσήκοντο*: compare
also *Schol. ad Eurip., Orest.*, 722—*Philochori
Fragment.*, 117, 118, ed. Didot.

obtained relief from the entire burthen of war ; but would merely have blunted the ardour and tied up the hands of her own troops, at a moment when they felt themselves in the full current of success. By the armament, most certainly—and by the generals, Alkibiadês, Theramênês, and Thrasybulus—the acceptance of such terms at such a moment would have been regarded as a disgrace.

If therefore, passing from the vague accusation, that it was the demagogue Kleophon who stood between Athens and the conclusion of peace, we examine what were the specific terms of peace which he induced his countrymen to reject—we shall find that he had very strong reasons, not to say preponderant reasons, for his advice. Whether he made any use of this proposition, in itself inadmissible, to try and invite the conclusion of peace on more suitable and lasting terms, may well be doubted. Probably no such efforts would have succeeded, even if they had been made : yet a statesman like Periklês would have made the trial, in a conviction that Athens was carrying on the war at a disadvantage which must in the long run sink her. A mere opposition speaker like Kleophon, even when taking what was probably a right measure of the actual proposition before him, did not look so far forward into the future¹.

Meanwhile Pharnabazus not only supplied maintenance and clothing to the distressed seamen of the vanquished fleet, but also encouraged the construction of fresh ships in the room of those captured. While he armed the seamen, gave them pay for two months, and distributed them as guards along the coast of the satrapy, he at the same time granted an unlimited supply of ship-timber from the abundant forests of Mount Ida, and assisted the officers in putting new triremes on the stocks at Antandrus.

Having made these arrangements, he proceeded to lend aid at Chalkêdon, which the Athenians had already begun to attack. Their first operation after the victory had been to sail to Perinthus and Selymbria, both of which had before revolted from Athens : the former, intimidated by the recent events, admitted them and rejoined itself to Athens ; the latter resisted such a requisition, but ransomed itself from attack for the present by the payment of a pecuniary fine. Alkibiadês then conducted them to Chalkêdon, opposite to Byzantium, on the southernmost Asiatic border of the Bosphorus. To be masters of these two straits, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, was a point of first-rate moment to Athens : first, because it enabled her to secure the arrival of the corn-ships from the Euxine for her own consumption ; next, because she had it in her power to impose a tithe or due upon all the trading ships passing through—not unlike the dues imposed by the Danes at the Sound. Until the spring of the preceding year, Athens had been undisputed mistress of both the straits. But the revolt of Abydos in the Hellespont (about April 411 B.C.) and that of Byzantium with Chalkêdon in the Bosphorus (about June 411 B.C.), had deprived her of this pre-eminence ; and her supplies obtained during the last few months could only have come through during those

¹ Kleophon must have known : (1) That, however long Athens retained command of the sea, the exhaustion of her funds must cripple her endeavours to reconquer the revolted allies ; (2) that at any moment Persian aid might be effectively given to the Peloponnesians—a reinforcement which would easily counterbalance the losses at Kyzikus. Though we cannot blame him

for seeking to obtain better terms, we might have expected him to make a genuine effort to secure peace. After the lesson of Kleon's failures in 425-424, it needed no Periklean wisdom to terminate the war ; and Kleophon's ' incapacity to look into the future ' was scarcely so trivial a foible as Grote suggests.—Ed.

intervals when her fleets there stationed had the preponderance, so as to give them convoy.

Though Chalkêdon itself, assisted by Pharnabazus, still held out against Athens, Alkibiadês now took possession of Chrysopolis, its unfortified seaport, on the eastern coast of the Bosphorus opposite Byzantium. This place he fortified, established in it a squadron with a permanent garrison, and erected it into a regular tithing port for levying toll on all vessels coming out of the Euxine¹. The Athenians seem to have habitually levied this toll at Byzantium, until the revolt of that place, among their constant sources of revenue: it was now re-established under the auspices of Alkibiadês. In so far as it was levied on ships which brought their produce for sale and consumption at Athens, it was of course ultimately paid in the shape of increased price by Athenian citizens and metics. Thirty triremes under Theramenês were left at Chrysopolis to enforce this levy, to convoy friendly merchantmen, and in other respects to serve as annoyance to the enemy.

The remaining fleet went partly to the Hellespont, partly to Thrace, where the diminished maritime strength of the Lacedæmonians already told in respect to the adherence of the cities. At Thasos the citizens expelled the Lacedæmonian harmost Eteonikus with his garrison, and admitted Thrasybulus with an Athenian force. Eteonikus, now expelled, accused the Lacedæmonian admiral Pasippidas of being himself a party to the expulsion, under bribes from Tissaphernês. The Lacedæmonians accordingly banished Pasippidas, sending Kratesippidas to replace him. The new admiral found at Chios a small fleet which Pasippidas had already begun to collect from the allies, to supply the recent losses.

The tone at Athens, since the late naval victories, had become more hopeful and energetic. Agis, with his garrison at Dekeleia, though the Athenians could not hinder him from ravaging Attica, yet on approaching one day near to the city walls, was repelled with spirit and success by Thrasyllus. For the safe reception of the corn vessels, Thorikus was soon after fortified. Agis decided that it was fruitless to shut out the Athenians from the produce of Attica, so long as plenty of imported corn was allowed to reach them. Accordingly he provided, in conjunction with the Megarians, a small squadron of fifteen triremes, with which he despatched Klearchus to Byzantium and Chalkêdon. That Spartan reached Byzantium in safety, though with the destruction of three of his squadron by the nine Athenian triremes which guarded the Hellespont².

In the ensuing spring, Thrasyllus was despatched from Athens at the

¹ See Demosthen., *De Coronâ*, c. 71; and Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 1, 22: καὶ δεκατεντήριον κατασκευάσαν ἐν αὐτῇ (Χρυσόπολει), καὶ τὴν δέκατην ἐξελέγοντο τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλοίων: compare iv. 8, 27; and v. 1, 28: also Diodor., xiii. 64.

The expression τὴν δεκάτην implies that this tithe was something known and pre-established.

Polybius (iv. 44) gives credit to Alkibiadês for having been the first to suggest this method of gain to Athens. But there is evidence that it was practised long before—even anterior to the Athenian empire, during the times of Persian preponderance (see Herodot., vi. 5).

[A δεκάτη is mentioned in Kallias' decree of 435 (C.I.A., i. 324; Hicks and Hill, 49), which may refer to a corn-toll at the Bosphorus. The treaty made with Methônê about 428 (C.I.A., i. 40; Hicks and

Hill, 60) suggests that a tax was levied on the corn that went to the allies, excepting a few favoured cities (including, no doubt, the capital itself). Alkibiadês probably erected the provisional station at Chrysopolis for the purpose of renewing this corn-impost, pending the capture of Byzantium.—Ed.]

See a striking passage, illustrating the importance to Athens of the possession of Byzantium, in Lysias, *Orat.* xxviii., *Cont. Ergokl.*, § 6.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 1, 35, 36. He says that the ships of Klearchus, on being attacked by the Athenians in the Hellespont, fled first to *Sestos*, and afterwards to Byzantium. But *Sestos* was the Athenian station. The name must surely be put by inadvertence for *Abydos*, the Peloponnesian station.

head of a large new force to act in Ionia. He commanded 50 triremes, 1,000 of the regular hoplites, 100 horsemen, and 5,000 seamen. Having reposed his armament for three days at Samos, he succeeded in making himself master of Kolophon with its port Notium. He next threatened Ephesus, but that place was defended by a powerful force which Tissaphernês had summoned, as well as by twenty-five fresh Syracusan and two Selinuntian triremes recently arrived. From these enemies Thrasyllus sustained a severe defeat near Ephesus, lost 300 men, and was compelled to sail off to Notium, from whence he proceeded northward towards the Hellespont.

After further skirmishing, Thrasyllus joined Alkibiadês at Sestos. Their joint force was conveyed over, seemingly about the commencement of autumn, to Lampsakus on the Asiatic side of the strait; which place they fortified and made their head-quarters for the autumn and winter, maintaining themselves by predatory excursions throughout the neighbouring satrapy of Pharnabazus. Even the entire army, however, was not able to accomplish the conquest of Abydos; which the Peloponnesians and Pharnabazus still maintained as their station on the Hellespont.

Meanwhile Athens had so stripped herself of force, by the large armament recently sent with Thrasyllus, that her enemies near home were encouraged to active operations. The Spartans despatched an expedition, both of triremes and of land-force, to attack Pylus, which had remained as an Athenian post and a refuge for revolted Helots ever since its first fortification by Demosthenês in B.C. 425. The Athenians sent to its relief 30 triremes under Anytus, who however came back without even reaching the place, having been prevented by stormy weather or unfavourable winds from doubling Cape Malea¹. Pylus was soon afterwards obliged to surrender, the garrison departing on terms of capitulation². Anytus was put on his trial for having betrayed the trust confided to him. It is said that he only saved himself from condemnation by bribing the Dikastery, and that he was the first Athenian who ever obtained a verdict by corruption³.

It was about the same time also, that the Megarians recovered by surprise their port of Nisæa, which had been held by an Athenian garrison since B.C. 424. The Athenians made an effort to retake it, but failed⁴.

Thrasyllus, during the summer of B.C. 409—and even the joint force of Thrasyllus and Alkibiadês during the autumn of the same year—seem to have effected less than might have been expected from so large a force. But the operations of 408 B.C. were more important. The entire force under Alkibiadês and the other commanders was mustered for the siege of Chalkêdon and Byzantium. Alkibiadês proceeded to block up Chalkêdon by a wooden wall carried across from the Bosporus to the Propontis. The wall was already completed, when Pharnabazus appeared with an army for the relief of the place, but the Athenians repelled all his efforts to force a passage through their lines⁵.

The blockade of the town was now made so sure, that Alkibiadês

¹ From an inscription (C.I.A., 188, l. 10) recording a payment Ἐρμῶνι, ἀρχόντι εἰς Πύλον, about the end of September, 410, we may infer that the Athenians were concerned not to lose Pylus (cf. E. Meyer, *Gesch. d. Alt.*, vol. iv., § 715.—Ed.

² Diodor., xiii. 64. The slighting way in which Xenophon (*Hellen.*, i. 2, 18) dismisses this capture of Pylus, as a mere retreat of some runaway Helots

from Malea—as well as his employment of the name *Koryphasion*, and not of *Pylus*—prove how much he wrote from the statements of Lacedæmonian informants.

³ Diodor., xiii. 64; Plutarch, *Coriolan.*, c. 14. [*Ath. Pol.*, c. xxvii.—Ed.]

⁴ Diodor., xiii. 65.

⁵ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 3, 5-7; Diodor., xiii. 66.

departed with a portion of the army to levy money and get together forces for the siege of Byzantium afterwards. During his absence, Theramenès and Thrasybulus came to terms with Pharnabazus for the capitulation of Chalkêdon. It was agreed that the town should again become a tributary dependency of Athens, on the same rate of tribute as before the revolt, and that the arrears during the subsequent period should be paid up. Moreover, Pharnabazus himself engaged to escort some Athenian envoys up to Susa, enabling them to submit propositions for accommodation to the Great King. Until those envoys should return, the Athenians covenanted, to abstain from hostilities against the satrapy of Pharnabazus.

Alkibiadès had employed his period of absence in capturing Selymbria¹, from whence he obtained a sum of money, and in getting together a large body of Thracians, with whom he marched by land to Byzantium. That place was now besieged, immediately after the capitulation of Chalkêdon, by the united force of the Athenians. A wall of circumvallation was drawn around it, and various attacks were made by missiles and battering engines. After the blockade had lasted some time, provisions began to fail; so that Klearchus, strict and harsh even under ordinary circumstances, became oppressive from exclusive anxiety for the subsistence of his soldiers, and even locked up the stock of food while the population of the town were dying of hunger around him. Seeing that his only hope was from external relief, he sallied forth from the city to entreat aid from Pharnabazus. But the favourable terms recently granted to Chalkêdon, coupled with the severe famine, induced a Byzantine party to open the gates by night, and admit Alkibiadès with the Athenians. Favourable terms were granted to the town, which was replaced in its position of a dependent ally of Athens, and probably had to pay up its arrears of tribute in the same manner as Chalkêdon².

So slow was the process of siege in ancient times, that the reduction of Chalkêdon and Byzantium occupied nearly the whole year, the latter place surrendering about the beginning of winter. Besides this improvement in her position, the accommodation just concluded with Pharnabazus was also a step of great value, and still greater promise. It was plain that the satrap had grown weary of bearing all the brunt of the war for the benefit of the Peloponnesians, and that he was well-disposed to assist the Athenians in coming to terms with the Great King. The envoys, five Athenians and two Argeians, were directed after the siege of Chalkêdon to meet Pharnabazus at Kyzikus. Some Lacedæmonian envoys, and even the Syracusan Hermokratès, who had been condemned and banished by sentence at home, took advantage of the same escort, and all proceeded on their journey upward to Susa. Their progress was arrested, during the extreme severity of the winter, at Gordium in Phrygia; and it was while pursuing their tract into the interior at the opening of spring, that they met the young prince Cyrus, son of King Darius, coming down in person to govern an important part of Asia Minor.

¹ From the extraordinarily lenient terms of surrender, recorded in C.I.A., iv. (1) 61a; Hicks and Hill, 77, we may infer that Alkibiadès was anxious to be relieved of this siege as soon as possible. Among the chief conditions we notice:

(1) the constitution to remain inviolate; (2) outstanding liabilities to be remitted; (3) judicial sentences on political offenders to be cancelled.—Ed.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 3, 15-22; Diodor., xiii. 67; Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 31.

CHAPTER XXXIV [LXIV]

FROM THE ARRIVAL OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER IN ASIA MINOR DOWN TO
THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ

THE advent of Cyrus, commonly known as Cyrus the younger, into Asia Minor, was an event of the greatest importance, opening what may be called the last phase in the Peloponnesian war.

He was the younger of the two sons of the Persian king Darius Nothus, and was now sent down by his father as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia the greater, and Kappadokia. His command did not at this time comprise the Greek cities on the coast, which were still left to Tissaphernês and Pharnabazus¹. But he nevertheless brought down with him a strong interest in the Grecian war, and an intense anti-Athenian feeling, with full authority from his father to carry it out into act. He came down well aware that Athens was the efficient enemy by whom the pride of the Persian kings had been humbled, the insular Greeks kept out of the sight of a Persian ship, and even the continental Greeks on the coast practically emancipated—for the last sixty years.

From the moment that Pharnabazus and the Athenian envoys met Cyrus, their farther progress towards Susa became impossible. Pharnabazus not only refused to let the Athenian envoys proceed onward, but was even obliged to obey the orders of the young prince, who insisted that they should either be surrendered to him, or at least detained for some time in the interior, in order that no information might be conveyed to Athens. The satrap resisted the first of these requisitions, having pledged his word for their safety; but he obeyed the second—detaining them in Kappadokia for no less than three years, until Athens was prostrate and on the point of surrender, after which he obtained permission from Cyrus to send them back to the sea-coast².

This arrival of Cyrus was a paramount item in that sum of causes which concurred to determine the result of the war. But important as the event was in itself, it was rendered still more important by the character of the Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, with whom the young prince first came into contact on reaching Sardis.

Lysander had come out to supersede Kratesippidas about December 408 B.C., or January 407 B.C.³ He was the last (after Brasidas and Gylippus) of that trio of eminent Spartans, from whom all the capital wounds of Athens proceeded, during the course of this long war. He was born of poor parents, and is even said to have been of that class called Mothakes, being only enabled by the aid of richer men to keep up his contribution to the public mess, and his place in the constant drill and discipline⁴.

¹ The *Anabasis* of Xenophon (i. 1, 6-8; i. 9, 7-9) is better authority, and speaks more exactly, than the *Hellenica*, i. 4, 3.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 4, 3-8. The words here employed respecting the envoys, when returning after their three years' detention—ὅθεν πρὸς τὸ ἄλλο στρατόπεδον ἀπέπλευσαν—appear to me an inadvertence. The return of the envoys must have been in the spring of 404 B.C., at a time when Athens had no camp: the surrender of the city took place in April, 404 B.C. Xenophon incautiously speaks as if that state of things which existed when the envoys departed, still continued at their return.

³ The commencement of Lysander's navy or year of maritime command appears to me established for this winter. He had been some time actually in his command before Cyrus arrived at Sardis (Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 5, 1).

⁴ Ælian, *V. H.*, xii. 43; Athenæus, vi., p. 271. The assertion that Lysander belonged to the class of Mothakes is given by Athenæus as coming from Phylarchus, and I see no reason for calling it in question. Ælian states the same thing respecting Gylippus and Kallikratidas also; I do not know on what authority.

He was not only an excellent officer, thoroughly competent to the duties of military command, but possessed also great talents for intrigue, and for organizing a political party as well as keeping up its disciplined movements. Though indifferent to the temptations either of money or of pleasure¹, and willingly acquiescing in the poverty to which he was born, he was altogether unscrupulous in the prosecution of ambitious objects, either for his country or for himself. His recklessness about falsehood and perjury is illustrated by various current sayings ascribed to him—such as, that children were to be taken in by means of dice, men by means of oaths². A selfish ambition—for promoting the power of his country not merely in connection with, but in subservience to, his own—guided him from the beginning to the end of his career. In this main quality, he agreed with Alkibiadēs; in reckless immorality of means, he went even beyond him. He seems to have been cruel, an attribute which formed no part of the usual character of Alkibiadēs. On the other hand, the love of personal enjoyment, luxury, and ostentation, which counted for so much in Alkibiadēs, was quite unknown to Lysander. The basis of his disposition was Spartan, tending to merge appetite, ostentation, and expansion of mind, all in the love of command and influence³—not Athenian, which tended to the development of many and diversified impulses, ambition being one, but only one, among the number.

The practice of reconstituting the governments of the Asiatic cities, begun by Kratesippidas⁴ at Chios, was extended and brought to a system by Lysander; not indeed for private emolument, which he always despised—but in views of ambition. Having departed from Peloponnesus with a squadron, he reinforced it at Rhodes and then sailed onward to Milētus. He took up his final station at Ephesus, the nearest point to Sardis, where Cyrus was expected to arrive; and while awaiting his coming, augmented his fleet to the number of 70 triremes. As soon as Cyrus reached Sardis (about April or May 407 B.C.), Lysander went to pay his court to him along with some Lacedæmonian envoys, and found himself welcomed with every mark of favour. Preferring bitter complaints against the double-dealing of Tissaphernēs, they entreated Cyrus to adopt a new policy, and execute the stipulations of the treaty by lending the most vigorous aid to put down the common enemy. Cyrus replied that these were the express orders which he had received from his father, and that he was prepared to fulfil them with all his might. He had brought with him (he said) 500 talents, which should be at once devoted to the cause: if these were insufficient, he would resort to the private funds which his father had given him; and if more still were needed, he would coin into money the gold and silver throne on which he sat⁵.

Lysander and the envoys returned the warmest thanks for these magnificent promises. So sanguine were the hopes which they conceived from his character and proclaimed sentiments, that they ventured to ask him to restore the rate of pay to one full Attic drachma per head for the seamen, which had been the rate promised by Tissaphernēs through his

¹ Theopompus, *Fragm.*, 21, ed. Didot; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 30.

² Plutarch, *Lysander*, c. 8.

³ Lysander might serve as the prototype of the τυμοκρατής ἀνρ in Plato's *Republic* (bk. viii., 548, 549).—Ed.

⁴ Diodor., xiii. 65; Xenoph., *Hellen.*, iii. 2, 11.

⁵ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 5, 3-4; Diodor., xiii. 70; Plutarch, *Lysander*, c. 4. This seems to have been a favourite metaphor, either used by, or at least ascribed to, the Persian grandees; we have already had it a little before from the mouth of Tissaphernēs.

envoys at Sparta, when he first invited the Lacedæmonians across the Ægean. As a motive for granting this increase of pay, Cyrus was assured that it would determine the Athenian seamen to desert so largely, that the war would sooner come to an end, and of course the expenditure also. But he refused compliance, saying that the rate of pay had been fixed both by the king's express orders and by the terms of the treaty, so that he could not depart from it¹. In this reply Lysander was forced to acquiesce. The envoys were subsequently feasted at a banquet; after which Cyrus, drinking to the health of Lysander, desired him to declare what favour he could do to gratify him most. 'To grant an additional obolus per head for each seaman's pay', replied Lysander. Cyrus immediately complied, having personally bound himself by his manner of putting the question. But the answer impressed him both with astonishment and admiration; for he had expected that Lysander would ask some favour or present for himself—judging him not only according to the analogy of most Persians, but also of Astyochus and the officers of the Peloponnesian armament at Milêtus, whose corrupt subservience to Tissaphernês had probably been made known to him.

The incident here described not only procured for the seamen of the Peloponnesian fleet the daily pay of four oboli (instead of three) per man, but also ensured to Lysander himself a degree of esteem and confidence from Cyrus which he knew well how to turn to account. I have already remarked, in reference to Periklês and Nikias, that an established reputation for personal incorruptibility, rare as that quality was among Grecian leading politicians, was among the most precious items in the capital stock of an ambitious man—even if looked at only in regard to the durability of his own influence. If the proof of such disinterestedness was of so much value in the eyes of the Athenian people, yet more powerfully did it work upon the mind of Cyrus. From this time forward he not only trusted Lysander with implicit pecuniary confidence, but consulted him as to the prosecution of the war.

Returning from Sardis to Ephesus, Lysander was enabled not only to make good to his fleet the full arrear actually due, but also to pay them for a month in advance, at the increased rate of four oboli per man; and to promise that high rate for the future. A spirit of the highest satisfaction and confidence was diffused through the armament. But the ships were in indifferent condition, having been hastily and parsimoniously got up since the late defeat at Kyzikus. Accordingly Lysander employed his present affluence in putting them into better order, and inviting picked crews. He took another step pregnant with important results. Summoning to Ephesus a few of the most leading and active men from each of the Asiatic cities, he organized them into disciplined clubs or factions, in correspondence with himself. He instigated these clubs to the most vigorous prosecution of the war against Athens, promising that as soon as that war should be concluded, they should be invested and maintained by Spartan influence in the government of their respective cities². Thus he procured for himself an ubiquitous correspondence, such as no successor could manage; rendering the continuance of his own command almost

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 5, 5.

This is not strictly correct. The rate of pay is not specified in either of the three conventions, as they stand in Thukyd., viii. 18, 37, 58. It seems

to have been, from the beginning, matter of verbal understanding and promise.

² Diodor., xiii. 70; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 5.

essential to success. The fruits of his factious manœuvres were seen in the subsequent Dekarchies or oligarchies of Ten, after the complete subjugation of Athens.

While Lysander and Cyrus were thus restoring efficacy to their side (during the summer of 407 B.C.), Alkibiadēs had accomplished the delicate step of re-entering his native city for the first time. According to the accommodation with Pharnabazus, the Athenian fleet was precluded from assailing his satrapy, and was thus forced to seek subsistence elsewhere. Byzantium and Selymbria, with contributions levied in Thrace, maintained them for the winter : in the spring (407 B.C.), Alkibiadēs brought them again to Samos, from whence he undertook an expedition against the coast of Karia, levying contributions to the extent of 100 talents. Thrasybulus, with thirty triremes, went to attack Thrace, where he reduced Thasos, Abdēra, and all those towns which had revolted from Athens ; Thasos being now in especial distress from famine as well as from past seditions. Thrasyllus at the same time conducted another division of the army home to Athens, intended by Alkibiadēs as precursors of his own return¹.

Before Thrasyllus arrived, the people had already manifested their favourable disposition towards Alkibiadēs by choosing him anew general of the armament, along with Thrasybulus and Konon. Alkibiadēs was now tending homeward from Samos with twenty triremes, bringing with him all the contributions recently levied. He first stopped at Paros, then visited the coast of Laconia, and lastly looked into the Lacedæmonian harbour of Gytheion, where he had learnt that thirty triremes were preparing. The news which he received of his re-election as general, strengthened by the pressing invitations of his friends, as well as by the recall of his banished kinsmen, at length determined him to sail to Athens. He reached Peiræus about the end of May 407 B.C.

The most extravagant representations, of the pomp and splendour of this return of Alkibiadēs to Athens, were given by some authors of antiquity—especially by Duris at Samos, an author about two generations later². All these details are refuted by the more simple and credible narrative of Xenophon. The re-entry of Alkibiadēs was not merely unostentatious, but even mistrustful and apprehensive. A vast crowd had assembled there from the city and the port to see him arrive.

No protection, however, was required. Not merely did his enemies attempt no violence against him, but they said nothing in opposition when he made his defence before the [council] and the public assembly. Protesting before the one as well as the other, his innocence of the impiety laid to his charge, he denounced bitterly the injustice of his enemies, and deplored the unkindness of the people. His friends all spoke warmly in the same strain. So strenuous and so pronounced was the sentiment in his favour, both of the [council] and of the public assembly, that no one dared to address them in the contrary sense³. The sentence of condemnation passed against him was cancelled : the Eumolpidæ were directed to revoke the curse which they had pronounced upon his head : the record

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 4, 8-10 ; Diodor., xiii. 72. The chronology of Xenophon, though not so clear as we could wish, deserves unquestionable preference over that of Diodorus.

[On p. 732 Thrasybulus is represented as having entered Thasos once before, in which case the island must have revolted again since 410. It

seems simpler to follow Xenophon (*Hellen.*, i. 1, 32), and defer the subjection of the island till 408.—Ed.]

² Diodor., xiii. 68 ; Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 31 ; Athenæ., xii., p. 535.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 4, 20 ; Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 33 ; Diodor., xiii. 69.

of the sentence was destroyed, and the plate of lead, upon which the curse was engraven, thrown into the sea : his confiscated property was restored : lastly, he was proclaimed general with full powers, and allowed to prepare an expedition of 100 triremes, 1,500 hoplites from the regular muster-roll, and 150 horsemen. All this passed, by unopposed vote, amidst silence on the part of enemies and acclamations from friends—amidst unmeasured promises of future achievement from himself, and confident assurances that Alkibiadēs was the only man competent to restore the empire and grandeur of Athens.

We may be satisfied, when we advert to the apprehensions of Alkibiadēs on entering the Peiræus, and to the bodyguard organized by his friends, that this overwhelming and uncontradicted triumph greatly surpassed the anticipations of both. Alkibiadēs had now been eight years in exile, from about August 415 B.C. to May 407 B.C. Now absence was in many ways a good thing for his reputation, since his overbearing private demeanour had been kept out of sight, and his impieties partially forgotten. There was even a disposition among the majority to accept his own explicit denial of the fact laid to his charge, and to dwell chiefly upon the unworthy manœuvres of his enemies in resisting his demand for instant trial immediately after the accusation was broached, in order that they might calumniate him during his absence.

But if the old causes of unpopularity had thus, comparatively speaking, passed out of sight, others had since arisen, of a graver and more ineffaceable character. His vindictive hostility to his country had been not merely ostentatiously proclaimed, but actively manifested. The sending of Gylippus to Syracuse—the fortification of Dekeleia—the revolts of Chios and Milētus—the first origination of the conspiracy of the Four Hundred—had all been emphatically the measures of Alkibiadēs. Even for these, the enthusiasm of the moment attempted some excuse : it was affirmed that he had never ceased to love his country, in spite of her wrongs towards him, and that he had been compelled by the necessities of exile to serve men whom he detested, at the daily risk of his life. Such pretences, however, could not really impose upon anyone. But his position was one altogether singular : having first inflicted on his country immense mischief, he had since rendered her valuable service, and promised to render still more. It is true, that the subsequent service was by no means adequate to the previous mischief : nor had it indeed been rendered exclusively by him, since the victories of Abydos and Kyzikus belong not less to Theramenēs and Thrasybulus than to Alkibiadēs¹; moreover, the peculiar present or capital which he had promised to bring with him—Persian alliance and pay to Athens—had proved a complete delusion. Still the Athenian arms had been eminently successful since his junction, and we may see that not merely common report, but even good judges such as Thukydidēs, ascribed this result to his superior energy and management.

Without touching upon these particulars, it is impossible fully to comprehend the very peculiar position of this returning exile before the Athenian people in the summer of 407 B.C. There was every reason for reappointing Alkibiadēs to his command ; but this could only be done

¹ This point is justly touched upon, more than once, by Cornelius Nepos—*Vit. Alcibiad.*, c. 6—*‘quanquam Theramenēs et Thrasybulus eisdem rebus præfuerant’*. And again in the life of

Thrasybulus (c. 1), *‘Primum Peloponnesiaco bello multa hic (Thrasybulus) sine Alcibiade gessit ; ille nullam rem sine hoc’*.

under prohibition of censure on his past crimes, and provisional acceptance of his subsequent good deeds as justifying the hope of yet better deeds to come. We are not to infer from hence that the people had forgotten the past deeds of Alkibiadês. In their present very justifiable sentiment of hopefulness, they determined that he should have full scope for prosecuting his new and better career, if he chose; but a train of combustible matter lay quiescent, ready to be fired by any future misconduct or negligence on his part.

Two colleagues, recommended by Alkibiadês himself—Adeimantus and Aristokratês—were named by the people as generals of the hoplites to go out with him, in case of operations ashore¹. In less than three months, his armament was ready; but he designedly deferred his departure until that day of the month Boêdromion (about the beginning of September) when the Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated, and when the solemn processional march of the crowd of communicants was wont to take place along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. For seven successive years, ever since the establishment of Agis at Dekeleia, this march had been of necessity discontinued, and the procession had been transported by sea, to the omission of many of the ceremonial details. Alkibiadês on this occasion caused the land-march to be renewed, in full pomp and solemnity, assembling all his troops in arms to protect, in case any attack should be made from Dekeleia. In reference to his own reputation, this act was especially politic, as serving to make his peace with the Eumolpidæ and the Two Goddesses, on whose account he had been condemned².

Immediately after the mysteries, he departed with his armament. It appears that Agis at Dekeleia, though he had not chosen to come out and attack Alkibiadês when posted to guard the Eleusinian procession, had nevertheless felt humiliated by the defiance offered to him. He shortly afterwards took advantage of the departure of this large force, to summon reinforcements from Peloponnesus and Bœotia, and attempt to surprise the walls of Athens on a dark night. If he expected any connivance within, the plot miscarried: alarm was given in time, so that the eldest and youngest hoplites were found at their posts to defend the walls. The assailants—said to have amounted to 28,000 men, of whom half were hoplites, with 1,200 cavalry, 900 of them Bœotians—were seen on the ensuing day close under the walls of the city, which were amply manned with the full remaining strength of Athens. In an obstinate cavalry battle which ensued, the Athenians gained the advantage even over the Bœotians. Agis encamped the next night in the garden of Akadêmus; again on the morrow he drew up his troops and offered battle to the Athenians, who are affirmed to have gone forth in order of battle, but to have kept under the protection of the missiles from the walls, so that Agis did not dare to attack them³. We may well doubt whether the Athenians went out at all, since they had been for years accustomed to regard themselves as inferior to the Peloponnesians in the field. Agis now withdrew, satisfied apparently with having offered battle, so as to efface the affront which he had received from the march of the Eleusinian communicants.

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, l. 4, 21. Both Diodorus (xiii. 69) and Cornelius Nepos (*Vit. Alcib.*, c. 7) state Thrasybulus and Adeimantus as his colleagues: both state also that his colleagues were chosen on his recommendation.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, l. 4, 20; Plutarch, *Alcib.*, c. 34. Neither Diodorus nor Cornelius Nepos mentions this remarkable incident about the escort of the Eleusinian procession.

³ Diodor., xiii. 72, 73.

The first exploit of Alkibiadēs was to proceed to Andros, now under a Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison. Landing on the island, he defeated both the native troops and the Lacedæmonians, and forced them to shut themselves up within the town, which he besieged for some days without avail, and then proceeded onward to Samos, leaving Konon in a fortified post, with twenty ships, to prosecute the siege¹. At Samos he first ascertained the state of the Peloponnesian fleet at Ephesus—the influence acquired by Lysander over Cyrus, and the ample rate of pay, put down even in advance, of which the Peloponnesian seamen were now in actual receipt. It was in vain that he prevailed upon Tissaphernēs to mediate with Cyrus, and to inculcate upon him his own views of the true interests of Persia, that is, that the war should be fed and protracted so as to wear out both the Grecian belligerent parties, each by means of the other.

Lysander had at Ephesus a fleet of ninety triremes, which he employed himself in repairing and augmenting, being still inferior in number to the Athenians. In vain did Alkibiadēs attempt to provoke him out to a general action. This was much to the interest of the Athenians, apart from their superiority of number, since they were badly provided with money, and obliged to levy contributions wherever they could: but Lysander was resolved not to fight unless he could do so with advantage, and Cyrus, not afraid of sustaining the protracted expense of the war, had even enjoined upon him this cautious policy, with additional hopes of a Phenician fleet to his aid—which in his mouth was not intended to delude². Thrasybulus had come from his post on the Hellespont and was now engaged in fortifying Phokæa, probably for the purpose of establishing a post to be enabled to pillage the interior³. Here he was joined by Alkibiadēs, who sailed across with a squadron, leaving his main fleet at Samos, under the command of his favourite pilot Antiochus, with express orders on no account to fight until his return.

During his absence at Phokæa and Kymē⁴, Antiochus, disobeying the express order pronounced against fighting a battle, sailed to the mouth of the harbour of Ephesus, where the Peloponnesian fleet lay. Entering that harbour with his own ship and another, he passed close in front of the prows of the Peloponnesian triremes, defying them to combat. Lysander detached some ships to pursue him, and an action gradually ensued, which was exactly that which Antiochus desired. But the Athenian ships were all in disorder, and came into battle as each of them separately could; while the Peloponnesian fleet was well-marshalled and

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 4, 22—i. 5, 18; Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 35; Diodor., xiii. 69. The latter says that Thrasybulus was left at Andros—which cannot be true.

² Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 9. I venture to antedate the statements which he there makes, as to the encouragements from Cyrus to Lysander.

³ The expression ἀποτειχίζειν Φωκαίαν (Xen., *Hellen.*, i. 5, 11) clearly refers to a siege. Phokæa had been in the enemy's hands since 412-411 (Thuk., viii. 31), and Alkibiadēs now wished to recover it.—Ed.

⁴ Xenophon nowhere mentions Alkibiadēs' operations at Kymē. Diod., xiii. 73, relates how Alkibiadēs plundered the territory of the city on some frivolous pretext, and was worsted in an engagement by the Kymæans, who recovered their property, and declined a second challenge to fight. The subsequent remonstrations of a Kymæan embassy at Athens are said by this authority to

have been in a large measure responsible for Alkibiadēs' disgrace.

This story is quite worthless. Kymē had revolted in 412 or 411 (Thuk., viii. 31), and was not a dependency of Athens at the time in question. Again, the sending of an embassy to Athens would have been impossible, if the commanders of the Athenian fleet had had any reason to prevent it. Besides, Alkibiadēs' conduct appears so gratuitously foolish that on this account alone the whole story deserves to be suspected. Grote attaches credence to this version, largely because Diodorus' authority (Ephorus) was a native of Kymē. But this fact serves equally well to discredit the story as a fabrication concocted *ad majorem Cymæ gloriam*.

No doubt Alkibiadēs laid siege to Kymē, as he had done to Phokæa. As Diodorus mentions a revolt in 407 (xiii. 99), he may on this occasion have succeeded in taking the town. Cf. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.*, vol. iii., p. 1575, n. 1.—Ed.

kept in hand ; so that the battle was all to the advantage of the latter. The Athenians, compelled to take flight, were pursued to Notium—losing fifteen triremes, several along with their full crews. Antiochus himself was slain¹.

It was in vain that Alkibiadēs, hastening back to Samos, mustered the entire Athenian fleet, sailed to the mouth of the harbour of Ephesus, and there ranged his ships in battle order. Lysander would give him no opportunity of wiping off the late dishonour. And as an additional mortification to Athens, the Lacedæmonians shortly afterwards captured both Teos and Delphinium ; the latter being a fortified post which the Athenians had held for the last three years in the island of Chios².

Even before the battle of Notium, it appears that complaints and dissatisfaction had been growing up in the armament against Alkibiadēs. He had gone out with a splendid force, not inferior in number of triremes and hoplites, to that which he had conducted against Sicily—and under large promises, both from himself and his friends, of achievements to come. Yet in a space of time which can hardly have been less than three months, not a single success had been accomplished ; while, on the other side, there was to be reckoned the disappointment on the score of Persia and the defeat at Notium. It was true that Alkibiadēs had given peremptory orders to Antiochus not to fight ; but this circumstance only raised new matter for dissatisfaction of a graver character. If Antiochus had been disobedient, who was it that had chosen him for deputy ; and that too against all Athenian precedent, putting a pilot, a paid officer of the ship, over the heads of the trierarchs who paid their pilots, and served at their own cost ? It was Alkibiadēs who placed Antiochus in this responsible situation : a personal favourite, destitute of all qualities befitting a commander³. And this turned attention on another point of the character of Alkibiadēs—his habits of excessive self-indulgence and dissipation.

It was in the camp at Samos that this general indignation against Alkibiadēs first arose, and was from thence transmitted formally to Athens⁴. It was even urged as accusation against him, that he was in guilty collusion to betray the fleet to Pharnabazus and the Lacedæmonians, and that he had already provided three strong forts in the Chersonese to retire to, so soon as this scheme should be ripe for execution.

Such widespread accusations, coupled with the disaster at Notium, and the complete disappointment of all the promises of success, were more than sufficient to alter the sentiments of the people of Athens towards Alkibiadēs. He had no character to fall back upon ; or rather he had a character worse than none—such as to render the most criminal imputations of treason not intrinsically improbable. The comments of his enemies, which had been forcibly excluded from public discussion during his summer visit to Athens, were now again set free. He had now had his trial ; he had been found wanting ; and the popular confi-

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 5, 12-15 ; Diodor., xiii. 71 ; Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 35 ; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 5.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 5, 15 ; Diodor., xiii. 76.

³ I copy Diodorus, in putting Teos, pursuant to Weiske's note, in place of Eion, which appears in Xenophon. I copy the latter, however, in ascribing these captures to the year of Lysander, instead of to the year of Kallikratidas.

⁴ Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 36. He recounts, in the tenth chapter of the same biography, an anecdote describing the manner in which Antiochus first won the favour of Alkibiadēs, then a young man, by catching a tame quail, which had escaped from his bosom.

⁵ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 5, 16, 17 ; Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 36.

dence, which had been provisionally granted to him, was accordingly withdrawn.

It is not just to represent the Athenian people (however Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos may set before us this picture) as having indulged an extravagant and unmeasured confidence in Alkiabidēs in the month of July, demanding of him more than man could perform; and as afterwards in the month of December passing, with childish abruptness, from confidence into wrathful displeasure, because their own impossible expectations were not already realized. That the people entertained large expectations from so very considerable an armament cannot be doubted. But we are not called upon to determine what the people would have done had Alkiabidēs, after performing all the duties of a faithful, skilful, and enterprising commander, nevertheless failed from obstacles beyond his own control. That which did occur was materially different. Besides the absence of grand successes, he had farther been negligent and reckless in his primary duties—he had exposed the Athenian arms to defeat by his selection of an unworthy lieutenant¹. The truth seems to be that he had really been spoiled by the intoxicating reception given to him so unexpectedly in the city. He became an altered man after that visit; or rather, the impulses of a character essentially dissolute broke loose from that restraint under which they had before been partially controlled. At the time of the battle of Kyzikus—when Alkiabidēs was labouring to regain the favour of his injured countrymen, and was yet uncertain whether he should succeed—he would not have committed the fault of quitting his fleet, and leaving it under the command of a lieutenant like Antiochus. If therefore Athenian sentiment towards Alkiabidēs underwent an entire change during the autumn of 407 B.C., this was in consequence of an alteration in *his* character and behaviour.

We may indeed observe that the faults of Nikias before Syracuse and in reference to the coming of Gylippus were far more mischievous than those of Alkiabidēs during this turning-season of his career—and the disappointment of antecedent hopes at least equal. Yet while these faults and disappointment brought about the dismissal and disgrace of Alkiabidēs, they did not induce the Athenians to dismiss Nikias, though himself desiring it. The contrast is most instructive, as demonstrating upon what points durable esteem in Athens turned; how long public incompetency could remain overlooked, when covered by piety, good intentions, and high station; how short-lived was the ascendancy of a man far superior in ability and energy, besides an equal station—when his moral qualities and antecedent life were such as to provoke fear and hatred in many, esteem from none.

On hearing the news of the defeat of Notium and the accumulated complaints against Alkiabidēs, the Athenians simply voted that he should be dismissed from his command, naming ten new generals to replace him

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 3, 16.

The expression which Thukydidēs employs in reference to Alkiabidēs requires a few words of comment: (vi. 15)—*καὶ δημοσίῃ κρᾶτιστα διαθέντα τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστοι τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτοῦ ἀχθεθέντες, καὶ ἄλλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες* (the Athenians), οὐδὲν μακροῦ ὄψησαν τὴν πόλιν.

The 'strenuous and effective prosecution of warlike business' here ascribed to Alkiabidēs, is

true of all the period between his exile and his last visit to Athens (about September B.C. 415 to September B.C. 407). During the first four years of that time, he was very effective against Athens; during the last four, very effective in her service.

But the assertion is certainly not true of his last command, which ended with the battle of Notium; nor is it more than partially true (at least, it is an exaggeration of the truth) for the period before his exile.

and his colleagues. He was not brought to trial, nor do we know whether any such step was proposed¹. As soon as he heard of his dismissal, he retired immediately from the army to his own fortified posts on the Chersonese.

The ten new generals named were Konon, Diomedon, Leon, Periklēs, Erasinidēs, Aristokratēs, Archedestratus, Protomachus, Thrasyllus, Aristogenēs. Of these, Konon was directed to proceed forthwith from Andros, with the twenty ships which he had there, to receive the fleet from Alkibiadēs².

The first measure of Konon was to contract the numbers of the armament from above 100 triremes to 70, and to reserve for the diminished fleet all the abler seamen of the larger. With this fleet he and his colleagues roved about the enemies' coasts to collect plunder and pay³.

Apparently about the same time that Konon superseded Alkibiadēs (that is, about December 407 B.C. or January 406 B.C.), the year of Lysander's command expired, and Kallikratidas arrived from Sparta to replace him. His arrival was received with undisguised dissatisfaction by the leading Lacedæmonians in the armament, by the chiefs in the Asiatic cities, and by Cyrus. Now was felt the full influence of those factious correspondences and intrigues which Lysander had established with all of them, for indirectly working out the perpetuity of his own command. While loud complaints were heard of the impolicy of Sparta in annually changing her admiral, both Cyrus and the rest concurred with Lysander in throwing difficulties in the way of a new successor.

Kallikratidas was distinguished for two qualities, both of them very rare among eminent Greeks, entire straightforwardness of dealing, and Pan-hellenic patriotism. Lysander handed over to him nothing but an empty purse, having repaid to Cyrus all the money remaining in his possession, under pretence that it had been confided to himself personally⁴.

Kallikratidas soon found that the leading Lacedæmonians in the fleet, gained over to the interests of his predecessor, openly murmured at his arrival, and secretly obstructed all his measures. But his remonstrance, alike pointed and dignified, produced its full effect. Everyone admitted that it was his duty to stay and undertake the command. The murmurs and cabals were from that moment discontinued.

His next embarrassments arose from the manœuvre of Lysander in paying back to Cyrus all the funds from whence the continuous pay of the army was derived. Kallikratidas, who had been sent out without funds, in full reliance on the unexhausted supply from Sardis, now found

¹ Xenophon (*Hellen.*, i. 5, 16, 17), followed by Diodorus and Plutarch, merely says χαλεπῶς εἶχον τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ καὶ ἄλλοις δέκα εἶλοντο στρατηγούς (for 407-406). Perhaps Alkibiadēs, like his colleague Theramenes (*Lys.*, C. *Agorat.*, § 10), merely failed at the polls.

However, it is quite possible that he had to submit to an ἀποχειροτονία; and this measure was usually followed by a public trial. Gilbert (*Beiträge*, p. 364 f.) quotes a notice in Himerius, 36, 16, and Photius, *Bibl.*, 377, to the effect that Kleophôn indicted Alkibiadēs. Probably also the banishment of Alkibiadēs' friend Kritias falls within this period. Thus there would seem to have been a number of prosecutions in 407, at the instigation of Kleophôn, and with these trials we may connect the restoration of the full democracy, in which Kleophôn obtained the leading position. Cf. n. 2, p. 714.—ED.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 5, 18; Diodor., xiii. 74.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 5, 20; compare i. 6, 16; Diodor., xiii. 77.

⁴ How completely this repayment was a manœuvre for the purpose of crippling his successor—and not an act of genuine and conscientious obligation to Cyrus—we may see by the conduct of Lysander at the close of the war. He then carried away with him to Sparta all the residue of the tributes from Cyrus which he had in his possession, instead of giving them back to Cyrus (*Xenoph.*, *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 8). The obligation to give them back to Cyrus was greater at the end of the war than it was at the time when Kallikratidas came out, and when war was still going on; for the war was a joint business, which the Persians and the Spartans had sworn to prosecute by common efforts.

himself compelled to go thither in person and solicit a renewal of the bounty. But Cyrus deferred receiving him—first for two days, then for a farther interval—until the patience of Kallikratidas was wearied out, so that he left Sardis in disgust without an interview, swearing that if he survived the year's campaign, he would use every possible effort to bring about an accommodation between Athens and Sparta¹.

In the meantime, he put forth all his energy to obtain money in some other way, and thus get the fleet to sea, knowing well, that the way to overcome the reluctance of Cyrus was to show that he could do without him. Sailing first from Ephesus to Milētus, he despatched from thence a small squadron to Sparta, disclosing his unexpected poverty, and asking for speedy pecuniary aid. In the meantime he convoked an assembly of the Milesians, communicated to them the mission just sent to Sparta, and asked from them a temporary supply until this money should arrive. He promised that when the remittance from Sparta and the hour of success should arrive, he would richly requite their forwardness. 'Let us, with the aid of the Gods, show these foreigners (he concluded) that we can punish our enemies without worshipping them.'

The energy of Kallikratidas imposed upon all who heard him, and even inspired so much alarm to those leading Milesians who were playing underhand the game of Lysander, that they were the first to propose a large grant of money towards the war, and to offer considerable sums from their own purses; an example probably soon followed by other allied cities. Some of the friends of Lysander tried to couple their offers with conditions, demanding a warrant for the destruction of their political enemies, and hoping thus to compromise the new admiral. But he strenuously refused all such guilty compliances². He was soon able to collect at Milētus fifty fresh triremes in addition to those left by Lysander, making a fleet of 140 sail in all. The Chians having furnished him with an outfit of five drachmas for each seaman (equal to ten days' pay at the usual rate), he sailed with the whole fleet northward towards Lesbos. Of this numerous fleet, the greatest which had yet been assembled throughout the war, only ten triremes were Lacedæmonian³, while a considerable proportion, and among the best equipped, were Bœotian and Eubœan⁴. He proceeded to attack Methymna, on the northern coast of Lesbos, a town not only strongly attached to the Athenians, but also defended by an Athenian garrison. Though at first repulsed, he renewed his attacks until at length he took the town by storm. The property in it was all plundered by the soldiers, and the slaves collected and sold for their benefit. It was farther demanded by the allies, and expected pursuant to ordinary custom, that the Methymnæan and Athenian prisoners should be sold also. But Kallikratidas peremptorily refused compliance, and set them all free the next day, declaring, that so long as he was in command, not a single free Greek should be reduced to slavery if he could prevent it⁵.

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 6, 7; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 6.

² Plutarch, *Apophthegm. Laconic.*, p. 222 C; Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 6, 12.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 6, 34.

⁴ Diodor., xiii. 99.

⁵ Xenophon, however, records that, in spite of his promises, Kallikratidas sold the Athenian captives into slavery (*Hellen.*, i. 4, 15). Nor was

he loth at first to receive Persian pay. Hence the enthusiasm of Grote for this admiral seems to outstrip the facts somewhat. Kallikratidas' pan-Hellenic views were no doubt admirable, and much superior to both the practice and the sentiment of his time; yet they do not seem to rest on a fundamental conviction, but to issue as fortunate inspirations on the part of a somewhat petulant character.—ED.

This proceeding stands, so far as I know, unparalleled in Grecian history. It is not merely that the prisoners were spared and set free: as to that point, analogous cases may be found, though not very frequent. It is, that this particular act of generosity was performed in the name and for the recommendation of Pan-Hellenic brotherhood and Pan-Hellenic independence of the foreigner: a comprehensive principle, announced by Kallikratidas on previous occasions as well as on this, but now carried into practice under emphatic circumstances. It is, lastly, that the step was taken in resistance to formal requisition on the part of his allies, whom he had very imperfect means either of paying or controlling, and whom therefore it was so much the more hazardous for him to offend.

Konon, in spite of his inferior numbers, had advanced near to Methymna to try and relieve it, but, finding the place already captured, had retired to the islands called Hekatonnêsoi, off the continent bearing north-east from Lesbos. Thither he was followed by Kallikratidas, who, leaving Methymna at night, found him quitting his moorings at break of day, and immediately made all sail to cut him off from the southerly course towards Samos. But Konon, having diminished the number of his triremes from 100 to 70, had been able to preserve all the best rowers, so that in speed he outran Kallikratidas and entered first the harbour of Mitylênê. His pursuers, however, were close behind, and even got into the harbour along with him, before it could be closed and put in a state of defence. Constrained to fight a battle at its entrance, he was completely defeated: thirty of his ships were taken, though the crews escaped to land; and he preserved the remaining forty only by hauling them ashore under the wall¹.

The town of Mitylênê, originally founded on a small islet off Lesbos, had afterwards extended across a narrow strait to Lesbos itself. By this strait (whether bridged over or not we are not informed), the town was divided into two portions, and had two harbours, one opening northward towards the Hellespont, the other southward towards the promontory of Kanê on the mainland². Both these harbours were undefended; the exits Kallikratidas kept under strict watch. He at the same time sent for the full forces of Methymna and for hoplites across from Chios, so as to block up Mitylênê by land as well as by sea. As soon as his success was announced, too, money for the fleet (together with separate presents for himself, which he declined receiving³) was immediately sent to him by Cyrus; so that his future operations became easy.

No preparations had been made at Mitylênê for a siege, and the crowd within the walls was so considerable, that Konon foresaw but too plainly the speedy exhaustion of his means. Nor could he expect succour from Athens, unless he could send intelligence thither of his condition. Putting afloat two triremes, the best sailers in his fleet, and picking out the best

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 6, 17; Diodor., xiii. 78, 79. Here, as on so many other occasions, it is impossible to blend these two narratives together. Diodorus conceives the facts in a manner quite different from Xenophon, and much less probable.

The narrative of Xenophon, which I have followed, plainly implies that Konon could have had no time to make preparations for defending the harbour.

² Thukyd., iii. 6. τοὺς ἐφ' ὧν ἐπὶ ἀμφοτέρω τοῖς λιμένιν ἐποιεῖτο — (Strabo, xiii., p. 617). Xenophon talks only of the harbour, as if it were

one; and possibly, in very inaccurate language, it might be described as one harbour with two entrances. It seems to me, however, that Xenophon had no clear idea of the locality.

Strabo speaks of the northern harbour as defended by a mole—the southern harbour, as defended by triremes chained together. Such defences did not exist in the year 406 B.C. Probably after the revolt of Mitylênê in 427 B.C., the Athenians had removed what defences might have been before provided for the harbour.

³ Plutarch, *Apophth. Laconic.*, p. 222 E.

rowers for them out of all the rest, he caused these rowers to go aboard before daylight. This went on four days successively, no favourable opportunity having occurred to give the signal for attempting a start. At length, on the fifth day about noon, when many of the Peloponnesian crews were ashore for their morning meal, the signal was given, and both the triremes started with their utmost speed; one to go out at the southern entrance towards the sea between Lesbos and Chios—the other to depart by the northern entrance towards the Hellespont. Instantly the alarm was given among the Peloponnesian fleet, and many triremes were put in motion to overtake the two runaways. That which departed southward, was caught towards evening: that which went towards the Hellespont escaped, rounded the northern coast of Lesbos, and got safe with the news to Athens, sending intelligence also, seemingly, in her way, to the Athenian admiral Diomedon at Samos.

The latter immediately made all haste to the aid of Konon, with the small force which he had with him, no more than twelve triremes. The two harbours being both guarded by a superior force, he tried to get access to Mitylênê through the Euripus, a strait which opens on the southern coast of the island into an interior lake or bay, approaching near to the town. But here he was attacked suddenly by Kallikratidas, and his squadron all captured except two triremes: he himself had great difficulty in escaping.

Athens was in consternation at the news of the blockade of Mitylênê. The whole strength of the city was put forth to relieve him, by an effort greater than any which had been made throughout the whole war. We read with surprise that within the short space of thirty days, a fleet of no less than 110 triremes was fitted out and sent from Peiræus. Every man of age and strength to serve, without distinction, was taken to form a good crew; not only freemen, but slaves, to whom manumission was promised as reward: many also of the Knights and citizens of highest rank went aboard as Epibatæ. The fleet proceeded straight to Samos, whither orders had doubtless been sent to get together all the triremes which the allies could furnish as reinforcements, as well as all the scattered Athenian. By this means, forty additional triremes (ten of them Samian) were assembled, and the whole fleet, 150 sail¹, went from Samos to the little islands called Arginusæ, close on to the mainland, opposite to the south-eastern cape of Lesbos.

Kallikratidas, apprised of the approach of the new fleet while it was yet at Samos, withdrew the greater portion of his force from Mitylênê, leaving fifty triremes under Eteonikus to continue the blockade. He was thus reduced to meet the Athenian fleet with inferior numbers—120 triremes against 150. It was his project to sail across the intermediate channel in the night, and attack them in the morning before they were prepared; but violent wind and rain forced him to defer all movement till daylight. On the ensuing morning both parties prepared for the greatest naval encounter which had taken place throughout the whole war.

The Athenian fleet was so marshalled, that its great strength was placed in the two wings, in each of which there were sixty Athenian ships,

¹ The thirty ships which raised the combined Athenian and Samian squadron to 150 sail were doubtless those which Konon had left behind at Samos earlier in the year. The allies, with the ex-

ception of Samos, owned no men-of-war; on this occasion they were used to man the empty Athenian triremes.—Ed.

distributed into four equal divisions, each division commanded by a general. Of the four squadrons of fifteen ships each, two were placed in front, two to support them in the rear. The centre, wherein were the Samians and other allies, was left weak and all in single line : it appears to have been exactly in front of one of the isles of Arginusæ, while the two other divisions were to the right and left of that isle. We read with some surprise that the whole Lacedæmonian fleet was arranged by single ships, because it sailed better and manœuvred better than the Athenians, who formed their right and left divisions in deep order, for the express purpose of hindering the enemy from performing the nautical manœuvres of the *diekplus* and the *periplus*. It would seem that the Athenian centre, having the land immediately in its rear, was supposed to be better protected against an enemy 'sailing through the line out to the rear and sailing round about' than the other divisions, which were in the open waters ; for which reason it was left weak, with the ships in single line. But the fact which strikes us the most is, that if we turn back to the beginning of the war, we shall find that this *diekplus* and *periplus* were the special manœuvres of the Athenian navy, and continued to be so even down to the siege of Syracuse, the Lacedæmonians being at first absolutely unable to perform them at all, and continuing for a long time to perform them far less skilfully than the Athenians. Now, the comparative value of both parties is reversed : the superiority of nautical skill has passed to the Peloponnesians and their allies : the precautions whereby that superiority is neutralized or evaded, are forced as a necessity on the Athenians.

Kallikratidas himself, with the ten Lacedæmonian ships, was on the right of his fleet : on the left were the Bœotians and Eubœans. The battle was long and obstinately contested, first by the two fleets in their original order ; afterwards, when all order was broken, by scattered ships contending in individual combat. At length Kallikratidas perished. His ship was in the act of driving against the ship of an enemy, when the shock, arising from impact, threw him off his footing, so that he fell overboard and was drowned¹. In spite of the discouragement springing from his death, the ten Lacedæmonian triremes displayed a courage worthy of his, and nine of them were destroyed or disabled. At length the Athenians were victorious in all parts : the Peloponnesian fleet gave way, and their flight became general, partly to Chios, partly to Phokæa. More than sixty of their ships were destroyed, over and above the nine Lacedæmonian, seventy-seven in all ; making a total loss of above the half of the entire fleet. The loss of the Athenians was also severe—amounting to twenty-five triremes. They returned to Arginusæ after the battle².

The victory of Arginusæ afforded the most striking proof how much the demagogical energy of Athens could yet accomplish, in spite of so many years of exhausting war. But far better would it have been, if her energy on this occasion had been less efficacious and successful. The defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet, and the death of their leader, were signal misfortunes to the whole Grecian world, and in an especial manner misfortunes to Athens herself. If Kallikratidas had gained the victory

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 6, 33.

The details given by Diodorus about this battle and the exploits of Kallikratidas are at once prolix and unworthy of confidence.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 6, 34 ; Diodor., xiii. 99, 100.

and survived it, he would certainly have been the man to close the Peloponnesian war; for Mitylênê must immediately have surrendered, and Konon with all the Athenian fleet there blocked up must have become his prisoners; which circumstance, coming at the back of a defeat, would have rendered Athens disposed to acquiesce in any tolerable terms of peace. Now to have the terms dictated at a moment when her power was not wholly prostrate, by a man like Kallikratidas, would have been the best fate which at this moment could befall her; while to the Grecian world generally, it would have been an unspeakable benefit, that in the re-organization which it was sure to undergo at the close of the war, the ascendant individual of the moment should be penetrated with ideas of Hellenic brotherhood at home, and Hellenic independence against the foreigner. The pertinence of these remarks will be better understood in the next chapter, when I come to recount the actual winding up of the Peloponnesian war under the auspices of Lysander. To have the sentiment of that patriotism enforced, at a moment of break-up and re-arrangement throughout Greece, by the victorious leader of the day, would have been a stimulus to all the better feelings of the Grecian mind such as no other combination of circumstances could have furnished. The defeat and death of Kallikratidas was thus even more deplorable as a loss to Athens and Greece, than to Sparta herself.

The news of the defeat was speedily conveyed to Eteonikus at Mitylênê by the admiral's signal-boat. As soon as he heard it, he desired the crew of the signal-boat to go again out of the harbour, and then return with wreaths and shouts of triumph—crying out that Kallikratidas had gained the victory and had destroyed or captured all the Athenian ships. All suspicion of the reality was thus kept from Konon and the besieged; while Eteonikus himself, affecting to believe the news, offered the sacrifice of thanksgiving, but gave orders to all the triremes to depart without losing a moment. And thus, without the least obstruction from Konon, all the ships, triremes and merchantmen, sailed out of the harbour, and were carried off in safety to Chios, the wind being fair. Eteonikus at the same time withdrew his land-forces to Methymna. Konon thus finding himself unexpectedly at liberty, put to sea with his ships when the wind had become calmer, and joined the main Athenian fleet, which he found already on its way from Arginusæ to Mitylênê. The fleet presently came to Mitylênê, and from thence passed over to make an attack on Chios; which attack proving unsuccessful, they went forward to their ordinary station at Samos¹.

The news of the victory at Arginusæ diffused joy and triumph at Athens. All the slaves who had served in the armament were manumitted and promoted, according to promise, to the rights of Plateans at Athens—a qualified species of citizenship². Yet the joy was poisoned by another incident which became known at the same time.

Not only the bodies of the slain warriors floating about on the water had not been picked up for burial, but the wrecks had not been visited to preserve those who were yet living. The first of these two points,

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 6, 38: Diodor., xiii. 100.

² This statement is based on *Ar. Ran.*, 692, 693: *καὶ γὰρ αἰσχρὸν ἔστι τοὺς μὲν ναυμαχησάντας μίαν καὶ Πλαταιᾶς εὐθὺς εἶναι κἀντὶ δούλων δεσπότας. Πλαταιαῖς* seems to have been a popular name for citizens of the status of the dispossessed Pla-

tæans, who were ineligible for certain priestly offices. These latter were settled in the territory of Skiónê (Thuk., v. 32), and were thus unable to exercise their political rights as Athenian citizens. —ED.

even alone, would have sufficed to excite a painful sentiment of wounded piety at Athens. But the second point inflamed that sentiment into grief and indignation of the sharpest character.

In the descriptions of this event, Diodorus and many other writers take notice of the first point, either exclusively¹, or at least with slight reference to the second, which latter, nevertheless, stands as far the gravest in the estimate of every impartial critic, and was also the most violent in its effect upon Athenian feelings. Twenty-five² Athenian triremes lay heeled over or disabled, with their oars destroyed, no masts, nor any means of moving, and gradually sinking. The original crew of each was 200 men. The field of battle was strewn with these wrecks, the men on board being helpless and unable to get away—for the ancient trireme carried no boat, nor any aids for escape. No step being taken to preserve them, the surviving portion, wounded as well as unwounded, of these crews, were left to be gradually drowned as each disabled ship went down.

The first letter from the generals which communicated the victory, made known at the same time the loss sustained in obtaining it. It announced, doubtless, the fact which we read in Xenophon, that twenty-five Athenian triremes had been lost, with nearly all their crews. It mentioned at the same time that no step whatever had been taken by the victorious survivors to save their wounded and drowning countrymen on board the sinking ships. A storm had arisen (such was the reason assigned), so violent as to render all such intervention totally impracticable.

It is so much the custom, in dealing with Grecian history, to presume the Athenian people to be a set of children or madmen, whose feelings it is not worth while to try and account for, that I have been obliged to state these circumstances somewhat at length, in order to show that the mixed sentiment excited at Athens by the news of the battle of Arginusæ was perfectly natural and justifiable. The narrative of Xenophon, meagre and confused as well as unfair, presents this emotion as if it were something causeless, factitious, pumped up out of the standing irascibility of the multitude by the artifices of Theramènes, Kallixenus, and a few others. But assuredly the excitement was spontaneous, inevitable, and amply justified. To expect that the Athenians would be so absorbed in the delight of the victory, and in gratitude to the generals who had commanded, as to overlook such a desertion of perishing warriors, is, in my judgement, altogether preposterous, and would, if it were true, only establish one more vice in the Athenian people, besides those which they really had, and the many more with which they have been unjustly branded.

The generals in their public letter accounted for their omission by saying that the violence of the storm was too great to allow them to move. First, was this true as matter of fact? Next, had there been time to

¹ See Diodorus, xiii. 100, 101, 102.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 6, 34.

Schneider in his note, and Mr. Mitford in his History, express surprise at the discrepancy between the number *twelve* which appears in the speech of Eurypolemus, and the number *twenty-five* given by Xenophon.

But, first, we are not to suppose Xenophon to guarantee those assertions as to matters of fact which he gives as coming from Eurypolemus;

who, as an advocate speaking in the assembly, might take great liberties with the truth.

Next, Xenophon speaks of the total number of ships ruined or disabled in action: Eurypolemus speaks of the total number of wrecks afloat and capable of being visited so as to rescue the sufferers *at the subsequent moment* when the generals directed the squadron under Theramènes to go out for the rescue.

discharge the duty, or at least to try and discharge it, before the storm came on to be so intolerable? These points required examination. The generals, while honoured with a vote of thanks for the victory, were superseded,¹ and directed to come home; all except Konon, who having been blocked up at Mitylênê was not concerned in the question. Two new colleagues, Philoklês and Adeimantus, were named to go out and join him². The generals probably received the notice of their recall at Samos, and came home in consequence, reaching Athens seemingly about the end of September—the battle of Arginusæ having been fought in August 406 B.C. Two of the generals, however, Protomachus and Aristogênês, warned of the displeasure of the people, and not confiding in their own case to meet it, preferred to pay the price of voluntary exile. The other six, Periklês, Lysias, Diomedon, Erasinidês, Aristokrâtês, and Thrasyllus (Archestratus, one of the original ten, having died at Mitylênê³), came without their two colleagues; an unpleasant augury for the result.

On their first arrival, Archedêmus, at that time an acceptable popular orator, and exercising some magistracy or high office which we cannot distinctly make out,⁴ imposed upon Erasinidês a fine to that limited amount which was within the competence of magistrates without the sanction of the Dikastery—and accused him besides before the Dikastery, partly for general misconduct in his command, partly on the specific charge of having purloined some public money on its way from the Hellespont. Erasinidês was found guilty, and condemned to be imprisoned.

This trial of Erasinidês took place before the generals were summoned before the Boulê to give their formal exposition respecting the recent battle and the subsequent neglect of the drowning men. And it might almost seem as if Archedêmus wished to impute to Erasinidês exclusively, apart from the other generals, the blame of that neglect—a distinction, as will hereafter appear, not wholly unfounded. If, however, any such design was entertained, it did not succeed. When the generals went to explain their case before the Boulê, the decision of that body was decidedly unfavourable to all of them, though we have no particulars of the debate which passed. A resolution was passed that the other five generals present should be placed in custody, as well as Erasinidês, and thus handed over to the public assembly for consideration of the case.

The public assembly was accordingly held, and the generals were brought before it. Theramenês was the man who denounced them most vehemently, as guilty of leaving the crews of the disabled triremes to be drowned. He appealed to their own public letter to the people, officially communicating the victory; in which letter they made no mention of having appointed anyone to undertake the duty, nor of having anyone to blame for not performing it.

The generals could not have a more formidable enemy than Theramênes. We have had occasion to follow him, during the revolution of the Four Hundred, as a long-sighted as well as tortuous politician: he had since been in high military command, a partaker in victory with Alkibiadês

¹ Unless Xenophon is mistaken in speaking of a formal deposition instead of mere supersession, and the generals had had their office simply pro-rogued after the Roman fashion from the previous year, we must suppose the electors returned the same candidates in 408-407 and 407-406.—Ed.]

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 7, 1: Diodor., xiii. 101.

³ Lysias, *Orat.*, xxi. (*Ἀπολογία Δημοδοκίας*), § vii.

⁴ The best emendation for the corrupt text in Xenophon (*Hellen.*, i. 7, 2), ὁ τῆς Δεκελείας ἐπιμελούμενος, is ὁ τοῦ δήμου προεστηκώς καὶ τῆς διωβελίας ἐπιμελούμενος. This would refer to the poor-law relief introduced by Kleophon (see note 2, p. 409). We do not know whether this office went by election or by lot.—Ed.

at Kyzikus and elsewhere ; and he had served as trierarch in the victory of Arginusæ itself. His authority therefore was naturally high, and told for much, when he denied the justification which the generals had set up, founded on the severity of the storm. It seems also that Thrasybulus—another trierarch at Arginusæ—concurred with Thêramenês in this same accusation of the generals,¹ though not standing forward so prominently in the case.

The case of the generals, as it stood before the Athenian public, was completely altered when men like Theramenês and Thrasybulus stood forward as their accusers. Doubtless what was said by these two had been said by others before, in the Boulê and elsewhere ; but it was now publicly advanced by men of influence, as well as perfectly cognizant of the fact. And we are thus enabled to gather indirectly (what the narrative of Xenophon, studiously keeping back the case against the generals, does not directly bring forward), that though the generals affirmed the storm, there were others present who denied it—thus putting in controversy the matter of fact, which formed their solitary justification. Moreover we come, in following the answer made by the generals in the public assembly to Theramenês and Thrasybulus, to a new point in the case, which Xenophon lets out as it were indirectly, and in that confused manner which pervades his whole narrative of the transaction. It is, however, a new point of extreme moment. The generals replied that if anyone was to blame for not having picked up the drowning men, it was Theramenês and Thrasybulus themselves ; for it was they two, to whom, together with various other trierarchs and with forty-eight triremes, the generals had expressly confided the performance of this duty². Nevertheless they made no charge against Theramenês and Thrasybulus—well knowing that the storm had rendered the performance of the duty absolutely impossible, and that it was therefore a complete justification for one as well as for the other. Diomedon, one of their number, had wished after the battle to employ all the ships in the fleet for the preservation of the drowning men, without thinking of anything else until that was done. Erasinidês, on the contrary, wished that all the fleet should move across at once against Mitylênê : Thrasyllus said that they had ships enough to do both at once. Accordingly, it was agreed that each general should set apart three ships from his division, to make a squadron of forty-eight ships under Thrasybulus and Theramenês. In making these statements, the generals produced pilots and others, men actually in the battle, as witnesses in general confirmation.

Here then were two new and important points publicly raised. First,

¹ That Thrasybulus concurred with Theramenês in accusing the generals, is intimated in the reply which Xenophon represents the generals to have made (l. 7, 6)—*Καὶ οὐχ, ὅτι γε κατηγοροῦσιν ἡμῶν, ἔφασαν, ψευδόμενα φάσκοιτες αὐτοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ χειμῶνος εἶναι τὸ κωλύσαν τὴν ἀναίρεσιν.*

The plural *κατηγοροῦσιν* shows that Thrasybulus as well as Theramenês stood forward to accuse the generals, though the latter was the most prominent.

² It is incredible that the generals did not mention the commission of Theramenês and Thrasybulus except as an after thought in the assembly. Though the generals' despatches no doubt observed this point, the examination before the *βουλὴ* must have brought out any such important evidence.

This disposes of the story that Theramenês gratuitously attacked the generals in the *ekklesia* : all the incriminating testimony must have been known before this.

If the commission was really given to these two subordinate officers, when nothing but a display of the highest authority could have nerved the exhausted troops to the difficult task involved, this action was, to say the least, injudicious. If the enterprise was worth attempting at all, it should have been undertaken whole-heartedly. Theramenês and Thrasybulus could hardly have been blamed for their failure, and had a perfect right to protest at Athens against such an unfair commission. Cf. Beloch, *Attische Politik*, p. 87.—Ed.

Theramênês and Thrasybulus denounced the generals as guilty of the death of these neglected men : next, the generals affirmed that they had delegated the duty to Theramênês and Thrasybulus themselves. If this latter were really true, how came the generals in their official despatch first sent home, to say nothing about it ? Euryptolemus, an advocate of the generals (speaking in a subsequent stage of the proceedings, though we can hardly doubt that the same topics were also urged in this very assembly), while blaming the generals for such omission, ascribed it to an ill-placed good-nature on their part, and reluctance to bring Theramênês and Thrasybulus under the displeasure of the people. Most of the generals (he said) were disposed to mention the fact in their official despatch, but were dissuaded from doing so by Periklês and Diomedon : an unhappy dissuasion (in his judgement), which Theramênês and Thrasybulus had ungratefully requited by turning round and accusing them all.

This remarkable statement of Euryptolemus, as to the intention of the generals in wording the official despatch, brings us to a closer consideration of what really passed between them on the one side, and Theramênês and Thrasybulus on the other. Diodorus states that the generals were prevented partly by the storm, partly by the fatigue and reluctance of their own seamen—that they suspected Theramênês and Thrasybulus, who went to Athens before them, of intending to accuse them before the people—and that for this reason they sent home intimation to the people that they had given special orders to these two trierarchs to perform the duty. When these letters were read in the public assembly, the Athenians were excessively indignant against Theramênês, who, however, defended himself effectively and completely, throwing the blame back upon the generals. He was thus forced, against his own will and in self-defence, to become the accuser of the generals, carrying with him his numerous friends and partisans at Athens. And thus the generals, by trying to ruin Theramênês, finally brought condemnation upon themselves¹.

Such is the narrative of Diodorus, in which it is implied that the generals never really gave any special orders to Theramênês and Thrasybulus, but falsely asserted afterwards that they had done so, in order to discredit the accusation of Theramênês against themselves. To a certain extent, this coincides with what was asserted by Theramênês himself two years afterwards in his defence before the Thirty—that he was not the first to accuse the generals²—they were the first to accuse him, affirming that they had ordered him to undertake the duty, and that there was no sufficient reason against his performing it—they were the persons who distinctly pronounced the performance of the duty to be possible, while he had said from the beginning that the violence of the storm was such as even to forbid any movement in the water, much more, to prevent rescue of the drowning men³.

Taking the accounts of Xenophon and Diodorus together, in combination with the subsequent accusation and defence of Theramênês at the time of the Thirty, I think it probable that the order for picking up the

¹ Diodor., xiii. 100, 101.

² This assertion is confirmed by the statements of his enemies (see note 1 on p. 755).—Ed.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 35. If Theramênês really did say, in the actual discussions at Athens on the conduct of the generals, that which he here asserts himself to have said (*viz.*, that the violence

of the storm rendered it impossible for anyone to put to sea), his accusation against the generals must have been grounded upon alleging that they might have performed the duty at an earlier moment ; before they came back from the battle—before the storm arose—before they gave the order to him.

exposed men was really given by the generals to Theramenês, Thrasybulus, and other trierarchs ; but that, first, a fatal interval was allowed to elapse between the close of the battle and the giving of such order—next, that the forty-eight triremes talked of for the service, and proposed to be furnished by drafts of three out of each general's division, were probably never assembled—or if they assembled, were so little zealous in the business as to satisfy themselves very easily that the storm was too dangerous to brave, and that it was now too late. It is a memorable fact, that of all the eight generals, not one of them undertook the business in person. In a proceeding where every interval even of five minutes was precious, they go to work in the most dilatory manner, by determining that each general shall furnish three ships and no more, from his division. Now we know from the statement of Xenophon that, towards the close of the battle, the ships on both sides were much dispersed. Such collective direction therefore would not be quickly realized ; nor, until all the eight fractions were united, together with the Samians and others, so as to make the force complete, would Theramenês feel bound to go out upon his visitation. He doubtless disliked the service—as we see that most of the generals did—while the crews also, who had just got to land after having gained a victory, were thinking most about rest and refreshment, and mutual congratulations¹. All were glad to find some excuse for staying in their moorings instead of going out again to buffet what was doubtless unfavourable weather.

But presently arose the delicate question, 'How are we to account for the omission of this sacred duty in our official despatch to the Athenian people ?' Here the generals differed among themselves, as Eurypotemus expressly states : Periklês and Diomedon carried it, against the judgement of their colleagues, that in the official despatch nothing should be said about the delegation to Theramenês and others, the whole omission being referred to the terrors of the storm. But though such was the tenor of the official report, there was nothing to hinder the generals from writing home and communicating individually with their friends in Athens as each might think fit ; and in these unofficial communications, from them as well as from others who went home from the armament—communications not less efficacious than the official despatch in determining the tone of public feeling at Athens—they did not disguise their convictions that the blame of not performing the duty belonged to Theramenês². Having thus a man like Theramenês to throw the blame upon, they did not take pains to keep up the story of the intolerable storm, but intimated that there had been nothing to hinder *him* from performing the duty if he had chosen. It is this which he accuses them of having advanced against him, so as to place him as the guilty man before the Athenian

¹ We read in Thukydides (vii. 73) how impossible it was to prevail on the Syracusans to make any military movement after their last maritime victory in the Great Harbour, when they were full of triumph, felicitation, and enjoyment.

[From the purely military point of view, it would no doubt have been wise to press on against Eteonikus, while the troops were still flushed with victory, and not yet overcome with that paralyzing languor which seizes recruits after their first battle. The capture of Eteonikus' squadron would have more than counterbalanced the loss of the sinking ships. But this was a policy which the generals

could not have commended afterwards to the *ekklesia*. Indeed, it is noticeable that Erasinidês, who proposed to follow up the victory with all available forces (Xen., *Hellen.*, i. 7, 29), was the first to be impeached. In 406, as in 376 (*cf.* pp. 761, 762), the admirals had to sacrifice the fruits of victory because the people would resent a heavy casualty-list. But it should be added that few Greek generals grasped the truth, since demonstrated by Grant and Moltke, that to strike hard often saves the most lives in the long run.—Ed.]

² Still less could they conceal this fact before the *Boulê*. *Cf.* n. to. p. 752.—Ed.

public : it was this which made him, in retaliation and self-defence, violent in denouncing them as the persons really blameable¹.

But the comparative account of blame and recrimination between these two parties is not the most important feature of the case. The really serious inquiry is as to the intensity or instant occurrence of the storm. Was it really so instant and so dangerous, that the duty of visiting the wrecks could not be performed, either before the ships went back to Arginusæ, or afterwards? Now, unfortunately for the character of Athenian generals, officers, and men, at Arginusæ—for the blame belongs, though in unequal proportions, to all of them—there exists here strong presumptive proof that the storm on this occasion was not such as would have deterred any Grecian seamen animated by an earnest sense of duty. We have only to advert to the escape of Eteonikus and the Peloponnesian fleet from Mitylênê to Chios, recollecting that Mitylênê was separated from the promontory of Kanê on the Asiatic mainland, and from the isles of Arginusæ, by a channel only 120 stadia broad²—about fourteen English miles. The whole fleet, triremes and merchant vessels both, went out of the harbour of Mitylênê and made straight for Chios, whither they arrived in safety, the merchant vessels carrying their sails, and having what Xenophon calls 'a fair wind'³. All this reasoning, too, assumes the fleet to have been already brought back to its moorings at Arginusæ; discussing only how much it was practicable to effect after that moment, and leaving untouched the no less important question, why the drowning men were not picked up before the fleet went back.

I have thought it right to go over these considerations, in order that the reader may understand the feelings of the assembly and the public of Athens, when the generals stood before them. The assembly had before them the deplorable fact that several hundreds of brave seamen had been suffered to drown on the wrecks, without the least effort to rescue them. In explanation of this fact, they had not only no justification, at once undisputed and satisfactory—but not even any straightforward and uncontradicted statements of fact. There were discrepancies among the generals themselves, comparing their official with their unofficial, as well as with their present statements—and contradictions between them and Theramenês. It was impossible that the assembly could be satisfied to acquit the generals, on such a presentation of the case. The defence of the generals was listened to with favour and seemed likely to prevail with the majority. Many individuals present offered themselves as bail for the generals, in order that the latter might be liberated from custody, but the debate had been so much prolonged (we see from hence that there must have been a great deal of speaking) that it was now dark, so that

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 32. The light in which I here place the conduct of Theramenês is not only coincident with Diodorus, but with the representations of Kritias, the violent enemy of Theramenês, under the government of the Thirty—just before he was going to put Theramenês to death—ὄντος δὲ τοι ἐστίν, ὅς ταχθεὶς ἀνελεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν τοὺς καταδύντας Ἀθηναίους ἐν τῇ περὶ Λέσβου ναυμαχίᾳ, αὐτὸς οὐκ ἀνελόμενος ὅμως τῶν στρατηγῶν κατηγορῶν ἀπέκτεινεν αὐτοὺς, ἵνα αὐτὸς περισωθῇ (Xen., *ut sup.*).

² Strabo, xiii. p. 617.

³ It should be remembered that if the wind came from the north or north-east, as it generally does during the hot season in Greek waters, Eteonikus'

course would have lain under the lee of Lesbos, in comparatively smooth water. But whereas the mountains on the Ægean islands form an admirable bar to the frequent gales at the 'change of the monsoon', the wind whips with redoubled fury down the exposed channels; and where reefs such as the Arginusæ are found, the surging cross-seas make navigation dangerous even to a modern coaster of 1,000 tons. Under these circumstances, the salvage work might have been quite impossible for the untrained and exhausted crews; on the other hand, a little steady rowing on the part of Eteonikus' sailors would keep the trim of his vessels straight enough.—Ed.

no vote could be taken, because the show of hands was not distinguishable. It was therefore resolved that the whole decision should be adjourned until another assembly; but that in the meantime the Boulê should meet to consider what would be the proper mode of trying and judging the generals—and should submit a proposition to that effect.

It so chanced, that immediately after this first assembly, the three days of the solemn annual festival called Apaturia intervened, early in the month of October. At the Apaturia the family ceremonies were gone through; marriages were enrolled, acts of adoption were promulgated and certified, the names of youthful citizens first entered on the gentile and phratric roll. Now the crews of the twenty-five Athenian triremes, lost at the battle of Arginusæ, (at least all those among them who were freemen) had been members of some one of these family unions, and were missed on this occasion¹. Many of the gentile unions, in spite of the usually festive and cheerful character of the Apaturia, clothed themselves in black garments and shaved their heads in token of mourning, resolving to present themselves in this guise at the coming assembly, and to appease the manes of their abandoned kinsmen by every possible effort to procure retribution on the generals².

Xenophon in his narrative describes this burst of feeling at the Apaturia as factitious, and the men in mourning as a number of hired impostors, got up by the artifices of Theramenês³, to destroy the generals. But the case was one in which no artifice was needed. The universal and self-acting stimulants of intense human sympathy stand here so prominently marked, that it is not simply superfluous but even misleading, to look behind for the machinations of a political instigator.

Moreover, what can be more improbable than the allegation that a great number of men were hired to personate the fathers or brothers of deceased Athenian citizens, all well-known to their really surviving kinsmen? What more improbable than the story that numbers of men would suffer themselves to be hired, not merely to put on black clothes for the day, which might be taken off in the evening—but also to shave their heads, thus stamping upon themselves an ineffaceable evidence of the fraud, until the hair had grown again? That a cunning man, like Theramenês, should thus distribute his bribes to a number of persons, all presenting naked heads which testified his guilt, when there were real kinsmen surviving to prove the fact of personation? That having done this, he should never be arraigned or accused for it afterwards,—neither during the prodigious reaction of feeling which took place after the condemnation of the generals, nor by his bitter enemy Kritias under the government of the Thirty? Not only Theramenês is never mentioned as having been

¹ Many of the dead may have ranked among the Knights, and represented the most distinguished families of Athens.—Ed.

² Lysias puts into one of his orations a similar expression respecting the feeling at Athens towards these generals—*ἡγοούμενοι χρῆναι τῇ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀρετῇ παρ' ἐκείνων δίκην λαβεῖν*—Lysias, *Cont. Eratosth.*, § 37.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 7, 8.

Here I adopt substantially the statement of Diodorus, who gives a juster and more natural description of the proceeding, representing it as a spontaneous action of mournful and vindictive feeling on the part of the kinsmen of the deceased (xlii. 101).

Dr. Thirlwall, as well as Sievers (*Commentat. de Xenophontis Hellen.*, pp. 25-30), supposes Theramenês to have acted in concert with the oligarchical party, in making use of this incident to bring about the ruin of generals odious to them—several of whom were connected with Alkibiadês. I confess that I see nothing to countenance this idea: but at all events, the cause here named is only secondary—not the grand and dominant fact of the moment.

[The strongly democratic character of the subsequent boards of generals shows that the oligarchic party at this time was quite powerless.—Ed.]

afterwards accused, but for aught that appears, he preserved his political influence and standing, with little, if any, abatement¹.

When the Boulê met, after the Apaturia, to discharge the duty confided to it by the last public assembly, of determining in what manner the generals should be judged, Kallixenus proposed, and the majority adopted, the following resolution: 'The Athenian people, having already heard in the previous assembly, both the accusation and the defence of the generals, shall at once come to a vote on the subject by tribes. For each tribe two urns shall be placed, and the herald of each tribe shall proclaim—All citizens who think the generals guilty for not having rescued the warriors who had conquered in the battle, shall drop their pebbles into the foremost urn; all who think otherwise, into the hindmost. Should the generals be pronounced guilty (by the result of the voting), they shall be delivered to the Eleven, and punished with death; their property shall be confiscated, the tenth part being set apart for the goddess Athênê.' One single vote was to embrace the case of all the eight generals.

The unparalleled burst of vindictive feeling at the festival of the Apaturia, extending by contagion from the relatives of the deceased to many other citizens, probably emboldened Kallixenus to propose, and prompted the Boulê to adopt, this deplorable resolution. As soon as the assembly met, it was read and moved by Kallixenus himself, but was heard by a large portion of the assembly with well-merited indignation. Its enormity consisted in breaking through the established constitutional maxims and judicial practices of the Athenian democracy. It deprived the accused generals of all fair trial, alleging, with a mere pretence of truth which was little better than utter falsehood, that their defence as well as their accusation had been heard in the preceding assembly. Now there has been no people, ancient or modern, in whose view the formalities of judicial trial were habitually more sacred and indispensable than in that of the Athenians—formalities including ample notice beforehand to the accused party, with a measured and sufficient space of time for him to make his defence before the Dikasts; while those Dikasts were men who had been sworn beforehand as a body, yet were selected by lot for each occasion as individuals. From all these securities the generals were now to be debarred, and submitted, for their lives, honours, and fortunes, to a simple vote of the unsworn public assembly, without hearing or defence. Nor was this all. One single vote was to be taken in condemnation or absolution of the eight generals collectively. Now there was a rule in Attic judicial procedure, called the psephism of Kannônus (originally adopted, we do not know when, on the proposition of a citizen of that name, as a psephism or decree for some particular case—but since generalized into common practice, and grown into great prescriptive reverence), which peremptorily forbade any such collective trial or sentence, and directed that a separate judicial vote should in all cases be taken for or against each accused party². The psephism of Kannônus,

¹ Lysias (*C. Agorat.*, § 10) says Theraménês was elected general for 406-405, but was rejected at the *δοκιμασία*. This disqualification, however, may have been of a formal character only.—ED.

² All that we know about this statute is derived from the passage in Xen., *Hellen.*, i. 7, 20 and 34. There is no proof that (1) it was peculiarly old and venerable, or that (2) it expressly forbade a collective sentence. As to (1), we notice that Kan-

nônus' measure, as opposed to the statutes concerning *προδοσία* and *ἱεροσυλία* (§ 22), is styled a *ψήφισμα*, and not a *νόμος*, and that its phraseology, *ἐὰν τις τὸν δῆμον* (not *τὴν πόλιν*) *ἀδικῇ*, suggests a date posterior to the establishment of the full democracy. Possibly it was passed after the revolution of the Four Hundred, as an additional precaution against oligarchic disaffection (*cf.* the Roman *lex majestatis*, which was brought

together with all the other respective maxims of Athenian criminal justice, was here audaciously trampled under foot.

As soon as the resolution was read in the public assembly, Euryptolemus, an intimate friend of the generals, denounced it as grossly illegal and unconstitutional, presenting a notice of indictment against Kallixenus under the *Graphê Paranomôn*, for having proposed a resolution of that tenor. Several other citizens supported the notice of indictment, which according to the received practice of Athens, would arrest the farther progress of the measure until the trial of its proposer had been consummated.

But the numerous partisans of Kallixenus were in no temper to respect this constitutional impediment to the discussion of what had already been passed by the *Boulê*. They loudly clamoured that 'it was intolerable to see a small knot of citizens thus hindering the assembled people from doing what they chose': and one of their number even went so far as to threaten that those who tendered the indictment against Kallixenus should be judged by the same vote along with the generals, if they would not let the assembly proceed to consider and determine on the motion just read. The excited disposition of the large party thus congregated was wound up to its highest pitch by various other speakers; especially by one, who stood forward and said—'Athenians, I was myself a wrecked man in the battle: I escaped only by getting upon an empty meal-tub; but my comrades, perishing on the wrecks near me, implored me, if I should myself be saved, to make known to the Athenian people, that their generals had abandoned to death warriors who had bravely conquered in behalf of their country'¹. Doubtless there were other similar statements, all contributing to aggravate the violence of the public manifestations, which at length reached such a point, that Euryptolemus was forced to withdraw his notice of indictment against Kallixenus.

Now, however, a new form of resistance sprung up, still preventing the proposition from being taken into consideration by the assembly. Some of the *Prytanes*, the legal presidents of assembly, refused to put the question; which, being illegal and unconstitutional, rendered them personally open to penalties. Kallixenus threatened, amidst encouraging clamour from many persons in the assembly, to include them in the same accusation with the generals. So intimidated were the *Prytanes* by the assembly, that all of them, except one, relinquished their opposition, and agreed to put the question. The single obstinate *Prytanis*, whose refusal no menace could subdue, was a man whose name we read with peculiar interest, and in whom an impregnable adherence to law and duty was only one among many other titles to reverence. It was the philo-

in to supplement the obsolescent *lex perduellionis*), and had not yet been passed by the *νομοθέται*.

(2) The assertion that it forbade a collective trial seems merely an inference from the fact that it prescribed a trial in a law-court, where each individual case would naturally be tried on its own merits: hence, *δίχα ἕκαστον κρίνειν* is equivalent to 'trial by jury'.

In § 19 Euryptolemus concedes that the generals might be tried in a body, if desirable; his contention is that, in a case where all the facts were not yet fully thrashed out, the question should be referred to a *dikastery* for further elucidation, and not summarily voted upon by the *ekklesia*.—Ed.

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 7, 11.

The people of Athens heard and fully believed this deposition; nor do I see any reason why an historian of Greece should disbelieve it. There is nothing in the assertion of this man which is at all improbable: nay, more, it is plain that several such incidents must have happened. If we take the smallest pains to expand in our imaginations the details connected with this painfully interesting crisis at Athens, we shall see that numerous stories of the same affecting character must have been in circulation—doubtless many false, but many also perfectly true.

sopher Sokratēs, on this trying occasion, once throughout a life of seventy years, discharging a political office. Sokratēs could not be induced to withdraw his protest, so that the question was ultimately put by the remaining Prytanes without his concurrence¹. It should be observed that his resistance did not imply any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the generals, but applied simply to the illegal and unconstitutional proposition now submitted for determining their fate.

The constitutional impediments having been thus violently overthrown, the question was regularly put by the Prytanes to the assembly. At once the clamorous outcry ceased, and those who had raised it resumed their behaviour of Athenian citizens—patient hearers of speeches and opinions directly opposed to their own. Nothing is more deserving of notice than this change of demeanour. The champions of the men drowned on the wrecks had resolved to employ as much force as was required to eliminate those preliminary constitutional objections, in themselves indisputable, which precluded the discussion. But so soon as the discussion was once begun, they were careful not to give to the resolution the appearance of being carried by force. Eurypτοlemus, the personal friend of the generals, was allowed not only to move an amendment negating the proposition of Kallixenus, but also to develop it in a long speech, which Xenophon sets before us².

It is no small proof of the force of established habits of public discussion, that the men who had been a few minutes before in a state of furious excitement, should patiently hear out a speech so effective and so conflicting with their strongest sentiments as this of Eurypτοlemus. Perhaps others may have spoken also; but Xenophon does not mention them. It is remarkable that he does not name Theramenēs as taking any part in this last debate.

The substantive amendment proposed by Eurypτοlemus was that the generals should be tried each separately, according to the psephism of Kannōnus, implying notice to be given to each, of the day of trial, and full time for each to defend himself. This proposition, as well as that of the Boulē moved by Kallixenus, was submitted to the vote of the assembly. The Prytanes pronounced the amendment of Eurypτοlemus to be carried. But a citizen named Meneklēs impeached their decision as wrong or invalid, alleging seemingly some informality or trick in putting the question, or perhaps erroneous report of the comparative show of hands. We must recollect that in this case the Prytanes were declared partisans. Feeling that they were doing wrong in suffering so illegal a proposition as that of Kallixenus to be put at all, and that the adoption of it would be a great public mischief, they would hardly scruple to try and defeat it even by some unfair manoeuvre. But the exception taken by Meneklēs constrained them to put the question over again, and they

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 7, 14, 15; Plato, *Apol. Socr.*, c. 20; Xenoph., *Memor.*, i. 1, 18; iv. 4, 2.

[The theory that Sokratēs' resistance was simply overruled is indeed not impossible, but such a breach of formalities should not be lightly assumed. All that Xenophon (*Hellen.*, i. 7, 15-16) strictly allows us to infer is that Sokratēs gave his opinion, and that then Eurypτοlemus spoke, without any vote necessarily being taken in between. Subsequently to the latter's speech, the motion suggested to the assembly was a διαχειρο-

ροvia—i.e., a question between two modes of procedure. Sokratēs may then have thought that after the oration of Eurypτοlemus this motion might safely be brought forward, and he or one of his fellow-presidents, perhaps, attempted some artifice against which Meneklēs protested; or else Meneklēs' motion led to an adjournment into the next Prytany, by which time Sokratēs had become again an ordinary councillor.—Ed.]

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 7, 16.

were then obliged to pronounce that the majority was in favour of the proposition of Kallixenus.

That proposition was shortly afterwards carried into effect by disposing the two urns for each tribe, and collecting the votes of the citizens individually. The condemnatory vote prevailed, and all the eight generals were thus found guilty, whether by a large or a small majority, we should have been glad to learn, but are not told. The six generals then at Athens—Periklês (son of the great statesman of that name by Aspasia), Diomedon, Erasinidês, Thrasyllus, Lysias, and Aristokratês—were then delivered to the Eleven, and perished by the usual draught of hemlock.

Respecting the condemnation of these unfortunate men, pronounced without any of the recognised tutelary preliminaries for accused persons, there can be only one opinion. It was an act of violent injustice and illegality, deeply dishonouring the men who passed it, and the Athenian character generally. In either case, whether the generals were guilty or innocent, such censure is deserved; for judicial precautions are not less essential in dealing with the guilty than with the innocent. But it is deserved in an aggravated form, when we consider that the men against whom such injustice was perpetrated, had just come from achieving a glorious victory. Against the democratical constitution of Athens, it furnishes no ground for censure—nor against the habits and feelings which that constitution tended to implant in the individual citizen. Both the one and the other strenuously forbade the deed: nor could the Athenians ever have so dishonoured themselves, if they had not, under a momentary ferocious excitement, risen in insurrection not less against the forms of their own democracy, than against the most sacred restraints of their habitual constitutional morality.

If we wanted proof of this, the facts of the immediate future would abundantly supply it. After a short time had elapsed, every man in Athens became heartily ashamed of the deed. A vote of the public assembly was passed¹, decreeing that those who had misguided the people on this occasion ought to be brought to judicial trial, that Kallixenus with four others should be among the number, and that bail should be taken for their appearance. But presently both foreign misfortunes and internal sedition began to press too heavily on Athens to leave any room for other thoughts. Kallixenus and his accomplices found means to escape, before the day of trial arrived, and remained in exile until after the dominion of the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy. 'Detested by all, he died of hunger'—says Xenophon; a memorable proof how much the condemnation of these six generals shocked the standing democratical sentiment at Athens.

From what cause did this temporary burst of wrong arise, so foreign to the habitual character of the people? Even under the strongest political provocation, and towards the most hated traitors (as Eurypotlemus himself remarked by citing the case of Aristarchus) after the Four Hundred as well as after the Thirty, the Athenians never committed the like wrong—never deprived an accused party of the customary judicial securities. Political hatred, intense as it might be, was never dissociated, in the mind of a citizen of Athens, from the democratical forms of pro-

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 7, 39. This vote of the public assembly was known at Athens by the name of *Probolê*. The assembled people discharged on

this occasion an ante-judicial function, something like that of a Grand Jury.

cedure : but the men, who stood out here as actors, had broken loose from the obligations of citizenship and commonwealth, and surrendered themselves, heart and soul, to the family sympathies and antipathies. The garb of mourning and the shaving of the head—phenomena unknown at Athens either in a political assembly or in a religious festival—were symbols of temporary transformation in the internal man. He could think of nothing but his drowning relatives, together with the generals as having abandoned them to death, and his own duty as survivor to ensure to them vengeance and satisfaction for such abandonment. Under this self-justifying impulse, the shortest and surest proceeding appeared the best, whatever amount of political wrong it might entail : nay, in this case it appeared the only proceeding really sure, since the interposition of the proper judicial delays, coupled with severance of trial on successive days according to the psephism of Kannônus, would probably have saved the lives of five out of the six generals, if not of all the six. When we reflect that such absorbing sentiment was common, at one and the same time, to a large proportion of the Athenians, we shall see the explanation of that misguided vote, both of the Boulê and of the Ekklesia, which sent the six generals to an illegal ballot—and of the subsequent ballot which condemned them. ‘*Ces pères de famille sont capables de tout*’—was the satirical remark of Talleyrand upon the gross public jobbing so largely practised by those who sought place or promotion for their sons. The same words, understood in a far more awful sense, and generalized for other cases of relationship, sum up the moral of this melancholy proceeding at Athens.

Lastly, it must never be forgotten that the generals themselves were also largely responsible in the case. I feel persuaded that with neither an English, nor a French, nor an American fleet, could such events have taken place as those which followed the victory of Arginusæ. If these generals, after their victory, instead of sailing back to land, had employed themselves first of all in visiting the crippled ships, there would have been ample time to perform this duty, and to save all the living men aboard before the storm came on. This is the natural inference, even upon their own showing ; this is what any English, French, or American naval commander would have thought it an imperative duty to do. What degree of blame is imputable to Theramenês, and how far the generals were discharged by shifting the responsibility to him, is a point which we cannot now determine. But the storm, which is appealed to as a justification of both, rests upon evidence too questionable to serve that purpose, where the neglect of duty was so serious, and cost the lives probably of more than 1,000 brave men. The general impression of the public at Athens—in my opinion, a natural and unavoidable impression—was that there had been most culpable negligence in regard to the wrecks, through which negligence alone the seamen on board perished.

In spite, therefore, of the guilty proceeding to which a furious exaggeration of such sentiment drove the Athenians—in spite of the sympathy which this has naturally and justly procured for the condemned generals—the verdict of impartial history will pronounce that the sentiment itself was well-founded, and that the generals deserved censure and disgrace. And the condemnation here pronounced, while it served as a painful admonition to subsequent Athenian generals, provided at the

same time an efficacious guarantee for the preservation of combatants on the wrecks or swimming for their lives after a naval victory. One express case in point may be mentioned. Thirty years afterwards (B.C. 376) the Athenian admiral Chabrias defeated, though not without considerable loss, the Lacedæmonian fleet near Naxos. Had he pursued them vigorously, he might have completed his victory by destroying all or most of them; but recollecting what had happened after the battle of Arginusæ, he abstained from pursuit, devoted his attention to the wrecks of his own fleet, saved from death those citizens who were yet living, and picked up the dead for interment¹.

CHAPTER XXXV [LXV]

FROM THE BATTLE OF ARGINUSÆ TO THE RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS, AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE THIRTY

THE victory of Arginusæ gave for the time decisive mastery of the Asiatic seas to the Athenian fleet; and is even said to have so discouraged the Lacedæmonians, as to induce them to send propositions of peace to Athens. But this statement is open to much doubt, and I think it most probable that no such propositions were made². Great as the victory was, we look in vain for any positive results accruing to Athens. After an unsuccessful attempt on Chios, the victorious fleet went to Samos, where it seems to have remained until the following year, without any farther movements than were necessary for the purpose of procuring money.

Meanwhile, Eteonikus, who collected the remains of the defeated Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, being left unsupplied with money by Cyrus, found himself much straitened, and was compelled to leave the seamen unpaid. During the later summer and autumn, these men maintained themselves by labouring for hire on the Chian lands; but when winter came, this resource ceased, so that they found themselves unable to procure even clothes or shoes.

Eteonikus finally had to demand money from the Chians, as a condition of carrying away his starving armament.

The Chians and the other allies of Sparta presently assembled at Ephesus to consult, and resolved, in conjunction with Cyrus, to despatch envoys to the Ephors, requesting that Lysander might be sent out a second time

¹ Diodor., xv. 35.

² The statement rests on the authority of Aristotle, as referred to by the Scholiast on the last verse of the *Frogs* of Aristophanes. And this, so far as I know, is the only authority: for when Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fast. Hellen.*, ad ann. 406) says that *Æschines* (*De Fals. Legat.*, p. 38, c. 24) mentions the overtures of peace—I think that no one who looks at that passage will be inclined to found any inference upon it.

Against it we may observe—

1. Xenophon does not mention it. This is something, though far from being conclusive when standing alone.

2. Diodorus does not mention it.

3. The terms alleged to have been proposed by the Lacedæmonians are exactly the same as those said to have been proposed by them after the death of Mindarus at Kyzikus, viz.—

To evacuate Dekeleia—and each party to stand as they were. Not only the terms are the same—

but also the person who stood prominent in opposition is in both cases the same—*Kleophon*. The overtures after Arginusæ are in fact a second edition of those after the battle of Kyzikus.

[On the other hand, the statement in *Ath. Pol.*, c. 34, is explicit enough as to the peace proposals, and as it probably has its source in an Attidographer drawing upon official documents, it weighs heavily against the silence of Xenophon and Diodorus.

The sameness of the terms in 410 and 406 is not surprising, the offer of the *status quo* being most simple and equitable. Again, Kleophon at this time was still more influential than in 410, and would be the natural person to move the rejection of the proposals. The reiteration of the peace proposals on the side of Sparta, and their successive defeat by the Athenian democrats, is paralleled by the negotiations of 425-424, when at least three offers were made.—Ed.]

as admiral¹. It was not the habit of Sparta ever to send out the same man as admiral a second time, after his year of service. Nevertheless the Ephors complied with the request substantially, sending out Arakus as admiral, but Lysander along with him under the title of secretary, invested with all the real powers of command.

Lysander, having reached Ephesus about the beginning of B.C. 405, immediately applied himself with vigour to renovate both Lacedæmonian power and his own influence. The partisans in the various allied cities, whose favour he had assiduously cultivated during his last year's command, all hailed his return with exultation. Discountenanced and kept down by his predecessor Kallikratidas, they now sprang into renewed activity, and became zealous in aiding Lysander to refit and augment his fleet. Nor was Cyrus less hearty in his preference than before. On arriving at Ephesus, Lysander went speedily to visit him at Sardis, and solicited a renewal of the pecuniary aid. The latter was thus enabled to return to Ephesus in a state for restoring the effective condition of his fleet. He made good at once all the arrears of pay due to the seamen—constituted new trierarchs—summoned Eteonikus with the fleet from Chios together with all the other scattered squadrons—and directed that fresh triremes should be immediately put on the stocks at Antandrus.

In none of the Asiatic towns was the effect of Lysander's second advent felt more violently than at Milêtus. He had there a powerful association of friends, who had done their best to hamper Kallikratidas on his first arrival, but had been put to silence, and even forced to make a show of zeal, by the straightforward resolution of that admiral. Eager to reimburse themselves for this humiliation, they now formed a conspiracy, with the privity and concurrence of Lysander, to seize the government for themselves. They determined (if Plutarch and Diodorus are to be credited) to put down the existing democracy, and establish an oligarchy in its place. But we can hardly believe that there could have existed a democracy at Milêtus, which had now been for five years in dependence upon Sparta and the Persians jointly. We must rather understand the movement as a conflict between two oligarchical parties; the friends of Lysander being more thoroughly self-seeking and anti-popular than their opponents—and perhaps even crying them down, by comparison, as a democracy. Lysander lent himself to the scheme, and even betrayed the government into a false security, by promises of support which he never intended to fulfil. At the festival of the Dionysia, the conspirators, rising in arms, seized forty of their chief opponents in their houses, and three hundred more in the market-place; while the government—confiding in the promises of Lysander, who affected to reprove, but secretly continued instigating, the insurgents—made but a faint resistance. The three hundred and forty leaders thus seized were all put to death; and a still larger number of citizens, not less than 1,000, fled into exile².

It would appear that factious movements in other towns, less revolting in respect of bloodshed and perfidy, yet still of similar character to that of Milêtus, marked the reappearance of Lysander in Asia, placing the towns more and more in the hands of his partisans. While thus acquiring greater ascendancy among the allies, Lysander received a summons from

¹ Diodor., xiii. 100.—Ed.

² Diodor., xiii. 104; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 8.

Cyrus to visit him at Sardis. The young prince had just been sent for to come and visit his father Darius, who was dangerously ill in Media. About to depart for this purpose, he carried his confidence in Lysander so far as to delegate to him the management of his satrapy and his entire revenues. Besides his admiration for the superior energy and capacity of the Greek character, and besides his esteem for the personal disinterestedness of Lysander, Cyrus was probably induced to this step by the fear of raising up to himself a rival, if he trusted the like power to any Persian grandee.

Thus armed with an unprecedented command of Persian treasure, and seconded by ascendant factions in all the allied cities, Lysander was more powerful than any Lacedæmonian commander had ever been since the commencement of the war. Having his fleet well paid, he could keep it united and direct it whither he chose without the necessity of dispersing it in roving squadrons for the purpose of levying money. It is probably from a corresponding necessity that we are to explain the inaction of the Athenian fleet at Samos: for we hear of no serious operations undertaken by it, during the whole year following the victory of Arginusæ, although under the command of an able and energetic man, Konon — together with Philoklēs and Adeimantus, to whom were added, during the spring of 405 B.C., three other generals, Tydeus, Menander, and Kephisodotus. It appears that Theramenēs also was put up and elected one of the generals, but rejected when submitted to the confirmatory examination called the *Dokimasy*¹. The fleet comprised 180 triremes, rather a greater number than that of Lysander, to whom they in vain offered battle near his station at Ephesus. Finding him not disposed to a general action, they seem to have dispersed to plunder Chios, and various portions of the Asiatic coast; while Lysander, keeping his fleet together, first sailed southward from Ephesus to Rhodes. He was even bold enough to make an excursion across the Ægean to the coast of Ægina and Attica, where he had an interview with Agis, who came from Dekeleia to the sea-coast². The Athenians were preparing to follow him thither when they learnt that he had recrossed the Ægean, and he soon afterwards appeared with all his fleet at the Hellespont, which important pass they had left unguarded. Lysander went straight to Abydos, still the great Peloponnesian station in the strait, and immediately proceeded to attack, both by sea and land, the neighbouring town of Lampsakus, which was taken by storm.

The Athenian fleet seems to have been employed in plundering Chios when it received news that the Lacedæmonian commander was at the Hellespont engaged in the siege of Lampsakus. Either from the want of money, or from other causes which we do not understand, Konon and his colleagues were behindhand with Lysander throughout all this summer. They now followed him to the Hellespont, away from the Asiatic coast, which was all unfriendly to them. They reached Elæus, at the southern extremity of the Chersonese, with their powerful fleet of 180 triremes, just in time to hear that Lysander was already master of Lampsakus; upon which they immediately proceeded up the strait to Sestos, and from thence, after stopping only to collect a few provisions, still farther up — to a place called Ægospotami.

¹ Lysias, *Orat. xlii.*, *Cont. Agorai.*, § 13.

² This flying visit of Lysander across the Ægean to the coasts of Attica and Ægina is not noticed

by Xenophon, but it appears both in Diodorus and in Plutarch (*Diodor.*, xlii. 104; *Plutarch, Lysand.*, c. 9).

Ægospotami, or Goat's River, was a place which had nothing to recommend it except that it was directly opposite to Lampsakus, separated by a breadth of strait about one mile and three-quarters. It was an open beach, without harbour, without good anchorage, without either inhabitants or supplies; so that everything necessary for this large army had to be fetched from Sestos, about one mile and three-quarters distant even by land, and yet more distant by sea, since it was necessary to round a headland. Such a station was highly dangerous to an ancient naval armament, without any organized commissariat; for the seamen, being compelled to go to a distance from their ships in order to get their meals, were not easily reassembled. Yet this was the station chosen by the Athenian generals, with the full design of compelling Lysander to fight a battle. But the Lacedæmonian admiral had no intention of accepting the challenge of his enemies at the moment which suited their convenience. When the Athenians sailed across the strait the next morning, they found all his ships fully manned, and ranged in perfect order of battle, with the land-force disposed ashore to lend assistance; but with strict orders to await attack and not to move forward. Not daring to attack him in such a position, the Athenians were at length obliged to go back to Ægospotami.

For four successive days this same scene was repeated, the Athenians becoming each day more full of contempt for the apparent cowardice of the enemy. It was in vain that Alkibiadēs—who from his own private forts in the Chersonese witnessed what was passing—rode up to the station and remonstrated with the generals on the exposed condition of the fleet on this open shore, urgently advising them to move round to Sestos, from whence they could go forth to fight whenever they chose. But the Athenian generals disregarded his advice, and even dismissed him with the insulting taunt, that they were now in command, not he¹. Continuing thus in their exposed position, the Athenian seamen on each successive day became more careless of their enemy, and rash in dispersing the moment they returned back to their own shore. At length, on the fifth day, Lysander ordered the scout ships, which he sent forth to watch the Athenians on their return, to hoist a bright shield as a signal, as soon as they should see the ships at their anchorage and the crews ashore in quest of their meal. The moment he beheld this welcome signal, he gave orders to his entire fleet to row across as swiftly as possible from Lampsakus to Ægospotami. All the triremes were caught at their moorings ashore, some entirely deserted, others with one or at most two of the three tiers of rowers. Out of the total of 180, only twelve were found in tolerable order and preparation². It was in vain that Konon, on seeing the fleet of Lysander approaching, employed his utmost efforts to get his fleet manned and in some condition for resistance: the utmost which he could do was to escape himself with the small squadron of twelve. All the

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 1, 25; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 10; Plutarch, *Alkib.*, c. 36.

Diodorus (xiii. 105) and Cornelius Nepos (*Alcib.*, c. 8) represent Alkibiadēs as wishing to be re-admitted to a share in the command of the fleet, and as promising, if that were granted, that he would assemble a body of Thracians, attack Lysander by land, and compel him to fight a battle or retire. Plutarch (*Alkib.*, c. 37) alludes also to promises of this sort held out by Alkibiadēs.

Yet it is not likely that Alkibiadēs should have talked of anything so obviously impossible. How could he bring a Thracian land-force to attack Lysander, who was on the opposite side of the Hellespont? How could he carry a land-force across in the face of Lysander's fleet?

The representation of Xenophon (followed in my text) is clear and intelligible.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 1, 29; Lysias, *Orat.* xxi. ('Ἀπολ. Δωροδ.), § 12.

remaining triremes were captured by Lysander on the shore, defenceless, and seemingly without the least attempt on the part of any one to resist. He landed and made prisoners most of the crews ashore, though some of them fled and found shelter in the neighbouring forts. This prodigious and unparalleled victory was obtained, not merely without the loss of a single ship, but almost without that of a single man¹.

Of the number of prisoners taken by Lysander—which must have been very great, since the total crews of 180 triremes were not less than 36,000 men²—we hear only of 3,000 or 4,000 native Athenians, though this number cannot represent all the native Athenians in the fleet. The Athenian generals Philoklēs and Adeimantus were certainly taken, and seemingly all except Konon. Some of the defeated armament took refuge in Sestos, which, however, surrendered with little resistance to the victor. He admitted them to capitulation, on condition of their going back immediately to Athens, and nowhere else; for he was desirous to multiply as much as possible the numbers assembled in that city, knowing well that it would be the sooner starved out. Konon too was well aware that to go back to Athens, after the ruin of the entire fleet, was to become one of the certain prisoners in a doomed city, and to meet, besides, the indignation of his fellow-citizens, so well deserved by the generals collectively. Accordingly he resolved to take shelter with Evagoras, prince of Salamis, in the island of Cyprus, sending the Paralus to make known the fatal news at Athens. But before he went thither, he crossed the strait to Cape Abarnis in the territory of Lampsakus, where the great sails of Lysander's triremes (always taken out when a trireme was made ready for fighting) lay seemingly unguarded. These sails he took away, so as to lessen the enemy's powers of pursuit, and then made the best of his way to Cyprus³.

The captured ships were towed off, and the prisoners carried across, to Lampsakus, where a general assembly of the victorious allies was convened, to determine in what manner the prisoners should be treated. In this assembly the most bitter inculpatations were put forth against the Athenians, as to the manner in which they had recently dealt with their captives. The Athenian general Philoklēs, having captured a Corinthian and an Andrian trireme, had put the crews to death by hurling them headlong from a precipice. Some speakers affirmed that the Athenians had determined that they would cut off the right hands of all who were captured. All the Athenian prisoners captured at Ægospotami, 3,000 or 4,000 in number, were massacred forthwith⁴.

Never was a victory more complete in itself, more overwhelming in its consequences, or more thoroughly disgraceful to the defeated generals taken collectively, than that of Ægospotami. Whether it was in reality very glorious to Lysander, is doubtful; for the general belief afterwards—not merely at Athens, but seemingly in other parts of Greece also—held that the Athenian fleet had been sold to perdition by the treason of some of its own commanders. Of such a suspicion both Konon and

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 1, 28; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 11; Plutarch, *Alkibiad.*, c. 36; Cornel. Nepos, *Lysand.*, c. 8.

Diodorus (xiii. 106) gives a different representation of this important military operation; far less clear and trustworthy than that of Xenophon.

² Possibly the Athenian ships carried less than the full complement of 200 men: Konon in 406

could only man 70 triremes efficiently. The undermining of the fleet would help to explain the extreme slowness of its movements.—Ed.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 1, 29; Diodor., xiii. 106: the latter is discordant, however, on many points.

⁴ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 1, 32; Pausan., ix. 32, 6; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 13.

Philoklès stand clear. Adeimantus was named as the chief traitor, and Tydeus along with him¹. Konon even preferred an accusation against Adeimantus to this effect,² probably by letter written home from Cyprus, and perhaps by some formal declaration made several years afterwards. when he returned to Athens as victor from the battle of Knidus. The truth of the charge cannot be positively demonstrated, but all the circumstances of the battle tend to render it probable, as well as the fact that Konon alone among all the generals was found in a decent state of preparation. Indeed we may add, that the utter impotence and inertness of the numerous Athenian fleet during the whole summer of 405 B.C., conspire to suggest a similar explanation. Nor could Lysander, master as he was of all the treasures of Cyrus, apply any portion of them more efficaciously than in corrupting one or more of the six Athenian generals, so as to nullify all the energy and ability of Konon.

The great defeat of Ægospotami took place about September 405 B.C. Such a moment of distress and agony had never been experienced at Athens. The wailing and cries of woe, first beginning in Peiræus, were transmitted by the guards stationed on the Long Walls up to the city. 'On that night (says Xenophon) not a man slept; not merely from sorrow for the past calamity, but from terror for the future fate with which they themselves were now menaced, a retribution for what they had themselves inflicted on the Æginetans, Melians, Skionæans, and others.' After this night of misery, they met in public assembly on the following day, resolving to make the best preparations they could for a siege, to put the walls in full state of defence, and to block up two out of the three ports.

Lysander was in no hurry to pass from the Hellespont to Athens. He knew that no farther corn-ships from the Euxine, and few supplies from other quarters, could now reach Athens; and that the power of the city to hold out against blockade must necessarily be very limited, the more limited, the greater the numbers that accumulated within it. Accordingly, he permitted the Athenian garrisons which capitulated, to go only to Athens, and nowhere else. His first measure was to make himself master of Chalkêdon and Byzantium. Next he passed to Lesbos, where as well as in the other cities which now came under his power, he constituted an oligarchy of ten native citizens, chosen from among his most daring partisans, and called a Dekarchy, or Dekadarchy, to govern in conjunction with the Lacedæmonian harmost. Eteonikus was sent to the Thracian cities which had been in dependence on Athens to introduce similar changes. In Thasos, however, this change was stained by much bloodshed. Sanguinary proceedings of the like character, many in the presence of Lysander himself, together with large expulsions of citizens obnoxious to his new dekarchies, signalized everywhere the substitution of Spartan for Athenian ascendancy³. But nowhere, except at Samos, did the citizens or the philo-Athenian party in the cities continue any open hostility, or resist by force Lysander's entrance and his revolutionary changes. At Samos they still held out: the people had

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 1, 32; [Lysias], *Cont. Alcib.*, A., § 38; Pausan., iv. 17, 2; x. 9, 5; Isokratès, *Ad Philipp.*, Or. v., § 70. [Lysias], in his *Λόγος 'Ενυράπιος* (§ 58), speaks of the treason, yet not as a matter of certainty.

Cornelius Nepos (*Lysand.*, c. 1; *Alcib.*, c. 8) notices only the disorder of the Athenian armament, not the corruption of the generals, as having

caused the defeat. Nor does Diodorus notice the corruption (xiii. 105).

Both these authors seem to have copied from Theopompus, in describing the battle of Ægospotami. His description differs on many points from that of Xenophon (*Theopomp. Fragm.*, 8, ed. Didot).

² Demosthen., *De Fals. Legat.*, p. 401, c. 57.

³ Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 13.

too much dread of that oligarchy, whom they had expelled in the insurrection of 412 B.C., to yield without a farther struggle.

The Athenian empire was thus annihilated, and Athens left altogether alone. What was hardly less painful—all her Kleruchs or out-citizens whom she had formerly planted in Ægina, Melos, and elsewhere throughout the islands, as well as in the Chersonese, were now deprived of their properties and driven home¹. The leading philo-Athenians, too, at Thasos, Byzantium, and other dependent cities², were forced to abandon their homes in the like state of destitution, and to seek shelter at Athens. Notwithstanding the pressure of present calamity, however, and yet worse prospects for the future, the Athenians prepared as best they could for an honourable resistance.

It was one of their first measures to provide for the restoration of harmony, and to interest all in the defence of the city, by removing every sort of disability under which individual citizens might now be suffering. All debtors to the state—all official persons now under investigation by the Logistæ or about to be brought before the dikastery on the usual accountability after office—all persons who had been condemned either to total disfranchisement, or to some specific disability—nay, even all those who, having been either members or auxiliaries of the Four Hundred, had stood trial afterwards, and had been condemned to any one of the above-mentioned penalties—all these persons were pardoned and released. From this comprehensive pardon were excepted—Those among the Four Hundred who had fled from Athens without standing their trial—Those who had been condemned either to exile or to death by the Areopagus or any of the other constituted tribunals for homicide, or for subversion of the public liberty. Not merely the public registers of all the condemnations thus released were ordered to be destroyed, but it was forbidden, under severe penalties, to any private citizen to keep a copy of them, or to make any allusion to such misfortunes³.

Pursuant to the comprehensive amnesty adopted by the people, the general body of citizens swore to each other a solemn pledge of mutual harmony in the acropolis⁴. But even the most prudent internal measures could do little for Athens in reference to her capital difficulty—that of procuring subsistence for the numerous population within her walls, augmented every day by outlying garrisons and citizens. She had long been shut out from the produce of Attica by the garrison at Dekeleia: she obtained nothing from Eubœa, and since the late defeat of Ægospotami, nothing from the Euxine, from Thrace or from the islands. Perhaps some corn may still have reached her from Cyprus, and her small remaining navy did what was possible to keep Peiræus supplied⁵; but to accumulate any stock for a siege was utterly impossible.

At length, about November, 405 B.C., Lysander reached the Saronic

¹ Xenoph., *Memorab.*, li. 8, 1; ii. 10, 4; Xenoph., *Sympos.*, iv. 31. Compare Demosthen., *Cont. Leptin.*, c. 24, p. 491.

A great number of new proprietors acquired land in the Chersonese through the Lacedæmonian sway, doubtless in place of these dispossessed Athenians; perhaps by purchase at a low price, but most probably by appropriation without purchase (Xenoph., *Hellen.*, iv. 8, 5).

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, i. 2, 1; Demosthen., *Cont. Leptin.*, c. 14, p. 474. Ekphantus and the other Thasian exiles received the grant of *ἀρίστεα*, or

immunity from the peculiar charges imposed upon metics at Athens.

³ This interesting decree or psephism of Patrokleïdēs is given at length in the Oration of Andokidēs, *De Mysteriis*, §§ 76-80.

⁴ Andokid., *De Myst.*, § 76.

⁵ Isokratēs, *Adv. Callimachum*, § 71; compare Andokidēs, *De Reditu Suo*, § 21, and Lysias, *Cont. Diogeiton*, Or. xxxii., § 22, about Cyprus and the Chersonese, as ordinary sources of supply of corn to Athens.

Gulf. The full Lacedæmonian and Peloponnesian force (all except the Argeians), under King Pausanias, was marched into Attica to meet him, and encamped at the gates of Athens; while Lysander, first coming to Ægina with his overwhelming fleet of 150 sail, blocked up completely the harbour of Peiræus. It was one of his first measures to collect together the remnant which he could find of the Æginetan and Melian populations, whom Athens had expelled and destroyed, and to restore to them the possession of their ancient islands.

Though all hope had now fled, the pride and the despair of Athens still enabled her citizens to bear up; nor was it until some men actually began to die of hunger that they sent propositions to entreat peace. They proposed to Agis to become allies of Sparta, retaining their walls entire and their fortified harbour of Peiræus. Agis referred the envoys to the Ephors at Sparta, to whom he at the same time transmitted a statement of their propositions. But the Ephors, not deigning even to admit the envoys to an interview, sent messengers to meet them at Sellasia on the frontier of Laconia, desiring that they would go back and come again prepared with something more admissible—and acquainting them at the same time that no proposition could be received which did not include the demolition of the Long Walls, for a continuous length of ten stadia. Notwithstanding all the suffering in the city, the [council] and people would not consent to take such humiliating terms into consideration. A councillor named Archestratus, who advised that they should be accepted, was placed in custody, and a general vote was passed¹, on the proposition of Kleophon, forbidding any such motion in future.

Under these circumstances, Theramenès offered to go as envoy to Lysander and Sparta, affirming that he should be able to detect what the real intention of the Ephors was in regard to Athens,—whether they really intended to root out the population and sell them as slaves. He pretended farther to possess personal influence, founded on circumstances which he could not divulge, such as would very probably ensure a mitigation of the doom. He was accordingly sent, in spite of strong protest from the senate of Areopagus and others; yet with no express powers to conclude, but simply to inquire and report. We hear with astonishment that he remained more than three months as companion of Lysander, who (he alleged) had detained him thus long, and had only acquainted him, after the fourth month had begun, that no one but the Ephors had any power to grant peace. It seems to have been the object of Theramenès, by this long delay, to wear out the patience of the Athenians, and to bring them into such a state of intolerable suffering that they would submit to any terms of peace which would only bring provisions into the town. In this scheme he completely succeeded; and considering how great were the privations of the people even at the moment of his departure, it is not easy to understand how they could have been able to sustain protracted and increasing famine for three months longer².

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 2, 12-15; Lysias, *Cont. Agorat.*, §§ 10-12.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 2, 16; Lysias, *Orat.* xiii., *Cont. Agorat.*, §§ 9-12; Lysias, *Orat.* xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, §§ 65-71.

See an illustration of the great suffering during the siege, in Xenophon, *Apolog. Socrat.*, § 18.

[The accounts of Lysias and of Xenophon concerning Theramenès' manoeuvres do not appear very trustworthy. The accusations in Lysias bear all the marks of unscrupulous party statement, in which Theramenès becomes a quite impossible monster.

Xenophon makes the astounding assertion that

We make out little that is distinct respecting these last moments of imperial Athens. Amidst the general acrimony, and exasperated special antipathies, arising out of such a state of misery, the leading men who stood out most earnestly for prolonged resistance became successively victims to the prosecutions of their enemies. The demagogue Kleophon was condemned and put to death, on the accusation of having evaded his military duty; the [council], whose temper and proceedings he had denounced, constituting itself a portion of the *Dikastery* which tried him—contrary both to the forms and the spirit of Athenian judicatures¹. Such proceedings, however, though denounced by orators in subsequent years as having contributed to betray the city into the hands of the enemy, appear to have been without any serious influence on the result, which was brought about purely by famine.

By the time that Theramenes returned after his long absence, so terrible had the pressure become that he was sent forth again with instructions to conclude peace upon any terms. On reaching Sellasia, and acquainting the Ephors that he brought with him unlimited powers for peace, he was permitted to come to Sparta, where the assembly of the Peloponnesian confederacy was convened, to settle on what terms peace should be granted. The leading allies, especially Corinthians and Thebans, recommended that no agreement should be entered into, nor any farther measure kept, with this hated enemy now in their power; but that the name of Athens should be rooted out, and the population sold for slaves. Many of the other allies seconded the same views, which would have probably commanded a majority, had it not been for the resolute opposition of the Lacedæmonians themselves, who declared unequivocally that they would never consent to annihilate or enslave a city which had rendered such capital service to all Greece at the time of the great common danger from the Persians². Lysander farther calculated on so dealing with Athens, as to make her into a dependency, and an instrument of increased power to Sparta apart from her allies. Peace was accordingly granted on the following conditions: That the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Peiræus should be destroyed: That the Athenians should evacuate all their foreign possessions, and confine themselves to their own territory: That they should surrender all their ships of war: That they

before the Athenians asked for terms, provisions had *entirely* given out (*Hellen.*, ii. 2, 11), and yet Theramenes subsequently waited for three months *pending the exhaustion of supplies*. Moreover, he represents Theramenes as staying with Lysander, whereas Lysias (*C. Agorat.*, § 11) says he spent the time at Sparta. This latter version is the more likely, since the Athenians would surely not have waited three months for an informal report of Theramenes from Lysander's camp, but would have superseded him in his mission.

The probable explanation of the whole story is that it took some time to convoke the congress at Sparta and to debate upon the terms of peace, and that this delay was utilized (whether at the prompting of Theramenes, of Lysander, or of the ephors, we cannot say) to concert with the Athenian commissioner about the constitutional reforms to be applied at Athens.—*Ed.*

¹ Lysias, *Orat. xliii. Cont. Agorat.*, §§ 15, 16, 37; *Orat. xxx., Cont. Nikomach.*, §§ 13-17.

This seems the most probable story as to the death of Kleophon, though the accounts are not all consistent, and the statement of Xenophon, especially (*Hellen.*, i. 7, 35), is not to be reconciled

with Lysias. Xenophon conceived Kleophon as having perished earlier than this period, in a sedition (*στάσις τινος γενομένης ἐν ἡ Κλεοφῶν ἀνέβη*), before the flight of Kallixenus from his recognisances. It is scarcely possible that Kallixenus could have been still under recognisance, during this period of suffering between the battle of *Ægospotami* and the capture of Athens. He must have escaped before that battle. Neither long detention of an accused party in prison, before trial—nor long postponement of trial when he was under recognisance—was at all in Athenian habits.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 2, 19; vi. 5, 35-46; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 15.

It seems from Diodor., xv. 63, and Polyæn., i. 45, 5, as well as from some passages in Xenophon himself, that the motives of the Lacedæmonians, in thus resisting the proposition of the Thebans against Athens, were founded in policy more than in generosity.

[Yet this leniency is quite in accord with the traditional attitude of the home authorities at Sparta with regard to Athens. Cf. p. 467, n. 1.—*Ed.*]

should re-admit all their exiles: That they should become allies of Sparta, following her leadership both by sea and land, and recognising the same enemies and friends¹.

With this document Theramenes went back to Athens. When he announced in the assembly the terms of which he was bearer, strongly recommending submission to the Lacedæmonians as the only course now open—there was still a high-spirited minority who entered their protest, and preferred death by famine to such insupportable disgrace. The large majority, however, accepted them, and the acceptance was made known to Lysander².

It was about the beginning of April that this victorious commander sailed into the Peiræus—twenty-seven years (almost exactly) after that surprise of Plataea by the Thebans, which opened the Peloponnesian war. Along with him came the Athenian exiles, several of whom appeared to have been serving with his army³, and assisting him with their counsel. The Lacedæmonians, both naval and military force, under Lysander and Agis, continued in occupation of Athens until the conditions of the peace had been fulfilled. All the triremes in Peiræus were carried away by Lysander, except twelve, which he permitted the Athenians to retain: the Ephors had left it to his discretion what number he would thus allow⁴. The unfinished ships in the dockyards were burnt, and the arsenals themselves ruined⁵. To demolish the Long Walls and the fortifications of Peiræus, was, however, a work of some time; and a certain number of days were granted to the Athenians, within which it was required to be completed. In the beginning of the work, the Lacedæmonians and their allies all lent a hand, with the full pride and exultation of conquerors; amidst women playing the flute and dancers crowned with wreaths; mingled with joyful exclamations from the Peloponnesian allies, that this was the first day of Grecian freedom⁶. But the business was not completed within the interval named, so that the Athenians did not come up to the letter of the conditions, and had therefore by strict construction forfeited their title to the peace granted⁷. The interval seems, however, to have been prolonged.

It appears that Lysander, after assisting at the solemn ceremony of beginning to demolish the walls, withdrew with a portion of his fleet to undertake the siege of Samos, which still held out, leaving the remainder to see that the conditions imposed were fulfilled⁸.

Among the exiles who returned to Athens were comprised Chariklès, who had been so distinguished for his violence in the investigation respecting the Hermæ—and another man, of whom we now for the first time obtain historical knowledge in detail—Kritias. He had been among the persons accused as having been concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ, and seems to have been for a long time important in the political, the

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 2, 20; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 14; Diodor., xiii. 107.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 2, 23. Lysias (Orat. xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, § 71) lays the blame of this wretched and humiliating peace upon Theramenes, who plainly ought not to be required to bear it: compare Lysias, Orat. xiii., *Cont. Agorat.*, §§ 12-20.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 2, 18.

⁴ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 2, 20—ii. 3, 8; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 14.

⁵ Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 15; Lysias, *Cont. Agorat.*, § 50.

⁶ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 2, 23; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 15.

⁷ Lysias, *Cont. Eratosth.*, Or. xii., § 75, p. 431 R; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 15; Diodor., xiv. 3.

⁸ Lysander dedicated a golden crown to Athênê in the acropolis—which is recorded in the inscriptions among the articles belonging to the goddess.

See Boeckh, *Corp. Inscr. Attic.*, Nos. 150-152, p. 235. [C. I. A. ii. 652 A, l. 30.—ED.]

literary, and the philosophical world of Athens. His wealth was large, and his family among the most ancient and conspicuous in Athens. He was himself maternal uncle of the philosopher Plato¹, and had frequented the society of Sokratēs so much as to have his name intimately associated in the public mind with that remarkable man. We know neither the cause, nor even the date of his exile, except so far, as that he was not in banishment immediately after the revolution of the Four Hundred—and that he *was* in banishment at the time when the generals were condemned after the battle of Arginusæ². He had passed the time, or a part of the time, of his exile in Thessaly, where he took an active part in the sanguinary feuds carried on among the oligarchical parties of that lawless country. He is said to have embraced what passed for the democratical side in Thessaly, arming the Penestæ, or serfs, against their masters³.

As soon as the city surrendered, and while the work of demolition was yet going on, the oligarchical party began to organize itself. The members of the political clubs again came together, and named a managing committee of Five, called Ephors in compliment to the Lacedæmonians, to direct the general proceedings of the party, and to determine what propositions were to be submitted to the public assembly⁴. Among these five Ephors were Kritias and Eratosthenēs.

But the oligarchical party, with a compliant [council] and a dispirited people, and with an auxiliary enemy actually in possession—still thought themselves not powerful enough to carry their intended changes without seizing the most resolute of the democratical leaders.⁵ Accordingly Strombichidēs, together with several others of the democratical generals and taxiarchs, were accused of being concerned in a conspiracy to break up the peace, and the patriots were put into prison, to stand their trial afterwards before a dikastery consisting of 2,000 members.

(A citizen named Drakontidēs⁶ now moved that a Board of Thirty should be named, to draw up laws for the future government of the city, and to manage provisionally the public affairs, until that task should be completed.) Among the thirty persons proposed, the most prominent names were those of Kritias and Theramenēs.)

Having seen the Thirty regularly constituted, Lysander retired from Athens to finish the siege of Samos, which still held out. Though blocked up both by land and sea, the Samians obstinately defended themselves for some months longer until the close of the summer. It was not until the last extremity that they capitulated, obtaining permission for every freeman to depart in safety. Lysander handed over the city and the

¹ Kritias is introduced as taking a conspicuous part in four of the Platonic dialogues—*Protagoras*, *Charmidēs*, *Timæus*, and *Kritias* (the last, as it now exists, only a fragment)—not to mention the *Eryxias*.

About the concern of Kritias in the mutilation of the Hermæ, as affirmed by Diognētus, see Andokidēs, *De Mysteriis*, § 47. He was first cousin of Andokidēs by the mother's side.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 35.
[The most probable date is 407; cf. n. 1, p. 744.—Ed.]

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 35; *Memorab.*, i. 2, 24.

⁴ Lysias, *Cont. Eratosth.*, Or. xii., § 44, p. 124.

⁵ Lysias, *Cont. Agorath.*, Or. xiii., § 28 (p. 132)—§ 35, p. 133.

Lysias represents the accusation of the generals, and this behaviour of Agoratus, as having occurred

before the surrender of the city, but after the return of Theramenēs bringing back the final terms imposed by the Lacedæmonians.

Without questioning generally the matters of fact set forth by Lysias in this oration (delivered a long time afterwards, see § 90), I believe that he *misdates* them, and represents them as having occurred *before* the surrender, whereas they really occurred *after* it. We know from Xenophon, that when Theramenēs came back the second time with the real peace, the people were in such a state of famine, that farther waiting was impossible: the peace was accepted immediately that it was proposed; cruel as it was, the people were glad to get it (Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 2, 22).

⁶ Lysias, *Cont. Eratosth.*, Or. xii., § 74; compare Aristotle *ap. Schol. ad Aristophan.*, *Vesp.*, 157. [See also Appendix.—Ed.]

properties to the ancient citizens—that is, to the oligarchy and their partisans who had been partly expelled, partly disfranchised, in the revolution eight years before. But he placed the government of Samos, as he had dealt with the other cities, in the hands of one of his Dekarchies, or oligarchy of ten Samians chosen by himself, leaving Thorax as Lacedæmonian harmost, and doubtless a force under him.

Having thus finished the war, and trodden out the last spark of resistance, Lysander returned in triumph to Sparta. So imposing a triumph never fell to the lot of any Greek, either before or afterwards. He brought with him every trireme out of the harbour of Peiræus, except twelve left to the Athenians as a concession: he brought the prow-ornaments of all the ships captured at Ægospotami and elsewhere: he was loaded with golden crowns, voted to him by the various cities: and he farther exhibited a sum of money not less than 470 talents, the remnant of those treasures which Cyrus had handed over to him for the prosecution of the war. That sum had been greater, but is said to have been diminished by the treachery of Gylippus, to whose custody it had been committed, and who sullied by such mean peculation the laurels which he had so gloriously earned at Syracuse¹. He wielded besides an extent of real power greater than any individual Greek either before or after. Imperial Sparta—as she had now become—was as it were personified in Lysander, who was master of almost all the insular Asiatic and Thracian cities, by means of the harmosts and the native Dekarchies named by himself and selected from his creatures.

The Thirty men at Athens—the parallel of the Dekarchies whom Lysander had constituted in the other cities—were intended for the same purpose, to maintain the city in a state of dependence upon Lacedæmon, and upon Lysander as the representative of Lacedæmon. (Though appointed, in the pretended view of drawing up a scheme of laws and constitution for Athens, they were in no hurry to commence this duty.) They appointed a new [Boulê], composed of compliant persons, including many of the returned exiles who had been formerly in the Four Hundred, and many also of the preceding [councillors] who were willing to serve their designs². They farther named new magistrates and officers; a new Board of Eleven, to manage the business of police and the public force; a Board of Ten, to govern in Peiræus; an archon to give name to the year, Pythodôrus. While thus securing their own ascendancy, they began by professing reforming principles of the strictest virtue, denouncing the abuses of the past democracy, and announcing their determination to purge the city of evil-doers³.

In execution of their design to root out evil-doers, the Thirty first laid hands on some of the most obnoxious politicians under the former democracy—men (says Xenophon) whom everyone knew to live by making calumnious accusations (called Sycophancy), and who were pronounced in their enmity to the oligarchical citizens'. Among them were comprised Strombichidês and the other democratical officers who had been imprisoned under the information of Agoratus, men whose chief crime consisted of a strenuous attachment to the democracy. The persons thus seized were brought to trial before the new Council appointed

¹ Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 16; Diodor., xlii. 106.

² Lysias, *Orat.* xii. *Cont. Eratosth.*, § 5, p.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 2, 11; Lysias, *Cont.* 121.

Agorat., *Orat.* xlii., §§ 23-30.

by the Thirty—contrary to the vote of the people, which had decreed that Strombichidēs and his companions should be tried before a dikastery of 2,000 citizens. But the dikastery, as well as all the other democratical institutions, were now abrogated, and no judicial body was left except the newly constituted Boulē. Whenever prisoners were tried, the Thirty were themselves present in the Council-house, sitting on the benches previously occupied by the Prytanes, and each [councillor] was required to deposit his pebble openly before them. Among the great numbers whom the Thirty brought before the Boulē, not a single man was acquitted except the informer Agoratus, who was brought to trial as an accomplice along with Strombichides and his companions, but was liberated in recompense for the information which he had given against them¹.

As yet, since all the persons condemned (justly or unjustly) had been marked politicians,—so, all other citizens who had taken no conspicuous part in politics, even if they disapproved of the condemnations, had not been led to conceive any apprehension of the like fate for themselves. Here Theramenēs, and along with him a portion of the Thirty as well as of the Boulē, were inclined to pause. They conceived the government to be securely established, and contended that farther bloodshed would only endanger its stability, by spreading alarm and alienating friends as well as neutrals.

But these were not the views either of Kritias or of the Thirty generally, who surveyed their position with eyes very different from Theramenēs, and had brought with them from exile a long arrear of vengeance yet to be appeased. In spite of the opposition of Theramenēs, envoys were despatched to Sparta to solicit aid from Lysander, who procured for them a Lacedæmonian garrison under Kallibius as harmost, which they engaged to maintain without any cost to Sparta, until their government should be confirmed by putting the evil-doers out of the way². They had thus a Lacedæmonian military force constantly at their command, besides an organized band of youthful satellites and assassins, ready for any deeds of violence; and they proceeded to seize and put to death many citizens, who were so distinguished for their courage and patriotism, as to be likely to serve as leaders to the public discontent. Several of the best men in Athens thus successively perished, while Thrasybulus, Anytus, and many others, fearing a similar fate, fled out of Attica, leaving their property to be confiscated and appropriated by the oligarchs, who passed a decree of exile against them in their absence, as well as against Alkibiadēs³.

These acts of violence were warmly opposed by Theramenēs. The persons hitherto executed (he said) had deserved their death because they were not merely noted politicians under the democracy, but also persons of marked hostility to oligarchical men. But to inflict the same fate on others, who had manifested no such hostility, simply because they had enjoyed influence under the democracy would be unjust. It was not merely the less obnoxious democratical politicians who became their victims, but men of courage, wealth, and station, in every vein of political feeling: even oligarchical men, the best and most high-principled of that party, shared the same fate. Among the most distinguished sufferers were a

¹ Lysias, *Cont. Agorat.*, § 41.

² *Ath. Pol.* (c. 37) represents the summoning of the Spartan garrison as subsequent to the death of Theramenēs. This seems the more probable version, since the Thirty had no real need for a

foreign force until they had decided to carry on their government without the support of the bulk of the community.—*Ed.*

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 42—ii. 4, 14; Isokratēs, *Orat.* xvi., *De Bigis*, § 46, p. 335.

wealthy man named Antiphon, who had devoted his fortune to the public service with exemplary patriotism during the last years of the war; Leon of Salamis; and Nikeratus (son of Nikias) a man who inherited from his father not only a large fortune, but a known repugnance to democratical politics, together with his uncle Eukratês, brother of the same Nikias¹.

The circumstances accompanying the seizure of Leon deserve particular notice. In putting to death him and the other victims, the Thirty had several objects in view. First, they thus got rid of citizens generally known and esteemed, whom they feared as likely to head the public sentiment against them. Secondly, the property of these victims, all of whom were rich, was seized along with their persons. But in the work of seizing their victims, they not only employed the hands of paid satellites, but also sent along with them citizens of station and respectability. By such participation, these citizens became compromised and imbrued in crime, and as it were, consenting parties in the public eye to all the projects of the Thirty². Pursuant to their general plan of implicating unwilling citizens in their misdeeds, the Thirty sent for five citizens to the Government-house, and ordered them to cross over to Salamis and bring back Leon as prisoner. Four out of the five obeyed: the fifth was the philosopher Sokratês, who refused all concurrence and returned to his own house.

All these circumstances furnished ample material for the vehement opposition of Theramenês, and tended to increase his party, not indeed among the Thirty themselves, but to a certain extent in the Boulê, and still more among the body of the citizens. He warned his colleagues that they were incurring daily an increased amount of public odium, and that their government could not possibly stand, unless they admitted into partnership an adequate number of citizens, having direct interests in its maintenance. He proposed that all those competent by their property to serve the state either on horseback or with heavy armour, should be constituted citizens, leaving all the poorer freemen disfranchised. Kritias and the Thirty rejected this proposition, being doubtless convinced—as the Four Hundred had felt seven years before, when Theramenês demanded of them to convert their fictitious total of Five Thousand into a real list of as many living persons—that ‘to enrol so great a number of partners, was tantamount to a downright democracy’. But they were at the same time not insensible to the soundness of his advice: moreover they began to be afraid of him personally, and to suspect that he was likely to take the lead in a popular opposition against them, as he had previously done against his colleagues of the Four Hundred. They therefore resolved to comply in part with his recommendations, and prepared a list of 3,000 persons to be invested with the political franchise, chosen, as much as possible, from their own known partisans and from oligarchical citizens. Besides this body they also counted on the adherence of the Horsemen, among the wealthiest citizens of the state. What privileges or functions were assigned to the chosen 3,000 we do not hear, except that they could not be condemned without the warrant of the [council], while any other Athenian might be put to death by the simple fiat of the Thirty³.

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 39-41; Lysias, *Orat.* xviii., *De Bonis Nicia Fratribus*, §§ 5 8.

² Plato, *Apol. Socr.*, c. 20, p. 32.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 51.

A body of partners thus chosen—not merely of fixed number, but of picked oligarchical sentiments—was by no means the addition which Theramenès desired. While he commented on the folly of supposing that there was any charm in the number 3,000, he admonished them that it was still insufficient for their defence: their rule was one of pure force, and yet inferior in force to those over whom it was exercised. Again the Thirty acted upon his admonition, but in a way very different from that which he contemplated. They proclaimed a general muster, and examination of arms, to all the hoplites in Athens. The 3,000 were drawn up in arms altogether in the market-place; but the remaining hoplites were disseminated in small scattered companies and in different places. After the review was over, these scattered companies went home to their meal, leaving their arms piled at the various places of muster. But the adherents of the Thirty, having been forewarned and kept together, were sent at the proper moment, along with the Lacedæmonian mercenaries, to seize the deserted arms, which were deposited under the custody of Kallibius in the acropolis¹.

Kritias and his colleagues, now relieved from all fear either of Theramenès, or of any other internal opposition, gave loose, more unsparingly than ever, to their malevolence and rapacity, putting to death both many of their private enemies, and many rich victims for the purpose of spoliation. A list of suspected persons was drawn up, in which each of their adherents was allowed to insert such names as he chose, and from which the victims were generally taken².

It was in execution of such schemes that the orator Lysias and his brother Polemarchus were both taken into custody. Both were metics, wealthy men, and engaged in a manufactory of shields, wherein they employed 120 slaves. Theognis and Peison, with some others, seized Lysias in his house, while entertaining some friends at dinner, and having driven away his guests, left him under the guard of Peison, sending their attendants to register and appropriate his valuable slaves. The prisoner availed himself of an unguarded moment to escape. Having first obtained refuge in the house of a friend in Peiræus, he took boat during the ensuing night for Megara. Polemarchus, less fortunate, was seized in the street by Eratosthenès, one of the Thirty, and immediately lodged in the prison, where the fatal draught of hemlock was administered to him, without delay, without trial, and without liberty of defence³.

In proposing the late seizure of the metics, the Thirty had desired Theramenès to make choice of any victim among that class, to be destroyed and plundered for his own personal benefit. But he rejected the suggestion emphatically, denouncing the enormity of the measure in the indignant terms which it deserved. So great was the antipathy of Kritias and the majority of the Thirty against him, so much did they fear the consequences of incurring the obloquy of such measures for themselves, while Theramenès enjoyed all the credit of opposing them, that they resolved to destroy him at all cost. Having canvassed as many of the

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 20, 41: compare Lysias, *Orat.* xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, § 41.

[*Ath. Pol.* (c. 37) places this event after Theramenès' execution, and immediately before the arrival of the Lacedæmonian garrison. The reason for preferring this account is given above, note 2, p. 774.—Ed.]

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 21; Isokratès, *Adv.*

Euthyrum, § 5, p. 401; Isokratès, *Cont. Kallimach.*, § 23, p. 375; Lysias, *Or.* xxv., *Δημ. Καταλ. Ἀπολ.*, § 21, p. 173.

³ Lysias, *Or.* xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, §§ 8, 21. Lysias prosecuted Eratosthenès before the dikastery some years afterwards, as having caused the death of Polemarchus.

[councillors] as they could, to persuade them that Theramenês was conspiring against the oligarchy, they caused the most daring of their satellites to attend one day in the [council]-house, close to the railing which fenced in the senators, with daggers concealed under their garments. So soon as Theramenês appeared, Kritias rose and denounced him to the Boulê as a public enemy, in an harangue which Xenophon gives at considerable length.

'If any of you imagine that more people are perishing than the occasion requires, reflect, that this happens everywhere in a time of revolution—and that it must especially happen in the establishment of an oligarchy at Athens, the most populous city in Greece, and where the population has been longest accustomed to freedom. You know as well as we do, that democracy is to both of us an intolerable government, as well as incompatible with all steady adherence to our protectors the Lacedæmonians. It is under their auspices that we are establishing the present oligarchy, and that we destroy, as far as we can, every man who stands in the way of it; which becomes most of all indispensable, if such a man be found among our own body. Here stands the man—Theramenês—whom we now denounce to you as your foe not less than ours. That such is the fact, is plain from his unmeasured censures on our proceedings, from the difficulties which he throws in our way whenever we want to despatch any of the demagogues. Had such been his policy from the beginning, he would indeed have been our enemy, yet we could not with justice have proclaimed him a villain. But it is he who first originated the alliance which binds us to Sparta—who struck the first blow at the democracy—who chiefly instigated us to put to death the first batch of accused persons; and now, when you as well as we have thus incurred the manifest hatred of the people, he turns round and quarrels with our proceedings, in order to ensure his own safety, and leave us to pay the penalty. He must be dealt with not only as an enemy, but as a traitor to you as well as to us. Though he enjoyed through his father Hagnon a station of honour under the democracy, he was foremost in subverting it, and getting up the Four Hundred: the moment he saw that oligarchy beset with difficulties, he was the first to put himself at the head of the people against them. He has well earned his surname of 'The Buskin,' fitting both legs, but constant to neither: he has shown himself reckless both of honour and friendship, looking to nothing but his own selfish advancement; and it is for us now to guard against his doublings, in order that he may not play us the same trick. We cite him before you as a conspirator and a traitor, against you as well as against us.'

Theramenês was probably not wholly unprepared for some such attack as this. At any rate he rose up to reply to it at once:

'I agree with Kritias, indeed, that whoever wishes to cut short your government, and strengthens those who conspire against you, deserves justly the severest punishment. But to whom does this charge best apply? To him, or to me? Look at the behaviour of each of us, and then judge for yourselves. At first we were all agreed, so far as the condemnation of the known and obnoxious demagogues. But when Kritias and his friends began to seize men of station and dignity, then it was that I began to oppose them. The man who gives you this advice, and gives it you openly, is he a traitor—or is he not rather a genuine

friend? It is you and your supporters, Kritias, who by your murders and robberies strengthen the enemies of the government and betray your friends. Depend upon it, that Thrasybulus and Anytus are much better pleased with your policy than they would be with mine. You accuse me of having betrayed the Four Hundred; but I did not desert them until they were themselves on the point of betraying Athens to her enemies. You call me the 'Buskin,' as trying to fit both parties. But what am I to call you, who fit neither of them, who under the democracy were the most violent hater of the people—and who under the oligarchy have become equally violent as a hater of oligarchical merit? I am, and always have been, Kritias, an enemy both to extreme democracy and to oligarchical tyranny. I desire to constitute our political community out of those who can serve it on horseback and with heavy armour:—I have proposed this once, and I still stand to it. I side not either with democrats or despots, to the exclusion of the dignified citizens. Prove that I am now, or ever have been, guilty of such crime, and I shall confess myself deserving of ignominious death.'

This reply of Theraménês was received with such a shout of applause by the majority, as showed that they were resolved to acquit him. But Kritias directed the Eleven with the body of armed satellites to press close on the railing, while the court was filled with the mercenary hoplites. Having thus got his force in hand, Kritias returned and again addressed the Boulê: 'I think it the duty of a good president, when he sees his friends around him duped, not to let them follow their own counsel. This is what I am now going to do: indeed, these men, whom you see pressing upon us from without, tell us plainly that they will not tolerate the acquittal of one manifestly working to the ruin of the oligarchy. It is an article of our new constitution, that no man of the Select Three Thousand shall be condemned without your vote; but that any man not included in that list may be condemned by the Thirty. Now I take upon me, with the concurrence of all my colleagues, to strike this Theraménês out of that list; and we, by our authority, condemn him to death'¹.

Theraménês sprang at once to the sanctuary in the interior of the house. The Eleven advanced into the Boulê, and went straight up to the altar, from whence Satyrus dragged him by main force.

He was conveyed to prison, where the usual draught of hemlock was speedily administered. After he had swallowed it, there remained a drop at the bottom of the cup, which he jerked out on the floor (according to the playful convivial practice called the Kottabus, which was supposed to furnish an omen by its sound in falling, and after which the person who had just drunk handed the goblet to the guest whose turn came next)—'Let this (said he) be for the gentle Kritias'².

The scene just described, which ended in the execution of Theraménês, is one of the most striking in ancient history; in spite of the bald and meagre way in which it is recounted by Xenophon, who has thrown all the interest into the two speeches. The atrocious injustice by which Theraménês perished—as well as the courage and self-possession which he dis-

¹ Although Xenophon may have been an eye-witness of this debate, his account of Kritias' action seems less probable than that of *Ath. Pol.* (c. 37), where Kritias proposes two measures: (1) that the Thirty should have power of life and death over others than the Three Thousand; (2) that from this latter body all persons should be

excluded who had opposed the fortification of Eetioneia or the other actions of the Four Hundred in 411. This statement is no doubt derived through the medium of an *Atthis* from an official copy of these enactments.—Ed.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 56.

played at the moment of danger, and his cheerfulness even in the prison, not inferior to that of Sokratēs three years afterwards—naturally enlist the sympathies of the reader in his favour, and have tended to exalt the positive estimation of his character. During the years immediately succeeding the restoration of the democracy¹, he was extolled and pitied as one of the first martyrs to oligarchical violence².

All open manifestation of dissent being now silenced, the Thirty proceeded to the uttermost limits of tyranny. They made proclamation that every one not included in the list of Three Thousand should depart without the walls, in order that they might be undisturbed masters within the city—a policy before resorted to by Periander of Corinth and other Grecian despots³. The numerous fugitives expelled by this order distributed themselves partly in Peiræus, partly in the various demes of Attica. Both in one and the other, however, they were seized by order of the Thirty, and many of them put to death, in order that their substance and lands might be appropriated either by the Thirty themselves or by some favoured partisan. The subsequent orators affirmed that more than 1,500 victims were put to death without trial by the Thirty⁴: on this numerical estimate little stress is to be laid, but the total was doubtless prodigious. It became more and more plain that no man was safe in Attica, so that Athenian emigrants, many in great poverty and destitution, were multiplied throughout the neighbouring territories—in Megara, Thebes, Orôpus, Chalkis, Argos, etc.⁵. It was not everywhere that these distressed persons could obtain reception, for the Lacedæmonian government, at the instance of the Thirty, issued an edict prohibiting all the members of their confederacy from harbouring fugitive Athenians, an edict which these cities generously disobeyed⁶, though probably the smaller Peloponnesian cities complied. Without doubt this decree was procured by Lysander, while his influence still continued unimpaired.

But it was not only against the lives, properties, and liberties, of Athenian citizens that the Thirty made war. They were not less solicitous to extinguish the intellectual force and education of the city, a project so perfectly in harmony both with the sentiment and practice of Sparta, that they counted on the support of their foreign allies. Among the ordinances which they promulgated was one, expressly forbidding everyone⁷ 'to teach the art of words'. The edict of the Thirty was in fact a general suppression of the higher class of teachers or professors, above the rank of the elementary (teacher of letters or) grammarist. If such an edict could have been maintained in force for a generation, combined with the other mandates of the Thirty—the city out of which

¹ See Lysias, Or. xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, § 66.

² Diodor., xiv. 5. Diodorus tells us that Sokratēs and two of his friends were the only persons who stood forward to protect Theramēnēs, when Satyrus was dragging him from the altar. [Plutarch] (*Vit. X. Orat.*, p. 836) ascribes the same act of generous forwardness to *Isokratēs*. There is no good ground for believing it, either of one or of the other.

Compare Cicero about the death of Theramēnēs (*Tuscul. Disp.*, i. 40, 96). His admiration for the manner of death of Theramēnēs doubtless contributed to make him rank that Athenian with Themistoklēs and Periklēs (*De Orat.*, iii. 16, 59). Aristotle too [*Ath. Pol.*, c. 28, quoted by Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 2] speaks with esteem of Theramēnēs, ranking him in the same general category with Nikias and Thukydides (son of Melesias),

though with considerable deduction and blame on the score of duplicity.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 4, 1; Lysias, Orat. xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, § 97; Orat. xxxi., *Cont. Philon.*, §§ 8, 9; Herakleid. Pontic., c. 5; Diogen. Laert., i. 98.

⁴ *Æschinēs, Fals. Legat.*, c. 24, p. 266, and *Cont. Ktesiph.*, c. 86, p. 455; *Isokratēs, Or. iv., Panegy.*, § 131; Or. vii., *Areopag.*, § 76.

⁵ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 4, 1; Diodor., xiv. 6; Lysias, Or. xxiv., § 28; Or. xxxi., *Cont. Philon.*, § 10.

⁶ Lysias, Or. xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, §§ 98, 99—*παντράχοθεν ἐκικνηνυτόμενοι*; Plutarch, *Lysand.*, c. 99; Diodor., xiv. 6; Demosth., *De Rhod. Libert.*, c. 10.

⁷ Xenoph., *Memor.*, i. 2, 31: *Καὶ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ἐγράψαι, λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν.*—*Isokratēs, Cont. Sophist.*, Or. xiii., § 12: *τὴν παιδείαν τὴν τῶν λόγων.*

Sophoklēs and Euripidēs had just died, and in which Plato and Isokratēs were in vigorous age, would have been degraded to the intellectual level of the meanest community in Greece. It was not uncommon for a Grecian despot to suppress all those assemblies wherein youths came together for the purpose of common training; either intellectual or gymnastic, as well as the public banquets and clubs or associations,—as being dangerous to his authority, tending to elevation of courage, and to a consciousness of political rights among the citizens¹.

Their dominion continued, without any armed opposition made to it, for about eight months from the capture of Athens by Lysander—that is, from about April to December 404 B.C. The measure of their iniquity then became full. During these important eight months, the general feeling throughout Greece had become materially different both towards Athens and towards Sparta. At the moment when the long war was first brought to a close—fear, antipathy, and vengeance against Athens had been the reigning sentiments, both among the confederates of Sparta and among the revolted members of the extinct Athenian empire; a sentiment which prevailed among them indeed to a greater degree than among the Spartans themselves—who resisted it, and granted to Athens a capitulation at a time when many of their allies pressed for the harshest measures. To this resolution they were determined partly by the still remaining force of ancient sympathy—partly by the odium which would have been sure to follow the act of expelling the Athenian population, however it might be talked of beforehand as a meet punishment—partly too by the policy of Lysander, who contemplated the keeping of Athens in the same dependence on Sparta and on himself as the other outlying cities in which he had planted his Dekarchies.

So soon as Athens was humbled, deprived of her fleet and walled port, and rendered innocuous—the great bond of common fear which had held the allies to Sparta disappeared; and while the paramount antipathy on the part of those allies towards Athens gradually died away, a sentiment of jealousy and apprehension of Sparta sprang up in its place, on the part of the leading states among them. For such a sentiment there was more than one reason. Lysander had brought home not only a large sum of money, but valuable spoils of other kinds, and many captive triremes, at the close of the war. As the success had been achieved by the joint exertions of all the allies, so the fruits of it belonged in equity to all of them jointly—not to Sparta alone. The Thebans and Corinthians preferred a formal claim to be allowed to share; and if the other allies abstained from openly backing the demand, we may fairly presume that it was not from any different construction of the equity of the case, but from fear of offending Sparta. In the testimonial erected by Lysander at Delphi, commemorative of the triumph, he had included not only his own brazen statue, but that of each commander of the allied contingents; thus formally admitting the allies to share in the honorary results, and tacitly sanctioning their claim to the lucrative results also. Nevertheless the demand made by the Thebans and Corinthians was not only repelled, but almost resented as an insult, especially by Lysander, whose influence was at that moment almost omnipotent².

¹ Aristot., *Polit.*, v. 9, 2.

² Justin (vi. 10) mentions the demand thus

made and refused. Plutarch (*Lysand.*, c. 27) states the demand as having been made by the Theban³

But besides such special offence given to the allies, the conduct of Sparta in other ways showed that she intended to turn the victory to her own account. Lysander was at this moment all-powerful, playing his own game under the name of Sparta. His position was far greater than that of the regent Pausanias had been after the victory of Platæa; and his talents for making use of the position incomparably superior. Altars were erected to him; pæans or hymns were composed in his honour; the Ephesians set up his statue in the temple of their goddess Artemis, while the Samians not only erected a statue to him at Olympia, but even altered the name of their great festival—the Heræa—to *Lysandria*¹.

Such excess of flattery was calculated to turn the head even of the most virtuous Greek. With Lysander, it had the effect of substituting, in place of that assumed smoothness of manner with which he began his command, an insulting harshness and arrogance corresponding to the really unmeasured ambition which he cherished. His ambition prompted him to aggrandize Sparta separately, without any thought of her allies, in order to exercise dominion in her name. Instead of that general freedom which had been promised as an incentive to revolt against Athens, a Spartan empire had been constituted in place of the extinct Athenian, with a tribute, amounting to 1,000 talents annually, intended to be assessed upon the component cities and islands².

It is easy to see that under such a state of feeling on the part of the allies of Sparta, the enormities perpetrated by the Thirty at Athens and by the Lysandrian dekharchies in the other cities, would be heard with sympathy for the sufferers. But—what was of still greater importance—even at Sparta itself, opposition began to spring up against the measures and the person of Lysander. If the leading men at Sparta had felt jealous even of Brasidas, who offended them only by unparalleled success and merit as a commander, much more would the same feeling be aroused against Lysander, who displayed an overweening insolence, and was worshipped with an ostentatious flattery, not inferior to that of Pausanias after the battle of Platæa. Another Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, was now king of Sparta, in conjunction with Agis. Upon him the feeling of jealousy against Lysander told with especial force, as it did afterwards upon Agesilaus, the successor of Agis; not unaccompanied probably with suspicion (which subsequent events justified) that Lysander was aiming at some interference with the regal privileges. Nor is it unfair to suppose that Pausanias was animated by motives more patriotic than mere jealousy; and that the rapacious cruelty, which everywhere dishonoured the new oligarchies, both shocked his better feelings and inspired him with fears for the stability of the system. A farther circumstance which weakened the influence of Lysander at Sparta was the annual change of Ephors, which took place about the end of September or beginning of October. Those Ephors, under whom his grand success and the capture of Athens had been consummated, passed out of office in September 404 B.C., and gave place to others more disposed to second Pausanias.

alone, which I disbelieve. Xenophon, according to the general disorderly arrangement of facts in his *Hellenica*, does not mention the circumstance in its proper place, but alludes to it on a subsequent occasion as having before occurred (*Hellen.*, iii. 5, 5). He also specifies by name no one but the Thebans as having actually made the demand;

yet there is a subsequent passage, which shows that not only the Corinthians, but other allies also, sympathized in it (iii. 5, 12).

¹ Pausanias, vi. 3, 6. The Samian oligarchical party owed their recent restoration to Lysander.

² Diodor., xiv. 10-13.

I remarked, in the preceding chapter, how much more honourable for Sparta, and how much less unfortunate for Athens and for the rest of Greece, the close of the Peloponnesian war would have been—if Kallikratidās had gained and survived the battle of Arginusæ, so as to close it then, and to acquire for himself that personal ascendancy which the victorious general was sure to exercise over the numerous re-arrangements consequent on peace. Probably he would have left the government of each city to its own natural tendencies, oligarchical or democratical, interfering only in special cases of actual and pronounced necessity. The influence of an ascendent state, employed for such purposes and emphatically discarding all private ends for the accomplishment of a stable Pan-Hellenic sentiment and fraternity—employed too thus, at a moment when so many of the Greek towns were in the throes of re-organization, having to take up a new political course in reference to the altered circumstances—is an element of which the force could hardly have failed to be beneficial.

In spite of formal prohibition from Sparta—obtained doubtless under the influence of Lysander—the Athenian emigrants had obtained shelter in all the states bordering on Attica. It was from Bœotia that they struck the first blow. Thrasybulus, Anytus, and Archinus, starting from Thebes with the sympathy of the Theban public and with substantial aid from Ismenias and other wealthy citizens—at the head of a small band of exiles stated variously at 30, 60, 70 or somewhat above 100 men¹,—seized Phylê, a frontier fortress in the mountains north of Attica, lying on the direct road between Athens and Thebes. Probably it had no garrison, for the Thirty, acting in the interest of Lacedæmonian predominance, had dismantled all the outlying fortresses in Attica². The Thirty marched out from Athens to attack him, at the head of a powerful force, comprising the Lacedæmonian hoplites who formed their guard, the Three Thousand privileged citizens, and all the Knights. Probably the small company of Thrasybulus was reinforced by fresh accessions of exiles, as soon as he was known to have occupied the fort. For by the time that the Thirty with their assailing force arrived, he was in condition to repel a vigorous assault made by the younger soldiers, with considerable loss to the aggressors.

Disappointed in their direct attack, the Thirty laid plans for blockading Phylê, where they knew that there was no stock of provisions. But hardly had their operations commenced, when a snowstorm fell, so abundant and violent, that they were forced to abandon their position and retire to Athens, leaving much of their baggage in the hands of the garrison at Phylê³. This storm was providential, since it gave time to receive rein-

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 4, 2; Diodor., xiv. 32; Pausan., i. 29, 3; Lysias, Or. xiii., *Cont. Agorast.*, § 84; Justin., v. 9; Æschinēs, *Cont. Ktesiphon.*, c. 62, p. 437; Demosth., *Cont. Timokrat.*, c. 34, p. 742. Æschinēs allots more than 100 followers to the captors of Phylê.

² Lysias, Or. xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, § 41, p. 124.

³ Xenophon nowhere indicates how long Thrasybulus stayed at Phylê; but it would take a considerable time for 700 refugees to hear of his venture and to find their way to his station.

From Xen., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 44, we might infer that Thrasybulus was already at Phylê before Theramenes' death, and that indeed the last stage of the reign of terror at Athens was a consequence of

the panic caused by the invasion of a refugee army. While Thrasybulus was gathering his forces at Phylê, the Thirty would have time to disarm the resident Athenians and summon the Spartan garrison, but the confusion of affairs in the city prevented an immediate and resolute advance against the fortress. The presence of a force at Phylê would also explain why Kritias became seriously alarmed at the prospect of Theramenes espousing the popular cause: in 411 the presence of a democratic fleet at Samos had gone far to bring about the overthrow of the extremists by the moderates. Cf. also the hint of Theramenes in Xen., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 44.—Ed.

forcements which raised the total to 700. Though the weather was such, that the Thirty did not choose to keep their main force in the neighbourhood of Phylê, yet they sent their Lacedæmonians and two tribes of Athenian Horsemen to restrain the excursions of the garrison. This body Thrasybulus contrived to attack by surprise. One hundred and twenty hoplites and a few Horsemen were slain, while abundance of arms and stores were captured. News of the defeat was speedily conveyed to the city, from whence the remaining Horsemen immediately came forth to the rescue, but could do nothing more than protect the carrying off of the dead.

This successful engagement sensibly changed the relative situation of parties in Attica, encouraging the exiles as much as it depressed the Thirty. Even among the partisans of the latter at Athens, dissension began to arise. The minority which had sympathized with Theramenes began to waver so manifestly in their allegiance, that Kritias and his colleagues felt some doubt of being able to maintain themselves in the city. They resolved to secure Eleusis and the island of Salamis, as places of safety and resource in case of being compelled to evacuate Athens. They accordingly went to Eleusis with a considerable number of the Athenian Horsemen, under pretence of examining into the strength of the place and the number of its defenders. Each Eleusinian hoplite, after having presented himself and returned his name to the Thirty, was ordered to pass out through an exit, where each man successively found himself in the power of the Horsemen, and was fettered by the attendants. Having thus carried away from Eleusis every citizen whose sentiments they suspected, and left a force of their own adherents in the place, the Thirty returned to Athens. At the same time, it appears, a similar visit and seizure of prisoners was made by some of them in Salamis¹. On the next day, they convoked at Athens their Three Thousand privileged hoplites, and made them condemn these prisoners, directing each man to deposit his pebble visibly to every one². Kritias was obeyed, without reserve or exception. All the prisoners, seemingly three hundred in number³, were condemned by the same vote, and executed forthwith.

This outrage contributed in part, we can hardly doubt, to the bold and decisive resolution now taken by Thrasybulus, five days after his late success, of marching by night from Phylê to Peiræus. His force, though somewhat increased, was still no more than 1,000 men, altogether inadequate by itself to any considerable enterprise, had he not counted on positive support and junction from fresh comrades, together with a still greater amount of negative support from disgust or indifference towards the Thirty. He was indeed speedily joined by many sympathizing countrymen, but few of them, since the general disarming manœuvre of the oligarchs, had heavy armour. Some had light shields and darts, but others were wholly unarmed, and could merely serve as throwers of stones.

Peiræus was at this moment an open town, deprived of its fortifications

¹ Both Lysias (*Orat. xii., Cont. Eratosth.*, § 53; *Orat. xiii., Cont. Agorat.*, § 47) and Diodorus (*xiv. 32*) connect together these two similar proceedings at Eleusis and at Salamis. Xenophon mentions only the affair at Eleusis.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 4, 9: Δείξας δέ τι χύριον, ἐς τοῦτο ἐκέλευσε φανεράν φέρειν τὴν ψήφον.

Compare Lysias, *Or. xiii., Cont. Agorat.*, § 40, and Thukyd., *iv. 74*, about the conduct of the Megarian oligarchical leaders—καὶ τούτων περὶ ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψήφον φανεράν διενεγκύν, etc.

³ Lysias (*Orat. xii., Cont. Eratosth.*, § 53) gives this number.

as well as of those Long Walls which had so long connected it with Athens. It was also of large compass and required an ampler force to defend it than Thrasybulus could muster. Accordingly, when the Thirty marched out of Athens the next morning to attack him, with their full force of Athenian hoplites and Horsemen, and with the Lacedæmonian garrison besides—he in vain attempted to maintain against them the great carriage-road which led down to Peiræus. He was compelled to concentrate his forces in Munychia—the easternmost portion of the aggregate called Peiræus, nearest to the Bay of Phalerum, and comprising one of those three ports which had once sustained the naval power of Athens¹. Thrasybulus occupied the temple of Artemis Munychia, accessible only by a street of steep ascent. In the rear of his hoplites, whose files were ten deep, were posted the darters and slingers. Presently Kritias and the Thirty were seen approaching with their superior numbers, mounting the hill in close array, with hoplites not less than fifty in depth. Thrasybulus waited patiently until they came within distance. When the troops of the Thirty advanced near enough in ascending the hill, the light-armed in the rear of Thrasybulus poured upon them a shower of darts over the heads of their own hoplites, with considerable effect. As they seemed to waver, seeking to cover themselves with their shields, and thus not seeing well before them, Thrasybulus charged vigorously down the hill, and after a smart resistance, drove them back in disorder, with the loss of seventy men. What was of still greater moment—Kritias and Hippomachus, who headed their troops on the left, were among the slain, together with Charmidês son of Glaukon, one of the ten oligarchs who had been placed to manage Peiræus.

The Thirty were obliged to give orders for immediately returning: this Thrasybulus did not attempt to prevent, though it might have been in his power to do so². But their ascendancy had received a shock from which it never fully recovered. On the next day they appeared downcast and dispirited in the Boulê, which was itself thinly attended, while the privileged Three Thousand were everywhere in discord and partial mutiny. Those among them who had been most compromised in the crimes of the Thirty, were strenuous in upholding the existing authority; but such as had been less guilty protested against the continuance of so unholy a war. And though the Knights still continued steadfast partisans, yet the Thirty were also seriously weakened by the death of Kritias—the ascendent and decisive head; while that party, both in the Boulê and out of it, which had formerly adhered to Theramenês, now again raised its head. A public meeting among them was held, in which what may be called the opposition party among the Thirty became predominant. It was determined to depose the Thirty, and to constitute a fresh oligarchy of Ten, one from each tribe. But the members of the Thirty were held to be individually re-eligible; so that two of them, adherents of Theramenês and unfriendly to Kritias, with others of the same vein of sentiment, were chosen among the Ten. Chariklês and the more violent members, having thus lost their ascendancy, no longer deemed themselves safe at Athens, but retired to Eleusis, which they had had the precaution to occupy beforehand. Probably a number of their

¹ For the topography of the Peiræus and the adjacent harbours, cf. E. Gardner, *Ancient Athens*, pp. 543-545.—Ed.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 4, 22; Lysias, *Orat.* xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, § 55.

³ Lysias, *Orat.* xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, §§ 55, 56.

partisans, and the Lacedæmonian garrison also, retired thither along with them.

The nomination of this new oligarchy of Ten was plainly a compromise, adopted by some from desire to come to accommodation with the exiles —by others, from a conviction that the only way of maintaining the oligarchical system, and repelling the exiles, was to constitute a new oligarchical Board. Instead of attempting to agree upon terms of accommodation with the exiles in Peiræus generally, they merely tried to corrupt separately Thrasybulus and the leaders, offering to admit ten of them to a share of the oligarchical power at Athens, provided they would betray their party. This offer having been indignantly refused, the war was again resumed between Athens and Peiræus¹.

Far from being able to abuse power like their predecessors, the Ten did not even fully confide in their Three Thousand hoplites, but were obliged to take measures for the defence of the city. The Ten sent envoys to Sparta to solicit farther aid ; while the Thirty sent envoys thither also, from Eleusis, for the same purpose ; both representing that the Athenian people had revolted from Sparta, and required farther force to reconquer them.

Such foreign aid become daily more necessary to them, since the forces of Thrasybulus in Peiræus grew stronger, before their eyes, in numbers, in arms, and in hope of success. Many exiles flocked in to their aid : others sent donations of money or arms. Among the latter the orator Lysias stood conspicuous, transmitting to Peiræus a present of 200 shields, as well as 2,000 drachms in money, and hiring besides 300 fresh soldiers². Proclamation was made by Thrasybulus, that all metics who would lend aid should be put on the footing of isotely or equal payment of taxes with citizens. Within a short time he had got together a considerable force both in heavy-armed and light-armed, and even seventy horsemen ; so that he was in condition to make excursions out of Peiræus, and to collect wood and provisions.

In the established civil war which now raged in Attica, Thrasybulus and the exiles in Peiræus had decidedly the advantage, maintaining the offensive, while the Ten in Athens, and the remainder of the Thirty at Eleusis, were each thrown upon their defence. Presently, however, the arrival of a Spartan auxiliary force altered the balance of parties. Lysander, whom the oligarchical envoys had expressly requested to be sent to them as general, prevailed with the Ephors to grant their request. While he himself went to Eleusis and got together a Peloponnesian land-force, his brother Libys conducted a fleet of forty triremes to block up Peiræus, and 100 talents were lent to the Athenian oligarchs out of the large sum recently brought from Asia into the Spartan treasury³.

The arrival of Lysander brought the two sections of oligarchs in Attica again into co-operation, restrained the progress of Thrasybulus, and even reduced Peiræus to great straits by preventing all entry of ships or stores. Nothing could have prevented it from being reduced to surrender, if Lysander had been allowed free scope in his operations. But the general sentiment of Greece had by this time become disgusted with his ambitious

¹ The facts which I have here set down result from a comparison of Lysias, *Orat.* xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, §§ 53, 59, 94 ; Diodor., xiv. 32 ; Justin, v. 9.

² Lysias, *Or.* xxxi., *Cont. Philon.*, §§ 19-34.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 4, 28 ; Diodor., xiv. 33 ; Lysias, *Orat.* xii., *Cont. Eratosth.*, § 60.

policy, and with the oligarchies which he had everywhere set up as his instruments—a sentiment not without influence on the feelings of the leading Spartans, who were determined not to allow him to conquer Attica a second time, in order to plant his own creatures as rulers at Athens.

Under the influence of these feelings, King Pausanias obtained the consent of three out of the five Ephors to undertake himself an expedition into Attica, at the head of the forces of the confederacy, for which he immediately issued proclamation. Opposed to the political tendencies of Lysander, he was somewhat inclined to sympathize with the democracy. It was probably understood that his intentions towards Athens were lenient and anti-Lysandrian, so that the Peloponnesian allies obeyed the summons generally. Yet the Bœotians and Corinthians still declined, on the ground that Athens had done nothing to violate the late convention, a remarkable proof of the altered feelings of Greece during the last year, since down to the period of that convention, these two states had been more bitterly hostile to Athens than any others in the confederacy. They suspected that even the expedition of Pausanias was projected with selfish Lacedæmonian views, to secure Attica as a separate dependency of Sparta, though detached from Lysander.

On approaching Athens, Pausanias, joined by Lysander and the forces already in Attica, encamped near the city gates. Pausanias was furnished at once with ample grounds, not merely for repudiating the Thirty altogether, and sending back the presents which they tendered to him¹—but even for refusing to identify himself unreservedly with the new Oligarchy of Ten which had risen upon their ruins.

At first he held a language decidedly adverse to Thrasybulus and the exiles, sending to them a herald, and requiring them to disband and go to their respective homes. The requisition not being obeyed, he made a faint attack upon Peiræus, which had no effect. Next day he marched down with two large divisions, and three tribes of the Athenian Horsemen, to reconnoitre the place, and see where a line of blockade could be drawn. Some light troops annoyed him, but his troops repulsed them, and pursued them even as far as the theatre of Peiræus, where all the forces of Thrasybulus were mustered. The Lacedæmonians were here in a disadvantageous position, so that all the light-armed of Thrasybulus were enabled to drive them out again with loss—two of the Spartan polemarchs being here slain. Pausanias was obliged to retreat to a little eminence about half a mile off, where he mustered his whole force, and formed his hoplites into a very deep phalanx. Thrasybulus on his side was so encouraged by the recent success of his light-armed, that he ventured to bring out his heavy-armed, only eight deep, to an equal conflict on the open ground. But he was here completely worsted, and driven back into Peiræus with the loss of 150 men, so that the Spartan King was able to retire to Athens after a victory and a trophy erected to commemorate it.

The issue of this battle was one extremely fortunate for Thrasybulus and his comrades, since it left the honours of the day with Pausanias, so as to avoid provoking enmity or vengeance on his part. It disposed Pausanias still farther towards an accommodation, strengthening also the force of that party in Athens which was favourable to the same object.

¹ Lysias, Or. xviii., *De Bonis Niciæ Frat.*, §§ 8-12.

This opposition-party found decided favour with the Spartan King, as well as with the Ephor Naukleidas who accompanied him. Xenophon, indeed, according to that narrow and partial spirit which pervades his *Hellenica*, notices no sentiment in Pausanias except his jealousy of Lysander, and treats the opposition against the Ten at Athens as having been got up by his intrigues¹. But it seems plain that this is not a correct account. Pausanias did not create the discord, but found it already existing, and had to choose which of the parties he would adopt. To second the pacific party was at once the easiest course for Pausanias to take, and the most likely to popularize Sparta in Greece; whereas he would surely have entailed upon her still more bitter curses from without, not to mention the loss of men to herself, if he had employed the amount of force requisite to uphold the Ten, and subdue Peiræus.

Under such a state of facts, it is not surprising to learn that Pausanias encouraged solicitations for peace from Thrasybulus, and granted them a truce to enable them to send envoys to Sparta. Along with these envoys went Kephisophon and Melitus, sent for the same purpose of entreating peace, by the party opposed to the Ten at Athens, under the sanction both of Pausanias and of the accompanying Ephors. On the other hand, the Ten, finding themselves discountenanced by Pausanias, sent envoys of their own to outbid the others. They tendered themselves, their walls, and their city, to be dealt with as the Lacedæmonians chose, requiring that Thrasybulus, if he pretended to be the friend of Sparta, should make the same unqualified surrender of Peiræus and Munychia. All the three sets of envoys were heard before the three Ephors remaining at Sparta and the Lacedæmonian assembly, who took the best resolution which the case admitted—to bring to pass an amicable settlement between Athens and Peiræus, and to leave the terms to be fixed by fifteen commissioners, who were sent thither forthwith to sit in conjunction with Pausanias. This Board determined, that the exiles in Peiræus should be re-admitted to Athens; that an accommodation should take place; and that no man should be molested for past acts, except the Thirty, the Eleven (who had been the instruments of all executions), and the Ten who had governed in Peiræus². But Eleusis was recognised as a government separate from Athens, and left in possession of the Thirty, to serve as a refuge for all those who might feel their future safety compromised at Athens in consequence of their past conduct³.

As soon as these terms were proclaimed, accepted, and sworn to by all parties, Pausanias with all the Lacedæmonians evacuated Attica. Thrasybulus and the exiles marched up in solemn procession from Peiræus to Athens. Their first act was to go up to the acropolis, now relieved from its Lacedæmonian garrison, and there to offer sacrifice and thanksgiving. On descending from thence, a general assembly was held, in which the democracy was restored.

The archons, the [Council] of Five Hundred, the public assembly, and the

¹ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 4, 35.

² *Ath. Pol.* (c. 38) differs from Xenophon in some points with regard to the settlement. (1) The number of the commissioners from Sparta is given as ten. (2) The original board of Ten at Athens was replaced, shortly before Pausanias' arrival, by a more representative Ten, who opened negotiations with Thrasybulus, and subsequently passed the *εὐθυνα* before the democracy with flying

colours. This version, which is probably based on official papers, and therefore the more trustworthy, somewhat detracts from the merits of Pausanias, as revealed by the philo-Spartan Xenophon. (3) The original Ten were not included in the amnesty. Considering their record, it may well be believed that *Ath. Pol.* is right on this point.—ED.

³ Xenoph., *Hellen.*, ii. 4, 39; Diodor., xiv. 33.

Dikasteries appear to have been now revived, as they had stood in the democracy prior to the capture of the city by Lysander¹. This important restoration seems to have taken place some time in the spring of 403 B.C., though we cannot exactly make out in what month. The first archon now drawn was Eukleidēs, who gave his name to this memorable year, a year never afterwards forgotten by Athenians.

Eleusis was at this time, pursuant to the late convention, a city independent and separate from Athens, under the government of the Thirty. It was not likely that this separation would last; but the Thirty were themselves the parties to give cause for its termination. They were getting together a mercenary force at Eleusis, when the whole force of Athens was marched to forestall their designs. The generals at Eleusis came forth to demand a conference, but were seized and put to death; the Thirty themselves, and a few of the most obnoxious individuals, fled out of Attica; while the rest of the Eleusinian occupants were persuaded by their friends from Athens to come to an equal and honourable accommodation².

We have now passed that short interval, occupied by the Thirty, which succeeded so immediately upon the extinction of the empire and independence of Athens as to leave no opportunity for pause or reflection. A few words respecting the rise and fall of that empire are now required—summing up as it were the political moral of the events between 477 and 405 B.C.

The Confederacy of Delos was formed by the free and spontaneous association of many different towns, all alike independent; towns which met in synod and deliberated by equal vote—took by their majority resolutions binding upon all—and chose Athens as their chief to enforce these resolutions, as well as to superintend generally the war against the common enemy. But it was, from the beginning, a compact which permanently bound each individual state to the remainder. None had liberty, either to recede or to withhold the contingent imposed by authority of the common synod, or to take any separate step inconsistent with its obligations to the confederacy. No union less stringent than this could have prevented the renewal of Persian ascendancy in the Ægean. Seceding or disobedient states were thus treated as guilty of treason or revolt, which it was the duty of Athens, as chief, to repress. Her first repressions, against Naxos and other states, were undertaken in prosecution of such duty; in which if she had been wanting, the confederacy would have fallen to pieces, and the common enemy would have reappeared.

Now the only way by which the confederacy was saved from falling to pieces, was by being transformed into an Athenian empire. Such transformation (as Thukydides plainly intimates³) did not arise from the ambition or deep-laid projects of Athens, but from the reluctance of the larger confederates to discharge the obligations imposed by the common synod, and from the unwarlike character of the confederates generally—which made them desirous to commute military service for money-pay-

¹ A detailed account of the working of the Athenian constitution in the fourth century will be found in *Ath. Pol.*, c. 42 onward.—ED.

² Xenoph., *Hellen.*, li. 4, 43; Justin., v. 11.

³ Thukyd., i. 97.

ment, while Athens on her part was not less anxious to perform the service and obtain the money. By gradual and unforeseen stages, Athens thus passed from consulate to empire, in such manner that no one could point out the precise moment of time when the confederacy of Delos ceased, and when the empire began.

But the Athenian empire came to include (between 460-446 B.C.) other cities not parties to the confederacy of Delos. Athens had conquered her ancient enemy the island of Ægina, and had acquired supremacy over Megara, Bœotia, Phokis, and Lokris, and Achaia in Peloponnesus. Her empire was now at its maximum, and had she been able to maintain it—or even to keep possession of the Megarid separately, which gave her the means of barring out all invasions from Peloponnesus—the future course of Grecian history would have been materially altered. But her empire on land did not rest upon the same footing as her empire at sea. The peace concluded in 445 B.C. left her with all her maritime and insular empire (including Eubœa), but with nothing more; while by the loss of Megara she was now open to invasion from Peloponnesus.

On this footing she remained at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterwards. I have shown that that war did not arise (as has been so often asserted) from aggressive or ambitious schemes on the part of Athens, but that, on the contrary, the aggression was all on the side of her enemies, who were full of hopes that they could put her down with little delay; while she was not merely conservative and defensive, but even discouraged by the certainty of destructive invasion, and only dissuaded from concessions, alike imprudent and inglorious, by the extraordinary influence and resolute wisdom of Periklês. That great man comprehended well both the conditions and the limits of Athenian empire. Athens was now understood by her subjects and enemies, as well as by her own citizens, to be mistress of the sea. It was the care of Periklês to keep that belief within definite boundaries, and to prevent all waste of the force of the city in making new or distant acquisitions which could not be permanently maintained. But it was also his care to enforce upon his countrymen the lesson of maintaining their existing empire unimpaired, and shrinking from no effort requisite for that end.

Following the events of the war, we shall find that Athens did adhere to Periklês' policy for the first seven years. In the seventh year of the war occurred the unexpected victory at Sphakteria and the capture of the Lacedæmonian prisoners. Had the great statesman been alive, he might have turned this moment of superiority to better account, and might perhaps have contrived even to get possession of Megara (a point of unspeakable importance to Athens, since it protected her against invasion) in exchange for the Spartan captives. But the general feeling of confidence which then animated all parties at Athens, determined them (in 424 B.C.) to grasp at this and much more by force. They tried to reconquer both Megara and Bœotia: in the former they failed, though succeeding so far as to capture Nisæa; in the latter they not only failed, but suffered the disastrous defeat of Delium.

It was in the autumn of that same year, 424 B.C., too, that Brasidas broke into their empire in Thrace, and robbed them of their most precious possession—Amphipolis. Again it seems that the Athenians departed

from the conservative policy of Periklês, not by ambitious over-action, but by inaction—omitting to do all that might have been done to arrest the progress of Brasidas.

But though that great man could not have prevented the loss, he would assuredly have deemed no efforts too great to recover it; and in this respect his policy was espoused by Kleon, in opposition to Nikias and the peace party.

We have, during the four years succeeding the battle of Delium (424-420 B.C.), a series of departures from the conservative policy of Periklês, departures, not in the way of ambitious over-acquisition, but of languor and unwillingness to make efforts even for the recovery of capital losses. Those who see no defects in the foreign policy of the democracy, except those of over-ambition and love of war, pursuant to the jests of Aristophanês, overlook altogether these opposite but serious blunders of Nikias and the peace party.

Next comes the ascendancy of Alkibiadês, leading to the two years' campaign in Peloponnesus in conjunction with Elis, Argos, and Mantinea, and ending in the complete re-establishment of Lacedæmonian supremacy. Here was a diversion of Athenian force from its legitimate purpose of preserving or re-establishing the empire, for inland projects which Periklês could never have approved.

We now come to the expedition against Syracuse. Down to that period, the empire of Athens (except the possessions in Thrace) remained undiminished, and her general power nearly as great as it had ever been since 445 B.C. That expedition was the one great and fatal departure from the Periklean policy, bringing upon Athens an amount of disaster from which she never recovered. Though Periklês would have strenuously opposed the project, yet he could not possibly have foreseen the enormous ruin in which it would end; nor could such ruin have been brought about by any man existing, save Nikias. In measuring therefore the extent of misjudgement fairly imputable to the Athenians for this ruinous undertaking, we must always recollect, that first the failure of the siege, next the ruin of the armament, did not arise from intrinsic difficulties in the case, but from the personal defects of the commander.

After the Syracusan disaster, there is no longer any question about adhering to, or departing from, the Periklean policy. Athens is like Patroklos in the *Iliad*, after Apollo has stunned him by a blow on the back and loosened his armour. Nothing but the slackness of her enemies allowed her time for a partial recovery, so as to make increased heroism a substitute for impaired force. And the years of struggle which she now went through are among the most glorious events in her history. These years present one peculiarly honourable moment, after the overthrow of the Four Hundred.

I have thought it important to recall, in this short summary, the leading events of the seventy years preceding 405 B.C., in order that it may be understood to what degree Athens was politically or prudentially to blame for the great downfall which she then underwent. Her downfall had one great cause—we may almost say, one single cause—the Sicilian expedition. The empire of Athens both was, and appeared to be, in exuberant strength when that expedition was sent forth: strength more than sufficient to bear up against all moderate faults or moderate mis-

fortunes, such as no government ever long escapes. But the catastrophe of Syracuse was something overpassing in terrific calamity all Grecian experience and all power of foresight. It was like the Russian campaign of 1812 to the Emperor Napoleon. No Grecian power could bear up against such a death wound; and the prolonged struggle of Athens, after it, is not the least wonderful part of the whole war.

Nothing in the political history of Greece is so remarkable as the Athenian empire, taking it as it stood in its completeness, from about 460-413 B.C. (the date of the Syracusan catastrophe), or still more, from 460-424 B.C. (the date when Brasidas made his conquests in Thrace). If we view it as it had stood before that event, during the period of its integrity, it is a sight marvellous to contemplate, and its working must be pronounced, in my judgement, to have been highly beneficial to the Grecian world. No Grecian state except Athens could have sufficed to organize such a system, or to hold, in partial, though regulated, continuous and specific communion, so many little states, each animated with that force of political repulsion instinctive in the Grecian mind. This was a mighty task, worthy of Athens, and to which no state except Athens was competent. We have already seen in part how little qualified Sparta was to perform it: and we may refer to a like fruitless essay on the part of Thebes.

As in regard to the democracy of Athens generally, so in regard to her empire—it has been customary with historians to take notice of little except the bad side. But my conviction is that the empire of Athens was not harsh and oppressive, as it is commonly depicted. Under the circumstances of her dominion the condition of the maritime Greeks was materially better than it had been before, or than it will be seen to become afterwards. Her empire, if it did not inspire attachment, certainly provoked no antipathy, among the bulk of the citizens of the subject-communities. If in her imperial character she exacted obedience, she also fulfilled duties and ensured protection—to a degree incomparably greater than was ever realized by Sparta.

Without being insensible either to the faults or to the misdeeds of imperial Athens, I believe that her empire was a great comparative benefit, and its extinction a great loss, to her own subjects. But still more do I believe it to have been a good, looked at with reference to Pan-Hellenic interests. Its maintenance furnished the only possibility of keeping out foreign intervention, and leaving the destinies of Greece to depend upon native, spontaneous, untrammelled Grecian agencies. The downfall of the Athenian empire is the signal for the arms and corruption of Persia again to make themselves felt, and for the re-enslavement of the Asiatic Greeks under her tribute-officers. Such was the natural tendency of the Grecian world to political nonintegration or disintegration, that the rise of the Athenian empire, incorporating so many states into one system, is to be regarded as a most extraordinary accident. Nothing but the genius, energy, discipline, and democracy of Athens, could have brought it about; nor even she, unless favoured and pushed on by a very peculiar train of antecedent events. But having once got it, she might perfectly well have kept it; and had she done so, the Hellenic world would have remained so organized as to be able to repel foreign intervention. When we reflect how infinitely superior was the Hellenic mind to that of all surrounding

nations and races, and how much more it might perhaps have achieved, if it had enjoyed another century or half-century of freedom, under the stimulating headship of the most progressive and most intellectual of all its separate communities—we shall look with double regret on the ruin of the Athenian empire.

APPENDIX

[THE statements in the *Ath. Pol.*, besides correcting Xenophon on some matters of detail, compel us to regard the institution of the Thirty Tyrants at Athens and their early history in a somewhat different light from that which commended itself to former historians.

The chapters of *Ath. Pol.* dealing with this crisis (34-39) are not characterized by the same wealth of documentary evidence which marks the account of the revolution of 411; yet this new account is of importance, in that it frequently supplements the fragmentary record of our other sources, and so offers the chance of reconstructing the history of 404-403 in a more consistent fashion than had hitherto been found possible.

A. C. 34, § 3, gives some valuable information regarding the peace-terms imposed by Sparta: the Athenians were to adopt a *πάτριος πολιτεία* (repeated in Diod., xiv. 3). This type of constitution has been already found in connexion with the name of Theraménès (Appendix to c. 32), and in this case it is more than likely that the clause was inserted at his suggestion. We now can understand what kept Theraménès busy during the peace-negotiations. What the original purpose of Lysander and the ephors may have been with regard to the future government of Athens, cannot be ascertained; but considering that their regular practice was to impose a dekarchy upon the conquered cities, we may conjecture that it was Theraménès who effected a modification in favour of a more liberal constitution for his native city.

We are furthermore informed, in this same passage, that the democrats strove to preserve the old constitution unchanged, that the returned exiles and club-partisans schemed to establish a close oligarchy; while a third party, which was dissociated from the *ἐραυελαί*, sought to establish the prescribed *πάτριος πολιτεία*. This account in the main confirms Lysias (*C. Eratosth.*, §§ 43, 44, 70-76; *C. Agorat.*, § 17 ff.), who mentions the institution of ephors and a campaign against the democratic leaders (see pp. 772, 773). Further, Lysias entirely dissociates Theraménès from the *ἐραυελαί*, though otherwise extremely hostile towards him, thus strikingly confirming the account of *Ath. Pol.* Diodorus (xiv. 3) likewise places Theraménès and the oligarchs in contrast, the latter being said to have branded the *πάτριος πολιτεία* as sheer democracy just as the extremists of 411 would not fall back upon the programme of the moderates (Thuk., viii. 92). The further inference of Diodorus, that Theraménès was a democratic representative, is of course a mistake.

B. Under these conditions it is no wonder that Lysander had to return from Samos to set matters straight (Lysias, *C. Eratosth.*, § 71; Diod., xiv. 3; *Ath. Pol.*, c. 34). The *ekklesia* was now constrained to elect a Constituent Committee, which, according to the important statement in Lysias (*C. Eratosth.*, § 76), was composed of ten champions of the democratic party, ten supporters of the 'ephors' (i.e., the extreme oligarchs), and ten partisans of Theraménès. Clearly, the board of Thirty represented a compromise between the three factions in Athens, and differed from the ordinary type of dekarchy in being more representative, and not so essentially oligarchic.

C. This committee was charged with the express duty of revising the Athenian constitution (Xen., *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 2). Xenophon (*Hellen.*, ii. 3, 11) remarks that the Thirty neglected this task from the first; but *Ath. Pol.*, c. 35 (which here, no doubt, as elsewhere, is based on official documents), states that, after installing a Council of Five Hundred, chosen by lot from a special list, they made a genuine endeavour to institute a *πάτριος πολιτεία*, and to this effect repealed, among others, the laws against the Areopagus which had ushered in the extreme democracy and the predominance of the *dikasteries*. Again, Xenophon and *Ath.*

Pol. agree in asserting that the Thirty at first made themselves popular by repressing the informers who had flourished since the days of Periklēs, and had incurred the odium not only of the disaffected aristocrats, but of the quiet proprietors and traders.

D. The duration of this period of well-meant reforms is nowhere mentioned. But all authorities admit that ultimately the board grew careless of its real duties, and began to exercise an irresponsible dominion which won them the name of 'Thirty Tyrants'. This development from a moderate to an extreme oligarchic type of government affords a singular analogy to the history of the Four Hundred.

E. The parallelism is sustained by the action of Theramenēs, who once again warns his colleagues against political excesses, insisting on the need of popular support, and once again succeeds in getting a large body of privileged citizens admitted to a share in the administration (Xenophon, *Hellen.*, ii. 3, 18; and *Ath. Pol.*, c. 36).

F. The final issue alone is different, for Kritias, the leader of the extremist wing of the Thirty, had learnt one, if only one, lesson from the fate of the conspirators of 411, and suppressed the opposition betimes by his unscrupulous execution of Theramenēs.

G. After the ultimate fall of the oligarchs, we find Theramenēs' ideal almost realized. The proposal of Phormisius, that the franchise be restricted to land-holders (Lysias, *Or.*, 34), and of Tisamenus, that the laws of Drako and Solon be investigated with a view to establishing a *πάτριος πολιτεία* (Andok., *De Myst.*, §§ 83, 84), though only partially sanctioned by the restored democracy, are quite in the spirit of the moderates' policy.

We may also observe that *Ath. Pol.* in cc. 34-37, as in cc. 29-32, gives us the most trustworthy information about Theramenēs which we possess. In accordance with its own estimate (c. 28), and those which Cicero and Cæsar held (*of.* note 2 on page 779, and Plut., *Cicero*, 39), Theramenēs now appears as a true statesman, with a far-seeing and practical programme of moderate reform. But his lot was cast in days of violent party-oscillations, reminding us of Thukydides' well-known description of political strife in iii. 82, 83. Hence his *μέλλησις προμηθείης* was ever overridden by the *τόλμα ἀλόγιστος* of partisan fanatics; and not being able to attach himself definitely to either of the intransigent sections, he found himself abused by both for being a man of no settled principles, and guided by nothing but personal considerations (*of.* the characterization of him in *Ar.*, *Ran.*, 535 ff. : μετακυλινδων ἀεὶ αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν εἰς πρᾶττοντα τοῖχον).

The heat of this hatred of the factions is reflected in all the contemporary authorities, be they aristocratic (like Thukydides and Xenophon) or democratic (Lysias). *Ath. Pol.* and Diodorus (so far as this latter historian does not transcribe Xenophon), who seem to derive many of their facts from an Atthis (presumably that of Androtion), present us with a less distorted version, in which the evidence of state-papers replaces the constructions of political enemies. Therefore, where authorities clash, preference should generally be given to the two last-mentioned sources, and the character of Theramenēs vindicated from those reckless charges which have hitherto found ready acceptance. For a criticism of the ancient sources, see B. Perrin in *American Historical Review*, 1904, pp. 649-669.—Ed.]

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